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Since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Navy has continued to chart a path relying on a maritime strategy enacted in 1986, which successfully drove all aspects of naval warfare, from training to procurement and deployment during the Cold War. Several Policy documents have emerged since 1991 attempting to set new strategic pursuits for the Navy, but none have had the cohesive vision that the Cold War strategy employed for its era. The literature on national security strategy lays out the theory of delegation and execution in the strategic process – from formulating grand strategy down to operational tactics – but supporting literature on organizational models offers arguments that question the rationality of national strategy decisions. The ways strategy develops remain unclear, raising questions about the overall purpose of naval forces and the policies required to support a new strategy. This thesis will examine the strategic disconnect and confusion the United States Navy is experiencing in searching for a new Maritime strategy through the lenses of the organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics models. This will lead to a better understanding of the military’s internal decision making process and its strategic direction.
FALLING OUT OF FORMATION: A LOOK AT THE NAVY’S SEARCH FOR A NEW MARITIME STRATEGY

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ABSTRACT

Since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Navy has continued to chart a path relying on a maritime strategy enacted in 1986, which successfully drove all aspects of naval warfare, from training to procurement and deployment during the Cold War. Several Policy documents have emerged since 1991 attempting to set new strategic pursuits for the Navy, but none have had the cohesive vision that the Cold War strategy employed for its era. The literature on national security strategy lays out the theory of delegation and execution in the strategic process – from formulating grand strategy down to operational tactics – but supporting literature on organizational models offers arguments that question the rationality of national strategy decisions. The ways strategy develops remain unclear, raising questions about the overall purpose of naval forces and the policies required to support a new strategy. This thesis will examine the strategic disconnect and confusion the United States Navy is experiencing in searching for a new Maritime strategy through the lenses of the organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics models. This will lead to a better understanding of the military’s internal decision making process and its strategic direction.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

Since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Navy has continued to chart a path relying on a maritime strategy enacted in 1986, which successfully drove all aspects of naval warfare, from training to procurement and deployment during the Cold War. The literature on national security strategy lays out the theory of delegation and execution in the strategic process – from formulating grand strategy down to operational tactics – but supporting literature on organizational models offers arguments that question the rationality of national strategy decisions. This thesis will examine the strategic disconnect and confusion the United States Navy is experiencing in searching for a new Maritime strategy through the lenses of the organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics models. This will lead to a better understanding of the military’s internal decision making process and its strategic direction.

B. IMPORTANCE

Several policy documents have emerged since 1991 attempting to set new strategic pursuits for the Navy, but none have had the cohesive vision that the Cold War strategy employed for its era. In the last three years, the White House and military leaders have produced several new strategy documents laying the foundation for national security, defense and military strategy. The literature on national security strategy

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outselves how the process of delegation and execution is supposed to work but supporting literature on organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics offers arguments that question the rationality of national strategy decisions. In its search for a new Maritime Strategy, the Navy appears to be exhibiting signs of strategic confusion or at least a tangential disconnect from the rational process.\footnote{The rational actor or realist school of thought depicts decisions made by “calculating costs and benefits of alternative courses of action and choosing the action that maximizes their utility.” See Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, “Model I: The Rational Actor,” \textit{Essence of Decision}, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1999), 13-75.} Before developing the maritime strategy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Michael Mullen, publicized his ideal 313 ship fleet, the 30-year procurement plan to get there,\footnote{Navy Office of Information, "Developing a New Maritime Strategy," Department of the Navy, \url{http://www.jhuapl.edu/maritimestrategy/library/12sepMarStratRL.pdf} (accessed February 25, 2007).} and signed a Naval Operations Concept (NOC), “guided by national strategy” to prescribe how the “Navy-Marine Corps team will contribute to the defense of our nation.”\footnote{U.S. Navy, \textit{Naval Operations Concept 2006} (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 2006), \url{http://www.mcwl.usmc.mil} (accessed February 25, 2007). Signed by M. Mullen and M. Hagee, 1.} Rationally, the Maritime Strategy should drive the force structure of the Navy; here the force structure is set before the creation of strategy. This disconnect will affect not only the composition of forces assigned to the Middle East, but also the scope of their influence in an already tumultuous region. To explore this disconnect from the literature on national security strategy, the models – organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics – will be used to analyze the specifics of the internal processes within the Navy which are producing the new Maritime Strategy.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Background

Since the creation of the Navy in the United States Constitution,\footnote{See US Const, Art I, § 8. “The Congress shall have power…To provide and maintain a Navy.”} its role in national security and military strategy has been debated. Post World War II saw a focus on antisubmarine warfare and the Navy’s role in nuclear strike warfare. Throughout the early stages of the Cold War limited war and nuclear deterrence shaped the strategic
debate. By the 1970s, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, outlined the “Four Missions of the Navy” as strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and peacetime presence.\(^8\) By the 1980s, maritime strategy had come to be the main focus of President Ronald Reagan’s first Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr. as he sought support for his 600-ship fleet. By the time his vision was fleshed out and released to the public as a supplement to the January 1986 issue of *United States Naval Institute Proceeds*, maritime strategy “was presented by the Navy as only one – albeit a vital – component of the national military strategy…The Navy Department and the fleet were now speaking with one sophisticated voice to – and increasingly for – the nation and its allies.”\(^9\) The strategy was heavily offensive oriented, especially towards open ocean blue water engagements with the Soviet Union. The major strategic objectives were:

- To prevent the seas from becoming a hostile medium of attack against the United States and its allies.
- To ensure that we have unimpeded use of our ocean lifelines to our allies, our forward-deployed forces, our energy and mineral resources, and our trading partners.
- To be able to project force in support of national security objectives and to support combat ashore, should deterrence fail.\(^10\)

Lehman was the Alfred Thayer Mahan of the late twentieth century and the carrier was the centerpiece of his forward deployed, global strategy. Carrier aviation would be instrumental as a nuclear deterrent force against the Soviet Union. Forward deployed forces would sail out to meet the enemy in its backyard instead of creating a defensive moat around the U.S. mainland. Regional conflicts and more limited wars would also be dealt with through the use of carrier strikes.

Crisis response to limited wars and maintaining a peacetime overseas presence in areas such as the Persian Gulf became the primary focus for the U.S. Navy from the time of Lehman’s “Maritime Strategy” until Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Ensuring freedom of the seas was the principle focus of Operation Earnest Will (1987-1988) during which U.S. Navy Warships escorted merchant shipping safely through the Persian

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9 Ibid., 195.

Following the Iran-Iraq War, forward deployed U.S. warships had become a fixture in the region remaining to ensure regional stability.

The Gulf War of 1991 saw a tremendous build up of air, land, and sea power of the United States and its allies in order to remove Iraq from Kuwait. Naval planners argued over how best to utilize their assets. As retired Marine Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor explains, the U.S. Navy and Air Force held polarizing views on the employment of air power. “[T]he Air Force thought in terms of campaigns, extended air operations to defeat an adversary.” Achieving victory in a massive conventional conflict was not part of the Navy’s aviation strategy. “Before the Gulf [War], Navy Planners had, in effect, two models of conflict: the short, one-day attacks off the coast of Libya or an all-out war with the Soviet Union.”

2. Survey of Prior Work on the Subject

Since the Gulf War in 1991, debate at the naval strategic level has involved two main naval missions: forward presence and operations in the littoral vs. blue water. What the current literature lacks is a comprehensive analysis of the specifics of the internal processes within the Navy which will result in an output in the form of a new Maritime Strategy today. In the era of globalization states such as Germany, Japan, and the former Soviet Union, that have traditionally maintained large navies, have lost interest in maritime power as a tool to exert influence and secure objectives. Large merchant fleets are now contracted out instead of manned by host flags and seamen. China’s merchant fleet remains the major exception; however, it shows little sign of trying to compete for near-peer status militarily with the United States. With so many countries relying on the efficiency of merchant sea traffic to transport exports, the United States remains the lead protector of the international sea lanes, a presence which is particularly heavy in the Persian Gulf. Without an influential global force capable of maintaining security and ensuring open sea lanes, chaos and destruction would follow. Pirating and sinking


merchant traffic would be counterproductive to global economic stability. Fishing grounds could potentially be ruined. Dispersed cargo could become a hazard to navigation, delaying and disrupting further merchant traffic.

With so many states economically and politically interconnected, why is the United States responsible for maintaining the bulk of the balance? This question becomes an antithesis to the usefulness of naval forces. Professing no imperial intentions and possessing a stable economic and industrial base, the United States has invested more capital in the construction, training, and support of a naval force than the next nine closest nations. Admiral William Owens argues that “the fleet was never forced to fight the open-ocean battles the Navy had been preparing for during the preceding twenty years.”

Having trained and prepared for a Cold War battle that never occurred, the Navy, is once again, forced to reinvent itself, or at least, find new justification for the blue water assets in its inventory. In fact the last significant confrontation between surface combatants came in 1988 and even that was hardly a challenge for U.S. forces.

With a new focus needed to justify its forces following the first Gulf War and throughout the 1990s, the Navy branched out into the littoral environment to rededicate itself to the long-standing naval mission of forward presence. With no real emerging near-peer threat to open ocean dominance, the Navy transitioned into a search for littoral dominance. This strategy was outlined in the publication of “…From the Sea” and “Forward…From the Sea.” Continuing to transform its expeditionary force, the Navy

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13 Frank Uhlig, Jr., "Fighting at and from the Sea: A Second Opinion," Naval War College Review 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003), 48-49.

14 President George W. Bush stated, “We're not an imperial power, as nations such as Japan and Germany can attest. We're a liberating power, as nations in Europe and Asia can attest as well.” See: “Transcript of Bush's Remarks on Iraq: 'We Will Finish the Work of the Fallen','” New York Times, April 14, 2004, Late Edition (east Coast), http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu (accessed November 13, 2007).

15 As quoted in Edward Rhodes, "...from the Sea' and Back again: Naval Power in the Second American Century," Naval War College Review 52, no. 2 (Spring 1999), 3.


would be called upon to shift their focus from open ocean operations, to operations originating at sea and projecting power inland.\textsuperscript{18} The new strategic objective was to support global regional stability, promote confidence in democracies, and help fledgling states orient themselves in the international arena. The goal was to shape the battle space through precision strikes, amphibious assaults, and maintaining open sea lanes of communication to either deter conflict or decisively end small regional conflicts quickly before they get out of hand. Operation Vigilant Warrior (1995) demonstrated U.S. resolve by stationing a carrier battle group in the Red Sea, and an amphibious ready group off the coast of Kuwait, in response to Iraqi threats.\textsuperscript{19} Additionally, the Fifth Fleet Command was activated by the United States in July 1995 to keep the Persian Gulf chokepoints and sea lanes of communication open and to serve as a primary contingency force for the combatant commander.\textsuperscript{20} The Navy chose the forward presence mission to demonstrate its relevance and sought missions of value to national security.

Two arguments exist against the littoral, forward-deployed strategy.\textsuperscript{21} One, the Navy is not the only service which can project forward presence. If a military presence is required to quell a regional conflict, sufficient warnings and indicators will enable the Army to establish a presence prior to combat operations. Some argue that land power has more deterrent value. “Because deterrence is based on perception and because most potential U.S. adversaries are primarily land powers, a U.S. land power presence may be the most effective deterrent.”\textsuperscript{22} Naval forces providing sea basing would be of little or no consequence in shaping the battle space. The Air Force argues that air power can be projected through bomber strikes more cheaply than the continuous presence of carrier battle groups and they can do it utilizing aircraft originating stateside or staged from allied bases around the world. The first Gulf War and the campaign in Kosovo illustrate

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{18}] O’Keefe, Kelso, Mundy, \textit{...from the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century}, 93-96.
\item[\textsuperscript{21}] Daniel Gouré, “The Tyranny of Forward Presence,” \textit{Naval War College Review}, 54, no. 3 (Summer 2001); Rhodes, \textit{...from the Sea and Back again: Naval Power in the Second American Century}.
\end{itemize}
the fact that if land bases are required, they will be “found or seized.” Expeditionary forces capable of deploying quickly in response to (or to prevent) crises has become the goal of all military branches. The Navy responds to these points of view by looking at a scenario in which the cost of access outweighs the risk, both politically and militarily; here the only approach left is via the sea.

The second argument against the littoral strategy lies in the fact that the Navy has failed to articulate precisely what the force make up should be to attain full spectrum dominance inside twelve miles from land. In response to events on the ground, the Navy invariably deploys traditional carrier battle and expeditionary strike groups, but this repackaging of old Cold War units leaves unaddressed the specific force needed to succeed in the littorals. The Navy has made small steps to this end, with plans to purchase the littoral combat ship (LCS) – of which only one has been commissioned and is far from deployment ready – and the creation of a riverine force to focus on the ‘brown water.’ However, both of these units are unproven and untested; their long term effectiveness has yet to be determined.

Forward presence operations (including both exercises and combat operations) have been conducted to shape the battle space prior to conflict or to create favorable circumstances for the U.S. and its allies. The Navy believes, that ships are designed to put to sea, so in pursuing national interests in regions around the world, sending the Navy makes the most sense. Naval forces are also the ideal platform for joint operations in the age of preemptive warfare. However, in order to maintain even the smallest presence overseas, the Navy needs a larger force to meet its demands. “For every ship deployed, the U.S. Navy requires between three and five more in rotation: steaming to or from the deployment area; in overhaul; in port for leave and repair; and ‘working up’ in local training exercises.”

leaving a ship forward deployed while swapping crews (so that the ship’s on-station time is lengthened) are concepts that have been attempted to alleviate some of the budgetary issues but they may not go far enough. “It is no secret that our current resources of [276] ships are fully deployed and in many cases stretched thin to meet the growing national security demands.” It follows, then, that despite using forward presence to justify its desired force structure, a concentration on the littoral environment weakens the single largest advantage the Navy brings to the projection of national interests in its unrivaled supremacy of the blue water arena.

3. Major Debates and Approaches to the Issue

Where is the Navy headed now? Can we predict its future course? The manner in which strategy develops remains unclear, raising questions about the overall purpose of naval forces and the policies required to support a new strategy. Today, several schools of thought exist on the processes utilized to predict and chart the implementation of policy and strategy. A plethora of literature exists on the process of delegation and execution of policy. The organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics models, two major theories dealing with the prediction and explanation of policy outputs, question the traditional rational actor paradigm and are purported to be better at explaining the organizational process. These models have been used to analyze and predict foreign policy decisions over the years. Scholarly experts argue that they are simultaneously useful and ineffective in dissecting the internal decision processes within government bureaucracies.

29 The Navy currently has a deployable battle force of 276 ships, a significant drop from the quoted (citation below) 316 ships in 2000. Of that number 1/3 are on deployment, and 42% are underway. For the latest data see: www.navy.mil.


Organizational behavior theory, drawn on by Graham Allison, proposes several propositions regarding the decisions leaders are likely to make. For his paradigm, Allison treats government action as the result of organizational routines and outputs. When confronted with a problem, organizational leaders will not look at it as a whole, but will break it down and allocate it according to pre-established organizational lines.\footnote{Allison and Zelikow, \textit{Essence of Decision}, 166.} Organizations are also prone to bounded rationality in their adherence to standard operating procedures and routines when taking action.\footnote{Ibid., 178.} Such routines do not lend themselves easily to innovation or flexibility.\footnote{Ibid., 180.} When action is recommended or taken it will often reflect the specific organizational priorities. Leaders gravitate towards solutions that limit short-term uncertainty; direct change can affect organizational outputs over time, but immediate responses to emerging crises make this rare.\footnote{Ibid., 181-82; David A. Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect," \textit{International Security} 17, no. 2 (Autumn, 1992), 120.} The overall goal of an organization is to increase its sphere of influence so that it can continue pursuing its own objectives. The U.S. military is an example of a strong organizational culture.\footnote{James Q. Wilson, \textit{Bureaucracy}. (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 164.}

Bureaucratic politics theory, as proposed by Allison and Morton Halperin, treats the organizational output as the result of compromise and negotiation between competing organizations and their interests.\footnote{Halperin and Clapp, \textit{Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy}, 296-97; Allison and Halperin, \textit{Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and some Policy Implications}, 43.} Even if they agree on the objective, leaders differ in how to achieve it because of such factors as organizational perspective, personal interests, and background.\footnote{Allison and Zelikow, \textit{Essence of Decision}, 305-06.} “Where you stand depends on where you sit.”\footnote{Ibid., 307.} Somewhere at the top is a leader exercising control over a collection of organizations, but even he must get those under him to accede to a consensus or risk having his order misinterpreted or ignored. When presenting options to the top echelon of leaders, organizations within the bureaucracy find it easier to defeat the agendas of others than to pass their own.\footnote{Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," \textit{Policy Sciences} 4 (1972), 470.}
absence of a consensus within the inner circle opponents may take advantage of these disagreements to promote what they feel is the right course of action.\textsuperscript{41} The only way for an organization to succeed is to convince others that the goals and objectives of the organization really mirror their respective agendas.

Currently, there is much debate regarding the effectiveness of these two theories. One of the drawbacks to the organizational model is its absence at the moment of decision. By focusing on the routines that restrict the formation of options, the organizational model explains how the rational decision making process becomes derailed (the means), but not how actual decisions are made (the ends).\textsuperscript{42} In seeing standard operating procedures as a rigid framework constraining the decision making outputs, military history is full of examples of leaders who deviated from their carefully scripted plans to achieve victorious results.\textsuperscript{43} “Routines are not a helpful analytical category, because they cannot be said to have the uniform characteristics or pervasive and systematic effects upon which to build powerful theories of state behavior.”\textsuperscript{44}

Additionally, the bureaucratic politics paradigm has been criticized for not advancing beyond a description of the process, and not offering “positive theories of action.”\textsuperscript{45} It is hard to test bureaucratic theories because of the “relationship between a player’s bureaucratic position and his or her preferences.”\textsuperscript{46} It is unclear how much they take into account the players perceptions, rather than placing more emphasis on the position itself.\textsuperscript{47} If the perceptions of the individual contribute largely in the decision making process, then how important is the bureaucratic process? Additionally, in this system of comprise through “hauling and pulling,” bureaucratic players know going into

\textsuperscript{41} Allison and Zelikow, \textit{Essence of Decision}, 307-08.


\textsuperscript{43} Welch, The \textit{Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect}, 124-25.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 128.


\textsuperscript{46} Welch, \textit{The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect}, 120.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 121.
the game that the output will require negotiation, so they do not request what their true organizational interests presume. Instead, they will attempt to anticipate the reaction of other organizations and present an option that has broader appeal.48

4. Major Questions and Argument

What has followed since the Cold War has been a collection of strategies and ideas that lay the foundation for transformation but do not deliver it completely. Is this a result of its organizational history and can the models prescribed here validate the process the Navy is going through? Will the United States continue pursuing the age old precept of forward presence? What is certain is that the security environment in which naval forces will operate in the twenty-first century has yet to play out as a result of globalization. A new maritime strategy will need to focus on an overarching logic of how the seas will be used to secure United States national interests. In getting to this point the Navy will be forced to make hard concessions, yet the theories suggest the Navy will avoid drastic transformation. By analyzing the process through the lenses of the organizational and bureaucratic models, this thesis hopes to not only examine their usefulness in predicting outputs, but also to explain the strategic disconnect and confusion in the Navy’s internal process. The existing literature spells out clearly where the Navy came from and how it got here, but falls short of providing a clear prescription for where it is going over the next twenty years. Can the Navy develop a strategy more specific than go wherever the country requires; do whatever is necessary; and stay as long as it takes?

D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

This thesis will utilize the United States Navy’s path in its revision of the Maritime Strategy as a case study with which to examine the two organizational models: organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics. One case will be used to examine both models. These models have been traditionally used to examine foreign policy and grand

strategy outputs. In order to limit the scope of this thesis, only two naval communities will be examined. Here, each model will be applied to the naval aviation and surface communities to determine its validity in a smaller, more micro case study, with the assumption that, despite different areas of expertise and operations the submarine and special warfare communities will act along similar lines. The thesis will first attempt to determine the Navy’s internal process of evaluating and implementing a new strategy. Once predictions are made, the author will examine how the Navy is actually responding and arriving at the output level. After that, the two results will be examined to determine whether they correlate with the organization behavior and/or bureaucratic politics models.
II. THE TWO MODELS: PREDICTIONS

A. FROM GRAND NATIONAL STRATEGY TO MARITIME STRATEGY

Before beginning to examine the process of creating and executing strategy, one must define grand strategy. Harry Yarger describes strategy as “the calculation of objectives, concepts, and resources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable outcomes than might otherwise exist by chance or at the hands of others. [It is] a coherent blueprint to bridge the gap between the realities of today and a desired future.”\(^{49}\) Since September 11, 2001 the national bureaucracies and the military have been flooded with a plethora of new security strategies with which to “bridge the gap.” From the top down, the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy have been rewritten to reflect globalization and the war on terrorism in the national security environment. For this thesis, grand strategy will refer to the strategic vision outlined in these documents.

A quick review of the objectives and concepts delineated from these strategic documents include several common themes. The National Security Strategy calls for “strengthen[ing] alliances to defeat global terrorism; …work[ing] with others to defuse regional conflicts; ignit[ing] a new era of global economic growth through free markets and trade; [and] transform[ing] America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges…of the 21\(^{st}\) century.”\(^ {50}\) The Secretary of Defense reiterated the National Security proclamation that “America is a nation at war,”\(^ {51}\) with the same strategic objectives. Elaborating on how the Department of Defense will accomplish those objectives, the secretary places emphasis on alliances, creating hard targets through “dissuad[ing] adversaries [and] deter[ring] aggression,”\(^ {52}\) “operating from the global


\(^{52}\) Ibid., 5-7.
commons,”53 and “continuous defense transformation.”54 Following the strategic guidance further down the chain of command the National Military Strategy “provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives and joint operating concepts from which the Service Chiefs and combatant commanders identify desired capabilities and against which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assesses risk.”55 By developing a new maritime strategy the Navy is attempting to build its capacity at the point of delivery which will allow its complex organization to structure in an appropriate manner the operational outputs needed to meet the demands of the national security environment. The organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics models can be used to deconstruct the process of creating and executing the maritime strategy for the United States Navy. Using the two models as a frame of reference, what should the Navy’s internal storyline be and what should its maritime strategy process look like?

B. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR

Organizational behavior predicts that the Navy will respond with a maritime strategy output based on its organizational capabilities, procedures and interests. Organizational theory, drawn on by Graham Allison, proposes several propositions regarding the decisions leaders are likely to make. For this paper, naval action (i.e. the maritime strategy) will be treated as the result of organizational routines and outputs. When confronted with the problem of developing a new maritime strategy, naval leaders do not look at it as a whole, but break it down and allocate it according to pre-established organizational lines.56 These lines will be split along the warfare communities for purposes of this analysis. The inputs of the surface and aviation communities will constitute the principal agents within the Navy for researching the problem of strategy

54 Ibid., 11.
56 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 166.
development. Each community of the Navy has its own organizational missions, imbedded organizational routines, and culture with which to tackle the maritime strategy problems within its purview.

To succinctly define their intent, both the commanders of the Atlantic surface and air forces of the Navy profess a mission statement. “The mission of Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet is to provide combat ready ships to the fleet; and supply those ships and supporting commands with the leadership, manpower, equipment, maintenance, training, and material needed to achieve operational excellence and conduct prompt, sustained combat operations at sea to ensure victory.”57 With this statement, the commander of the surface forces seeks to dominate sea power with conventional surface assets. His goals, as laid out in the organizational mission, are his interpretation of orders from higher command to operate in the surface arena.

On the other hand, the Commander, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic Fleet, lays out his mission statement: “Man, train, equip and maintain a naval air force that is immediately employable, forward deployed and engaged. We support the Fleet and Unified Commanders by delivering the right force with the right readiness at the right time at reduced cost......today and in the future....Our core competency is the projection of combat power, whether from a flight deck or a forward base.”58 His purview includes all aspects of aviation and flight related matters. The two communities have similar mission statements in the pursuit of dominance of their respective specialties, but are part of the larger Navy organization, which has its own institutional goals and direction from the National Command Authority. The organizational actors make decisions based on their operational charters and missions. As we work our way down the organizational chain, all the way from the President to operational commanders, “organizations interpret mandates into their own terms. This is especially true when the broad goals conflict or offer little operational guidance.”59

59 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 167.
In its adherence to standard operating procedures and routines the Navy is also prone to bounded rationality when taking action.\textsuperscript{60} Shipboard life lends itself to strict standard operating procedures (SOP) in order to accomplish routine operational tasks. In the surface Navy every officer-of-the-deck (OOD) or engineering-officer-of-the-watch (EOOW) is extremely familiar with checklists. Checklists drive every special evolution, from lighting off boilers, starting gas turbine engines, getting ships underway, to replenishments at sea. In the aviation community there are routines established for the landing and taking off of aircraft from carriers. Such routines do not lend themselves easily to innovation or flexibility.\textsuperscript{61} SOPs exist to carry out rules and processes designed by higher authorities. The organization is much more concerned with the "how" of a task than with the "what" because the mission is vague and lacking a definitive objective. Checking every box along the way is as important as reaching a defined objective. Crises often do not conform to the standard routines for which plans exist, creating an environment which “does not constitute far sighted, flexible adaptation to ‘the issue’”\textsuperscript{62} of maritime strategy. When action is recommended or taken it will often reflect specific organizational priorities. When leaders are trained in this environment, this type of decision making prevents creative and strategic thinking. To develop strategy, leaders will gravitate towards solutions that limit short-term uncertainty; direct change can affect organizational outputs over time, but immediate responses to emerging crisis make this rare.\textsuperscript{63}

The overall goal of the organization is to increase its sphere of influence so that they can continue pursuing their own objectives. The U.S. military, and in the case of this paper, the Navy, is an example of a strong organizational culture.\textsuperscript{64} In order to operate the ships and aircraft necessary to perform their missions, each community seeks to wield the most influence in organizational decisions, such as creating a maritime strategy. Along these lines, naval surface forces will promote traditional combatants

\textsuperscript{60} Allison and Zelikow, \textit{Essence of Decision}, 178.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 180.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 178.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 181-82; Welch, \textit{The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect}, 120.
\textsuperscript{64} Wilson, \textit{Bureaucracy}, 164.
(cruisers and destroyers or CRUDES) and naval aviators will push for the continued central role of the aircraft carrier to fulfill the maritime strategy. As participants in the strategy process, surface and aviation leaders will analyze proposals with the idea of how it will impact their respective community’s ability to carry out their missions. “In one way or another, the pursuit of influence itself is felt to be in the [Navy’s] interest.”\textsuperscript{65} According to Halperin’s view of the model, each community will be staffed with career officers who share a common vision of their organizational essence.\textsuperscript{66} As a part of the larger naval organization, surface and aviation forces will compete to define their singular essence in the maritime strategy.

The role of carriers and conventional combatants is not new to the naval organizational strategy debate. The U.S. fleet surviving the December 7, 1941, attack did not have the ideal Mahanian composition that naval officers wanted to wage their campaign. The age of Mahan had dictated that the battle group should revolve around battleships; all assets protected the big guns whatever the cost. What staff planners found following Pearl Harbor was a force largely composed of cruisers, submarines and three carriers. The Navy, following Mahan’s theory of “control the enemy’s navy and so control the sea,” had to adapt and develop its naval strategy around the surviving assets. Task forces were reorganized around a carrier and ordered to commence a war of attrition in the tradition of George Washington and Nathaniel Greene. Unproven as a major offensive weapon, the carrier replaced surface fire superiority in the Mahanian tradition. When attached to a carrier task force, the battleship concentrated on keeping Japanese battleships at bay, thereby protecting the carriers’ vulnerable flight decks. “Thus the battle fleet, which had been the center of navy thinking and planning for over thirty years, quietly disappeared.”\textsuperscript{67}

Long after World War II, the Navy continued to debate which forces best controlled the sea. Aviators continued to fight for increased roles of carrier based aircraft, from increasing carrier based strikes in Vietnam, to debates with the Air Force regarding nuclear weapons deployment throughout the Cold War. Just as for years naval

\textsuperscript{65} Halperin and Clapp, \textit{Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy}, 26.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 27.
\textsuperscript{67} George W. Baer, \textit{One Hundred Years of Sea Power} (Standford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 213.
officers held fast to Mahan’s vision of ships of the line, the aviation community has resisted efforts to reduce its role in maritime strategy. Forward presence and operations from the sea, are hallmarks of naval aviation. In the same regard, surface forces also see themselves as indispensable elements of maritime strategy. Cruisers and destroyers provide a cadre of combat capabilities ranging from air and surface defense to naval surface fire support and long range missile strikes ashore.

C. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

Bureaucratic politics theory, as proposed by Allison and Morton Halperin, treats the organizational output as the result of compromise and negotiation between competing organizations and their interests. Decisions, in this case the final maritime strategy, will be based on calculated negotiations over several competing actions or objectives, and not a singular rational calculation. Even if they agree on the strategy, leaders will differ in how to achieve it because of such factors as organizational perspective, personal interests, and background. “Where you stand depends on where you sit.” Such a multi-person decision making process would intuitively lead to better decision and strategy making. However, many more independent observers examining a problem can lead to “analysis paralysis.” The leaders from each community -- surface and aviation -- act as players in the political strategy game, bringing their own experience to the strategy developing process. Where the organizational behavior model puts emphasis on the collective output of the organization, i.e., the surface and aviation communities, bureaucratic politics goes further in explaining the decision making process by placing the emphasis on the individual players, not the developed routines of the organization. Because the difficulty in using the bureaucratic politics model lies in the emphasis on the players in the political game, the solution to the maritime strategy will also reflect the fact

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68 Halperin and Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 296-97; Allison and Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and some Policy Implications, 43.

69 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 305-06.

70 Ibid., 307.

71 Ibid., 265.

72 Ibid., 273.
that officials are not exclusively focused on the strategic question at hand. In addition to focusing on the strategic dilemma at hand, Navy officials are also required to take into account how decisions today will affect their communities tomorrow.

Who contributes in this strategy development process? Like the organizational behavior model, players in the bureaucratic politics model will come to the strategic development table predisposed with their organization’s missions, routines, and culture. But this does not guarantee their decisions play out along party lines. The “Revolt of the Admirals” (1948-49) and the debate over the role of Naval aviation in national security highlights the role of individuals in the decision making process. Then Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, disagreed with senior naval officers on the role of carrier based aviation. “He understood that the country needed a Navy but, to his way of thinking, it should be a Navy that concentrated on its basic defensive tasks in light of its potential adversary, not one that used its varied capabilities for a whole range of offensive and defensive tasks.”

He chose instead to focus on unifying naval aviation and the Army Air Force within the Department of Defense. At the cancellation of the USS UNITED STATES by Johnson, the Secretary of the Navy, John Sullivan, immediately resigned in protest. His successor, Francis Matthews, received the appointment, not to support the Navy but to support the greater transformation vision of the Secretary of Defense. When called to testify before House Armed Service Committee on 13 October 1949, Admiral Louis Denfeld, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), laid out his case:

Why do we need a strong Navy when any potential enemy has no navy [with which] to fight? I read this in the press, but what is more disturbing, I hear it repeatedly in the councils of the Department of Defense. As a result, there is a steady campaign to relegate the Navy to a convoy and antisubmarine service, on the ground that any probably enemy possesses only negligible fleet strength. This campaign results from a misunderstanding of the functions and capabilities of navies and from the erroneous principle of the self-sufficiency of air power…Fleets never in history met opposing fleets for any other purpose than to gain control of the sea – not as an end in itself, but so that national power could be exerted against the enemy.

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74 Ibid., 253.
Until this time, Admiral Denfeld had never expressed opinions contrary to Department of Defense policies; his first dissenting opinion led to his forced resignation. Denfeld’s defection caused one senior general to remark, “Personal relationships have gone to hell.”

Today, in regards to Maritime Strategy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) will appoint a committee of senior officers to begin looking at the strategy problem. These officers, representing an inner circle of elite policy makers, are more often prone to “theoretical thinking” because they have greater freedom to go after their own agendas. This allows senior naval officials assigned to develop strategy to not only reexamine the CNO’s objectives, but also strategic objectives sent down by the National Command Authority. Allison cites Richard Bett’s work, as he explores this phenomenon. “There are differences between services, between branches of the same service, between different cliques within branches, between ‘Pentagon’ officers and those in the field.” Gathering a large group of seasoned officers with similar organizational backgrounds and training, but with vastly different experiences, creates an environment where quality decisions are not necessarily made along organizational lines.

As a player in the strategic process, a flag level officer’s position will be influenced by “national security interests, organizational interests, domestic interests, and personal interests.” Despite generally agreeing on basic aspects of maritime strategy (i.e. necessity for homeland defense, protecting global sea lanes of communication), individuals can disagree on how wide the scope and reach of specific issues regarding the strategy. Feeding information to senior officials are mid-level officers (04-06 paygrade range) who represent an outer circle of “staffers.” Their job is to create talking points for senior officials; in essence filling the gap between directives from higher authority and the strategic process. From December 1948 until November 1949, Captain Arleigh Burke, a decorated World War II destroyerman, and his OP-23 staff filled this role. “OP-23 was to familiarize itself on all matters pertaining to unification; advise [the CNO] and keep him and other senior officers informed on all unifications matters…and be the

77 Ibid., 277.
clearing house within the navy for unification matters.” This military bottom up approach relies on mid-grade officers who may or may not have the knowledge and experience in their background to properly frame the strategic issues. Tension can also be observed at the lower levels, as the staff argues over exactly which positions and issues to push up to the senior officials. Interestingly, in this case, Captain Burke held the respect of surface and aviation officers alike; his superiors favored his analytical and problem solving skills when applied to major naval policies.

By increasing the number of qualified personnel examining the strategy dilemma, the CNO effectively avoids many of the problems that arise out of singularly focusing on an individual issue. At the top, he is the leader exercising control over a collection of organizations (warfare communities) but even he must get those under him to accede to a consensus or risk having his orders misinterpreted or ignored. Secretaries Johnson and Matthews counted on Admiral Denfeld’s support for their unification policies. Halperin cites George Keenan when considering the uncertainty of orders: “policies can be correctly and effectively implemented only by people who understand the entire philosophy and world of thought of the person or persons who took the original decision.” Today, the CNO’s direction to explore strategic options may be vague enough to elicit questions as to how exactly he wants it carried out. Senior officials may not be fully aware of the motives behind the CNO’s Maritime Strategy decision and why they were directed to redevelop it. This can lead to difficulty in implementing decisions which align with the CNO’s vision.

Additionally, the CNO may find that his vision for the Maritime Strategy meets with resistance. “Participants still have different interests and still see different faces of an issue and have different stakes in it.” When presenting options to the top, officers within the bureaucracy find it easier to defeat the agendas of others than to pass their own. When the Navy lost funding for its flush deck carriers, the service attacked the

80 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 308.
82 Halperin and Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 249.
83 Ibid., 254.
84 Art, Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique, 470.
Army Air Force’s B-36 production and capabilities. Today, by pursuing traditional combatants, surface warfare flag officers will simply downplay the need for aviation assets instead of pushing the expensive destroyers of the future. If naval aviation does not need new F-22 fighters, then more money will be freed up for DD(X) and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) funding. In the absence of a consensus within the inner circle opponents may take advantage of these disagreements to promote what they feel is the right course of action. The only way for an organization to succeed is to convince others that what they want them to accomplish really mirrors their own agendas. In 1949 the Navy had to convince congress that Secretary Johnson’s diminished role for naval aviation went contrary to national defense. This led to the resurrection of carrier procurement funds and the Navy’s role in air power. Such “hauling and pulling,” will lead to a maritime strategy that reflects the compromises between aviation and surface objectives and priorities and possibly resist changes sought by the CNO. Utilizing such a political lens to view the strategic process, it is hard to envision the resulting strategy being more evolved than a watered down version of a grander maritime strategy.

85 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 307-08.
III. STORY OF A PROCESS: WHAT IS REALLY HAPPENING?

A. TOP DOWN: THE CNO’S STRATEGIC VISION

On 14 June 2006, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen, addressed the Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College in Newport, RI. During his remarks Admiral Mullen reflected on Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s strategic vision during the Cold War, which Lehman outlined in a speech to the same War College forum twenty five years earlier. “It was a watershed speech because it outlined in public a new set of ideas that guided the Navy for some time, a cornerstone strategy that set the Navy’s course on the long path to victory during those closing years of the Cold War. It clearly defined the purpose of naval forces in that struggle … and articulated precisely how they would be used to deter and, if necessary, defeat the forces of the Soviet Union, first at sea and then ashore.”86 Building on that strategic vision of the Cold War, Admiral Mullen challenged those in attendance to take a broader view of naval power in the strategic arena and to let go of the long held belief “that maritime strategy exists solely to fight and win wars at sea, and the rest will take care of itself.”87

Out of the national security directives, Adm. Mullen selected several key points from which to launch the maritime strategy. Among them are the defense of the homeland, prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), prevention of a near peer competitor, and global interdependence through secure sea lanes of communication (SLOC).88 He refers to a "national fleet" comprising both the Navy and the Coast Guard, which has the small-boat expertise for dealing with littoral and fourth generation warfare threats. Mullen is also seeking unprecedented cooperation from foreign navies and even from some major merchant shipping companies. Together,

87 Ibid., 5.
he says, like-minded navies could serve as a global "1,000-ship Navy"\textsuperscript{89} that could work jointly to keep the peace. Accordingly, Mullen wants naval planners to focus not just on threats to the United States but also on the relationship between maritime security and the globalized economy. The United States and its allies depend more than ever on sea lanes for the transportation of goods and resources. For example, the United States takes more than 6 million cargo containers into its ports each year. “And since most governments derive their legitimacy from economic stability, and most of the world’s commerce still travels by sea – some 90 percent – there remains a key role for navies and maritime security. It is not by happenstance that our vision for the Navy includes the need to keep sea lanes open and free.”\textsuperscript{90} Admiral Mullen hopes that the economic globalization angle will entice foreign cooperation.

B. CREATING STRATEGY

What does the internal storyline and process look like according to the research? According to the Navy, the Maritime Strategy today is the key to achieving American sea power supremacy and a piece of a larger four-part structure. This includes the Navy’s vision which is outlined in \textit{Sea Power 21}. Tactics, which are addressed in the \textit{Naval Operations Concept}, dictate how resources will be utilized by the navy war fighter. Finally, with limited resources, the \textit{Navy Strategic Plan} will provide the necessary guidance for policy makers in creating a budget for submission to Congress. Since the vision, tactics, and resources are set, naval officials are supposed to see the new Maritime Strategy fulfilling their strategic naval goals.\textsuperscript{91}

Five phases were laid out to develop the maritime strategy in a memo from the Navy Office of Information:

\textbf{Phase I: Collect Inputs and Analyze Strategic Environment.} This begins the process and continues through all phases.

\textsuperscript{89} Mullen, \textit{Remarks as Delivered by Adm. Mike Mullen Current Strategy Forum}, 8.


Phase II: *Develop Maritime Strategies.* Discuss strategic theories in public forums in order to socialize initial concepts.

Phase III: *Test, Examine and Refine Alternatives.* The Navy will legitimize and validate proposed strategies through the testing and gaming process and analysis of results.

Phase IV: *Synthesize and Report.* The Navy will synthesize successful strategies into one comprehensive strategy.

Phase V: *Sustainment.* The Navy will continue to promote and uphold principles of the Maritime Strategy, ensuring its enduring value and legitimacy.  

Before strategic process could begin in earnest, the Naval War College set out to define and frame the geo-strategic environment and global trends which would influence naval operations in the next twenty years. A conference convened in Newport, from 23-24 August 2006, brought together military, academics, think-tanks, and industry leaders to discuss the global relationships between economics, energy, society and demographics, environment, government, technology, and security and law. Several conclusions regarding the direction of the Maritime Strategy include the following:

1. Any new strategy must encompass more than warfighting to remain relevant.
2. Relationship between energy costs and operational deployments favors embedding forces rather conducting periodic exercises with other states to achieve 1000-ship navy. If global maritime cooperation is a good idea, and most participants agreed it was, and, if energy costs continue to rise, which most participants thought likely, then the most effective and efficient way to garner cooperation and save money is to embed a limited number of ships with select host navies. Otherwise exercise opportunities will be so limited as to make the notion of a 1,000-ship navy implausible.  

Further guidance from the Admiral John Morgan, Deputy CNO Information, Plans & Strategy (N3/N5) at a Process Analysis Workshop on 30 August 2006 stated that a new maritime strategy needed to be linked to the current national strategic documents set forth by the White House and Pentagon, but that they should not be seen as “straight jackets.”

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93 Bradd C. Hayes, Results of the Maritime Strategy Geo-Strategic Environment Workshop 23-34 August 2006 (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War Collge, [2006]).  
for developing strategy. Additionally, every effort should be made to correlate the maritime strategy to “real intelligence” and take into account how it will relate to the “strategic, bureaucratic, intellectual, budgetary” context in which it will be utilized.

Shortly after the geo-strategic environment was defined, the Maritime Strategy Red Executive Group convened on 7 September 2006 in Newport, RI to begin work on their charter to “shape, scope and critique the overall Red analytical effort throughout the Maritime Strategy development process.” The group identified seven strategic challenges to the new maritime strategy and ranked them in order of priority. They include, China, a radical Salafist movement, an Iran-backed Shia movement, Pakistan, North Korea, Russia, and, India. The strategic objectives of these entities will be used to war-game every aspect of the maritime strategy options developed during the strategic development process.

C. A CONVERSATION WITH THE COUNTRY

The five step process was intended to use a “linear and collaborative approach” to collect inputs from various individuals and groups around the country. Coined a “conversation with the country,” eight Maritime Strategy Seminars were planned throughout the United States to allow for as wide a sampling of ideas as possible. Target audiences included opinion leaders, local, state and federal government, business, industry, academia, and media.

The “Conversations” were set up as a one day strategic forum to encourage a competition of ideas regarding maritime strategy. The author attended the conference held on March 12, 2007 at the Marine Memorial Hotel in San Francisco, California. Vice Admiral John Morgan (N3/N5) opened the conference by framing the Navy’s strategic


95 Ibid.


97 Ibid., 2-3.
search through the Conversations, *Sea Power 21*, and the Maritime Strategy as the ends, ways, and means, respectively. Admiral Morgan also emphasized that globalization had led to economic integration and stressed the importance of the “economics of the oceans.” To provide a historical framework for those in attendance, Professor Walling, from the Naval War College, laid out the past dialogue that has consumed the Maritime Strategy debate: building a “moat” for homeland defense versus power projection in order to secure free use of the commons. Next, Peter Swartz, Chairman of the Global Business Network, presented his work on “The Art of the Long View” and our need to challenge “mental maps.” After an entire morning of lectures and Power Point presentations, the afternoon featured a brief interactive conversation about maritime strategy. Keypads were set up for individuals at the conference to rate his/her perceived importance of a particular issue regarding maritime strategy; a brief discussion of opinions followed each question. “The results cannot be used in any scientific way. But they can provide useful insight for Navy officials seeking to figure out how to tell the Navy story to policy makers and taxpayers who may wonder why, while the nation is engaged in a ground war, the Defense Department should spend $130 billion a year on the sea service.”

A few key statistics regarding the group in attendance:

- 87% were male
- 57% were over the age of 61
- 13% were on active duty
- 27% were in defense related private sector fields

Question one asked the audience to rate the importance of forward deployed naval forces versus a force geared toward homeland defense. Eighty-three percent (83%) favored forward deployment; one percent (1%) favored homeland defense; the rest sat in the middle ground. Reasons given centered on taking the fight to the enemy away from American shores. Homeland defense does not guarantee freedom of the seas. Building a “moat” with maritime forces created a line too easily penetrated; references were made to

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France’s Maginot Line of the early 20th century. Those in the middle favored forward deployed forces but cautioned against leaving the proverbial back door unguarded. Some even wondered if the question was a false dichotomy. Would America look favorably on a foreign Navy forward deployed to the coastline of the United States?

The second question asked the audience to rate the importance and role of alliances in a new maritime strategy. Seventy-seven percent (77%) favored a strong role for alliances. Most opinions felt that the United States did not have the manpower or the constitution to go it alone for a long duration. Those in the middle ground pointed out that the U.S. needs to be careful which countries it aligns itself with; there is always the possibility of being drawn into unwanted conflicts that do not benefit the U.S. There is also a difference between an alliance and a coalition. Alliances seem to be critical to the Navy’s “1000 Ship” vision, but some brought up the question, “what if they do not show?” Others wondered how we get a “1000 ship navy” to agree to the same objectives.

The third question of the conversation pitted control of the commons against expeditionary power projection from the sea. Twenty-eight percent (28%) of those polled leaned toward overall control of the commons, with fifty percent (50%) preferring power projection from the sea. The remaining thirty-two percent (32%) held the middle ground on the issue. Those in favor of control of the global commons believed that power projection only remained useful for short tactical engagements. Some also questioned whether expeditionary power had gotten the United States into trouble in the past.

Concluding the discussion VADM Morgan called for the American people to own the maritime strategy. If the strategy did not have the support of America at large, then it would not be successful. He cited the importance of those present at the conversations around the country taking the debate back to their own circles.

D. THE MARITIME STRATEGY OPTIONS

Out of the strategic process, three Maritime Strategy Options (MSO) have emerged for final testing and validation. Constant variables for all three MSO’s are the
national security objectives which remain true to ADM Mullen’s original four tenets\(^9^9\) and geo-political assumptions. The geo-political assumptions include the following:

1. Global commons (sea, space, cyberspace) remain important for U.S. national security and economic well-being.
2. Not all threats to the United States are strategic.
3. China’s relative importance in global politics will increase because of economic and military growth.
   a. China is not necessarily a U.S. adversary.
   b. China is a credible potential peer competitor.
4. Terrorists will pose an infrequent but potentially spectacular threat to U.S. homeland.
5. Access to Persian Gulf energy resources is essential for global economy.
6. Hostile or competitive strategic actors will develop asymmetric ways to counter U.S. conventional force.
7. States will seek WMD advantage against regional threats and/or to neutralize U.S. military advantages.
8. U.S. maritime forces will maintain a strategic deterrence capability.\(^1^0^0\)

Varying among the three MSO’s are the “maritime strategic concepts, supporting logic, maritime mission areas enabling capabilities/concepts, and regional implementation.”\(^1^0^1\)

Option One would preserve “winning combat power forward,” enabling the Navy to prevail on short notice and take “preemptive or preventative action as necessary.” MSO One aims to defeat aggression and overcome anti-access and area-denial strategies from the sea while focusing primarily on the zone from the Persian Gulf to Northeast Asia. This option, which would maximize combat power, sees China as the main candidate to become a near-peer or peer competitor to the United States. Option one sees terrorism as a “less frequent but more spectacular” threat that allows terrorists the opportunity to utilize the seas to access the United States. Unfriendly states will seek

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\(^9^9\) As stated earlier: to protect U.S. homeland (NDS/NMS), prevent proliferation and use of WMD (NSS/NDS), hedge against the emergence of near peer competitor (QDR), and maintain free flow of global commerce including energy (NDS).


\(^1^0^1\) Ibid, 4.
weapons of mass destruction and regional instability will endanger Persian Gulf energy supplies. This approach places emphasis on seabasing, missile defense and blunt sea strike offensives.\textsuperscript{102}

Option Two concentrates on securing the global maritime commons. Maritime forces would focus on missions involving core competencies, ensuring sea control and countering sea denial. To implement this concept, cooperation and flexibility would be needed. MSO Two stresses working with allied navies, increasing awareness of activities close to foreign shores and the ability of other nations to assure their own maritime security. The second option concedes that United States’ forces no longer assume command of the seas in all situations in all parts of the world. The United States’ sea control capabilities are diminishing and new technological, political and legal ways of contesting sea control have come into view. However, MSO Two holds that U.S. maritime forces need to maintain the ability to counter sea denial threats. Option Two pushes for greater joint interoperability between the services in maritime domain awareness and maritime security operations, ballistic missile defense, and homeland security.\textsuperscript{103}

MSO Three endeavors to prevent future great power wars, which can drastically “disrupt the global system that supports U.S. security and prosperity.” Maritime forces would keep the peace and deter major wars by maintaining a forward deployed combat power. This option also considers China the most likely near-peer and focuses on this “‘high end’ conflict in order to demonstrate power and resolve.” This option also aims to prevent local and regional conflicts from escalating, while building relationships internationally through “culturally aware shaping operations and enhanced commitment to ‘low end’ operations.” The interests of the United States are best served by supporting the current global system. Great powers can be drawn into regional conflicts in bids for resources or influence and the rise of challengers to the dominant national economy has also sparked war between great powers. MSO Three advocates stronger declaratory nuclear policy as well as continued development of missile defense. This option also

\textsuperscript{102} McGrath, \textit{Toward a New Maritime Strategy: Process Update and Discussion 13 April 2007}, 8-15.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 16-23.
focuses more on low-end operations to counter terrorist activities, WMD traffic and transnational crime. Maritime domain awareness and seabasing are among the priorities emphasized.\footnote{McGrath, \textit{Toward a New Maritime Strategy: Process Update and Discussion 13 April 2007}, 24-31.}
IV. MATCHING THEORY WITH REALITY

A. OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROCESS

After laying out the organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics models and then looking at how the process unfolded, one can now begin to deconstruct the creation and execution of maritime strategy for the United States Navy. Since Admiral Mullen threw down the strategy gauntlet to the Naval War College in June 2006, debates have been ongoing within the Department of the Navy regarding its direction and purpose. However, strategic debates have not followed the service community lines originally proposed in this thesis. Surface warfare officers and aviators have not squared off to battle for destroyers and littoral combat ships in favor of F/A 18 Super Hornets and carriers. While debates do exists regarding the future battle line of the Navy, the issue at hand is not surface versus aviation. In fact, naval aviation and surface support have become synonymous with forward presence and power projection. Cemented in the 313-ship fleet proposed by Admiral Mullen are eleven aircraft carriers (or carrier strike groups) and supporting air wings. Multi-mission (i.e. guided missile destroyers) vs. single mission (i.e. littoral combat ship) surface platforms are still vying for funding and prominence in strategic planning, however, whatever support landed will complement naval aviation and the projection of combat power forward.\footnote{For a detailed breakdown of the proposed 313-ship fleet see Captain J.F. McCarthy, USN, “Recapitalizing the Navy’s Battle Line,” a PowerPoint presentation given at a Department of the Navy Media Roundtable on June 8, 2006, www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/T.20060330.NavyEvent/T.20060330.NavyEvent.pdf (accessed 15 September 2007).} Multi-mission platforms excel at blue water operations while single mission hulls would be better suited to the littorals.

At first glance it would appear that the models failed to predict the three output options which are being analyzed by Vice Admiral Morgan’s N3/N5 staff. But the models show interesting results when viewing the strategic process in context with the larger national strategic guidelines. By re-writing the Maritime Strategy, the Navy as an organization is interpreting the objectives and policies from the Department of Defense
in its own terms. As indicated though the strategy process, regardless of warfare designation, the participants are focused on maintaining maritime dominance in the consciousness of national security.

Paul Bracken argues that what made the Navy’s strategic process unique to strategy at the national level was a refusal to jump to immediate strategy at the outset of the exercise. The maritime strategy process started without the answer to the security problem. Whether or not naval leaders professed to have a clear picture of the output (in the form of maritime strategy) in the beginning, much of the details in the three options are not groundbreaking. The Navy may have stated a desire to approach the maritime strategy problem and process without an ultimate strategy in mind, but the author argues that the strategy options outlined in Chapter Three are predictable given the Navy’s strategic culture and the organizational models.

This chapter reviews the three maritime strategy responses. What these three options detail is a classic look at the strategic culture through the organizational and bureaucratic politics lenses. Borrowing from Roger Barnett, the shared and enduring characteristics of naval culture are:

- Maintaining a systems approach
- Recognizing the primacy of context
- Performing in an expeditionary manner: offensive, forward, mobile, and joint
- Ensuring Adaptability
- Accounting for inherent uncertainty and risk

These organizational characteristics are common to the leadership and communities crafting the strategic options.

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107 See Chapter III.

B. APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM

Unlike the United States Army, naval strategists are prone to think in a systems approach. Instead of agonizing over organizational charts referring to exactly which units are supplying which forces, naval commanders are more concerned with air defense, logistics, and strike systems. All three of the Maritime Strategy Options were developed by examining the security environment from a holistic and systematic point of view. Naval officials broke the problem down, setting up a plan of action and milestones (POAM) to outline the strategic process. Organizationally, the Navy had many standard operating procedures for examining the strategic process in this manner. Naval planners analyzed the security environment; they looked at past strategies; they analyzed possible foreign responses and war-gamed those responses to flesh out problems. A large part of the systematic approach was creating debates about sea power from San Diego to Newport through the “Conversations with the Country” with the hopes of exposing dissenting or alternative options.

By looking at the process through the “conversations” and the organizational models, an explanation of reinterpreting national grand strategy can be seen. “Few would argue that such a conversation would be unproductive; any deliberate, inclusive, and truly open dialogue about maritime strategy will be sure to yield positive results, even if they are nothing more than a restatement of the value of maritime power to the United States.” More than simply updating the Maritime strategy, naval officials hope to thrust the importance and relevance of the Navy in the twenty-first century. A look again at the statistical breakdown of the San Francisco ‘Conversation’ illustrates this point: 57% were over the age of 61; 13% were on active duty; 27% were in defense related private sector fields. It was the author’s observation that these were people who already have some idea of the capability and importance of sea power. They were average people who may, but most likely had no strategy related experience. By seeking out people who shared its organizational essence, naval officials practically guarantee that when action is

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recommended or taken it will often reflect the specific organizational priorities. They
even brought out Peter Swartz and his work on “The Art of the Long View” and the need
to challenge “mental maps.” However, once it came time to “get out of the box” and talk
strategy, every question asked put the audience, and their individual points of view, back
into it. For example, when opening the conference, the initial presenter, Professor
Walling, went out of his way to frame homeland defense as “building a moat” and a less
than desirable option. It is no surprise then, that in the afternoon, eighty-three percent
(83%) of those polled favored a strategy based on forward deployed forces. Vice
Admiral Morgan even commented that the real challenge was to get the American public
to own the maritime strategy. He has also stated, “I think there is a diversity of opinion
and we’re all shaped by our own experiences. That is healthy and informative.”111 But
his real goal and take-home message was for every participant to take the debate back to
their inner circles and continue the “conversation.” This is really what the
“Conversations” have been about: reminding the American public that they still need
maritime forces, which will cost money.

Despite eclipsing $623 billion in fiscal year 2007,112 the Department of Defense
budget accounts for only roughly four percent of the national GDP and resources are
tightly controlled. Organizationally, naval objectives reflect efforts which are not to lose
ground to sister services in importance and relevance, especially when it comes to
funding. This relationship, between maritime strategy and resources is not
groundbreaking. Samuel P. Huntington explores it in a 1954 issue of United States Naval
Institute Proceedings:

The second element of a military service is the resources, human and
material, which are required to implement its strategic concept. To secure
these resources it is necessary for society to forego the alternative uses to
which the resources might be put and to acquiesce in their allocation to the
military service. Thus the resources which a service is able to obtain in a
democratic society are a function of the public support for that service.

111 Christopher J. Castelli, "Navy Weighs Three Maritime Strategy Options," Inside Defense.com,

112 Department of Defense, National Defense Department Budget Estimates for FY 2008 (Washington,
D.C.: GPO, March 2007),
2007), 5.
The service has the responsibility to develop the necessary support and it can only do so if it possesses a strategy concept which clearly formulates its relationship to the national security.\textsuperscript{113} By reconstituting the maritime strategy, naval officials hope to influence civilian leadership not only in budget talks but also in future national security strategy forums. In fact, this philosophy is plainly stated in the “Developing Maritime Strategy” talking points on the Navy Office of Information website: “We see the new Maritime Strategy, which should be released in about a year, influencing the next cycle of strategic thinking, including the next Navy Strategic Plan and into the next QDR.”\textsuperscript{114} Here, there is no revolutionizing of naval strategy as in the transition to carrier-centric battle groups in World War II and the fight for naval aviation, simply a goal of shaping future national strategy through a status quo and increase in funding.

**C. PRIMACY OF CONTEXT**

The “Conversations” illustrated part of Navy’s strategic process, which then leads to the context of the maritime strategy. Instead of strictly aligning strategy with national defense objectives, the Navy is attempting to preempt the next administration by entrenching its own strategic vision. The strategic culture of the Navy is indicative of the military, its civilian oversight and the institutions which are responsible for grand strategy. While rational theory holds that each level of strategy, from the President down to Service Chiefs, should complement one another, the organizational and bureaucratic politics models show something different. “Each level of strategy making has its own set of requirements and constraints, resulting from the nature of the system, thereby creating the possibility for contradictions and disjunctions.”\textsuperscript{115} It might take several versions of maritime strategy to meet the national grand strategy if it is “ambiguous or insufficient to make a clear delineation as to how to proceed.”\textsuperscript{116} When crafting the National Security

\textsuperscript{114} Navy Office of Information, \textit{Developing a New Maritime Strategy}.
\textsuperscript{116} Barnett, \textit{Strategic Culture and its Relationship to Naval Strategy}, 32.
strategies the framers miss the fact that the “American Way of War” is greatly mismatched with the strategic environment of globalization and asymmetric threats which they themselves defined. As Colin Gray explains:

American public, strategic, and military culture is not friendly to the means and methods necessary for the waging of warfare against irregular enemies. The traditional American way of war was developed to defeat regular enemies. It reflects many of the strengths of American society and culture. Alas, one military style does not suit all kinds of warfare equally well. The fit between the traditional “American way,” and the requirements of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, for example, falls far short of perfect.117

Following the Cold War, America flexed its newfound hegemonic power, using the overwhelming might of military force to solve almost any problem it encountered on the international scene.

In Clausewitzian terms, if the use of force is simply policy by other means, then the end state and objectives need to be clearly defined. In the American bureaucratic system, with administrations changing every four or eight years, strategy must be easily adaptable. With the 2001 and 2006 Quadrennial Defense Reviews, the civilian policy makers outlined their perceived potential threats to U.S. national security which encompassed four different types of threats: (1) traditional challenges involving military engagements with other nation states; (2) irregular challenges involving confrontations with enemy combatants outside military forces from non-state actors; (3) catastrophic challenges involving threats of weapons of mass destruction; and (4) disruptive challenges involving both state and non-state actors trying to tip the scale of U.S. hegemony.118 It was then left to the Department of Defense and the respective service branches to develop the strategy to defeat the threats. At the same time as directives were filtering down from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Chief of Naval Operations, the military has been in the middle of two major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. So, as the military is being directed to alter its strategy to fit the


changing security environment, it finds itself right in the middle of an irregular war for which it has no strategy. If the terms are not sufficiently defined by the leadership from the outset, then it is next to impossible for the military to learn and adapt. What follows is failed or minimal transformation and poor strategy.

As part of this process, by developing maritime strategy, the CNO embarked the Navy on an “adaptive planning process” aimed at mitigating the risks inherent in “ad hoc planning,” or the rational top-down approach. “If I’m inclined to believe in anything, I’m inclined to believe in agility and adaptability and resilience,” stated Vice Admiral Morgan, in an interview with Inside the Navy.119 If the Navy relies on strategy created only from guidance handed down from higher authority, then it is limited in its response “to what the future may actually hold for Navy’s interests and only provide traceability of Navy risk decisions to [Department of Defense]-level risk guidance.”120 In framing the maritime strategy process both Admirals Mullin and Morgan illustrate the “theoretical thinking” of bureaucratic politics. Navy hierarchy generally agrees with the tenets of national security directives but has to go beyond them. Governmental administrations come and go while the military institutions follow a more constant and structured path. To placate the directions from the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the initial naval strategic response does not look to new innovations, but simply repackages old and existing technology and assets to maintain status quo within the Department of Defense. With this type of response, is the Navy holding onto the “American way of war” when it should be adapting?

With phrases like “joint operations” and “continuous transformation,” and terms like “mobility” and “expeditionary” littered throughout national strategy documents, the question remains, is the Navy responding to the changing security environment and demands from civilian authorities? Since September 11, 2001 the Navy has cited its participation in numerous operations in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Officials cite medical and construction support for forces on the scene in Iraq and Afghanistan, long range surveillance of suspected terrorists by ships and aircraft, maritime interception

119 Castelli, Navy Weighs Three Maritime Strategy Options.
operations (MIO), direct action missions by special operations forces (SEALs), tomahawk missile strikes against terrorist targets, and increased cooperation with the United States Coast Guard to enhance overall maritime domain awareness (MDA), as vital contributions to the GWOT.\textsuperscript{121} Since the Quadrennial Defense Review in 2006, the Navy has continued to expand its presence in the GWOT. Initiatives such as the “1,000-ship Navy,” Global Fleet Stations (GFS), the acquisition of the first littoral combat ships (LCS) and a riverine force add to the Navy’s capabilities in supporting the GWOT. The Navy has also assumed command of the Horn of Africa joint task force, the detainee operation at Guantanamo, Cuba, various prisons in Iraq, and defense of the Haditha Dam and the offshore oil terminals in Iraq.\textsuperscript{122} The Department of the Navy contends that “[t]hese operations support our nation’s interest[s]…There are over 12,000 sailors ashore (including Individual Augmentees supporting ground forces in core mission areas and new capability areas) and 17,000 at sea in the U.S. Central Command region alone engaged in the GWOT.”\textsuperscript{123} But is this increased role in the GWOT necessary and are these really organizational changes that are appropriate? They essentially are on the surface. The Navy has responded to the call for change in order to preserve their organizational essence, but have failed to adequately address how it plans to fight the new threats in irregular conflicts of globalization and defeat a near peer. By adapting to civilian calls for change, while at the same time pursuing their own maritime strategy, the Navy leaders are simply playing the “hauling and pulling” game of bureaucratic politics. Because the strategic culture and process cannot predict the future, the process postulates multiple futures and multiple force designs, selecting those characteristics most robust for the best force design and examining optimal strategies for achieving them. The Navy puts its strategic focus on providing insight for decisions that must be made today.

\textsuperscript{121} Ronald O’Rourke, \textit{Navy Role in Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) – Background and Issues for Congress, RS22373}, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 16 April 2007), 1-2.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 3.
D. NO ESCAPING FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS

Each of the three Maritime Strategy Options reviewed relies on the traditional hallmark of naval missions: a concentration on forward deployed forces. As stated before, naval forces are not garrison forces; ships are meant to put to sea. With such a long history of forward presence operations, it will be next to impossible to get the Navy to alter the organizational mindset of maintaining forward deployed forces and the country may not want it to change. History shows that the Navy, as an arm of the Department of Defense, has a sporadic record of homeland defense and security operations. These types of defensive operations do not stick: America, and especially the Navy, enjoys playing the “away game,” preferring strategy which takes the fight to the enemy. Following the Cold War, a small sect of Americans believed in a foreign policy favoring isolationism and avoiding armed conflict. Forward presence operations won out when the U.S. realized how intertwined its economy was in the fast paced world of globalization. Ships already at sea can easily be redeployed elsewhere, particularly if they are supported by afloat logistics forces.

Expeditionary forces are important to MSO One which would preserve “winning combat power forward,” enabling the Navy to prevail on short notice and take “preemptive or preventative action as necessary.” Naval forces will act in a preemptive or preventative manner, relying less on deterrence and more on unilateral or multilateral combat power to secure national interests. MSO Three endeavors to prevent future great power wars, which can drastically “disrupt the global system that supports U.S. security and prosperity.” Here, maritime forces would keep the peace and deter major wars by maintaining a forward deployed combat power. Both One and Three, see China as the main candidate to become a near-peer or peer competitor to the United States. Simply having forces available for power projection is not enough; on the heels of the Cold War, the Navy has been on the lookout for the next great naval threat. The problem with China becoming a near peer is explained by economist Albert Keidel:

Even if China came close to spending annually what the U.S. does on military activities and procurement, it would take China many decades to accumulate the stock of aircraft carrier task forces, command and control installations, space-based platforms, and other combinations of hardware,
software, and talent that reflect many decades of U.S. high-quality expenditure and accumulation, especially when one considers the U.S. accumulation of basing rights around the world. These are generally not for sale. China’s economic prowess at mid-century may help it acquire bases and basing rights in strategic locations, but it would take a long time for that process to begin to match the U.S. global presence.\footnote{Albert Keidel, "Assessing China's Economic Rise: Strengths, Weaknesses and Implications," Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org/enotes/200707.keidel.assessingchina.html (accessed August 2007).}

China, and for that matter, the seventeen national navies behind the U.S. do not even come close to operating a fleet comparable in aggregate tonnage. The 2.85 million ton U.S. fleets dwarfs the combined 2.66 million tons of the next seventeen countries.\footnote{Work, "Economics" and Established Maritime Powers: Resource Implications of the New Maritime Strategy, 67-68.} Despite the China/near-peer argument, naval strategy has to concentrate on emphasizing that the major military threat to national security will come from abroad, and thus it must be ready. MSO One aims to defeat aggression and overcome anti-access and area-denial strategies from the sea while focusing primarily on the zone from the Persian Gulf to Northeast Asia.

\section*{E. INNOVATION AND THE 1000-SHIP NAVY}

Perhaps the most innovative and questionable portion of the three strategy options is the execution of Admiral Michael Mullen’s “1000-ship Navy.” Despite enjoying an unheard of hegemonic power over the global commons, policing it will require substantially more capability than the United States can deliver. "Where the old 'Maritime Strategy' focused on sea control," Admiral Mullen said last year, "the new one must recognize that the economic tide of all nations rises not when the seas are controlled by one [nation], but rather when they are made safe and free for all."\footnote{Mullen, Remarks as Delivered by Adm. Mike Mullen Current Strategy Forum.} It will take a combination of national, international, and private-industry cooperation to provide the platforms, people, and protocols necessary to secure the seas against transnational threats. In effect, the 1,000-ship Navy is about the voluntary development of a network that

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126 Mullen, Remarks as Delivered by Adm. Mike Mullen Current Strategy Forum.
vastly increases the number of sensors available to maintain Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and at the same time increasing the number of responders capable of enforcing security.

The challenge is for individual nations to come together by determining where their national interests intersect and to determine what contribution they can make to this already-emerging network to meet those common interests. This is a call for a global partnership unheard of for the United States. Traditional American alliances, such as NATO, are exclusive rather than inclusive alliances of support. Option Two concentrates on securing the global maritime commons, focusing on missions involving core competencies, ensuring sea control and countering sea denial. Instead of operating multi or unilaterally, in order to implement this concept cooperation and flexibility would be needed. MSO Two stresses working with allied navies, increasing awareness of activities close to foreign shores and the ability of other nations to assure their own maritime security. This is not a call for a thousand U.S. hulled fleet, as in the Reagan era maritime strategy. The second option concedes that United States’ forces no longer assume command of the seas in all situations in all parts of the world. The United States’ sea control capabilities are diminishing and new technological, political and legal ways of contesting sea control have come into view.

However, MSO Two holds that U.S. maritime forces need to maintain the ability to counter sea denial threats. As an extension of the 1,000 ship navy, Admiral Mullen has introduced the Global Fleet Stations concept to build relationships and support forward presence in countries around the globe. This innovation to maritime strategy is being pushed hard by Admiral Mullen. An individual player in the strategic process, his experiences and ideas are reflected in the 1,000-ship Navy. “The peculiar preferences and stands of individual players can have a significant effect on [strategic] action.”127 If someone else were CNO and calling for a new maritime strategy, such a global partnership of maritime forces may not have come about. At the same time, as Admiral Mullen turns over the top sailor position to Admiral Garry Roughead, the incoming officer may not put the same value on the 1000-ship Navy as his predecessor. His career

127 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 305.
experiences may have led to different priorities for the Navy than Admiral Mullen’s, and his new position now affords him the opportunity to pursue them. But, organizationally, “individuals in sub-organizations are trained, rewarded, and promoted according to a particular way of doing business. Those socialized and promoted by the organization to do things in a particular way, will in their turn, apply the same criteria to their subordinates.”\textsuperscript{128} Therefore, in this regard, Admiral Roughead would likely continue to promote the 1000-ship Navy.

V. CONCLUSION: STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS

A. THE NEW MARITIME STRATEGY

Maritime and grand strategy have been portrayed in this thesis as a chain of political-military means and ends. Historical decisions are often used to determine whether choices today are going to mirror the choices of the past. The organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics models have proven useful in analyzing both the choices of the past and predicting the outputs of today and to some degree with the new Maritime Strategy. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, attempts at new maritime strategy have failed to grab the attention of many outside those who wrote them. In calling for the new maritime strategy last summer, Admiral Mullen stayed true to the basic principles of Admiral Vern Clarke’s strategic contribution, Sea Power 21, while at the same time repackaging it to meet what he saw as the maritime needs of the twenty-first century.

Throughout the research for this thesis the author has been concerned with the past attempts at maritime strategy, the Navy’s process for developing strategy, and the possible options produced by that process. On October 17, 2007 at the International Seapower Symposium held at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, General James Conway, Marine Corps Commandant, and Admiral Thad Allen, Coast Guard Commandant unveiled the output from the year-and-a-half long strategy process, A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-first Century Sea Power. On the surface it is a departure from the heavy-handed offensive based strategy of the 1980s. In keeping with previous maritime strategies, some missions have not change (primarily maintaining open sea lanes of communication), but the new strategy shifts from a narrow focus on sea combat toward one that also emphasizes the use of "soft power" to counter terrorism and deliver humanitarian assistance, hallmarks of Admiral Mullen’s 1000-ship vision.

The Strategy opens by restating the Navy’s perceived objectives from the national strategy documents. As a subset of national grand strategy, maritime strategy influences
a whole gambit of national interests. As this thesis has tried to demonstrate, grand strategy provides the overarching direction of power to achieve national goals, and below it the maritime strategy influences national power at sea. The new strategy then departs from the national strategic guidance in stating that “maritime forces will be employed to build confidence and trust among nations through collective security efforts that focus on common threats and mutual interest in a multi-polar world.”

The claim that the United States is operating in a multi-polar world is the first instance in the strategic vision by the administration and military leaders that the U.S. has an equal in the world. Led by current President George W. Bush, the American civil/military bureaucracy has thrust the country into adopting a path of global primacy. This idea is alluded to in the National Security Strategy and explicitly stated in the National Defense Strategy: “We will have no global peer competitor and will remain unmatched in traditional military capability…Though we have no global peer, we will have competitors and enemies – state and non-state.”

If anything, these previous and higher authority documents call for the United States to maintain and expand its global hegemonic status in a uni-polar world. This illustrates a disconnect between the Navy and civilian authorities’ view of the security environment and the Navy’s inability to firmly set itself within the context of national strategy. As Barry Posen explains, “Interpreting the external environment is the specialty of civilians. Building and operating military forces is the task of services.”

The new Maritime Strategy fails to adequately describe the force structure necessary to succeed in either security environment or to adequately relay its proposed relationship to national grand strategy.

While the U.S. Navy fills a subset role in American national strategy, it does not fulfill the nation’s maritime security needs alone. The new Maritime Strategy represents the first time that the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard have collaborated on a single, common strategy for defending the U.S. homeland and protecting U.S. interests overseas. Additionally, maritime strategy involves numerous other aspects of national

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power other than military power. Diplomacy, preservation of economic trade routes and sea lanes of communication, coastal and littoral defense, border security, and anti-sea denial concerns both regional and worldwide are just several of the issues maritime strategy must incorporate. “No one nation has the resources required to provide safety and security throughout the entire maritime domain. Increasingly, governments, non-government organizations, international organizations, and the private sector will form partnerships of common interest to counter these emerging threats.” Understanding these various issues will aid the United States in making policy decisions which take into account that not every country shares the same interests and strategies in maritime affairs.

Shortly after the terrorist attacks in New York City on September 11, 2001, naval forces conducted strike and combat missions against Taliban targets in Afghanistan. Operation Enduring Freedom became a textbook maneuver from the sea operation. The USS PELELIU and USS BATAAN Amphibious Ready Groups deployed marines into the heart of Afghanistan over 450 miles inland from the Arabian Sea. Two years later, power projected from the sea would continue as the Navy took part in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The year 2003 saw U.S. naval forces committed to maintaining open sea lanes of communication for military logistics and commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf. The following is a short list of the Navy’s accomplishments during Operation Iraqi Freedom:

- During OIF, more than 50 percent of [the naval] force was forward deployed. The deployment of seven Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) and eight large deck amphibious ships proved our ability to be both a surge and a rotational force demonstrating our flexibility and responsiveness.

- Navy and Marine Corps aircraft flew more than 8000 sorties and delivered nearly 9000 precision-guided munitions.

- Over 800 Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired from 35 coalition ships, one-third of which were launched from submarines. The highest number of TLAM’s launched in one day occurred on March 21, 2003 – nearly 400 Tomahawks.

- Navy Special Forces, MCM, EOD and coalition counterparts cleared more than 900 square miles of water, ensuring the safe passage of critical humanitarian relief supplies to the Iraqi people.

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Marines from the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), supported by Sea Basing concepts, made one of the swiftest combat advances in history. They fought 10 major engagements, destroying nine Iraqi divisions in the 450 mile advance into Iraq.

Eleven Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) ships provided equipment and sustainment for over 34,000 Marines and Sailors and fourteen amphibious ships embarked and delivered another 12,000 Marines and Sailors and their equipment.\footnote{Senate Armed Service Committee, \textit{Statement of Honorable Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Department of the Navy Posture}, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 2 March 2004, \url{http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2004/March/England.PDF} (accessed October 26, 2007).}

Operation Iraqi Freedom did nothing to reverse or reexamine the direction naval strategy was moving. Battles at sea continued to be replaced by missions from the sea.

The new maritime strategy effectively captures the strategy and operations which the Navy has been conducting afloat since before September 11, 2001 without setting a new strategic direction - save the focused maritime integration between the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard - but rather maintaining its preferred course. There are six strategic objectives (referred to as “imperatives”), six capabilities, and three strategic priorities listed in the new strategy. The six strategic imperatives include the traditional missions of concentrating major combat forces in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and Western Pacific to deter or fight potential conflicts. Protecting vital sea lanes represents a growing priority, it states, as seaborne trade has more than quadrupled over the last four decades and now accounts for ninety percent of all international commerce and two-thirds of global petroleum trade. In addition, the strategy calls for dispersing smaller maritime teams to carry out humanitarian as well as counter terrorism missions, weapons proliferation, piracy and other illicit maritime activities – in order to contain threats before they can reach the United States. These teams, which would integrate Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard forces, would deploy to areas such as Africa and the Western Hemisphere to promote closer cooperation with maritime forces in other nations.\footnote{U.S. Navy, \textit{A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-first Century Sea Power}, 6-9.}
For the most part, the public and many government agencies do not see or know how the Navy performs these tasks. The six capabilities to implementing the strategic objectives include: forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response. \(^{135}\) These capabilities amount to the basic organizational standard operating procedures of the U.S. Navy. Throughout its history, the Navy has developed a preferred way of conducting the business of naval warfare and maritime security. Each warfare community in the Navy owns a personal and professional stake in maintaining the status quo of strategic and operational capabilities. It is no surprise then that the objectives and the capabilities to implement them have not changed significantly in the new maritime strategy. The individuals who created the document were trained and promoted within an organizational system which conditioned them to apply the organizational mindset and essence to the strategic process.

Overall the new maritime strategy represents a failed opportunity on the part of senior naval leadership. Those involved in the process were no doubt the best and brightest, and their hard work should not be overlooked. However, this document reflects the strategy development process for exactly what it is: the product of group think and bureaucratic compromise. There is no attempt to address specific enemies such as China, North Korea, or Iran. The three preliminary Maritime Strategy Options focused on specific adversaries, just as Lehman’s strategy focused on the Soviet Union. The old strategy targeted the Soviet Union and outlined pre-planned responses to scenarios. The new Maritime Strategy reads more like the product of an unsure security environment. How long will the U.S. enjoy hegemonic power? Is it in decline? These are questions the new Maritime Strategy implies no one knows the answers to. With a specific shift away from blue water engagements, the new strategy consolidates 1990s’ strategic thinking in operations “from the sea” projected ashore. The output here does little more than attempt to once again sell the country on why it needs a navy. Why did the Navy fail at transformation and strategic innovation?

\(^{135}\) Senate Armed Service Committee, *Statement of Honorable Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Department of the Navy Posture*, 10-12.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, AND TRANSFORMATION

When applied to the maritime strategy process, organizational behavior theory explains the strategic preferences and operational behavior of the Navy. It does so by focusing on the capabilities and limitations of organizations and the decisions they are prone to make without direction from higher leadership. The research cites little organizational debate between the surface and aviation communities within the Navy in the context of the maritime strategy process. However, naval aviation enjoys a preponderance of support fleet wide in executing the maritime strategy in the last twenty years. The organizational model was useful in examining the process from start to finish and predicting the traditional, stagnant strategy which resulted. When looking at the process, the Navy was left to its own devices to interpret and twist national grand strategy to suit its own organizational essence – both to preserve and to expand its political influence. In adding its own interpretation on the security environment contrary to national directives, the Navy certainly adhered to the organizational principles of eluding civilian direction in favor of its own priorities and preferred capabilities. According to organizational behavior, this should have been seen as outside the Navy’s capabilities.

Bureaucratic politics theory also proved useful in examining the process when looking at the roles of individual players and their necessary roles in the political game. Change and innovation only come as a result of heavy-handed leadership from the top. The national grand strategy had this in the transformational ideas of the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld and the Quadrennial Defense Review. The maritime strategy received guidance and leadership from Admiral Mike Mullen. His vision for strategic innovation came in the form of the 1000-ship Navy, a concept he pushed down on the Navy and through active campaigning at two international maritime conferences. “At the Mediterranean Regional Seapower Symposium in Venice and at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Pearl Harbor, he told his contemporaries that it was time to ‘move beyond dialogue’ and to ‘take tangible steps’ that would ‘put these powerful ideas to work at sea.’”136

This thesis has argued the military has more intellectual stability than is found in the top civilian echelons of the government, yet the Navy’s own bureaucratic politics could deemphasize its own strategic direction. There is no convincing evidence that either side is right in its strategic process and direction. Instead, both are products of the civil-military relationship which has been long established in this country. “Resistance to change is a natural tendency of both humans and large organizations, but in a world characterized by accelerating change, it is a strategic liability…The world is moving very rapidly – and the Department of Defense is too attached to the past…[It] brings to the fore the struggle of each officer to find that balance between loyalty to service and devotion to the larger needs of the nation.”137 The Navy, and by extension the military, may have more stability in the long run, but civilians set the strategy: therein lies the disconnect. “Different bureaucracies command different types of expertise.”138 It's not for the military to make foreign policy decisions, however, how is the military machine suppose to react when its strategic direction is shifted every, two, four or eight years? Why is it so important for the Navy to come to grips with its strategic vision? Unlike the other services, the platforms which comprise much of the fleet are expensive, have long life-cycles, take years to construct, and are increasingly difficult to modify once new applications and missions are discovered. Since the fall of its Cold War rival, the U.S. Navy has found it increasingly difficult to impact the national and global security environments with short term solutions to transformation. Following the development of the new Maritime Strategy, the fleet continues to operate a blue water, open ocean force in a littoral, green-to-brown water arena. The organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics models show how the Navy has struggled with the problems of a constantly changing security environment and national security directives, while deploying a fleet designed to fight an enemy long gone and creating a fleet for an enemy which exists over the horizon.

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