Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe

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Summary

Successive administrations have urged the creation of an anti-missile system to protect against long-range ballistic missile threats from rogue states. The Bush Administration believes that North Korea and Iran are strategic threats and questions whether they can be deterred by conventional means. The Administration’s policy position on this issue remains unchanged after a recent reassessment that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was halted in 2003. The Administration has built long-range missile defense bases in Alaska and California to protect against North Korean missile threats. Although the system has been tested, most agree that further testing is necessary. The Administration proposed deploying a ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) element of the larger Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) in Europe to defend against an Iranian missile threat. The system would include 10 interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic to be completed by 2013 at a cost of $4.04 billion.

The proposed U.S. system has encountered resistance in some European countries and beyond. Critics in Poland and the Czech Republic assert that neither country currently faces a notable threat from Iran, but that if American GMD facilities were installed, both countries might be targeted by missiles from rogue states — and possibly from Russia. Some Europeans claim that GMD is another manifestation of American unilateralism, and assert that the Bush Administration did not consult sufficiently with NATO allies or with Russia, which the Administration argues was not the case. Other European leaders, however, support the missile defense project. NATO has also been deliberating long-range missile defense, and has taken actions that have been interpreted as an endorsement of the American GMD system.

The GMD plan has also affected U.S.-Russia relations. President Putin has argued that the proposal would reignite the arms race and upset U.S.-Russian-European security relations. U.S. officials dispute Russian objections, noting that Moscow has known of this plan for years and that the interceptors are intended to take out Iranian missiles aimed at Europe or the United States and could not possibly act as a deterrent against Russia. Some argue that Russia has been attempting to foment discord among NATO allies. In mid-2007, however, Putin offered to cooperate on missile defense, proposing the use of a Russian leased radar in Azerbaijan, but urging that U.S. facilities not be built in Eastern Europe. President Bush welcomed the apparent policy shift in principle, but insisted upon the need for the European sites. Despite ongoing discussions over the issue, Russian criticism of the program has continued. Whatever the final outcome, some observers believe that the exchanges between Bush and Putin served to reduce tensions. Russian cooperation in missile defense could remove an impediment to the program and dampen criticism by European leaders.

In 2007, Congress examined the European GMD proposal and eliminated proposed funding for initial site construction for FY2008 pending formal agreement on deployment with Poland and the Czech Republic and independent studies on missile defense options for Europe.
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Introduction

In the FY2008 defense budget, the Bush Administration requested about $310 million to begin design, construction, and deployment of a ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) in Europe.¹ According to the Administration, the proposed GMD European capability would help defend U.S. forces stationed in Europe, U.S. friends and allies in the region, as well as to defend the United States against long-range ballistic missile threats, namely from Iran.

The proposed system would include 10 silo-based interceptors to be deployed in Poland, a fixed radar installation in the Czech Republic, and another transportable radar to be deployed in a country closer to the Middle East. Deployment of the GMD European capability is scheduled to be completed by 2013 at a cost of $4.04 billion.

The prospect of a GMD capability based in Europe raises a number of significant international security and foreign policy questions. Central to the debate for many is how the proposed U.S. system might affect U.S.-European-Russian relations. For FY2008, Congress eliminated funding to start construction of the European site pending final approval of international agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic and an independent study of alternative missile defense options for Europe.² Congress’s decision on whether to fund the European site proposal in the FY2009 defense budget will likely continue to revolve around its assessment of broader security and foreign policy issues and technical concerns related to the proposed European system.

The Threat

The Bush Administration argues that North Korea and Iran constitute major strategic threats. North Korea claims to have tested a nuclear device and has a

¹ Some were calling for such an effort in Europe before the Administration formally requested funding in early 2007. For instance, in October 2006, Sen. Sessions noted NATO steps in developing an Alliance-wide theater missile defense capability, and encouraged the deployment of a U.S. long-range missile defense system in Europe. See “U.S. Missile Defense Site in Europe Needed to Support Alliance Strategy,” Space News, October 9, 2006, p. 19.

ballistic missile program. The Administration argues that Iran continues to acquire and develop ballistic missiles of various ranges. Until recently, the Administration argued that Iran had an active nuclear weapons development program. In November 2007, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stated that “in Fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program,” but that Iran is also keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons at some point. The Iranian nuclear weapons program reportedly also included developing a warhead that could fit atop an Iranian ballistic missile.

The Bush Administration continues to regard both countries as unpredictable and dangerous, and does not believe they can be constrained by traditional forms of military deterrence, diplomacy, or arms control. On a trip to attend a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in early December 2007, Secretary of State Rice told reporters: “I don’t see that the NIE changes the course that we’re on” to deploy a European missile defense system. Accompanying her on the trip, Undersecretary of State John Rood, lead U.S. negotiator for the European missile defense talks, added: “the missile threat from Iran continues to progress and to cause us to be very concerned.... Missile defense would be useful regardless of what kind of payload, whether that be conventional, chemical, biological, or nuclear.”

According to unclassified U.S. intelligence assessments, Iran may be able to test an ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) or long-range ballistic missile capability by 2015 with foreign assistance, such as from Russia or China. Many in Congress and elsewhere share this specific assessment, or that the potential threat may not emerge by 2015 but is sufficiently worrisome to begin addressing it now. Many therefore believe it prudent to move forward with plans to deploy a long-range missile defense system in Europe to defend U.S. forward deployed forces in Europe, friends and allies, and the United States against long-range ballistic missile threats. Some in the larger international security policy and ballistic missile proliferation community argue that evidence of an Iranian ICBM program is scant and unpersuasive. Additionally, the Iranian government reports (which cannot be verified) that Iran has a limited missile capability with a range of about 1,200 miles and that it has stopped development of ICBM range missiles.

Although some Europeans have expressed concern about Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program, some U.S. friends and allies in Europe question the

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7 There are reports that Iran is developing other medium-range ballistic missiles with ranges greater than those now deployed, but short of what is considered ICBM range (i.e., more than 5,500 kilometers).
Administration’s assessment of Iran’s potential ICBM capability. Hence, some question the need for a GMD element of the U.S. BMDS in Europe.

### The System

The U.S. Department of Defense began deploying long-range missile interceptors in Alaska and California in late 2004 to address long-range missile threats from North Korea. Currently, the U.S. GMD element of the BMDS includes about 20 silo-based interceptors in Alaska and several in California. As part of an integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) capability, the United States also has a number of ground-based radars in operation around the world, space-based assets supporting the BMDS mission, command and control networks throughout the United States and the Pacific, as well as ground-mobile and sea-based systems for shorter-range BMD.

What remains necessary as part of the global BMDS, according to the Administration, is an ability in the European theater to defend against intermediate-to-long-range ballistic missiles launched from Iran. The Department of Defense (DOD) argues it is important to U.S. national security interests to deploy a GMD capability in Europe to optimize defensive coverage of the United States and Europe against potential threats both into Europe and against the United States.

There have not been a large number of intercept flight tests of the deployed GMD element. The Administration and many U.S. military leaders have expressed confidence in the deployed system. Most agree there is the need for further operational testing. Some observers continue to question how much confidence there should be in the system’s potential operational or combat effectiveness based on the types of tests conducted and the test results to date.

The current GMD program began flight tests in 2002. This effort was built on several earlier long-range BMD programs with decidedly mixed results themselves since the early 1980s. Since 2002, a number of GMD intercept flight tests have taken

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8 For instance: 1) General Cartwright, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, said the July 4, 2006 North Korean missile tests spurred a limited operational activation of the BMD System. “We learned that the ballistic missile defense system, procedures, and personnel performed well, and demonstrated a credible operational missile defense capability for homeland defense.” Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 21, 2007; 2) Admiral Mullen, on his nomination hearing to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he believes the U.S. “Has a viable initial operational capability and we are maturing the system toward a full operational capability.” “Answers to Advanced Policy Questions,” Senate Armed Services Committee, July 26, 2007; and 3) Dr. Charles McQueary, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, said: “I can state that the ballistic missile defense system has demonstrated a limited capability against a simple foreign threat. Coupled with the successes of other element-level testing and MDA’s integrated ground tests, the BMD system is definitely maturing. My assessment is bolstered by the fact that the MDA is increasing the operational realism of each successive test.” Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 11, 2007.
Two tests in March and October 2002 using an older interceptor successfully intercepted their intended targets. Three flight tests (IFT-10, IFT-13c and IFT-14) using the GBI in planned intercept attempts failed in those attempts for various reasons: 1) December 2002, the kill vehicle failed to deploy; 2) December 2004, the GBI launch aborted due to a software error in the interceptor; and 3) February 2005, the GBI did not launch due to problems with the test facility launch equipment. In the May 2007 flight test, the target missile second stage booster failed in flight, so the interceptor was not launched as planned. In September 2006 and 2007 successful intercepts were achieved.

In 2002, the GMD moved to the operational booster and interceptor. The interceptor system flew two developmental tests in 2003 and 2004, and the GMD element of the BMDS was deployed in late 2004 in Alaska and California. Two planned intercept flight tests of the new configuration for December 2004 and February 2005 were not successful. After technical review, the interceptor successfully demonstrated a booster fly-out in 2005. In September 2006, a successful flight test exercise of the GMD element as deployed took place. (Although a missile intercept was not planned as the primary objective of this data collection test, an intercept opportunity occurred and the target warhead was successfully intercepted.) Additional intercept flight tests of the deployed element whose primary objectives were intercepts of long-range ballistic missile targets were originally scheduled for later in 2006, but then subsequently postponed. Then a May 2007 intercept test was scrubbed when the target missile failed to launch as planned. A follow-on attempt scheduled for summer 2007 was completed successfully on September 29, 2007.

Supporters and many military officials have expressed confidence in the deployed system, but some continue to question the system’s potential effectiveness based on the intercept flight test record. Most observers agree, however, that additional, successful flight testing is necessary. Supporters add that a significant number of non-flight tests and activities are conducted that demonstrate with high confidence the ability of the GMD element to perform its intended mission.

What would the European element of the BMDS look like? The proposal is to deploy up to 10 Ground-based Interceptors (GBI) in silos at a former military base in Poland. It should be noted that the proposed GBI for the European GMD capability will not be identical to the GBI deployed now in Alaska and California. Although there is significant commonality of hardware, there are some differences. For example, the European GBI will consist of two rocket stages in contrast to the

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10 The Administration maintains that since 2002 it has fielded a long-range BMD capability where none existed previously. Furthermore, the United States now has operationally capable upgraded early warning radars, command, control and battle management systems, Navy cruisers and destroyers capable of conducting long-range ballistic missile search and track missions, and about 20 GBI fielded in Alaska and California. This element of the BMDS was transitioned to alert in July 2006 when North Korea launched several ballistic missiles, including a long-range ballistic missile.
The Orbital Boost Vehicle 2 (OBV/2) is a modification of the existing, tested OBV/3 achieved by removing the 3rd stage from the existing missile. More accurately, according to MDA, two stages provide the enhanced performance and burnout velocity required for the mission.

Deployment of the silos and interceptors in Poland is scheduled to begin in 2011 with completion in 2013. A final decision will take into consideration a detailed site and environmental analysis, as well as an overall security and support assessment. The field of the 10 interceptors itself is likely to comprise an area somewhat larger than a football field. The area of supporting infrastructure is likely to be similar to a small military installation. In addition, an American X-Band radar (a narrow-beam, midcourse tracking radar), currently being used in the Pacific missile test range, would be refurbished and transported to a fixed site at a military training base in the Czech Republic. The X-Band radar with its large, ball-shaped radome (radar dome) is several stories in height. A second, transportable forward acquisition radar would be deployed in a country to be determined, but closer to the Middle East. Some European press accounts have mentioned the Caucasus region, but the Administration has not publicly indicated where this radar might be located. Additionally, the proposed GMD European capability would include a communications network and support infrastructure (e.g., power generation, security and force protection systems, etc.) A few hundred U.S. personnel would be engaged in securing and operating both the interceptor and radar sites. The Administration intends for the United States to have full command authority over the system.

The FY2008 request is $310.4 million for the proposed European GMD across several program elements of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget. The total estimated GMD costs for the European site are $4.04 billion (FY2007-FY2013), including Operation and Support costs through 2013. Although relatively small in U.S. defense budget terms, this year’s request represented a significant commitment to the proposed European system.

Both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees asked for studies of alternatives to the Administration’s proposed European GMD deployment (see section on congressional actions). Recently, some, such as Representative Tauscher,
have suggested the Administration consider instead a combination of sea-based (Aegis SM-3) and land-based systems (PAC-3, THAAD). MDA Director General Henry Obering has argued that most of the current Aegis fleet would be required to defend Europe, and that the cost would be considerably greater than the current Bush Administration proposal.\textsuperscript{14} Separately, the Center for Naval Analyses (a federally funded research center) is conducting an analysis of alternatives for the Navy’s next big surface combatant ship.\textsuperscript{15} That review reportedly includes recommendations about future naval BMD requirements that might bear on any discussion of alternatives to the proposed European GMD plan.

The Location

In 2002 the Bush Administration began informal talks with the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic over the possibility of establishing missile defense facilities on their territory. Discussion of a more concrete plan — placing radar in the Czech Republic and interceptor launchers in Poland — was reported in the summer of 2006. The issue was increasingly debated in both countries. In January 2007, the U.S. government requested that formal negotiations begin. If agreements are struck, and if the Polish and Czech parliaments approve the projects, construction on the sites would likely begin in 2008, with initial deployments expected in 2011. The two governments have grappled with several issues as the debate has evolved.

Poland

Some analysts maintain that in Poland the notion of stationing American GMD facilities was more or less accepted early on in the discussions and that the main questions subsequently have revolved around what the United States might provide Warsaw in return. Some Poles believe their country should receive additional security guarantees in exchange for assuming a larger risk of being targeted by rogue state missiles because of the presence of the U.S. launchers on their soil. In addition, many Poles are concerned about Russia’s response. The Polish government reportedly has been requesting that the United States provide batteries of Patriot missiles to shield Poland against short- and medium-range missiles.\textsuperscript{16}

Any future base agreement will require the approval of the Polish parliament. Formal negotiations began in early 2007 under the populist-nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) party, led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski. As talks began, Civic Alliance (PO), then the leading opposition party, had questions about the system — particularly the command and control aspects — and urged the government to ensure that it be integrated into a future NATO missile defense program. The former ruling leftist

\textsuperscript{14} See [http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1539/how-many-aegis-ships-to-defend-nato].


party supported deployment of the missiles, but also called for greater transparency in the decision-making process. The smaller parties of the governing coalition expressed some skepticism, mainly for reasons of sovereignty, and indicated support for a public referendum.\(^{17}\)

In snap elections on October 21, 2007, Poles turned out PiS and replaced it with a center-right two-party coalition led by PO. Observers believe that the new government, led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, may not be as compliant toward the United States, and that it will seek to bargain more actively on missile defense. It has also been noted that, from a purely practical standpoint, the change in government personnel will likely cause some delay in the negotiations.

As he left office, former Prime Minister Kaczynski urged the incoming government to approve the missile defense proposal, arguing that an agreement would strengthen relations with the United States. In a post-election news conference, however, Tusk was cautious about the plan: “If we recognize that the anti-missile shield clearly enhances our security, then we will be open to negotiations.... If we recognize, jointly in talks with our partners from the European Union and NATO, that this is not an unambiguous project, then we will think it over.” Two weeks later, however, newly minted Defense Minister Bogdan Klich stated that Poland should again “weigh the benefits and costs of this project for Poland. And if that balance results unfavorably, we should draw a conclusion from those results.”\(^{18}\) Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski later indicated that the new government would discuss the project with Russia. It is believed that talks between Warsaw and Washington, which are currently on hold, will resume early in 2008 after the Polish government consults with neighbors and allies, and after Tusk and/or Sikorski visit the United States. Some observers believe that the new Polish government will strongly renew the argument for the United States to provide additional air and/or short-range missile defenses.\(^{19}\)

Polls have consistently indicated that a majority of Poles disapprove of a missile defense base being established in their country. Most objections appear to be based on concerns over sovereignty, as well as over the belief that the presence of the system would diminish rather than increase national security and might harm relations with neighboring states and Russia.


\(^{19}\) Poland Said Likely To Launch Tough Missile Defence Talks With USA. *Gazeta Wyborcza* [in: *BBC Monitoring European*.] December 5, 2007.
Czech Republic

In September 2002, the Czech defense minister, a member of the Social Democratic Party (CSSD), announced that he had “offered the United States the opportunity to deploy the missile defense system on Czech soil.”\(^{20}\) In June 2006, inconclusive elections toppled the CSSD government and replaced it with a shaky coalition led by the center-right Civic Democratic Party (ODS). As with the outgoing government, the new one voiced support for GMD. However, the CSSD, now in opposition, began to backpedal on its support as polls showed increasing public skepticism, and by mid-2006 only the ODS was unambiguously backing deployment. When a relatively stable ODS-led government was finally formed in January 2007, the ODS apparently persuaded its coalition partners to support GMD (the Greens made agreement contingent upon NATO approval). In January 2007, it was announced that the United States had requested that official negotiations be started, and in March the Czech government formally agreed to launch talks.

On October 23, 2007, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Prague to discuss several issues — including the proposed radar installation — with Czech leaders. During the visit, he reportedly proposed that, in the interest of transparency, Russia be allowed to station personnel at the radar site. Czech Prime Minister Topolanek had no immediate comment but appeared to concur with Gates’s observation that the presence of Russians on Czech territory would have to be approved by Czechs first. Gates also suggested that activation of the missile defense system could be delayed until such time as there was “... definitive proof of the threat — in other words, Iranian missile testing and so on.” On the same day, however, President Bush delivered a speech in which he called the need for the missile defense project “urgent.” Some analysts have argued that the U.S. proposal to include Russia might complicate Topolanek’s efforts to secure approval for an eventual agreement with the United States.\(^{21}\)

On December 5, 2007, the Czech Foreign Ministry issued a statement asserting that the U.S. intelligence community’s conclusion that Iran had suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003 would not affect Prague’s decision to host the radar facility, as the threat has the potential to re-emerge in the future.\(^{22}\)

Public opinion surveys have shown strong opposition to the plan among Czechs, who share many of their Polish neighbors’ concerns. Some Czech officials believe that public opposition may be the result of a lack of knowledge about the program, and argue that the U.S. government has not provided sufficient information about the planned facilities. Recent polls show that opposition to the plan to host U.S. radar


has declined from nearly two-thirds to about half; the survey gave support for the proposal at 22%. The CSSD is calling for a public referendum on the issue, and a summer poll showed that three-quarter of Czechs would like to have a referendum on the issue. Any eventual agreement will have to be ratified by the parliament. Approval is not a foregone conclusion.

Policy Issues

U.S. proponents of the missile defense program note that the bases being planned would be part of a limited defensive system, not an offensive one. The missiles would not have explosive payloads, and would be launched only in the event that the United States or its friends or allies were under actual attack. Critics respond that Europe does not currently face a significant threat from Iran or its potential surrogates, but that Polish and Czech participation in the European GMD element would create such a threat. If American GMD facilities were installed, they argue, both countries would likely be targeted by terrorists, as well as by missiles from rogue states — and possibly from Russia — in the event of a future confrontation.

Debate in Poland and the Czech Republic

Some proponents of the proposed GMD European capability system assert that cooperation would help consolidate bilateral relations with the United States. In Poland in particular there is a sense, based in part on historical experience, that the United States is the only major ally that can be relied upon. Therefore, some Poles argue, it would be beneficial to strengthen the relationship by becoming an important U.S. partner through joining the missile defense system. In addition, some Czechs and Poles believe that the missile defense sites would become a prestigious symbol of the two countries’ enhanced role in defending Europe. Some would argue that the Czechs and the Poles see this formal U.S. military presence as an ultimate security guarantee against Russia; when asked shortly before Poland’s October 21, 2007, parliamentary elections about the missile defense issue, former Prime Minister Kaczynski singled out Russia as a threat.

Opponents, however, contend that this is not a valid reason for accepting missile defense facilities because the two countries, which joined NATO in 1999, already enjoy a security guarantee through the alliance’s mutual defense clause. Polish missile defense skeptics also maintain that their country does not need to improve its bilateral security relationship with the United States because it has already shown its loyalty through its significant contributions to the military operation in Iraq and the global war on terrorism. Some Polish and Czech political leaders reason that the


United States will proceed with missile defense with or without them, so they may as well be on board. However, the missile bases are unpopular among the Czech and Polish public, and any government that agreed to host such facilities might lose political support. Some Czechs and Poles may be speculating whether it would be worthwhile to expend political capital on the GMD bases, as the issue may become moot. If GMD proponents are voted out of office in the United States and the project is discontinued, “Poland will become an international laughingstock.”

A Czech member of parliament noted that, if the U.S. Congress determines not to fund a European arm of missile defense, “[t]he USA will thus solve the problem for us.”

Some Czechs and Poles have argued that the extra-territorial status of the proposed bases would impinge upon national sovereignty. However, the Czech position is that the base “would be under the Czech Republic’s jurisdiction.” In addition, some have raised questions over command and control — who would decide when to push the launch button and what would the notification system be? Polish and Czech government leaders reportedly acknowledged that the time between the detection of the launch of a missile by a hostile regime and the need to fire off an interceptor would be so brief as to preclude government-to-government consultations.

Opponents have also cautioned that the interception of a nuclear-tipped missile over Polish or Czech territory could result in a rain of deadly debris. Supporters argue that an enemy missile would not be intercepted over Eastern Europe, and that even if it were, the tremendous kinetic energy of impact would cause both projectiles to be obliterated and any debris burnt upon atmospheric reentry. Skeptics note, however, that testing of these systems is never performed over populated areas.

**European Response**

The proposed U.S. system has encountered resistance in some European countries and beyond. Some critics claim that the program is another manifestation of American unilateralism and argue that, because of opposition by major European partners, Polish and Czech participation in the GMD program could damage those countries’ relations with fellow EU members. Supporters, however, counter that


the establishment of a missile defense system would protect Europe as well as the United States.

Some European leaders have asserted that the Bush Administration did not consult sufficiently with European allies or with Russia on its GMD plans. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier faulted the Bush Administration for failing to adequately discuss the proposal with affected countries. Former French President Chirac cautioned against the creation of “new divisions in Europe.” Bush Administration officials, however, maintain that these arguments are disingenuous, as they have held wide-ranging discussions on GMD with European governments, and with Russia, both bilaterally and in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council. In addition, critics charge that establishing a European GMD base to counter Iranian missiles implies a tacit assumption on the part of the Bush Administration that diplomatic efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile aspirations are doomed to failure, and that Iran’s future leaders will be undeterred by the prospect of nuclear annihilation.

Europeans also have raised questions about the technical feasibility of the program as well as its cost-effectiveness. According to a wire service report, “Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn called the U.S. [missile defense] plan an ‘incomprehensible’ waste of money....”

Other European leaders, however, including those of Denmark and Britain, have indicated that they support the missile defense project as a means to protect Europe from threats from rogue states. In addition, some European allies do not appear to be averse to the missile defense concept per se. Foreign Minister Steinmeier indicated that Germany and other countries were interested in building a comparable system, but lacked the technological know-how.

NATO has also been deliberating strategic missile defenses. A feasibility study of such a program called for in the 2002 Prague Summit was completed in 2005. In the final communique of their 2006 Riga summit, NATO leaders declared the alliance study had concluded that long-range BMD is “technically feasible within the limitations and assumptions of the study,” and called for “continued work on the political and military implications of missile defence for the Alliance including an update on missile threat developments.” Supporters contend that the U.S. facilities currently under negotiation in Eastern Europe are intended to be a good fit — and therefore not inconsistent with — any future NATO missile defense. However, other policymakers have recommended that the establishment of any anti-missile system

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in Europe should proceed solely under NATO auspices rather than on a bilateral basis with just two NATO partners. U.S. officials maintain that “the more NATO is involved in [GMD], the better.”

Some observers have suggested that the Bush Administration chose not to work primarily through NATO because consensus agreement on the system was unlikely. However, in mid-June 2007, alliance defense ministers did agree to conduct a study of a complementary “bolt-on” anti-missile capability that would protect the southeastern part of alliance territory that would not be covered by the planned U.S. interceptors. American officials have interpreted the move as an implied endorsement of the U.S. GMD plan and an adaptation of NATO plans to fit the proposed U.S. system. In addition, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated “The roadmap on missile defense is now clear... It’s practical, and it’s agreed by all.”

European opponents of the proposed U.S. plan also contend that statements by Russian officials are evidence that deployment of the U.S. system would damage Western relations with Russia. At a February 2007 security conference in Munich, President Putin strongly criticized GMD, maintaining that it would lead to “an inevitable arms race.” Russia has threatened to abrogate the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated this class of U.S. and then-Soviet missiles that were stationed in Europe. Putin also announced that Russia suspended compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and on another occasion indicated Russia might now target Poland and the Czech Republic and transfer medium-range ballistic missiles to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Some U.S. and European officials have dismissed Russian alleged concerns and have noted that Moscow has known of this plan for years and has even been invited to participate. GMD proponents maintain that the interceptors are intended to take out launched Iranian missiles aimed at European or American targets and could not possibly act as a deterrent against Russia, which has hundreds of missiles and thousands of warheads. The chief of the Czech general staff has noted that “by simple arithmetic, Russian generals can see that U.S. missile defenses cannot imperil Moscow’s arsenal.” Some Russians contend, however, that the modest GMD

33 This program should be distinguished from the theater missile defense system intended to protect deployed forces, which the alliance has already approved. See Riga Summit Declaration. NATO web page. [http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm] Missile Defense and Europe. Foreign Press Briefing. U.S. Department of State. March 28, 2007.


facilities planned for Eastern Europe are likely just the harbinger of a more ambitious program.

Russian officials have also argued that North Korean or Iranian missiles would not likely enter European airspace, and that the real reason for GMD is to emplace U.S. radar in eastern Europe to monitor Russian missile sites and naval operations. A Czech military officer dismissed the charge of electronic espionage as “absolute nonsense,” arguing that “the radar monitors the already launched missiles, and it cannot monitor what is going on on the ground” — a task that is already being performed by U.S. surveillance satellites.  

Some argue that Russia has other motives for raising alarms about the U.S. missile defense system: to foment discord among NATO member states, and to draw attention away from Russia’s suppression of dissent and its nuclear technology cooperation with Iran. Observers note that Russia blustered about NATO expansion, too, and argue that Russia’s veiled threats may actually stiffen resolve in Prague and Warsaw. Some observers note, however, that Russian acceptance of NATO expansion was conditioned on a tacit understanding that NATO or U.S. military expansion into the new member states would not occur. The European GMD in this regard is seen as unacceptable to Russia.

On June 7, in a surprise move during the G-8 meeting in Germany, Putin offered to partner with the United States on missile defense, and suggested that a Soviet-era radar facility in Azerbaijan be used to help track and target hostile missiles that might be launched from the Middle East. President Bush responded by calling the proposal an “interesting suggestion,” and welcomed the apparent policy shift. The following day, Putin suggested that GMD interceptors be “placed in the south, in U.S. NATO allies such as Turkey, or even Iraq ... [or] on sea platforms.” Military and political representatives from both countries have been meeting to discuss the proposal, but some experts point out that Azerbaijan is technically not the ideal place to locate the radar because it would be too close to potential Iranian launch sites; they also argue that the radar is outmoded.

In the meantime, Putin urged the United States not to deploy elements of GMD until his offer had been examined. One week later, however, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that even if the United States were to accept Russia’s offer to share use of the Azeri radar, that facility would be regarded as “an additional capability” to complement the proposed GMD sites planned for Europe. In late July 2007, MDA Director Obering said the United States is looking at the proposal very seriously. He said the Azeri radar could be useful for early detection of missile launches, but that it does not have the tracking ability to guide an interceptor missile to a target — which the proposed Czech radar would be able to do, he said.


At a July 1-2 meeting in Kennebunkport, ME, Putin expanded on his counterproposal by recommending that missile defense be coordinated through offices in Brussels and Moscow. He also suggested the possible use of radar in south Russia and said that cooperation could be expanded to other European countries through the use of the NATO-Russia council — eliminating, he added, the need for facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic. President Bush responded positively to Putin’s new proposal, but insisted on the need for the Eastern European sites.39

Despite ongoing discussions over the issue, Russian criticism of the program has continued. During an October 2007 visit to Moscow by Secretaries Gates and Rice, President Putin remarked “of course we can sometime in the future decide that some anti-missile defense system should be established somewhere on the moon.” Putin later likened the U.S. placement of the missile defense facilities in central Europe to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis — a comparison disputed by U.S. officials. In late November 2007, Russia rejected a written U.S. proposal on the project, arguing that it failed to include the points Secretary Gates had discussed in a month earlier, including “joint assessment of threats, ... Russian experts’ presence at missile shield’s sites, [and] readiness to keep the system non-operational if there is no actual missile threat....”40 In December, the chief of Russia’s army suggested that the launching of U.S. missile defense interceptors against Iranian missiles might inadvertently provoke a counter launch of Russian ICBMs aimed at the United States. However, critics assert that a Russian counterstrike could not be prompted so easily and mistakenly.41

Whatever the final result, some observers believe that the recent dialog between the two countries may help reduce tensions. Eventual Russian cooperation in missile defense could remove a significant impediment to the program and could dampen criticism by European and other leaders. It also may open the door to a more favorable attitude by NATO toward missile defense.

Congressional Actions

Congress examined the European basing proposal. In its report on the FY2008 defense authorization bill, the House Armed Services Committee cited its concern from last year (FY2007) that investment in the European BMD site was premature.42 In part, the Committee’s concerns focus on the need to complete scheduled integrated


end-to-end testing of the system now deployed in Alaska and California. Additionally, the Committee notes its reluctance to fund the European site without formal agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic and without knowing the terms under which the estimated $4 billion program costs would be expended. Therefore, the Committee recommended that no funds be approved for FY2008 for construction of the European GMD site.\textsuperscript{43} The Committee did, however, recommend $42.7 million to continue procurement of ten additional GMD interceptors that could be deployed to the European site or for expanded inventory at the GMD site in Alaska (as noted in MDA budget documents). Also, the Committee expressed concern over the testing plan and risk reduction strategy for the proposed two-stage GMD interceptor for Europe. The Committee further directed that two studies be done: 1) the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State are to submit a report to Congress by January 31, 2008, to include how the Administration will obtain NATO’s support for the European GMD proposal, and how other missile defense capabilities such as Aegis and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) could contribute to the missile defense protection of Europe; and 2) an independent assessment of European missile defense options should be done in a timely manner.

In the Senate defense authorization bill, the Armed Services Committee recommended limiting the availability of funding for the European GMD site until two conditions have been met: 1) completion of bilateral agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic; and 2) 45 days have elapsed following the receipt by Congress of a report from an FFRDC (federally funded research and development center) to conduct an independent assessment of options for missile defense of Europe.\textsuperscript{44} The Committee recommends a reduction of $85 million for site activation and construction activities for the proposed European GMD deployment. The Committee also limits FY2008 funding for acquisition or deployment of operational interceptor missiles for the European system until the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that the proposed interceptor to be deployed has demonstrated, through successful, operationally realistic flight testing, that it has a high probability of working in an operationally effective manner. The Committee notes that the proposed 2-stage version of the interceptor has not been developed and is not scheduled to be tested until 2010.\textsuperscript{45} Therefore, the Committee notes, it could be several years before it is known if the proposed interceptor will work in an operationally effective manner. The Committee indicates that it would not limit site surveys, studies, analysis, planning and design for the proposed European GMD site, but that construction and deployment could not take place prior to ratification of formal bilateral agreements, which MDA estimates would not take place before 2009. Finally, the Committee

\textsuperscript{43} To preserve the opportunity to move forward with the research and development components of the European interceptor and radar site, the Committee recommended that $150 million for FY2008 be available. Upon completion of bilateral agreements and if further engagement with NATO on the proposed site can be demonstrated, the Committee notes that the Department of Defense has the option of submitting a reprogramming request to Congress in FY2008 to fund site preparation activities.


\textsuperscript{45} See footnote 5.
notes there are a number of near-term missile defense options to provide defense of Europe against short-range, medium-range and future intermediate-range ballistic missiles, such as the Patriot PAC-3, the Aegis BMD system, and THAAD.

In floor debate, the Senate approved an amendment by Senator Sessions (90-5) to the defense authorization bill stating that the policy of the United States is to develop and deploy an effective defense system against the threat of an Iranian nuclear missile attack against the United States and its European allies. Further debate and passage of the defense authorization bill was postponed by the Majority Leader until after debate over the Iraq war.

On November 13, 2007, President Bush signed into law the FY2008 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3222; P.L. 110-114). This bill eliminates the proposed $85 million for FY2008 for the European missile defense site construction and permits $225 million for studies, analyses, etc. of the proposed European GMD element.

The House passed the FY2008 National Defense Authorization bill (H.R. 1585) on May 17, 2007. The Senate passed its version on October 1, 2007. House and Senate negotiators filed the defense authorization report on December 6, 2007. The House adopted the report on December 12, 2007. The Conference Report contains a number of provisions pertaining to the proposed European GMD element. First, it cuts the $85 million requested for site activation and construction activities. This leaves about $225 million for surveys, studies, analysis, etc. related to the European GMD element to proceed. Second, the Conference Report also requires an independent assessment of the proposed deployment of missile defense interceptors and associated radar in Europe and options for missile defense in Europe before site construction and activation can begin. The conferees note that if the Polish and Czech governments give final approval to any successfully completed agreements during FY2008, the Department of Defense has the option of submitting a reprogramming request for those funds to begin site construction in Europe. Third, the conferees strongly support the need to work closely and in coordination with NATO on missile defense issues. On December 28, 2007, the White House announced that President Bush would veto the conference report on H.R. 1585 because of a provision in the bill unrelated to missile defense.