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**INFLUENCE THROUGH AIRPOWER SECURITY
COOPERATION IN EGYPT AND PAKISTAN:
LESSONS FOR IRAQ**

by

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December 2007

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AND PAKISTAN: LESSONS FOR IRAQ**

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ABSTRACT

The recent demise of the Iraqi Air Force creates an airpower vacuum in the region that affords the United States an opportunity to garner influence through the development of a robust airpower security cooperation program. The question is what are the characteristics of airpower security cooperation that will best serve U.S. interests with respect to Iraq and the broader region? In seeking to answer this question, this thesis examines the recent history of U.S. airpower security cooperation with Pakistan and Egypt. The central argument is that these cases suggest that the key variables affecting the success of airpower security cooperation as a diplomacy instrument are: 1) the degree to which the security cooperation program addresses the recipient's principal security needs as determined by the state's strategic culture; 2) the degree to which airpower assistance facilitates and maintains an appropriate regional balance of power; and 3) the degree of trust imbued to the recipient regarding the endurance of the U.S. commitment to the security relationship. If the U.S. can account for these "three tenets" when implementing airpower security cooperation with Iraq, it can expect to garner specific measures of influence in matters critical to U.S. security interests.

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I. INTRODUCTION

When the United States and “the coalition of the willing” invaded Iraq in 2003, coalition airpower enjoyed what the USAF calls “air dominance,” an environment in which friendly air assets can operate nearly uncontested.¹ This rather opportune environment developed as a result of the attrition of the Iraqi air defense system through Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and the subsequent decade of no-fly-zone operations in which coalition air forces routinely retaliated to any acts of a hostile nature. What defenses remained in 2003 were quickly dismantled by the air onslaught and invasion of ground forces. Saddam’s decision to literally bury his remaining fighter aircraft paid a symbolically fitting tribute to the disparity in airpower capabilities between the coalition and Iraqi air forces.

The demise of the Iraqi Air Force renders the new Iraqi state wholly dependent upon the United States to maintain the sovereignty of Iraqi airspace. With a likely reduction or withdrawal of coalition ground forces in the (perhaps near) future, Washington must decide how best to posture air forces to both meet Iraq’s security needs and further U.S. interests. Options range from relying on a robust USAF presence with minimal Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) capability to embarking upon a serious effort to rebuild the IqAF to a level of increased capability and regional significance, with little to no American presence. At the time of writing, the United States has thus far chosen the former; the IqAF has been reconstituted with only minimal transport and reconnaissance capabilities. As a result the IqAF has no offensive firepower means, leaving it incapable of either defending Iraqi sovereignty or providing any measure of firepower support to

¹ Most of the threats posed to coalition air assets were isolated to the low altitude arena, included anti-aircraft artillery, short-range tactical surface-to-air missiles, and shoulder launched surface-to-air missiles. Aircraft were able to mitigate surface threats by operating higher altitudes. Records indicate that only one fixed-wing manned aircraft was shot down by a surface threat. Other fixed-wing losses were due to safety mishaps or fratricide. USAF CENTAF Assessment and Analysis Division, *Operation IRAQI FREEDOM--By the Numbers*, April 30, 2003, 3. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/uscentaf_oif_report_30apr2003.pdf (accessed November 1, 2007).

Iraqi Army or other security forces.² Out of necessity, the USAF is likely to maintain a presence in Iraq. Over the long term, however, policy choices must dictate what Iraqi airpower capabilities will best serve the interests of the United States in the region. In lieu of the airpower-vacuum concomitant with the demise of the IqAF the United States has a unique opportunity to implement an enduring airpower security cooperation partnership with Iraq.

The question is: what characteristics of an airpower security cooperation relationship that will best serve the interests of the United States? In pursuit of a viable policy recommendation, this thesis examines the case studies of airpower security cooperation to Pakistan and Egypt to assess the impact these programs have had on the diplomatic relationships between the supplier (United States) and the respective recipients. Ultimately, the goal is to be able to provide programmatic recommendations to the State Department, Department of Defense, and United States Air Force regarding an airpower security cooperation program that pertains to rebuilding the IqAF. Toward this effort, this thesis addresses the following:

- Have airpower security cooperation programs been implemented with clearly articulated policy goals and desired outcomes?
- What factors determined the success or failure of airpower security cooperation as a policy instrument?
- To what extent has the United States gained diplomatic leverage via airpower security cooperation?

In addition, the thesis assumes the following with regard to U.S. interests:

- Iraq will be a unitary state with which the United States will be interested in maintaining a long-term alliance;
- Ensuring the sovereignty of Iraqi airspace is essential to regional stability and is in the interest of the United States and Iraq;
- The United States will continue past diplomatic patterns by engaging in some measure of airpower security cooperation with the Iraqi government.

² The author's intent is not to necessarily criticize funding pertaining to the IqAF thus far, as the administration has (appropriately) prioritized resources towards rebuilding the Iraqi Security Forces on the ground in order to improve the domestic security situation. Nonetheless, the vacuum in IqAF capability remains an unresolved issue.

By identifying factors in these programs that have produced both desirable and unwanted outcomes, this thesis seeks to make recommendations regarding how best to implement an airpower security cooperation program in Iraq over the next two to three decades.

A. SECURITY COOPERATION—A POLICY INSTRUMENT

Security cooperation is an instrument of national policy broadly defined as those activities conducted with allies and friendly nations to build relationships that promote U.S. interests, build allied and friendly nation capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.³ The State Department articulates overall objectives conforming to the National Security Strategy and also provides funding to the Department of Defense and its service components for implementation. Echoing the various national strategy documents' emphasis on the importance of spreading democratic values, the State Department currently purports that security cooperation is a viable instrument through which to promote “the principles of democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law” that also assures “allies and friendly nations of U.S. commitment to their security.”⁴ Several “defense policy themes” guide security cooperation activities including: a desire to influence key powers, cooperating with parties to address regional disputes, combating weapons of mass destruction, and combating terrorism.⁵ Further, in the parlance of joint military doctrine, security cooperation is a component of “phase zero” campaign planning—the phase referred to as “shaping”—that entails garnering multinational cooperation to “assure [sic]

³ Definition obtained at the website for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. <http://www.dsca.osd.mil/Default.htm> (accessed October 28, 2007). Also, Since 9/11 national strategy documents such as *The National Security Strategy*, *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, *The National Defense Strategy*, *The National Military Strategy*, and the *Quadrennial Defense Review* give new emphasis to security cooperation as a policy instrument.

⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006*. Released by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, September 2006. Available at <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2006/74679.htm> (accessed September 24, 2007).

⁵ *Ibid.*

success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and allies...and providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.”⁶

As for airpower components of security cooperation, the Secretary of the Air Force’s Office of International Affairs develops airpower security cooperation plans in support of COCOMs’ theater security operation strategies. *The Air Force Security Operation Strategy* provides overall guidance and emphasizes the need for common interoperable systems, logistics and training, shared CONOPS (concept of operations), organizational structures, doctrine, and “most importantly, shared experiences and common threat perspectives.”⁷ The policy contends that “partnership capacity is built on relationships” and that long-term interpersonal relationships in particular “provide the strongest basis for action and produce the most fruitful Air-Force to Air Force (AF-to-AF) relationships”⁸

B. WHY AIRPOWER MATTERS

While the bulk of U.S. effort in security cooperation in South Asia and the Middle East is currently invested in its more ground-centric elements due to the security situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, airpower components of security cooperation are unique in that they provide Washington a long-term instrument through which to engage partnering states. Modern airpower weapon systems have a life-span of decades rather than years, a time over which the recipient needs technical support and training provided by the U.S. The high cost of modern systems also provides the U.S. with a means to establish a degree of dependency onto the recipient through financial cooperation in the form of foreign military financing (FMF) or grants.

Beyond its diplomatic utility, airpower components of foreign-military-sales (FMS) allow the U.S. to sustain the defense industrial base by keeping open the assembly lines of key weapon systems, thereby retaining critical engineering and technical

⁶ Joint Publication 3.0, *Joint Operations*, 17 September 2006, iv-27.

⁷ The United States Air Force, *Security Operation Strategy: Building Capacity, Integrating Capabilities*. Available at <http://international.hq.af.mil> (accessed September 15, 2007), ii.

⁸ *Ibid.*

expertise. The defense industry also represents one of the few in the U.S. economy that contributes positively to the overall U.S. balance of trade position.⁹ Washington openly acknowledges these incentives for promoting FMS—a point which critics contend represents a conflict of interest with respect to the principal intent of FMS as a policy instrument—to promote peace and stability by bolstering the legitimate national security needs of select states.¹⁰

As for the interests of the recipient, the desire to bolster airpower capabilities derives from its significance in modern warfare and its ability to forge geopolitical shifts among state powers.¹¹ For example, Israel used the combination of airpower's speed, range, and surprise in their defeat over numerically superior Egyptian and Syrian forces in 1967; the event solidified the permanence of the Israeli state, doomed the ideological movement of pan-Arab nationalism espoused by the likes of Egypt's Gamel Abdel Nasser, and imbued what some describe as a lingering humiliation among Arab

⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Military Training...*, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ Critics fear that economic interests compel U.S. politicians to promote sales of advanced weapon systems to states beyond their level of need...something that they argue foments instability as opposed to stability. By law, defense articles and services shall be furnished or sold solely: for internal security; for legitimate self-defense; to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements consistent with the Charter of the United Nations; or to assist militaries in less developed countries to construct public works and to support economic and social development activities. U.S. Department of State, "Legal Basis for Arms Transfers." Available at <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rsat/c14022.htm> (accessed September 24, 2007).

¹¹ In Phillip S. Mellinger's *10 Propositions Regarding Airpower*, the author argues that airpower provides a unique ability to dominate the battlespace, or in other words: whoever controls the air also controls the ground. Airpower is an inherently offensive and flexible component of maneuver that can achieve militarily strategic effects with relative efficiency—unlike ground-based forces which have to directly confront opposing forces; airpower can bypass the bulk of enemy forces and target the enemy's specific centers of gravity. The advent of precision weapons yields a previously unknown efficiency of force because of its ability to create strategic effects without having to undergo long drawn-out phases of attrition. Also, depending on the sophistication of enemy air defenses, the speed and range of airpower forces allows them to achieve surprise more readily than ground-based components. Publication available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/dodandmilitaryejournals/www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/fulltext/10_propositions_regarding_air_power.pdf (accessed November 1, 2007).

societies.¹² Several other inter-state conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia continued to witness the growing significance of airpower, including the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Egyptian-Yemeni War, the Iran–Iraq war, as well as multiple wars between Pakistan and India.¹³ The Gulf War of 1991, however, raised airpower’s stock tremendously as the overt and media-catalogued destruction of the Middle East’s dominant army created a previously unattained level of prestige for owning and operating U.S. airpower systems, the evidence of which was the U.S. supplanting other arms suppliers in the years following, particularly through a significant growth of U.S.-manufactured fighter aircraft to the region.¹⁴

Obviously the introduction of modern U.S. airpower weapon systems to the Middle East and South Asian states impacts the conventional balance of power in these regions. However, there is also a non-conventional implication that accompanies airpower modernization; with the reality of nuclear proliferation in South Asia and the potential for proliferation in the Middle East, modern fighter aircraft represent a delivery means for a nascent nuclear power. As a result, levels of “airpower balance” between states can profoundly impact regional stability either toward its edification or degradation, a fact which requires policy makers to carefully consider the design of airpower security cooperation instruments (particularly FMS).

¹² Since 1967, the vast majority of Arab negotiating positions with respect to the Israelis call for a return to the pre-1967 borders, as called for in U.N. Resolution 242. In contrast, prior to the Israeli military victory in 1967, there was little to no acceptance of Israeli borders (or recognition of the Israeli state). Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Fifth Edition* (Boston: Bedford / St. Martins, 2005), 217-331.

¹³ See Nadav Safran, “Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973,” *International Security*, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Autumn 1977), 133-170; also Youssef Aboul-Enein “The Egyptian-Yemen War (1962-67): Egyptian perspectives on Guerrilla warfare,” *Infantry Magazine*, January 1, 2004; available at <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-116585276.html> (accessed November 1, 2007); also Douglas A. Kupersmith, *The Failure of Third World Air Power: Iraq and the War with Iran* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1993); finally Hussaini, *PAF over the Years* (Peshawar, Pakistan: PAF Book Club, 2002).

¹⁴ Prior to Desert Storm, the Soviets, French, and British shared in exports to the region; in the years following, however, U.S. suppliers dominated. Joe Stork, “The Middle East Arms Bazaar After the Gulf War,” *Middle East Report*, No. 197, Vulnerabilities in the Gulf. (November-December 1995), 14-17, 19.

Another factor that drives a state to modernize its airpower capabilities is its desire to garner prestige in the international system. Security cooperation provides weaker states with a means through which to maintain diplomatic access to the United States, whose favor can bode well for their interests on the world stage (in the United Nations in particular). Also, operating and maintaining a modern air force is one mode of asserting a state's legitimacy among regional neighbors. This "norms and values" model is one manner in which to explain why a state like the United Arab Emirates would purchase eighty highly advanced F-16s, a force that from the perspective of critics appears to unjustly exceed any legitimate security needs (these particular F-16s, the Block 60 variant, are more advanced than anything the USAF currently operates).¹⁵ It is plausible to suggest that there is a certain "keeping up with the Jones" that drives states (particularly authoritarian regimes) to seek the "American brand" of defense hardware, the crown jewel of which is U.S. fighter aircraft. This "need for prestige" is one factor that facilitates opportunities for the U.S. to influence states via the instrument of airpower security cooperation.

C. SECURITY COOPERATION AS A POLICY INSTRUMENT— BACKGROUND AND EXISTING ARGUMENTS

Security cooperation has been a significant policy instrument of the United States since World War II when President F.D. Roosevelt lent fifty American destroyers to the British Royal Navy in return for basing rights.¹⁶ It was in the context of the Cold War, however, under which various security cooperation instruments were amalgamated under the Foreign Cooperation Act of 1961, which in addition to the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 continues to provide the legal framework for all security cooperation programs.¹⁷

¹⁵ "United Arab Emirates - Air Force," August 2, 2007; available at <http://www4.janes.com/> (accessed November 1, 2007). Also, the "norms and values" model mentioned here is described in Scott Sagan's "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996-1997).

¹⁶ Geoffrey Kemp, "The Continuing Debate over U.S. Arms Sales: Strategic Needs and the Quest for Arms Limitations," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 535 ("The Arms Trade: Problems and Prospects in the Post-Cold War World," September 1994), 148.

¹⁷ Duncan L. Clark, Jason D. Ellis, and Daniel B. O'Connor, *Send Guns and Money, Security Cooperation and U.S. Foreign Policy*, London: Praeger Publishers, 1997, 10.

During the Nixon Administration, security cooperation gained primacy as a policy instrument in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. This “Nixon Doctrine” stated that the United States would provide military and economic cooperation to allies for problems of internal security and national defense so that future U.S. administrations could “avoid another war like Vietnam any place in the world.”¹⁸ However, debate regarding the efficacy of security cooperation programs peaked in response to the outcome of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which saw the toppling of a regime that had been a significant beneficiary of U.S. security cooperation under the Nixon administration.¹⁹ The Carter administration’s subsequent attempt to lead the world’s weapons suppliers in restricting conventional arms exports was set back by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Reversing course altogether, the Reagan and first Bush administrations eschewed notions of export restraint and instead advocated increased use of security cooperation programs to achieve a variety of U.S. foreign policy objectives.

At the conclusion of the Cold War, the realities of reduced domestic military spending bolstered the impetus for increases in arms exports despite the lack of ideological struggle that formerly justified their purpose. Once again debate ensued, as the primary recipients in the export market were the states of the Middle East, consuming over 40 percent of the world’s arms in 1991 (an increase from 36 percent in 1981 during the height of the Cold War). Efforts by the first Bush administration to reengage the world’s primary arms suppliers (who happened to be the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council) in cooperative restrictions on the proliferation of arms to the Middle East proved to be superficial and short lived.²⁰ In fact, to the surprise of many the Clinton administration championed arms exports as a means to serve the economic interests of the United States by declaring the U.S. government would actively seek

¹⁸ William D. Hartung, *And Weapons for All: How America’s Multibillion-Dollar Arms Trade Warps Our Foreign Policy and Subverts Democracy at Home* (New York: Harper Collins, 1995) 22.

¹⁹ Kemp, *Ibid.*, 152-153.

²⁰ Joe Stork, “The Middle East Arms Bazaar after the Gulf War,” *Middle East Report*, No. 197 (Vulnerabilities in the Gulf, November-December 1995), 15-16.

foreign buyers for U.S. defense products, thus marking a transition of purpose for security cooperation from one of security to one of American economic well-being.²¹

Debate regarding Washington's extensive use of security cooperation programs throughout these preceding decades has been generally divided into two schools of thought. Realist thinkers have viewed security cooperation as a viable policy instrument through which the state may further its overall national security interests.²² Those with a more liberal view of international relations have tended to view security cooperation programs as something that discourages trust and cooperation between states; on the contrary, they have alleged that such programs engender arms races, destabilization, human rights abuses, and conflict.²³ Liberal criticism of U.S. security cooperation policy was particularly fervent with respect to the trend of increasing arms exports to the Middle East region after the 1991 Gulf War, a phenomena that was asserted to be primarily driven by corporate greed and defense industry influence rather than foreign policy strategy.²⁴ Regardless, while the liberal view gained mild influence during the Carter and first Bush administrations, the realist approach towards security cooperation has prevailed in the realm of U.S. policy, with the persisting underlying argument being that it provides the United States with a measure of influence over the purchasing state.

²¹ Michael N. Beard, LtCol, USAF, *United States Foreign Military Sales Strategy: Coalition Building or Protecting the Defense Industrial Base*. Research Report submitted to the Air War College (Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL: March 1995) 2.

²² Kemp, *Ibid.*, 152-154.

²³ *Ibid.*, also Clark, Ellis, and O'Connor define three categories of thought regarding security cooperation policy in the post-Cold War period: traditionalists—those who promote the continuation of the practice, reformers—those who see value in security cooperation as a policy tool but who also call for more prudence with respect to arms exports, and abolitionists—those who see the continued practice of security cooperation in the post-Cold War period as unnecessary and immoral. Clark *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 126-134.

²⁴ See William D. Hartung, *And Weapons for All: How America's Multibillion-Dollar Arms Trade Warps Our Foreign Policy and Subverts Democracy at Home*, New York: Harper Collins, 1995. Also William W. Keller, *Arm in Arm: The Political Economy of the Global Arms Trade*, New York, 1995, Harper Collins.

Scholarly examination of the legitimacy of this underlying assertion has led some to suggest there are limitations to how much influence the supplier-state can expect to gain.²⁵ Keith Krause, arguing from a neo-Marxist paradigm, contended that the relationship of the supplier and recipient must be viewed in context to the military hierarchy of the broader international structure. He interestingly noted that Middle Eastern states have displayed a desire to reduce their dependency on supplier states by intentionally diversifying their purchases among different suppliers despite the inherent military inefficiencies associated with such a policy. As a result, he argues that due to supplier competition in the post Cold War period, suppliers have been unable to use arms transfers as a means to exert political influence.²⁶

Another notable contribution yields a similarly cautious conclusion with respect to supplier influence. In his essay “Influence through Arms Transfers: Lessons from the U.S. Pakistani Relationship,” T.V. Paul examined the U.S. security cooperation policy with respect to Pakistan and the ensuing proliferation of nuclear weapons to that state, and asserted that influence in security cooperation relationships during the Cold War was at times a two-way street; in other words, the bipolar international struggle yielded opportunities for recipient states to exert their influence onto their suppliers because of the latter’s security needs. He suggested, however, that the end of the Cold War has reduced recipient states’ abilities to exert any measure of reverse influence.²⁷ While Paul’s compelling argument was limited to a single-case analysis, his theoretical assertions nonetheless provide a useful framework for examining influence in the supplier-recipient relationships in other cases.

²⁵ Cristian Catrina, “Main Directions of Research in the Arms Trade,” in “The Arms Trade: Problems and Prospects in the in the Post-Cold War World,” in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, ed. Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994, 202.

²⁶ Keith Krause, *Arms and the state: patterns of military production and trade*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations: 22 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 182-203.

²⁷ T.V. Paul, “Influence through Arms Transfers: Lessons from the U.S. Pakistani Relationship,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 32, No. 12 (December 1992), 1078-1092.

Overall the preceding three decades have witnessed some comprehensive studies on U.S. security cooperation policy and the global trends of arms transfers. However, except for the aforementioned authors, most scholars have focused on aspects of security cooperation not directly pertaining to the measurement of supplier-recipient influence. Also since September 11, 2001 there has been a relative dearth of scholarly work regarding security cooperation policy. While journalists have recognized that there appears to be a renewed “arms bonanza” in the Middle East during the contemporary period, the current environments in Iraq and Afghanistan have diverted scholarly attention away from the various security cooperation programs in the Middle East.²⁸

In lieu of the new regional structural context and uncertainties engendered by the U.S. occupation of Iraq, sectarian conflict within Iraq, the expansion of Iranian influence, and concomitant anxiety of regional actors, the efficacy of U.S. security cooperation programs in the region will be of critical importance over the near and long term. Unfortunately, there has been no comparative analysis of regional programs that identifies factors yielding policy failure or success. Further, previous analysis has focused solely on the arms transfer aspect of security cooperation and has largely neglected its other facets such as personnel exchanges and combined training and operations. This thesis intends to fill these gaps and ultimately produce lessons and recommendations as to what future airpower security cooperation in Iraq should look like. In general, this thesis finds that airpower security cooperation is best viewed as an instrument of *realpolitik*—one that will be effective in promoting U.S. interests if it accounts for Iraq’s principal inter-state security concerns, maintains regional power balances at appropriate levels, and imbues a sense of enduring commitment by the U.S. With these characteristics, Washington can expect to garner investment returns in the form of Baghdad’s cooperation in promoting regional stability, nuclear non-proliferation, and continued cooperation in the GWOT. However, toward the objective of democracy promotion in Iraq, a pragmatic assessment of the case studies suggests that airpower security cooperation will have an uncertain effect.

²⁸ “Security Assistance Bonanza after September 11th,” *Middle East Report*, No. 222 (Spring 2002), 11.

D. RESEARCH METHOD

Research focused on U.S airpower security cooperation with Egypt and Pakistan to determine to what extent these efforts have produced desired diplomatic policy objectives. These programs take on various forms as they can be comprised of various combinations of FMS, FMF, direct commercial sales, International Military Education and Training (IMET), combined training and exercises, and in some cases combined operations under the guise of multinational coalitions.²⁹

The thesis seeks to identify the key variables of airpower security cooperation that produce intended policy outcomes. As the emphasis is on airpower security cooperation's utility as an instrument of diplomacy, the thesis mostly examines broad factors pertaining to inter-state relationships. Accordingly, while research included the study of various components of security cooperation instruments (such as FMS, FMF, IMET, and combined training/operations) analysis is qualitative and does not include "number crunching" the levels of funding, force levels, etc. As for the dependent variable "desired policy outcomes" analysis first determines whether or not policy intent has been clearly articulated by the United States with respect to each case recipient. Once policy intent is resolved, the case studies reveal whether or not the subsequent actions of recipient states reflective intended outcomes. In the contemporary context, analysis measures outcomes with respect to U.S. intentions regarding regional stability, nuclear non-proliferation, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and democracy promotion.

The cases of Egypt and Pakistan were chosen because they share the following characteristics: they represent major regional actors, are currently defined as major non-NATO allies, have particular significance among Muslim countries due to their historical place in Islam as well as their citizens' contributions to the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism, and are governed by pro-U.S. regimes that currently face significant

²⁹ IMET is conducted solely on a grant basis. FMS can be conducted using host nation funds, donor funds or FMF. Website for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. <http://www.dsca.osd.mil/Default.htm> (accessed October 28, 2007). Also see Duncan L. Clarke, Daniel B. O'Connor, and Jason D. Ellis, *Send Guns and Money, Security Cooperation and U.S. Foreign Policy*, London: Praeger Publishers, 1997, 11-13.

domestic pressures from Islamist opposition groups.³⁰ Arguably, any future unitary state of Iraq will share these characteristics. These two cases also provide the benefit of examining various levels of diplomatic success. On one end of the spectrum, a preliminary view of the program pertaining to Egypt may be judged to have produced mostly positive outcomes, while policies with respect to Pakistan have had mixed results. These two cases reveal plausible factors of causation that underlie broad generalizations regarding policy outcomes. They also provide some insight as to what characteristics of an airpower security cooperation program with Iraq will promote success.

Sources for research included governmental policy directives and documents, governmental reports containing data regarding security cooperation programs (such as those provided by the Congressional Research Service, State Department, and Defense Security Cooperation Agency), journalistic sources (newspapers and magazines), scholarly journals and books, interviews with members of the Office of International Affairs under the Secretary of the Air Force, interviews with regional scholars, and interviews with USAF exchange officer personnel and foreign air force officers.

E. THESIS ROADMAP

The introduction of each chapter provides a short history of U.S. security cooperation to the recipient state. Next, the chapters review the supplier and recipient interests pertaining to the region as well as the historic and contemporary impact of airpower on the regional strategic calculus. Following a brief description of security cooperation policy, analysis determines whether results met the desired intent. With respect to the contemporary era, policy results are measured with respect to objectives regarding regional stability, nuclear non-proliferation, diplomatic and military cooperation with a focus on the GWOT, and democracy advancement inside the recipient state. The conclusion of each chapter portends lessons pertaining to airpower security cooperation with Iraq.

³⁰ Gilles Kepel describes the contributions to the recent rise of political Islam by men such as Egypt's Sayiid Qutb (intellectual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood) and Pakistan's Malwana Mawdudi (founder of *Jamaat-e-Islami*). *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, translated by Anthony F. Roberts (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press: 2002) 23-42.

Chapter II focuses on two phases of U.S. security cooperation to Pakistan. First, analysis looks at the period of cooperation that was implemented as a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, a program that ultimately spanned four presidential administrations and bore many lessons regarding influence in the supplier-recipient relationship. Specifically, this portion of analysis will focus on Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons despite Washington's policy mandate that Pakistan forego nuclear proliferation activities as a precondition for security assistance. Next, the chapter reveals the consequences concomitant with the divorce in the U.S.-Pakistani security relationship that resulted after the implementation of Pressler sanctions. Finally, the chapter focuses on the period since 9/11 and U.S. efforts to cajole the Pakistani government into cooperation against the Taliban and Al Qaeda factions that operate in Afghanistan and within Pakistan.

Chapter III addresses security cooperation to Egypt that began as an outcome of the Camp David accords. The case suggests that the enduring partnership in security cooperation with Egypt has yielded measurable and consistent results. The Egyptian case further suggests that addressing a state's concerns regarding airpower balance with respect to its principal rivalry can foment inter-state regional peace.

Chapter IV applies lessons from the Pakistani and Egyptian security cooperation programs to the prospect of rebuilding the Iraqi Air Force. Analysis examines the program in its current state and measure current IqAF capabilities against Iraqi regional and domestic security needs. Most significantly, the chapter predicts the extent to which a robust airpower security cooperation program would provide the United States a means to exact influence towards the promotion of its regional interests pertaining to regional stability, nuclear nonproliferation, cooperation in the GWOT, and democracy advancement. Finally, the concluding chapter recommends policy characteristics pertaining to reconstituting the Iraqi Air Force over the next two to three decades.

II. AIRPOWER SECURITY COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN DURING TWO PERIODS: THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

A. INTRODUCTION

The importance of Pakistan's cooperation with the United States in security matters became paramount during two periods: the Soviet invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan from 1979-1989 and the U.S. Global War on Terror in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. For each period, this chapter presents an overview of U.S. and Pakistani interests with respect to the South Asian region and briefly presents how airpower plays into the regional strategic calculus. Next, the objectives of U.S. security cooperation programs with Pakistan are assessed against actual outcomes. For the first period, the chapter focuses on Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons despite Washington's condition that security assistance be tied to Pakistan's abstinence from proliferation activities. For the more recent period, the chapter assesses results pertaining to regional stability, nuclear non-proliferation, cooperation in the GWOT, and democracy advancement. The chapter also addresses the intervening era between these two periods in order to identify consequences that resulted from the on/off/on-again nature of the security relationship between the two states. Overall, the case of Pakistan reveals that the degree of influence afforded by airpower security cooperation has largely been determined by the extent to which it facilitated Pakistan's perception of its own regional security vis-à-vis India. Accordingly, for the case of Pakistan any desired policy outcome or measure of influence the United States wishes to exact derives from this key variable.

B. SECURITY COOPERATION DURING THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN, 1979-1989

The mutual defense agreement of 1954 represented the initial amalgamation of U.S. and Pakistani interests whereby Pakistan became part of the U.S. Cold War policy of containment. As a benefit of this agreement as well as Pakistan's willingness to be

included in the pro-west South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization, the U.S. provided nearly \$2 billion in U.S. assistance to Pakistan from 1953 to 1961. However, in response to the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971, the U.S. suspended military assistance to Pakistan (and India), commencing what would become a pattern of aid provision followed by aid suspension.³¹

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 altered U.S. interests with respect to Pakistan in a monumental fashion. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan was viewed by Washington as a Soviet stepping stone towards controlling the vast oil resources of the Persian Gulf. In conjunction with the recent loss of Iran as a Persian Gulf ally concomitant with Khomeini's Islamic Revolution, the Soviet invasion represented a nearly direct threat to national security when viewed in the context of the Cold War.³² Accordingly, the Carter and Reagan administrations would wrestle with the need to ensure Pakistan's cooperation in confronting the Soviet presence in Afghanistan while simultaneously discouraging Pakistan from developing or obtaining nuclear weapons.

Pakistan's principal security interest since its inception has been survival against its larger and more powerful neighbor India. The ever-present threat of war with India is imbedded in Pakistan's "strategic culture" for good reason, as the two states fought full-scale wars in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971 and have engaged in multiple limited conflicts since.³³ As a result, India's nuclear testing in 1974 presented Pakistani security planners

³¹ K. Alan Kronstadt, *Pakistan-U.S. Relations*, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33498. Updated August 24, 2007. 10-11. Also, Duncan L. Clark, Daniel B. O'Connor, and Jason D. Ellis, *Send Guns and Money, Security Assistance and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Westport, CN: Praeger, 1997) 38-40.

³² Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York, NY: FREE PRESS, 1991) 701.

³³ Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, 10. Also, throughout this thesis, the term "strategic culture" is used in a manner best described by Kanti Bajpai: "strategic culture consists of two parts. The first is the central strategic paradigm--the basic assumptions about orderliness in the world. Included here are assumptions about the role of war in human affairs, about the nature of the adversary, and about the efficacy of the use of force. The second part is grand strategy, or the secondary assumptions about operational policy that follow from the prior assumptions. These may be gleaned from various texts written over time by statesmen, soldiers, scholars, commentators, and diplomats. Kanti Bajpai, "Indian Strategic Culture," in *Strategic Asia 2006: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty*, ed. Ashley Tellis and Michael Wills (Washington D.C: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), 246-247. Also, regarding Pakistan's strategic culture, see the chapter in the same text by Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan's Strategic Culture."

with an untenable security situation whereby Pakistan had to ensure state survival either by obtaining their own nuclear deterrence or by gaining the assurances of a formal security alliance with a greater power. The United States however had already gained a reputation as an unreliable security partner due to the imposition of sanctions following the wars with India in 1965 and 1971 and in response to Pakistan's alleged attempts to obtain nuclear weapons.³⁴ For Pakistan, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan therefore represented both a security threat as well as an opportunity. The existence of Soviet forces on Pakistan's border required that policymakers entertain the possibility of further Soviet expansion into Pakistan.³⁵ On the other hand, Pakistani willingness to counter the Soviet presence through its support of the *mujahadeen* rebels in Afghanistan afforded Pakistan a unique opportunity to increase its leverage with respect to the United States.

C. THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN SOUTH ASIA DURING THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN

Pakistan boasts a professional, competent, and battle tested air force with a proud history. Born as a component of the British Royal Air Force, the independent Pakistani Air Force (PAF) first saw action in 1948 conducting logistical and supply missions in support of ground forces during operations in Kashmir. PAF success during the war against India in 1965 led historians to refer to that year its "zenith" from which it "could justify being its country's crowning glory."³⁶ Throughout its air battles with India in both the 1965 and 1971 wars the PAF claimed a kill-ratio of three-to-one, a figure supported by then U.S. defense representative to Islamabad Brigadier General Chuck Yeager.³⁷ Later, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the PAF claimed it shot

³⁴ Krondstadt, *op. cit.*

³⁵ At the time, Pakistan's ambassador to the United States wrote that the Soviet intervention was a "grave and unprecedented act of military aggression" that "flouts all norms of peaceful co-existence and principle of sovereignty of states" and stated further that "it is therefore vitally important that U.S. commitment to Pakistan's territorial integrity and independence should extend beyond verbal assurances and become a credible and durable guarantee." Sultan Muhammed Khan, "Pakistani Geopolitics: The Diplomatic Perspective," *International Security*, Vol. 5, No. 1. (Summer 1980), 26-36.

³⁶ "PAF Kills/Claims—1971 War," website for the Pakistani Military Consortium, available at <http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/airforce/> (accessed August 28, 2007).

³⁷ *Ibid.*

down eight Soviet fighters for intrusions into Pakistani airspace. Pakistani pilots also saw action outside the region by serving with other states' air forces in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1971 as well as the Yemeni Civil War in 1969.³⁸

As a result of these conflicts, the PAF imbued a perceived measure of prestige onto the Pakistani state. Bolstering this sense of pride was the belief that the PAF enjoyed a qualitative advantage due to the fact that it operated western military hardware as compared to the Soviet-supplied Indian Air Force (IAF).³⁹ The PAF's first year as the benefactor of U.S. security assistance in 1957 was described as "momentous" because of the delivery of 100 F-86 Sabre jet fighters as well as an eventual procurement of B-57 light bombers and F-10 Starfighters.⁴⁰ This same pride was raised to new levels by the purchase of F-16 fighters that came about due to U.S.-Pakistani security cooperation during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; inevitably, this airpower-induced euphoria would make the sting of sanctions stopping delivery of these F-16s all the more caustic when Washington elected to use airpower security cooperation in a coercive manner.⁴¹

D. AIRPOWER SECURITY COOPERATION DURING THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN: F-16S, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, AND THE PRESSLER SANCTIONS

As a result of the Carter administration's desires to curb global arms transfers and concerns regarding Pakistan's alleged desire to obtain nuclear weapons, Congress passed the Glenn and Symington amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act which disallowed arms transfers to states that were suspected to be developing nuclear weapons, thus

³⁸ Performance of Pakistani pilots in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 prompted the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Air Force to remark that he was glad that Air Marshal Noor Khan (then commander of the PAF) was not his Egyptian counterpart. "Pakistan Air Force," article available at <http://www.geocities.com/Baja/Dunes/1107/HTML/paf/war.htm?200728> (accessed August 28, 2007).

³⁹ Feroz Khan, Brigadier Pakistani Army, retired (Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Department of National Security Affairs). Interview by author, August 28, 2007.

⁴⁰ "Pakistani Air Force—Yesterday and Today," website for the Pakistani Military Consortium, <http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/airforce/> (accessed August 28, 2007).

⁴¹ Feroz Khan, *op. cit.*

forbidding military aid to Pakistan.⁴² However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan engendered a policy reversal in the Carter administration such that it sought to strengthen Pakistan's self-defense capability in response to the Soviet threat through the provision of aid: "we will provide military equipment, food and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and national security against the seriously increased threat from the north."⁴³ Toward that end, the administration offered a package amounting to \$400 million in military and economic aid over two years as well as a re-affirmation of the 1959 security cooperation agreement.

In response to both the amount of aid and Carter's refusal to include the sale of highly desired F-16s as part of the offer, President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq scoffed that the deal amounted to "peanuts" considering both the severity of the Soviet threat and the degree to which the United States needed Pakistan's cooperation: "you take Pakistan out of the region, and you will find that you have not one inch of soil where America can have influence—right from Turkey down to Vietnam."⁴⁴ President Zia correctly presumed that Pakistan would benefit from the Reagan electoral victory in 1980, as his administration returned to the practice of overtly promoting security assistance as a viable means to contain the "Evil Empire." Reagan's Secretary of State Alexander Haig soon offered a deal to Pakistan worth \$3.2 billion over five years, the purpose of which was to give "Pakistan confidence in our commitment to its security and provide us with reciprocal benefits in terms of our regional interests."⁴⁵

⁴² Carter declared via Presidential Directive 13 (PD-13) that arms transfers were an "exceptional" tool of foreign policy, and that the U.S. would "not be the first supplier to introduce into a region newly developed weapon systems which would create new or significantly higher combat capability." Duncan L. Clark, Daniel B. O'Connor, and Jason D. Ellis. *Send Guns and Money, Security Assistance and U.S. Foreign Policy*. (Westport, CN: Praeger, 1997) 65-66. Also, The Glenn and Symington Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act "specifically forbade U.S. aid to countries that transfer to, or receive from other nations plutonium reprocessing or uranium enrichment equipment, materials, or technology that is not under international safeguards." T.V. Paul, "Influence through Arms Transfers: Lessons from the U.S. Pakistani Relationship," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 32, No. 12 (December 1992), 1087. Also see Kronstadt, *Ibid.*, 8.

⁴³ Dennis Kux. *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001) 247.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 248-251. Also Paul, *op. cit.*, 1083, 1085.

⁴⁵ Comment made by Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia Nicholas Veliotos. See Kux, *op. cit.*, 256.

As part of the new aid offer, the Reagan administration requested a waiver to the Symington and Glenn amendments in order to include the sale of F-16s to the Pakistanis. The argument in favor of the sale was that Zia's cooperation for the CIA's covert operations in Afghanistan was a crucial element of national security strategy, as Pakistan was deemed to be a "front line state" in the policy of containment.⁴⁶ Also, the argument for the sale contained an element of nuclear non-proliferation—the concept was that adequate security assistance can "assuage perceptions of security that drive states to go nuclear."⁴⁷ The Pakistani's rhetoric implicitly supported the concept that the F-16s would promote non-proliferation, arguing that by modernizing the air force they could leverage their overall conventional capability giving them what they perceived to be "a slight edge over India and what forces are in Afghanistan" as well as a "long-term, cost-effective *deterrent* capability."⁴⁸ A congressional study on the F-16 sale agreed, stating that any alteration of the sale would "result in Pakistan's reviewing its relationship with the United States, propelling it toward a nuclear explosion..."⁴⁹

Congress was not convinced that the security assistance package would obviate Pakistan's desire for nuclear weapons and as a result passed the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act in order to compensate for the loss of non-proliferation measures of the now-defunct Symington amendment. This latest measure required the President to annually certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon before the United States would provide any form of military aid.⁵⁰

During the latter portion of the Reagan administration U.S. intelligence discovered Pakistani uranium enrichment activities and alleged plots to smuggle nuclear-related materials from the United States. In accordance with the Pressler Amendment,

⁴⁶ Clark *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 75. Also William D. Hartung. *And Weapons for All: How America's Multibillion-Dollar Arms Trade Warps Our Foreign Policy and Subverts Democracy at Home* (New York: Harper Collins, 1994). 100. Also, for a thorough analysis of CIA-Pakistani ISI cooperation and involvement in Afghanistan, see Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars, the Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Ladin, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Group, 2004).

⁴⁷ Kux, *op. cit.*, 260.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* Emphasis added by author.

⁴⁹ Paul, *op. cit.*, 1086.

⁵⁰ Clarke *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 111.

aid was stopped for a short six-week period; however, the Reagan administration and pro-aid lobby eventually pushed through Congress a bill that extended the level of aid to \$4 billion over six additional years, arguing that terminating aid ran counter to the strategic interests of the United States and served to destabilize to the region. By this time, aid proponents also expressed the opinion that terminating the aid would not keep Pakistan from going nuclear.⁵¹

It was not until 1990 during the George H.W. Bush administration that U.S. intelligence agencies unanimously concluded that Pakistan possessed a nuclear bomb. Purporting to be constrained by the Pressler Amendment, President Bush made the continued provision of aid illegal. All aspects of the security assistance package were stopped immediately. Most notably and particularly troubling to Pakistan, twenty-eight new F-16s went into storage in the United States instead of being delivered to Pakistan.⁵²

Overall, the Pakistani response to implementation of sanctions under the Pressler amendment could be characterized as “disbelief, shock, and anger.”⁵³ The Pakistani press characterized the aid stoppage as unfair and anti-Islamic, and was quick to note that while Pakistan had not yet even tested its weapons capability, India had actually exploded one in 1974 and was not punished as severely. The pervading perception was that because the Soviets had recently withdrawn from Afghanistan, the United States no longer valued its relationship with Pakistan and was therefore acting in a manner that facilitated its reputation as a fickle strategic partner.⁵⁴

The Bush and Clinton administrations both continued attempts to use the undelivered F-16s as an instrument of diplomatic leverage. Initially, U.S. demands were that Pakistan roll-back their nuclear program and verifiably destroy the existing cores.

⁵¹ While the aid package was before Congress, Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan stated that Pakistan had a nuclear weapons “capability.” Paul, *op. cit.*, 1088-89. Also Kux, *op. cit.*, 308.

⁵² Officials in the Defense Department, having developed significant military-to-military relationships with their Pakistani counterparts, convinced the Pakistanis that they should continue to pay the U.S. contractor for the undelivered fighter jets so that they might improve their chances of receiving them once diplomacy rectified the current impasse. Perhaps believing that the precedence of short-lived aid stoppages would apply in this case, the Pakistanis agreed to continue payments. Paul, *op. cit.*, 1090.

⁵³ Kux, *op. cit.*, 310.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

Later, these demands evolved to Pakistan freezing its nuclear program and allowing “non-intrusive” inspections. Islamabad insisted, however, that it would not entertain any degree of non-proliferation unless India would reciprocate in kind. Reflecting the mood of Pakistan’s security planners, Army Chief of Staff General Abdul Waheed expressed a more candid position, stating that the Pakistani military would not “bargain away Pakistan’s nuclear programme for F-16s or anything else.”⁵⁵ Ultimately, the issue was resolved without any non-proliferation measures being considered...no inspections, no destruction of weapons components, and certainly no roll-back.

After a decade and a half, Pakistan received billions of dollars in economic and military assistance, obtained some of the F-16 fighter aircraft they had purchased while being reimbursed for the costs those undelivered, and most significantly developed a nuclear weapons capability (ironically for which the primary delivery platform would be the F-16s). The end result begs the question of “who influenced whom” with respect to the proliferation issue.

E. ASSESSING INFLUENCE: THE F-16 DEAL AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

The results of airpower security cooperation with Pakistan (specifically the FMS of F-16s) during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan produce mixed results. When measured against the intent of dissuading Pakistani development of nuclear weapons, the program failed altogether. However, if measured as a component of the overall strategic objective of expelling the Soviets from Afghanistan, one can legitimately claim that the policy contributed to a successful outcome. Analyzing the causes of these disparate outcomes yields lessons regarding to what extent the United States can expect to use FMS of airpower assets to influence recipients.

⁵⁵ After the Pressler sanctions were invoked, Prime Minister Bhutto expressed Pakistan’s confusion over the American policy, stating that the U.S. position had changed from one of “stay where you are” to “roll back your program.” Later during the Clinton administration, Prime Minister Nawaz threatened legal action regarding the undelivered F-16s, resulting in the Clinton administration offering to repay 70 percent of the cost outright, with the other 30 percent being paid through donated wheat and other commodities. At this point the F-16 deal was essentially closed. *Ibid.*, 310, 326-327.

One question that must be answered is whether or not policy intent with respect to nuclear proliferation was clearly communicated by Washington and correctly received by Islamabad. The language of the Pressler amendment simply stated that aid to Pakistan was contingent upon Pakistan not possessing “a nuclear explosive device.”⁵⁶ In retrospect it is evident that the Pakistanis believed they had some leeway to conduct some proliferation activities short of *possessing* a nuclear explosive device considering the fact that the U.S. President controlled certification of Pakistani compliance. Based upon comments later made by senior Pakistani government officials after the implementation of the Pressler sanctions, they believed they had been given a green light from the Reagan administration to proceed with development of their nuclear weapons program; as long as their activities remained sufficiently “in bounds” the assumption was that the F-16 deliveries would not be jeopardized. Subsequent statements by Reagan administration officials support such a message being sent.⁵⁷

Actions by the Reagan administration certainly supported a perception of executive influence over the implementation of the Pressler amendment. When Reagan appealed to Zia to reduce the level of uranium enrichment to that which was commensurate with civilian-only energy use, intelligence confirmed that no reduction in enrichment activities followed. Despite this information, the administration failed to invoke sanctions and instead presented a larger aid package to Congress than the one preceding it.⁵⁸ Thus it appears that the policy intent of the F-16 FMS with respect to

⁵⁶ U.S. Department of State. “Sanctions on India and Pakistan,” fact sheet, available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/5101.htm> (accessed September 19, 2007).

⁵⁷ Zia’s negotiators initially made it clear that they would not compromise their nuclear development; Secretary of State Haig’s response was that the nuclear issue should not obstruct the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. Comment made by Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia Nicholas Veliotis. Kux, *Ibid.*, 256, 260. Also, Assistant Secretary of State Jane Coon subsequently stated that there was a tacit understanding during the Reagan administration that they would tolerate Pakistan possessing a bomb, as long as they did not explode one (conduct a test). Kux, *op. cit.*, 257. Finally, it is interesting to note that some Reagan administration officials believed that Carter’s restrictions on arms transfers fomented Pakistan’s desire for a nuclear deterrence and that despite public statements to the contrary a Pakistani nuclear weapons capability might actually serve U.S. interests in the region Paul, *op. cit.*, 1088.

⁵⁸ Paul, *op. cit.*, 1088. Also, Pakistani officials argued that they had not actually violated Pressler, as they had merely declared a nuclear weapons *capability*...which does not necessarily equate to *possession* of a nuclear explosive device. To the layman this nuance in terms may seem trivial, but when taking into account the alleged message of “tacit approval” established by the Reagan administration, Pakistani shock at the implementation of sanctions appears to be consistent with such a message being given. Kux, *op. cit.*, 314.

non-proliferation was somewhat muddled by the disparity between the executive branch's message versus that put forth by Congress. Such message variations regarding policy intent challenge any attempts to assess outcomes. In this particular case, however, analyzing the U.S and Pakistani security relationship through a lens of *realpolitik* elucidates the outcome despite the muddled policy message.

First, Pakistan's quest to develop a nuclear weapon was undoubtedly driven by their overriding strategic culture...survival of the state. The reality of India possessing a nuclear capability presented Pakistan with an untenable situation with respect to its national security. In retrospect it would appear dubious to argue that bolstering Pakistan's conventional defenses with military aid, to include the F-16s, would dissuade them from developing a truly viable deterrent to India's nuclear capability without the benefit of a formal security guarantee. From this perspective, Pakistan's nuclear development in spite of the Pressler amendment was a predictable outcome and casts doubt as to whether or not airpower security cooperation can realistically dissuade states from attempting to acquire a nuclear deterrent, particularly when survival of the state is perceived to be at stake and a sufficiently strong alliance cannot be obtained.

Second, the Bush administration's refusal to certify Pakistani nonproliferation cooperation came amidst the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. It was the Soviet threat that propelled the Carter administration (and to a much greater extent the Reagan administration) to seek Pakistani cooperation in supplying the *mujahideen* in Afghanistan via the \$4 billion security assistance package. Once the threat of Soviet influence in the region was gone, Washington reassessed its need for maintaining its special relationship with Pakistan. From this perspective, the security assistance package and sale of F-16s in particular represented a reward for Pakistani cooperation in a matter that served U.S. interests—countering the Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf by supporting the *jihad* in Afghanistan.⁵⁹ For the immediate benefit of U.S. interests, terminating the security

⁵⁹ Paul, *op. cit.*, 1091.

relationship with Pakistan appeared to be the rational choice. With the benefit of hindsight however, the next section reveals that deleterious consequences clearly resulted.

F. FALLOUT FROM PRESSLER AND THE SEVERED SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN

The Pressler sanctions and hasty termination of security cooperation between the United States and Pakistan did not bode well for U.S. interests and regional security in South Asia over the ensuing decade. First, the lesson learned by the PAF regarding the sanctions was that it could no longer afford to become dependent on a sole supplier, meaning that even if the U.S. once again offered FMS to Pakistan it would still seek to diversify sources of supply despite any inefficiencies associated with such a policy.⁶⁰ For example, to compensate for the undelivered F-16s and loss of spare parts, the PAF acquired F-7 tactical aircraft from China and later looked to Sweden to acquire an aircraft platform for the airborne-early-warning-and-control (AWACS) mission.⁶¹

Second, the severed relationship and loss of F-16s decreased Pakistan's self-perception of its security vis-à-vis India. As a result, Pakistan sought to bolster its nascent nuclear capability with ballistic missiles using technology garnered from North Korea to supplement ongoing missile acquisition efforts from China.⁶² Cooperation with North Korea began in 1993 but became public in 1998, when Pakistan tested its Ghauri missile—essentially a renamed North Korean No-Dong missile. Analysts suspect that the missile technology from North Korea was granted in return for Pakistan's knowledge

⁶⁰ Wing Commander Syed Zaidi, PAF. Interview by author, August 28, 2007.

⁶¹ Hussaini, *PAF over the Years* (Peshawar, Pakistan: PAF Book Club, 2002). 107. Information also obtained from Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-South Asia, "PROCUREMENT, Pakistan." Available at <http://jmsa.manes.com>. Date posted: 13 June 2007 (accessed August 20, 2007).

⁶² According to Professor Feroz Khan, the entire transfer of No-Dong missile technology costs Pakistan less than \$100 million. Comments made at the Naval Postgraduate School, August 27, 2007. Also, Pakistan likely turned to North Korea because of waning Chinese assistance in their missile development programs. Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar. *Deadly Arsenal: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat*. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2005) 250-252.

regarding gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment technology.⁶³ The missile test further strained the U.S.-Pakistani relationship as the U.S. imposed additional sanctions via the Missile Technology Control Regime.⁶⁴

Third, the Pressler sanctions severed U.S.-Pakistani military-to-military relationships that had been cultivated over time, although some contacts were periodically facilitated through international peace-keeping operations.⁶⁵ The IMET program that brings foreign officers to U.S. military schools was thereafter denied to Pakistan, the result of which was that “Pakistan low and mid-level military officers are no longer ‘westward looking’...and the U.S. military lost the opportunity to appreciate and understand the ethos, capabilities, orientation, and competence of the Pakistani military.”⁶⁶ According to a panel of U.S. flag-rank officers, “the lack of such relations with Pakistan during the 1990s...showed their consequences in the immediate aftermath of September 11” when the United States once again sought Pakistani cooperation.⁶⁷

Finally and most disconcerting, the intervening years between the Pressler sanctions and September 11, 2001 were plagued by multiple crises between Pakistan and India that in one case brought both parties to nuclear brinkmanship that culminated in overt nuclear weapons testing by both sides in 1998. Causes of these conflicts were

⁶³ Cirincione, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 252. Also, “In late 2003...inspections in Iran and a decision by Libya in December to renounce its WMD programs provided evidence that Pakistani scientists had supplied nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Pakistani officials denied any government knowledge of such cooperation and at first, denied that A.Q. Khan (former head of Khan Research Laboratories) and his associates had assisted Libya or North Korea. Khan confessed to his proliferation misdeeds in early February 2004 and was pardoned by President Musharraf immediately...It was not until President Musharraf published his memoirs in September 2006 that he admitted nuclear technology had been sold to North Korea.” Sharon A. Squassoni, *WMD Trade between North Korea and Pakistan*, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL31900, November 28, 2006, 2.

⁶⁴ Cirincione *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 252.

⁶⁵ Pakistan’s participation in United Nations peacekeeping provided a conduit for U.S.-Pakistani military contact outside of normal channels. In some instances Pakistan was allowed to obtain parts for sustaining military equipment despite sanctions: “for example on August 13, 2001, President Bush granted a one-time waiver of sanctions that permitted the spare parts sales for Pakistan’s Cobra helicopters and armored personnel carriers as well as ammunition to support Pakistan’s contribution to peacekeeping activities in Sierra Leone.” C. Christine Fair. *The Counterterror Coalitions; Cooperation with Pakistan and India*. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Cooperation, 2004) 12-13.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁶⁷ Michael R. Chambers, “U.S. Military Perspectives on Regional Security in South Asia,” in *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliance*, ed. Michael R. Chambers (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002) 231-232.

complex, but a continuing grievance of India was that Islamabad was guilty of fomenting Islamic militancy in the Kashmir region that resulted in as many as 66,000 lives lost since 1989. In more recent years India also blamed Pakistan for terrorist attacks inside India.⁶⁸ Some scholars allege these activities were part of Pakistan's desire for "strategic depth" with respect to India, a policy that promoted asymmetric strategies to counter the Indian conventional advantage and which may have led Islamabad to initially support the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.⁶⁹

It would be a stretch to claim that the Pressler and subsequent sanctions were the preponderant factor in Pakistan's use of asymmetric methods to counter Indian military superiority in South Asia during the 1990s. Rather, it is more accurate to state that Pakistani disappointment over its severed security relationship with the U.S. and growing disparity of its airpower capabilities lent to its overall sense of insecurity with respect to India, the outcome of which were security policies that engendered regional instability and countered U.S. interests. The doldrums of the U.S.-Pakistani relationship in the years following Pressler would change abruptly because of the events of September 11, 2001, after which Washington would once again seek Pakistan's assistance in implementing its security strategies.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, 10-11. Also, Fair, *op. cit.*, 7.

⁶⁹ Fair describes Pakistan's use of militants as part in asymmetric strategies: "while all evidence suggests that Musharraf is not and indeed has not been favorable inclined toward the ethos of the militant groups and their destructive influence upon the social fabric of Pakistan and its political and economic development, groups operating in Indian-held Kashmir and within India proper have long been considered a 'strategic reserve.' Pakistan views these individuals as a relatively inexpensive way of tying up hundreds of thousands of Indian security forces in the counterinsurgency grid." Fair, *op. cit.*, 25. Also, Vali Nasr explains Pakistani support for the Taliban: "The military, initially ideologically opposed to the Taliban, came to see an added benefit to this change. It allowed the military, which was gradually becoming more secular, to be more Islamically effective without becoming any more Islamic itself. This became most clear during General Parvez Musharraf's command of the army and later control of Pakistan." Vali Nasr, "Islamic Extremism and Regional Conflict in South Asia," in *Prospects for Peace in South Asia*, ed. Rafiq Dossani and Henry S. Rowen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005) 29. Finally, according to Professor Feroz Khan, Pakistan eventually abandoned asymmetric strategies because the Pakistani government's attempts at co-opting militant forces to counter India ultimately caused domestic problems that outweighed any strategic gain vis-à-vis India. Interview conducted by the author on August 28, 2007.

⁷⁰ Prior to 9/11 Pakistan faced further sanctions because of its nuclear testing of 1998 and the military coup that brought President Musharraf to power in 1999. Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, 12-13.

G. SECURITY COOPERATION SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

In the days immediately after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Washington and Islamabad rapidly progressed toward unprecedented cooperation whereby substantial provisions of military and economic aid garnered the U.S. limited basing rights, access to Pakistani airspace by U.S. combat aircraft, and the Pakistani government's direct efforts in countering extremists inside Afghanistan and within its own borders.⁷¹ Concerns persist however regarding Pakistan's role in regional and global terrorism, nuclear proliferation, conflict with India and concomitant regional instability, as well as the lack of progress toward democratization under the Musharraf regime. The question is: how does airpower security cooperation play into what has or has not been successful in achieving U.S. policy objectives in Pakistan since 9/11?

The following sections make the case that the U.S. airpower security cooperation bolsters Pakistan's perception of its national security and as a result has contributed to regional stability as evidenced by diplomatic détente with India and to a lesser extent a strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation measures. Most notably security cooperation has garnered Pakistan's consistent cooperation in the GWOT. However, results thus far suggest that military instruments of security cooperation are not well suited to objectives of facilitating the growth of democratic institutions inside Pakistan. Rather, such intent requires the additional implementation of other policy instruments.

H. CONTEMPORARY U.S. AND PAKISTANI INTERESTS AND CONCERNS

In contrast to previous eras of U.S-Pakistani security cooperation, Washington must now carefully weigh Pakistan's status as a bona fide nuclear weapons state and the probability that any development that decreases regional instability also raises the

⁷¹ According to President Musharraf, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage issued ultimatums consistent with the new Bush policy of "you're either with us or against us," threatening that a failure to ally with the United States in its War on Terror would subject Pakistan to intense bombing. "Musharaff says U.S. threatened to bomb Pakistan," *International Herald Tribune*. September 22, 2006. Available at <http://www.ihf.com/articles/2006/09/22/news/web.0922pakistan.php> (accessed September 19, 2007).

prospect of nuclear war.⁷² The ongoing dispute with India over Kashmir in particular is a “tinder box” issue over which the positions of the United States and Islamabad diverge due to allegations that Pakistan facilitates low-intensity conflict in that region in order to expend India’s conventional military resources. If true these activities counter U.S. desires for stability in South Asia and contradict U.S. denunciation of Islamic militancy and terrorism. The United States also continues to be concerned about the potential for the proliferation of nuclear technology from Pakistan to other non-nuclear states that many analysts believe occurred with respect to Libya, North Korea, and Iran via the A.Q. Khan nuclear black-market network.⁷³

The nuclear dimension also raises the level of angst regarding internal stability in Pakistan, which has recently been impacted by power struggles between the Musharraf regime, the Pakistani Supreme Court, and opposition parties to the ruling regime. Far more troubling is what appears to be a significant rise in Islamic militancy as evidenced by increasing numbers of incidents of suicide bombers and the recent Lal Mosque Crisis.⁷⁴ The potential ascension to power of Islamic extremists and concomitant access to nuclear weapons represents a “nightmare scenario” from the perspective of U.S. policymakers.⁷⁵

Finally, Washington is concerned over what intelligence suggests is an Al-Qaeda safe-haven in western Pakistan. Relations have been strained due to allegations in Washington that Musharraf has pursued a “policy of appeasement” towards extremists in the western tribal areas. Tensions have worsened because of statements by various U.S. officials that Washington should consider taking unilateral action inside Pakistan against “actionable targets,” a suggestion that has engendered outrage among Pakistani security officials.⁷⁶

⁷² Pakistan and India have not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Cirincione *et al.*, *Ibid.*, 27-28.

⁷³ Howard B. Schaffer. “U.S. Interests in South Asia,” in *Prospects for Peace in South Asia*, ed. Rafiq Dossani and Henry S. Rowen. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005) 335-339.

⁷⁴ Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, 28.

⁷⁵ Schaffer, *op. cit.*, 337.

⁷⁶ Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, 2, 16-17.

For Pakistan, the 9/11 events represented an opportunity to once again increase its leverage with the United States and concomitantly to enhance its status in the international system. Pakistani policies prior to 9/11—support for the Taliban, indigenous nuclear development and testing, horizontal proliferation of nuclear technology and delivery systems, support for militancy in Kashmir, and the incursion in Kargil—partially isolated it from the international community.⁷⁷ Pakistani moderates desire to garner prestige in the Muslim world by facilitating an image as a secular state that enjoys a functional democratic government—a “modern state for Muslims.”⁷⁸ This ideal is currently being challenged by more fundamental Islamic political currents promoting governance according to *Shariah* law. Moderates in Pakistan view its relationship with the United States and status in the international community as essential to helping them confront the Islamist domestic political challenge.⁷⁹ Pakistanis remain skeptical however, about the longevity of U.S. partnership based upon pervasive distrust of U.S. intentions and staying power. Fears persist that in the future the U.S. will make a hasty departure from the region as it did in 1989 after which Pakistan was left to deal with the flood of the Afghan *jihadis*, resulting in law enforcement problems that overwhelmed its infrastructural and bureaucratic capacity.⁸⁰

Ultimately, Pakistan views all regional security issues in the context of its ongoing struggle with India. For example, Islamabad suspects that Indian diplomatic activity in Afghanistan amounts to an Indian policy of “strategic encirclement.”⁸¹ More importantly, Pakistanis view with great skepticism the recent overtures between the United States and India towards establishing a strategic partnership, the mark of which includes the sharing of nuclear technology for civilian use as well as bilateral military

⁷⁷ Fair, *op. cit.*, 55-56.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 56.

⁷⁹ Chambers, *op. cit.*, 233.

⁸⁰ Fair, *op. cit.*, 54-55

⁸¹ India has opened numerous consulates in Afghanistan since 2001. Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, 13.

exercises.⁸² Accordingly while elements of U.S. security cooperation are routinely advertised as having a purpose overtly pertaining to U.S. interests in fighting the GWOT, Pakistan weighs such elements as either enhancing or detracting from its own strategic position vis-à-vis India. This is certainly true regarding Pakistan's view of conventional balance of power vis-à-vis India and its renewed opportunity to purchase U.S. military hardware, especially advanced fighter aircraft.

I. CONTEMPORARY AIRPOWER IMBALANCE IN SOUTH ASIA

The airpower picture in South Asia can best be characterized as one of imbalance in favor of India, a trend that will only worsen over the next decade if India's air force modernization efforts continue without a reciprocal effort on behalf of the Pakistanis.⁸³ India maintains a quantitative and qualitative airpower advantage over Pakistan with exclusive capabilities that include aerial refueling and beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles. India's fleet of fighters are more numerous and more capable (Su-30 vs. F-16A), leading many to predict that in the event of full-scale conventional war India would quickly establish air superiority. Accordingly many analysts suggest that this increases the chance of nuclear war because of Pakistani assessments that the PAF would be unable to defend its nuclear ballistic missile sites. Indeed, heavy losses by the PAF are one of the unofficial thresholds put forth by Pakistani security officials that would compel Pakistan to use nuclear weapons against India.⁸⁴

A persistent overall conventional military imbalance could also encourage Pakistani security planners to once again advocate asymmetric means to counter India's conventional advantage, such as renewed support of anti-India militant groups in Kashmir. Similar strategies in the past have proven to destabilize the region and have facilitated an increase in Islamic extremist political forces inside Pakistan.⁸⁵

⁸² Fair, *op. cit.*, 54-61. Also, according to a PAF officer, USAF and IAF Cope India air-to-air exercises are viewed by the PAF as a disparity in U.S. diplomatic favor towards India. Interview with Wing Commander Syed Zaidi (PAF); conducted by the author on August 28, 2007.

⁸³ Gill, *op. cit.*, 255-256.

⁸⁴ Cirincione *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 247.

⁸⁵ Gill, *op. cit.*, 253-254.

J. CONTEMPORARY AIRPOWER SECURITY COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN

Pakistan is currently among the world's leading recipients of U.S. aid and the third highest recipient of security assistance behind Israel and Egypt, receiving about \$3.2 billion for the four fiscal years spanning 2002-2006, an amount that includes more than \$1.2 billion in security-assistance.⁸⁶ According to the State Department's most recent budget request for foreign assistance to Pakistan, the policy seeks to maintain "Pakistan's support in the Global War on Terror and efforts to build positive relations with its neighbors, India and Afghanistan."⁸⁷ In addition, the strategy is to "encourage Pakistan's participation in international efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and support in the development of a moderate, democratic, and civilian government..."⁸⁸

Security assistance components of the State Department's strategy are designed to continue "force modernization and traditional defense capabilities." Foreign Military Financing (FMF) measures are to enhance border security, counterterrorism capabilities, and force modernization through equipment upgrades and acquisitions as well as the renewal of the flow of parts supply to maintain U.S. equipment purchased prior to the Pressler sanctions. The strategy emphasizes that "this will have a direct impact on the war on terrorism and will enhance U.S. Pakistani interoperability."⁸⁹ Security assistance also employs IMET also to "raise the quality and professionalism of officers by focusing on defense management, civilian control of the military, human rights, and the rule of law."⁹⁰ Noticeably absent throughout the State Department's strategy for security cooperation is any reference to Pakistan's conventional military strength vis-à-vis India.

⁸⁶ Pakistan also has since 2001 received some \$5 billion in reimbursements for its support of U.S.-led counterterrorism operations. U.S. Department of State. *Congressional Budget Justification: FOREIGN OPERATIONS.*, Fiscal Year 2008. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/84462.pdf> (accessed November 27, 2007) 564. Also Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, from "Summary" (no page number given).

⁸⁷ The Department of State. *Congressional...*, *op. cit.*

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* Also, in order to provide aid to Pakistan for its cooperation in the GWOT, the U.S. government waived the Glenn-Symington Amendment sanctions that forbid U.S. security assistance to regimes that obtained power via military coup, Fair, *op. cit.*, 15.

⁹⁰ The Department of State. *United States Foreign Assistance...*, *op. cit.*

As a result of the renewed opportunity to acquire U.S. military hardware, Pakistan is undergoing aggressive attempts to modernize its air force by upgrading its existing fleet of F-16s and by acquiring new models. Recently the Pakistani Cabinet approved the purchase of 26 older F-16 A/B models and 18 new F-16 C/D Block 52s. In addition, the F-16 purchase may include up to 500 AIM-120C Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and 500 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM).⁹¹

The addition of these munitions in conjunction with upgrades to the existing F-16 fleet and the new Block 52 F-16s would provide a monumental increase in capability to the PAF. The AMRAAM would provide the PAF its first beyond-visual-range (BVR) shoot-down air-to-air missile, a capability that India already possesses. This importance of this capability cannot be underestimated; an air force lacking a modern BVR capability that must confront an air force possessing a BVR capability faces extremely disturbing odds—survival is dubious, and air superiority for the latter almost guaranteed.⁹²

The GPS-assisted, inertially-guided JDAM would provide the PAF with a precision-ground-munition to attack fixed targets. Coupled with the BLU-109 the JDAM can penetrate hardened targets such as bunkered command and control facilities. Precision is an airpower force-multiplier that enhances strategic efficiency and economy of forces by reducing the number of sorties required to achieve target destruction. Hypothetically for example, a target that requires eight aircraft sorties to achieve a desired probability of destruction with unguided munitions might only require one sortie with precision munitions. JDAM is most effectively used against fixed targets for which intelligence may provide a pre-known target location to a specific degree of accuracy. However, the planned purchase of the SNIPER advanced targeting pod with the fleet of new F-16s represents a sensor-weapon combination that provides a potential capability

⁹¹ Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, 25. Also, The 26 aircraft of older F-16s are reportedly to come from the original fleet of those that were previously purchased but never delivered because of sanctions invoked under the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. The U.S. Navy has operated some of these aircraft in the “aggressor” training role at Fallon NAS, NV.

⁹² This assertion assumes that the pilots are trained and proficient at using their own weaponry; for Pakistan and India the assertion is valid.

for flexible, real-time precision targeting.⁹³ These advanced weapon systems would do much to decrease any qualitative gap between the PAF and IAF, but are not sufficient to eliminate the overall airpower advantage currently enjoyed by India.⁹⁴

In addition to FMS and FMF programs, the U.S. has reinitiated IMET and intra-theater air force cooperation efforts.⁹⁵ As these programs are ongoing, policy outcomes are evolving; however, one may assess what the U.S. has obtained in response to airpower security cooperation thus far and whether or not results have met U.S. intentions. The following sections assess results with respect to the policy intentions of maintaining Pakistan's cooperation toward the promotion of regional stability, nuclear non-proliferation, the GWOT, and democracy advancement in Pakistan.

K. ASSESSING INFLUENCE: REGIONAL STABILITY

The United States renewed security relationship with Pakistan following the September 11, 2001 attacks was timely as subsequent events would call for U.S. diplomatic intervention to reduce regional tension. Following the terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, much of 2002 was spent by both sides on military buildups and nuclear brinkmanship fomented by the respective leaders' vitriolic rhetoric. Multiple visits by U.S. diplomats were credited with gaining Islamabad's cooperation in banning militant operations in Pakistani controlled areas of Kashmir, a development that allowed a return to diplomacy between Pakistan and India and helped to avert war between India and Pakistan in 2002.⁹⁶ Since Pakistan initiated a cease-fire agreement in

⁹³ Source is the author's own expertise in F-16 weapons systems and tactical employment.

⁹⁴ In the Pentagon's overt assessment, the provision of these advanced weapon systems to the PAF would not significantly alter the airpower qualitative and quantitative advantage enjoyed by the IAF, nor would they affect the regional balance of power. Christopher Bolkcom, Richard F. Grimmet, and K. Alan Kronstadt, *U.S. Combat Aircraft Sales to South Asia: Potential Implications*. CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33515, July 6, 2006.

⁹⁵ Specific AF-to-AF levels of cooperation are not available in open sources. However, Wing Commander Syed Zaidi (PAF) contends that there is some level of cooperation and combined training between the USAF and PAF in Pakistan. Interview conducted by the author on August 28, 2007.

⁹⁶ In response to visits by U.S. Deputy-Secretary-of-State Dick Armitage, Musharraf banned *Hizbul Muhahideen* activities in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and barred the leader of outlawed *Jaish-e-Mohammed* from entering Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. Cirincione *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 242-243.

October 2003, it has taken overt steps to improve bilateral relations, reduce tensions, and increase confidence building measures including travel and commerce across the Kashmiri line-of-control and as well as increases in bilateral trade.⁹⁷

The trend towards improved bilateral relations between India and Pakistan has recently survived terrorist events that have derailed such efforts in the past, suggesting that current progress towards a lasting peace has substantial momentum. Musharraf and his Indian counterparts have found a manner in which to facilitate cooperation in response to terrorism through the creation of a “joint terrorism network,” whereby Pakistani and Indian officials agree to meet quarterly to share information garnered from investigations into terrorist incidents and as well as any information that can be used to prevent terrorist attacks. The new framework for cooperation was tested in February 2007 when two bombs exploded on an Indian passenger train killing 68 people; days after the two foreign ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the peace process despite such efforts to ruin it.⁹⁸

The increase in bilateral contacts and measures to improve relations have thus far avoided the contentious subject of Kashmir, which the Pakistanis continue to contend represents a “freedom struggle” in contrast to India’s view that unrest in the region amounts to illegitimate militant activities and acts of terrorism. However, the increase in engagement between the two sides recently led their respective foreign ministers to remark that they conducted “the most sustained and intensive dialogue” to date regarding the Kashmir problem.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, 48.

⁹⁸ In 2006, despite a cessation of foreign secretary-level talks following the July terrorist bombings in Bombay, President Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Singh announced resumption of formal peace negotiations and the creation of a “joint anti-terrorism mechanism.” Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, 14.

⁹⁹ Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, 15.

Finally, the renewed U.S.-Pakistani security relationship has been followed by efforts to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war in South Asia. Islamabad has begun to work with New Delhi to prevent accidental nuclear war by implementing measures such as the establishment of a hot-line between the two states' foreign ministers and extending the moratorium on nuclear testing.¹⁰⁰

In sum there is substantial, measurable evidence of progress toward improved bilateral relations between Pakistan and India, all of which have occurred since the rebirth of U.S.-Pakistani security cooperation. While one cannot contend that security cooperation is responsible for the reduction in tensions, trends in South Asia suggest a *correlation* between the two; rather it is more appropriate to suggest that security cooperation programs, particularly the airpower components, leverage Pakistan's perception of its security vis-à-vis India and provide it with a strengthened negotiating position. However, despite these positive trends territorial disputes remain capable of instigating a return to conflict and instability. A return to asymmetric strategies by Pakistan (all of which previously occurred during an era of non-cooperation with the U.S.) would derail what progress has been achieved so far. Continued U.S. airpower security cooperation encourages Pakistan to stay on the current course of continuous improvement in bilateral relations with India. The next section addresses a matter that affects stability beyond South Asia—the potential for horizontal proliferation of nuclear technology, and whether or not airpower security cooperation with Pakistan has produced any positive trends regarding this key security concern.

L. ASSESSING INFLUENCE: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

With respect to Pakistan, U.S. concerns for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are primarily aimed at the state's nuclear technologies. Pakistan is not known to possess biological or chemical weapons and has ratified both the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.¹⁰¹ In lieu of

¹⁰⁰ Circione *et al.*, *op. cit.*

¹⁰¹ Squassoni, *op. cit.*, 4. Also, "there is some concern that it [Pakistan] is conducting a limited chemical weapons research program." Circione *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 240.

the nuclear tests of 1998, the potential for a Pakistan-India nuclear arms race was formerly the focus of U.S. nonproliferation efforts in South Asia. Since 9/11 however Washington has been more concerned by evidence of transfer of Pakistani nuclear technologies and materials to third parties including North Korea, Iran, and Libya.¹⁰²

The prospect of a non-NATO ally proliferating technology to the principal members of the “axis of evil” is indeed disturbing. Revelations regarding the A.Q. Khan network prompted Washington to impose sanctions directly onto the Khan Research Laboratories (notably, as opposed to the Pakistani government) from March 2003 to March 2005.¹⁰³ The U.N. Security Council also responded by passing Resolution 1540 requiring states to criminalize trade activities related to proliferation.

In an effort to restore its standing in the international community amid revelations of the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market, Pakistan passed increasingly stringent export legislation five times from 1998 to 2004, the latest of which was designed to close previously established loopholes that gave the military certain exemptions. However, the question remains as to whether or not government has the intention or even the capacity to enforce the laws.¹⁰⁴ The question of succession to the Musharraf regime ensures that the issue of who controls Pakistan’s nuclear technologies will remain a central focus of U.S. policymakers and proliferation watchdogs.

Despite these overt attempts to assuage U.S. proliferation concerns, suspicions persist regarding Pakistan’s relationship with North Korea under Musharraf. According to a recent report by the Congressional Research Service, there is a lack of hard evidence

¹⁰² Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, from “Summary” (no page number given).

¹⁰³ Squassoni, *op. cit.*, 3.

¹⁰⁴ The latest version of export legislation “prohibits the diversion of controlled goods and technologies, including reexport, transshipment, and transit; requires licensing and record keeping; establishes export control lists and penal provisions of up to fourteen years of imprisonment and a fine of PRs 5 million (about \$86,500).” The law applies to every Pakistani national at home or abroad as well as foreign nationals inside Pakistan. Cirincione *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 249-250.

regarding Pakistan's assistance to North Korea's nuclear weapons development; however, there are multiple reports suggesting that Pakistan assisted North Korea in obtaining centrifuge rotors.¹⁰⁵

Unfortunately, renewed security cooperation efforts cannot “undo” the horizontal proliferation activities that emanated from within Pakistan, as the foundations for proliferation via the A.Q. Khan network were already in place by the time Washington renewed its relationship to Pakistan in response to September 11th. However, airpower security cooperation is a viable instrument to address the elements of Pakistan's strategic culture that brought about its efforts to obtain a nuclear deterrent in the first place—its security vis-à-vis India. In addition, it also provides the U.S. access to those residing at the center of Pakistan's strategic culture—the military leaders responsible for making Pakistan's security choices. While none of these benefits of airpower security cooperation can safely predict the extent to which Pakistan cooperates in nuclear non-proliferation, the previous era of non-cooperation with Pakistan suggests that Washington's failure to comprehend the importance of airpower assets to its strategic culture contributed to the horizontal proliferation of nuclear technologies. The next section addresses an area of cooperation that has fortunately yielded more tangible results.

M. ASSESSING INFLUENCE: PAKISTANI COOPERATION IN THE GWOT

Pakistan's cooperation in the U.S. led GWOT represented an immediate manifestation of bilateral security cooperation following 9/11, as President Musharraf offered the support of Pakistani intelligence services, access to Pakistani airspace by U.S.

¹⁰⁵ “Apparently, North Korea attempted to obtain materials from China, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, and Europe, but Pakistan provided most of the assistance related to the [centrifuge] rotors. A Pakistani official involved in Khan's investigation reportedly said North Korea ordered P-1 centrifuge components from 1997 to 2000. The scope of Pakistan's cooperation with Libya and Iran (including P-1 and P-2 designs, a nuclear weapon design for Libya, and some complete rotor assemblies) raises significant questions about how much other help Khan might have given to the North Koreans. In his September 2006 memoir, Pakistani President Musharraf stated that he believes that Khan sent some of ‘Pakistan's most technologically advanced nuclear centrifuges.’” Squassoni, *op. cit.*, 7. Also, Islamabad has reportedly not allowed U.S. access to interview of A.Q. Khan and has since declared its own investigation of the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market “closed.” Given the lack of attention of the Bush administration to the purported lack of access to A.Q. Khan leaves some analysts to entertain the prospect that the U.S. has in fact had access, and that public denials to the contrary are designed to provide political support to Musharraf.

combat aircraft, and logistical support of U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Throughout Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Pakistan provided its support “without any of the formal agreements or user fees that are normally required for such privileges.”¹⁰⁶

Pakistani contributions to U.S. military operations during OEF have been extensive. According to briefings given by CENTCOM personnel, by 2002 Pakistan had already contributed 35,000 army personnel for internal security and operations support and another 7000 personnel from the air force. The PAF also deployed radars and moved two squadrons in support of U.S. Forward Operating Bases and activated three additional bases. Perhaps most significant was that two-thirds of Pakistan’s airspace was made available for the transit of U.S. combat sorties into Afghanistan, resulting in 28,000 sorties from Oct 1, 2001 to March 7, 2002, allowing for persistent air cover over Afghanistan in support of ground forces engaging the Taliban and elements of Al-Qaeda.¹⁰⁷

Access to Pakistani bases have been critical to logistical support for operations in Afghanistan, providing operating locations for over 50 aircraft and 2000 military personnel. Bases included four areas used for intermediate staging, two of which hosted Predator UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) operations that journalists allege were used to assassinate members of Al-Qaeda inside Pakistani territory.¹⁰⁸ Logistical support at these locations included Pakistan’s provision of 10,000 gallons of fuel for daily air operations. In addition, Pakistani security forces sufficiently protected coalition forces such that there were no successful terrorist attacks made against them inside Pakistan.¹⁰⁹

One of the most significant contributions of Pakistan to the GWOT is their capacity to provide human intelligence (HUMINT), providing an “important complement to U.S. technical and other means of intelligence collection,” the impact of which not only aids the mission in Afghanistan but also enables Pakistani and U.S. military and law

¹⁰⁶ Fair, *op. cit.*, 13, 15.

¹⁰⁷ Also, Pakistani maritime cooperation has, according to CENTOM, assisted the U.S. Navy in providing “freedom of operations within areas proximate to Pakistan.” Fair, *Ibid.*, 27-28, 31.

¹⁰⁸ Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, 15.

¹⁰⁹ There have been some attacks against American civilians in Pakistan, but thus far none against U.S. military forces have been successful. Fair, *Ibid.*, 28.

enforcement officials to conduct “direct, low profile efforts...in tracking and apprehending fugitive Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani territory.”¹¹⁰ As of 2002, Pakistani authorities remanded to U.S. custody approximately 500 such fugitives including key Al Qaeda key members such as Abu Zabaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, and Abu Faraj al-Libbi.¹¹¹

Pakistan’s direct participation in the GWOT has not been without costs. In autumn of 2003, Musharraf sent 25,000 armed forces personnel into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the Afghan border to confront pro-Taliban militants; in the two Waziristan areas in particular fighting between Pakistani armed forces and militants resulted in more than 800 deaths of Islamic extremists in addition to 600-700 Pakistani troops.¹¹² Hundreds of civilians were reportedly caught in the crossfire as well, an unintended outcome that complicated efforts to sway domestic opinion away from sympathy for Islamic pro-Taliban militants in the FATA. In what many suggests represented a stark example of the government’s limited capacity to effectively counter pro-Taliban militants in the FATA, Islamabad later shifted to a strategy of reconciliation with the pro-Taliban militants, a policy that immediately engendered disappointment and skepticism in the United States and has since been judged “to have failed in its central purposes” and to have “inadvertently allowed foreign (largely Arab) militants to obtain safe haven from which they can plot and train for terrorist attacks against U.S. and other Western targets.”¹¹³ Thus, while by in large Pakistan has delivered much in response to Washington’s security cooperation investments since 9/11, these machinations of strategies in the FATA indicate the difficulty with which Islamabad must confront domestic currents of Islamic militancy in Pakistani society and alludes to a limited capacity of security cooperation to shape such domestic trends, and concomitantly to advance democracy in this difficult setting.

¹¹⁰ Fair, *op. cit.*, 32. , Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, 15.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, 17-18.

¹¹³ Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, from “Summary” (no page number given), also 16-17.

N. ASSESSING INFLUENCE: DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

The desire to facilitate democracy in Pakistan is perhaps the most challenging outcome to achieve via instruments of security cooperation. The legitimacy of the Pakistani government has been challenged by a perception that the domination of the military in domestic politics has led to enduring instabilities in the government. Indeed, Pakistan has more often been ruled by military than civilian regimes and in the two instances when a civilian government amassed enough power to amend the constitution, military coups immediately followed. Perceptions pertaining to the current regime are no different, as political observers both inside and outside Pakistan criticize an apparent concentration of power in the presidency that is supported by the military and intelligence institutions. Critics also suggest that appointments of military officers to high-level leadership positions undermine the independency of civilian institutions.¹¹⁴

In a political trend that mirrors those throughout Muslim countries, the groups that have the greatest capacity to challenge the Musharraf regime are Islamists. A recent election resulted in significant gains by the United Action Front (a coalition of six Islamic parties) in which they won eleven percent of the popular vote and about one-fifth of the seats in the National Assembly.¹¹⁵ Political Islam's more violent manifestations in Pakistan have resulted in multiple assassination attempts on President Musharraf, increasing numbers of suicide bombers, and the highly public and violent confrontation of Islamic extremists with the Pakistani military at the Lal Mosque.¹¹⁶

A common thread throughout Islamist movements is disdain for U.S. foreign policies which are thought to be inherently anti-Islamic. However, it is unfortunate for both the United States and Pakistani moderates that perceptions regarding U.S. foreign policy are not confined to the more extreme end of the political spectrum, but rather

¹¹⁴ Charles H. Kennedy, "Constitutional and Political Change in Pakistan: The Military-Governance Paradigm," in *Prospects for Peace in South Asia*, ed. Rafiq Dossani and Henry S. Rowen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005) 37-45.

¹¹⁵ Local government has also witnessed Islamist influence; for example, the North West Frontier Province provincial assembly recently passed a bill which calls for the implementation of *Shariah* law, although this was later struck down by the Pakistani Supreme Court. Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, 32.

¹¹⁶ Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, 23-27.

represent the majority opinion, or as Musharraf himself expressed: “the man on the street does not have a good opinion of the United States.”¹¹⁷ Public polling data published by the University of Maryland supports this assertion:

- 67% of Pakistanis have an unfavorable view of the United States;
- 73% think weakening and dividing the Islamic world is a policy objective of the United States;
- 54% agree strongly with the goal of requiring strict application of *Sharia* law in every Islamic country.¹¹⁸

These societal perceptions adversely affect Washington’s ability to market its agenda in the region as representing something that benefits its inhabitants. It also complicates matters for the Musharraf regime, which through its cooperation with the United States is subject to being viewed as one that cows to U.S. interests over the interests of Pakistan, a perception that plays into the rhetoric of Islamist propaganda.

Despite these limitations, the fact remains that the military holds measurable influence in Pakistani politics and security cooperation grants the United States influence with those who are close to power. More simply, the U.S. is better positioned to forward its immediate interests with those who have the capacity to do so. This is not to say that efforts to shape society via education reform, economic growth, and political liberalization are not important; rather, they are...and may well represent the solution to a larger root cause of current ideological battles in Muslim countries. The capacity of security cooperation programs to address these problems is merely limited, and may in fact exacerbate anti-U.S. perceptions if the ruling regime is also unpopular. Attempts to shape societal political forces and promoting democracy and human rights are, therefore,

¹¹⁷ Kronstadt, *op. cit.*, 37.

¹¹⁸ Musharraf alluded that negative perceptions of the United States were wrought from a belief that Pakistan had been “left high and dry” after serving as a strategic U.S. ally during the 1980s Afghan war. *Ibid.*, 37-38.

better left to other policy instruments.¹¹⁹ Rather, military instruments of security cooperation are better suited to forwarding U.S. security interests in South Asia, bolstering the security interests of Pakistan vis-à-vis India, maintaining an appropriate balance of power, and enhancing Pakistan's status in the international system.

O. CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis of U.S. security cooperation with Pakistan since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan yields salient lessons regarding policy *outcomes* with respect to *expectations* as well as factors that contribute to, or detract from, the congruence of the two. First, the period of assistance during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan reveals that influence is not an exclusive right of the supplier; rather, the recipient can exact a measure of “reverse-influence” over its provider under circumstances whereby the recipient's cooperation is deemed to be critical to the provider's national security.¹²⁰ This outcome was evidenced by Pakistan's successful development of nuclear weapons program despite U.S. stipulations mandating otherwise. The Reagan administration's temporary stoppage of aid was short-lived because such a measure was deemed to detract from U.S. interests in the region as long as the Soviets were still in Afghanistan. In contrast, President Bush's decision to not certify Pakistan's compliance with nuclear abstinence was made after the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan. Simply put, the Pakistanis were better able to get what they wanted while the United States had no other alternative but to seek Pakistan's cooperation in countering the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

¹¹⁹ While the preponderance of assistance dollars to Pakistan has been oriented towards security cooperation and assistance, the United States has embarked on a comprehensive approach towards aid to Pakistan and particularly emphasizes support for educational reform to counter the influence of the *madrassahs*. Current State Department budget requests reflect “a commitment to provide \$600 million in economic and security assistance and \$50 million in earthquake reconstruction assistance on an annual basis through FY2009.” The objective is that “U.S. assistance will encourage Pakistan's participation in international efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and support in the development of a moderate, democratic, and civilian government which promotes respect for human rights and participation of its citizens in government and society.” The Department of State. *Congressional...*, *op. cit.*, 1081.

¹²⁰ T.V. Paul offers a concise model that explains the phenomena of reverse-influence through arms transfers. Paul, *op. cit.*

Second, with respect to proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Pakistan case suggests that security cooperation pertaining to the modernization of conventional forces such as F-16 fighter aircraft may be insufficient to ameliorate a state's security concerns such that they are dissuaded from "going nuclear." In retrospect, U.S. policymakers were perhaps naïve to expect Pakistan to not pursue nuclear weapons development given the paradigm of Pakistan's strategic culture, one that perceives survival of the state as the paramount concern, and what amounted to an untenable situation whereby the principle threat to their national security had become a nuclear power. Without a formal alliance or security guarantee with another power to counter the Indian nuclear threat, Islamabad chose to develop its own nuclear deterrence.

Third, attempts at using U.S. security cooperation as a coercive instrument via sanctions imposed by Congress under the Pressler Amendment, while well intended and appearing to promote U.S. interests, yielded outcomes that ultimately countered U.S. interests in the intervening years between the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and September 11, 2001. The loss of the F-16 deal in particular diminished the relative airpower parity vis-à-vis India that Pakistan once enjoyed such that India now holds a clear quantitative and qualitative advantage. As a result Pakistan looked to China to bolster its airpower needs—a development that furthered Chinese influence in the region. The disparate airpower imbalance also led Pakistan to rely further on its nuclear deterrent, a policy that manifested the sharing of nuclear technologies with North Korea in return for a ballistic missile capability. The airpower disparity also increases the likelihood that Pakistan would use its nuclear forces in the event of full-scale war with India because of a fear of losing its nuclear sites to IAF attack.

The era of security non-cooperation also witnessed Pakistan electing to counter India's quantitative and qualitative military advantage with asymmetric means that included subversion and insurgency in Kashmir, the outcome of which was regional

instability marked by multiple flashpoints that threatened full scale war and the increasing influence of Islamic militants in Pakistani politics.¹²¹

Finally, the imposition of sanctions severed military-to-military relationships that had developed over the preceding decade, effectively eliminating a conduit for U.S. access to the only institution in Pakistan that has maintained persistent influence on political affairs. The loss of the military cooperative relationship was also an issue that challenged U.S. operational efforts in the region immediately after September 11, 2001.

Since September 11, 2001 outcomes that resulted from the renewed security relationship can so far be described as having met the intent of obtaining comprehensive Pakistani cooperation with Washington's GWOT. Regarding Pakistan's end of the deal, U.S. security assistance is addressing some of Pakistan's conventional airpower concerns. However, the prospect for larger airpower FMS deals with India continue to imbue a belief among Pakistan's security apparatus that the U.S. has adopted an "India first" strategy in the region, a perception that threatens to once again detract from Pakistan's assessment of its national security.

The effect of the renewed security relationship with Pakistan on nuclear proliferation potential has yet to be determined. However, Pakistan has responded to U.S. and international pressure by passing anti-proliferation legislation; whether or not the state has the capacity to enforce the measures is yet to be seen, but U.S. security cooperation provides a means to remain engaged with the Pakistani government and increases opportunities for awareness of any unwarranted proliferation activities.

The contemporary case of Pakistan suggests that airpower security cooperation is most effective in bolstering inter-state security with respect to India, garner cooperation for U.S military operations, maintain a persistent political influence through military-to-military relationships, and afford Islamabad leverage in the international system via its

¹²¹ Regarding the latter, the perception in Pakistan persists that when the Soviets left Afghanistan, the United States left Pakistan to deal with the presence of Islamic *jihadists* who for a time served Washington's purposes. Their regional presence, in conjunction with the loss of the United States as a security partner and the concomitant feeling of insecurity vis-à-vis India, engendered Islamabad's co-opting of Islamic militants as an instrument to occupy the Indian armed forces--thereby shoring up the national security of the Pakistani state. Feroz Khan, lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, August 2007.

relationship with the United States. Other U.S. agendas related to the promotion of democratic institutions, liberalizing civil society, and facilitating economic growth are best left to other policy instruments. Recent legislation in Washington that makes aid to Pakistan conditional upon Presidential certification of its cooperation in the GWOT harkens back to the Pressler Amendment and engenders assertions that the United States will cease to be a strategic partner once its regional objectives are met.¹²² Returning to a status where there is little-to-no engagement is no longer rational given Pakistan's proliferation potential as well as the possibility that any "regime change" in Pakistan might empower political actors whose intentions reflect a radical Islamist agenda.¹²³ The next chapter studies the case of U.S. airpower security cooperation with Egypt that relative to the Pakistani case has been marked by greater consistency over time and on the surface appears to have produced positive policy results.

¹²² During an unannounced visit to Islamabad in February 2007, Vice President Dick Cheney reportedly warned President Musharraf that a Democratic-party controlled Congress might cut off aid to Pakistan unless they take more aggressive action to counter Al-Qaeda and Taliban elements on Pakistani soil. Recently, this verbal threat manifested into legislative reality when Congress passed a bill stating that future remittances of U.S. aid to Pakistan would only be granted once the President certified that Pakistan is sufficiently targeting "militant training camps, arresting leaders and halting cross border attacks, as well as implementation of democratic reforms." To Pakistanis in government and in the populace at large, the bill harkens back to the ill-will begotten by the Pressler amendment, prodding Foreign Ministry spokesman to state that "such linkage did not serve the interest of bilateral cooperation in the past and it can prove to be detrimental in the future." "Pakistan objects to U.S. aid bill," *gulfnews.com*, available at <http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/07/07/29/10142738.html> (accessed August 12, 2007).

¹²³ Fair describes the potential consequences: "one potential post-Musharraf future for Pakistan is a state that has become wary of the United States, vexed with India, and marginalized once again on the world stage. Such a Pakistan may become recalcitrant and actively support militancy and other manifestations of terrorism while taking cover under its nuclear umbrella." Fair, *op. cit.*, 54-55.

III. AIRPOWER SECURITY COOPERATION WITH EGYPT— ENDURING COMMITMENT YIELDS SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE

A. INTRODUCTION

Since the 1978 Camp David Accords engineered peace between Egypt and Israel, the United States has provided an annual average of \$2 billion in security assistance to Egypt, making it second only to Israel in the amount of military aid granted to any state.¹²⁴ U.S. security cooperation was a key component of the watershed agreement and marked an abrupt transition for the Egyptian armed forces which had been primarily supplied with Soviet hardware. Through the provision of modern airpower assets in particular, Washington designed a specific regional balance of power that provided Egypt with a sufficient conventional deterrence to Israeli aggression while still maintaining a qualitative advantage for the Israeli forces. The question is, with regard to the high cost of this program to the American taxpayer, what has the United States gained through its substantial investment in Egyptian security?¹²⁵

This chapter presents an overview of U.S. and Egyptian interests with respect to the Middle East region and briefly presents how airpower plays into the regional strategic calculus. Next, the objectives of airpower security cooperation programs with Egypt are assessed against actual outcomes pertaining to regional stability, nuclear non-proliferation, the GWOT and other forms of military cooperation, and democracy advancement inside Egypt. The case of Egypt reveals that the enduring relationship in

¹²⁴ Jeremy M. Sharp, *Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations*, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL3303, updated June 14, 2006, 1.

¹²⁵ Egypt's "switch" from a Soviet client state to a U.S. client state from the perspective of arms sales benefited the U.S. in the context of the Cold War. The new U.S.-Egyptian relationship became particularly important with the loss of Iran as a Middle East ally concomitant with the Islamic Revolution in 1979. For the Soviets, Egypt had put a significant dent in their prestige; the Soviet-supplied Egyptian army suffered defeat in 1967 and were teetering on annihilation before superpower diplomatic intervention in 1973. Sadat's subsequent alignment with the U.S. for arms was all the more embarrassing. Some scholars have suggested that these developments are one factor that compelled the Soviets to intervene on behalf of communist elements in Afghanistan. For a Soviet view of Cold-War arms transfers, see Andrei v. Shoumikhin, "Soviet Policy toward Arms Transfers to the Middle East" in *Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia*, ed. Shelly A. Stahl and Geoffrey Kemp (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992) 221-227.

airpower security cooperation has largely been a success story—one that has resulted in outcomes favorable to the U.S. However, the one exception is that airpower security cooperation has not yet facilitated democracy promotion in Egypt, a result which alludes to the limited capacity of this policy instrument to contribute to this unique objective.

B. U.S. AND EGYPTIAN REGIONAL INTERESTS

Egypt's diplomatic cooperation is a linchpin of U.S. foreign policy in the region. The United States cherishes Cairo's voice of moderation among Arab states, especially with respect to the enduring Arab-Israeli conflict. The U.S. counts on Egypt to use its formal peace with Israel as an instrument to facilitate dialogue between the various factions pertaining to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian issue. The security relationship with the most populous and powerful Arab state affords Washington a degree of influence in the broader Middle East, especially among the members of the Arab League (for which Egypt is the host nation). Specifically, the U.S. views Egyptian participation in the nuclear non-proliferation regime as being essential to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. For its GWOT efforts the U.S. expects Egypt's cooperation in facilitating U.S. military operations in the region and also expects the government to counter terrorist-leaning elements within Egyptian society. In aggregate the U.S. desires its policies in Egypt to promote economic liberalization, greater democracy, and transparent and accountable government. As a policy instrument the U.S. expects airpower security cooperation to continue garnering Egypt's cooperation in these areas.¹²⁶

Egypt's security relationship with the United States has not come without costs, the first and most evident of which was Sadat's assassination by disgruntled Islamists. Peace with Israel engendered regional consequences as well, as Egypt was ostracized diplomatically from other Arab states and expelled from the Arab League from 1979 until

¹²⁶ Sharp, *Egypt: Background...*, *op. cit.*, from "Summary" (no page number given). Also see U.S. State Department, "Foreign Policy Objectives—Near East Region," available at <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2006/74685.htm> (accessed September 24, 2007).

1989.¹²⁷ Domestically, wide-spread perceptions that U.S. policies facilitate Israeli “oppression” towards the Palestinians injustice on behalf of the Palestinian peoples makes the Mubarak regime’s diplomatic alignment with the U.S. unpopular.

In lieu of these costs, Egypt has its own expectations regarding security cooperation with the United States. Cairo has persistently sought an as-yet-unattained bilateral free trade agreement with the U.S. as part of its efforts to enact liberal economic reforms.¹²⁸ With regard to U.S. calls for political liberalization, the Mubarak regime views criticism as particularly irksome given the realities of Islamists’ challenges to his regime’s legitimacy. On the nuclear proliferation front, Egypt would like to see U.S. policies that promote the legitimacy and prestige of the non-proliferation regime; Egypt expects that regional bad-actors will not get away with illegitimate proliferation activity. Its foremost concern, however, is that it expects aid to continue uninterrupted so that it can maintain a palatable military balance towards Israel.¹²⁹ This last expectation alludes to the significance of airpower in the region considering its role in shaping recent events.

C. THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Airpower has been a significant factor in shaping the regional interstate geopolitical power structure. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war in particular showcased the ability of airpower to affect strategic outcomes when the Israeli Air Force’s preemptive attack destroyed the Egyptian Air Force on the ground. Israeli air superiority left

¹²⁷ Iran’s successes in its war with Iraq gave Gulf states impetus to bolster their security; “as such, the 1987 Arab League resolution allowing the restoration of relations with Egypt was seen as a direct tradeoff—Egypt would put its military weight behind the Gulf States in return for the economic assistance that Cairo needed from the oil producers.” As a result Egypt regained full membership in 1989. “External Affairs-Egypt,” *Jane’s Defense Weekly* <http://jmsa.com/JDIC/JMSA> (accessed September 26, 2007).

¹²⁸ While the bilateral trade agreement has not been achieved, the State Department’s policy toward Egypt states that the U.S. remains committed to the goal of achieving a bilateral free trade agreement. U.S. Department of State, *Congressional..., op. cit.*, 483. Economic liberalization has been part of Egypt’s strategic culture since Anwar Sadat came to power. He believed that his predecessor had left Egypt “ethically and politically bankrupt” as well as economically burdened by Egypt’s defense budget, which accounted for 20 percent of gross-domestic-product. Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York, Free Press, 1992) 593.

¹²⁹ Mubarak responded to recent threats by the U.S. Congress to make aid to Egypt contingent upon democratization progress by entertaining other military suppliers. Alon Ben-David, “U.S. votes to withhold military aid until Egypt instigates reforms,” *Jane’s Defense Weekly*. July 4, 2007. Available at <http://jmsa.janes.com/JDIC/JMSA/> (accessed September 26, 2007).

assaulting Arab ground forces vulnerable to undeterred attack by the IAF that after six days resulted in a resounding and humiliating military defeat of the Arab armies through which Israel doubled the territory under its control including the Sinai Peninsula. The political fallout engendered by the defeat and occupation of Egyptian territory by Israeli forces brought about the demise of President Nasser's grand ideology of pan-Arabism and left Arab regimes in the region scrambling for legitimacy.

The impact of airpower in 1967 was not lost on Anwar Sadat, whose respect for the Israeli Air Force led him to mandate in his 1973 October War that the Egyptian army not advance beyond the protection of Egyptian air defenses. This strategy underscored the degree to which Egypt's perception of its security vis-à-vis Israel was and remains directly related to its ability to counter Israeli airpower.¹³⁰ Accordingly, Sadat and his successor Hosni Mubarak have emphasized modernization of the Egyptian Air Force through acquisition of U.S. airpower weapon systems and doctrines in order to maintain an overall suitable balance of power.

D. AIRPOWER SECURITY COOPERATION WITH EGYPT

According to State Department documents, U.S. security assistance is a tool whose purpose "will continue to support a modern, well-trained Egyptian military" that helps "to ensure *stability* in the Middle East and North Africa" and strives "to achieve interoperability with U.S. forces."¹³¹ Toward that end, the Bush administration requested \$1.3 billion in FMF for Egypt in FY 2007, continuing the practice of making Egypt second only to Israel in the amount of aid granted.¹³² To date Egypt has purchased 220 F-16 aircraft, 36 Apache helicopters, and the Patriot air defense system, each of which includes follow-on contracts for training and maintenance. The F-16 represents the core

¹³⁰ The Egyptian air defense umbrella was comprised of Soviet supplied surface-to-air missile systems. Advancing beyond the protection of these systems was unnecessary because of Sadat's limited military objectives that entailed pushing Israeli forces from the Sinai. Sadat's military objectives were designed to strengthen Egypt's negotiating position vis-à-vis the Israelis. William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East: Third Edition* (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 2004) 375-376.

¹³¹ Emphasis added. U.S. Department of State, "Egypt: Security Assistance." Available at <http://state.gov/t/pm/64696.htm> (accessed September 24, 2007).

¹³² Since the Camp David Accords, the U.S. has consistently provided Egypt with half of the amount of aid granted to Israel. Sharp, *Egypt: Background...*, *op. cit.*, 27.

of Egyptian airpower modernization and includes acquisition of 24 Block 40/42 F-16s that are capable of employing precision air-to-ground weaponry. Air Force modernization has also included advanced E-2C early warning aircraft that are interoperable with U.S. command and control systems. Other airpower enhancements increases Egypt's air defense capabilities and include U.S. I-HAWK and U.S. Patriot air missile systems, the same systems used by the U.S. army for theater air defense. While current funding pays for existing cash obligations and support these existing programs, Egypt has expressed interest in acquiring new, more advanced F-16s or perhaps the F-35 joint strike fighter once it becomes operational and available for export.¹³³

The other notable characteristic of U.S. security cooperation with Egypt is the extensive military-to-military contacts that are made possible by \$1.2 million for IMET in FY2007, under which Egyptian officers participate in a wide range of educational opportunities at U.S. service war colleges, command and staff colleges, as well as officer and non-commissioned officer entry-level courses.¹³⁴ U.S. and Egyptian military personnel also participate in joint training activities such as the USAF provision of F-16 Weapons School instructors to the Egyptian Air Force's Weapons School (their advanced tactical aviation school).¹³⁵ Also, Egypt hosts the biannual Brightstar exercise focusing on large-scale employment of combined arms that in 2005 included the participation of 9000 U.S. servicemen.¹³⁶

To date, U.S. security cooperation with Egypt has continued uninterrupted since the signing of the Camp David accords, resulting in an enduring security relationship that has spanned five different presidential administrations. Recently, however,

¹³³ In another massive acquisition program Egypt acquired 880 M-1 A1 Abrams tanks. *Ibid*; Egypt also receives "hundreds of millions" of dollars worth of excess defense articles. U.S. Department of State, "Egypt: Security Assistance." <http://state.gov/t/pm/64696.htm> (accessed September 24, 2007).

¹³⁴ U.S. Department of State, "Egypt..." *op. cit.*

¹³⁵ Major Scott Arbogast, F-16 pilot in the D.C. Air National Guard and former exchange officer to the Egyptian Air Force. Interview by the author via e-mail, 30 October 2007.

¹³⁶ During the late 90s Brightstar involved 66,000 personnel from eleven countries. The U.S. cancelled its participation in 2003 due to GWOT commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, but resumed participation in 2005 with 9000 U.S. servicemen participating. Sharp, *op. cit.*, 26; also Hillel Frisch, "Guns and Butter in the Egyptian Army," in *Armed Forces in the Middle East; Politics and Strategy*, edited by Barry Rubin and Thomas A. Keany (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002) 101.

Congressional concerns regarding a perceived lack of progress towards greater democratization in Egypt has resulted in measures that if passed would make the remittance of aid contingent upon the U.S. Secretary of State's verification of sufficient Egyptian progress towards greater democratization.¹³⁷ Congressional inquiries into what exactly the United States gains from its investment in Egypt is certainly warranted considering the size of the investment and State Department claims that "the U.S. receives a range of strategic benefits from security assistance to Egypt, particularly in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the pursuit of peace in the Middle East."¹³⁸ The following sections catalog the extent to which airpower security cooperation with Egypt is producing the desired results with respect to the regional stability, nuclear proliferation, the GWOT, and democracy advancement.

E. ASSESSING INFLUENCE—REGIONAL STABILITY

Security cooperation with Egypt is designed to enhance regional stability by maintaining an appropriate balance of power between Egypt and its principal former adversary Israel.¹³⁹ In lieu of the Arab-Israeli wars since 1947 Washington has pursued policies that address an *overall* balance of power between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In lieu of Egypt's status as the greatest Arab power, the Camp David Accord architects theorized that if Egypt could be transformed from an adversary of Israel to at least a tolerant neighbor, the other Arab states would be too weak to challenge Israel militarily—thereby reducing the chance for attack by either side. The appeal to balance of power directly addresses Egypt's strategic culture, as President Mubarak has made clear: "history has taught us that the cause behind many wars is the weakness of one side. This

¹³⁷ Ben-David, *op. cit.*

¹³⁸ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional...*, *op. cit.*, 483.

¹³⁹ The principal advantage to Israel granted by the Camp David accords was that formal peace with Egypt took the most powerful Arab military force out of Israel's mix of adversaries. Some would argue that this fact allowed Israel to be excessively aggressive in the Levant. William B. Quandt, *Peace Process, American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution: 2005) 190.

prompts the second side to attack...Therefore, peace and stability must exist under the umbrella of a military force that protects and preserves them.”¹⁴⁰

Evidence that Egypt continues to view Israel as a threat to its national security was readily apparent when in 1996 Egypt conducted military exercises whereby Israel was portrayed as the adversary state; the exercise entailed an amphibious landing of mechanized infantry supported by the Egyptian naval and air forces: “the attack was supposed to be a response to an Israeli attack on the Egyptian front in which the Egyptian army first engages in a defensive battle and then switches to a counterattack, and finally takes over the whole of the Sinai including limited penetration over the international border.”¹⁴¹ Egypt’s persistent caution (if not overt mistrust) towards Israel leads the U.S. to mandate that every defense article sold to the state must be solely for defensive purposes; in practice they must also preserve a qualitative military advantage for Israel, guided by the concept that Israel faces a quantitative disadvantage with respect to its Arab neighbors’ collective military forces.

This concept pertains to airpower capabilities in particular given its past significance in shaping regional military conflicts. Egypt’s air-to-air weaponry is inferior to that which is possessed by Israel; however, the capabilities of Egypt’s air defense system acting in concert would make the cost of Israeli air attack excessively high.¹⁴² Egypt’s airpower modernization efforts have built a force that is lesser than or equal to

¹⁴⁰ Hillel Frisch, “Guns and Butter in the Egyptian Army,” in *Armed Forces in the Middle East; Politics and Strategy*, edited by Barry Rubin and Thomas A. Keany (Portland, OR, Frank Cass Publishers: 2002) 96.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 96, 102.

¹⁴² Egyptian Air Force F-16 weaponry includes beyond-visual range AIM-7 in addition to short range AIM-9 dogfight air-to-air missiles, which are quite capable but not as advanced as Israel’s air-to-air armament that includes the AIM-120 AMRAAM as well as the indigenously produced Python short range dogfight missiles (author’s opinion). Also, according to officials at the Secretary of the Air Force Office for International Affairs, concerns regarding Egypt’s communication security procedures are one factor that prevents the EAF from being eligible for the AIM-120 AMRAAM. James F. Mueller, Maj, USAF, Country Director, Mideast/ Africa Division, Secretary of the Air Force International Affairs Division. Interview by the author via e-mail, August 2, 2007.

Israeli capabilities but have succeeded in producing a viable deterrent to Israeli air attack. Thus far, the practice has been sufficient to preserve the peace between the two states.¹⁴³

The enduring inter-state peace facilitated by airpower balance has yet to bear fruit of comprehensive regional peace, as evidenced by ongoing conflicts between the Israelis and Palestinian factions within the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza as well as with external non-state actors in Lebanon. Against the latter, Israel has intervened twice: in 1982 against the Palestinian Liberation Organization and again in 2006 against Hizbollah. During the most recent occasion Cairo's view of the conflict paralleled that of Washington in that it initially assigned blame to Hizbollah's militant activities (kidnapping and killing of Israeli soldiers) for inciting the Israeli military reprisal. Mubarak's assertion that Hizbollah's regional influence is a "product of the malign influence of Iran and Syria in the region" is also shared by Washington.¹⁴⁴

It is important to note that prior to the peace between Israel and Egypt supported by U.S-Egyptian airpower security cooperation, it is unlikely that Egypt would have stood by while Israel invaded Lebanon without a serious consideration of military reprisal.¹⁴⁵ The Mubarak regime's position that Hizbollah represents more of a threat than Israel gives testimony to the extent of the alignment of the Egyptian and U.S. governments' assessment of their regional interests. While Israel's conflicts within its borders and with actors in Lebanon represent persistent threats to regional stability, state-

¹⁴³ Provisions of the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt reduced the opportunity for surprise attack by either side as they "led to a process of military cooperation to monitor implementation of the agreement" and "established the precedent of an asymmetrical balance of forces and territory in such as to address Israeli insecurities" and "reduced to a minimum the possibility of accidental clashes on land or sea or in the air." Abdel Monem Said Aly, "The Middle East and The Persian Gulf: An Arab Perspective" in *Cascade of Arms: Managing Conventional Weapons Proliferation*, ed. Andrew J. Pierre (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press: 1997) 272.

¹⁴⁴ Mubarak also feared that Hizbollah offered the Egyptian Brotherhood an example of how a popular Islamist group can build widespread popular base and challenge a regional power. Domestic support in Egypt for Hassan Nasrallah (Hizbollah's leader) compelled Mubarak to moderate his anti-Hizbollah rhetoric where upon he instead called for an immediate cease fire, respect Lebanese sovereignty, and restraint by both sides. In the conflict's aftermath Egypt supported UNSC Resolution 1701 that called for the deployment of UNIFIL forces and Lebanese armed forces in the south. Cairo continues to urge the international community to consider Lebanon within broader context of Arab-Israeli issues. "External Affairs-Egypt," article available at <http://jmsa.com/JDIC/JMSA> (accessed September 26, 2007).

¹⁴⁵ Some analysts suggest that poor economic conditions inside Egypt increased Mubarak's dependency on U.S. assistance and therefore contributed to Egypt abstaining from countering Israel. Cleveland, *op cit*.

on-state conflict in the region would arguably be more disruptive to regional peace than the current more limited conflicts between Israel and these non-state actors.¹⁴⁶ Fortunately, inter-state conflict has thus far been obviated by U.S. security cooperation efforts.

Further, Egypt has been a reliable broker for attempts at resolving what many perceive to be the root cause for instability in the Levant, the enduring Israeli-Palestinian conflicts that have persisted since the foundation of the Israeli state. Mubarak endorsed the Declaration of Principals signed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1993 and more recently hosted talks between the Israelis and Palestinians in 1999, 2000, and 2005.¹⁴⁷ While current events testify to the ineffectiveness of attempts to achieve a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace, the lack of results thus far do not undermine the importance of Egypt's role in negotiations toward that objective.

Egypt's cooperation on security matters has not been confined to the immediate region, but extends to the broader Middle East and beyond. The most obvious manifestation came in 1991 when the Egyptian armed forces participated in the allied coalition during Operation Desert Storm that succeeded in expelling Iraq from Kuwait in 1991.¹⁴⁸ U.S. and Egyptian officers attributed the combined training afforded by the Bright Star military exercises as being instrumental to facilitating U.S.-Egyptian cooperation and military compatibility during Desert Storm.¹⁴⁹ More importantly, as Egypt represents the most populous Arab state, one cannot underestimate the contribution that Egypt's participation gave to the legitimacy of the coalition (especially when compared to Washington's subsequent endeavors in Iraq that enjoyed no such Arab

¹⁴⁶ In the past, inter-state conflict in the region has threatened broader conflict. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War the Cold War superpowers were almost drawn into direct confrontation to the point that the Nixon administration put U.S. nuclear forces on alert for the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yergin, *op. cit.*, 604-605. Also Cleveland, *op. cit.*, 375.

¹⁴⁷ Sharp, *op. cit.*, 13.

¹⁴⁸ Egyptian forces suffered nine killed and 74 wounded in the fighting. Sharp, *op. cit.*, 5, 25.

¹⁴⁹ Bright Star exercises in 1999 included 66,000 personnel from 11 states, including Egypt, the U.S., France, the UK, Italy, Greece, and Kuwait. Frisch, *op. cit.*, 101. Also Sharp, *op. cit.*, 25.

participation).¹⁵⁰ Egypt has also contributed to international military cooperative efforts by participating in peace-keeping efforts in Somalia and Yugoslavia, Sudan, Liberia, East Timor, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, all which are efforts facilitated by aid granted under U.S. security cooperation.¹⁵¹ Finally, with respect to nuclear non-proliferation, the U.S. relies on Egypt's status as an ardent non-proliferator to promote stability in the region and beyond.

F. ASSESSING INFLUENCE—NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Egypt's choice to forego nuclear weapons results from an evolution of policy decisions since the time of Nasser. Initially Egypt's nuclear development was limited to peaceful energy production, but the revelation of an Israeli nuclear reactor in 1960 compelled Nasser to assert that any acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel would drive Egypt to "acquire them at any price."¹⁵² During the 1960s state efforts to both indigenously produce nuclear weapons as well as acquire foreign-manufactured nuclear weapons were overcome by various endogenous and exogenous obstacles. Ultimately, the 1967 defeat at the hand of the Israelis devastated the Egyptian economy and led to the elimination of funding for nuclear programs, where after Nasser instead focused what resources were available on bolstering Egypt's conventional forces.¹⁵³

Like his predecessor, Anwar Sadat initially claimed that Egypt would do whatever it took to acquire nuclear weapons if Israel pursued its own capability. However, the outcome of the Camp David Accords mitigated to a great extent Egypt's previous

¹⁵⁰ As a reward for Egypt's participation, the U.S. subsequently cancelled \$7 billion of Egypt's military debts. Cleveland, *op. cit.*, 481.

¹⁵¹ Sharp, *op. cit.*, 26. Also U.S. Department of State, *Congressional...*, *op. cit.*, 484.

¹⁵² Under President Gamal Abdel Nasser Egypt established the Egyptian Atomic Energy Agency (AEA) in 1955 for peaceful purposes, and with help from the Soviet Union completed construction of its first nuclear reactor in 1961, which was too small to present a proliferation risk. Rober J. Einhorn, "Egypt: Frustrated but Still on a Non-Nuclear Course," in *The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices*, Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn Mitchell B. Riess, eds. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004) 45.

¹⁵³ Cairo was unable to obtain consistent scientific help from the outside and faced considerable economic constraints as well as multiple delays in closing deals on reactor construction, bureaucratic friction within the Egyptian government, pressure from the United States, and a covert Israeli campaign against German scientists who were assisting Egypt at the time. *Ibid.*, 45-47.

rationale for its desire to possess nuclear weapons—the ever-present prospect of war with Israel. The agreement’s underlying provision of massive security assistance to Egypt by the United States was sufficient to persuade Sadat to accept the bilateral peace without having reached a non-nuclear deal with Israel, much to the chagrin of many in the Egyptian defense establishment. Sadat instead renounced nuclear weapons as one of the facets of Egyptian security strategy along with continued peace with Israel, a pursuit of regional stability, economic growth, and a close security relationship with the United States.¹⁵⁴ Despite frustrations toward Israel’s nuclear policy of “ambiguity,” Egypt became an official member of the NPT in February 1981 and has been a stalwart promoter of nonproliferation ever since.¹⁵⁵

Under Mubarak Egypt continues to view the alleged nuclear imbalance with frustration and as a result has attempted to use mechanisms of the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the promotion of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East as a means to coerce Israel to alter its nuclear policy toward one of “denuclearization”...so far to no effect. Accordingly, Egypt has abstained from any additional nuclear agreements since signing the NPT and has refused to sign bans on chemical weapons as long as Israel allegedly maintains a nuclear weapons capability.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ Campbell, Einhorn, Riess, eds., *The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices*, 51.

¹⁵⁵ Egypt signed the NPT in 1968 but did not initially ratify the treaty because of concerns over Israel’s alleged nuclear weapons capability. Egypt’s decision to ratify the Non-Proliferation-Treaty amid Israeli intransigence towards the NPT and its stated nuclear policy of “ambiguity” was in part due to its need for nuclear assistance and Washington’s requirement that only NPT parties were eligible for U.S. financing of nuclear power plants. President Hosni Mubarak has kept Egypt on a consistent non-nuclear path ever since. The discovery of substantial natural gas reserves obviated the need for the development of a robust nuclear energy industry, prompting Mubarak to pull the plug on existing nuclear programs following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. As a result Egypt has not developed a nuclear reactor for energy production, but does have a research reactor that is subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as required by the NPT. There is some concern that the research facility does not sufficiently employ Egypt’s cadre of nuclear scientists and that as a result they might be tempted to find work for whom ever values their skills, including would-be proliferators. Einhorn, *op. cit.*, 50-58.

¹⁵⁶ Hillel Frisch, “Guns and Butter in the Egyptian Army” in *Armed Forces in the Middle East; Politics and Strategy*, edited by Barry Rubin and Thomas A. Keany (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers: 2002) 103. Also, some analysts might argue that nuclear proliferation to U.S. allies in the region would be warranted as a response to an Iranian nuclear capability. This paper will not seek to refute this argument; rather, it will examine the impact of influence via security assistance on Egypt’s decisions.

On the surface, U.S. security cooperation has been instrumental in affecting Egypt's non-nuclear stance; the question is: to what extent...and will this policy instrument continue to be effective amid nuclear proliferation in the Middle East? In his efforts to explain state nuclear choices, Scott Sagan's "security model" offers simply that "states build nuclear weapons to increase national security against foreign threats, especially nuclear threats," and as a corollary—states forego proliferation in "the absence of the fundamental military threats."¹⁵⁷ This model of analysis suggests that Egypt's security confidence is sufficiently bolstered by U.S. security cooperation such that it obviates the necessity for an indigenous nuclear deterrent—even amid a presumed Israeli nuclear weapons capability.

Of course, the possibility of regional proliferation pressures Egypt's non-nuclear strategic culture; nonetheless, the entrenchment of U.S. security cooperation into Egypt's strategic culture mandates that any future desires to alter its nuclear course include an assessment of the costs, which for Egypt amount to it potentially losing \$2 billion of security assistance per year. For now, Egypt's dependency on the provision of U.S. security assistance gives the United States a tangible measure of influence over its proliferation decisions. While one cannot guarantee that current levels of security cooperation will continue to satisfy Egypt's strategic culture, one can safely assume that any degradation or material reduction in the relationship would require Egypt's policy-makers to reconsider its nuclear stance. For this reason, Egypt's contentment regarding its portion of the regional airpower balance remains critical.

As Cairo desires to maintain a prominent role in regional and international affairs, Egypt's nuclear stance is also affected by its ability to garner prestige through it. The current regime has used Egypt's status as a stalwart non-proliferator as a platform from

¹⁵⁷ While this thesis's focus on security cooperation makes the "security model" the most appropriate for analysis regarding its impact on Egypt's nuclear choices, Sagan also presents two other models for explaining a state's nuclear choices: "the domestic politics model" and the "norms model," both of which provide a valuable framework for analyzing whether or not a state is likely to opt for or against nuclear proliferation. Interestingly, Sagan notes a pattern of former Soviet client states' decisions to give up their nuclear arsenals in part because of "increased U.S. security guarantees" that "made their possession of nuclear weapons less necessary" (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus each inherited nuclear weapons as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union). Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security*, Vo. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996-1997).

which to lead other states—for example, by calling for the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free-zone in the Middle East. Once more, regional proliferation threatens to undermine the non-proliferation regime upon which Egypt invests its status. As Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa stated, “Egypt will never accept playing second fiddle. It will do whatever it takes to maintain its position in the Middle East and in the Arab World.”¹⁵⁸ Thus far, the leverage afforded to Egypt via its security relationship with the United States has mitigated desires to gain leverage in the international system through its own nuclear weapons capability. Airpower modernization efforts and other components of airpower cooperation represent an instrument through which Washington may continue to bolster Egyptian prestige amid an environment of proliferation speculation.

To a minor extent, airpower security cooperation can also impact domestic factors affecting Egypt’s nuclear decisions. A state’s nuclear choices are made by groups of domestic actors inside which there often exists a pro-nuclear contingent that consists of high-ranking military officers (in addition to scientists and those with nuclear business interests).¹⁵⁹ In Egypt, despite Mubarak’s dictate regarding Egypt’s non-nuclear posture, there has been some evidence of dissatisfaction among the Egyptian military elite regarding the “lack of balance” vis-à-vis Israel (in an apparent reference to the Israeli qualitative conventional advantage and alleged nuclear capability).¹⁶⁰ Currently, there is not evidence of any pro-proliferation actors having the capacity to challenge Mubarak, although at least one general has tried to do so regarding his discontent with Egypt’s non-nuclear stance.¹⁶¹ However, the impending transition in power over the next decade to

¹⁵⁸ Einhorn, *op. cit.*, 65.

¹⁵⁹ This group pertains to Sagan’s “domestic politics” model. Sagan, *op. cit.*

¹⁶⁰ Einhorn, *op. cit.*, 58. Also see “Egypt’s nuclear dilemma,” *Jane’s Intelligence Digest* (October 13, 2006) available at <http://jmsa.janes.com/JDIC/JMSA> (accessed August 26, 2007).

¹⁶¹ The Minister of Defense during the 1980s, General Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala, “sought Mubarak’s approval in 1984 to start a nuclear weapons program, was turned down, and then preceded to pursue the idea on his own” where after he purportedly colluded with Iraq on their nuclear weapons development and attempted to smuggle nuclear and missile-related equipment from the U.S. Einhorn, *op. cit.*, 55-56.

another executive actor represents a chance for Egypt to alter its nuclear position.¹⁶² While airpower security cooperation cannot directly affect this dynamic, it allows for Washington to remain engaged with the institution close to power—the military. Further, as long as airpower security cooperation persists, the inheritor of executive power must contend with its value when assessing the cost-benefit analysis of Egypt’s nuclear decisions.

Unfortunately, there are elements within Egyptian society pressuring Egypt’s non-nuclear stance that for the most part are beyond the reach of influence of security cooperation. The Peoples’ Assembly speaker has issued warning that “street pressures” fomented by the rhetoric of Egypt’s religious elite could make the current course of nonproliferation difficult to maintain. Islamic leaders in Egypt have portrayed the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a religious duty, as stated in a *fatwa* issued by al-Azhar’s Religious Ruling Committee in 2002.¹⁶³ According to the head of the Religious Ruling Committee, Sheikh Ali Abu al-Hassan, “what is happening to the Muslims in all countries of the world is the result of weakness; and if the Muslims obtain this [nuclear] weapon, no one will conspire against them.”¹⁶⁴

This domestic dynamic alludes to a potential limitation of airpower security cooperation—the ability to impact political trends in the societies of partnering states. Overall however these opinions have not found influence among those with decision-making power. Rather, to date the robust and enduring nature of U.S. airpower security cooperation with Egypt has been a decision-shaping instrument that has encouraged Cairo to adopt nonproliferation as a component of its strategic culture. While future proliferation in the region will give cause for Cairo to reconsider its nuclear stance, its

¹⁶² Mubarak is currently 79 years old. While many point to his son as the likely successor, he has failed to officially name one so far. If a like-minded leader with the same political base assumes power (i.e. someone from the military and/or National Democratic Party) there will likely be no change in Egypt’s nonproliferation posture. However, many observers assert that the greatest opportunity for pro-proliferation parochial interest groups to change the nuclear course is following a transition in executive power, so one could anticipate those disenfranchised with the current policy to attempt to increase their influence. Sagan points to the examples of South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina as states that changed their nuclear course in the context of changes in government. Sagan, *op. cit.*, 69-70.

¹⁶³ Einhorh, *op. cit.*, 70.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 70.

policy decisions must account for the value of U.S. airpower security cooperation and its contribution to Egypt's national security. The next section reveals investment returns from U.S. airpower security cooperation in the form of Egypt's impact on the conflict of our times, the Global War on Terror.

G. ASSESSING INFLUENCE—GWOT

Egypt and the U.S. have a marriage of interests in thwarting terrorism as Islamic radical offshoot groups of the Muslim Brotherhood have both threatened to overthrow the Mubarak regime as well as attack the United States—"the far enemy."¹⁶⁵ Two such groups are the *Jamaah Islamiya* (Islamic Group) and *Al Jihad*, the latter of which focused on targeted assassinations of government officials including the 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat.¹⁶⁶ *Al Jihad* has produced some notable figures in international terrorism, such as its former leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who is now widely infamous as the chief spokesperson for Al-Qaeda and second-in-command to Osama bin Laden. *Jamaah Islamiya's* contributions to terrorism in Egypt came in the form of a campaign from 1992-1997 that resulted in 1300 deaths, including ninety foreign tourists. The last two years in particular have seen an upsurge in terrorist activity.¹⁶⁷

While the Mubarak administration's methods in combating these groups have been criticized as amounting to overt dictatorial oppression, the U.S. security apparatus pragmatically views the regime's efforts as having successfully thwarted terrorism within its society. The current administration particularly values Cairo's capacity to provide

¹⁶⁵ Fundamentalist founders such as Sayyid Qutb promoted *takfeeri* ideology, which deemed the post-colonial military regimes of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak as essentially non-Muslim, impious apostates unworthy to rule the *ummah*. One such extremist, Ayman al-Zawahiri was imprisoned along with others following the assassination of Anwar Sadat. It was upon his release that he emigrated to Afghanistan where he participated in the *jihād* against the Soviet invasion and established contacts with other like-minded Sunni fundamentalists, including Osama bin Ladin. Zawahiri's transition from his long held belief that Islamic fundamentalists should prioritize the overthrow of regional apostate regimes to the more transnational priority against the United States (the proverbial "far enemy") was partly due to the lack of success in bringing down regimes like Mubarak's. For more information see Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹⁶⁶ Sharp, *op. cit.*, 16.

¹⁶⁷ On April 26, 2006, Egyptian terrorists attacked a resort in Dahab on the Sinai Peninsula killing 21 people. Two days later suicide bombers attacked a police station in northern Sinai and a base camp of multinational observers that were part of the peacekeeping mission that has been in place since the bilateral peace treaty of 1979. *Ibid.*, 1, 16-17.

valuable intelligence regarding terrorist groups that some critics suggest is derived via looser interrogation methods that they allege amount to torture.¹⁶⁸ Nonetheless, from what open sources can gather, the U.S. appears to have benefited from intelligence sharing with Egypt. Egypt also supports the GWOT via its geographic position as the gateway to the CENTCOM area of responsibility which includes Iraq and Afghanistan. Egypt's provision of over-flight rights and access to the Suez Canal by U.S. warships represents a critical measure of cooperation without which logistical support of U.S. forces in CENTCOM would be severely degraded.¹⁶⁹ Also, while domestic opinion forbade Egyptian participation in the coalition that participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Egypt has supported U.S. efforts in Iraq indirectly by training Iraqi Security Forces and by conducting training exercises with the nascent Iraqi army.¹⁷⁰ Egypt was also one of the first countries to send an ambassador to Iraq in 2005.¹⁷¹ Also in Afghanistan, Egypt maintains a field hospital at Bagram Air Base as part of the ongoing efforts to establish security there. Finally, Egyptian soldiers have deployed to the Sudan for peacekeeping operations.

In short, Egypt's cooperation in the GWOT has produced measurable, quantifiable results—representing a contemporary manifestation of return for Washington's heavy investment in Egyptian security. However, U.S. policy also calls for security cooperation to facilitate the advance of democracy; given criticism that asserts the Mubarak administration's counter-terrorism methods amount to dictatorial

¹⁶⁸ Dana Priest and Dan Eggen, "Terror Suspect Alleges Torture: Detainee Says U.S. Sent Him to Egypt Before Guantanamo," *The Washington Post*, Thursday, January 6, 2005; A01. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A51726-2005Jan5?language=printer> (accessed November 2, 2007).

¹⁶⁹ Egypt waived the 30-day prior notification requirement to pass nuclear armed U.S. warships through the Suez Canal. Sharp, *op. cit.*, 15.

¹⁷⁰ "In late 2004 an Iraqi infantry company was invited to Egypt to participate in a joint training program with the Egyptian Army. According to the Egyptian government, 134 soldiers from Iraq's 5th Infantry Division trained alongside Egypt's 3rd Infantry Division at the Mubarak Military City in northern Egypt." Christopher M. Blanchard, Kenneth Katzman, Carol Migdalovitz, Alfred Prados, Jeremy Sharp, *Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy*, CRS Report to Congress, Order Code RL33793; updated September 12, 2007, 6.

¹⁷¹ The Egyptian ambassador was later abducted and murdered by insurgents in Iraq. Sharp, *op. cit.*, 15.

oppression, simultaneous calls for greater democratization and for continued combating of terrorist organizations inside Egypt hints at a tension in U.S. policy.

H. ASSESSING POLICY OUTCOMES—DEMOCRACY ADVANCEMENT

U.S. policy towards Egypt emphasizes need for political reforms to create a “more transparent and democratic government while also acknowledging the important role Egypt plays in the GWOT”.¹⁷² Security cooperation with Egypt is intended to facilitate democratization by “bolster[ing] local capabilities to contain conflict, protect national territory, and pre-empt the establishment of safe havens for terrorists, while enhancing civilian oversight of the military.”¹⁷³ Political observers are quick to note, however, that true “civilian oversight” of the military is an ideal challenged by the presence of an enduring military autocracy and a parliament that is securely under the control of the executive. The regime is routinely criticized by journalists, scholars, human rights organizations, as well as some U.S. Congressmen who are quick to note the Mubarak regime’s non-democratic characteristics that include the squashing of political dissent and the conduct of widespread arrests and detainments without due process.¹⁷⁴ Yet U.S. desires for the regime to crack down on “extremists” in the name of the GWOT amid simultaneous calls for greater political liberalization reveals an inherent tension in U.S. policy toward Egypt.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷² U.S. Department of State, *Congressional...*, *op. cit.*, 483. Also: *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (September 2006) promotes the establishment of “effective democracies” that preserve freedom and dignity for individuals in those societies who might otherwise be vulnerable to the terrorists’ agenda. To be deemed “effective,” the strategy states that a democracy must not merely provide for free and fair elections, but must also uphold “basic human rights, including freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly, and press,” 9.

¹⁷³ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional...*, *op. cit.*, 476.

¹⁷⁴ “After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the ensuing U.S. focus on promoting democracy in the Middle East, the Mubarak regime has come under increasing U.S. pressure to accelerate political reforms and make Egypt more democratic. In an effort to control the reform agenda without relinquishing their grip on power, Mubarak and the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) have instituted some political reforms, while emphasizing the need for economic growth as a precondition for democratic change,” Sharp, *op. cit.*, 6.

¹⁷⁵ From 1992-1997, *Jamaah Islamiya* implemented a terror campaign that resulted in 1300 deaths which included ninety foreign tourists. In response, the Mubarak regime confronted the group with “non-democratic measures” which purportedly included seizure without warrant, detention without trial, conviction without appeal, and what some would suggest are interrogation techniques that amount to physical torture, Sharp, *op. cit.*, 16.

One may view U.S. security assistance dollars as a military-enabler in Egypt; therefore when assessing the impact of U.S. security cooperation on democratization efforts it is prudent to examine the role that the military plays in Egyptian society and governance. Scholars describe the military as being the “preeminent institution in Egyptian society” that has been used by the regime to maintain internal security and its hold on political power.¹⁷⁶ The army is the most politically influential component due to its size and impact on the economy, while the Egyptian Air Force is typically viewed as being the most professional, educated and western-oriented service and is considered to be more efficient and less bureaucratically burdened. The air force also enjoys close ties to the ruling regime due to the fact that President Mubarak was the former top air force commander.¹⁷⁷

The economic and social impact of the military stems from the number of jobs it provides to the male population. The army employs hundreds of thousands of young people in the midst of an economy that suffers from fifteen to twenty percent unemployment rates.¹⁷⁸ The military also has its own companies that produce pharmaceuticals, consumer products, and manufactured goods and have expanded into areas such as water management and the production of electricity, prompting Egyptian newspapers to laud the military’s contribution to developing services that benefit Egyptian society.¹⁷⁹ The officer corps enjoys a higher standard of living and better healthcare, which encourages loyalty to the government.¹⁸⁰ Political opposition to the ruling regime criticizes both this higher standard of living as well as the military’s fiscal

¹⁷⁶ Sharp, *op. cit.*, 7; also, Frisch states that in contrast to other Arab states, “the values held by the armed forces are assumed to be the values still cherished by Egyptian society. Frisch, *op. cit.*, 94.

¹⁷⁷ Sharp, *op. cit.*, 5.

¹⁷⁸ Some estimates claim that the military employs up to twelve percent of Egyptian males and Egypt’s defense industries employ an additional 100,000. Sharp, *op. cit.*, 7; also, the conscripts number approximately 80,000 per year. Frisch, *op. cit.*, 101.

¹⁷⁹ Frisch, 94, 106.

¹⁸⁰ “The metamorphosis of the military into producer as well as employer is now an important chunk of the economy, and helps to assure the loyalties of the military to the government and the dominant party, the NDP.” Sherifa Zuhur, “Egypt: Security, Political, And Islamist Challenges,” September 2007. Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications. Available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB787.pdf> (accessed October 5, 2007).

autonomy, asserting that “there is little civilian control over the military’s budget.”¹⁸¹ This last point alludes to an important dynamic in Egyptian politics: the discord between the ruling military autocracy and Islamist opposition—and begs the question as to what role the military plays in this dynamic.

Anwar Sadat’s assassination at the hands of Islamist-leaning members of the military engendered a persistent fear of Islamist influence in the military, a concern that so far has precluded the military being used against Islamist opposition groups or to counter terrorism inside Egypt.¹⁸² Rather, the military leadership has separated itself from the repressive policies of the Interior Ministry and has “mainly concentrated on providing a decisive deterrent force positioned in the background” against terrorism, a distinction that has protected to some extent the favorable opinion of the military by the general population.¹⁸³ The government has attempted to shield military personnel from the reach of Islamists by going through “great pains” to establish military cities isolated from civilian society.¹⁸⁴ Military journals also routinely attempt to de-legitimize fundamentalist ideologies and the groups that promote them.¹⁸⁵

Unfortunately, for the United States and the Mubarak regime, grievances regarding the regime and anti-Americanism espoused by Islamist political groups permeate throughout Egyptian society. The reality is that since the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan in response to 9/11 popular consensus has viewed the U.S.-led GWOT as a war against Muslims despite Washington’s repeated claims to the contrary.¹⁸⁶ According to a recent public opinion survey, the vast majority (over two-thirds) of those surveyed believe that U.S. desires to control oil and dominate the region supersede intentions of

¹⁸¹ There is no legislative oversight of the military budget and “emergency legislation” in Egypt prevents oversight of the arms industry from the legislature and the press. Frisch, *op. cit.*, 106; also Sharp, *op. cit.*, 7.

¹⁸² One of Sadat’s assassins included a colonel on active duty and a lieutenant colonel reservist. Frisch, *op. cit.*, 104-105.

¹⁸³ Zuhur, *op. cit.*, 17; Quote is taken from Frisch, *op. cit.*, 104.

¹⁸⁴ Frisch, *op. cit.*, 105.

¹⁸⁵ One such article was titled “The Extremists Commit Major Sins in Order to Avoid Small Ones” by Ben Muhammad Shabal. *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ Zuhur, *op. cit.*, 9.

spreading democracy, human rights, and regional stability. Over three-quarters of those polled stated that the United States and Israel represented the two countries who posed the greatest threat to Egypt. Also, since the Israeli war with Hizbollah in 2006 “being Muslim” has supplanted “being Egyptian” and “being Arab” as the principal measure of individual identity, a trend that portends greater influence by Islamist opposition forces. Yet, those surveyed also stated that when making policy decisions the government should prioritize what is best for Egypt over what is best for Muslims, Arabs, or the world—indicating a preference for pragmatism over ideology.¹⁸⁷

These attitudes challenge the U.S. to market its ideology for greater democratization in the region, a policy that is largely viewed as either arrogant or wholly insincere. The impact of the perception of unfairness regarding U.S. policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian issue and the perception that the GWOT is a moniker for U.S. war against Muslims plays into Islamist rhetoric that the U.S.-Egyptian security relationship represents an instrument of U.S. control exacted onto a puppet Mubarak regime. Arguably, there is little that security cooperation instruments can do to facilitate a change in public attitudes.

Airpower security cooperation policies’ effects on democratization are either minimal or undetermined, but it is realistic to presume that they facilitate the regime’s stronghold on political power. One may safely predict, however, that even with the rise in influence of Islamist political organizations and impending transfer of power within the next ten years, the military is likely to maintain considerable influence on Egyptian politics.¹⁸⁸ This presumption of military influence supports the importance of

¹⁸⁷ Other polling data includes the following: 69 percent believed that spreading democracy was a false U.S. objective; 69 percent surveyed had an unfavorable opinion of the United States; 79 percent had “no confidence in the U.S.,” 72 percent stated that U.S. policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict were “very important” determinant in their attitude towards the U.S.; 90 percent thought the war in Iraq resulted in less democracy in the Middle East; 79 percent had a more favorable view of Hezbollah after the 2006 war; as a matter of personal identity, fifty percent now prioritize being a Muslim over an Egyptian citizen or Arab (opposite trend from the past). All surveys are based on urban samples. Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development University of Maryland/Zogby International “2006 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey: A Six Country Study: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and UAE;” Professor Shibley Telhami, Principal Investigator (survey came in the form of a PowerPoint Presentation obtained from James Russell, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School).

¹⁸⁸ Mubarak is 79 years old. Zuhur states that the U.S. should be prepared for transition of government to a successor by 2011, *op. cit.*

maintaining the security relationship with Egypt that at least grants the U.S. access to those who have influence in developing Egyptian policies. The ability of security cooperation programs (particularly IMET) to translate the importance of civilian rule of the military has not produced any direct results in Egypt, nor is it likely to of its own accord. The goal towards greater democratization is better left to other policy instruments such as the Middle East Partner Initiative, but these policies are also burdened by widespread suspicion about what Egyptians believe to be true U.S. intentions in the region.

I. CONCLUSION

For the most part Egypt represents a positive example of what Washington can achieve through a robust and enduring (albeit expensive) security relationship. Airpower security cooperation in particular has contributed to Egypt's perception of its own security and has afforded it a measure of prestige—the outcomes of which are now regional inter-state stability, Egypt's active promotion of nuclear non-proliferation, and its cooperation in a multitude of regional issues including the Global War on Terror. More specifically the Egyptian case suggests that sufficiently managing a state's airpower balance with respect to its principal rivalry can foment inter-state regional peace. It is important to note however that Egypt's nuclear choices have contrasted sharply with those made by Pakistan; it is therefore prudent to analyze this disparity further with regard to how U.S. airpower security cooperation with Iraq can shape that state's future nuclear choices. Finally, the one notable exception where the policy instrument has thus far fallen short of objectives is with respect to democracy advancement. In a state ruled by an autocratic regime—one in which the military maintains dominant influence—security cooperation has displayed a limited to nonexistent capacity to promote democratic reforms, especially when U.S. simultaneously calls for the recipient regime to combat terrorist organizations within the society it governs. This last observation portends similar challenges for security cooperation objectives in Iraq.

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IV. FUTURE AIRPOWER SECURITY COOPERATION WITH IRAQ—PREDICTING INFLUENCE

A. INTRODUCTION

The current security and political instabilities in Iraq in addition to domestic political discontent in the U.S. might seem to render moot any discussions regarding long-term security commitments between Washington and Baghdad. However, it is probable that even after a large scale withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Iraq, Washington will seek to maintain a long term presence in Iraq via its already established airbase posture in the country.¹⁸⁹ The fact is that the USAF cannot precipitously withdraw without creating an airpower vacuum over Mesopotamia; in the midst of political and sectarian instability inside Iraq, such open undefended airspace might invite Iraq's regional neighbors to intervene in support of their perceived interests.¹⁹⁰ Potential conflicts include Turkish power projection against Kurdish factions in northern Iraq or perhaps intervention by Saudi Arabia and Iran into a widened Sunni-Shia conflict inside Iraq. Also, because Iraqi airspace currently serves as a buffer between Israel and Iran, the removal of USAF air defenses would permit either party to attack the other. Quite simply, maintaining air sovereignty in Iraq is a requisite to preventing further regional instability that could lead to a broader war.

This chapter applies lessons from U.S airpower security cooperation with Egypt and Pakistan toward future cooperation with Iraq using the following assumptions:

¹⁸⁹ Steve Holland, "Bush envisions U.S. presence in Iraq like S. Korea," *Reuters*, Wednesday, May 30, 2007. Available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSN3041621320070530?pageNumber=1> (accessed November 2, 2007). Also, comments made by the Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynn to an audience at the Naval Postgraduate School indicate there are preliminary plans for a long term USAF presence in Iraq. Michael Wynn, Secretary of the United States Air Force. Questioned posed by the author at a USAF officers' call, Naval Postgraduate School, September 22, 2006.

¹⁹⁰ Without a U.S. presence in Iraq, Turkey would no longer have a compelling reason to exercise restraint against Kurdish militants. U.S. and Turkish alliance via their NATO membership makes the current prospect of Turkish airpower projection against Kurdish militants unlikely.

- Iraq will be a unitary state with which the United States will be interested in maintaining a long-term alliance;
- Ensuring the sovereignty of Iraqi airspace is essential to regional stability and is in the interest of the United States and Iraq;
- The United States is likely to continue past diplomatic patterns by engaging in airpower security cooperation with the Iraqi government.

The previous chapters' analysis of airpower security cooperation with Pakistan and Egypt suggest the following factors are key variables that shape outcomes of security cooperation policies: understanding the recipient state's strategic culture and addressing its principal security needs, using airpower security assistance to maintain an appropriate regional balance of power, and inculcating an enduring sense of U.S. commitment to the relationship. This chapter draws on these lessons to predict Washington's capacity to influence Iraq regarding regional stability, nuclear proliferation, military cooperation including the GWOT, and democratization efforts. First, however, the next section offers an overview of U.S. and Iraqi interests in the region and the manner in which airpower impacts the regional strategic calculus.

B. U.S. AND IRAQI REGIONAL INTERESTS

The unfortunate reality facing both the current and next U.S. presidential administrations is that Iraq's domestic insecurity threatens to destabilize the region. U.S. prestige in the international system is at stake—and over time will be affected by what type of state Iraq becomes: an Iraq that can “govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself” or one whose internal instabilities and sectarian conflicts foment anxiety onto Iraq's neighbors, increasing the possibility for their military intervention.¹⁹¹ The Iraqi Study Group stated that to achieve the Washington's desired end-state in Iraq, it must build Baghdad's capacity to maintain its territorial integrity, pursue peace with its

¹⁹¹ Comments by President George Bush regarding goals in Iraq, as published in the *Iraqi Study Group Report*. James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs; other members include Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K. Simpson. (New York: Vintage Books, 2006) 40.

neighbors, and deny sanctuary to terrorist organizations.¹⁹² Airpower security cooperation is an instrument that can help to achieve these three objectives over the long haul.

The U.S. will expect to derive certain benefits from its security relationship with Iraq regarding regional diplomatic cooperation, access to oil, and basing rights. In particular, Washington will likely expect Iraq to present a moderate and non-aggressive stance towards Israel and will encourage Baghdad to formerly recognize the Israeli state. Washington will also desire that its security relationship with Iraq actively contain Iranian regional influence, something that is of particular importance to the region's Sunni states (especially Saudi Arabia).¹⁹³ In lieu of Iraq's immense oil reserves the U.S. will expect the Iraqi government to be a responsible member of OPEC that promotes policies that ensure the continuous and uninterrupted flow of oil to the world economy. Washington is likely to lobby for preferred access by U.S. oil companies in developing Iraq's oil industries over foreign competitors from states such as Russia and China.¹⁹⁴ Finally, U.S. policy precedence in the region suggests that Washington will expect the Iraqi state to allow military access (basing rights) in return for security assistance dollars.¹⁹⁵

For its part, the future unitary Iraqi government will have its own expectations regarding security cooperation with the United States. First, Iraq will desire adequate strength that gives it the capacity to not only resist meddling in its internal affairs by regional neighbors but also the capacity to influence regional matters. With respect to

¹⁹² *Iraqi Study Group Report, op. cit.*

¹⁹³ "During a well publicized speech in New York in September 2005, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal commented that "we are handing the whole country [Iraq] over to Iran without reason," and warned of increased Sunni-Shiite violence." Christopher M. Blanchard, Kenneth Katzman, Carol Migdalovitz, Alfred Prados, and Jeremy Sharp, *Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy*, CRS Report to Congress, September 12, 2007, 18. Reference given is *Reuters*, "Saudi Says U.S. Policy Handing Iraq over to Iran," September 20, 2005.

¹⁹⁴ "The United States imports about 660,000 barrels per day of crude oil from Iraq," Kenneth Katzman, *Iraq: Post Saddam Governance and Security*, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL31339, December 6, 2006, 24-25.

¹⁹⁵ For more on extensive U.S. basing presence in the region see Kenneth Katzman, *The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2003*. CRS Report for Congress, Order Code 31533. December 19, 2002, 19-22.

Iran, while Baghdad will resist Tehran's influence in domestic affairs, it will not welcome serving as a U.S. staging area for any conflict with Iran. With respect to the region, Iraq will desire its security and economic strength to give it a capacity to influence the decisions of bodies such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and OPEC.¹⁹⁶ Also, Baghdad will expect its relationship with Washington to afford it leverage on the international stage via its political and economic influence in organizations such as the United Nations Security Council, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the G8. Finally, because public perception of Iraq's diplomatic sovereignty is critical to regime legitimacy, the Iraqi government is likely to press for a minimal U.S. footprint, as both the cases of Egypt and Pakistan show the degree to which widespread anti-U.S. sentiment can adversely affect public opinions of regimes that maintain a security relationship with the U.S. Accordingly, Baghdad will seek to maintain an image of autonomy from Washington and will likely resist any heavy-handed attempts to use security assistance as an instrument of coercion, especially with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian issue and the development of its oil industry.¹⁹⁷

Airpower security cooperation policies will have to account for these interests that will influence Iraq's strategic culture if they are to be successful. Fortunately, for the U.S., airpower's role in shaping the region's geopolitical terrain gives it added significance and makes it a viable tool through which to invest in U.S. and Iraqi interests.

C. ROLE OF REGIONAL AIRPOWER

Airpower has played a prominent role in shaping the outcome of regional military conflicts since 1967 when Israel showed how effective use of airpower could facilitate the defeat of a numerically superior force. Iraq too learned a hard lesson at the behest of

¹⁹⁶ Iraq is not a member of the GCC, but is certainly affected by, and would like to have the capacity to affect, its decisions.

¹⁹⁷ These two issues are widely believed to be central to U.S. designs in the region: to preserve Israeli hegemony over Arabs and to control the oil; hence, the government in Baghdad will be particularly sensitive to how its policies are perceived by the public to be representative of Iraqi, and not American interests. See: "2006 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey: A Six Country Study: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and UAE;" Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development University of Maryland/Zogby International; Professor Shibley Telhami, Principal Investigator (survey came in the form of a PowerPoint Presentation obtained from James Russell, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School).

Israeli airpower in 1981 when the IAF destroyed its *Osriaq* nuclear facility.¹⁹⁸ Mindful of airpower's importance in modern warfare, Saddam built up the IqAF to considerable strength using mostly Russian and French hardware as part of his quest to make Iraq into a first-rate military power. Saddam used the IqAF extensively during the Iran-Iraq war in support of ground forces and eventually used it to employ chemical weapons against Iranian troops.¹⁹⁹ The effectiveness of Iraqi airpower in the conflict has been debated, but among the Iraqi populous the performance of the IqAF imbued a significant measure of pride.²⁰⁰

Domestically, Saddam used his airpower assets to quell internal rebellions, acts for which he garnered international infamy by employing chemicals against Kurdish civilians in Northern Iraq in 1988. Later following the war with the U.S. led coalition in 1991, Saddam once again used airpower to crush internal uprisings of the Kurds as well as Shia rebels in southern Iraq; both events compelled the U.N. to establish and enforce "no-fly-zones" in northern and southern Iraq over the following decade. After a decade of these operations (OSW and ONW), coalition airpower systematically dismantled Iraqi air defenses such that at the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom the coalition enjoyed "air dominance," a condition under which coalition air assets operated in the skies of Iraq with near impunity.

One of the outcomes of Operation Desert Storm was that it had a profound effect on airpower's status as a national instrument of power. The display of U.S. airpower induced regional regimes to seek like capabilities; the trend over the ensuing decade was that air forces became a mechanism through which regimes chose to bolster their status among their neighbors. As a result, the United States defense industry benefited from

¹⁹⁸ Shai Feldman, "The Bombing of Osiraq-Revisited," *International Security*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (Autumn 1982), 114-142.

¹⁹⁹ Andrew Rathmell, "Middle East, Chemical Weapons In The Middle East - Lessons From Iraq," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, (Vol. 7, Issue 12), 1 December 1995.

²⁰⁰ Abbas Kadhim, Professor of Middle East Studies, Naval Post Graduate School. Interview by the author. December 4, 2006.

robust foreign military sales of fighter aircraft to the region, a process through which Washington garnered basing rights in purchasing states' territories.²⁰¹

Largely as a result of U.S. FMS, the contemporary environment finds Iraq's neighbors all possessing measurable airpower capacity, but those with the greatest capability to project power onto other states are Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia because of their modern weapon systems and indigenous air refueling capabilities. Other Gulf States have acquired highly modern airpower assets, but without air refueling their power projection is limited by the combat radius of their fighter aircraft. Iran has a less capable air force but should not be discounted as it is continuing to modernize.²⁰² The result is that in the current strategic context Iraq sits among states that have bolstered their airpower capabilities significantly since 1991 while its air force has been wholly dismantled. In order for Iraq to regain regional prestige, its future airpower capacity must be quantitatively and qualitatively matched to that of its neighbors. Accordingly, U.S. policy makers need to carefully design and implement security cooperation instruments such that the Iraqi airpower capabilities enhance regional stability by preserving an appropriate balance of power.

D. CONTEMPORARY AIRPOWER SECURITY COOPERATION EFFORTS

Current levels of foreign assistance funding for Iraq are \$2.3 billion for FY2007, which includes approximately \$1.2 million for IMET, an amount that is to increase to a requested \$2 million for FY2008. IMET currently facilitates English language training for Iraqi soldiers with the hope that they can obtain a level of proficiency that will eventually permit their attendance at U.S. military schools. Commercial defense trade also contributed defense articles and services to Iraq valued at over \$834 billion in 2005.

²⁰¹ Most recently, FMS included a sale of eighty Block-60 F-16s to the United Arab Emirates, a platform which provides technological advantages that the USAF will not enjoy until the arrival of the Joint Strike Fighter. "PROCUREMENT, United Arab Emirates," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - The Gulf States*, Date Posted: August 3, 2006. Available at <http://jmsa.janes.com/JDIC/JMSA> (accessed September 26, 2007).

²⁰² While most of the news on Iran regards its apparent attempts at developing nuclear weapons, it's also upgrading its conventional forces; in the 1990s Iraq purchased MiG-29 fighters from Russian and has recently performed indigenous modifications to its fleet of F-5s. "World Air Forces-Iran," *Jane's World Air Forces*, <http://www4.janes.com/> (accessed October 30, 2007).

While the bulk of U.S. security cooperation efforts and resources are appropriately geared towards strengthening the army and police forces, the U.S. has commenced with the task of reconstituting the IqAF. The organization responsible for standing up the IqAF is the Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT), which by the end of June 2006 had rebuilt the Iraqi Air Force to a level of about 750 personnel, 155 of whom were pilots while the rest were maintainers, air traffic controllers, and security and logistics staff personnel.²⁰³

Thus far equipping and training the IqAF has been centered on mission areas that support the ground forces' counterinsurgency capabilities: reconnaissance, surveillance, troop transport, and casualty evacuation. The CAFTT has emphasized reconnaissance in particular because of the need to protect key infrastructural assets such as oil pipelines and electrical grid components, both which are seen as primary interdiction targets of the insurgency because of their being critical to the stabilization of the Iraqi economy (Washington also would prefer that Iraq's oil revenue help pay for any future IqAF acquisitions).²⁰⁴ Equipment acquisition thus far has been limited to a handful of C-130s, light propeller reconnaissance aircraft, and a fleet of Russian and American made

²⁰³ The goal is purportedly to build a force of about 2900 Iraqi airmen by the end of 2007. Accordingly the CAFTT is working to reestablish a pipeline for training Iraqi pilots; as of 2006, all of the pilots previously served in Saddam's air force but most of these airmen are 38-40 years in age. There has been some success in bringing former air force pilots back to the service, but there have been instances of pilots being threatened by insurgents, and some purportedly have been assassinated for cooperating with the coalition. CENTCOM has recently put out a bid for private companies to provide pilot training to new Iraqi pilots and there have also been discussions of putting Iraqi pilot candidates through USAF pilot training. Caitlin Harrington, "U.S. Air Force Pursues Private Training for Iraqi Pilots," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, November 1, 2006 (Section 1; Column 1) 21.

²⁰⁴ Policy makers envision using oil revenue to use to finance the future procurement of air force assets. "Coalition, Iraqi Officials to Huddle over Future of Nascent Air Force," *Inside the Air Force* (Vol. 17, No. 25), June 23, 2006.

helicopters that are undergoing upgrades to give them modern capabilities.²⁰⁵ Notable characteristics of equipment procured thus far are the lack of defensive and offensive systems, making them vulnerable to insurgents' threat systems and incapable of providing functions currently offered by coalition airpower assets, such as fire support to ground forces, communications jamming, and national air defense.²⁰⁶ While procurement thus far has focused on high-tech reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities rather than firepower or any measure of regional power projection, in the future Iraq must address its ability to ensure the sovereignty of its airspace.²⁰⁷ According to the Iraqi Air Force website, "there will be a time in the future for the Iraqi people to build a great Air Force. Once it has defeated the insurgency, the Iraqi Armed Forces will turn attention to contributing to regional stability as a part of future coalitions. With a stable economy the country will initiate a great modernization program."²⁰⁸ Current efforts led by the CAFFT represent the foundation on which long-term airpower security

²⁰⁵ For example, sixteen UH-1Hs given by Jordan are being upgraded to the Huey II configuration to improve their performance in hot climates. Also, eight Mi-17 helicopters from Poland have been delivered with plans for two more to be delivered at a later date. "ISR Platform To Be First Aircraft In Iraq's New Defense Purchasing Plan," *Inside the Air Force* (Vol. 17, No. 25), June 23, 2006. Also: there are currently few tasks that the Iraqis conduct on their own; the two most notable are flying reconnaissance missions in support of Iraqi ground forces and performing maintenance on their fleet of C-130s. As a recent example, Iraqi pilots conducted air patrols over the streets of Baghdad during Ramadan. Efforts are ongoing to increase the tasks that Iraqi airmen will perform without assistance, such as air traffic control and airfield emergency response. "Iraqis Keep Eye In Sky During Ramadan," *U.S. Fed News*, October 24, 2006. Also see "Iraqi Air Force Takes Over First-Line Maintenance," *U.S. Fed News*, October 1, 2006. Finally: for airlift needs the plans are to acquire a total of six C-130 aircraft; currently, the primary reconnaissance asset for the Iraqi Air Force is the SAMA CH2000 light propeller aircraft. Stacy Fowler, 506th Air Expeditionary Group Public Affairs, "Mission accomplished for Airmen on project team," Department Of Defense U.S. Air Force Releases, August 17, 2006.

²⁰⁶ The importance of maintaining air superiority in the counterinsurgency cannot be overemphasized. While the term typically applies to efforts in dismantling national air defense systems, the concept is equally important to counterinsurgencies and "small wars." As one recent study on the role of airpower in counterinsurgencies noted, "without some relative measure of air superiority from these weapons, the additional capabilities of airpower in small wars are greatly diminished." Ronald F. Stuewe, Jr., *One Step Back, Two Steps Forward: An Analytical Framework For Airpower In Small Wars*, M.S. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006., 61; Also, regarding threats to IqAf aircraft, see Patrick Cockburn, "U.S. fears insurgents have upgraded missiles as helicopter is shot down," *The Independent (London)*, February 8, 2007.

²⁰⁷ Michael Fabey, "Counter-insurgency ISR aircraft sought to fight Iraq insurgents," *Aerospace Daily & Defense Report*, Monday, August 21, 2006, 5, Vol. 219, No. 34.

²⁰⁸ "Air Forces," July 22, 2006. Official Website of Multi-National-Force-Iraq. Available at http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1099&Itemid=85 (accessed November 1, 2007).

cooperation can facilitate such a modernization program that also, perhaps, provides Washington with a conduit through which to influence Bagdad's policy choices.

E. PREDICTING INFLUENCE—REGIONAL STABILITY

Both the Egypt and Pakistan cases suggest two factors effect airpower security cooperation's ability to promote regional stability: first, Washington must adequately understand the state's "strategic culture;" second, it must design its security cooperation programs (in particular FMS) to contribute to an appropriate regional balance of power. For Egypt and Pakistan, understanding these states' strategic cultures entails comprehending the degree to which they weigh their national security with respect to a principal adversary: Israel for the case of Egypt, and India for case of Pakistan.

Egypt's strategic culture stresses the need for maintaining appropriate balance of power with respect to Israel through the maintenance of a modern and capable conventional force. U.S. airpower security cooperation provides Egypt with a host of advanced weapons systems that have slightly lesser capabilities than those granted to Israel; nonetheless, in aggregate Egypt's airpower capabilities present Israel with a substantial deterrent to offensive military action. The result is a program that has made Egypt confident in its national security—the benefits of which include an enduring Egyptian-Israeli peace and Egypt's diplomatic participation in resolving outstanding regional issues and conflicts, all of which contribute to inter-state regional stability.

The Pakistan case suggests that a failure to understand a state's strategic cultures denies U.S. decision makers the ability to forecast unintended outcomes of their policy choices. The Pressler sanctions invoked by the Bush administration represented a well-intended attempt to punish Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities. However, the severing of the U.S.-Pakistani security relationship in the context of a wide power imbalance vis-à-vis a nuclear India portended an era of horizontal nuclear proliferation to rogue states and security policies that included "asymmetric strategies," all of which countered the interests of the United States and contributed to an environment that

permitted Al Qaeda to prepare for the September 11, 2001 attacks.²⁰⁹ Also, the wide airpower imbalance that resulted in part due to Pressler sanctions created a dangerous environment in South Asia whereby Pakistan now relies on early use of its nuclear weapons in the event of war with India. In short, regional stability was undermined by Washington's collective management of security cooperation with Pakistan. In contrast, since cooperation was re-initiated following since 2001, Islamabad has cooperated with New Delhi to reduce regional tensions, underscoring the concept that addressing a state's needs with respect to its strategic paradigm can produce positive results.

With regard to Iraq, one may make plausible assumptions regarding the state's future strategic culture. First, the post-Saddam constitutional Iraqi government will continue to be challenged by elements from within that disclaim its legitimacy. The most fundamental and extreme groups will seek to overthrow the Iraqi government in order to establish an Islamic state based on *Shariah* law.²¹⁰ Second, Iraq will deem its natural resources as being vital to its national security and will defend them against any regional actors that threaten its territory. Third, Iraq will desire regional prestige and will not settle for being a second-tier regional state. Fourth, Iraq will seek to maintain an overt appearance of autonomy from the United States (more so than the case of Egypt). Anti-Americanism sentiment among Iraqis since the U.S. invasion will continue to require Iraqi politicians to distance themselves from Washington in order to maintain their domestic legitimacy. Iraq will desire its armed forces, including its airpower components, to serve this strategic paradigm.

Exogenous factors that affect Iraq's strategic environment include the following: the region's Sunni regimes will view Iraq as a Shia state and will be suspicious of Iranian-Iraqi ties; Iraq will most likely adopt a moderate but nonetheless antagonistic

²⁰⁹ Pakistan's security strategies that co-opted Islamic fundamentalist groups and supported the Taliban in Afghanistan created the space for Al Qaeda to operate in Afghanistan. Vali Nasr, "Islamic Extremism and Regional Conflict in South Asia," in *Prospects for Peace in South Asia*, ed. Rafiq Dossani and Henry S. Rowen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005) 25-29.

²¹⁰ Current factions labeled by MNFI as "terrorist groups" that are calling for an Islamic state in Iraq include: al-Qaida Organization in the Land of Two Rivers, *Mujahideen Shura* Council, Islamic Army in Iraq, and *Ansar al-Sunnah*. "The Insurgency," 20 August 2007. Official Website for Multi-National-Force-Iraq. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=729&Itemid=45 (accessed November 2, 2007).

posture toward Israel in order to preserve a perception of autonomy from the U.S. and credibility among Arab Muslims; Iraq will likely be moderate towards Iran but resist what it deems to be Iranian interference in Iraqi domestic affairs; finally, Iraq at the very least will view any Turkish incursion into northern Iraq as threatening stability in a region vital to Iraq's economy because of the natural resources around Kirkuk.²¹¹

Iraq's position amid a multi-polar strategic dynamic differs from the cases of Egypt and Pakistan in that these states' strategic cultures were oriented towards a principal adversary. In these cases U.S. security cooperation facilitated stability when the recipient perceived that its armed forces' conventional strength presented an effective deterrence to the adversary. Likewise, failures to address the recipients' perceived security needs fomented instability. In order to design and implement an airpower security cooperation formula that creates an adequate deterrence while not being perceived as overly threatening, Washington will have to consider Iraq's strategic culture with respect to the multitude of regional players.

Iraq is likely to view Israel a threat if not its principal adversary. There is no obvious issue over which the two states are bound to collide; however, Iraq is an Arab state, so it will take diplomatic positions against the Israeli state out of a necessity to maintain credibility. Any events that bring about Israeli aggression toward an Arab state would certainly compel Iraq to sympathize with the Israeli foe at the very least; at the very worst, Iraq could choose to counter Israel directly as part of a broader Arab coalition. While it is likely that the Iraqi state will eschew conflict with Israel, Israel's military capabilities necessitate that Iraq be wary of its ability to project power.

Iraq's greatest potential for inter-state conflict in the near future is perhaps with its northern neighbor Turkey, who is dissatisfied with a perceived lack of control of Kurdish militants in northern Iraq. Recently Turkey has threatened to intervene militarily

²¹¹ "Iraq and the Kurds: The Brewing Battle Over Kirkuk," *Middle East Report* No. 56, July 18, 2006; International Crisis Group. Available online at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/sectarian/2006/0718kurds.pdf> (accessed November 1, 2007). Regarding fears of the Sunni regimes' fears of rising Shia influence in the region, see Vali Nasr, *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006) 241-250.

if the U.S. and Iraqi governments do not address emboldened Kurdish separatist movements that operate within the “safe-haven” of northern Iraq.²¹² Whether or not this occurs in the near term, the status of a semi-autonomous Kurdistan region in northern Iraq will continue to irk Turkey’s strategic culture. Any events that engender a Turkish invasion would be perceived by Iraq as a direct threat to its national interests; while Baghdad holds no favor toward Kurdish separatists, it would likely portray any Turkish intervention as “aggression” and may opt to resist to the extent possible.²¹³

Iraq’s posture towards Iran is difficult to predict. With the fall of Saddam it is apparent that animosities regarding the Iran-Iraq war have waned. The two states have natural ties because of their predominantly Shia populations, a fact that imbues skepticism among the region’s Sunni regimes. However, the Shia factor could be superseded by disapproval over Iranian influence in Iraqi domestic affairs. Nonetheless Iraq would likely eschew direct conflict with Iran making bilateral conflict between the two states doubtful in the foreseeable future.²¹⁴ Washington however seeks to check Iran’s attempts at expanding its influence in the region, an objective that finds accord among the Gulf’s Sunni regimes. Regardless of the method, the U.S. will seek to preserve a conventional capability in Iraq that deters Iran from any ideas of direct intervention with its military (or paramilitary) forces. Therefore, it would be in Washington’s interest for Iraq’s airpower component to pose a significant challenge to the Iranian military.

Toward Iraq’s neighboring Sunni regimes, the most significant of which is Saudi Arabia, it will have to contend with suspicions of an Iraqi-Iranian Shia nexus. Accordingly U.S. airpower security cooperation efforts must consider these suspicions

²¹² Michael Howard, “Turkey bombards northern Iraq after ambush,” *The Guardian*, Monday, October 22, 2007. Available online at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,2196358,00.html> (accessed November 3, 2007).

²¹³ There is also potential that Turkey would view a strengthened U.S.-Iraqi security relationship as a threat to Washington’s value of the U.S.-Turkish relationship. Turkey is a member of NATO and a formal ally of the U.S. as a result, but the discontent of Turkey with respect to developments in northern Iraq, in addition to recent souring of relations because of U.S. Congressional attempts to blame the Ottoman Empire for committing genocide in World War I, could imbue a sense that Washington is choosing to invest its regional security interests with Iraq.

²¹⁴ Abbas Kadhim, *op. cit.*

when developing Iraqi airpower capabilities so as not to imbue undue anxiety over Iraq's military capabilities. Saddam's territorial aggression toward Kuwait is still recent history; Washington would not desire for memories of Iraq's former aggressions to instigate fears that the Shia-dominated Iraqi government would do likewise at some point in the future.

Because of ubiquitous U.S. FMS to the region, most of Iraq's neighbors are equipped with U.S. defense industry articles such that Washington can manage qualitative and quantitative airpower balances.²¹⁵ In order to maintain an appropriate regional balance of power Washington should consider the following principal regarding future airpower FMS to Iraq: the IqAF should possess sufficient strength and capabilities to maintain air sovereignty and defend against territorial breaches while not possessing a significant capability to project power far beyond its borders. Qualitatively, the IqAF should enjoy a significant advantage over the Iranian Air Force but no greater capability than parity with respect to other U.S. regional partners.²¹⁶ In addition, with respect to Israel and Turkey in particular, the IqAF should possess lesser overall capabilities, thus 1) preserving the Arab-Israeli airpower formula under which Israel enjoys a qualitative advantage to compensate for its quantitative disadvantage vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors and 2) preserving Turkey's prestige and perception of favorability as a NATO ally of the U.S. Toward limiting Iraq's capacity to project power, Washington should not provide any indigenous air refueling capability.²¹⁷

Managing balance of power via FMS is only one aspect of airpower security cooperation through which Washington may affect regional stability. Any measure by which the U.S. can increase Iraq's security confidence can preclude the nascent constitutional regime from engaging in asymmetric strategies to bolster its inter-state

²¹⁵ This does not prevent these states from acquiring weapon systems from other states such as France, Britain, China, and Russia, although provisions of financial assistance can create a compelling incentive to purchase U.S. airpower hardware.

²¹⁶ With respect to Iran, because of sanctions following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 that precluded parts supplies to the Iranian air force, any air force modeled after Egyptian capabilities would present Iran with a sufficient deterrence against aerial incursions by its air force.

²¹⁷ Iraqi pilots could be trained to air refuel from U.S. tankers but not be given their own indigenous capability. This would allow them to participate in U.S.-sanctioned coalitions without giving the IqAF regional offensive power projection.

security. Considering the host of sub-state actors who have perfected asymmetric strategies against U.S. forces in Iraq, the future unitary state could face similar challenges that Pakistan faced following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan—how to keep the *ihadists* occupied once their *ihad* was over. One manner in which Islamabad co-opted non-state militants was by using them to challenge India’s conventional superiority through unrest and subversion in Kashmir.²¹⁸ If Baghdad were to adopt similar strategies by co-opting its sub-state militant factions to address inter-state disputes, regional stability and U.S. interests would be directly undermined. Iraq’s confidence in U.S. airpower security cooperation can help preclude the use of asymmetric means to assert state power.

The relationship-oriented instruments of security cooperation are particularly well-suited to instilling sincerity of commitment on behalf of the U.S. The case of Pakistan shows how interruptions in relationship-instruments facilitated unfavorable policy outcomes and challenged military operations initially after September 11th. In contrast, the case of Egypt suggests that enduring and consistent military relationships have produced positive results, the most significant of which was the tangible measure of operational military cooperation by the Egyptians in the 1991 Gulf War. In Iraq the U.S. has the opportunity to sow seeds for long-term airpower cooperation while reconstituting its airpower capabilities. Accordingly, Washington can use instruments of IMET, USAF led pipeline training of Iraqi airmen, officer exchanges between the USAF and IqAF, and perhaps even combined squadrons to nurture the nascent relationship. Put simply, the more interaction between U.S. and Iraqi airmen, the higher the perceived level of commitment to Iraq’s security—and with it, the greater the likelihood that Baghdad’s activities will promote regional stability.

F. PREDICTING INFLUENCE—NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

The potential for nuclear proliferation in the Middle East threatens the stability of an already volatile region. It is highly likely that the future unitary state of Iraq will be pressured by structural factors that tempt it to once again “go nuclear.” The question is to

²¹⁸ Vali Nasr, “Islamic Extremism...,” *op. cit.*, 29.

what extent U.S. airpower security cooperation with Iraq can shape its nuclear choices. Interestingly, the cases of Egypt and Pakistan convey disparate results regarding the impact of U.S. security cooperation on a state's nuclear choices. On one hand, the case of Egypt suggests that robust security cooperation obviated its desires to have a nuclear deterrent amid what is presumed to be a nuclear-capable adversary. On the other hand, Pakistan developed nuclear weapons covertly during substantial U.S. investment in its conventional airpower capabilities. Yes, the nuclear threat to Pakistan was more overt because of India's nuclear testing. Yet one must consider that the Israeli nuclear policy of "ambiguity" exacts a similar pressure onto Egypt. In order to address how U.S. airpower security cooperation with Iraq can influence that state's choices, one must first account for the Egypt-Pakistan nuclear choice disparity.

With respect to security cooperation as an instrument of influence, the difference in Egypt's and Pakistan's nuclear choices is best explained by what amounted to different levels of Washington's comprehension of the recipients' strategic culture—and the confidence inculcated to the recipients that security cooperation was addressing their principle security concerns. For the case of Egypt, U.S. military assistance was a byproduct of the Camp David Accords peace treaty under which the Carter administration invested substantial diplomatic effort to address both sides' security concerns. U.S. influence with respect to Israel imbued Sadat with sufficient trust to press forth with the agreement—a trust bolstered by U.S. airpower security cooperation that afforded Egypt an appropriate level of conventional power vis-à-vis Israel.

As for the case of Pakistan during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there was no such U.S. diplomatic involvement with the state's principal rival India. The security relationship was better defined as a temporary marriage of interests as opposed to an enduring security investment whereby the recipient's real security concerns were addressed. The lack of clarity regarding policy intent evidenced by different signals coming from the executive and congressional branches complicated matters. However, a more coherent policy message warning against proliferation would have not mattered without greater U.S. diplomatic efforts addressing a strategic culture obsessed with survival against a nuclear-capable India.

In short, the disparate outcomes suggest that in order for airpower security cooperation to effectively influence Iraq toward nuclear non-proliferation (assuming that it would have a capacity to develop or acquire nuclear weapons), the policy must imbue confidence that Washington both comprehends Iraq's security concern vis-à-vis a nuclear threat *and* has sufficient influence over the adversary representing the source of the threat. In cases where the latter is not true, Washington may have to resort to firm security guarantees to keep Iraq true to a non-nuclear path. The U.S. has substantial influence with all of Iraq's potential regional adversaries except Iran, with whom it can currently attempt to influence only through punitive forms of diplomacy such as sanctions or armed conflict. Amid a nuclear-capable adversary, any absence of trust in the U.S.-Iraqi security relationship could compel Iraq to seek its own nuclear capability; airpower security cooperation is one instrument through which Washington can bolster the level of trust between the two states.

A second factor affecting Iraq's future nuclear choices is the state's inherent desire for prestige; assuming it chooses a non-nuclear strategic culture, its regional status will be directly linked to the prestige of the non-proliferation regime. If the "wheels come off" the proverbial "non-proliferation wagon," Iraq will face similar pressures as Egypt when considering its nuclear choices. A capable and modern the Iraqi Air Force can counter the prestige-impetus for nuclear proliferation. In a similar vein, the closer the relationship with U.S. airpower forces, the more able Iraq can sustain its status as an important player in the region. While either of these factors cannot guarantee Iraq chooses non-proliferation as a component of its strategic culture, they can at least mitigate Iraq's desires to obtain nuclear weapons merely to preserve a seat at the table of diplomacy.

A third factor affecting Iraq's nuclear choices is the potential influence by domestic interests promoting nuclear weapons development. In lieu of Saddam's past efforts to develop nuclear weapons, there already exists a potential "pro-nuclear" element consisting of former Iraqi nuclear scientists and engineers. Airpower security cooperation is a limited tool with which to address this aspect, making current U.S.

efforts to keep Iraqi nuclear scientists gainfully employed seem prudent.²¹⁹ Also, similar to social forces in Egypt that call for nuclear weapons as a measure to defend Islam, there exists the possibility that religious and political elements within Iraqi society could do likewise. A combination of nuclear proliferation among the region's states and worsening suspicions between Sunni and Shia governments adds another dynamic—instead of calling for an “Islamic bomb” to challenge the west, regional tensions and domestic pressures could compel Iraq to acquire a “Shia bomb” in response to a “Sunni bomb.”²²⁰

Once again, airpower security cooperation has a limited capacity to address these particular domestic pressures. However, as in the case of Egypt suggests, it does allow Washington to engage the military that sits at the center of Iraq's strategic culture; further, robust airpower security cooperation would compel any Iraqi regime to consider the costs of proliferating without Washington's concurrence. Another question is to what extent airpower security cooperation can assist Bagdad's efforts in countering another form of domestic pressures—terrorists and sectarian militants in Iraq intent on overthrowing the constitutional regime.

G. PREDICTING INFLUENCE—MILITARY COOPERATION INCLUDING THE GWOT

The Bush administration and Al Qaeda agree that Iraq represents the principal battleground in the war between the two antagonists. Put simply, Iraq represents the “front line” in the GWOT, and credibility for both players is at stake. Al Qaeda's quest to rid the region of U.S. influence and to eventually establish a pan-Islamic caliphate

²¹⁹ “U.S. Hires Ex-Saddam Scientists,” Associated Press, December 18, 2003. Available online at <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/12/18/iraq/main589339.shtml> (accessed November 3, 2007).

²²⁰ The term “Islamic bomb” has been widely used in reference to Pakistan's indigenous development of nuclear weapons. See “Pakistan's Islamic Bomb,” article describing speaking event by Dr. George Perkovich at the website for the Middle East Institute. October 8, 2003. Available online at <http://www.mideasti.org/summary/pakistans-islamic-bomb> (accessed November 3, 2007).

centers on defeating the U.S. in Iraq.²²¹ If U.S. forces withdraw, Al Qaeda will continue attempts to discredit and eventually overthrow the Iraqi regime it views as a product of U.S. imperialism. The extent to which the constitutional-regime has to contend with terrorism and challenges to its authority depends on the level of political reconciliation that is yet to occur and the extent to which Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are able to maintain support among Iraqi society and the broader region.

The cases of Egypt and Pakistan show that security cooperation since 9/11 has resulted in measurable cooperation by the respective governments in the form of intelligence, direct confrontation with Islamic militants and terrorist organizations, and access to supply routes and the use of airspace in support of OIF and OEF. Inevitably, these regimes' cooperation in the GWOT solidifies their alignment of interests with Washington—the latter needs the regimes' continued cooperation and the former needs U.S. support in the form of economic assistance and security cooperation to stay in power amid rising dissenting forces that are staunchly anti-American. Iraq will likely be no different. Survival of the post-Saddam constitutional government will require that it continue to counter extremist groups intent on its demise. Airpower security cooperation is a tool that can build Baghdad's capacity to fight terrorist groups and insurgents; however, the counter-insurgency strategist must consider that the indirect fires brought by airpower can also result in propaganda victories for the opposition if used incorrectly.

This last point underscores an important consideration regarding airpower security cooperation over the near term. Current Iraqi airpower capabilities center on reconnaissance and surveillance and have no offensive capability, mandating that any indirect fires from airpower in support of Iraqi ground forces be delivered by U.S.

²²¹ Intercepted transmissions from Al Qaeda leaders to Al Qaeda in Iraq indicate a long-term goal to establish a Caliphate in Iraq: "Zawahiri called that stage the setting up of an 'emirate,' in as much of Sunni-dominated Iraq as possible, to be followed by the longer-term goal of a 'caliphate,' reuniting the historical Islamic empire centered in modern-day Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel." Susan B. Glasser and Walter Pincus, "Seized letter outlines Al Qaeda's long-term goals," *Washington Post*, October 12, 2005. Available online at http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2005/10/12/seized_letter_outlines_al_qedas_long_term_goals/ (accessed November 3, 2007).

airpower assets.²²² In the event that U.S. ground forces withdraw, the question remains as to if coalition air assets will be used to support the Iraqi ground forces. As a recent journal reported: “senior military leaders continue to debate how fire support will be called in to support Iraqi forces’ security operations after U.S. troops leave that nation...In short, Moseley [Chief of Staff, USAF] said senior leaders simply ‘don't know’ at this point what the tactical air support policy for post-occupied Iraq will look like.”²²³

Using air assets to provide fire support to ground forces engaged in counterinsurgency is no simple matter. The procedures used by American forces have evolved from the lessons learned since the Korean War and are designed to maximize flexibility, responsiveness, and lethality of air-delivered fire support while mitigating risks to friendly forces on the ground; also, in counter-insurgency (COIN) the mitigation of unwanted collateral damage is a particularly important component of the effective use of airpower.²²⁴ Hence, delegating control of CAS (close-air-support) events to Iraqis is problematic considering the resources required to training a fully qualified JTAC (Joint Terminal Attack Controller) as well as the hosts of risks involved if American commanders were to delegate control of American air attack assets to Iraqis on the

²²² Recent news releases indicate that the USAF considering adding a strike capability to procurement requirements for an Iraqi Light Attack Aircraft (LAA). “The U.S. Air Force is reassessing,” *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, October 1, 2007 (Vol. 167, No. 13) 21.

²²³ “Coalition, Iraqi Officials to Huddle over Future of Nascent Air Force,” *Inside the Air Force* (Vol. 17, No. 25), June 23, 2006. The most recent reports suggest that the USAF would only consider providing “limited non-destructive air support to remaining embedded coalition units” once U.S. ground forces leave. “USAF CONSIDERS LIMITED SUPPORT ROLE TO IRAQI ARMY,” *Jane’s Defense Weekly*, January 10, 2007.

²²⁴ *JPub 309.3, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support* is the reference containing the necessary guidance for planning and procedures for execution. At the time of writing the current version of Joint Publication 3-09.3 referenced is 3 September 2003, Incorporating Change 1, September 2, 2005.

ground.²²⁵ First, because CAS procedures are communications-intensive, the language barrier is an extensive obstacle; American pilots would be appropriately hesitant to engage if they could not understand the directions of the controller.²²⁶ Second, if the wrong target is hit due to misidentification, error in coordinates or target marking, language barriers, or simply weapons system malfunction (which probabilities suggest will occur given enough events), adverse outcomes could result in finger-pointing as to who was responsible and could engender mistrust between Iraqi ground forces and U.S. pilots. Regardless, if recent trends continue, effective and responsive fire support will be needed to combat the insurgency.²²⁷ Eliminating fire support from U.S. airpower assets portends a tactical disadvantage for Iraqi security forces given the fact that the IqAF currently has no such capabilities.

Hence, there are essentially three options regarding airpower and fire support for the Iraqi Security Forces in conjunction with a reduction or withdrawal of American ground troops. First, Washington could imbed U.S. JTACs directly into Iraqi units so that they could orchestrate fire support for Iraqi ground commanders. Second, the USAF

²²⁵ U.S. military doctrine dictates that the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) is the person on the ground responsible for airpower fire-support events in support of the ground commander's intent. Accordingly, the JTAC provides targeting information to the pilot via a target briefing, target marking if required, and control for the attack. Inherent in his responsibilities is the obligation to ensure that friendly forces are not injured or killed by the engagement and that the commander's guidance for collateral damage mitigation is met. Producing a fully qualified JTAC is not simple, and there is considerable cost associated with the maintenance of their proficiency. For example, during initial qualification, a JTAC is required to control a minimum of 12 events, six of which must involve fixed wing assets, four of which must involve live ordnance, and six of which must occur at night. To maintain proficiency, a JTAC must have six controls every six months with similar requirements for night, fixed wing, and live ordnance events as well as annual evaluations. The dollar cost in sorties, range time, and full scale weapons in spent in JTAC production and proficiency maintenance is considerable. "Joint Terminal Attack Controller Memorandum of Agreement," signed September 1, 2004, provided by the Air-Ground-Operations-School, Nellis AFB, NV. Also: The U.S. military has three groups of personnel that perform the JTAC function. The Air Force uses primarily enlisted airmen to function as JTACs in Air Support Operations Squadrons; these units are generally tied to specific army units for training and combat operations. The Marine Corps uses Marine aviation officers for their JTACs (known as Forward Air Controllers, or FACs), while the special operations community typically relies on Air Force Combat Controllers who carry the JTAC qualification. The Air Force and Marine Corps also train pilots who are trained to control CAS events from the air with or without the assistance of a JTAC, known as FAC(A) (Forward Air Controller-Airborne).

²²⁶ Author's opinion is based upon pilot experience conducting CAS with foreign controllers.

²²⁷ According to daily CENTAF airpower summaries, coalition fixed wing assets flew an average of 33 CAS sorties per day during the month of November 2006 and provided actual fire-support to ground forces an average of three times per day. A fire-support event in this case does not necessarily equate to the number of aircraft or weapons used against a target, just that fire support in a particular area was provided. Data was obtained from published CENTAF daily airpower summaries from November 1-30.

could train Iraqis in the art of terminal attack control and accept the inherent risks and limitations of relying on coalition air assets. Third, U.S. security cooperation could sufficiently equip the IqAF to provide some measure of kinetic strike capability so that the entire kill-chain, start-to-finish, was owned by Iraqi forces.

The first option, imbedding USAF and/or Marine JTACs with Iraqi units, may appear to be the easiest to implement in the near term, as they are already trained and equipped to provide air-delivered fire support to Iraqi ground commanders. The biggest challenge in implementing this option would be training the Iraqi commanders as to how best utilize their JTAC and airpower assets, as well as teaching them to consider fratricide potential and collateral damage avoidance. There are some obvious drawbacks to this option: Placing American individuals directly in Iraqi units subjects their individual security to the protection of those units. Also the potential still exists for adverse political outcomes due to missed targets; if a bomb misses its intended target, collateral damage could foment mistrust between the Iraqis and the U.S. controller. The second option, training Iraqis to conduct their own fire support, eliminates the personal risk to the JTAC but retains the risk of potential adverse outcomes that is inherent when relying on coalition firepower to support Iraqi units. Only if U.S. airpower security cooperation builds an IqAF that has the capacity to provide effective, precision targeting capability in support of Iraqi ground troops can these adverse potentialities be avoided. Firepower could come from helicopter, fixed-wing, or unmanned platforms. The critical requirements are that the assets be survivable in the contemporary COIN environment and that the sensor-weapon combination provides a high level of precision and small yield explosive such that collateral damage can be mitigated.

In sum, the best option for the provision of air-delivered fire support for the COIN is for the Iraqis to control their own firepower from their own assets that ideally would be survivable and provide day-or-night precision, low yield kinetic effects. As per the recent recommendations of the Iraqi Study Group, reliance on American combat capability is not conducive to the long term success of the mission in Iraq.²²⁸ Recently

²²⁸ *Iraqi Study Group Report, op. cit., 7-76.*

published USAF doctrine on Irregular Warfare agrees, stating that “the best way to apply airpower in IW [irregular warfare] is often by, with, and through the PN’s [partner nation’s] air force.”²²⁹ Towards this objective, U.S. airpower security cooperation can facilitate Iraqi effectiveness in the GWOT by organizing, training, and equipping the IqAf to provide precision firepower in support of ground elements fighting extremists bent on challenging the constitutional regime—a regime through which the Bush administration hopes to eventually advance democracy throughout the region.

H. PREDICTING INFLUENCE—DEMOCRACY ADVANCEMENT

In the cases of Egypt and Pakistan there is unfortunately little to no correlation between security cooperation and democracy advancement. Each of these regimes has faced or is currently facing significant domestic pressures and security concerns that threaten regime survival, a factor which facilitates an enduring and disproportionate influence by the military on state politics.²³⁰ Arguably, security cooperation instruments enable these unfavorable military-political power structures; however, the pragmatic utility of these instruments is that they do provide Washington a conduit through which to engage those with decision-making power. It remains to be seen how “democratic” Iraq will be, but in lieu of the poor security situation, ongoing sectarian strife, and the importance of Iraq to Al Qaeda, one may presume that the military and other security forces will preserve influence with those who hold decision-making power in the government. U.S. State Department goals of using security cooperation as a means through which to convey U.S. democratic values in Iraq are laudable. However, it is perhaps more realistic to expect that airpower security cooperation be used as an instrument to secure Iraq internally and externally so that other instruments can be used to advance democracy in Iraq. In any case, the effort will require a persistent airpower relationship that lasts decades rather than years.

²²⁹ Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, *Irregular Warfare*. August 1, 2007, 28-29.

²³⁰ For more information on the impact of the military on Middle East politics, see: Picard, Elizabeth. “Arab Military in Politics: from Revolutionary Plot to Authoritarian State.” In *The Arab State*, edited by Giacomo Luciani, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) 189-219. Also Richards, Alan, and John Waterbury. *A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class and Economic Development*; “Ch. 13: The Military and the State” (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990) 353-373.

V. CONCLUSION—FINAL OBSERVATIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this thesis was to identify characteristics of airpower security cooperation that produce tangible results that serve the interests of the United States. Toward this pursuit, the “Introduction” chapter posed the following questions:

- **Have airpower security cooperation programs been implemented with clearly articulated policy goals and desired outcomes?**

Since 9/11, the answer is clearly “yes.” There are a host of national strategy documents that emphasize partnering with foreign states as a critical element of the national security strategy of the United States. The theme is common throughout the *National Security Strategy*, *National Strategy to Combat Terrorism*, *National Defense Strategy*, *National Military Strategy*, and *Quadrennial Defense Review*, as well as the military’s joint doctrine documents. For each partnering state the State Department sets broad security cooperation policy goals while the Defense Department executes security cooperation activities through the COCOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Strategy (TSCS). In support of the TSCS, SAF/IA develops an airpower security cooperation plans according to guidance of the *USAF Security Cooperation Strategy*. Newly released Air Force Doctrine Documents regarding *Irregular Warfare* and *Internal Defense* guide the operational implementation of airpower security cooperation activities, while the *SAF/IA Security Assistance Handbook* provides guidance to country directors for airpower FMS programs.

At the national level of government, however, the implementation of the Pressler sanctions onto Pakistan following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan showed that policy cohesion can be challenged by variances in intent between the executive and congressional branches of government. This is not to state that Congress should avoid intervening to ensure security cooperation programs serve the interests of the U.S. Rather, it is merely an observation that stresses a need for the national security institutions to adequately comprehend the recipient’s strategic culture when setting policy

objectives for security cooperation programs; it also suggests that analysts carefully examine and communicate to Congress any potential consequences deriving from coercive utilization of the security cooperation instrument.

- **What factors determined the success or failure of airpower security cooperation as a policy instrument?**

The cases of Pakistan and Egypt suggest that key variables affecting the success of airpower security cooperation as a diplomacy instrument are: 1) the degree to which the security cooperation program addresses the recipient's principal security needs as determined by the state's strategic culture; 2) the degree to which airpower assistance facilitates and maintains an appropriate regional balance of power; and 3) the degree of trust imbued to the recipient regarding the endurance of the U.S. commitment to the security relationship. If Washington can account for these "three tenets" when implementing airpower security cooperation, the recipient state is more likely to "feel secure" and hence is more likely to act responsibly in ways that engender regional stability. Concomitantly Washington can then expect to garner specific measures of influence with respect to the recipient in manners which serve U.S. security interests.

- **To what extent has the United States gained diplomatic leverage via airpower security cooperation?**

Security cooperation activities are most effective when treated as an investment in a relationship as opposed to payment for services rendered by the recipient. Leverage can be a two-way street depending on the severity of needs of the U.S. and partnering state. If either party has no alternative partner in the supplier-recipient relationship, they can expect to have a lesser capacity to influence the other. Certainly, after the U.S. is entrenched in a state's strategic culture, as is now the case with Egypt, it may exact influence by the mere fact that it is the sole provider for parts and modernization capabilities related to the recipient's airpower assets. If a state does not depend on U.S. financial assistance as part of the security relationship, the U.S. loses a degree of influence because of ample opportunities for the recipient to find other security partners (for example, any one of the members of the UNSC are prolific arms suppliers).

In addition, the United State's place in the world provides the recipient of airpower security cooperation with added leverage onto the international system, a benefit through which Washington also derives influence. The cases of Pakistan and Egypt suggests that when airpower security cooperation accounts for the aforementioned key variables, Washington can expect to garner the recipient's cooperation in matters related to regional stability, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the GWOT. Thus far, however, influence regarding democracy reforms in these recipients has been less apparent, an outcome that alludes to a need for patience—or perhaps an unrealistic policy objective considering the domestic instability in these recipient states.

If cases where the U.S. has no alternative to the recipient's specific manners of cooperation, it can expect limits on its capacity to shape the recipient government's policies. In such cases, attempts at using security cooperation instruments as manners of coercion are bound to either be unsuccessful or produce unintended consequences. Unfortunately, this assertion portends difficulty in coercive attempts with respect to a unitary Iraqi government. The success of Iraq is critical to U.S. prestige not only in the region, but the world—a fact upon which any future Iraqi government may exact leverage onto the U.S. and resist any attempts at using airpower security cooperation as a means of coercive influence. In particular, legislative calls for military aid to be conditioned by proven democratic reforms on behalf of the recipient (as has been suggested recently for both Pakistan and Egypt) are not practical given the degree to which the U.S. needs the Iraqi constitutional government to succeed. In short, the consequences of Pressler-like sanctions with respect to Iraq would need to be weighed carefully before their implementation, whether they were intended for democracy promotion, human rights, regional policies, or non-proliferation cooperation.

A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States has an opportunity to sow seeds for an enduring relationship with Iraq through airpower security cooperation, commencing with rebuilding the Iraqi Air Force. To be successful over the long haul, the USAF and other governmental agencies should implement policies intentionally designed to address the “three tenets” of

security cooperation: addressing strategic culture, maintaining an appropriate balance of power, and inculcating trust. Recently published USAF doctrine emphasizing security cooperation is a good start. Other considerations follow:

First, as Iraq under the post-Saddam constitutional regime is still challenged by internal security, its strategic culture is driven by survival from internal threats and for the most part does not yet account for external inter-state rivalries. Accordingly, initial efforts to supply, train, and equip the IqAF to the COIN mission are prudent. Also, the CAFTT should amend acquisition efforts to include a platform with a precision strike capability so that the IqAF can support ground forces engaged in COIN; failure to provide this capability either denies the Iraqis airpower capabilities now exclusively enjoyed by coalition forces or places USAF and other coalition airmen in the difficult position of providing fire support directly to Iraqi ground commanders—the risks of which exceed any potential benefit. Simply put, it is best for the Iraqis to own and operate their own assets that provide fire support to their own troops.

Long term airpower security cooperation should not limit the IqAF to the COIN mission, but should take into account all the roles that airpower provides the state—particularly maintaining the sovereignty of the Iraqi airspace. Toward that end, the FMS instrument should provide Iraq with a modern fighter force that contributes an appropriate balance of power amid the multi-polar regional environment. Forecasting the provision of specific weapon systems is not warranted; however in general the IqAF should enjoy a qualitative advantage vis-à-vis Iran, be of lesser capability than Israel and perhaps Turkey, and be of no greater than parity with respect other regional neighbors. Accordingly, airpower security cooperation efforts should eschew granting the IqAF an indigenous air-refueling capability in order to limit its power projection reach. Eventually, the goal should be to build a modern Iraqi Air Force that provides the state with a substantial measure of prestige in the region.

Finally, Washington should use the relationship-oriented components of airpower security cooperation to inculcate the Iraqi state with trust in the U.S. commitment. This goal suggests the need for an enduring presence of U.S. airmen working side-by-side with Iraqi airmen for years to come. A recent RAND study suggested that the COIN

mission in particular calls for the USAF to institutionalize “airpower advising,” stating that “the best role for outsiders is an indirect one: training, advising, and equipping the local nation, which must win the war politically and militarily.”²³¹

For the airpower security cooperation effort with Iraq to build trust, relationships will matter, and the quality of relationships will be affected by individuals’ cultural understanding. Accordingly, the USAF would be wise to allocate time and resources to giving its advisors the same language and cultural skills possessed by their Army counterparts. The USAF should tap into its already established international-affairs-specialist (IAS) program to train qualified advisors for the Iraqi airpower security cooperation mission.²³² Obviously this effort involves substantial investment in time and resources, especially for aircrew; longer tour lengths than those associated with current AEF rotations would therefore be appropriate. Also, over time the USAF should consider granting Iraqi airmen the same exchange opportunities now enjoyed by our major allies, including operational fighter pilot exchanges.

B. METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES

While the author believes the findings of this thesis and concomitant recommendations to be valid, they were the result of analysis that faced certain methodological limitations. First, the reliance on open-source information limited the amount of information available regarding specific measures of military and intelligence cooperation with Pakistan and Egypt, most of which is classified; even the broad guidance contained in the CENTOM Theater Security Cooperation Plan is not available in open channels.

²³¹ Alan J. Vick, Adam Grissom, William Rosenau, Beth Grill, Karl P. Mueller, *Airpower in the New Counterinsurgency Era, The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006) 4. Also, the *Iraqi Study Group Report* suggested that the best role for the U.S. military was to train the Iraqis to fight the insurgency with minimal direct assistance from U.S. forces.

²³² The RAND report further recommends that the USAF should tap into its expanding political-military-affairs specialist program to meet the need for more advisors: “there will be a natural synergy between the expansion of USAF’s counterinsurgency cadre and the services’ international affairs specialist program. Personnel with advisory experience should make excellent international affairs specialists, and (potentially) vice versa. Both programs will need to be expanded and strengthened in parallel.” Vick *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 145.

Second, there are admittedly some gaps that the thesis' analysis failed to overcome. This study presented recipients' national security policies and diplomatic activities as representing outcomes of U.S. airpower security cooperation policies; however, it is safer to assert that airpower security cooperation *contributed* (or at the very least *correlated*) to these outcomes and did not comprise a direct causal link; nonetheless, the results of the study suggests airpower security cooperation contributes to positive policy results when the aforementioned variables are included as antecedent conditions: 1) addressing recipient security needs, 2) maintaining appropriate levels of regional balance of power, and 3) instilling trust in the recipient's relationship with the United States.

In order to fill in remaining gaps toward a more comprehensive cause-and-effect process, research would need to be conducted in the presence of actual airpower security cooperation activities—an effort requiring research to be accomplished on site and at higher classification levels. In addition, more case studies are needed to wholly validate these variables as viable conditions on which to base successful policies.²³³ Any attempt to conduct “large-N” study of airpower security cooperation as an instrument of national policy would require a quantitative method to be devised whereby dependent and independent variables, conditions, and suitable metrics were designed and measured. Currently however it is difficult to quantify and measure specific effects of relationship-oriented components of security cooperation such as IMET, officer-exchange programs, and combined training. For example, the U.S. government does not track the careers of foreign officers who participate in IMET, so there is no way to validate the assumption that this instrument inculcates these officers with an appreciation for civilian control of the military, human rights, and other democratic values.²³⁴ Perhaps such an effort is warranted in the future. In any case, the State Department and USAF should study

²³³ The foregoing analysis suffers from what political scientists would call the “small-N” problem, whereby the data set is too limited to produce any statistically viable results.

²³⁴ James F. Mueller, Major, USAF; Country Director, Mideast/ Africa Division International Affairs, Secretary of the Air Force International Affairs Division. E-mail correspondence with the author, October 29, 2007.

airpower security cooperation efforts with Iraq closely so they may garner as much knowledge as possible from this unique opportunity to utilize this particular policy instrument.

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