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Thesis

CHINA’S REACTIONS TO THE INDIA DEAL: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

by

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December 2007

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# China's Reactions to the India Deal: Implications for the United States

## Abstract

China’s reactions to the U.S.-India nuclear deal and their implications for the United States are presented in this thesis. The 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1998 Indian Nuclear test were the prime causes of the enduring Sino-Indian rivalries, and differing views from Beijing, New Delhi, and Washington are explored. The U.S.-India Strategic Partnership is briefly covered with emphasis placed on the desired improvements in U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation. Several Chinese-specific concepts, Beijing’s White Paper on arms control, as well as, Beijing’s perceptions of threats from Washington and New Delhi are considered before Beijing’s perceptions of and reactions to the India deal are investigated. This thesis concludes by analyzing the implications of Chinese reactions to the U.S.-India nuclear deal and offers recommendations for U.S. policy toward Asia. Although the deal has not been formally concluded as of the writing of this thesis, the intent, implications, and reactions are all relevant to policy considerations.

## Subject Terms

- The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal
- The India Deal
- China’s Reactions to the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal
- China’s Reactions to the India Deal: Implications for the United States
- Chinese Perceptions of Threat
- The United States
- China
- India
- Nonproliferation
- NPT
- The China threat
- Hegemony
- Sino-Indian rivalry

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CHINA’S REACTIONS TO THE INDIA DEAL: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

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ABSTRACT

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 1

II. ENDURING SINO-INDIAN RIVALRIES ............................................................................................... 7
   A. BEIJING’S VIEW OF NEW DELHI ............................................................................................. 7
      1. 1962 Sino-Indian War .......................................................................................................... 7
      2. 1998 Indian Nuclear Test .................................................................................................... 9
   B. NEW DELHI’S VIEW OF BEIJING ........................................................................................... 11
      1. 1962 Sino-Indian War ........................................................................................................ 12
      2. 1998 Indian Nuclear Test .................................................................................................. 14
   C. WASHINGTON’S VIEW OF BEIJING AND NEW DELHI .......................................................... 15
   D. CHAPTER SUMMARY .............................................................................................................. 19

III. UNFOLDING THE U.S.-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP ......................................................... 21
   A. THE FOUR AREAS OF STRATEGIC COOPERATION ............................................................ 22
      1. Security Cooperation .......................................................................................................... 23
         a. Military-to-Military Relations ....................................................................................... 23
         b. Arms Sales ...................................................................................................................... 25
         c. Missile Defense ............................................................................................................... 26
      2. High-Technology Trade ...................................................................................................... 27
      3. Civil Space Cooperation ..................................................................................................... 28
      4. Civil Nuclear Cooperation .................................................................................................. 30
   B. THE “INDIA DEAL” ................................................................................................................ 30
      1. Supporters from the United States and India .................................................................... 31
      2. Critics from the United States and India .......................................................................... 33
   C. REACTIONS FROM PAKISTAN ............................................................................................... 37
   D. CHAPTER SUMMARY .............................................................................................................. 38

IV. BEIJING’S PERCEPTIONS OF AND REACTIONS TO THE INDIA DEAL ........................................ 41
   A. THE “UNIQUELY” CHINESE CONCEPTS ............................................................................. 41
      1. Cultural Superiority ........................................................................................................... 42
      2. Shi (勢 in traditional Chinese or 勢 in simplified Chinese) .................................................. 44
      3. Comprehensive National Power (CNP) ........................................................................... 45
   B. BEIJING’S PERCEPTIONS OF THREATS .............................................................................. 48
      1. Washington ....................................................................................................................... 49
         a. Hegemony ....................................................................................................................... 49
         b. The “China Threat” Theory ......................................................................................... 52
      2. New Delhi .......................................................................................................................... 55
         a. Competition ..................................................................................................................... 56
         b. Military Modernization ................................................................................................. 58
   C. BEIJING’S PERCEPTIONS OF AND REACTIONS TO THE INDIA DEAL .................................. 59
      1. Beijing’s White Paper on Arms Control .......................................................................... 59
      2. Beijing’s Perceptions of and Reactions to the India deal ................................................ 62
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I. INTRODUCTION

The current Bush administration’s nuclear policy towards India is a major departure from what had been the course of U.S. foreign policy for the last three decades. It is also controversial because the United States is agreeing to recognize India as a nuclear power despite the fact that India is not a signatory to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The purpose of this thesis is to assess China’s reactions to the U.S.-India nuclear deal and their implications for the United States.

According to the Hyde Act of December 2006 (also known as the “India deal” or the “U.S.-India nuclear deal”), the United States agrees to acknowledge India as a globally-responsible possessor of nuclear weapons. In return, India agrees to “assume the same responsibility and practices” as if it were a NPT state, separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities, place two-thirds of its current civilian reactors (14 out of 22) under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection and keep the remaining for military use, as well as, extending its moratorium on nuclear testing.\(^1\)

While supporters of this deal emphasize the improvement of bilateral relations, nonproliferation experts argue the technicalities in dealing with nuclear weapons and America’s strategic priorities. It is also widely speculated that America’s hidden agenda is to contain a rising China and maintain a balance of power in Asia.

For the United States, China was a “strategic partner” during the Clinton administration and became a “strategic competitor” during the Bush administration. China’s success in its January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test, where it destroyed one of its own orbiting weather satellites, combined with the continuing military build-up as asserted by the Pentagon,\(^2\) appears to have elevated the murkiness of China’s increasing military budget above all other standing bilateral issues. Trade issues between the United States and China are also being taken very seriously. Some in the U.S. Congress have


threatened to take punitive actions against China as a result of its refusal to float the renminbi (RMB), the growing U.S. trade deficit with China in the range of hundreds of billions of dollars, as well as China’s violation of World Trade Organization (WTO) requirement to crack down intellectual property rights (IPR) piracy, which are also costing U.S. industries billions of dollars.

Aside from these delicate issues, Chinese actions are as predictable as usual when dealing with North Korea. As for Taiwan, China’s arms build-up continues despite ever expanding cultural and economic exchanges between the two. Of additional note is China’s voracious appetite for resources to fuel its economy. Economic growth is vital for domestic stability and regime survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Chinese quest for resources and access to export markets has taken it to parts of the world (i.e., the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia) where anti-American sentiments are prevalent.³

While China officially kept silent of its opposition to the U.S.-India nuclear deal, the government-controlled media outlets acted otherwise. Accusations such as “double standards” on nuclear proliferation and setting the precedent for others to follow in weakening the NPT regime surfaced.⁴ Concerns of India dedicating its resources and energy to the research and development of nuclear weapons, as well as, the rights of others to develop civil nuclear energy were also raised. “Wouldn’t it be possible for other nuclear states to cooperate with Pakistan in the development of nuclear energy? Pakistan…has a need to develop civil nuclear energy and the right to do so…”⁵ Beijing


has signaled that it could follow Washington’s path. Ironically, China also published a white paper on arms control and non-proliferation very shortly after the U.S.-India nuclear deal was announced.\(^6\)

For India, the opportunity to receive assistance from the world’s superpower to improve national security in areas such as arms purchases, missile defense, high-technology trade, space, and nuclear cooperation, is rare, and it is keen to seize the opportunity. However, if the India deal is one of the U.S. government’s strategies to limit China’s growing influence, then the effectiveness of this strategy may be in question, as Sino-Indian relations have shown signs of improvement. China and India have ongoing high-level dialogues in resolving border disputes. Bilateral trade and cultural exchanges have also increased over the recent years. While American companies such as General Electric and Bechtel have been poised to compete in India’s estimated $60-100 billion dollar nuclear power industry, private companies in India and state-owned companies in China have been preparing to do the same.\(^7\) Furthermore, Chinese President Hu Jintao’s four-nation visit to South Asia in November 2006 included India and Pakistan, where a multitude of Sino-Indian and Sino-Pakistani agreements were signed. This was the first visit to India by a Chinese head of state in a decade, which shows India’s elevated importance in China’s foreign policy.\(^8\)

Beijing and New Delhi are both pursuing a strategy of diversifying their energy supplies. Both have competed directly over energy deals and indirectly for influence in Central Asia, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Africa, and Southeast Asia. When China prevails, India’s “energy diplomacy” has been to “develop as many potential supply

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arrangements, with as many potential suppliers, as it possibly can, and to try to neutralize its potential competitors (principally China) with cooperation agreements.”

Regardless of the improving ties, Sino-Indian relations have not always been harmonious. China and India, two neighboring countries divided by the Himalayas, have been rivals more than friends since their independence in the late 1940s. A number of disagreements exist in Sino-Indian relations: territorial disputes dealing with Tibet, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Sino-Pakistani relations, Burma, the Indian Ocean, and nuclear weapons.

When India used the “China threat” and China’s alleged involvement in Pakistan’s nuclear program as justifications for its 1998 nuclear tests, China reacted strongly, stating that India’s action “is nothing but outrageous contempt for the common will of the international community...[India] will entail serious consequences...” One China scholar even suggested that “one should not conclude that China will ignore the seriousness of the threat posed by India’s nuclear weapons in the future...”

Most recently, the Chinese Ambassador to India told the Indian press that “the whole of what you call the [Indian] state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory...we are claiming all of that—that’s our position.” This remark, which took place on the eve of Chinese President Hu Jintao’s historical visit to India, shows China’s determination to maintain sovereignty in disputed territory. In addition to the standing issues, China sees India’s foreign policies vis-à-vis Japan, Taiwan, Russia, and the United States as contrary to its interests.

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10 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 3-22. Dr. Garver is a well-published scholar on China and India. He is a professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology.


In light of the Sino-Indian disagreements and the newly-embraced Sino-Indian friendship, the major question this thesis seeks to answer is: What are the implications of Chinese reactions for the United States? In doing so, this thesis proceeds through the following subordinate questions:

1. What was the state of Sino-Indian relations before 9/11?
2. What is Washington’s view of Sino-Indian relations prior to 9/11?
3. What are the Chinese perceptions of the U.S.-India nuclear deal?
4. How will China react to the U.S.-India nuclear deal?
5. What are the implications of Chinese reactions for the United States?

Chapter II will answer the first two questions. In answering the first question, the focus of the Sino-Indian rivalries will be on the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1998 Indian nuclear test, where India cited its “China threat” theory as the justification for the nuclear test. In answering the second question, this chapter will also cover America’s view of both China and India.

Chapter III will focus on unfolding the four areas of U.S.-India strategic cooperation: security, high-technology trade, space, and nuclear cooperation. Emphasis will be placed on nuclear cooperation, as it is the focus of this thesis. Reaction from Pakistan will also be covered, as India and Pakistan have been archrivals since their independence, and India also cited China’s alleged assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear program as one of the reasons behind the 1998 nuclear test.

Chapter IV will answer the third and the fourth questions. In answering the third question, Chinese perceptions of the U.S.-India nuclear deal will be covered. This chapter will also answer the fourth question on how China will react to the India deal based on its views of the U.S.-India “love fest.” The United States’ recognition of India, a non-NPT state, as a global nuclear power threatens China’s status as Asia’s sole

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14 This phrase was coined by BG Feroz Khan during his class on Security in South Asia, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July-September, 2007.
legitimate nuclear power as recognized by the NPT. More explicitly, the U.S.-India nuclear deal is the United States’ indirect endorsement of India’s military nuclear program.

Chapter V will answer the fifth question: Implications of Chinese reactions for the United States. This concluding chapter will also recap chapter summaries from earlier and provide recommendations relating to U.S. foreign policies in Asia.
II. ENDURING SINO-INDIAN RIVALRIES

This chapter serves as the background for the enduring Sino-Indian rivalries and answers the first two questions. The first question “what was the state of Sino-Indian relations before 9/11?” will be answered from both Beijing and New Delhi’s view points of the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1998 Indian nuclear test. The second question “what is Washington’s view of Sino-Indian relations prior to 9/11?” will be answered in the last section of this chapter.

This chapter is divided into four sections: Beijing’s view of New Delhi on the 1962 war and 1998 nuclear test, New Delhi’s view of Beijing on the same events, Washington’s view of both Beijing and New Delhi, and chapter summary.

A. BEIJING’S VIEW OF NEW DELHI

In Beijing’s eyes, there are no eternal enemies or allies; the only permanent agenda vis-à-vis its foreign policy is its national interests. Sino-Indian relations in the decade leading up to their 1962 border conflict can be described as friendly, although each had their own agendas. While border disputes in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh were to blame, Tibet is the root cause for the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

1. 1962 Sino-Indian War

Tibet is a large area where both China and India over-lap their self-perceived historical spheres of influence. Territorial disputes over Tibet can be characterized as the main quarrel between the two. Mao Zedong was determined to end China’s so-called “Century of National Humiliation” and reclaim all territories lost during this shameful period in the Chinese history. Not only that, Mao saw “China’s Tibet” as a buffer zone essential to “his” national security. As a result, Beijing interpreted New Delhi’s “concerns” over Tibet, its tolerance towards the Dalai Lama, and its leniency towards Tibetan refugees on Indian soil as interference in Beijing’s internal affairs. “By keeping

Tibet weak and the PLA out of Tibet, New Delhi hoped to keep Tibet open to Indian penetration and exploitation in ways established by and inherited from the British imperialists.”16 Additionally, Tibet possesses 40 percent of “China’s” mineral resources. Most notable are high-grade uranium deposits, possibly Asia’s largest copper deposits, China’s richest gold deposits, and petroleum.17 Mao emphasized that, “The national minority areas are extensive and rich in resources… The Han nationality must actively assist the national minorities to carry out social economics…”18

Other Sino-Indian border disputes include Aksai Chin in the eastern sector and Arunachal Pradesh in the western sector of the Himalayas. Due to terrain, weather, and logistical reasons, the PLA constructed Xinjiang-Tibet Highway south of the Johnson Line in Aksai Chin in 1957, directly linking China’s Xingjiang to Tibet, thus enhancing Beijing’s direct control over Tibet. Meanwhile, border skirmishes over Arunachal Pradesh continued. Beijing rejected the McMahon Line and claims more favorable boundaries in its quest for areas south of the line.

After New Delhi rejected Zhou Enlai’s “informal offer” for a comprehensive compromise settlement of the boundary (i.e., swap Aksai Chin for the Chinese-claimed territory of Arunachal Pradesh) in 1960, Mao concluded that the U.S.-India-U.S.S.R. anti-China coalition sought to keep the new China weak by splitting Tibet from China and denying China nuclear weapons.19 To reinforce his belief, Mao told a Nepali delegation in 1964 that the major problem in the Sino-Indian relations is “…the Tibet

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question. In the opinion of the Indian government, Tibet is theirs.”20 In short, Beijing went to war with New Delhi for two reasons. One is the “perceived need to punish and [to] end Indian efforts” in undermining Beijing’s control over Tibet, and the other is the “perceived need to punish and [to] end perceived Indian aggression against Chinese territory” along the Sino-Indian border.21 The “timing” of the 1962 war may have been calculated by Mao to redirect the Chinese people’s focus away from his disastrous Great Leap Forward campaign. Additionally, the two superpowers were unlikely to intervene, as Washington and Moscow were focused on the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.22

2. 1998 Indian Nuclear Test

Sino-Indian normalization accelerated after Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s historical visit to Beijing in 1988, but Operation Shakti in May 1998 disrupted this warming trend. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Zhu Bangzao expressed Beijing’s “deep concern” over the initial nuclear test conducted by New Delhi and that it was not beneficial to peace and stability in the Asian subcontinent. However, Beijing’s response to New Delhi’s second nuclear test was not as controlled when New Delhi used the “China threat” and Beijing’s alleged nuclear assistance to Islamabad as justifications to Washington for conducting its second nuclear test. Beijing strongly disapproved of New Delhi for its second nuclear test, stating that New Delhi’s action “is nothing but outrageous contempt for the common will of the international community for the comprehensive ban on nuclear test and a hard blow [for global efforts] to prevent nuclear proliferation. [New Delhi] will entail serious consequences to the peace and


stability in South Asia and the world….”23 Beijing also expressed regret and disappointment over Islamabad’s decision to conduct nuclear test but “blamed India as the instigator of the South Asian nuclear crisis.”24 In retaliation, Beijing allied with Washington and headed the passage of a UN Security Council resolution “to compound denial of India’s nuclear status with punitive international isolations.”25

Aside from expressing outrage through official statements, commentary sections of the government-sponsored People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) and the PLA’s authoritative newspaper (Jiefangju Bao) called for international actions against New Delhi. These commentaries perceived the “China threat” theory as New Delhi’s drive to dominate South Asia and concluded, “…the root cause of India’s actions was a desire to bolster its alleged quest for hegemony in the region.” One of these commentaries further carried personal attacks on Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes, who had supposedly given “smiling assurances” regarding the “peaceful and stable” border disputes to the PLA Chief of Staff Fu Quanyou, who had just returned from New Delhi before the nuclear test. The other commentary went after Indian Prime Minister Vajapyee, who reportedly disclosed to President Clinton in a published letter, “tracing the Chinese threat to Chinese aggression in the 1962 Sino-Indian border war.” This second commentator accused New Delhi for its “extremely ignominious role in the Tibet issue” by allowing the Dalai Lama to conduct “separatist activities” in India and that New Delhi “owe the Chinese people an apology.”26

According to a Beijing-sponsored media outlet directed at overseas Chinese, PLA’s Jiefangju Bao dedicated a full page targeting New Delhi’s “military

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24 Ibid, 979-980.
26 This is taken from the review in “PRC on India Tests.” The People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) and Jiefangju Bao articles were published promptly by Xinhua and carried by FBIS (internet version). As cited in Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Policy Priorities and Their Implications for the United States (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 137-138.
expansionism” and “ambition of seeking regional hegemony.” One such article purportedly detailed New Delhi’s military spending and weapons programs, as well as, its possession of intermediate-range nuclear-capable missiles that could reach southern China. This article further claimed that New Delhi had “intensified efforts to make war preparation” since the Cold War ended, and that such effort “was a means of attaining New Delhi’s strategic goal of dominating South Asia, containing China, controlling the Indian Ocean, and becoming a major military power.” Despite the criticisms from Beijing, these commentaries also noted the progress both sides have made in improving Sino-Indian relations and urged New Delhi to stop actions that would result in further damages.27 This suggests that Beijing was cautious of not letting history repeat itself vis-à-vis the 1962 border conflict. However, in spite of Beijing’s signal, “one should not conclude that China will ignore the seriousness of the threat posed by India’s nuclear weapons in the future…”28

B. NEW DELHI’S VIEW OF BEIJING

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had hoped that Beijing and New Delhi would create a partnership “in constructing a new Asian order…which would make a vast difference to the whole set-up and balance of the world.”29 New Delhi’s “appeasement”30 to Beijing included lobbying for Beijing’s entry into the UN, and supporting Beijing’s stance on the Korean Peninsula. Nehru went as far as coining the phrase “India and China are brothers,” or “Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai” in Hindi. However, New Delhi’s eagerness to please Beijing ultimately backfired, which forced New Delhi to shift its “China policy,” and New Delhi eventually declared war against Beijing over territorial disputes.

27 This is taken from the review in “PRC on India Tests.” The People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) and Jiefanjung Bao articles were published promptly by Xinhua and carried by FBIS (internet version). As cited in Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Policy Priorities and Their Implications for the United States (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 137-138.


30 John W. Garver characterizes New Delhi’s eagerness to please Beijing as “appeasement.”
1. **1962 Sino-Indian War**

In New Delhi’s view, national security interests are far more important than its cultural interest vis-à-vis Tibet. New Delhi’s strategy in protecting the Tibetan buffer zone, in preserving Tibetan autonomy, and in minimizing PLA presence in Tibet was to “…avoid confrontations, and befriending the PRC” to persuade Beijing that such action was unnecessary.\(^{31}\) This was also Nehru’s strategy of avoiding large defense expenditures due to the lack of funds, as well as, his fear of a militarized India. New Delhi’s “Tibet strategy” led to the 1954 agreement, in which New Delhi agreed to accept Beijing’s sovereignty over Tibet and recognition of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (or Panch Shila in Hindi). New Delhi’s acceptance of “China’s Tibet” also was partly influenced by the 1951 Seventeen Point Agreement between Beijing and Tibet. In what Nehru perceived was a “gentleman’s deal” (the 1954 agreement), Nehru was under the impression that Beijing had implicitly agreed to New Delhi’s position vis-à-vis the border, and therefore there was no need to secure a separate formal agreement on such issue.\(^ {32}\) Also central to the 1954 agreement was New Delhi’s perception of Beijing’s unspoken agreement to preserve “substantial de facto Tibetan autonomy.” New Delhi felt “betrayed” when Tibetan autonomy diminished under Beijing’s control.\(^ {33}\) In Indian nationalist opinion, the deepest offense regarding the Chinese control of Tibet is the perceived destruction of “India-derived Tibetan civilization” and “the fundamental Tibetan approach to life [which] reflected Indian aspiration.”\(^ {34}\)

Sino-Indian relations appeared to have deteriorated as Beijing asserted a tight grip over Tibet and successfully suppressed Tibetan insurgency. Issues that were previously


\(^{34}\) Ibid., 39-40.
deemed as insignificant became priorities. New Delhi’s “China policy” shifted drastically when Beijing refused New Delhi’s demand to withdrawal PLA troops from the disputed territory of Aksai Chin. In New Delhi’s view, Aksai Chin is an extension of Indian-controlled Kashmir, and the PLA had illegally occupied Indian territory with the construction of Xinjiang-Tibet Highway in 1957. When Nehru complained to Zhou Enlai about PLA’s direct intrusion into Indian territory, Zhou insisted that the area where Xinjiang-Tibet Highway was constructed belongs to China, contrary to his earlier response to Nehru in 1954.35

After New Delhi’s swift rejection of Beijing’s “informal offer” for a comprehensive compromise settlement of the boundary in 1960, New Delhi implemented a “forward policy,” which involved sending small contingents of lightly-armed Indian troops into the disputed areas of both Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, in the hopes that the presence of Indian troops would compel the PLA to withdrawal. This policy, in the words of one senior Indian general, “…had neither teeth nor tail” due to the lack of weaponry and the lack of logistical support36, which were all consequences of New Delhi’s defense policy.

The PLA’s attacks on Indian troops in the disputed territories left New Delhi in shock and took away any delusions New Delhi had on its friendship with Beijing, as well as, its dependency on geography as natural barriers against invasion.37 Nehru died in office two years later, and his daughter, Indira Gandhi, blamed the Chinese for her father’s death. New Delhi learned a hard lesson from this humiliating defeat, both in the loss of lives and in national pride. Consequently, New Delhi shifted its defense policy by accelerating its force modernization in all aspects, including actively seeking defense cooperation with the superpowers.


37 Ibid., 114-115.
2. 1998 Indian Nuclear Test

Following the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict and China’s first nuclear test, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi “expressed interest in nuclear deterrence provided by the superpowers” as a way to counter China. While many speculated the timing of *Operation Shakti* had to do with the Pakistani missile test and a provision of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), others believe it had to do with BJP, New Delhi’s newly-elected political party at the time. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had a long-standing “Great India” policy: “Great powers have nuclear weapons and so must India.”

Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes publicly commented that Chinese activities in South Asia had begun to “encircle” India. Beijing was New Delhi’s “potential threat number one” because “China has provided Pakistan with both missile as well as nuclear know-how,” and “it [China] has its nuclear weapons stockpiled in Tibet right along our borders.” He further stated that New Delhi should discard its “careless and casual attitude” towards its national security and be serious about making “real economic sacrifices” to prepare against Beijing’s military threat. The BJP spokesman Jag Mohan defended Fernandes’ position during a Lok Sabha debate: “We only …want to remain prepared….This is the basic issue….We only want that when we sit at the negotiation table they [China and Pakistan] should not get the impression that we are a weak nation and we can be pushed around.” Even the opposition party did not refute the “China threat”; instead, the Congress Party only pointed out that “India’s leaders ought not to talk openly and recklessly about such challenges.”

Prime Minister Vajpayee conveyed the same view but in a less-direct manner in his May 12, 1998 letter to President Clinton. In this letter, Vajpayee stated that New

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Delhi had faced “for some years past” a “deteriorating security environment, especially the nuclear environment….We have an overt nuclear weapon state [China] on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem.” In addition, this “overtly nuclear neighbor” had also “helped another neighbor of ours [Pakistan] to become a covert nuclear weapons state [which had also] attacked India three times in the last fifty years…..For the last ten years we have been the victims of unremitting terrorism and militancy sponsored by it.”

In spite of increased international criticisms instigated by Beijing and the inevitable Washington-imposed economic sanctions, New Delhi was determined not to back down and continued to reiterate its “China threat” belief. As if to add fuel to the fire, Vajpayee met with the Dalai Lama as Sino-Indian relations deteriorated in the aftermath of Operation Shakti, which was, as expected, met with strong condemnation from Beijing as “interference in China’s domestic affairs,” which violated New Delhi’s promise of not allowing the Dalai Lama to engage in “anti-China activities in India” and, as a result, caused “deep resentment” among the Chinese people.

As Washington attempted to re-engage New Delhi in the aftermath of its 1998 nuclear test, Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh told Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott: “Our problem is China. We are not seeking parity with China. … We are seeking a minimum deterrent.”

C. WASHINGTON’S VIEW OF BEIJING AND NEW DELHI

The purpose of this section is to answer the second question, “What is Washington’s view of Sino-Indian relations?” posed earlier. Washington viewed both

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Beijing and New Delhi in the context of the Cold War. Beijing to Moscow was what New Delhi was to Islamabad. The only difference lies in scale; the former is global strategic while the latter is continental strategic in South Asia.\textsuperscript{45} This view was also reflected in the U. S. foreign policy in the 1950s.

In spite of Indian Ambassador K. M. Panikkar’s warning of possible Chinese involvement in the Korean War\textsuperscript{46}, neither President Truman nor General MacArthur took the warning seriously, as President Truman viewed it as “a bold attempt to blackmail the United Nations.” According to President Truman’s Memoirs, “Mr. Panikkar had in the past played the game of the Chinese Communists fairly regularly, so that his statement could not be taken as that of an impartial observer.”\textsuperscript{47}

Even so, Washington’s aversion for Beijing increased as its troops became involved in the Korean War, its support for the communist Viet Minh, as well as, its instigation of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. New Delhi, on the other hand, despite Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ dislike for its non-aligned movement rhetoric, benefited from substantial economic aid from the Eisenhower administration, for President Eisenhower saw New Delhi’s political neutrality as an advantage. Washington sided with New Delhi in the Sino-Indian border dispute, as evidenced by President Eisenhower’s unprecedented visit to New Delhi in 1959, at the onset of the declining Sino-Indian relations. The 1962 Sino-Indian War coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis, a proxy war between the two superpowers. Upon the arrival of U.S. naval forces in the Bay of Bengal, Beijing’s sudden unilateral cease fire prevented Washington from intervening in this conflict.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{45} Harry Harding, “The Evolution of the Strategic Triangle: China, India, and the United States,” in The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know, ed. Francine R. Frankel & Harry Harding (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), 338. Dr. Harding is dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs and professor of international affairs and political science at George Washington University. He is a noted specialist on U.S. relations with Asia and has served on a number of boards contributing to U.S. policies towards Asia.


However, in spite of Washington’s show of support for New Delhi, New Delhi’s suspicion of the U.S.-Pakistan ties precluded further development of the U.S.-India bilateral relations. Washington provided more advanced arms packages to Islamabad as compared to New Delhi, as well as, its continued support of Islamabad over New Delhi on Kashmir. Nevertheless, Washington did so for two reasons. One was New Delhi’s objection over Washington’s position on Vietnam and nonproliferation, and the other was to prevent the inevitable China-Pakistan alliance, which Beijing was eager to form as a way to inflict further damage to New Delhi’s wound in the aftermath of the 1962 border conflict.

The 1970s saw a dramatic realignment of the Cold War blocs. In response, Washington shifted from containment to détente during the “Kissinger era.” With the Sino-Soviet split and the U.S.-China rapprochement, New Delhi and Moscow converged on common grounds. The 1971 India-Soviet treaty of peace and friendship was signed shortly after National Security Advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger visited Beijing. In Washington’s view, this took away India’s political neutrality and placed New Delhi in the Soviets’ communist camp. The tense relationship between Indira Gandhi and President Nixon only exaggerated this view and contributed to the deterioration of U.S.-India ties. Meanwhile, Washington stepped up its courtship with Islamabad to minimize Moscow’s influence in South Asia, and to deter New Delhi’s efforts in dominating the region. Washington resumed arms sales to Islamabad and welcomed strengthened Sino-Pakistan ties. Rather than a strategy of countering New Delhi, Beijing was cautious in justifying its growing ties with Islamabad as “containing the expansion of Soviet influence in Central Asia.” Some U.S. analysts argue that it was in this context that Beijing began to support Islamabad’s nuclear weapons program.

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The end of the Cold War not only brought triumph to Washington but also forced New Delhi and Beijing to navigate in previously unfamiliar waters. Despite increased flows of U.S. foreign direct investment, the U.S.-China relations suffered a major setback from the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. New Delhi, on the other hand, suffered a major domestic crisis of its own; its inability to meet its financial obligations nearly bankrupted the country. The Rao-Singh market reform in 1991 revived the Indian economy by devaluing the rupee, removed the stifling license system, lowered tariffs, and encouraged foreign direct investments in India.52 Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s Washington visit in 1994, aimed at attracting U.S. foreign direct investments to New Delhi, marked the starting point of the improved U.S.-India bilateral relations.53 Nevertheless, New Delhi’s decision to conduct its 1998 nuclear test, Operation Shakti, resulted in the U.S.-imposed economic sanctions in accordance with the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act.

Some in the United States believe that New Delhi’s perceptions of the “China threat” are well-justified. The unresolved territorial disputes from the 1962 war, the Chinese military presence in Myanmar, Sino-Pakistan relations, and their fundamental disagreement on the status of Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal, and Kashmir represent a serious possibility for another Sino-Indian military conflict.54

The 1998 nuclear test took place just as Washington and Beijing were seeking “a new strategic rationale…to replace the common opposition to Soviet expansion…in the 1970s,” and to overcome their differences in human rights, trade, and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. The joint U.S.-China statement on the 1998 South Asian Crisis, issued during President Clinton’s visit to Beijing, appeared to signal this realignment.55

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

In response to the first question, Sino-Indian relations in the decade leading up to their 1962 border conflict can be described as friendly, although each had their own agendas. The Cold War played a role in the continued Sino-Indian hostilities in the 1960s and the 1970s, as Beijing severed its ties with Moscow and formed new ones with Washington and Islamabad, while New Delhi developed its friendship with Moscow. Sino-Indian normalization coincided with the ending of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. India’s 1998 nuclear test brought unusually strong reaction from Beijing, but it did not stop the two from resuming their diplomatic relations after the 1998 South Asian Crisis.

Both Beijing and New Delhi wanted what they considered as rightfully theirs based on their self-perceived “cultural greatness” and for their own benefits (resources and security). Disputed frontier boundaries in desolate locations with multiple cultural influences are an opportunity for conflict. New Delhi’s military weakness was exposed in the 1962 war and resulted in its drive for the ultimate weapon. Beijing’s claim to all lands that may have ever been under its self-perceived sphere of influence is a major test of today’s international system. The topic of unspoken or undocumented agreements being broken is a weakness of New Delhi’s in its dealings with Beijing (and a lesson for others). The problem of less than complete documentation and agreements of intentions is again illustrated as an opportunity for conflict. In answering the second question, Washington’s desire for stability in this ancient but new born region magnified the problem of changing alliances. The regional shifting shades of grey in a White vs. Black Cold War world allowed the introduction of nuclear weapons to an area far distant from American shores. The goal of non-proliferation could only slow, not stop, the spread of such weapons.

In Washington’s calculation, as reflected in the U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, Beijing was more important than New Delhi. But now, nearly two decades after the end of the Cold War, New Delhi is as important as Beijing. In fact, it is important enough to counter a rising China, according to Washington’s calculation. The next chapter will unfold the U.S.-India strategic partnership. Although none of the five
questions will be answered in this chapter, Chapter III provides essential background needed to understand the significance of what Washington is willing to do in exchange to “partner-up” with New Delhi, which indirectly shows New Delhi’s elevated importance in Washington’s foreign policy calculations.
III. UNFOLDING THE U.S.-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

The purpose of this chapter is to reveal the four areas of U.S.-India strategic cooperation: security, high-technology trade, space, and nuclear cooperation. Emphasis will be placed on the nuclear cooperation, as it is the focus of this thesis. Reaction from Islamabad will also be covered, as New Delhi and Islamabad have been archrivals since their independence, and New Delhi also cited Beijing’s alleged assistance in Islamabad’s nuclear program as one of the reasons behind the 1998 nuclear test. None of the five questions will be answered directly in this chapter, but material presented in this chapter is relevant in answering the remaining three questions in the following chapters, as well as, the major question of this thesis.

In an attempt to bring New Delhi closer to Washington’s arms control and nonproliferation goals, the fourteen-round Talbott-Singh dialogue took place in seven different countries over a period of two years. Washington’s support for New Delhi over Islamabad during the 1999 Kargil Crisis signaled a shift in Washington’s Indian policy and marked the beginning of U.S.-India rapprochement. President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee’s reciprocal visits in 2000 further elevated the bilateral relations.

Although the Clinton administration laid the ground work for U.S.-India rapprochement, then governor of Texas George W. Bush had already showed an interest in forging alliance with India before winning his bid for the White House. After being briefed by his team of foreign policy advisors (led by Dr. Condoleezza Rice) in the spring of 1999, then Governor Bush asked “What about India? … A billion people in a functioning democracy. Isn’t it something? Isn’t it something?” Dr. Rice later wrote that China should be viewed as a “strategic competitor” rather than a “strategic partner,”


and suggested that the United States redirect its focus and “pay closer attention to India’s role in the regional balance...[there is a ] strong tendency to connect India with Pakistan and ...Kashmir or the nuclear competition.... India is an element in China’s calculation, and it should be America’s, too. India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one.”

The tragic events of 9/11 presented a perfect opportunity for the Bush administration to create “a new new world order” by enhancing New Delhi’s international role as an emerging power capable of countering China’s rise. This chapter discusses the “quartet”—the four controversial areas of the U.S.-India strategic cooperation, and it is comprised of four sections: The four areas of strategic cooperation with emphasis on the nuclear deal, reactions from Pakistan, and the chapter summary.

A. THE FOUR AREAS OF STRATEGIC COOPERATION

During an interview, then Secretary of State General Powell referred to the “basket of issues” from New Delhi as the “trinity”: “How could you help us? How can we expand our trade in high tech areas, in areas having to do with space launch activities, and with our nuclear industry?” The “trinity” later became the “quartet” when missile defense was included as part of the bilateral strategic cooperation. The now-concluded Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative allowed for the opening of “dialogue and build trust on a number of sensitive areas, including high-
technology trade, civil nuclear cooperation, space, and missile defense.”

Although the bilateral strategic partnership encompasses a wide range of issues ranging from a commitment to promote democracy to a pledge to reduce intellectual property piracy and to promote public health; unsurprisingly, the “quartet” turned out to be the essence of the bilateral strategic partnership.

1. Security Cooperation

The security cooperation pillar consists of three sub-categories: military-to-military relations, arms sales, and missile defense. The India-U.S. Defense Policy Group (DPG) has the broad oversight of U.S.-India bilateral security cooperation. A ten-year defense contract, signed in 2005, calls for an unprecedented, multi-faceted interaction covering a wide range of issues such as increasing bilateral defense trade and collaboration in missile defense, expanding opportunities for technology transfers and joint-production, as well as, creating a bilateral Defense Procurement and Production Group. In spite of the significant asymmetries on technology transfer, some experts praise Washington’s views of its defense relationship with New Delhi as “common principles and shared national interests.”

On the contrary, critics point out that Indian belief in nonalignment and multi-polarity will be a major obstacle for India to form any true strategic partnership with any country.

a. Military-to-Military Relations

The U.S.-India military cooperation intensified after 9/11. In 2003, the U.S. and Indian Special Forces held a high-altitude joint exercise in Ladakh for “interoperability” between the two armies. According to the local commander who hosted this exercise, the terrain in Ladakh are unlike those available in the United States, and this


type of exercise indicates a new long-term strategic and military understanding between New Delhi and Washington.65 Ironically, Ladakh is the province where Aksai Chin is located; and Aksai Chin is one of the disputed territories that led to the 1962 Sino-Indian War. The 2004 Cooperative Cope Thunder in Alaska was the Indian Air Forces’ first refueling mission outside India. Likewise, the 2004 Cope India maneuvers at Gwalior were the Indian Air Force’s largest and longest air combat exercise with a foreign counterpart. The Indian Air Force, despite of its older Soviet-supplied jets, outperformed its U.S. counterpart.66 The 2005 Cope India air exercise was the first bilateral exercise to involve Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft. In addition, the Malabar naval exercise in September and October 2005 was the largest U.S.-India joint exercise, and the first to involve aircraft carriers from the two navies. The two navies also demonstrated capabilities of responding jointly to emergencies at sea in a separate exercise conducted in the early part of 2006. While the two navies were collaborating at sea, the two armies held a company-sized exercise in the foothills of the Himalayas,67 further demonstrating “joint-ness” in all branches of the two militaries.

A “spillover” of bilateral military cooperation is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) introduced by President Bush in 2003, and the 2004-2005 tsunami relief in Southeast Asia. The PSI’s goal is to create multi-lateral cooperation on the interdiction of weapons of mass destructions (WMD)-related shipments.68 Under the PSI, 11 of more than 60 countries have committed to disrupt WMD trade. New Delhi has not joined the PSI as of yet; but if it did, it would significantly extend the initiative’s reach.69


66 Ibid.


Escalation in the cooperation of the two militaries, according to a report published by a Department of Defense-affiliated organization, is Washington’s aim to have a “capable partner” (i.e., New Delhi) to take on “more responsibility for low-end operations” in Asia. This report, a compilation of interviews with 82 senior U.S. and Indian (mostly military) officials who are closely linked with the bilateral security relations, concludes that Washington’s objective in its strategic relationship with New Delhi is a “hedge” against losing significant allies in Asia, more explicitly, Japan and South Korea.70

b. Arms Sales

Equipment commonality”71 will certainly enhance the interoperability aspect of the future bilateral joint operations. In 2002, Washington agreed to sell New Delhi 12 Firefinder radars (counter-battery radars) worth $190 million dollars. New Delhi also purchased counterterrorism equipment for its special forces and top-of-the-line U.S.-made electronic ground sensors, worth $29 million, for the Kashmir region. In 2004, Congress was notified of a possible sale, worth up to $40 million, of aircraft self-protection systems to be mounted on the aircraft that carry the Indian head of state. Additionally, Washington has agreed to sell New Delhi the jointly-developed U.S.-Israeli Phalcon airborne early-warning system, which may very well tilt the regional strategic balance. The 2006 Congressional approval for the sale of the decommissioned USS Trenton to New Delhi was worth $44 million. The former U.S. amphibious transport ship is now the second largest ship in the Indian Navy, the INS Jalashwa, commissioned


71Ibid.
in June 2007. New Delhi spent another $39 million for the purchase of six surplus Sikorsky UH-3H Sea King helicopters from Washington to go along with the INS Jalashwa. In May 2007, Congress was notified of a potential sale of six C-130J Hercules military transport aircraft in excess of $1 billion dollars, the largest defense deal to New Delhi to date.\footnote{K. Alan Kronstadt, India-U.S. Relations (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 30-31. RL33529.}

New Delhi reportedly has a wish list of U.S. made weapons, to include PAC-3 anti-missile systems, electronic warfare systems, and even combat aircraft. Washington has hinted that it is willing to entertain New Delhi’s requests on the possible purchase of F-16 or F/A-18 multi-role fighter jets, as well as, “the sale of transformative systems in areas such as command and control, early warning, and missile defense.” New Delhi is expected to issue a bid for 126 new fighter jets worth $9 billion dollars by the end of 2007, which arms dealers around the globe are expected to compete.\footnote{Ibid.}

Ironically, New Delhi has attempted to purchase the advanced Arrow Weapons System, an anti-missile system jointly developed by the United States and Israel, from Jerusalem instead of Washington. Despite the Pentagon’s willingness to approve the sale, the State Department is reluctant in supporting the sale, citing Washington’s obligations under Missile Technology Control Regime. As of the writing of this thesis, Washington has not approved the sale of this particular weapons system to New Delhi.\footnote{Ibid.}

c. Missile Defense

President Bush initiated his call for missile defense with New Delhi months before 9/11. Nearly six years later, progress on missile defense has been slow. Indian experts have attended briefings in Colorado in 2002, followed by attendance in the multilateral ballistic missile defense conferences in Kyoto and Berlin in 2003, as well as,
observed the U.S. Roving Sands missile maneuvers in Berlin in July 2004. Washington has gone only as far as discussing potential sales on such systems with New Delhi and not finalized any direct sales between the two. Meanwhile, New Delhi’s failed attempt in circumventing Washington in the purchase of the Arrow system from Jerusalem is one that would raise concerns on the motives behind New Delhi’s decisions in approaching Jerusalem vice Washington, its strategic partner.

Indian Defense Minister once said that New Delhi has no intentions of “accepting a missile shield from anyone.” Some Indian defense analysts have warned against the purchase, citing the high probability of ineffectiveness of U.S.-made systems and the potential insecurities that it would bring to the region.

2. High-Technology Trade

The high-tech trade pillar consists of dual-use high-technology goods, specifically, those with both civilian and military applications. Since its 1998 nuclear test, a number of Indian organizations have appeared on the U.S. export control “Entity List” as foreign end users implicated in weapons proliferation activities. As part of the NSSP initiative, seven Indian organizations were subsequently removed from the Entity List, including the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). The U.S.-India High-Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) was created in 2003 as a forum to facilitate the bilateral high-technology trade. The “Trusted Customer” program, designed to facilitate more bilateral high-technology trade, was introduced in 2006. The majority of dual-use licensing applications for New Delhi are approved. In fact, less than 1 percent of total

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U.S. exports to India have licensing requirements, down from 24 percent in 1999. Bilateral trade has reached $32 billion and is expected to double by 2010.\textsuperscript{78}

3. Civil Space Cooperation

Civil space cooperation is the third pillar of the bilateral strategic partnership, as New Delhi is reportedly to have been seeking American space technology since the 1960s. The \textit{NSSP} initiative called for bilateral cooperation on “the peaceful uses of space technology,” and the Bush-Singh July 2005 Joint Statement further called for “closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation and launch, and in the commercial space arena.” In 2006, Washington and New Delhi agreed to the “launch of U.S. satellites and satellites containing U.S. components by Indian space launch vehicles.” This agreement later expanded to include two U.S. scientific instruments on India’s Chandrayaan lunar mission scheduled for 2007.\textsuperscript{79}

With foreign assistance, New Delhi started developing its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability as early as the 1960s. The U.S., Russia, England, France, and China (the permanent-five members of the United Nations Security Council) use a ballistic missile as a space launch vehicle, while New Delhi chose to modify a space launch vehicle into a ballistic missile. Paul Wolfowitz is reportedly to have compared space launch vehicles to “peaceful nuclear explosives” (PNEs), since both have civilian applications, as well as, hardware and technology with military applications. New Delhi has exhibited this “interchangeability” with both the space launch vehicle and the PNEs.\textsuperscript{80} Secretary of State General Powell once commented that certain red lines with respect to proliferation need to be protected because it’s “hard to separate within space


launch activities…and nuclear programs…which could go to weapons…and which could be solely for peaceful purposes…”

Although New Delhi neither officially confirms nor denies the existence of its ICBM program, Indian analysts generally cite status as a world power and the ability to counter the “high-tech aggression” as demonstrated in the first Iraq War as the two reasons for pursuing an ICBM capability. The first reason given is straightforward and easily understood. The second reason, contrary to the first, is quite troublesome and, frankly, provoking. The second reason implies that Washington employed “high-tech aggression” during the 1990-1991 Iraq war, and it is Washington’s ability that New Delhi seeks to counter in the event of a conflict. The Surya-2 has a reported range of 12,000 km, capable of reaching the United States. The Surya-1 has a range of up to 5,000 km and is capable of reaching China.

The question now becomes: Does Washington want history to repeat itself vis-à-vis its space technology transfer/assistance to Beijing during the Reagan administration? Beijing stunned the international community with its first successful anti-satellite missile test in January 2007. While Beijing’s intentions behind its anti-satellite test remain undisclosed, it is highly possible that the U.S.-India Civil Space Cooperation has a great deal to do with it. New Delhi is already developing an ICBM capable of targeting the

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81 Ibid., 186-187.
United States. Any assistance to aid New Delhi’s ambition in its space exploration could potentially backfire on Washington in the future.

4. Civil Nuclear Cooperation

Civil nuclear cooperation is undoubtedly the cornerstone of the bilateral strategic partnership, and the most controversial one of the four areas. As Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “India has made this [nuclear cooperation] the central issue in the new partnership developing between our countries.”

According to this agreement, Washington agrees to acknowledge New Delhi as a globally-responsible possessor of nuclear weapons. In return, New Delhi agrees to “assume the same responsibility and practices” as if it were a NPT state, separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities, place two-thirds of its current civilian reactors (14 out of 22) under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection and keep the remaining for military use, as well as extending its moratorium on nuclear testing.

In December 2006, President Bush signed the “Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006” (aka, the “India deal,” or the “U.S.-India nuclear deal”), which legalized the export of nuclear technology and fuel to New Delhi despite the fact that New Delhi is not a signatory to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite the passing of the Hyde Act, the “India deal” is still as controversial today as the day it was announced, both at home and abroad. The next section will cover both the supporters and the opponents’ views, from both the United States and India, on the contentious “India deal.”

B. THE “INDIA DEAL”

The Bush administration emphasizes that this deal benefits the United States in five major areas. First, it benefits our security by bringing India “into the

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nonproliferation mainstream;” second, it benefits our consumers by reducing pressures on
global energy markets, specifically carbon-based fuels; third, it benefits the environment
by reducing carbon emissions/green house gases; fourth, it benefits U.S. business
interests through sales of nuclear reactors, fuel, and auxiliary services to India; and
finally, it enhances the progress of the broader U.S.-India “global partnership.”

It appears that, from what the Bush administration is advertising, America stands
to benefit more than India from this nuclear deal simply by recognizing New Delhi as a
nuclear power. If so, then why did it set off a storm in the nonproliferation world? And
if all New Delhi has to do is agree to be a pseudo-NPT state, place its civilian reactors
under IAEA inspections, and agree to no more nuclear testing, then why is the Singh
government having a hard time selling it to his Parliament? The next two sections will
closely examine arguments from both sides of the camp on the pros and cons of this
nuclear deal.

1. Supporters from the United States and India

The main supporters of the deal in the United States, along side the Bush
administration’s rhetoric, appear to be offering explanations that focus on the big picture.
Ashley J. Tellis, one of the principle architects of the deal and a senior associate at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says this deal provides New Delhi with a
back-up plan in the event that its indigenous nuclear plan falls short of expectations, and
this is not “a closet atoms for war” effort that would lead to the growth of New Delhi’s
nuclear arsenal, which would exacerbate the potential arms race with Beijing and

88 The main supporters of this deal appear to be either Indian-Americans or Americans who have
affinity for India. U.S. Ambassador Robert Blackwell and his advisor Ashley J. Tellis were the principle
architects behind this deal. Ambassador Blackwell has since resigned from public service and is now
employed in the lobbying industry for Indian causes. Ashley J. Tellis, an Indian-American, was intimately
involved in the negotiation of the “India deal.” He is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. Sumit Ganguly is a noted Indian-American scholar and the Director of the India
Studies Program at Indiana University, Bloomington. C. Raja Mohan is Strategic Affairs Editor at The
Indian Express and a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board.
Islamabad. Sumit Ganguly, a noted Indian-American scholar and the Director of the India Studies Program at Indiana University in Bloomington argues that this agreement enables New Delhi to address its energy needs, reduce the dangers of nuclear accidents at obsolete nuclear facilities, and solidifies its alliance with the world’s superpower, the United States. Additionally, according to C. Raja Mohan, who is Strategic Affairs Editor at The Indian Express and a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board, this deal is “less about nuclear issues than it is about creating the basis for a true alliance between the United States and India—about India to work in the United States’ favor as the global balance of power shifts.” Supporters of the India deal proclaim the passage of the Hyde Act as “the most significant U.S. strategic development since the end of the Cold War.”

To sum up, the supporters have neglected the first four areas of benefits claimed by the Bush administration and have chosen to concentrate on the fifth point, which is enhancing the broader U.S.-India strategic partnership.


91 C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Balance of Power,” Foreign Affairs 85 (2006), 28. C. Raja Mohan is Strategic Affairs Editor at The Indian Express and a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board.

2. Critics from the United States and India

While supporters of the deal focus on the balance of power and addressing New Delhi’s energy needs, critics of the U.S.-India nuclear deal\(^\text{93}\) have an abundance of counter-arguments ranging from technicalities dealing with nuclear weapons to strategic priorities of the United States. First, this deal will not benefit our security by bringing New Delhi “into the nonproliferation mainstream.” Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, DC who has also testified before Congress, insists that this deal will allow New Delhi to expand its civilian nuclear power program and free up its uranium to build more bombs. More importantly, this deal violates Article I of the NPT, which prohibits states (i.e., the United States) from helping nuclear weapons efforts of those (i.e., India) that did not have nuclear weapons prior to the treaty’s completion. Another equally important point is that “the Indian nuclear deal trades away our credibility on North Korea and Iran….the United States will be joining the ranks of North Korea and Iran as NPT violators.”\(^\text{94}\) Robert J. Einhorn, former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation from 1999-2001 and currently a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, echoes the same concerns.\(^\text{95}\)

Second, this deal does not benefit American consumers by way of stabilizing world energy markets from reduced Indian demands for oil, nor would it benefit the environment by reduced carbon emissions/green house gases. An analysis done by John Stephenson and Peter Tynan, both are consultants in Dalberg’s Washington, DC office, concludes that the economic and resource arguments as claimed by the backers of the

\(^{93}\) The main opponents of this deal are key non-proliferation experts in the United States. Henry Sokolski is the Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington DC and had testified against this nuclear deal before Congress. Robert J. Einhorn is former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation from 1999 to 2001 and currently a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Michael Krepon is Co-Founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center and a noted proliferation expert. George Perkovich is Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a leading expert on India’s nuclear program. All four are noted experts in the nonproliferation studies in the United States.


India deal is overstated. Nuclear energy is unlikely to reduce carbon emissions and is not the most significant option for reducing greenhouse gas. In fact, nuclear energy will not reduce India’s dependence on oil and gas. This conclusion nullifies the second and third so-called benefits.96

To support the invalidity of the second and third claimed benefits, nuclear energy will not substitute for most of the imported foreign fuels because the end uses are different in India. As Ashton Carter of Harvard University wrote, nuclear power can help but will not be the answer in addressing India’s energy problems. In the foreseeable future, India’s electricity will be generated from coal-burning power plants, and nuclear power will provide less than ten percent of the overall electricity output. Therefore, “…[nuclear power] can do little to slake the thirst of the principle consuming sector in India—transportation—because cars and trucks do not run off the electrical grid and will not for a long time.”97 Michael Levi and Charles Furguson, both of the Council on Foreign Relations, further emphasized that “most Indian oil is used by cars and trucks, not by power plants, so nuclear power will not significantly change the demand for oil.”98

To help in addressing India’s increased need for more and cleaner energy, says Henry Sokolski during testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, focus should be redirected to increase efficiencies in its consumption, distribution, and the generation of energy, which means a restructuring of New Delhi’s coal industry, curbing massive energy thefts and subsidies, as well as, expanding the use of renewable energy.99

Third, Washington’s strategic priorities are inverted because this deal sets precedence for Beijing to seek similar exemptions in the future, which further undermines Washington’s efforts in curbing China’s rise, according to George Perkovich, Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a


leading expert on India’s nuclear program. Economic growth is the first and foremost determinant of both Indian and Chinese power and stability; the U.S.-India strategic partnership as a whole offers nothing significant to foster Indian economic growth. Besides, this deal will not “buy lasting Indian partnership” because the basis of the U.S.-India strategic partnership is too shaky.\textsuperscript{100} Michael Krepon, another noted nonproliferation expert in the United States, shares the same concerns.\textsuperscript{101} This argument discounts the fifth so-called benefit and is a direct contrast of the supporters’ argument of focusing on the big picture.

In addition to strong domestic opposition in the United States, this deal has also generated its fair share of criticism in India. Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, points out that this deal could permanently poison the growing U.S.-India ties before the deal was announced. More to the point, because only non-nuclear weapon states are subject to IAEA inspection, “discrimination is built into the deal” when New Delhi agrees to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA inspection. To further dispute the second and the third benefits of the deal as claimed by the Bush administration, nuclear power will not help ease India’s energy demands because nuclear power plants take too long to build, and nuclear energy only makes up a tiny share of India’s total electricity demand. Similarly, India does not use oil to generate electricity, so this deal will not decrease India’s oil dependence and help stabilize world oil prices. Lastly, it’s all about the money: New Delhi has promised to import eight American reactors worth up to $20 billion within the next six years. This deal will help revive U.S. nuclear power industry, which has not received a single reactor order in more than three decades.\textsuperscript{102} Chellaney’s last point, ironically, substantiates the fourth so-call benefit of the deal as advertised by the Bush administration: it’s all about the money.


Even worse than disputing the so-called major benefits by New Delhi’s analysts is the domestic political opposition by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), one of New Delhi’s main political parties: “...the stipulations [of this deal]...would ‘cap’ India’s nuclear program and ‘keep India in perpetual bondage’ to Washington.”\textsuperscript{103} The BJP has opposed this deal since it was announced in July 2005. Two years after the deal was announced, Washington and New Delhi finally came to a consensus over a technical pact known as the 123 agreement, referring to Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Washington gave New Delhi just about everything it asked for, which suggests that Indian persistence prevailed over American impatience.

In spite of this, the Indian communist parties insist that this nuclear deal would allow Washington to influence New Delhi’s foreign policy and to control its treasured nuclear weapons program. The Indian communist parties’ fundamental objection over this nuclear deal came from their broader ideology: They don’t want New Delhi to lean towards Washington and they don’t want India to be a client state to the U.S., comments Sharad Joshi, a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies.\textsuperscript{104} As Basudeb Acharya, a top official of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) stated, “We must stand against a strategic partnership with the United States of America.” He also called the Iraq war and Washington’s attempt in stopping Tehran’s nuclear weapons program “foreign policy adventures [that] we want no part of...” Some opponents of the deal attempted to disrupt the Indian Parliament by shouting at Singh during his victory speech over the 123 agreement: “...[this deal] is another step in our journey to regain our due place in global councils.”\textsuperscript{105}

Besides objection over ideological differences between the two countries, critics in New Delhi have also stressed that the vagueness of the U.S.-India 123 agreement does

\textsuperscript{103} K. Alan Kronstadt, \textit{India: Chronology of Recent Events} (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Services, 2006). RS21589. This statement was made by the head of India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP has a long standing “Great India” policy which essentially states “great powers have nuclear weapons and so must India.”


not specifically state New Delhi’s right to test nuclear weapons. In addition, it makes no specific mention to the possible halt of the nuclear deal should New Delhi decide to test nuclear weapons in the future, suggesting that Washington’s goal is to terminate New Delhi’s nuclear weapons program. However, the 123 agreement does explicitly acknowledge New Delhi’s right to stockpile and to reprocess nuclear fuel. Although no parliamentary approval is required, the Singh government could collapse if the majority of his parliament walks out over their objection of the nuclear deal. If so, it would “be a major setback to India’s international ambitions...[because]...India, without the help of the United States and or any other big power, will take much longer to be counted globally,” says retired Indian General Ashok Mehta.¹⁰⁶

Regardless of the consensus over the 123 agreement, the nuclear deal still needs the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and the U.S. Congress approval by December 2007 before it is complete, or else the deal will be dead and difficult to revive as the next presidential election will be in full swing after that. While this chapter has so far provided an overview of the U.S.-India strategic cooperation with emphasis on the nuclear deal, it would not be balanced without covering reactions from Islamabad, which is covered in the following section.

C. REACTIONS FROM PAKISTAN

The Bush administration justifies its decision not to extend the same courtesy to Pakistan by comparing the nonproliferation track record of New Delhi to that of Islamabad. Differences between Washington and Islamabad remain over the legitimacy of the A. Q. Khan investigation, Washington’s perception of a lack of effort on the part of Islamabad in combating terrorism, and the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline.

Pakistan has stood firm in its opposition to the U.S.-India nuclear deal since the very beginning and has disagreed with Washington over the “de-hyphenated [U.S.] South Asia policy.”¹⁰⁷ A Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson stated, “Our relations with the

U.S. have their own dynamics and we do not have to compare what the U.S. does with other countries, but certainly if an exception is made for one country in the NSG, we would like that to be extended to Pakistan as well.”

Upon the announcement of the U.S.-India 123 agreement, the Pakistani National Command Authority cautioned that the nuclear deal would tilt the strategic balance in the Asian region. Islamabad further cautioned that the India nuclear deal has “implications on strategic stability,” as it would allow New Delhi “to produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from unsafeguarded nuclear reactors….Strategic stability in south Asia and the global non-proliferation regime would have been better served if the U.S. had considered a package approach for Pakistan and India…with a view to preventing a nuclear arms race in the region.” As if it were sending a powerful message to Washington that it, too, has options, Islamabad has officially approached the NSG in seeking an equivalent of the “Indian exception” following the announcement of the U.S.-India 123 agreement. Islamabad’s action appears to be in sync with Beijing’s efforts in crafting a set of special rules for non-NPT states.

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Washington’s “appeasement” of New Delhi is comparable to New Delhi’s appeasement of Beijing half a century ago. The appearance of caving in to the majority of New Delhi’s demands shows Washington’s eagerness to act in the geopolitical balance of Asia and the unstated importance of both New Delhi and Beijing in the U.S. foreign policy priorities. However, Washington’s neglect of Islamabad and the NPT regime is not without consequences.

Beijing’s efforts in making a special set of rules for those outside of the NPT regime, of which Islamabad is a member of, is not a coincidence; in fact, the seed was perhaps already planted when Washington refused to grant Islamabad its version of the


“India deal,” if not earlier. Chinese consent is required for New Delhi to receive NSG approval before the deal moves forward to the Congress. Based on the current state of Sino-Indian relations, it is unlikely that Beijing will object to the U.S.-India nuclear deal. Contrary to the American style of “be vocal and hurry things,” the Chinese are known for their subtlety and taking their time. The next chapter, the heart of this thesis, will explore Beijing’s perception of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, its reactions, and possible future actions.
IV. BEIJING’S PERCEPTIONS OF AND REACTIONS TO THE INDIA DEAL

The purposes of this chapter are to answer the third question (“How does Beijing perceive the U.S.-India nuclear deal?”) and the fourth question (“How will Beijing react in the future?”) of this thesis. In doing so, one must first understand that East Asians think differently than Westerners. This will begin with several critical concepts that are “uniquely” Chinese, all of which are vital in understanding how the Chinese perceive, and what the Chinese perceive as threats. From there, questions three and four will be answered in the later sections of this chapter.

Chapter IV is divided into four sections: the “uniquely” Chinese concepts, Beijing’s perceptions of threats, Beijing’s perceptions of and reactions to the India deal, and chapter summary.

A. THE “UNIQUELY” CHINESE CONCEPTS

To understand the Chinese way of thinking, one must understand the differences between the East Asian way of thinking versus Western thoughts. According to Dr. Richard E. Nisbett, a noted American psychologist, Western thoughts are influenced by ancient Greek philosophers and are thus more analytic. In the Western way of thinking, “objects and people are separated from their environment, categorized, and reasoned about using logical rules.” On the other hand, East Asians are influenced by ancient Chinese philosophies such as Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. The East Asian way of thinking is thus holistic, “perceiving and thinking about objects in relation to their environments and reasoning dialectically, trying to find the Middle Way between opposing propositions.” Because social practices are different, thoughts are therefore different. “...the West being individualistic and the East collectivistic.”

111 Richard E. Nisbett, The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently...and Why (New York: The Free Press, 2003). Dr. Nisbett is Theodore M. Newcomb Distinguished University Professor at the University of Michigan. His research focus has primarily been on how laypeople reason and make inferences about the world. Dr. Nisbett’s most recent work focuses on the reasoning comparisons of East Asian and Westerners.
above, it can be said that harmony and balance are the dominant factors in the traditional East Asian way of thinking.\textsuperscript{112}

Now that it has been established that East Asians think differently than Westerners, one must also grasp three “uniquely” Chinese concepts in order to understand how the Chinese perceive. These Chinese concepts are cultural superiority, \textit{shi}, which means soft power, and comprehensive national power. Since there are ethnic Chinese in almost all parts of the world, it must be clarified that the concepts of cultural superiority and \textit{shi} are passed down as part of the traditional Chinese family teachings and thus are known to ethnic Chinese worldwide. However, the concepts of cultural superiority and \textit{shi} are most notable among ethnic Chinese residing in China. Unlike the first two concepts, the concept of comprehensive national power was developed by Beijing’s influential elite.

1. Cultural Superiority

If there is one thing that students from Brigadier General Charles W. Hooper’s Chinese Foreign Policy class at the Naval Postgraduate School walked away from, it is “an inherent belief in the superiority of Chinese culture.”\textsuperscript{113} The self-perceived “cultural superiority” is the result of its 5,000-year-old ancient civilization, the achievements of this civilization (i.e., paper, gunpowder, printing, and magnetic compass), its self-proclaimed “pursuit of peace,” and its defensive approach (as a result of its “Century of National Humiliation,” hence the self-proclaimed “victims of foreign aggression” mentality), all of which have been consistently demonstrated in Chinese writings and rhetoric.

This “cultural superiority” was evident during PLA Lieutenant General Li Jijun’s speech to an audience of American military officers at the U.S. Army War College. General Li attributed China’s “uninterrupted civilization” to “the soul of the Chinese

\textsuperscript{112} Susan L. Craig, \textit{Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats} (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 6. \url{http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/} Date accessed: August 16, 2007. In addition, the author of this thesis has first hand knowledge and thus is keenly aware of the Chinese concepts discussed here.

\textsuperscript{113} Charles W. Hooper, Brigadier General, U.S. Army. \textit{Chinese Foreign Policy}, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, September-December 2006. BG Hooper is now the Defense Attaché in Beijing.
nation, which makes unremitting efforts for self-improvement and stresses morality and respect for others and national unity.”

“National unity” is referencing China’s “Century of National Humiliation” as a result of the invasion by the West. To the Chinese, despite the fact that America took no part in contributing to its “Century of National Humiliation,” the United States is guilty by association for the simple fact that America is part of the “West.”

General Li also told the story of Chinese explorer Zheng He, 87 years before Christopher Columbus’ voyage, to emphasize the Chinese goals of “…to convey friendship and goodwill and to promote economic and cultural exchanges,” contrary to “…Western explorers who conquered the land they discovered…[Zheng He’s] fleet was not a voyage to plunder the local populace for treasure nor was it one to establish…colonies.” An article featured in the opinions section of China Daily on the 600th anniversary of Zheng He’s first expedition echoed the same sentiment, “…China cherishes a similar desire to befriend the world. But regrettably its goodwill is demonized because established powers fear a resurgent China.” This article is a rare but candid view of Beijing’s belief that countries such as the United States and Japan fear its rise.

Because of its colored-perception of “cultural superiority,” Beijing believes that it can transform itself into the global rank of the rich and powerful without resorting to violence (as compared to Germany during World War I and Japan during World War II) for two reasons. According to Ye Zicheng, Director for Chinese Strategic Studies at Beijing University, “…[Beijing] has no intent[ion] to challenge the existing international system through military expansion…” And because of Beijing’s importance in the global

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114 Speech by Lieutenant General Li Jijun, “Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China: An Address to the U.S. Army War College,” Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 29, 1997. General Li was the Vice President of the Academy of Military Science. Despite of his retirement since making this speech, General Li is still considered as one of China’s most respected and influential strategists. As cited in Susan L. Craig, Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 6-8.


115 Ibid.


economy, its rise can occur peacefully.\textsuperscript{117} The implicit message here is, although Beijing does not intend to challenge the existing international system \textit{militarily}, it plans to \textit{restructure} the current international system via \textit{economic expansion}, as demonstrated in its self-proclaimed importance in the global economy. Should its road to becoming a world power be interrupted, Beijing’s self-perceived “righteousness” justifies its decision in resorting to military actions. It is very important to note that, when Beijing’s actions are \textit{not} in line with its rhetoric (i.e., “active defense,” “peaceful development,” “win-win,” and “mutual security through cooperation”), it \textit{still perceives} its actions as guided by the principles of morality, peace, and defense.\textsuperscript{118} Regardless of the reasoning behind its decisions, Beijing’s self-perceived “righteousness” is the “one size fits all” justification to its actions.

\section*{2. \textit{Shi} (勢 in traditional Chinese or 势 in simplified Chinese)}

To understand the Chinese mindset, one must also grasp the concept of \textit{shi}, which in general terms means (soft) power, influence, momentum, or tendency.\textsuperscript{119} In national security terms, Chinese linguists define it more specifically as the “strategic configuration of power” or “the potential borne of disposition.” The Chinese believe that \textit{shi} represents the natural power in all things.\textsuperscript{120} A more mystical Chinese explanation of \textit{shi} is that the \textit{ying} and the \textit{yang} (i.e., the sun, the moon, and the stars) have to be “just right” in order for one to gain the upper hand to exploit the circumstance to one’s benefit. The Chinese believe that everyone regardless of social status can take advantage of \textit{shi} by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Ralph Sawyer defines it as “strategic configuration of power” in his translations of the \textit{Seven Military Classics}. Francois Jullien wrote an entire book on the concept called \textit{The Propensity of Things}. The phrase “potential borne of disposition” is one of the many ways he attempts to capture the concept. As cited in Susan L. Craig, \textit{Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats} (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 11. \url{http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/} Date accessed: August 16, 2007. The author of this thesis is familiar with this Chinese concept, as this concept was taught to her at a very early age when she lived in Taiwan.
\end{itemize}
understanding and taking advantage of the situation. For example, Japan had shi during World War II because it was a rising power. Japan had resources that enabled it to achieve its objectives, and it seized the opportunity to exploit the situation to its advantage. However, when Japan was forced to surrender at the end of World War II, world politics no longer favored Japan’s rise and therefore Japan had lost shi. Japan had regained shi at the assistance of the United States, which led it to become one of the world’s leading economies in the 1980s. In the case of China, its “Century of National Humiliation” was its turn in the bottom of barrel. Now it is Beijing’s turn to be a rising global power, the momentum of becoming a great global power is on its side, and it is determined to seize and prolong this “strategic window of opportunity”\(^{121}\) by materializing yet another Chinese concept, comprehensive national power.

3. Comprehensive National Power (CNP)

Beijing believes Western powers measure their national strengths in terms of military force and international influence (i.e., the size of the U.S. military and how much shi Washington has in world affairs, for instance, in convincing the UN to support the U.S.-led Iraq war). Contrary to the West, Beijing’s CNP comprises of a wide range of factors and emphasizes survival, development, and international influence.\(^{122}\) According to Li Changjiu, “Comprehensive national strength refers to the organic whole of various forces possessed by a sovereign state [containing] various elements including resources, economy, military, science and technology, education, politics, diplomacy, and national willpower and cohesive force.”\(^{123}\) The Chinese developed a mathematical formula to


calculate the CNP of ten countries. While the mathematical formula seems to be objective, the subjectivity is highly questionable because the quantitative values assigned are based on the Chinese-perceived international influence of these countries.

Beijing was in the midst of an economic boom when it witnessed the disastrous implications of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis in its periphery. To insulate itself from similar incidents, which would disrupt its economic development, Beijing set up a research group comprised of more than 100 scholars to calculate, via a mathematical formula, the CNP of different countries. China ranked sixth according to the group’s calculus. A more important conclusion derived from this is that China will continue to rise. According to Li Zhongjie, director of the Central Party School’s Scientific Research Department, “China’s political status and influence in the world is constantly on the rise.” Moreover, despite ranking the United States as number one in CNP, the Chinese believe that America’s shi is in decline due to the pursuit of unfavorable unilateral actions (i.e., the Iraq war) and thus isolation from the world community, as well as, a developing multi-polar world. The Chinese influential elites believe the United States is well on the way to its demise because of the American scholars who write about the decline in American soft power. This Chinese perception has led to yet another formula:

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\text{American actions of alienating the international community} + \text{Chinese actions of international cooperation} = \text{elevating Chinese international stature and influence} = \text{strengthened Chinese CNP.}\]

124 “Comparison of Comprehensive Power of Major World Countries,” Wang Ling, ed., *Yellow Book of International Politics Reports on International Politics and Security*, Beijing: Social Sciences Academy Press, 2006. Ranking of ten countries in this study is as follows: The United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, Germany, China, Japan, Canada, Korea, and India.


Although Beijing’s CNP comprises more than military strength, Chinese military strategists use CNP as a framework in guiding their strategic outlook and measuring the PLA’s potential combat effectiveness. According to Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi in *The Science of Military Strategy*, CNP is “the source of combat effectiveness” and “the fundamental base for war preparations.” In other words, a country’s strong CNP can serve as a valuable deterrent against attack, whereas a weak country (defined by a weak CNP) is “…often …the first target to be invaded and controlled by hegemonists.” In short, in Beijing’s eyes, its national strength is multi-faceted, as opposed to the Chinese-perceived two-prong national strength in the West.

Beijing sees the world moving towards multi-polarity, which benefits its rise in terms of stature and influence in the world. Beijing also understands that to sustain a strong CNP, it must focus on long term efforts. Despite this favorable trend, the “time frame” beneficial to Beijing’s growth into a world power “is limited and fraught with danger.” Therefore, Beijing must seize the “window of strategic opportunity” in continuing its economic growth and social transformation, while eliminating any external threats to maintain peace and stability at the same time.

However, despite its multilateralism rhetoric, Beijing does not appear to have discarded behaviors associated with its traditional “Middle Kingdom” mentality, as it has a very broad definition of what it sees as threats. For example, Beijing sees anything that compromises its sovereignty, territorial integrity, economic growth, social and political transformation, “national dignity,” and “status of equality in the international community” as threats. Further, it considers its over-dependence on resources from abroad, Washington’s insistence on unilateral actions in world affairs, and its own population unable to go beyond the historical memories with Japan (as a result of its own

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129 Ibid., 210.


propaganda from some years past) as endangering its national security. The next section discusses Beijing’s perceptions of threats, as it is also important in answering questions three and four in the later part of this chapter.

B. BEIJING’S PERCEPTIONS OF THREATS

To understand Beijing’s perceptions of threats, one must understand that Beijing labels threats in two broad categories: Nontraditional threats and traditional threats. Nontraditional threats are issues such as the bird flu, AIDS, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), piracy, drug and human trafficking, economic and social disparities, environmental degradation, and energy dependence. Beijing is extremely concerned with these nontraditional threats coming from within because only serious internal reforms can fix these issues, and it is unable to carry out these reforms.

While nontraditional threats consist of domestic issues, traditional threats originate from abroad. Traditional threats, according to Beijing’s definition, originate from a country’s alleged willingness and capability of jeopardizing China’s national security (i.e., sovereignty, economic development, and international stature). Beijing classifies the United States, Japan, and India as traditional threats because of historical memories and existing differences, and the abilities these three countries have in interrupting China’s rise to becoming a great global power. Beijing is very concerned about the possible containment (i.e., economic, political, and diplomatic) by any or all of these countries. In addition, Beijing is apprehensive towards “the fluctuating, unpredictable, and seemingly unstable nature of the democratic process” in the United States, Japan, and India.

Since the topic of this thesis deals with two of the three countries that Beijing sees as threats, the next section will deal with Beijing’s perception of Washington as a threat, followed by its perception of New Delhi as a threat.

133 Ibid., vii-ix.
134 Ibid.
1. **Washington**

Beijing sees Washington as a threat for two reasons: Washington’s desires to maintain its sole superpower status and the “China threat” theory. This section will be further broken down into two sub-sections to further elaborate why Beijing believes Washington is a threat.

   **a. Hegemony**

Beijing’s analysis of Washington as a threat can best be summarized by this statement: “Many hotspot problems are...close to China...complex and fragile peripheral security environment...Kashmir and Afghanistan...Korean peninsula...South China Sea and Taiwan Strait...‘the American factor’ is behind all these problems...”

In reference to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula, one leading Beijing scholar alleges Pyongyang’s nuclear test in October 2006 “is brought about by the United States and is part of the U.S. strategic plan [in maintaining its hegemony].” Shen Dingli, Vice President of the Institute of International Issues and Director of the U.S. Research Center at Fudan University, claims Washington-imposed sanctions on Pyongyang gave Pyongyang “an excuse” not to participate in the Six-Party Talks, while at the same time insisting Beijing accept responsibilities for Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, which was caused by threats from Washington in the first place. In doing so, Washington hopes to “drive a wedge” between Beijing and Pyongyang. Moreover, Washington is “undermining [Beijing’s] influence over [Pyongyang]” by bringing in the “multilateral framework of the United Nations.” Shen further contends that because Washington and Seoul have different policies vis-à-vis Pyongyang, Washington intentionally caused Pyongyang to conduct nuclear test so to sabotage the Seoul-Pyongyang bilateral relations, thereby strengthening the fragile Washington-Seoul relations.

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While Shen’s theory seems far fetched from an American perspective, it is representative of Beijing’s obsession with the “American threat.” Beijing’s leading American scholars conclude that Washington’s grand strategy is to maintain hegemony, and this perception is apparent in their writings. For instance, Lie Jianfei, Professor at the Central Party School, wrote “The core content of US global strategy…to establish and consolidate its world leadership status…and maintain its world hegemony status.” According to Ruan Zongze, Deputy Director and Research Fellow at China Institute of International Studies, “…the United States has made the maintenance of its hegemony the goal of its global strategy now and for a long time to come.” Jin Canrong, Vice President and Professor at School of International Relations in Chinese People’s University wrote, “…the national strategic goal of the…United States…is, to maintain…‘world leadership status’ for as long as possible.” Wang Jisi, former Director of Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences wrote, “The United States is the sole superpower…and will be the only nation…[with] capacity…ambition to exercise global hegemony…”


These examples reveal Beijing’s infatuation with the concept of hegemony, which has a very negative tone in the Mandarin language because Beijing faults hegemony as the root cause of its “Century of National Humiliation,” which is still deeply ingrained in its people. Beijing’s obsession with hegemony further reinforces its perception of the United States being a hegemonic power. In fact, the opinion of the United States being a hegemonic power dominates all Chinese perceptions about the United States today. Based on this, Beijing concludes that because a rising China challenges America’s status as the world’s sole superpower, Washington will thus do anything to contain China while it is still capable of doing so. Beijing further concludes that American foreign policy of spreading democracy, unilateralism, and preemption (i.e., Taliban in Afghanistan and the Iraq war) is Washington’s way of solidifying and prolonging its supremacy.\textsuperscript{141} This Chinese perception of the American intent on prolonging America’s supremacy is very similar to the Chinese way of seizing its so-called “strategic window of opportunity” via its CNP.

Unlike the Chinese, America’s National Security Strategies are published on a regular basis as mandated by the U.S. Congress, and when these security doctrines are published, they are studied very closely by Beijing’s America-watchers. Unsurprisingly, Beijing perceives the 2002 and 2006 United States National Security Strategies as threatening because of the emphasis on spreading democracy and “the latitude in…acting preemptively.” From the Chinese perspective, the latter translates to interference in others’ domestic affairs, which violates its “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.” Wang Pufeng, a senior officer at the Academy of Military Science, is of the opinion that the United States National Security Strategy is “threatening because of the leeway it provides America in invading China.”\textsuperscript{142} While Washington has never threatened to invade China, Beijing senses otherwise.

In essence, Beijing interprets America’s national security strategies as evidence in maintaining American hegemony, which is against the Chinese view of the


\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 30-31.
current world trend of multi-polarity. This is not acceptable to Beijing because it has been thriving in a multi-polar world since the late 1980s, and it needs this multi-polarity to continue in order to maximize its “strategic window of opportunity” and to achieve its modernization goals. The American cowboys have therefore threatened the Chinese security environment, of which Beijing relies on for its prosperity and rise to becoming a great global power.143

As if the Chinese allegation of American hegemony isn’t enough, Beijing’s America-watchers believe Washington’s “China Threat” theory is a strategy in limiting China’s rise, which will be discussed next.

b. The “China Threat” Theory

No one can precisely point out the origin of the “China threat” theory, although a widely held belief amongst the Chinese scholars is that this theory has been around since the Cold War era, and the emphasis of the “China threat” theory is driven by the state of U.S.-China bilateral relations. Regardless of the validity of this theory, “the spread of the China threat theory in itself is a threat to China.”144 Beijing does not appreciate this anti-China theory for two reasons. One, this anti-China theory may materialize and thus hurt Beijing’s self-proclaimed peace-loving image. In fact, Beijing had begun “to hire international media expertise to polish China’s image” as early as 1991 to lobby the U.S. Congress for the unconditional renewal of the most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status, which succeed. The Chinese also hired an American consulting firm to run its public relations campaign in its bid for the 2008 Olympics, which also succeed.145 In this case, Beijing is so preoccupied with the “China threat” theory that it even published a white paper in 2005 explicitly defending its position while implicitly refuting the Chinese-perceived, American-instigated, anti-China theory. The other reason Beijing would like to control this anti-China theory is that it doesn’t want to

144 Ibid., 33-34.
become Washington’s “strategic rival,” just as Moscow was to Washington during the Cold War. Beijing realizes that if it were Washington’s “strategic rival,” Washington would employ whatever means necessary to contain it, which will interrupt its efforts in seizing the so-called “strategic window of opportunity.”

Beijing validates its perception of Washington’s anti-China theory through American policy statements, American actions, and American academia. Speeches and statements by American lawmakers are constantly under scrutiny by Chinese scholars. As a matter of fact, Beijing interprets these statements as Washington’s acceptance of the “China threat” theory. For instance, Beijing considers former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s June 2005 speech in Singapore “insulting” because Secretary Rumsfeld refers to the PLA military buildup as “a concern.” Not only that, it sees the congressionally-mandated Pentagon publication, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, as proof of Washington’s Cold War mentality. The PLA General Peng Guangqian observed that there have been only two occasions where Washington has published on the military power of another country: one was on the former Soviet Union, and the other is the current report on China. General Peng concludes, “Cooking up this kind of report…reflects typical Cold War thinking.” The Chinese conclude that the Americans are threatened by them because of the congressionally-mandated Pentagon publication. Based on this, Chinese scholars further question how the Americans could feel threatened when its military is far more powerful and its budget for military expenditure is significantly higher than that of the PLA. Of course, the PLA budget is questionable from an American perspective, but


the subliminal message here is the typical Chinese-style psychology of pumping one up to redirect one’s attention away from the real issue.

From Beijing’s perspective, the Pentagon’s report is an indication of Washington’s Cold War thinking and suspicion, which is a mentality threatening to the PLA’s modernization effort and its quest for international influence. Not only that, it also finds Washington’s actions as proof to the Chinese-perceived, America-instigated, anti-China theory. More to the point, Beijing perceives Washington’s actions as efforts to contain China’s rise. For example, it believes that Washington is focused in the Asian Pacific region because it is physically surrounded by American forces. The U.S.-Japan security cooperation led Beijing to conclude that it is another of Washington’s strategies in limiting China’s rise. Washington’s strengthened relations with Beijing’s neighbors (i.e., Japan, Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, and India) are seen as a part of Washington’s ‘grand contain China” plan. Moreover, because of the extreme emphasis the Chinese place on money (they attach monetary values to everything, and they determine where a person is in the food chain based on his income), Beijing has determined that Washington’s demand to float the RMB is an American strategy in further containing China’s rise and therefore is part of America’s “contain China policy.”

As if referencing Washington’s policy statements and actions weren’t enough, Beijing’s America-watchers also point to American scholars for evidence of the “China threat” theory. Contrary to their American peers, Chinese scholars work for the Chinese government and are therefore subordinates of the Chinese Community Party. Disregard the different practices in the two countries, Chinese scholars perceive the writings of American scholars as indicative of a Washington policy statement. The Chinese influential elite favor John Mearsheimer’s neoconservative theory because it “fits” the Chinese explanation of the Chinese-perceived, America-instigated, anti-China theory. Dr. Mearsheimer concludes that Beijing and Washington are “destined to be

adversaries” as Beijing will try to take over Asia the way Washington controls the Western Hemisphere. While Dr. Mearsheimer is an accomplished political scientist at the University of Chicago, these Chinese scholars have failed to take into account that Dr. Mearsheimer has spent his entire career in academic settings and has not served in any official government post. Nevertheless, Mearsheimer’s conclusion validates Chinese perceptions of an American threat; that is, Washington seeks to maintain hegemony and therefore seeks to contain China via slowing the dragon’s economic growth.

John Stoessinger’s statement is most appropriate in summarizing Chinese perceptions of the American threat, “If a nation perceives another nation to be its enemy, and does so hard enough and long enough, it will eventually be right.” Now that Beijing’s assessment of Washington as a threat has been covered, next section will focus on Beijing’s views of New Delhi as a threat, as it is also crucial in answering questions three and four that this thesis seeks to answer.

2. New Delhi

The best way to predict where New Delhi stands in Beijing’s foreign policy priorities is by the number of Indian experts Beijing has. In fact, it is fair to say that Beijing’s India policy is reactionary to Washington’s India policy. Despite New Delhi’s elevated importance in Beijing’s eyes, New Delhi still has far more China experts than Beijing has Indian experts. Nevertheless, Beijing sees New Delhi as a threat for a number of reasons. Besides the enduring Sino-Indian rivalries already covered in Chapter one of this thesis, Beijing perceives New Delhi’s competition for resources and New Delhi’s military modernization as major sources of threat. Each of these Chinese-perceived Indian threats will be elaborated in the subsequent sections.


a. **Competition**

For a country that never fails to remind others of its “Century of National Humiliation” and the constant implicit display of the “victims of foreign aggression” mentality, Beijing appears to have swept its historical differences with New Delhi under the rug. Its rhetoric towards New Delhi now emphasizes cultural similarities, shared interests, friendship and cooperation. Nonetheless, Beijing does not see New Delhi as its equal. In fact, Beijing is superior to New Delhi because, according to Beijing’s own mathematical calculation in CNP, Beijing ranked sixth and New Delhi ranked tenth.\(^\text{153}\)

Zhao Gancheng, Director of South Asia Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, asserts that New Delhi is resentful of Beijing because Beijing developed its economy first: “…China started its reforms much earlier…and [China’s achievements] seems also more outstanding, and hence a higher position and more important role in the world system.” Not only that, the Chinese economy is far more important than [the] Indian economy is in the world.\(^\text{154}\) Therefore, in comparison, Beijing is superior making New Delhi inferior. And because of this, Beijing is of the opinion that New Delhi views Beijing as its competitor. Beijing faults New Delhi for its erroneous views of Beijing both as an aggressor (from the 1962 Sino-Indian War) and a threat (from the 1998 Indian nuclear test). More to the point, Beijing interprets New Delhi’s competition for resources, market share, and international influence as confirmation of its perception. Unsurprisingly, Beijing blames New Delhi for coercing the Chinese into this same competition and justifies its actions as responding to threats from, implicitly, New Delhi.\(^\text{155}\)

\(^{153}\)“Comparison of Comprehensive Power of Major World Countries,” Wang Ling, ed., *Yellow Book of International Politics Reports on International Politics and Security*, Beijing: Social Sciences Academy Press, 2006. Ranking of ten countries in this study is as follows: The United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, Germany, China, Japan, Canada, Korea, and India.


Sino-Indian competition for resources is not new; rather, it is the intensity of their competition that’s making the headlines these days. When Beijing prevails, New Delhi’s “energy diplomacy” has been to “try to neutralize its potential competitors (principally China) with cooperation agreements.”\(^\text{156}\) Realizing competitions lead to price increases, which in turn impede Beijing’s attempts in monopolizing world resources for as little as possible, Beijing has chosen to diminish this threat via cooperation with New Delhi. Despite the Chinese success in neutralizing the Indian threat in the energy arena, competing for international influence is a different story. Both Beijing and New Delhi are vying for shi in the other’s self-perceived sphere of influence while attempting to mitigate the growing shi of the other in its own backyard. New Delhi is irritated by Beijing’s abilities in maintaining an upper hand in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Beijing’s acceptance as an observer by the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), of which New Delhi is a sitting member. On the other hand, Beijing is aggravated with New Delhi’s observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), its quest in gaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and its pursuit in attaining membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), all of which Beijing is a sitting member. Beijing’s activities surrounding New Delhi is viewed as a strategy to encircle India, while New Delhi’s cooperation with countries that share tumultuous relationships (more explicitly, Washington, Tokyo, and Moscow) with Beijing is interpreted as containing China.\(^\text{157}\) In fact, it was in this context that the Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi, warned New Delhi against alignment with Washington, “We have nothing against India’s growing ties with the U.S., but Indo-


U.S. ties should not be directed against a third country (explicitly, China).”¹⁵⁸ To sum up, Beijing and New Delhi are “not intimate neighbors” and they “lack mutual trust.”¹⁵⁹

**b. Military Modernization**

Besides the Sino-Indian competition for resources and influence, New Delhi’s military modernization is viewed as the other major source of Indian threat. Beijing has long been both envious and wary of Indian Navy’s power projection in the Indian Ocean. In 1993, the PLA General Zhao Nanqi, Director of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences said, “We are not prepared to let the Indian Ocean become India’s Ocean…”¹⁶⁰ It perceives a stronger Indian navy, New Delhi’s acquisitions of advanced weapons, and its growing nuclear arsenal as evidence of New Delhi’s response to the anti-China theory. One Chinese scholar concluded in 2001 that New Delhi’s “momentum of arms procurement is violent,” and the most worrisome point is the “agreements with [Moscow] to purchase aircraft carriers, tanks, and fighters.”¹⁶¹ The Sino-Soviet split and Moscow’s support of New Delhi in the Sino-Indian War have led to Chinese India scholar Hu Shisheng’s observation: “…Russia and India…signing more than 350 defense cooperation agreements…Russia’s ‘show of favoritism toward India at the expense of China’ has [resulted in the sale of] three major weapons systems.”¹⁶²

So, of all sources of Indian threat, ranging from New Delhi’s potential as a destabilizing force in Tibet, New Delhi’s political and social instabilities, to New Delhi’s competition for resources and influence, Beijing perceives New Delhi’s military modernization as the most threatening. Based on this, it is logical to say that Beijing feels threatened by the U.S.-India strategic cooperation because it is all about Washington helping New Delhi in military modernization, which includes expanding New Delhi’s nuclear arsenal. Since the Chinese perceive Washington and New Delhi as threats, what are Beijing’s perceptions of the U.S.-India nuclear deal? What are Beijing’s reactions to the U.S.-India nuclear deal? Both of these questions will be answered in the following sections.

C. BEIJING’S PERCEPTIONS OF AND REACTIONS TO THE INDIA DEAL

The basis of how the Chinese perceive and what the Chinese perceive as threats have been established. We now have the tools to answer questions three (“How does Beijing perceive the U.S.-India nuclear deal?”) and four (“How will Beijing react in the future?”) of this thesis. In doing so, this section is further divided into the subsequent subsections: Beijing’s white paper on arms control, and Beijing’s perceptions of and reactions to the India deal.

1. Beijing’s White Paper on Arms Control

In examining the Chinese position on arms control, this section will begin with a brief history of Beijing’s journey to becoming a nuclear power and what it had to do to get the U.S.-China civil nuclear agreement during the Reagan administration, followed by a brief analysis of Beijing’s position on arms control.

Beijing’s journey to becoming a nuclear power started in the 1950s. As a reward for siding with Moscow during the initial phase of the Cold War, Beijing began its nuclear weapons program with Moscow’s assistance in 1955. After the Sino-Soviet split, Beijing pursued an independent nuclear program and conducted its first nuclear test in 1965. Mao Zedong viewed the success of his nuclear program as “…a symbol of China’s
final drive to total independence” and “as an important source” of his power.163 The Chinese official statement following its first nuclear test in Lop Nur reaffirmed Mao Zedong’s paper tiger thesis and emphasized that “…The truth is exactly to the contrary. In developing nuclear weapons, China’s aim is to break the monopoly of the nuclear powers and to eliminate nuclear weapons…On the question of nuclear weapons, China will neither commit the error of adventurism nor the error of capitulationism. The Chinese people can be trusted.”164

Beijing upheld its firm stance on nuclear proliferation until the early 1980s, when it shifted focus to nuclear energy as a way to address the severe power shortages from its reliance on coal and hydroelectric power. The potential of the Chinese nuclear market and the Chinese preference of American companies due to technological superiorities coincided with Washington’s goal of bringing Beijing into the international nonproliferation mainstream. From the initial talks in September 1981 to Congressional approval in July 1985, the U.S.-China civil nuclear energy cooperation took four years to complete, twice as long in comparison to the U.S.-India nuclear deal. Beijing’s unwillingness to commit to the NPT due to historical memories and allegations of its assistance to Islamabad’s nuclear program delayed the negotiation process. Nevertheless, Beijing’s desperate need for foreign assistance in developing its nuclear energy program forced it to accede to the IAEA in 1984. Beijing dropped its proliferation rhetoric in May 1984 when Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang publicly stated that China does not “engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries to develop nuclear weapons.” Beijing’s position in nonproliferation became more explicit in January 1985 when Vice Premier Li Peng said, “China has no intention, either at the present or in the future, to help non-nuclear countries to develop nuclear weapons.” The attainment of the U.S.-China nuclear cooperation was closely linked to Beijing’s actions in accepting the

164 Ibid., 139.
IAEA safeguard and clarification of its nonproliferation policy.\textsuperscript{165} Beijing became a signatory to the NPT in 1992, and a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004.

In the U.S.-China nuclear deal, it appears that Beijing had to comply with nearly all of Washington’s demands; whereas in the U.S.-India nuclear deal, Washington seems to be appeasing New Delhi by giving in to almost everything New Delhi asked for. More to the point, Beijing perceives Washington’s willingness to team up with an “inferior” New Delhi as evidence of a China containment intent. As an implicit denouncement of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, Beijing published a white paper on arms control in August 2005, weeks after the announcement of the U.S.-India civil nuclear energy agreement was made in July 2005. This strategy bears a strong resemblance to Beijing’s publication of a white paper on its nonproliferation policy in December 2003. That white paper was aimed at controlling rumors of Beijing’s alleged violation of nonproliferation protocols prior to becoming a member of the NSG in 2004. In analyzing Beijing’s perceptions of and reactions to the India deal, it is imperative to examine Beijing’s official position on weapons proliferation.

According to Beijing’s white paper on arms control, \textit{China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation}, because of its experience during the “Century of National Humiliation,” Beijing understands and therefore fully supports world peace, referencing its “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.” The purpose of publishing this white paper was to “fully elaborate [Beijing’s policies and positions]…and to give a systematic account of China’s involvement in the international [community].” Several points in this white paper are worth dissecting. First, in terms of handling arms control issues, Beijing “always bases its policy-making on the judgment whether it serves to safeguard national sovereignty and security, whether it serves to maintain global strategic stability and whether it serves to promote security for all and mutual trust among countries.” The key word here is “judgment,” which implies that Beijing will do what it perceives as the right thing to do to benefit from whatever the

circumstance may be. Second, besides the implicit attack on Washington (i.e., Beijing “will never seek hegemony and...[support] safeguarding world peace...”), Beijing holds “the two countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals [responsible] for nuclear disarmament.” The embedded message here is this: Beijing will not be the first to reduce its nuclear arsenals; in fact, the “victims of foreign aggression” mind-set justifies Beijing’s possession of nuclear arsenals, which is forced on it by Washington and Moscow in the first place. Third and the most obvious reference to the U.S.-India nuclear deal is Beijing’s assertion of having “…persistently exercised the utmost restraint on the scale and development of...nuclear weapons.” Beijing is undoubtedly accusing Washington of aiding the growth of New Delhi’s nuclear arsenal. In fact, the U.S.-India nuclear deal is Washington’s indirect endorsement of New Delhi’s military nuclear program.

Now we know Beijing’s official position on arms control, that it will do what it perceives as the right thing to do to exploit the circumstances, that it will not reduce its nuclear arsenals until Washington and Moscow do so, and that it holds Washington responsible for the increase in New Delhi’s nuclear arsenal. The next section will cover Beijing’s perception of and reactions to the India deal.

2. Beijing’s Perceptions of and Reactions to the India deal

As an opening to its defensive strategy, the PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu Jianchao says China “hopes the U.S.-India nuclear deal ... [would] abide the non-proliferation rules.” While Beijing officially kept silent of its opposition, the government-controlled media outlets blasted the U.S.-India nuclear deal. *China Daily* reported this news infused with the typical communist propaganda. It interprets the U.S.-India nuclear deal as how far Washington is willing to go in “maintaining regional

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strategic balance,” which means strengthening an inferior country’s (New Delhi) international stature in order to contain a superior one (Beijing). The *China News Agency* described this deal as Washington’s “….best bargaining chip and a counterweight to China” because New Delhi is a democracy and Washington’s model of economic development. *People’s Daily* accused Washington of applying “double standards” on nuclear proliferation, and that others would follow the precedence made in the U.S.-India nuclear deal and weaken the NPT regime. *China Daily* said the U.S.-India nuclear deal will “trigger a chain reaction of nuclear technology proliferation” and further “complicate the nuclear issues of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea all the more.”

Shen Dingli, a nuclear security expert and Vice President of Institute of International Studies at Fudan University asserts that the U.S.-India nuclear deal is about helping New Delhi developing nuclear weapons aimed at Islamabad while “containing another country.” Shen further claims that Washington’s assistance in New Delhi’s nuclear weapons program “is intended to suppress the rise of what in the eyes of [Washington] is an ‘authoritarian’ power.” Moreover, Shen accused Washington of “contributing to nuclear proliferation” as “[New Delhi] can now devote its resources and energy to the research and development of nuclear weapons…Wouldn’t it be possible for other nuclear states to cooperate with Pakistan in the development of nuclear energy?

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Pakistan...has a need to develop civil nuclear energy and the right to do so...”  

Beijing has signaled that it could do the same with Islamabad.

Despite the biased reporting by the Chinese media, it praised New Delhi for being a leader of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) countries with its own strategic interest in mind: “India will still maintain an independent and all-round diplomatic posture to gain its own maximum state interest...[and] will not easily board any ship because India itself is a large ship.”  

Compared to the 1998 nuclear test, Beijing’s reactions are rather restrained this time around. In fact, this is indicative of Beijing’s stepped-up effort in courting New Delhi, which is representative of its strategy to neutralize threat with cooperation.

According to Dr. Jing-Dong Yuan, an expert on Asia-Pacific security, arms control and nonproliferation, America’s Asia policy, and China’s defense and foreign policy at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, as a general rule of thumb, Beijing’s official position is always indirect and subtle, which explains its initial response. Despite the official silence from Beijing, the fact that a series of articles criticizing the U.S.-India nuclear deal was published in the tightly-controlled Chinese media outlets reflects Beijing’s silent approval of these articles. In other words, Beijing implicitly disapproves of the India nuclear deal. As a matter of fact, Beijing blames Washington for the India deal because this deal violates the NPT, says Dr. Phillip C. Saunders, a China watcher at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. Nevertheless, since Beijing also provided assistance to Islamabad’s

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175 Jing-Dong Yuan, interview by author, Monterey, California, September 17, 2007. Dr. Yuan is a native of China and thus is familiar with the workings of the Chinese government. He is Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and Associate Professor of International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, CA.
nuclear weapons and missile programs, neither can point fingers at one another because both Washington and Beijing are violating NPT together.176

Beijing is aware that it is in a complicated situation and thus must handle its objection to this nuclear deal delicately. First, it is keenly aware that it cannot stop the U.S.-India nuclear deal, as Beijing’s objections to the deal at the NSG will upset New Delhi hence jeopardizing the improved Sino-Indian diplomatic ties that it has worked hard to rebuild since the 1998 Indian nuclear test. Second, from a big picture stand point, Beijing cares more about the hidden agenda behind the India nuclear deal than the deal itself, says Dr. Yuan. Based on the history of U.S.-Indian relations, Beijing is more apprehensive about the anti-China agenda behind the “estranged democracies” becoming “strategic partners.” In fact, Beijing has noted Washington’s pattern of cozying up to New Delhi as early as President George W. Bush took office. Details such as Washington honoring former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee with a formal state dinner versus treating the current Chinese President Hu Jintao with a “working dinner,” as well as, reports of President Bush intentionally surprised the Indian delegates by dropping in to their meeting with Secretary of State Dr. Rice, which led to a 40-minute unscheduled meeting in the Oval Office, have all been analyzed by Beijing as a part of Washington’s efforts in containing a rising China. Beijing was initially more concerned with the defense cooperation dimension of the U.S.-India strategic cooperation, but Beijing’s success in its January 2007 ASAT test has since bolstered the Chinese confidence.177

As if signaling that Beijing is prepared to counter Washington’s growing clout in its self-perceived sphere of influence, Chinese President Hu Jintao’s South Asian trip in November 2006 included India and Pakistan, where multitudes of Sino-India and Sino-Pak agreements, to include Sino-Indian civil nuclear cooperation, were signed. The U.S.-India nuclear deal has resulted in Beijing stepping up its courtship with its neighbors

176 Phillip C. Saunders, interview by author, Monterey, California, April 5, 2007. Dr. Saunders is a former director of the East Asian Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He is a noted China watcher and has published extensively in the United States.

177 Jing-Dong Yuan, interview by author, Monterey, California, September 17, 2007.
south of its border. Despite the U.S.-India “love fest,” Beijing perceives this “love fest” as one-sided due to Washington’s strategic concerns in Asia, says Dr. Yuan. People’s Daily reported that New Delhi is merely seizing the opportunity to rise as a global power out of “practical political considerations,” and further pointed out that “India’s DNA doesn’t allow itself to become an ally subordinate to the U.S., just like Japan or Britain.”

Now that we know Beijing’s perceptions of the India deal, what are its reactions and possible future actions? First and foremost, Beijing is not prepared to push New Delhi towards Washington by objecting to the India deal at the NSG. Shen Dengli, a Chinese nuclear security expert at Fudan University, says Beijing will not “stand out to oppose the agreement; it doesn’t want to offend” Washington or New Delhi. If Beijing were to object, “…the political costs of opposing it would be too high. It would drive a wedge between China and India…but China may demand adjustments, even just to make a point about its concerns,” says Zhang Li, a Chinese expert on South Asia at Sichuan University. Beijing’s own analysis of the India deal suggests that the deal is a part of Washington’s “contain China” strategy, but New Delhi is unlikely to form an alliance with Washington due to its own strategic interests and pledge to Non-Aligned Movement from some years past.

While it appears that Beijing may be unwillingly stuck with the short end of the stick this time for the sake of “saving face,” it is prepared to exploit the situation as subtly stated in its white paper on arms control. The PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesperson said Beijing “believes…countries may cooperate in the peaceful use of nuclear energy…observing…international obligations…safeguard and strengthen the principles

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178 This phrase was coined by BG Feroz Khan during a course on Security in South Asia, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July-September 2007.

179 Jing-Dong Yuan, interview by author, Monterey, California, September 17, 2007.


Beijing is signaling that it is ready to exploit the circumstance by venturing into the $100 billion dollar Indian nuclear market, which in turn, fuels the Chinese economy. The PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu said, “Based on the principles, we are ready to have discussions [relaxation of nuclear exports to New Delhi.” Another way the Chinese will surely make use of the situation is their “let’s wait for the final framework to be presented at the NSG” approach, says Dr. Yuan. Beijing does not see a need to “block the road” currently being paved by Washington. If the India deal gets its blessings from the NSG, then Beijing can pursue the same with Islamabad, as the exception will have been made for Washington and New Delhi. How Beijing reacts in the future depends on the final framework as approved by the NSG, comments Dr. Yuan.184

As of the writing of this thesis, the U.S.-India nuclear deal has not been forwarded to NSG for approval. However, assuming the Singh government survives this nuclear deal and the deal is approved by the NSG and the U.S. Congress in a timely manner before it is dead in the water, what are the implications for Washington as a result of Beijing’s reactions to the India nuclear deal? This question will be answered in the next chapter.

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

While ascending to become a global power, Beijing has never failed to remind the world of how far it has come since its “Century of National Humiliation.” Desperate for resources to fuel its economy, Beijing is pursuing a grand strategy based on its “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” in the hopes that international stability will buy the time it needs for transformation into the elite rank of the global rich and powerful. President George W. Bush’s public acknowledgement of New Delhi as “a legitimate


184 Jing-Dong Yuan, interview by author, Monterey, California, September 17, 2007.
nuclear power” ended its 30-year quest for such recognition.\textsuperscript{185} His statement also forced Beijing to face the reality that New Delhi is the other rising global power in Asia.

We have covered a lot in this chapter. In particular, the “uniquely” Chinese concepts had to be clarified in order to explain how the Chinese perceive, and Beijing’s perceptions of threats had to be covered to understand what the Chinese perceive as threats. In answering Beijing’s perceptions and reactions to the India deal, Beijing’s official position on arms control also had to be explored. We now know that Beijing sees the India deal is part of Washington’s “contain China” strategy and that it believes New Delhi will not tilt to Washington due to its own strategic interests. Nevertheless, Beijing has stepped up courting New Delhi as an attempt to counter Washington’s growing influence in South Asia. Beijing is also ready to take advantage of the “Indian exception” by benefiting from the Indian nuclear market and backing Islamabad in seeking its own version of the similar exception from the NSG. The next chapter will answer the major question this thesis seeks to answer and provide policy recommendations relating to U.S. foreign policies in Asia.

\textsuperscript{185} Asht\textsuperscript{on} B. Carter, “America’s New Strategic Partner?” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 85 (2006), 33.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S REACTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The purpose of this concluding chapter is to answer question five of this thesis: What are the implications of Chinese reactions for the United States? In doing so, this chapter is divided into three sections: a summary of the analysis presented thus far, an answer to question five of this thesis, and recommendations relating to U.S. foreign policy in Asia.

A. RECAP

The U.S.-India nuclear deal, in essence, was not well-thought through because of the enormous number of concessions Washington is giving to New Delhi in what appears to be an effort to contain China. In the process of doing so, Washington has damaged the nonproliferation regime. Moreover, the India deal will lead to an increase in India’s nuclear arsenal and thus tilt the balance of power in Asia. Instead of having a rising China to deal with, now Washington has to find a balance between China and India, as New Delhi appears to be standing firm in guarding its own strategic interests.

Chapter II described the enduring Sino-Indian rivalries and answered the first two questions posed by this thesis. In responding to the first question (what was the relationship between Beijing and New Delhi before 9/11?), Sino-Indian relations prior to 9/11 can be characterized as tumultuous, distrustful, and full of diplomatic pretense. The Cold War played an important role in the state of Sino-Indian relations in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict. Sino-Indian normalization coincided with the ending of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. India’s 1998 nuclear test brought unusually strong reaction from Beijing, but it did not stop the two from resuming their diplomatic relations after the 1998 South Asian Crisis. In answering the second question (what is Washington’s view vis-à-vis Sino-Indian relation before 9/11?), Beijing was more important than New Delhi, as reflected in the U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War era. However, the shift in post-Cold War geopolitics has elevated New Delhi’s importance, as demonstrated in Washington’s current foreign policy priorities.
Chapter III described the emerging U.S.-India strategic partnership with emphasis on the U.S.-India nuclear deal. This chapter highlighted Washington’s “appeasement” of New Delhi and compared it to New Delhi’s “appeasement” of Beijing half a century ago. The appearance of caving in to most of New Delhi’s demands highlights Washington’s eagerness to influence the geopolitical balance in Asia and the importance of both New Delhi and Beijing in the U.S. foreign policy priorities. Washington’s violation of the nonproliferation regime and its neglect of Islamabad have led to Beijing’s efforts in exploiting cracks in the U.S. foreign policies.

Chapter IV covered several Chinese concepts, which are essential in understanding how and what the Chinese perceive as threats. Beijing’s official position on arms control was also examined before the third and the fourth questions were answered. In response to the third question (how does Beijing perceive the U.S.-India nuclear deal?), Beijing sees the India deal as Washington’s strategy in limiting China’s rise, and it concludes that New Delhi will not lean towards Washington as a result of the U.S.-India nuclear deal. In answering the fourth question (how will Beijing react in the future?), Beijing has stepped up its courtship of New Delhi in an attempt to counter Washington’s growing influence in South Asia. Additionally, Beijing is ready to benefit from the Indian nuclear energy market and backing Islamabad’s efforts to obtain its own exception from the NSG.

So far, the first four questions have been answered. The next section will answer the fifth question (what are the implications of China’s reactions for the United States?).

B. IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S REACTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

If there is one word most commonly used to describe the typical Chinese way of doing things, it would be subtleness, which is very different than the western-style of conducting business and therefore not easy for the West to comprehend. In the case of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, strategic implications of China’s reactions for the United States can be broken down to short-term and long-term categories.

186 John W. Garver characterizes New Delhi’s eagerness to please Beijing as “appeasement.”
In the short-term, Beijing is unlikely to take radical actions against Washington or New Delhi because of its interdependence in the global economy, more specifically, the global energy market. Therefore, Beijing has chosen to silently denounce this deal because it doesn’t want to offend Washington and New Delhi, as it still needs Washington and New Delhi’s cooperation in other international forums to facilitate its own economic growth. However, despite of this, Beijing may choose to demonstrate its implicit disapproval further by abstaining from the vote or be notably absent from the NSG if and when the deal comes up for vote.

Nonetheless, to the Chinese, settling of scores doesn’t have to be immediate and it can take different forms. They will wait for the perfect opportunity regardless of however long it may take. Cases in point are Beijing’s claim of Arunachal Pradesh and the Chinese ASAT test. Arunachal Pradesh is one of the disputed territories that caused the 1962 Sino-Indian War. It has been nearly half-a-century since the 1962 war, and Beijing has not relinquished its claim over Arunachal Pradesh, which was granted Indian statehood by Rajiv Gandhi in 1987. On the eve of Chinese President Hu Jintao’s historical visit to India in November 2006, the Chinese Ambassador to India told the Indian press that “the whole of what you call the [Indian] state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory…we are claiming all of that—that’s our position.”\footnote{Robert Gates, *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2007). [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/china.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/china.html). Date accessed: May 31, 2007.} This remark not only shows Beijing’s determination to maintain sovereignty in disputed territory but also illustrates the resolve Beijing has in achieving its objectives. Another concrete example is Beijing’s success in its January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test, where it destroyed one of its own orbiting weather satellites. The Chinese have devoted decades of efforts and resources in making its ASAT success a reality. In fact, Jane’s Intelligence Review reported that Beijing had three unsuccessful attempts in July 2005 and February 2006.\footnote{“Space to Maneuver-Satellite attack upsets US space supremacy,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, February 7, 2007. Date accessed: February 19, 2007.}

These concrete examples suggest that long-term strategic implications of China’s reactions for the United States cannot be overlooked. The analysis presented in this thesis has identified two effects of the U.S.-India nuclear deal that have major long-term
implications. These are an increase in India’s CNP, and the violation of the NPT. Each of these implications is discussed as follows.

1. Increase in India’s Comprehensive National Power (CNP)


Sun Tzu says to hold your friends close and your enemies closer. The U.S.-India nuclear deal forced Beijing to face the reality that New Delhi is the other rising global power in Asia. In fact, the India deal has already resulted in Beijing’s stepped-up courtship of New Delhi and its strategy of encircling India. For example, the long-standing Sino-Pakistani partnership is likely to intensify. Beijing will ensure that Islamabad stays competitive with New Delhi. One should not be surprised if Beijing supports Islamabad in seeking a similar exception at the NSG. In addition, Beijing will reinforce its ties with Yangon to ensure that the Chinese investments in Myanmar’s maritime developments are not fruitless, which in turn would ensure the PLA Navy’s uninterrupted access to the Indian Ocean. As the PLA General Zhao Nanqi said, “We are not prepared to let the Indian Ocean become India’s Ocean…”\footnote{190 “China’s Plan to Build Up Navy,” The Hindustan Times, January 13, 1993. As cited in Denny Roy, China’s Foreign Relations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 170.} With the recent democratic uprising in Myanmar, both Beijing and New Delhi have chosen not to interfere with Yangon’s domestic affairs, as non-interference is one of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence preached often by the Chinese. Nevertheless, the hidden agenda
shared by Beijing and New Delhi is their shared interest in tapping Yangon’s undeveloped resources (i.e., timber and natural gas). Additionally, as part of the strategy to encircle New Delhi, Beijing will continue to expand cooperation with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Iran, and others in South and Southeast Asia.

Besides strategically encircling India, Beijing will intensify its military modernization effort to stay competitive with that of New Delhi, currently aided by Washington. While the PLA’s power projection is currently confined to China’s immediate periphery, analysts in the West generally agree that the aim of the PLA’s power projection is the United States. Aside from military competition, Beijing will act to limit New Delhi’s quest for expanded international influence, just as it has been successful in preventing Japan from becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. President George W. Bush said in September 2007 that he is ready to discuss adding more members to the UN Security Council without elaborating further. An educated guess would be India, as this would be the next step in New Delhi’s quest to become a global power. Nonetheless, Beijing will see to it that this doesn’t become a reality.

2. Violation of the NPT Regime

The second long-term strategic implication of Beijing’s reactions is that the U.S.-India nuclear deal damages the NPT regime. As Henry Sokolski pointed out during his Congressional testimony, this deal violates Article I of the NPT, which prohibits states (i.e., the United States) from helping nuclear weapons efforts of those (i.e., India) that did not have nuclear weapons prior to the treaty’s completion. Regardless of Washington’s rhetoric of bringing New Delhi “into the nonproliferation mainstream” via this nuclear deal, the fact that New Delhi is still not a signatory to the NPT cannot be disputed. Moreover, this deal “trades away our credibility on North Korea and Iran…the United States will be joining the ranks of North Korea and Iran as NPT violators.”191 Because of Washington’s strategy in balancing geopolitics in Asia and therefore the unintentional

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infringement of the NPT, Beijing sees it as an indication that it is acceptable to violate the NPT because Washington, the world’s superpower, does it.

Therefore, Beijing is likely do the same with Islamabad, a non-NPT state, thus further damage the nonproliferation regime. The serious consequence of this implication cannot be overstated as it jeopardizes the legitimacy of the NPT regime. Furthermore, this nuclear deal allows New Delhi to expand its civilian nuclear power program and free up its uranium to build more nuclear weapons, which tilts the balance of power in Asia. As former Secretary of State Colin Powell said during an interview in regards to this nuclear deal, it is difficult to separate nuclear programs that are for weapons from those that are for peaceful purposes. If New Delhi decides to build more nuclear weapons, it would not be violating the NPT because it is not a signatory to the NPT. Nevertheless, the nuclear deal itself has already strengthened New Delhi’s comprehensive national power from Beijing’s perspective.

In answering the fifth and the major question of this thesis, an increase in India’s CNP and damage to the nonproliferation regime are the two major implications of China’s reactions to the India nuclear deal for the United States. If strengthening India’s CNP is the implicit goal of the George W. Bush administration, then it certainly has achieved this goal. However, if President Bush’s goal were to influence India’s foreign policy to lean towards the United States, then efforts and resources devoted to make this nuclear deal happen may be wasted, because as of the writing of this thesis, India’s domestic political climate doesn’t appear to allow it. Based on implications of China’s reactions, the next section provides recommendations relating to U.S. foreign policy toward Asia.

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C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ASIA

Considering the current political and media forces on the war in Iraq and the overall War on Terror, it is a diversion to consider foreign policy interactions in Asia. Based on the major implications of China’s reactions, two specific policy recommendations for Asia are presented.

The first recommendation is focused on China. Beijing’s unprecedented military modernization is already tilting the regional balance of power. Washington needs to act to keep that balance stable. A two-prong strategy, military and economic, is needed to maintain this balance.

Militarily, Washington should aggressively pursue increasing the military capabilities of Beijing’s regional competitors. Beijing views Washington’s joint military exercises with its democratic neighbors in Asia such as Japan, Australia, Thailand, and India, as threats. The PLA General Peng Guanqian stated that a country’s military combat effectiveness has become increasingly more important in a country’s overall CNP; hence, military competition is “key to the strategic thoughts of all countries.” Beijing’s focus on CNP should be used to illustrate the regional shift in the balance of power to our allies and Beijing’s regional competitors. By working to increase the military component of these countries’ CNP, Washington would be re-stabilizing the balance and also indirectly forcing the PLA to continue on its costly expansion programs. It should be made clear to all that these actions are in response to the PLA’s modernization efforts and not a new anti-China initiative.

Economically, in a complimentary effort to slow Beijing’s CNP growth, Washington should hold Beijing accountable for non-compliance to its WTO obligations and pull its permanent Most Favorable Nation (MFN) trade status if necessary. This would work to reduce the explosive growth of the Chinese economy, which would reduce the availability of funds for the continued PLA modernization. President Reagan pushed for Star Wars ahead of its time, which resulted in the collapse of the former Soviet Union.

193 Jing-Dong Yuan, interview by author, Monterey, California, September 17, 2007.
and ended the Cold War. The collapse occurred because Moscow could not keep up with Washington’s military evolution, and Beijing is aware of this. Actions by Beijing’s self-perceived competitors to increase their own CNP and military readiness in response to the PLA’s modernizations should cause the CCP to re-evaluate its priorities.

The second policy recommendation is to keep on the table Washington’s offer to assist Islamabad in meeting its growing energy needs. In March 2006, Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman and his team of seven went to Islamabad for discussions on how Washington can provide such assistance. Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri and his team of twelve reportedly provided the U.S. camp different proposals that Islamabad deemed as “do-able” by Washington. One of these proposals included civil nuclear energy, but Secretary Bodman said “…no such assistance was being extended to Pakistan.” However, as an alternative, Washington offered to help Islamabad in developing potential energy sources such as coal, gas pipelines (barring the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline), and renewable energy such as cellulose-based ethanol and wind or solar energy, which were rejected by Islamabad.195 Washington should revive this offer to Islamabad and maintain positive bilateral relations with the Pakistani government, particularly the Pakistani military. Additionally, Washington should not object to assistance from any country, specifically China and France, for Pakistan’s civilian energy projects. Most importantly, different government agencies in Washington should act in unison when making public statements about Pakistan. For instance, James Clad, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia, said “India simply…matters more for us than Pakistan.”196 Despite immediate clarifications by the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad stating Washington’s position of not ranking countries in any framework of strategic interests,197 damage has already been done and is irreversible.

Aside from these specific policy recommendations, Washington should also ensure senior representative attendance in all major multi-lateral association activities and reflect Sun Tzu’s philosophy of keeping friends close and enemies closer. In closing, Washington’s intimate involvement in Asia’s geopolitics is key to prolong America’s soft power in a region with long-term strategic implications.
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82


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