AN INTERAGENCY COMMAND FOR HOMELAND PROTECTION: TAKING THE NEXT STEPS TO INTEGRATE DEFENSE AND SECURITY AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

by

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Since September 11, 2001, re-organization within the United States Government has dominated the homeland security agenda. While this strategic focus is required, it has left numerous questions unanswered at the operational level. After four years, these new organizations are still wrestling with fundamental questions that require definitive answers in order to shape an effective homeland security and homeland defense solution. This paper provides an evaluation of the terms "defense" and "security," related interagency perspectives, and recent exercises that highlight operational command and control as a challenge. This review also highlights several inconsistencies that must be addressed before further steps can be taken to streamline an overarching operational construct. Several items are discussed which shape a solution to this interagency command and control problem. Most prominently is the evaluation of pros and cons of an interagency command at the operational level. Further discussions include structure, span of control, leadership, changes to law, duplication of effort, and leveraging other related activities. Recognition of the doctrinal principle of Unity of Command and Unity of Effort, defining the relationship between executive departments, and scoping National Guard involvement frames these discussions. Given the background of U.S. Government restructuring over the past four years, it is clear that the next logical step is integration. This paper recommends the establishment of an Interagency Command to accomplish this integration and provides a notional structure based on the DoD’s combatant command construct. Related recommendations are made in the areas of strategic direction, term definitions, law, doctrine as well as training and education.
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Abstract

Since September 11, 2001, re-organization within the United States Government has dominated the homeland security agenda. While this strategic focus is required, it has left numerous questions unanswered at the operational level. After four years, these new organizations are still wrestling with fundamental questions that require definitive answers in order to shape an effective homeland security and homeland defense solution. This paper provides an evaluation of the terms “defense” and “security,” related interagency perspectives, and recent exercises that highlight operational command and control as a challenge. This review also highlights several inconsistencies that must be addressed before further steps can be taken to streamline an overarching operational construct. Several items are discussed which shape a solution to this interagency command and control problem. Most prominently is the evaluation of pros and cons of an interagency command at the operational level. Further discussions include structure, span of control, leadership, changes to law, duplication of effort, and leveraging other related activities. Recognition of the doctrinal principle of Unity of Command and Unity of Effort, defining the relationship between executive departments, and scoping National Guard involvement frames these discussions. Given the background of U.S. Government restructuring over the past four years, it is clear that the next logical step is integration. This paper recommends the establishment of an Interagency Command to accomplish this integration and provides a notional structure based on the DoD’s combatant command construct. Related recommendations are made in the areas of strategic direction, term definitions, law, doctrine as well as training and education.
**Introduction**

Since September 11, 2001, re-organization within the United States Government (USG) has dominated the homeland security agenda. The most significant of these efforts includes the White House Homeland Security Council (HSC), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), restructuring of the Intelligence Community and changes to the Department of Defense (DoD) unified command plan with the addition of USNORTHCOM. While this strategic focus is required, it has left numerous questions unanswered at the operational level. After four years, these new organizations are still wrestling with fundamental questions that require definitive answers in order to shape an effective Homeland Security and Homeland Defense solution.

This paper begins with an evaluation of the current understanding related to the difference between Homeland Security (HS) and Homeland Defense (HD). Additionally, other interagency perspectives and exercises have highlighted operational command and control as a challenge given the number of organizations involved. This review highlights several inconsistencies that must be addressed before further steps can be taken to streamline an overarching United States Government (USG) operational construct.

In order to identify recommendations, several items are discussed which shape a solution to this interagency command and control problem. Most prominently is the evaluation of pros and cons of an interagency command at the operational level. Further discussions include structure, span of control, leadership, changes to law, duplication of effort, and leveraging other related activities. Framing this discussion is recognition of the doctrinal principle of unity of command and unity of effort, defining the relationship between DHS and DoD, and scoping National Guard involvement.
Given the background of USG restructuring over the past four years, it is clear that the next logical step is integration. From a DoD perspective, the National Military Strategy articulates protection of the United States as the military’s first priority. Coupled with the best C2 and a preponderance of assets, the DoD is best equipped to provide the cornerstone for this integration. This paper recommends the establishment of an Interagency Command (IACOM) to accomplish this integration based on the shaping considerations discussed previously. A notional structure is discussed that leverages information and suggestions from previous research papers. Furthermore, this command should recognize key supporting activities/elements of the DHS and the Department of Justice (DoJ) and elevate the role of the National Guard. Finally, related recommendations are made in the areas of strategic direction, term definitions, law, doctrine as well as training and education.

**Background – The Need for Change**

*Defense & Security Defined.* A critical issue framing the debate about how to best structure organizational roles and missions to protect the homeland/nation is defining the difference between HD and HS. Which of these activities has precedence?, are they co-equal or mutually supporting? Does HD transition to HS at some “to be defined” interface or does HD denote military activities whereas HS denotes civil “law enforcement” activities? Previous research has argued that “one can logically derive that defense follows security, as defense is now required because the security effort failed.” However, Hoopen’s review of current related organizational mission statements suggests one “does not follow the other” and that “in actuality, they are two operational concepts that should be ongoing simultaneously.” Clearly, there is still a debate regarding the interpretation of these terms.
The careful selection of terms and clear articulation of missions is best accomplished by a review of dictionary definitions and a consistent application of its terminology. The *American Heritage Dictionary* defines defense as the “the act of defending against attack, danger, or injury…a means or method of defending or protecting.”\(^5\) Whereas the term security is defined as “measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage, sabotage, or attack.”\(^6\) The, DoD further refines the definition of security as “measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness.” However, regardless of the definitions, Roget’s thesaurus recognizes that defense and security are mutually synonymous words,\(^7\) a key point highlighted by the fact that the word “protection” in the definition of defense is synonymous with “giving or assuring safety” in the definition of security.

It is likely that this similarity in terms causes a lot of confusion. For missions requiring the integration of security and defense functions the USG might be better off using a common term like protection. The dictionary defines protection as “to keep from being damaged, attacked, stolen, or injured.”\(^8\) This definition adequately captures the essence of both defense and security as it relates to the HD and HS missions. Using a neutral word such as protection would enable all participating organizations to provide unbiased involvement in this critical national security mission, unhampered by organizational title references such as Department of Defense or Department of Homeland Security.\(^9\) Throughout this paper the term Homeland Protection (HP) will be used to identify the overarching mission covered by both HS and HD (see Appendix A, Figure 1d).

*Strategic Direction.* Further compounding the confusion of terminology are the multiple sources of strategic direction. Shortly after the events of September 11\(^{th}\), President Bush
established a new interagency coordination body, the Homeland Security Council (HSC), that is modeled after the long established National Security Council (NSC). While most likely created to highlight the USG’s emphasis on HS, the creation of the HSC has frustrated the DoD given the NSC’s traditional role of dealing with both domestic and foreign security issues. Additionally, duplicity of effort with the NSC was evident almost immediately, with HSC membership growing to a point where now organizational composition is duplicative and includes all NSC members even though not mandated by the Executive Order. On more than one occasion the Presidential Directives published by the HSC and NSC have been the same (i.e. NSPD-17/HSPD-4 and NSPD-41/HSPD-13). As pointed out by Klippstein, “maintaining two distinct decision forums requires narrowly defined, homeland security specific actions to be separated from those of a broader national security nature.” Since the NSC can include the DHS and is already well established it is clearly the “best forum to conduct interagency coordination given its holistic view of foreign and domestic strategic choices and risks.”

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America is clearly the overarching strategic document addressing strategies for both domestic and foreign security. As stated in the NSS, “defending our nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the federal government.” This commitment is articulated in the NSS with specific chapters addressing the prevention of attacks, preventing enemies from threatening us with weapons of mass destruction, and transforming America’s national security institutions. Furthermore, the NSS recognizes that protecting the homeland requires a layered defense that need not be sequential, but rather includes direct continuous foreign action to identify and destroy threats before they reach our borders.
Given this framework, it follows that a National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) should be a derivative of the NSS just like the documents on National Defense and Military Strategy. However, the NSHS is signed by the President and addresses both DHS and DoD responsibilities for HP. In the document, DoD is recognized as contributing to HP through “its military missions overseas, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities.”\(^{18}\) Furthermore, this document recognizes a vital need for intergovernmental coordination “on a scale never before seen in the United States,” and discusses some approaches for vertical integration with state and local agencies. However, with a stated purpose “to mobilize and organize our Nation to secure the US homeland from terrorist attacks,” when it comes to horizontal integration (i.e. within each level of government) the document sorely lacks a strategy for ensuring Unity of Effort or Unity of Command.\(^ {19}\)

_Homeland Defense Definition & Structure._ The current state of flux within the DoD on defining HD, articulating joint doctrine and finalizing organizational responsibilities also serves to delay progress. The Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security, JP 3-26, has been in final coordination format since March of 2004. This key document provides fundamental principles and doctrine to guide US Armed Forces in the conduct of HS missions. It articulates HD as the “protection of US territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression” and recognizes the DoD as the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for HD.\(^ {20}\) However, confusion is introduced in how DoD defines HD as a sub-mission area of HS along with Civil Support (CS) while also articulating that the DoD HS focus is broader than the national HS focus on terrorist threats (see Appendix A, Figure 1).\(^ {21}\) Additionally, DoD serves in a supporting role to other agencies when performing CS missions defined as “support to civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities.”\(^ {22}\)
Providing supervision for all DoD HD activities is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD(HD)) within the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The ASD(HD) ensures internal coordination of DoD policy direction, assists the SecDef in providing guidance to the combatant commanders for HD and CS, and conducts coordination with DHS.\(^{23}\) Responsible for advocating the department’s budget for HD, interfacing with DHS and establishing policy guidance for the cornerstone of the National Military Strategy, ASD(HD) seems drastically understaffed with only 65 DoD employees.\(^{24}\) Furthermore, ASD(HD) officials have articulated that DoD’s principle role in HD “is to attack the enemies of the United States where they live, as opposed to letting them attack us where we live”\(^{25}\) thereby highlighting that DoD’s primary HD focus is overseas versus within the homeland.

As the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) tasked with “protecting Americans where they live and work,” USNORTHCOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) covers the United States, Alaska, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Atlantic/Pacific Ocean approaches.\(^{26}\) USNORTHCOM operationally implements HD for the DoD through a seamless HD approach that includes air and space, maritime, land, and force projection forces.\(^{27}\) Additionally, USNORTHCOM is responsible for making military forces available to civil agencies at the federal, state and local levels in support of CS missions.\(^{28}\) However, interesting to note is the Command’s recognition that interagency integration is “the domestic dimension necessary to ensuring the defense and security of the homeland” and that they possess a core competency in the ability to provide interagency information management and sharing.\(^{29}\)

With a mission to “conduct operations to deter, prevent and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States,”\(^{30}\) USNORTHCOM is the LFA as well as the supported commander for HD. However, the definition of threats in this mission statement does not directly include
terrorism, which is treated as a law enforcement issue involving DHS along with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. A similar interpretation was also applied to combating drugs until Congress and the President declared them a threat to National Security in 1989 and increased the scope of military involvement. The similarities between drug cartels/criminals and terror groups/terrorists warrants further review since it may modify the way we handle terrorist threats. However, in limited situations command and control mechanisms have been established to enable the military to take direct action against terrorists, as in the case of a potential repeat of 9/11 forcing air defense forces to shoot down a civilian airliner. Given this precedence, modifications to the definition of LFA responsibilities are clearly up for further debate and review.

Additional combatant commands play a significant role in supporting and/or leading HD related activities. With two of the 50 states falling in its AOR, U.S. PACOM is the supported commander for HD missions and responsible for CS planning within its AOR. Additionally, USSTRATCOM is responsible for global missile defense operations and support that must be fully coordinated with all the combatant commanders and clearly supports USNORTHCOM’s HD mission. More recently, the SecDef has assigned USSTRATCOM the mission of interdicting and eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and related materials with guidance to all combatant commanders to support the command’s development, integration and synchronization of capabilities. This action directly supports the focus on counterproliferation outlined in the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. However, this places in question who will be responsible for interdicting these types of threats to the homeland. Will it be USNORTHCOM as LFA for HD or USSTRATCOM as supported commander for WMD interdiction? Furthermore, USSOUTHCOM serves as a supporting
command to USNORTHCOM for HD with a principle function to detect and monitor drug trafficking activities in transit zones toward the U.S. and provide warning and hand-off of these threats.\textsuperscript{38}

\textit{Homeland Security Definition \& Structure}. As discussed in the NSHS, “homeland security” has come to mean various things to many people and is now recognized as a new term. In an attempt to add clarification, the NSHS provides this federal government definition:

“Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur”

The NSHS places special emphasis on preventing, protecting against, and preparing for catastrophic threats.\textsuperscript{39} The DHS lists seven strategic goals in their 2003 strategic plan, four of these, prevention, protection, response and recovery, support the NSHS.\textsuperscript{40} Under the prevention goal, DHS recognizes that it also has a lead role along with USNORTHCOM in securing the borders against terrorists, illegal drugs and other illegal activity.\textsuperscript{41}

It is enlightening to note that a variety of nongovernmental groups have studied the issue of reorganizing the executive branch to address homeland security. Although these commissions ultimately influenced the President and Congress in establishing the HSC and the DHS, their articulation of a few deeper issues is worth noting. First, all noted a need for better coordination among departments as well as integration of foreign and domestic activities.\textsuperscript{42} Second, the Gilmore Commission stated that the “organization of the federal government’s programs is fragmented, uncoordinated, and politically unaccountable.”\textsuperscript{43} Although the HSC and DHS may partially address the uncoordinated and politically unaccountable questions, it is hard to see how the creation of additional organizations fixes fragmentation. Furthermore, countering the creation of additional organizations and the need for centralized strategic direction was
recognized by the Hart-Rudman Commission, who concluded that the NSC “would still play a strategic role in planning and coordinating homeland security activities.”

The DHS faces many challenges as it brings together 22 separate federal entities with HS missions. Most importantly is the recognition that DHS must continue to ensure execution of the non-homeland security missions of its various elements. It must develop coordination and streamlining relations with all federal, state and local government agencies involved in the HS mission as well as play the central role in implementing the NSHS. Furthermore, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with its National Incident Management System (NIMS), the U.S. Border Patrol and the United States Coast Guard (USCG), all entities of DHS, provide critical operational HS functions.

Several other federal entities have HS responsibilities, to include the Department of Justice (DoJ), the Department of Agriculture (DoA), the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). As the head of DoJ, the Attorney General leads our nation’s law enforcement, to include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in efforts to detect, prevent and investigate terrorist activity within the United States. The DoA’s Food Safety Inspection and Agricultural Research Services helps to prevent agroterrorism, while the DHHS provides critical expertise related to bioterrorism through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health. Lastly, the CIA heads the National Terrorist Threat Integration Center and plays a key role in collecting and analyzing all information regarding potential terrorist threats. This diversity of organizations highlights the complexity related to establishing effective coordination for unity of effort, let alone any attempt to orchestrate operational control through unity of command.
Interagency Perspectives. Although the federal government may have the right organizations to respond to the multitude of incidents that might occur, it still lacks an effective command and control structure. As early as 1999, research recognized that no clear operational organization existed for efficient command and control as well as effective response to the threat of terrorism with chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Efforts discussed in this paper to date have yet to address the command and control while focusing on improving coordination to side step this critical issue. Although the designation of LFAs and identification of supporting/supported relationships takes a step in the right direction, it is no substitute for clear articulation of command relationships. Perhaps some of this difficulty lies in the fact that there is no equivalent within the other executive departments of the federal government to the operational combatant command structure of the DoD.

The DoD is also wrestling with efforts to streamline interagency coordination that should help improve the effectiveness of unity of effort at all levels, but particularly at the operational level considered in this paper. The cornerstone joint publication that provides authoritative guidance on this issue, Joint Pub 3-08, Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations, has been under final revision since April 2004. This document outlines the interagency environment and describes how to best achieve coordination between the combatant commands and other agencies of the federal government and nongovernmental organizations during unified actions. Although the new draft does clarify how to organize for successful coordination given recent federal government organizational changes, it still highlights that:

“A coordinated and integrated effort between the joint force and other government agencies, NGOs, and IGOs should not be equated to the command and control of a military operation. Military operations depend upon a command structure that is often very different from that of civilian organizations. These differences may present significant challenges to coordination efforts. The various
USG agencies’ different, and sometimes conflicting, goals, policies, procedures, and decision making techniques make unity of effort a challenge.”

A review comment sheet indicates finalization of the draft is pending a new National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on interagency coordination, however, the author has found no other reference to this activity.

The USG’s experience in combating drugs provides another related perspective that should be leveraged in combating these threats to HS. Mary Beth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counter Narcotics, says it would be wrong to say that combating drugs is the same as combating terrorism, however there are lessons from the war on drugs that are applicable. Many of the organizations involved in combating drugs, such as the FBI, U.S. Coast Guard, CIA and various combatant commands, are also involved in other HS missions. Furthermore, Long indicates that international terrorists are establishing links with the drug community with evidence of financial links in both the Madrid bombings and terrorist activities in Afghanistan. This symbiotic relationship may work to the U.S.’s advantage as combating drug smuggling networks may also combat terrorism, however these well-developed networks also create the greatest challenge for detection and afford the terrorists a potentially easy route into the United States.

The need for some type of drastic change has also been recognized at the highest levels of the DoD. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, USMC, commented at a Marine Corps Association Forum in September 2004 that although our interagency system allows us to “tee-up” issues for the President, once the President decides to do something our government goes back into stovepipes for execution. He went on to highlight the possible need for a Goldwater-Nichols-like Act for the interagency communities to bring together DoD, DHS, DoJ, etc., and create a new level of efficiency just as the DoD Act created
jointness within the military. He also questioned the need to have both an NSC and HSC given their significant overlap in responsibilities, and also evaluated how the DoD is organized, trained, equipped, and legally postured for operations in the United States.

Recent exercises conducted in the summer of 2003 also identified vulnerabilities in the nation’s domestic incident management capability. As a Congressionally mandated national terrorism exercise, Top Officials 2 (TOPOFF 2) was “the largest and most comprehensive terrorism response exercise ever conducted in the U.S.”\textsuperscript{57} TOPOFF 2 was the first opportunity for DHS to implement its Principle Federal Official (PFO) concept to “provide integrated communications and coordinated action planning.”\textsuperscript{58} Although the report documented that the PFO was well received in all venues, the exercise highlighted the need for a dedicated staff with the ability to support the administrative and functional aspects of the emergency in question. Furthermore, although it was noted that the PFO has the potential to assist in coordination among all the federal activities, the roles and responsibilities need to be clarified with respect to other on scene commanders such as the FBI Special Agent in Charge, the FEMA Regional Director (RD), and the Federal Coordination Officer (FCO).\textsuperscript{59} This further highlights the lack of an established command and control structure as well as the necessity for exercises to identify interagency integration issues.

\textbf{Shaping an Interagency Solution}

\textit{Pros of a Centralized Interagency Command}. Just like the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 (GWNA) streamlined the operational chain of command from the President through the SecDef to the unified combatant commanders and created jointness,\textsuperscript{60} a centralized interagency command should result in similar positive outcomes. Since 1986, the GWNA has changed the way DoD operates with joint operations, from Desert Storm to
Operation Iraqi Freedom, now the norm. The idea of creating “interagency-ness” would elevate the recognition that several components of the federal government provide unique contributions to HP much like the individual services (i.e. Army, Air Force, etc.) provide unique contributions in joint warfare.

Central to establishing the unified action of Armed Forces is the concepts of *unity of effort* and *unity of command*. As discussed in joint doctrine, unity of effort “requires coordination among government departments and agencies,” while “unity of command is central to unity of effort.” It is inferred from doctrine that unity of command is a preferred condition yet recognized as not achievable outside military channels, primarily due to the involvement of NGO’s. However, HP operations will primarily involve other government organizations that could be placed under a single chain-of-command structure. The attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon reaffirmed the role of the federal government as protector of the United States against foreign aggression. Given the recognition of this primary role in the current National Military Strategy, DoD must consider the employment of forces in ways previously considered outside the scope of operations. Any analysis of federal organizational strengths will clearly identify that DoD offers *unity of command* as a core competency that, according to doctrine, will ensure operational *unity of effort* in any HP mission.

A key advantage to establishing a centralized operational command is to reduce or eliminate duplication of effort. In his review of the Posse Comitatus Act, Tomisek highlights that almost every federal department has offices or subordinate agencies with a role in HS. Furthermore, each of these agencies continues to independently evaluate their organizational structures to ensure they are organized in the best way to support the NSHS. Although improvements are inevitable, organizing each stovepipe does not address the horizontal
integration of organizations that would highlight duplication of effort. Command and control overlaps and disagreements discussed previously are just one example of the confusion that can be generated by this duplication. Another dimension to duplication is identifying who will lead and who will support various mission areas. Although DoD has the ability to support all homeland security missions, it is necessary to identify which are enduring missions as well as those that the department is suited to backstop another agency. Likewise, studies have suggested that some mission areas require establishing capabilities that currently do not exist within departments. This analysis must occur across all departments in an interagency fashion to prevent duplication and waste of scarce resources. A centralized operational command would, by definition, clarify these conflicting roles and ensure that the various agencies were delivering their critical operational contributions.

Finally, an operational command will ensure continuity during operations. Part of the problem in the defense versus security definition is the need to establish an operational boundary. Just as the military has a fire support coordination line to establish boundaries of responsibility on the battlefield, so too should the DoD and other executive departments identify boundaries that may impact operational effectiveness. Boundaries driven by organization or function require specific mechanisms for integration. The mechanism used in DoD was a unified combatant command. Given there is no other known solution to this type of problem, an equivalent interagency command could be chartered with addressing these organizational and functional boundary layers to ensure continuity of operations.

**Cons of a Centralized Interagency Command.** Multiple counter-arguments also exist to establishing an operational interagency command, to include recognition that coordination is more important than organizational structure. The Center for Strategic and International Studies
highlighted that there is “broad agreement that some central office is needed to coordinate the federal effort…and to coordinate [an] emergency response capability.” However, their review did not recognize the need to establish an operational element such as this paper articulates. Additionally, an evaluation of other interagency coordination activities recognized that while improving the interagency process through increased cooperation is necessary, reorganization might not help the situation and instead might make it worse. This is an inherent recognition that after four years of rather significant federal organizational changes, perhaps the best short-term course of action is non-organizational adjustments to the existing structure.

Another negative to centralizing operational command of HP objectives is due to the lack of mission definitions, and the challenges of integrating federal, state and local agencies that may be beyond the abilities of one command. In an article discussing the role of DoD in HS, Erckenbrack and Scholer give their opinion that “defense implies deterrence and/or response whereas security is more comprehensive.” Given this perspective, they argue for keeping DoD away from any capstone role and/or acting as a first responder. However, they do recognize DoD’s inherent capacity to improve homeland security on the federal, state and local levels and to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or large explosive events. Finally, the author has found no literature that would support a conclusion that the successes of service integration through the GWNA can be scaled to the level of integration required to bring the executive departments together to perform the HP mission.

Further detracting from a centralized solution involving multiple departments is the recognition that most of the threats to the homeland are dealt with as normal law enforcement activities. This is true even in cases involving foreign threats and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has argued it does not make sense to change these arrangements.
They further contend that previous statistics on terrorism need to be kept in perspective when allocating resources given potentially greater national challenges in other mission areas such as violent crime. For example, in just the first six months of 1999 over 47,000 casualties occurred from murder, rape and assault in 47 of the United States largest cities.\textsuperscript{75} These higher probability threats highlight why law enforcement activities cannot focus on dealing with low probability issues like terrorism until there is a clearer threat identified.\textsuperscript{76} If these nontraditional threats continue to be recognized as primarily a law enforcement responsibility, then centralization at the federal level may not benefit from a DoD lead role.

Finally, it is argued that DoD has enough missions and DHS has the lead responsibility for the HS mission. Recognizing this concern, DoD carefully worded the current definition of HD and furthermore noted that the US defense structure cannot afford a definition that piles on every conceivable threat or which does not consider priorities.\textsuperscript{77} Recent efforts to focus the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review also highlights this challenge by giving greater weight to the role of other federal agencies, NGO’s, and coalition partners in dealing with SecDef Rumsfeld’s four strategic problems, which includes the military’s role in Homeland Security.\textsuperscript{78} However, it is recognized that while the DoD must have partners from other agencies who are able to operate alongside it, “there is a big gap between what is needed and what exists in terms of operational capacity outside DoD.”\textsuperscript{79}

\textit{Span of Control and Structural Considerations.} The author believes integrating the current scope defined by the definitions of HD and HS, into a concept of Homeland Protection, will adequately capture the operational span of control for this interagency command. As in the case of a combatant commander, an interagency commander must be assigned operational
responsibility for those missions spanning the breadth of HP within the assigned AOR and, as directed by the President, should carry out specific functions to include:

- Authoritative direction to subordinate interagency elements
- Prescribe the chain of command
- Organize commands and interagency elements within the command necessary to carry out the assigned missions
- Employ interagency elements as necessary to carry out command missions
- Assign command functions to subordinate interagency elements

In order to focus the interagency command, traditional AOR definitions used by the existing GCCs along with clearly defined supported and supporting relationships must be used. Additionally, other federal entities that provide supported and supporting missions must be integrated into the command to ensure unity of effort and unity of command.

In addition to span of control, the structure of the command must recognize both links to strategic and tactical elements. Strategically, direction should flow from the NSC and President in a similar fashion to the way the current combatant commanders receive strategic direction from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and SecDef. Interfaces to tactical elements will be significantly more complicated but should accommodate assigned assets from the various executive departments in a manner similar to the way combatant commanders are assigned assets by the military departments under the unified command plan (see Appendix A, Figure 2). Furthermore, the interagency command should be assigned the lead for HP planning that will require identifying apportioned interagency assets required to facilitate this process in a manner consistent with the DoD’s Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

Based on the diversity and scope of functions required to perform HP, there is clearly a need for both a physical and an organizational command structure. At its core, the interagency
command should have a well-defined structure that physically integrates key elements of the critical executive departments into an operational interagency command. These key elements, in the author’s view, include the DoD and the DHS with its relative subordinate units, but could also include the DoJ and the Department of Health and Human Services. The organizational element of this command structure must recognize the distributed nature of these federal agencies and subordinate units, as well as the associated state and federal elements vital to the HP mission.

**Legal Considerations.** A detailed evaluation of the legal ramifications related to establishing an interagency command are beyond the scope of this research paper, however a few specific legal issues are worth noting, the most significant of which is the Posse Comitatus Act. Although “many in uniform believe this act precludes the use of U.S. military assets in domestic security operations,” erosion of the prohibitions has made the act more a “procedural formality than an actual impediment to the use of military force in homeland defense.”\(^{82}\) While recognizing that Congress has established numerous exceptions to this act, the USNORTHCOM website emphasizes “operating with the law” and articulates the general prohibitions still in effect against active duty military personnel performing “active” functions such as interdiction, search, pursuit and seizure against civilians.\(^{83}\) Use of the military in HP missions should consider the expanded use of the military in antidrug law enforcement as approved by Congress (10 U.S.C., sections 371-381) as well as the approved use of the military in civil law enforcement based on the Civil Disturbance Statutes (10 U.S.C., sections 331-334).\(^{84}\) Additionally, development of plans to use the military in HP operations must recognize that, regardless of any act restricting their use, the U.S. Constitution provides the President with the right and duty to preserve federal functions.\(^{85}\) As pointed out by Trebilcock in the Myth of Posse
Comitatus, “it is difficult to think of a domestic terrorism scenario of sizable scale under which use of the military could not be lawfully justified in view of the [Posse Comitatus] act’s erosion.”

Another legal consideration that will shape any solution is the employment of the National Guard. The National Guard can be employed under multiple levels of command depending on the mission. Under state active duty status they fall under the command of the governor, are paid by the state, and can support law enforcement activities. At the other extreme, under Title 10, they fall under command of the President, are federally paid, and are restricted from supporting law enforcement just like active duty military personnel. However, in between these two employment extremes is Title 32, in which the federal government pays for training and the state controls the forces thereby allowing continued use in law enforcement. However, this scheme constrains employment of the National Guard in an integrated command given that control is retained by the state governors. State control has long been a tenant of the Guard, recognizing that “the Constitution preserves the rights and powers of states by explicitly enumerating the powers of the federal government and declaring that all others are reserved to the states.” However, use of the Guard in HP is essential given their close working relationship with multiple organizations at the state level, which can help ensure unity of effort. The challenge is to find a way to maintain the Guard’s state command relationships as well as law enforcement capabilities while integrating them at the federal level to enhance unity of command.

Other laws have been enacted that specifically limit the range of possible organizational solutions to HP missions. Specifically, section 876 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 strictly prohibits the DHS from directing or controlling military activity. This specific section was added at the request of the DoD to ensure that direct control of all military assets, with the
exception of the U.S. Coast Guard, remain with the SecDef in accordance with U.S.C. Title 10.\textsuperscript{91} While the desire to maintain unity of command within each executive department is admirable, the need to seek cross-department unity of command must also be recognized. Given that all executive departments are under the direct control of the President, this legal constraint may be obviated depending on the organizational solution employed to ensure integration and unity of command.

\textit{Deciding Who Would be in Charge}. The discussion of who leads clearly needs to focus less on \textit{who’s in charge} and more on \textit{what they’re in charge of} given the diversity of HP missions.\textsuperscript{92} As pointed out by Cordesman from CSIS, “no matter what the solution, no federal approach can hope to develop a system that will truly be ready to deal with such threats and attacks when they actually emerge.”\textsuperscript{93} There is also an assumption that creating the correct organization chart and assigning responsibilities will somehow integrate the various federal capabilities required to deal with this threat.\textsuperscript{94} However, until a command and control structure is defined, implemented, and fully exercised, the weaknesses will not be identified and the potential for the federal government to improve on an integrated solution will not occur.

Given the earlier discussion of the National Guard, it has been suggested that they offer a potential command solution with capabilities not yet sufficiently leveraged at the federal level. While a National Guard officer has been assigned as the chief of staff for USNORTHCOM, it is possible that the vital role the Guard plays will advocate for placing the Command under a four-star National Guard general.\textsuperscript{95} Since there are 54 National Guard units (49 of which have state area and numbered troops commands) representing the 50 states as well as Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Washington D.C., the Guard has the inherent ability to interact throughout the Homeland Protection AOR with all state and territorial governors.\textsuperscript{96} These
existing state commands, coupled with involvement at the federal level through USNORTHCOM, highlights the Guard’s ability to integrate federal and state responsibilities and makes them a logical choice to lead any proposed interagency command.

Looking at the breadth and depth of U.S. military capabilities along with its primary responsibility to “protect the United States,” it appears logical that the DoD role should be one of leadership not support. The DoD already plays a significant role in HP, from its preemptive activities overseas to its robust consequence management here at home. However, “executive directives and congressional legislation have focused on using domestic civil response capabilities as the primary tool while assigning the military a supporting role.” As one observer argues, “there is no other federal agency that has the experience in planning and executing missions” of the magnitude required to provide homeland protection.

Leveraging other Models. Numerous studies of HD and HS have been conducted that highlight various interagency command concepts, to include evaluation of other countries approaches. Given their focus on internal security, Israel is an excellent case study that reveals the role of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) as the lead for guaranteeing their national security since the countries inception in 1948. The role of domestic defense in Israel comes under one of the IDF’s regional commands known as the Home Front Command. This command has three responsibilities: prepare civil defense forces for emergencies; create a central command for all military and emergency forces; and serve as the primary authority for civil defense. With these responsibilities, it is clear that the Israeli model places a premium on unity of command that does not exist within the U.S. structure. The IDF’s lead role in Israel’s Homeland Protection provides precedence for increasing the DoD’s role in Homeland Protection that should be further evaluated.
Any command solution should also leverage the DoD’s defense-in-depth concept by ensuring appropriate integration of other supporting organizational elements. This concept, discussed in the National Military Strategy, is a layered strategy in which:

“the first line of defense is abroad and includes mutually supporting activities with US allies to counter threats closer to their source. As the threats get closer to home, the Armed Forces use capabilities to secure strategic air, land, sea and space approaches to the U.S. and its territory. Lastly, when directed, the Armed Forces employ military capabilities at home to protect the nation, the domestic population and critical infrastructure from direct attack.”

This strategy recognizes that meeting the new threats to HP requires not just a good defense but also a good offense. However, offense in this context does not mean only military force but rather the entire spectrum of military and nonmilitary capabilities. Furthermore, this strategy should be expanded upon with inclusion of four additional tiers: perimeter defense to keep out dangerous people and objects; domestic prevention to stop threats from operating freely within the United States; protection of critical targets that pose a risk of mass casualties or series economic harm; and, consequence management to reduce the toll from any attack that may still occur.

Finally, the development of operational linkages should leverage evaluations of the components mission area organizations. Focusing on the maritime domain, Hoopen articulates a command and control structure between DoD and DHS elements, namely the Navy and Coast Guard, to simultaneously deter and prevent attacks in and through this medium. In his review he further articulates how organizational constructs “begin to get cloudy” given the unclear artificial boundary established between security and defense. Similar efforts in the air, land and sea domains should be performed to support operational to tactical refinement of these command relationships.


Recommendations

Provided with the previous discussions on the need for change as well as the elements that should shape an interagency solution, this section articulates a possible construct for an Interagency Command (IACOM). From the authors’ perspective, USNORTHCOM provides the only realistic starting point for establishing an IACOM. Although key contributions for this unique command should come from the DoD, DHS and DoJ, other supporting relationships are also required. Also discussed are some related recommendations that should help facilitate the establishment of an IACOM and ensure success.

An Operational Interagency Command. The basic structure for an IACOM has already been laid out in the joint doctrine through the identification of a combatant command structure (see Appendix A, Figure 2). As shown, modification of the Joint Publication 0-2 (JP 0-2) structure with executive agencies in place of services, the NSC in place of the JCS, and associated interagency elements in place of service/component elements constitutes the notional command structure. Critical to establishing this type of layout is the identification and/or development of interagency elements that are aligned with the IACOM. The next section will discuss each of the executive department’s key contributions in this regard. Additionally, specific interagency task forces for operational missions will come from existing executive department task forces, such as DoD’s Joint Task Force–North (JTF-North) that is already aligned with USNORTHCOM and FEMA’s regional elements that are already aligned with DHS.

Establishing the command will also require an interagency staff structure to facilitate normal command related functions and integrate the necessary executive departments and agencies. As with a combatant command, these basic functions include personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, planning, and command, control, communications and computers. In
previous research on an interagency command, Watkins discussed in detail the organizations that should be involved as well as a proposed structure for the staff elements of this IACOM.\textsuperscript{110} She also discusses the vital administrative roles of the special staff that must support the commander, such as the public affairs, legislative liaison and inspector general.\textsuperscript{111} To standup an IACOM effectively, the command should consider Watkins’ internal staff structure recommendations as well as her identified external players and their lead/supporting roles on the staff. This command would resolve DoD versus DHS LFA based on unity of effort with the IACOM reporting to directly to the POTUS for operations and receiving support elements from executive department secretaries.

\textit{Key Supporting Activities.} The key supporting elements of this IACOM come from a triad of existing executive departments, i.e. the DoD, the DHS, and the DoJ. The DoD has already established the basic shell for this IACOM through the stand-up of USNORTHCOM on October 1, 2002 with a typical JP 0-2 combatant command structure.\textsuperscript{112} With three solid years of organizational development already completed, this operational command has already developed the necessary interagency links required to grow into a fully functioning IACOM. Furthermore, the DoD’s combatant command structure already enables deliberate and crisis planning that are essential functions for this IACOM. In addition to the existing staff, JTF-North and JTF-Civil Support could provide the initial interagency task force elements, and the already assigned air, land, and sea elements would provide the DoD interagency components. Finally, given the Command’s already established lead role for Homeland Defense and support role for Civil Support missions, the focus can shift to integrating the operational functions of DHS and DoJ thereby minimizing the IACOMs stand-up.
Given its charter as the LFA for Homeland Security, DHS is a vital partner in the successful stand-up and operation of an IACOM for Homeland Protection. The DHS must provide a significant portion of the IACOMs staff personnel as well as identify key interagency component elements aligned to the command. As a minimum, the operational component elements should include the Coast Guard, as well as relevant border and transportation security organizations such as the US Border Patrol.\textsuperscript{113} As a minimum, task force elements should include the FEMA operation centers. Merging these critical elements of DHS with the DoD elements discussed previously will establish an effective operational defense-in-depth continuum for HP. By maintaining unity of command over this continuum, the IACOM can execute all necessary sub-missions, from prevention to consequence management, by tasking appropriate interagency components and task force elements (see Appendix A, Figure 1d).

The final key supporting activity is the DoJ with its vital role in providing law enforcement functions associated with HP. The DoJ’s key interagency command element/task force element(s) will be the assignment of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and its associated 66 JTTFs located nationwide.\textsuperscript{114} These JTTFs should be integrated operationally at the state level with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) headquarters to enhance unity of effort down at the state level for protection and defeat related missions. Integrating counterterrorism responsibilities at the operational level should also resolve supporting and supported roles by enabling a single command to determine operational requirements while allowing the executive departments to focus on organizing, training and equipping necessary elements.

\textit{Other Supporting Activities.} Other reforms within the federal government must also be considered in establishing an IACOM for HP. Central to this effort are the organizational
linkages required to ensure effective support from the Intelligence Community. Based on the current Administrations efforts to strengthen intelligence, the National Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) along with the FBIs Counterterrorism Division and the CIA's Counterterrorist Center have been collocated.\textsuperscript{115} This collocated intelligence activity should be operationally aligned with the IACOM to provide necessary intelligence support for related missions. Additionally, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 should be used as an opportunity for the IACOM to work with the new National Intelligence Director to facilitate any further organizational changes deemed necessary to guarantee Intelligence Community integration with the IACOM.

At the tactical level, the DoD’s Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) should be structured to facilitate operational-to-tactical execution of the HP mission. The JTF-North mentioned earlier should be expanded to an interagency task force like JIATF-S and JIATF-W and additional JIATFs should be established within all of the GCCs.\textsuperscript{116} All of the JIATFs should be assigned a common mission for their AOR, to include, as a minimum, drug interdiction and counterterrorism. Although aligned with their respective GCCs, JIATFs other than JTF-North should be assigned supporting roles to the IACOM in order to ensure unity of effort.

Other than the executive department contributions already noted, the NGB and its state headquarters will be the most influential element of this IACOM. As noted by the current Chief of the NGB, “the Guard is eminently suited for [homeland defense and homeland security] because it’s already forward deployed nationwide.”\textsuperscript{117} As the “first military responders”\textsuperscript{118} within the CONUS, the adjutants general within each state and territory are standing up provisional joint force headquarters (JFHQ). These JFHQs can provide a command and control capability at the state level for either the governor or the IACOM.\textsuperscript{119} Given their close
interaction with agencies at the state and local level, the Guard provides an excellent structure to establish interagency elements with tactical control within the IACOM.

Lastly, the roles and responsibilities of the DoD functional and geographic combatant commands must be clarified given the stand-up of an IACOM. To provide the requisite defense-in-depth, these commands must support the IACOM through command center coordination as well as assigning subordinate units such as the JIATFs mentioned earlier. In addition, as STRATCOM’s role in WMD intervention is solidified, the IACOM must work closely with this command to develop the HP approach to this threat. Lastly, JFCOM’s ability to provide training and doctrinal support should not be overlooked as an asset to use in standing up an IACOM.

Reach Back Capabilities. Coordination with other command elements will be an essential function required of the IACOM given the Command’s role in linking strategic direction and tactical execution. From a strategic perspective, the command must link directly to the White House Situation Room, Presidential Emergency Operations Center and other command and control elements necessary to receive direction directly from the President. The IACOM must also establish connectivity and relationships with the DoD’s National Military Command Center, DHSs Homeland Security Operations Center, and DoJs National Terrorism Task Force Command Center. This horizontal ring of connectivity should enable coordination and facilitate execution of requirements not identified by the IACOM through deliberate planning activities. However, this coordination should not substitute for the pre-established vertical command and control arrangements with the assigned interagency elements. To do so would risk losing the unity of command established by creating the IACOM.

Related Recommendations. This section identifies some additional considerations that would enable or enhance stand-up of an IACOM for Homeland Protection.
Strategic Direction: In the event that the HSC is subsumed to the NSC, as discussed in this paper, then the NSHS should be signed out by an executive department head similar to the National Defense Strategy. This would help by clarifying equivalent roles of HS and HD, therefore establishing just one coordinating body, i.e. the NSC, for an IACOM.

Definitions: The NSC should clarify the difference between HS and HD with the use of a neutral all-inclusive term like HP. This clarification is required to help eliminate interagency self-generated friction that results from trying to define appropriate roles and responsibilities at mission boundary lines. By implementing and IACOM that has complete mission authority over HP, operational issues can be rapidly resolved by the established unity of effort and chain of command.

Law: Revise the Posse Comitatus Act to formally recognize the allowed use of the military in law enforcement functions across all HP missions under the control and direction of the President. The stand-up of an IACOM would provide the chain of command necessary to ensure unity of command for use of military forces in any required mission. Second, based on other countries use of defense capabilities for HP, evaluate legal changes required to place state and local law enforcement under federal control. Lastly, review Title 10 and Title 32 Guard application for incorporation of an intermediate Title allowing Guard integration into federal activities to ensure unity of command while retaining law enforcement capabilities inherent under state control.

Doctrine: Establish and/or finalize HD and HS Doctrine within each executive department involved with HP. In order to streamline this process, the NSC should lead this effort with the development of a set of publications for HP. This would eliminate duplication of
publications within each department. In the interim, a serious effort should be made to finalize and publish DoD related doctrine, mainly JP 3-26 and JP 3-08.

Training & Education: Organizational changes are no substitute for the essential training and education that must occur between federal, state and local authorities. As pointed out in the CSIS study on defining homeland defense, “no amount of task forces, coordinating bodies, and reorganization can substitute for a lack of investment in the proper training, facilities, and equipment.” Just as TOPOFF was used to argue in this paper for unity of command through an IACOM, future interagency exercises must be conducted to argue for further improvements.

Summary

As discussed, confusion over definitions, efforts to articulate roles and responsibilities, and significant organizational changes are today’s status quo for HD and HS. To start the resolution process, it is proposed that the federal government adopt a neutral term, HP, encompassing mission elements of both HD and HS. From this will come recognition that the nation needs an interagency command for HP, if for no other reason than unity of command and unity of effort. The introduction of an IACOM to perform this operational role will provide a level of integration not yet apparent in any literature. If done correctly, it will link strategic direction from the President with the various tactical elements responsible for execution across the continuum of HP missions.

It is clear that the pros outweigh the cons for establishing an IACOM and the author can think of no more vital mission requiring this level of integration. The successes of the Goldwater Nichols Act, the DoD doctrinal principle of unity of command, and the need to maintain continuity of operations while eliminating duplication of effort, all point toward an IACOM solution to this organizational problem. Additionally, now is the target of opportunity given the
current state of re-organization and interagency streamlining efforts. Although it is argued that
the DoD has more than enough missions, the proposed use of USNORTHCOM as the starting
point and incorporation of the other executive departments should eliminate this valid concern.
Furthermore, although coordination is vital, it is no substitute for a clear chain of command and
the number of organizations required actually dictates the need for an integrating body. The final
structure of an IACOM should be shaped by looking at the security models of other countries,
leveraging the DoD’s defense in depth strategy, and incorporating other organizational command
studies. Lastly, this paper discussed how the National Guard is a natural fit, not just for an
expanded role at the tactical state level, but also for command or a significant leadership role
within the IACOM. Some additional recommendations were proposed that should support the
stand-up and evolution of the IACOM. After resolving the definitional issues, doctrine must be
finalized and promulgated as authoritative guidance. Additionally, laws regarding use of the
military in law enforcement and use of the Guard in federal activities should be modified to meet
current and future needs.

The stand-up of an IACOM will be a significant undertaking, however, it can be done
over time like the evolution of combatant commands through GWNA, growing and evolving
based on training, experiences, and other organizational restructuring efforts. As discussed by
the ASD(HD), “there is no ‘home game.’ There is no ‘away game.’ We are engaged in a global
conflict. And in that global conflict, the defense of the U.S. homeland is the pre-eminent
duty.” To carry out this duty, the federal government owes the American people the best
offense and defense it can develop. The next logical step toward providing “the best defense” is
to integrate the supporting activities discussed in this paper by establishing an IACOM for
Homeland Protection.
End Notes

1 Throughout this paper the following abbreviations will be used: USNORTHCOM for United States Northern Command, USSTRATCOM for United States Strategic Command, USPACOM for United States Pacific Command, and USSOUTHCOM for United States Southern Command.


4 Ibid.


6 Ibid.


8 The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language.

9 Emphasis added.


12 Ibid.


15 Ibid., 25.


17 Ibid., vii.


19 Ibid., Executive Summary.

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27 Ibid., 13.
28 Ibid., 15.
29 Ibid., 1, 13.
30 Ibid., 12.
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(b) Other research perspective on mission relationship with Homeland Defense broader than Homeland Security

(d) Authors perspective on mission relationship based on Hopers dictionary and Roget’s Thesarus and DeMaso

Figure 1. Interpretation of the mission relationship between Homeland Defense and Homeland Security.
(a) JP 0-2 DoD Chain of Command and Control

(b) Authors notional Chain of Command and Control based on JP 0-2

Figure 2. Notional Interagency Command structure based on Joint Pub 0-2.
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