

THE FRENCH-ALGERIAN WAR AND FM 3-24, *COUNTERINSURGENCY*:
A COMPARISON

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

Jason Michael Norton, MAJ, USA
B.A., University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 1992

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2007

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 14-12-2007			2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) Feb 2007 - Dec 2007	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The French-Algerian War and FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency: A Comparison</i>					5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
					5b. GRANT NUMBER	
					5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ Jason Michael Norton					5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
					5e. TASK NUMBER	
					5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD 100 Stimson Ave. Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301					8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)					10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
					11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.						
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES						
14. ABSTRACT Many aspects of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in today's contemporary operating environment suggest historical review of previous COIN experiences can provide critical insight. Such reviews tend to fail to be incorporated into doctrine as time and era change reduced the perceived relevance of previous experiences. Development of COIN doctrine requires a detailed study of available insurgency experiences to enable the U.S. military to apply the crucial principles of COIN to current threat models. An example of an army which struggled to develop COIN doctrine as it combated an insurgency is the French Army in their conflict in Algeria from 1954 to 1962. French experiences in Algeria provide information on COIN operations that achieved great success at the tactical level, but failure at the strategic level. From this perspective, it is important to examine current U.S. Army doctrine, recently published in FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency</i> , in light of French efforts in Algeria. Centered on the influencing a population, French COIN experiences provide examples to compare against current U.S. doctrine.						
15. SUBJECT TERMS FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Algeria, French, doctrine, COIN						
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON	
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)	
Unclassified	Unclassified	Unclassified	UU	126		

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ Jason Michael Norton

Thesis Title: The French-Algerian War and FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*: A Comparison

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
LTC (Ret.) Louis A. DiMarco, M.A.

_____, Member
LTC (Ret.) Joseph D. G. Babb, M.A.

_____, Member
Dr. Gary J. Bjorge, Ph.D.

Accepted this 14th day of December 2007 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 14 December 2007
2. Thesis Author: MAJ Jason Michael Norton
3. Thesis Title: The French-Algerian War and FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*: A Comparison
4. Thesis Committee Members: Louis A. DiMarco
Signatures: Joseph G. D. Babb
Gary J. Bjorge

5. Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

A B C D E F X

6. Justification: None required.

EXAMPLE

<u>Limitation Justification Statement</u>	/	<u>Chapter/Section</u>	/	<u>Page(s)</u>
	/		/	
	/		/	
	/		/	

<u>Limitation Justification Statement</u>	/	<u>Chapter/Section</u>	/	<u>Page(s)</u>
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature: _____

STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to US Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:

1. Foreign Government Information. Protection of foreign information.
2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the US Government.
3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.
4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.
5. Contractor Performance Evaluation. Protection of information involving contractor performance evaluation.
6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.
7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.
8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.
9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority.
10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a US military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and US DoD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).

ABSTRACT

THE FRENCH-ALGERIAN WAR AND FM 3-24, *COUNTERINSURGENCY: A COMPARISON*

by MAJ Jason Michael Norton, 126 pages.

Many aspects of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in today's contemporary operating environment suggest that historical review of previous COIN experiences can provide critical insight. Such reviews tend to fail to be incorporated into doctrine as time and era change reduced the perceived relevance of previous experiences. Development of COIN doctrine requires the study of available insurgency experiences to enable the U.S. military to apply the crucial principles of COIN to current threat models. An example of an army which struggled to develop COIN doctrine as it combated an insurgency is the French Army in their conflict in Algeria from 1954 to 1962. French experiences in Algeria provide information on COIN operations that achieved great success at the tactical level, but failure at the strategic level. From this perspective, it is important to examine current U.S. Army doctrine, recently published in FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, in light of French efforts in Algeria. Centered on the influencing of a population, French COIN experiences provide examples to compare against current U.S. doctrine.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the guidance and assistance of my committee members. LTC (Ret.) Louis A. DiMarco provided the conceptual framework to guide my otherwise unconstrained thoughts, as well as input on *le guerre revolutionnaire*, interrogation methods, and counterinsurgency operations. Mr. Joseph Babb provided excellent and insightful guidance on structure, design, and conceptual analysis of the material adding input on unconventional warfare and irregular warfare. Dr. Gary J. Bjorge provided constructive criticism and much needed assistance on formatting and language. As a knowledgeable member of the History Department, his assistance added great value to identifying the historical context of the time period.

The members of the oral comprehensive exam board also participated in this project, supporting its development throughout the process. LTC (Ret.) Kevin Brown, LTC (Ret.) Timothy Hentschel, LTC (Ret.) Matthew Broaddus, and LTC (Ret.) Barry Leslie examined portions of this thesis and assisted my progress.

Finally, COL (Ret.) Clint Ancker, Director of Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth gave his valuable time for an informal interview on FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* doctrine development from 2003 until present. His input was instrumental in providing the most current information on the FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, as well as adding additional insight and information on past doctrine development related to the study of counterinsurgency.

In short, this thesis would not have been accomplished without the support and tireless efforts of the above individuals. While their support is appreciated and acknowledged, any errors or deficiencies are solely the author's responsibility.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	ii
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT	iii
ABSTRACT.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vii
ACRONYMS.....	ix
ILLUSTRATIONS	x
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	1
Problem Statement.....	2
Thesis	2
Definitions	3
Limitations	5
Constraints	6
Assumptions.....	7
Literature Review	7
Counterinsurgency Theory.....	8
Historical and Personal Accounts	12
Torture and Ethics in Counterinsurgencies	14
Geo-Political Studies	15
Miscellaneous	17
Methodology.....	18
Summary.....	18
CHAPTER 2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT	21
History of Algeria.....	21
French Counterinsurgency Experience in Indochina (1946 – 1954)	29
<i>Le Guerre Revolutionnaire</i>	32
The French-Algerian War (1954 – 1962)	33
Rise of the FLN/ALN	33
The Height of the Insurgency (1954 – 1960).....	36
Politics and French Departure from Algeria (1960 – 1962)	37
French Counterinsurgency Efforts in Algeria.....	39
Destructive Operations.....	39

Political-Psychological Operations	42
Constructive Operations.....	43
Conclusion	45
CHAPTER 3. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN.....	51
Brief History of US Counterinsurgency Doctrine	51
FM 3-24 Developmental History	55
Introduction to FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency</i>	56
Chapter 1, FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency</i>	57
Chapter 2, FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency: Unity of Effort in Integrating Civilian and Military Activities</i>	58
Chapter 3, FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency: Intelligence in Counterinsurgency</i>	63
Human Intelligence (HUMINT)	65
Chapter 4, FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency: Designing Counterinsurgency Campaigns</i> .	67
Chapter 5, FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency: Executing Counterinsurgency Operations</i> ..	69
Conclusion	71
CHAPTER 4. MILITARY SUPPORT ACTIVITIES TO COUNTERINSURGENCY ...	77
Chapter 6, FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency: Developing Host-Nation Security Forces</i> ..	77
Chapter 7, FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency: Leadership and Ethics</i>	80
Chapter 8, FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency: Sustainment</i>	82
Appendix A, FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency: A Guide to Action</i>	84
Appendix B, FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency: Social Network Analysis</i>	86
Appendix C, FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency: Language and Indigenous Personnel</i>	91
Appendix D, FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency: Rule of Law</i>	93
Appendix E, FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency: Airpower</i>	96
Conclusion	98
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION.....	101
French Operational Alignment with FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency</i>	102
French Operational Divergence from FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency</i>	104
Unity of Effort.....	105
Ethically-Conducted Intelligence Operations	106
Information Operations	107
Legitimacy of Counterinsurgency Effort	108
Contrasts between French Efforts and FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency</i>	109
Shortfalls in French Efforts.....	110
Shortfalls in FM 3-24, <i>Counterinsurgency</i>	112
Conclusion	113
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	117
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	123

ACRONYMS

ALN	<i>Front de Libération Nationale</i> - National Liberation Army
CADD	Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
COE	Contemporary Operating Environment
COIN	Counterinsurgency
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FLN	<i>Armée de Libération Nationale</i> - National Liberation Front
FM	Field Manual
FMI	Field Manual, Interim
GW	Guerilla Warfare
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
HN	Host-Nation
IRW	Irregular Warfare
JP	Joint Publication
MTLD	<i>Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques</i> – Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties
OAS	<i>Organisation Armée Secrète</i> – Organization Secret Army
OE	Operating Environment
SAS	<i>Spéciale Administracion Section</i> – Special Administration Section
SAU	<i>Spéciale Administracion Urbaines</i> – Special Administration Urban
U.S.	United States
UW	Unconventional Warfare

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Map of Algeria.....	22
Figure 2. Example of Simple Network.....	88
Figure 3. Example of Link Diagram	89
Figure 4. Example of French SNA of FLN in Algiers, 1958.	91

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On all these points he {*Trinquier*} is instructive and one can only wish that, for example, American commanders going to Iraq would have understood as he did the importance of such measures as the use of national identity cards or, conversely, the futility of such measures as large-scale sweeps through insurgent areas, inaccurate aerial bombing, or hunkering down in fortified bases separated from the population they are seeking to protect.¹

Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*

France faced a very difficult insurgency in Algeria in the mid-1950s with the rise of anti-colonial sentiment and desires for sovereignty from the National Liberation Front (FLN).² The FLN was a political and military group initially determined to gain political sovereignty for Arab Algerians and expulsion of French colonial rule. Later into the insurgency, the FLN pursued the introduction of Islamic values back into the Algerian culture as a stated objective of the conflict. The FLN fought in a manner reminiscent of the guerrilla war theorist, Mao Tse-tung, who refined his principles of guerrilla warfare in China during the Communist Revolution of the 1920s and 1930s, further still in the war against Japan in the 1930s and 1940s, and finally during the Chinese civil war of the late 1940s. The FLN sought mass support from the populace, organized into both a political and military wing, sought international recognition, and used terrorism in urban areas as well as conventional and unconventional methods in rural areas.³ The French experience in Algeria illustrates what happens when a modern, Western military engages an insurgency by solely focusing on military applications to the tactical problem. The French developed many methods to combat the insurgency in Algeria which varied from the widespread use of torture and harsh interrogation, to unique and innovative

intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) techniques, to aggressive military patrolling and action. Yet, the French were expelled from Algeria. The French were unable to properly grasp the root causes of the insurgency and counter the revolutionary message of the insurgency, and their harsh treatment of the population negated any successes they had.

Problem Statement

The challenges the French faced in Algeria are similar to the challenges facing U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in support of the Global War on Terrorism; specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan. FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, is the guiding doctrinal manual now being employed by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. is entering its fourth year in Iraq and much like the French in the early years of their involvement in Algeria, struggling to develop and disseminate a comprehensive and broadly accepted approach to counterinsurgency. As stated earlier, the French experience in Algeria illustrates what happens when a military develops a counterinsurgency strategy too slowly, and with little regard to anything but the military equation. U.S. doctrine should be properly grounded in historical lessons and validated premises, or may face similar results as the French in Algeria.

Thesis

The French experiences in Algeria illustrate that military methods may not provide the sole solution to defeating an insurgency. Therefore, the analysis of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* compared to French practices indicates that the manual is a more comprehensive guide to effective counterinsurgency strategy.

This thesis investigates, through an examination of French experiences combating an insurgency in Algeria from 1954-1962 whether the lessons learned of that period have been incorporated into current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. The paper examines the French counterinsurgency doctrine in Algeria and the role it played in French operations. It also looks at the national strategy of France and the history of Algeria and European involvement in the country. This paper focuses on the role international legitimacy plays in counterinsurgency operations. Its main focus is differences and similarities in FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* and French methods of 1954-1962. It also relates the failure of the French military in Algeria to U.S. doctrine to today's contemporary operating environment. Clearly, the scope and importance of understanding and implementing counterinsurgency doctrine rapidly to the force is illustrated daily by U.S. and Coalition efforts in Iraq. They are highlighted in the increasing tensions between the East and the West, between Muslim, Christian, and Jew in an almost clockwork fashion.

Definitions

The two most important definitions required for this thesis are the definitions of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, dated October 2007, defines insurgency as “an armed uprising or revolt against the established political or civil authority through means of irregular warfare, conventional warfare, terrorism, or all of them combined.”⁴ JP 1-02 defines counterinsurgency (COIN) as simply “the actions taken by the established civil or political authority to counter the insurgency.”⁵ According to FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, insurgents use the following approaches to wage war: conspiratorial, military-focused, urban, protracted popular war, identity-

focused, and composite and coalition approaches.⁶ All of these approaches are important to defining an insurgency and the response methods of established authority as well as clearly defining the boundaries of research for the thesis.

Generally, it is accepted that insurgent groups use terrorism and unconventional warfare (UW) as methods of the insurgency. Therefore, it is important to define both terms. JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)* dated 30 April 2004 defines terrorism as “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”⁷ Unconventional warfare is defined as “a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominately conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, and sometimes equipped by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare (GW) and other direct offensive, covert, or clandestine operations as well as indirect acts of subversion and sabotage.”⁸

Other important definitions to types of warfare are critical to understanding the complex nature of insurgencies. Often, revolutionary warfare, guerilla warfare, or terrorism is used interchangeably. However, they are not the same. Revolutionary warfare, based heavily on the writings of Mao Tse-tung, espouses the importance of protracted struggle, strength of will, and political considerations over military action. Revolutionary warfare has a political objective and seeks to completely overthrow the social, economic, and political order existing in a country or region. Guerilla warfare is generally a tool used in countering government legitimacy and influence.

It is also important to define time periods used within this thesis. The French

were in Algeria since 1830. However, the period of time between 1954 and 1962 is the focus of this study. Ultimately, counterinsurgency success should be defined as defeat of the insurgency and continued exercise of governmental control by the existing civil and political authority. An additional definition pertinent to this thesis is the definition of contemporary operating environment (COE). FM 7-100.1, *Opposing Force (OPFOR) Operations* dated December 2004 defines COE as “the operational environment that exists today and for the clearly foreseeable future.”⁹ This is broken out further by FM 7-100.1 into critical variables that include sociological demographics, physical environment, time, military capabilities, and national will among others.¹⁰ This is the threat environment facing the U.S. military.

Limitations

The primary limitation for this thesis is the existing data and sources for determining the accepted French doctrine for counterinsurgency during the time period. While there are many sources written on the order of battle, methods used and results achieved, there is little available official written information on the exact doctrine used by the French military. Much of the writing on doctrine comes from informal outlets such as personal and professional writings and operational orders of the time. Additionally, a second limitation rests with the inherent difficulty of comparing and contrasting the French experience in Algeria and the U.S. doctrine on insurgencies. Every insurgency is different with different motivations for all those involved (governmental, military, insurgent, and civilian). FM 3-24 is designed to be broad, not specific to one region or type of insurgency. Some of the important aspects of the French experience in Algeria have no relevance to the thesis and thus limit the scope of applied

doctrine.

Constraints

The primary constraint imposed on the research will be the restriction to a specific time period. As the events in Algeria are researched, the majority of information significant to the thesis will be from the period of 1954-1962. There are other times periods in Algerian and French history that may shed additional light on the subject, but those periods cover a broad range of events and historical realities and would be too broad in scope for this thesis. Another constraint will be the need to provide a brief but detailed review of the development of U.S. doctrine as it pertains to counterinsurgency, while maintaining an overall focus on current doctrine encompassed in FM 3-24, specifically the December 2006 publication. It will also be important to limit the focus on national strategy and policy. Counterinsurgencies are as much about politics as they are about military or economic efforts. The focus of this thesis is to the actions within the elements directly fighting or impacting the counterinsurgency. It will require background and supporting evidence related to political will and national strategy, but it will primarily fall on the actions at the political-military (POLMIL - generally used at the ambassadorial level and defined in JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, dated October 2007 as the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic factors at the operational level) which highlight the efforts of the actual combatants.¹¹ This is a difficult constraint, but necessary to create a feasible research thesis. Finally, there are good historical case studies of counterinsurgencies, but this thesis will limit the discussion to Algeria. The Algerian War was a significant insurgency, costly in terms of blood and “national treasure”, and is represented by solid,

researchable information to answer the thesis question.

Assumptions

There are some important assumptions required to complete this thesis. It is the basic belief that regardless of motivating factors for the insurgents, a pan-Arab nationalist insurgency, a sectarian-driven insurgency, or Communist-based insurgency, they all approach their objective in a similar manner. In other words, regardless of desired end-state (sovereign, secular state free from colonial rule, or an Islamic law-based state), the insurgency is still an insurgency and therefore comparable to any other insurgency in history. Additionally, it is an important assumption that political will and national strategy are more important to defeating an insurgency than pure military operations. Military objectives must be nested in national strategy to successfully counter an insurgency. Finally, it is an important assumption that the centers of gravity to insurgencies rest within the population. It is not that this is the only way in which insurgencies can succeed, but it is the support and tolerance of the population that legitimacy is most critically established.

Literature Review

There is a large body of research available on the general politics, social dimensions, and French military operations of the period of the Algerian War. These sources range from newspaper articles chronicling events to detailed theory and analysis of counterinsurgency techniques and principles. However, the relationship between French experiences and current U.S. doctrine in FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* has not been examined. For this thesis the referenced information falls generally within one of

five categories: counterinsurgency (COIN) theory, historical / personal accounts, torture and ethics in counterinsurgencies, geo-political studies, and miscellaneous. Areas of research such as French methods or order of battle fall across several categories. U.S. doctrinal analysis and historical anecdotes also fall across several categories.

Counterinsurgency Theory

The principle issue at study in this thesis is counterinsurgency warfare and how lessons of the past may or may not support present accepted theories. Recognized as one of the seminal works relating to counterinsurgent warfare, French Colonel and veteran of Algeria David Galula's *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* is an excellent source that analyzes counterinsurgencies from both a political and military standpoint. Its suitability as a source is that it provides an excellent summary of strengths and weaknesses of guerilla warfare. Additionally, Galula has written another outstanding source on the same subject matter, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956 – 1958*. While many of the key areas of study are in both resources, *Pacification in Algeria* adds another dimension. Galula served as an officer in Algeria during the war and provides personal experiences that augment his writings on the theory of counterinsurgency. Key tenets within *Pacification in Algeria* focus on the importance of the populace in an insurgency, the need to focus operations within urban centers, and the pitfalls of not having a counterinsurgency doctrine. Another source with similar authority is French Colonel (and veteran of Indochina and Algeria) Roger Trinquier's *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*. This reference is again a personal yet analytical study of counterinsurgency theory. It provides an excellent discussion on intelligence and tactical operations conventional forces can conduct in support of the counterinsurgency effort.

Both Galula and Trinquier are essential to understanding “*la guerre révolutionnaire*”, the French counter-revolutionary warfare concept discussed in this thesis.

Another principle source in this category is *Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare*, edited by Sam Sarkesian. Mr. Sarkesian was both a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army and academic who brought together a compilation of theorists that focus on the multi-dimensional aspect of insurgent warfare. Ranging from ideological content to practical application of theory, this volume provides a thorough analysis of the varied aspects of guerrilla warfare necessary as a foundation for this thesis. Again, the re-occurring fact of these compilations is the study of the political and social dynamics of this type of warfare.

A slightly more contemporary study of counterinsurgency theory is college professor and lecturer Bard E. O’Neill’s book *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*. Dr. O’Neill explores insurgencies with respect to strategies, goals, and governmental responses to insurgent activities. Dr. O’Neill spends a significant amount of time within the book speaking to ideological motivations to insurgencies and their root causes. While not a primary source for this thesis, the reference is invaluable in providing a contemporary view to previous insurgencies.

Another significant research source for this thesis is the historian and journalist Robert Taber’s *The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice*. Essentially, the critical tenet within Mr. Taber’s writings is that guerrilla warfare, much like conventional warfare, is an extension of politics, of the battle between the “have’s and have-nots.”¹² The strength in this publication is its ability to add solid insight into the connection between politics, revolutionary movements, and the growth of political

terrorism.

There is also a growing body of contemporary literature addressing counterinsurgencies, in theory and practice. Certainly, since the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly as the war progresses, there has been a dramatic increase in writings on the subject. Many of the writings reach back to previous examples of insurgencies, and Algeria and the French involvement is a common subject. Many other additional writings include re-prints and updated additions of previous works such as *The Counter Insurgency Manual* by Leroy Thompson, a U.S. Air Force officer who has written extensively on security, personal protective services, and counterinsurgencies. This particular source discusses multiple insurgencies and their outcomes against the backdrop of Mao's principles. Again, this is an excellent source for the thesis in terms of identifying and explaining the basic foundations and lines of operations of an "insurgency" or guerrilla warfare. Several books like *The Roots of Counter-Insurgency: Armies and Guerrilla Warfare, 1900 - 1945*, edited by Ian Beckett are compilations by several distinguished authors and theorist in military doctrine and counterinsurgency methods.

Ultimately, there is no shortage of writing available on basic COIN theory. This thesis will attempt to use a cross-section of available writings, but the pre-dominate reference to be used will be FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. FM 3-24 is the key document for review and comparison against the case study of Algeria. It is the principle source and focus of this thesis. Along with some of the previous manuals, such as FMI 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations* dated October 2004, and the MCWP 3-33, *Counterinsurgency* (the Marine Corps version of FM 3-24), there is plenty of available

US doctrine and theory related to the subject of this thesis.

There are two non-field manual publications used extensively by this thesis for research on the development and evolution of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine.

Providing an outside look at U.S. Army doctrine development, author, historian, and professor Andrew Birtle's *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942 - 1976* (and its companion volume that covers from 1860 – 1941) provides a chronological examination of U.S. doctrine as it developed and the contributing factors to that development. Dr. Birtle focuses the discussion on doctrine evolution in two key areas, outside influences and internal organizational influences. Essentially, while doctrine has developed and been refined over decades, many of the fundamental causal factors counterinsurgency doctrine is designed to combat have not dramatically changed. Geographic factors and the political climate are greater impediments or precursors to change in doctrine than any realistic threat assessment.

Another outside view of doctrine development used extensively in this thesis is Dr. Wray Johnson's dissertation *From Counterinsurgency to Stability and Support Operations: The Evolution of U.S. Military Doctrine for Foreign Internal Conflict, 1961 – 1996*. Dr. Johnson is a former U.S. Air Force Special Operations officer, author, and historian. The thesis for Dr. Johnson's publication is that over the course of 50 years, despite intense commitment to insurgencies world-wide, U.S. doctrine has been mostly a rudimentary doctrine not greatly altered since U.S. involvement in Greece in the late 1940s. Dr. Johnson does attempt to validate, through strategic policy review why the national security bureaucracy has been unable to fully engage military policy towards the increasingly common mode of warfare: counterinsurgency.

A final area for counterinsurgency theory source documents for this thesis comes in several references on doctrinal issues associated with French experiences in Algeria. Dr. George Kelly's book *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947 – 1962* details the doctrinal struggles of the French Army through the aforementioned period. Dr. Kelly, an author and university professor, not only looks to analyze military doctrine of the French Army, but ties much of the discussion and in-depth analysis to the political framework of France. Edgar O'Ballance's book *The Algerian Insurrection 1954 - 1962* also takes French counterinsurgency "doctrine" and provides an interesting and straightforward account of the French efforts against the political and cultural tensions of the time. Despite not having a specific, written French military counterinsurgency doctrine of the period, there is a significant body of work on methods, tactics, and strategy of French experiences and their pertinence to today's operations such as Peter Paret's *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine* published by Princeton Studies in World Politics.

Historical and Personal Accounts

A substantial amount of this thesis' source material for French experiences in Algeria is found in historical accounts. Within this category, there is a wide variety of material, many of which serve several reference roles. Alistair Horne's work, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954 – 1962* is a well-written, easily-read historical narrative of events surrounding French involvement in Algeria underscoring both the brutal methods and chaotic environment of the time. Dr. Horne not only captures the historical context of the time, but provides tactical, operational, and political insight to both cultures represented in the war. It stands as a principle source for both its historical background

and for the political and social commentary of events as they unfolded. Another historical account in an individual narrative is author Ted Morgan's work, *My Battle of Algiers* which details Mr. Morgan's service as a newly drafted French soldier sent to Algeria in 1956 – 1957. The strength of this source for this thesis is the books' ability to add a tactical flavor to the French counterinsurgency effort from a simple enlisted soldier's perspective. Mr. Morgan uses his background in journalism to weave a vibrant and brutal story based in historical and first-hand accounts. For the background history of Algeria, three key publications were used for this thesis. First, the Library of Congress' *Algeria, A Country Study* (edited by Helen Metz) was invaluable in establishing a basic chronological perspective of the long history of Algeria. Covering Carthage to modern-day Algeria, the publication provided a significant overview of the rise of the nation-state of Algeria and the political, social, and cultural norms that impacted the development of the country. Secondly, Professor Charles-Robert Ageron's *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present* also provides a detailed historical account of Algeria focusing from the period generally viewed as the primary point of French conquest of Algeria through to the recent rise of Islamic militancy and secular strife of the 1990s. The political and cultural underpinnings analyzed within Dr. Ageron's book provide great insight into the causal factors of conflict for both the French and Algerians. Finally, Dr. Michael Willis' *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History* was another primary source of historical background for this thesis. Dr. Willis' publication focuses analysis on the origins of resistance and the rise of nationalism both leading up to the expulsion of the French as well as post-colonial influence Algeria of the 1960s and 1970s. The background historical context provides a

good summation of key events through Algeria's history and additionally links those events to insurgent goals and methods that gave rise to the FLN and other organizations.

Several multi-media presentations provide excellent interviews and analysis of all major players in the conflict, such as Gillo Pontecorvo's movie *The Battle of Algiers*. While much of the story is a fictional representation, it uses actually FLN members to reprise their real-life roles as well as being filmed on location in Algiers not long after the conflict ended. The movie is an excellent source for general information of the insurgency as well as visual representation of what events were like during the Battle of Algiers. In addition, the special edition DVD also has first-person interviews of key FLN members and French Army officers who provide historical record of events told with insight by the people who conducted the missions, ordered the bombings, and fought each other intensely for several years.

Torture and Ethics in Counterinsurgencies

One of the more commonly studied areas of French involvement in counterinsurgency operations in Algeria has been in torture and the ethics of harsh interrogation procedures. It is not hard to find articles comparing U.S. abuses at Guantanamo or Abu Gharib to previous French abuses in Algeria. In fact, much of available literature tends to focus on French uses of torture providing tactical success, but illustrating how it was never linked to operational centers of gravity necessary to counter Maoist-modeled insurgencies.

This thesis does not just focus on torture as part of the comparison of intelligence tenets within FM 3-24. However, it is important for consideration in understanding overall counterinsurgency methods. One of the primary sources for this thesis comes

from Algerian veteran and French General Paul Aussaresses' book *The Battle of the Casbah: Counter-terrorism and Torture*. The significance of this source lies in the fact that torture can become institutionalized within counterinsurgency forces with simple justifications and highlights how insurgent warfare becomes personal, brutal, and often morally ambiguous. General Aussaresses' consistent stance on the justification of torture provides excellent insight to the potential pitfalls in counterinsurgent methods. Another publication previously mentioned, Roger Trinquier's *Modern Warfare*, also provides a similar insight. Both sources highlight the moral issues associated with counterinsurgent warfare and the blurred lines of success at any cost.

With the continued US struggles in Iraq, there is a significant growth of publications and articles relating to torture and the potential positive as well as negative impacts. A 2004 publication in History News Network by Shawn McHale titled *Torture Didn't Work for the French in Algeria Either* represents just a simple search of recent articles on torture and again attempts to analyze the moral implications within the strategic framework of counterinsurgent methods.

For the purposes of this thesis, the publications and sources relating to torture are primarily used in the comparison of ethics within counterinsurgent forces. Certainly, there are examples of successful torture sessions providing actionable, reliable intelligence to French forces during their experiences in Algeria. However, the sources used for this thesis are there to help focus second and third order effects in the strategic realm and operational lines of approach.

Geo-Political Studies

A fourth category typical of the sources used for this thesis is publications that

focus on geo-political analysis of the French in Algeria and insurgencies in general. Geo-political is defined as “a combination of geographic and political factors relating to or influencing a nation or region” or “the study of the relationship among politics and geography, demography, and economics, especially with respect to the foreign policy of a nation.”¹³ There are three primary sources used in this thesis that fall within this category. The first, James McDougall’s *History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria*, provides an analytical breakdown of the relationships between the Algerian political landscape of past and present and the rise of Arab nationalism and subsequent insurgency. It also links Islamic culture with political growth and brutal guerrilla warfare methods. Written as a historical narrative grounded with political analysis, this source provides an understanding of the populace and their political aspirations which are an integral part of any counterinsurgency theory.

Several sources link the insurgent desire for international recognition and support of political priorities with guerrilla warfare tenets. One such source is Professor Matthew Connelly’s *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era*. Dr. Connelly’s publication provided this thesis with a detailed analysis of the contributing political factors to the Algerian efforts at independence from colonial French rule. Again, using historical narrative and a detailed study of political agendas against cultural and social values, Dr. Connelly presents a case of geography, religion, and culture are as much at play in the political policies of insurgencies as military policies.

One additional important source in this category is another compilation publication edited by Martin Alexander and J.F.V. Keiger, political historians from

universities in the United Kingdom, titled *France and the Algerian War 1954 – 62: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy*. Drawing heavily on French governmental archives that became more available in the 1990s, the different authors focus discussion around French army training methods and practices against the political landscape of French government of the time. It is an effective source for providing political theory and reality nested with military attitudes and doctrine of the period.

Miscellaneous

The research requirements for this thesis are detailed and varied. Many sources provide information within multiple categories of the general trends of study. However, a few sources provide background not easily classified in other categories or pertinent only in the periphery. Author Jean Larteguy's *The Centurions* is a work of historical fiction that gives flavor and texture to the human landscape of French involvement in Algeria and Indochina. It is another view into the time and provides a general interest tone to this thesis.

Urban combat is a consistent requirement of counterinsurgencies throughout history. While *City Fights: Selected Histories of Urban Combat from World War II to Vietnam*, edited by Colonel John Antal, tends to focus on conventional forces engaged against conventional forces in urban terrain, two key chapters focus on the evolution of urban combat doctrine and lessons learned. They are valuable tools in understanding the nature and complexity of urban warfare which is an inherent part of most counterinsurgent efforts. This source has provided one of the few complete discussions of the evolution of US urban combat doctrine.

Methodology

The methodology used to compare and contrast French experiences in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 and U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is logical. It begins with the historical background of Algeria. Then, French counterinsurgency efforts, relevant methods and lessons will be analyzed.

Chapter 2 focuses on the history of French involvement in Algeria, and examines their experiences in Indochina in the post-WW II era. It briefly examines the course of the Algerian War as well as the history of Algeria. The critical area of study is the historical examination of French doctrine (informal and formal) relating to counterinsurgency development. This includes examination of the destructive, constructive, and civil-military efforts developed as part of the French comprehensive effort at combating the insurgency.

Chapter 3 and 4 examines French experiences against the two sections that make up the chapters of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. Chapter 3 analyzes the first six chapters of FM 3-24 which cover counterinsurgency campaign design. Chapter 4 analyzes the remaining 3 chapters and appendices that cover military support activities to counterinsurgencies. This leads to the conclusion in chapter 5, where a consideration of relevant lessons, as well as shortfalls between U.S. doctrine and French experiences is discussed.

Summary

Ultimately, the significance of this study is the continuing struggle to develop effective counterinsurgency doctrine, and the ever-increasing number of insurgencies world-wide. This thesis focuses analysis on the French experiences in Algeria to

determine if the valuable lessons learned in that conflict reflected in the capstone COIN manual of the U.S. military. Its significance is not to just highlight differences or point out specific failures; that is just one part of it. Doctrine can only be a guideline to point in a direction. Further analysis using historical context frames the subject into more meaningful models and allows for additional comparison between eras and events. It breaks the information into more manageable parts and then puts each into perspective against the other. The U.S. military is facing an operational challenge of far-reaching strategic and national import. Therefore, continued analysis, research, and commitment to the problem can only add to the body of knowledge.

¹LTC Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, London: Praeger Security International, 2006, ix. From Eliot Cohen's forward within the source identifying the importance of comparison to GWOT and OIF.

²Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, New York: Penguin Books, 1977, 24.

³George Armstrong Kelly, *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947 – 1962*, Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press, 1965, 303. Describes the success and focus on the urban areas during the FLN's perceived "second battle of Algiers."

⁴Dept. of Defense, JP (Joint Publication) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2003), 272. Amended 17 October 2007.

⁵*Ibid.*, 134.

⁶Dept. of the Army, FM (Field Manual) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, (Washington, D.C.: US Army TRADOC, 2006), 1-5. Taken from paragraph 1-25.

⁷Dept. of Defense, JP (Joint Publication) 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 1996), GL-7. Dated 26 June 1996. Amended June 2003.

⁸Ibid., GL-7.

⁹Dept. of the Army, FM (Field Manual) 7-100.1, *Opposing Force Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: US Army TRADOC, 2001), vi.

¹⁰Ibid., vii.

¹¹Dept. of Defense, JP (Joint Publication) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 423. Amended 17 October 2007.

¹²Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice*, New York: Stuart Publishing, 1965, 11. Discusses revolutionary warfare as the confrontation between those that have political and economic control and those that do not.

¹³The Free Dictionary, 2007. <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/geopolitical>, (accessed 17 April 2007). The study of the relationship among politics and geography, demography, and economics, especially with respect to the foreign policy of a nation.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

What in France is called “*la guerre d’Algerie*” and in Algeria “the Revolution” was one of the last and most historically important of the grand-style “colonial wars”, in the strictest sense of the words.¹

Alistair Horne, *Savage War of Peace*

Algerian history has been called a language detailing “the presence of the past” among the events of today.² Much the same could be said of French history, particularly as it relates to Algeria. To understand the scope and detail of the French-Algerian War experiences of both the French and Algerians and compare it to U.S. doctrine requires an understanding of the background of events. This chapter provides a brief study of the history of Algeria and French counterinsurgency experiences. In addition, it reviews the evolution of U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. It will attempt to lay the framework for the counterinsurgency doctrine that is analyzed in greater detail in a subsequent section.

History of Algeria

All too often, violence seems to be a singular distinguishing characteristic of Algerian history. Because of this, it is not difficult to accept that a brutal insurgency against a Western power occurred. However, this does not explain how much the influencing details of past events really had in shaping the insurgency of 1954 - 1962. A brief history of four periods in Algerian history significant establishes the context of the insurgency: pre-19th century (1500 – 1830); the forty years of colonial conquest (1830 – 1870); the height of colonial influence (1870 – 1950); and the years of rebellion (1954 –

1962).



Figure 1. Map of Algeria

Source: Graphic Map: Algeria, CIA World Fact Book, used with license by www.maps.com, Location Map #1, Magellan Geographic, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html>, CA, 1997 (accessed 21 June 2007).

The nomadic peoples of the North African region had coalesced into a group of inhabitants known as the Berbers by 900 B.C.³ From the time of Carthage (800 B.C.), through the Romans (24 A.D.), the peoples of this region fought to maintain sovereignty and independence from successive invasions and settlements. A dramatic change came with the spread of Islam in 642 AD.⁴ It took a long time for the Jewish and Christian communities to be marginalized by the growth of Islam in the region, but eventually a

successive series of Muslim dynastic kingdoms rose to prominence and ruled the region between 662 and 1492 A.D.⁵ The “European Offensive” came with the growth of Christian Spain’s influence in the area as Muslim society in North Africa and southern Europe was suppressed through by the Spanish Inquisition.⁶ Between 1516 and 1587, the Ottoman Turks gained influence in the region, ultimately basing in Algiers and Tunis. They maintained that influence until the French conquest. The most important aspect of this period for Algeria is the important influence of Islam, brought about by the ever-increasing control exerted by the Ottoman-chosen provincial governors, know as *beylerbeys*.⁷ It was also under the Ottoman Turks that Algeria was given its basic geographic shape based on the boundaries of provincial administrative districts.⁸ The continued intrigue, assassination, subversion, and combat of the city-states and regional tribes mark this era as a violent, yet progressive period lasting between 1529 and 1566. The incessant revolts of the Berber tribes were contained by the Ottomans who, though waning in power as French influence grew in the region, maintained firm control on the country by militarizing the government. They played the divisions and rivalries of the *coffs*⁹ (tribal factions) against each other, and utilized the influence of the Sufi brotherhoods (deeply loyal troops converted to Islam and forming lodges much like the Knights Templar’s of the past) to maintain control.¹⁰

In June of 1830, a force of 34,000 French soldiers invaded Algeria as part of a plan originally envisioned by Napoleon as early as 1808.¹¹ Previously, in 1827, France had imposed a naval blockade of Algiers after failing relations with the ruling Ottoman administrators led to increased tensions.¹² The restored Bourbon monarchy of France, invaded in response to a political slight and to distract from increasing domestic unrest,

and the changing political dynamics of Europe. With French prestige waning, the motivation for a French invasion could be summed up in the phrase, “it would be a useful distraction from political trouble at home.”¹³ By July 1830, French forces had captured Algiers from the Turkish forces.¹⁴ The French government had intended to form an Arab or Moorish government to run Algeria and remove France from garrisoning the area and embroiling themselves in the political responsibilities as long as trade continued from the region. Before this could happen, the monarchy of King Charles X was brought down and King Louis Philippe rose to the throne. From 1830 to 1834 as the French government sought to regain order at home, the Muslim population of Algeria focused inward and fought a succession of bloody sectarian-driven conflicts among tribes and thus did not force the Christian invaders out. This also marked a period of great influx of European settlers (French, Spanish, and Germanic) to the region. And despite the official position of the French government on “restricted occupation”, army officers in Algeria pursued a policy of anti-Arab control.

Several prominent Arab leaders attempted to establish their dominance of the region before France formed a specific policy for Algeria. This period was marked by extreme violence between rival religious and secular Arab factions throughout the country and region. Finally, in 1841 the French decided on a program of “a war of devastation” and over the course of the next two years launched an expedition that methodically ravaged all territory not under French control in an effort to pacify the countryside.¹⁵ The French continued their expedition pushing into Morocco in an attempt to apply the same policy to the tribes of that region. For the French these campaigns were bloody affairs, and cost them more men than any other colonial

conquest. Deficiencies in supply and medical support proved costly.¹⁶ This period of colonial expansion marked a time of extending French administration and law which saw the reduction in influence of Muslim institutions. This placed the Muslim population on a lower cultural status than the occupying Europeans. Uncultivated land was taken over by European settlers called *colons* and by 1847 nearly 109,000 European settlers had entered Algeria.¹⁷ Wanting to feel secure in their lands (lands usurped from the native population both by military influence and economic manipulation), the *colons* pushed for the government in Paris to make the civil territory of Algeria an integral part of France itself. The French Constitution of 1848 declared Algeria to be French national territory.¹⁸

The next ten years marked a period of administrative and political domination by the French and European settlers; further reducing Muslim institutions and increasingly dividing and forcing the ethnic populace into poverty and servitude. This time of great colonial expansion, referred to as the “Hegemony of the *Colons*,” reflected dramatic political and social change in Europe. It paved the way for great economic growth of the *colons* and merchants in Algeria as they capitalized on trade, commerce, and the immigration of European settlers.¹⁹ Under Napoleon III, France attempted to regain its position of preeminence in Europe, but was defeated by Prussia in 1871. The loss reduced French prestige and influence and stopped the growing liberal policy towards French colonial holdings throughout the world further preventing any change in the economic and political dominance by the minority European *colons* in Algeria.²⁰ The economic growth and influence of the *colons* continued despite growing resentment and cries of revolt from the Muslim population. The departure of the army to fight against Prussia had signaled a chance for the Arab population to respond to the confiscation of

their lands, rule by European mayors, and civil law and justice dispensed by juries of *colons* without regard for traditional Islamic values and Arab culture.²¹ Prominent tribal leaders and ethnic groups attempted to regain power regionally within Algeria, but had a tendency to focus on old hatreds among the tribal factions and never gained unity of effort against the returning French Army. A series of local revolts against French administrative rule were either poorly executed or never realized. The *colons*, who had gained control of many of the key positions in the Algerian government, pursued a brutal policy of repression intended to terrorize the natives into submission once and for all. While it succeeded in meeting that goal, it also established a deep resentment among the ethnic tribes of Algeria. The *colons*, along with successive governor-generals of Algeria, sought to prevent any national identity and breakdown the resistance of Arab society.

This period, from 1845 – 1858, also saw the development by civil authorities of communities that were administered and controlled by French authorities. The *communes' mixtes*, or mixed communities, would have approximately 20-30,000 Muslim inhabitants governed by a uniformed administrator who exacted taxes from the inhabitants, in some ways isolating the Arab population from their own lands.²² The communes were administered by Europeans appointed by the governor-general.²³ Local law was enacted and enforced through that administration. Schools and other social institutions were managed as well, further reducing traditional Islamic culture. All of this kept a majority Muslim population from administering their own municipalities, as well as forcing, by economic necessity, more Muslims to locate in the communes in the first place.

Both private and government-supported colonization became the rule and a new

period of European settlement, specifically focused towards the rural areas occurred in this period. *Colon* landowners changed the names of towns and villages, continued to buy at favorable prices (or simply take control by force or through biased governmental policy) the best farm land, and repeatedly denigrated Muslim social institutions by promoting policies that placed European systems of governance and social conduct above that of traditional Islamic culture. The Algerian Muslim elite and secular progressive Arab political leaders, who enjoyed some political and economic influence, thought of gaining equality by legitimate political means. These Muslim elites, generally tolerated by the *colons* for their western-style approach to politics and moderate religious and cultural views, had thought they could access French legislation and law to change the status quo in Algeria. They advocated a policy of staying a province of France if the situation improved. They had come to believe in the liberal philosophy of democracy espoused by the European settlers. They sought French citizenship and to remain part of France, not necessarily expulsion of French rule. Yet, they were French subjects, not French citizens.

As the 1920s gave way to the 1930s, Paris and many parts of urban France was experiencing a growth of communist organizations and political parties directly related to post-World War I communist influences. This internal French political strife forced focus away from the changes occurring in North Africa. In Algeria, rising Arab nationalism began to express itself across all classes of native population. Part of this growth in nationalism can be attributed to the initiatives of several prominent *ulema*²⁴ (class of Muslim legal scholars engaged in fields of study of Islamic law such as shari'a law) like Abd el-Hamid Ben Badis, who espoused a movement for Islamic reform and a

restoration of faith to its original purity.²⁵ Ultimately, despite initial slow acceptance of the religious aspect of these initiatives, the principles resonated with Algerians because they spoke to the majority who believed Algeria had its own history, religious unity, language, culture, and traditions; that it was not part of France.

In 1936, the Popular Front, a left-wing political party opposed to colonialism, came to power in France and seemed sympathetic to the Algerians demand for political equality and religious freedom.²⁶ However, in Algeria, the European population opposed a conciliatory approach to the Arab population and continued to impede any reform. Before political events could come to a head, France was defeated by Nazi Germany in 1940. Afterwards, the Vichy government of Marshal Petain, gave representation to both Europeans and Muslims from Algeria in the National Council.²⁷ The Allied landings in 1942 gave further hope to the Arab Algerians, and by 1944 most legal and administrative discriminations against Muslims had been abolished. Muslim Algeria expected full independence as a result of the German surrender. Demonstrations in support of independence turned into bloody riots and clashes between European settlers and Muslim Algerians as the *colons* reacted to the growing Arab nationalism. The *colons*, backed by the European-dominated police and constabulary, were fearful of backlash from native Algerians, as well as the potential loss of economic wealth. In May 1945, in the town of Setif, this example of Arab nationalism and *colon* reprisals came to a head during a celebration within the town.²⁸ The Muslim demonstration turned violent, and, most likely urged on by more militant members within the demonstration, resulted in violent attacks and murders against European residents. The army, using aggressive, historically harsh Senegalese units, moved in to restore control.²⁹ When it was over, nearly 103

Europeans and over 15,000 Muslims had been killed.³⁰

Once again, the *colons* had re-asserted control and repressed the Arab population. Algerian nationalism continued to grow as the Arab population grew more frustrated at the lack of fundamental political reform; reform promised in the initial post-World War II period and granted to other North Africa nations. Decreasing French military power due to commitments and then defeat in Indochina, encouraged the rapid growth of an armed and highly organized revolt against colonial rule. As the country moved closer to that revolt, the population had become dramatically polarized. By 1954, nearly one million *colons* made up only about 10% of the total population.³¹ In 1954, revolt and warfare broke out between Algerian insurgents and the French. The French attempted political reform but it was too late. As late as 1956, no more than 8 out of 864 higher administrative positions were held by Muslims within the Algerian provincial leadership.³²

French Counterinsurgency Experience in Indochina (1946 – 1954)

To understand the methods employed and the organizations formed to fight in Algeria, it is first important to understand where those elements came from. For the French, Algeria was not the first time that their military had faced an anti-colonial insurgency. Other experiences, particularly in Indochina and in other parts of North Africa informed the French response. Indochina was crucible of real experience for France when facing an insurgency. Indochina was the catalyst for serious intellectual thought and analysis by military and academic elites in France. These ideas were carried by the French veterans of the Asian conflict to Algeria.

France had attempted to reassert control and influence in Indochina after W.W. II.

In the post-W.W. II vacuum, France had believed that if they did not rush to reassert their colonial claim on Indochina, Britain or the U.S. might interfere. The U.S. pressure on the Dutch after W.W. II to withdraw from Indonesia was an example highlighting French concerns.³³ The Japanese had filled the administrative void following the collapse of the French in 1940, but the conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists in China kept the region unstable. A growing Vietnamese nationalist movement, spurred by Ho Chi Minh and others, worked to keep French influence from the region. Lacking any real strength in the region after the defeat of the Japanese, the French still pushed to return to the pre-war status quo in Indochina. Eventually the issue came to a head with the Viet Minh, the Vietnamese communist and nationalist movement led by Ho Chi Minh, who fought to gain sovereignty from French colonial rule. From 1947 to 1954, French forces engaged in guerrilla and conventional warfare with the Viet Minh who were supported by China and the Soviet Union. To the Viet Minh and Ho Chi Minh, it was a political war, therefore, in accordance with Maoist revolutionary philosophy, a total war.³⁴

From 1950 to 1954, the war in Indochina had a familiar theme throughout; the French assured communication and contact by day, the Viet Minh by night; the French maintained control of the towns and the main highway, the Viet Minh maintained control of the rural areas, the isolated villages, and the footpaths. The French forces were limited in effectiveness by size and insufficient mobility. Forever seeking pitched battle with Viet Minh forces, only twice did the French succeed at the operational level in doing so; in 1951 when Viet Minh General Giap's launched a poorly planned major conventional offensive against French forces, and later in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu.³⁵ At the time of Dien Bien Phu, the French government was suffering from internal political weakness,

and a new French government was pushing for a limited victory or stalemate, including a continued presence and influence of French power in the region. However, the military strategy was not in line with political strategy. The French rushed to force an issue with the Viet Minh before the end of the Korean War permitted Chinese influence in Indochina to grow. This led French forces to their precarious position in Dien Bien Phu. Dien Bien Phu was "the first time that a non-European colonial independence movement had evolved through all the stages from guerrilla bands to a conventionally organized and equipped army able to defeat a modern Western occupier in pitched battle".³⁶ The political fallout of Dien Bien Phu would spell defeat for French forces.

Ultimately, the experience gained in Indochina convinced the French of the need to challenge the classical idea of warfare.³⁷ The conventional battles of W.W. II did not fit the battle ground of Indochina. Pacification had been an operative word for actions in Indochina, but the French military pursued it mostly by military means. The Viet Minh had proven exceptionally adept at subversive and propaganda techniques either through their well-established communist political apparatus or through terror and reprisals at the tactical level. The economic, social, and ideological terrains were becoming major battlefields in their own right. The French military turned inward in an attempt to determine their reasons for failure. To the returning veterans from Indochina it seemed their principal fault lay in not understanding the revolutionary ideas of a Marxist enemy. The French began to look for solutions in sociology and politics. Eventually, this would lead to the informal development of a counter-revolutionary warfare doctrine known as *La guerre révolutionnaire*. Not a formally adopted doctrine, *la guerre révolutionnaire* focused on the fight for the population: win the population means win the war of

ideology, which in turn brings victory in combat. The experiences of Indochina, taken to heart by a self-critical and shaken French military, were the catalyst for the emergence of this new counterrevolutionary theory.

Le Guerre Revolutionnaire

La guerre révolutionnaire was not formally adopted as doctrine by the French Army. Described as a “diagnosis and prescription” by influential French officers and career soldiers (almost all of them returning veterans of Indochina), it addressed the chief failure of the Western world as they perceived it.³⁸ Principally, it was a failure of the Western world to meet the challenge posed by atheistic Communist subversion and revolutionary warfare.³⁹ Primarily expressed through the private and professional writings of these influential officers, the new doctrine focused on what was believed to be the key aspect of the battlefield, the support and allegiance of the people.⁴⁰ By providing an alternate ideology to the population, a Western military could defeat a revolutionary movement. That alternate ideology adopted by the French was based on liberal democracy with strong Christian overtones.⁴¹

Using Indochina as the example, coupled with post-WW II intellectual analysis of the casual factors of “small wars” and “wars of liberation” as insurgencies were being increasingly referred to when describing counterrevolutionary warfare, would require three specific tasks to be effective. First, operations must be more destructive to the insurgent. This required smaller, more lethal, more mobile forces with a focused targeting effort on insurgent leadership and capabilities. Secondly, destructive operations must be coupled with political-psychological operations, referred to as *actione psychologique*.⁴² Essentially, this meant political indoctrination in democratic ideology,

as well as aggressive psychological operations to counter enemy information operations, at least at the tactical level. Thirdly, constructive operations must be joined with the previous two to complete the approach. Constructive operations are civil-military and administrative operations. The execution of these three tasks rested on the incorporation of five key counterinsurgency fundamentals: isolation of the insurgents from the population; providing security to the population; executing effective targeting of insurgent forces and leadership; establishing French political legitimacy and effective indigenous political and military forces; and establishing a robust intelligence capability.⁴³

The French-Algerian War (1954 – 1962)

As the French struggled with these new approaches and methods for conducting counterrevolutionary warfare, the situation in Algeria had evolved into a war. A series of terrorist attacks and armed bands raiding the rural areas in 1954 signaled the beginnings of insurrection. *Front de Liberation Nationale* (FLN – National Liberation Front) announced its presence dramatically on 1 November 1954 with attacks and diplomatic posturing. The attacks went beyond the ability of the French police and government in Algeria to handle. From 1954 to 1962, the FLN waged a guerilla war against France and the French military for control of Algeria.

Rise of the FLN/ALN

While the French military was reeling from Indochina and struggling with a period of self-reflection and institutional change, the Algerian nationalism movement itself was going through a period of change, consolidation, and development. The 1920s

and 1930s had seen a rapid rise of several Algerian nationalist and independence movements that eventually coalesced into the National Liberation Front and National Liberation Army (FLN and ALN). The Etoile Nord-Africaine (North African Star) was one of the first modern Algerian nationalist organizations, followed by the Algerians People's Party (PPA) in 1937.⁴⁴ Both organizations were founded by Ahmed Ben Messali Hadj, an Algerian-born nationalist living in France.⁴⁵ Both organizations were suppressed by the French government and Messali was imprisoned for several years. In 1943, another nationalist, Ferhat Abbas, formerly a supporter of integration with France, released his Manifesto of the Algerian People.⁴⁶ The manifesto abandoned assimilation, outlined the evils of colonial rule and denounced the continued oppression of Muslims. The events and requirements of W.W. II put most of the issues on hold. However, after the Setif violence and several other clashes between *colons*, French forces, and native Algerians, many political leaders like Abbas believed independence could only be achieved through non-peaceful means.

When Messali Hadj was released from confinement in 1944, he returned to Algeria and co-founded the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD).⁴⁷ Recent French political reforms had resulted in the formation of an Algerian Assembly, giving political power to Algerian Muslims; replaced mixed communes with elected local councils; and abolished some military governmental-control throughout Algeria. In 1947, the MTLD swept municipal elections. Despite these changes, very little real political power had been granted to the native Algerians. The gap between the objectives of the Algerians and reality widened.

In 1952, a clandestine group, called the Special Organization (OS), was created

within the MTL D to further promote independence through terrorist operations when political protest by legal means was suppressed. By 1950, French police actions had broken the OS and other groups, and with continued political and economic suppression by the *colons*, the MTL D began to lose its influence. In 1952, anti-French demonstrations precipitated by the OS led to Messali Hadj's arrest and deportation to France.⁴⁸ An activist group within the MTL D and led by Ahmed Ben Bella, a political activist who had headed up the OS, took advantage of the situation and formed a new underground action committee.⁴⁹ Known as the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (CRUA), the group was based in Cairo and began organizing a complex military network within Algeria while at the same time attempting to acquire arms, funds, and international support for the coming struggle. The CRUA and remnants of the MTL D merged under Ben Bella, and by October 1954 renamed themselves the National Liberation Front (FLN) and assumed the responsibility for the political direction of the revolution.⁵⁰ At the same time, the FLN formed a military wing, the National Liberation Army (ALN) focused on using terror and guerilla warfare to force independence. In its orientation, the FLN had a loose socialist ideology within a Muslim framework. Broadly, the organization sought total sovereignty from France, equality for native Muslims, agrarian reform within Algeria, and a nationalized and governmentally-controlled economy independent of foreign influence.⁵¹ The ALN was organized into two levels: 30,000 soldiers training and operating outside Algeria and by 1957 an estimated 20,000-50,000 guerrilla fighters operating in cells within Algeria.⁵² When the FLN launched a series of attacks against military installations, police posts, warehouses, and public utilities on the morning of 1 November 1954, it signaled the start of the War of

Independence within Algeria.⁵³ By the time of the attacks, the FLN had established a government in exile, began equipping and training a conventional army in Tunisia and Morocco, and developed a complex network of political and military cells within Algeria. By 1956, almost all Muslim nationalist movements within Algeria had joined the FLN.

The Height of the Insurgency (1954 – 1960)

The initial military actions of the FLN, while varied, were limited in scope and failed to mobilize sizeable support from the Muslim population. However, the French government did not act decisively but rather attempted outdated political solutions hoping to buy time and reduce tensions without loss of political capital. Many political leaders in Paris viewed much of the terrorism as a police-action and not as serious as the first reports indicated. They underestimated the strength and resolve of the FLN and Algerian nationalism in general. The police and military were slow to react and unprepared for the growing violence of the insurgency. Once awakened to the threat, however, the French counterinsurgency efforts intensified, despite what appeared as an ill-conceived approach.

In 1955, continuous attacks against governmental and economic centers, and Europeans in general intensified. Most of the limited political and social reforms attempted were too late and too little to stem the growing nationalism and anger over the harsh reprisals of the French military. In conjunction with the terrorist activities and unconventional warfare, worker strikes and disruption of economic systems added to the overall campaign. Another critical event occurred in 1956 that added to the tensions between the combatants was the Anglo-French landings in the Suez Canal area to take control from Egyptian President Nasser. The French involvement in the Suez further

discredited them in the eyes of the Arab world.

In late 1956, the terrorism had moved to key urban centers like Algiers and had become increasingly murderous and violent. European *colons* responded with vigilante tactics and a terrorist campaign of their own. French paratroopers moved into the city of Algiers in early 1957 and began operations which would last for nearly 1 year. Simultaneously, insurgent and terrorist elements battled French forces in the rural areas. Gradually, and with a large influx of troops from France, the military regained control of the countryside. As the French military fully employed the Special Administrative Sections (SAS or *Sections Administratives Spécialisées*), mobile striking groups, and population control measures, the armed wing of the insurgents began to lose its effectiveness and was in danger of being completely defeated.

By 1958, French forces intensified operations against FLN safe-havens in Tunisia through air strikes, naval cordon, and establishment of the Morice Line. However, these efforts brought international attention to and sympathy for the Algerian insurgents. French forces, though harsh in their methods, were successful in re-establishing control of key urban areas, particularly Algiers by the end of 1957 and early 1958. Combat continued in the rural areas, but gradually the insurgents' freedom of action was limited to occasional small-scale and high risk raids and ambushes. By 1960 most of the effective combat power of the insurgency had been defeated, captured, or killed.

Politics and French Departure from Algeria (1960 – 1962)

In 1960, elements within the French army, in concert with *colons*, staged an insurrection in Algeria. Dissatisfied with the political direction of the war, and what they perceived as a policy of surrender and lack of commitment, the attempted coup divided

the French military effort. Most of the army stayed loyal and the insurrection was put down. Again, in 1961, elements of the French army and the *colons* again attempted another revolt. It was intended to seize control of Algeria and topple President de Gaulle's regime in Paris.⁵⁴ This attempt also failed and President de Gaulle became more determined to abandon the *colons* and extricate France from Algeria for good. On 3 July 1962, following the Evian Accords which had decreed a cease-fire, France declared Algeria an independent country following near unanimous vote for sovereignty in a referendum held on the 1st of July.⁵⁵ Over the next year, nearly 1.4 million refugees, mostly *colons*, would leave Algeria for France and Europe.⁵⁶

France was highly successful in its tactical and operational approach to the insurgency: defeating the ALN as early as 1958. The French military employed varied and effective methods and formations ranging from the SAS to mobile striking groups. However, their strategic approach failed. Ultimately, defeat in the international and diplomatic arena, and flagging support and internal discord among the French domestic population were decisive. Additional contributing factors included the loss of legitimacy resulting from the French Army's use of torture and the highly disruptive counterinsurgency policy of *regroupement* and relocation. The FLN executed a skilled diplomatic campaign, keeping the international community focused on their issues and the colonialism of France. The FLN also executed a successful information campaign, publicizing French military atrocities and torture throughout the conflict. The French military involved itself in the domestic politics of both France and Algeria, which undermined domestic support for the military and called into question the loyalty of the Army. Independence for Algeria came because the French military did not decisively

influence the center of gravity of the insurgency. Although the battleground had, in fact, been the population, the counterinsurgency message of the French was not tailored to the primary grievances for the center of gravity: nationalism. The French military did not believe they faced a nationalist movement, but rather a Marxist-based insurgency. Their counter was democratic ideology coupled with Christian values. The insurgency in Algeria was one of nationalism and economic/ social independence. It would not be solved by maintaining the status quo of continued French colonial rule regardless of how much representation or reform was instituted by France.

French Counterinsurgency Efforts in Algeria

As the FLN/ALN escalated their attacks and efforts to gain independence, French forces were getting an opportunity to practice their emerging doctrine of counterrevolutionary warfare: *La guerre révolutionnaire. La guerre révolutionnaires'* overriding concern was the isolation of the population from the insurgency. In essence, the battleground was for the population. While it was not an established doctrine, it was practiced throughout the war. The three-pronged counterinsurgency approach (destructive, political-psychological, and constructive operations) employed by the French was not, at least initially, the officially accepted approach of the counterinsurgency effort. The French efforts became more nuanced and developed over time, but most of the techniques applied had their roots in Indochina.

Destructive Operations

Destructive operations or direct military operations were always a part of French counterinsurgency efforts. The French Army never neglected direct engagement of

insurgent forces. In May of 1955, French forces in Algeria numbered around 100,000.⁵⁷ By the autumn of 1956, there were approximately 400,000 troops on the ground, not counting police and paramilitaries.⁵⁸ The French Army fielded a significant strike ability complimented by a full range of other operational capabilities. These operational capabilities ranged from small-scale ambushes conducted at the platoon and company level, as well as regimental-sized ambushes, cordon and sweeps, and conventional-styled battalion operations in both rural and urban areas. Artillery, air power (particularly helicopter support), and mechanized/motorized forces were employed in support of operations.

Recognized as a critical requirement to destructive operations was the need to cut-off outside support and external safe havens to the insurgency, the French Army expended tremendous resources of men and material to create a *cordon sanitaire* along the entire Tunisian border.⁵⁹ A 200-mile long system of in-depth defenses was established. Named the Morice Line, the defenses included electrified fencing, large minefields, ground radars, pre-registered indirect fires, continually manned strong-points, and mobile striking teams (both vehicle and helicopter borne). Supported by naval and air interdiction, the Morice Line proved extremely effective in cutting off the external support to the insurgency.⁶⁰ A similar *cordon sanitaire* was built along the Moroccan border as well, but not to the same detail as on the Tunisian border.⁶¹ A key component of this effort was the employment of mobile forces: elite mechanized, armored, and parachute forces were employed to respond to attempted breaches in the line. It proved costly to the insurgents, as their attempts to breach were decisively defeated by the combined arms of air power, artillery, defense in-depth, and well-trained mobile forces.

Additionally, combat operations were mounted throughout the country to eliminate the internal insurgent forces. These operations coincided with other efforts to provide security for the population, protect vital governmental facilities, and keep pressure on the insurgents. The French targeted the insurgent leadership and military capability. To facilitate these efforts, the country was divided into quadrants. The concept was called *quadrillage*, and was implemented in 1956.⁶² *Quadrillage* provided both a destructive and constructive mission. Under the destructive operations, each quadrant in the system was assigned a garrison force with the goal of not only securing and defending vital locations, but also providing a standing force capable of conducting rapid and decisive sweeps and ambushes, maintaining a continued presence in an area through repeated patrolling and contact, and reacting quickly to pursue insurgent elements.

The garrison force was tailored to the threat and environment of their area of operations.⁶³ *Quadrillage* lent itself readily to large-scale cordons with the intent to “pacify” regions. The garrison forces in each quadrant were also tasked to identify key insurgent targets or threats beyond their capability. When that occurred, an additional element of the *quadrillage* was employed. A highly mobile strike reserve of elite mechanized/motorized, airborne, and Foreign Legion forces could move and respond anywhere in the country to mounting insurgent threats, or could be rapidly employed in planned operations to “pacify” operational objectives.⁶⁴ This reserve was specifically designed for mobility and striking power with the goal of rapid support to the local forces in the *quadrillage*. The mobile reserve would be used to continually and constantly pursue insurgent forces both before and after their attacks within a quadrant. By 1957,

the quadrillage concept had made the rural area sanctuaries of the insurgents far less secure and very vulnerable to interdiction and defeat.⁶⁵

Political-Psychological Operations

Indochina had taught the French military that military options were not the sole measure for success against an insurgency. To win the population not only required defeating an enemy's capability, but also defeating his message. Political-psychological operations, typically referred to as *actionné psychologique*, were an effort to counter the revolutionary propaganda and ideology of the insurgent.

Operations were designed as political actions to spread French democratic values, as well as information operations designed to counter the insurgent's appeal to the population. Psychological warfare (PSYOPS) personnel and resources were added in French Army organizations down to company-level.⁶⁶ Specific training in PSYOPS was included as part of training at the counterinsurgency warfare training school established in Arzew, near Oran, Algeria, in 1957.⁶⁷ Psychological operations included leaflet drops by aircraft, loudspeaker use in urban areas, use of collaborators, counter-propaganda efforts, and general non-lethal targeting of diplomatic and international information efforts of the insurgents.

On the political indoctrination side, most efforts rested within the constructive operations. It included increased administrative training to indigenous personnel as well as education on French democratic and political ideology. Within the communes and military districts, military personnel conducted civilian education to all levels that was heavily laced with liberal democratic philosophy.

Another aspect of political-psychological operations that should be mentioned

was the use of torture by French forces. It became an acceptable instrument in countering the insurgency, particularly by the intelligence elements within the French military. Many in the army believed it was a necessary practice to insure victory and that it was used against an enemy viewed as communist and therefore evil.⁶⁸ As the course of the conflict continued, torture would be repeatedly used for tactical, even operational successes, but would be one of the key components of strategic failure. Torture dismissed the legitimacy of the French mission and international opinion turned against the French for condoning torture. Torture undermined support among the Algerian population and destroyed support at home. Chapter 3 will cover in more detail issues pertaining to torture and intelligence operations.

Constructive Operations

Essentially, constructive operations were civil-military operations nested within both destructive and political-psychological operations and aligned to the established districts and sectors of Algeria. Indochina had highlighted the need to approach an insurgency with more than just military options while still retaining military presence in all lines of effort. There were three primary areas of focus and effort within constructive operations: military civic action programs, population control, and ancillary civil-military measures.⁶⁹

The SAS stands out as a particularly effective and widely used organization. Established in 1955 by the Governor-General of Algeria, Jacques Soustelle, the SAS mission was to establish contact with the Muslim population and “bridge the gap between French administration and the poorer inhabitants”.⁷⁰ Outside the military command, the SAS, called “Blue kepis,” usually reported to the French provincial administrator in the

area they were assigned.⁷¹ The SAS teams were small and relied on recruiting indigenous personnel to augment security. The SAS executed a large number of tasks. The teams brought training and reform to local government and civic administration, brought agricultural improvements to over-used or under-utilized ground, provided and established medical services, and trained local officials and police forces. Additionally, the SAS conducted educational programs by building and monitoring schools, re-establishing local educational institutions, and by even teaching classes. The educational support was designed to reinforce democratic ideals to Algerians and reduce insurgency influence.

Directly linked to the *quadrillage* system, the SAS teams also performed military and security functions. The SAS programs within a quadrant were designed to help shape combat operations against the FLN/ALN. Additionally, by recruiting, equipping, and controlling *harka* indigenous forces, the SAS could also conduct limited direct action in local areas or in defense of villages.⁷² As the *harkas* increased in capability and effectiveness, their role could switch to offensive combat operations, relieving French forces from that commitment. Coupled with a program to fortify areas against the insurgency, the SAS was fully integrated into French military operations. The SAS became a unifying force between military operations against the insurgents, security restoration in the towns and villages of Algeria, and development of intelligence on both the insurgents and indigenous population. The intelligence alone greatly improved the targeting and effectiveness of French efforts against the FLN/ALN.

The second focus of constructive operations was in population control. The system of *quadrillage* was one of the more common methods of population control. It

was not the only method employed by the French military: who also practiced *regroupement* or resettlement.⁷³ Executed as part of *quadrillage*, French forces conducted whole-scale movement of the population to areas more accessible and controllable by the Army. Moved to barracks-style camps, the French attempted to deny the population to the insurgents. Started in mid-1957, and carried out continuously until 1961, over two million Muslims would be re-located.⁷⁴ *Regroupement* was intended to achieve two purposes: 1) to make the re-settled population secure, and 2) achieve civic re-education of the individuals within the “new” villages. Despite some successes, *regroupement* was too artificial and only succeeded in creating more hatred among the population it was designed to protect.

A final aspect to the constructive operations had been ongoing since the start of the conflict. The ancillary civil-military (CMO) methods employed included screening and forced documentation of the population, detailed census, and recruiting of indigenous personnel to serve in militias, security forces, and augment French military units.⁷⁵ This also included civil police training and development. Most French counterinsurgency operations were designed to be complementary to police efforts, since Algeria had a functioning police force, albeit one that was overwhelmed by the rebellion.

Conclusion

Algeria’s complex historical setting is important for establishing the context and giving a general outline of counterinsurgency operations conducted by the French. The social and cultural conditions of Algeria also contributed to the conflict. The economic and political dominance by the *colons*, and the oppression of traditional Islamic values and culture all played a role in setting the stage for war. For the French military, their

experiences in Algeria were largely tied to their failure in Indochina, and the desire to maintain the integrity of what was perceived as French territory. The military recognized the need to counter revolutionary warfare with more than just military means. The French placed emphasis on influencing and protecting the population; the population served as a battle ground to counter the influences of the insurgent. While never formalizing their doctrine, the French did institutionalize their approach within their professional writings, newly established training centers, and within unit organizations. In the next chapter, the thesis begins addressing the specific details of FM 3-24 and comparing and contrasting them to experiences of the French in Algeria.

¹Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954 – 1962*, New York: Penguin Books, 1977, 14.

²James McDougall, *History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006, 3.

³Helen Chapin Metz, eds., *Algeria: A Country Study*, Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1994, 8.

⁴*Ibid.*, 11.

⁵*Ibid.*, 16.

⁶*Ibid.*, 17.

⁷Charles-Robert Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1964, 3.

⁸*Ibid.*, 2.

⁹*Ibid.*, 3.

- ¹⁰Ibid., 1.
- ¹¹Helen Chapin Metz, eds., *Algeria: A Country Study*, 22.
- ¹²Charles-Robert Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*, 5.
- ¹³Ibid., 5.
- ¹⁴Ibid., 6.
- ¹⁵Helen Chapin Metz, eds., *Algeria: A Country Study*, 19.
- ¹⁶Ibid., 21.
- ¹⁷Ibid., 26.
- ¹⁸Ibid., 28.
- ¹⁹Ibid., 32.
- ²⁰Charles-Robert Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*,
47.
- ²¹Ibid., 50.
- ²²Ibid., 55.
- ²³Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954 – 1962*, 33.
- ²⁴Helen Chapin Metz, eds., *Algeria: A Country Study*, 37-38.
- ²⁵Charles-Robert Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*,
94.
- ²⁶Ibid., 96.
- ²⁷Ibid., 98.
- ²⁸Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954 – 1962*, 26.
- ²⁹Ibid., 26.
- ³⁰Ibid., 27. Estimates vary by source.
- ³¹LTC John W. Towers, “The French in Algeria, 1954-1962: Military Success, Failure of Grand Strategy.” USAWC Strategy Research Masters diss., Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 2002, 2.

- ³²Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954 – 1962*, 34.
- ³³George A. Kelly, *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947 - 1962*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975, 34.
- ³⁴*Ibid.*, 90.
- ³⁵*Ibid.*, 49.
- ³⁶*Ibid.*, 52.
- ³⁷*Ibid.*, 91.
- ³⁸Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, excerpted from John Shy's article, *Revolutionary War*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, 852.
- ³⁹*Ibid.*, 852.
- ⁴⁰Louis A. DiMarco, Louis, "Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Révolutionnaire in the Algerian War", *Parameters* 36, no. 2 (Summer 2006), 67.
- ⁴¹*Ibid.*, 67.
- ⁴²Martin S. Alexander, eds., *France and the Algerian War, 1954-62: Strategy, Operations, and Diplomacy*, London: Frank Cass, 2002, 38.
- ⁴³Louis A. DiMarco, Louis, "Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Révolutionnaire in the Algerian War", 68.
- ⁴⁴Helen Chapin Metz, eds., *Algeria: A Country Study*, 37.
- ⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 40.
- ⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 41.
- ⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 41.
- ⁴⁸Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954 – 1962*, 43.
- ⁴⁹*Ibid.*, 74.
- ⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 111.
- ⁵¹George A. Kelly, *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947 - 1962*, 163.
- ⁵²*Ibid.*, 172.

- ⁵³Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954 – 1962*, 83.
- ⁵⁴Helen Chapin Metz, eds., *Algeria: A Country Study*, 54.
- ⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 55.
- ⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 55.
- ⁵⁷Edgar O’Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection 1954 – 1962*, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1967, 53.
- ⁵⁸LTC John W. Towers, *The French in Algeria, 1954-1962: Military Success, Failure of Grand Strategy*, 4.
- ⁵⁹Karl Goetzke, *A Review of the Algerian War of National Liberation Using the US Army’s Current Counterinsurgency Doctrine*, MA diss., Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 2005, 10.
- ⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 10.
- ⁶¹*Ibid.*, 10.
- ⁶²*Ibid.*, 7.
- ⁶³Louis A. DiMarco, Louis, “Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Révolutionnaire in the Algerian War”, 68.
- ⁶⁴*Ibid.*, 68.
- ⁶⁵LTC John W. Towers, *The French in Algeria, 1954-1962: Military Success, Failure of Grand Strategy*, 5.
- ⁶⁶Karl Goetzke, *A Review of the Algerian War of National Liberation Using the US Army’s Current Counterinsurgency Doctrine*, 12.
- ⁶⁷Martin S. Alexander, eds., *France and the Algerian War, 1954-62: Strategy, Operations, and Diplomacy*, 37.
- ⁶⁸Louis A. DiMarco, Louis, “Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Révolutionnaire in the Algerian War”, 71.
- ⁶⁹Karl Goetzke, *A Review of the Algerian War of National Liberation Using the US Army’s Current Counterinsurgency Doctrine*, 6.
- ⁷⁰Martin S. Alexander, eds., *France and the Algerian War, 1954-62: Strategy, Operations, and Diplomacy*, 5.
- ⁷¹*Ibid.*, 58.

⁷²Louis A. DiMarco, Louis, “Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Révolutionnaire in the Algerian War”, 69.

⁷³George A. Kelly, *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947 - 1962*, 188.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, 188.

⁷⁵Karl Goetzke, *A Review of the Algerian War of National Liberation Using the US Army’s Current Counterinsurgency Doctrine*, 8.

CHAPTER 3

THE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN

Experience shows that in this sort of war political factors are just as important as the military ones, if not more so. This was particularly true in Algeria, where, especially after 1956, there was practically no military contest in the conventional sense owing to the superiority of the French armed forces in size, equipment, training, and command.¹

David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria: 1956-1958*

Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (dated December 2006) is the current counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine of the U.S. Army. The manual is designed to merge traditional approaches of counterinsurgency (COIN) with more modern constructs of the contemporary global environment. FM 3-24 provides a broad approach to counterinsurgency, not necessarily offering exact procedures to defeating an insurgent. It is a strategic and operational approach to combating insurgencies stressing general root causes, and the need to protect and secure the population affected by the insurgency. This chapter takes key operational concepts from the first five chapters of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* and compares and contrasts them to French efforts and experiences in Algeria. Initially, the history of the development of U.S. doctrine and the developmental history of FM 3-24 will be covered to provide an understanding of the development of U.S. military approaches to counterinsurgency.

Brief History of US Counterinsurgency Doctrine

The U.S. military has executed irregular warfare numerous times over the years, yet only slowly accepted the doctrine. The words used to describe COIN warfare over the years—“*situations short of war, low intensity warfare, cold war operations, stability*

operations, guerrilla war, internal defense and development, para-war, and sub-limited war” – makes it clear that the doctrine has struggled to find a clear definition for counterinsurgency.² The U.S. military experience and development of COIN doctrine divides into four periods that reflect the nature of the counterinsurgency at the time: early doctrine through the end of World War II; post-W.W. II counterinsurgency doctrine from 1945 – 1960; the Vietnam experience 1965 – 1975; post-Vietnam period 1980 – 2003.

During the mid- to late nineteenth century, the U.S. Army was involved in numerous “small wars.” The “Indian Wars” in the 19th Century were the among the first U.S. experiences with guerilla warfare.³ Experiences in Central and Latin America and the Philippines in the early 1900s were additional confrontations with insurgencies. “Small wars” were generally defined as “operations undertaken for the purpose of suppressing an insurrection, establishing order, or dispensing punishment.”⁴ The pamphlets, curricular material, and professional material of the time such as the Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual* identified approaches to “small wars”. The concepts included tailoring forces, integration of the political and military actions, and population control. Military doctrine of the time took a dim view of guerrillas, and legitimized employing severe measures against the perceived “illegal” combatants.⁵ World War II provided little occasion for counterinsurgency efforts to further develop. U.S. efforts focused on supporting insurgencies in the form of resistance forces and irregular warfare behind conventional lines. FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulations (dated 1940)* , which covered basic combat principles for the Army, did not change at all from 1939 to 1949, and it’s only COIN guidance was to encircle the irregular forces and allow air attacks to weaken the guerrillas resolve and combat power.⁶

The post-war era saw attempts to legislate wartime actions as the U.S. military embraced a more humane approach to COIN, banning previous practices of collective punishment, reprisals, and hostage taking.⁷ World events, like the Chinese Revolution and the Greek communist insurgency, identified a need for formally publishing U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. In 1951, the Army published FM 31-20, *Operations against Guerrilla Forces*, which was based on U.S. operations fighting communist infiltrators and guerrillas in South Korea.⁸ The manual, while acknowledging the link between the political and military spheres, did not provide specific guidelines for addressing political issues. Intelligence, propaganda, and combat power were the critical areas discussed.⁹ In 1952, FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulations* saw the first modification to the Army's basic combat manual since before the Korean War adding sections on "Security against Airborne Attack", "Guerilla Attack, and Infiltration."¹⁰ In 1957, FM 31-21, *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare*, was released with more concrete methods for fighting insurgents, including those incorporated from FM 100-5.¹¹ Doctrine addressed combined-arms responses to insurgencies and the legal parameters under which U.S. forces would conduct COIN operations and their relationship between population and popular support, but continued study was beginning to decline. The Korean War was winding down and many officers believed COIN doctrine was playing too prominent a role in overall strategy. The French experiences in Indochina were noted but little interest was taken by the U.S. military.

President Kennedy's inauguration renewed interest in COIN. Emerging thought argued that economic, social, and technical assistance were important to containing insurgencies.¹² Academic theories also echoed those sentiments. U.S. support to

governments facing insurgencies was increasing. The generic military approach to counter-guerrilla or COIN warfare was shifting towards a more balanced, comprehensive approach oriented on more than military concerns. As U.S. Special Forces and advisory troops began deploying to Vietnam in 1965, U.S. COIN doctrine was being updated. Still, COIN doctrine was not consolidated into one manual, and the language was changing to reflect “internal defense” as opposed to counterinsurgency.¹³ With the increased focus on counter-guerrilla operations by the Special Forces community, a general disagreement developed over who would be the principle proponent for counter-guerrilla activities. By 1967, documents like FM 31-23, *Stability Operations: U.S. Army Doctrine* (dated 1967), stressed the importance of civil considerations in military operations, noting that popular support would be tied to social and economic development, but leaving room for interpretation of what that meant.¹⁴ The conventional forces were being asked to view non-combat tasks in the same light as war-fighting tasks; something not easily accepted by conventional forces. The 1967 edition of FM 31-16, *Counter guerrilla Operations* started to incorporate Vietnam-related material into the doctrine.¹⁵ Still, no clear doctrine or agreement on doctrine had emerged. In 1970, there were over 15 different manuals between the Army and Marine Corps covering information related to counterinsurgency warfare.

After the fall of Saigon in April 1975, COIN doctrine was relegated to a lesser importance as the U.S. military attempted to distance itself from the failure in Vietnam. By 1982, COIN was marginalized both in doctrine and training, except within elements of the Special Operations community. That same year the Army published FM 90-8, *Counter guerrilla Operations*, which attempted to consolidate post-Vietnam COIN

lessons into one manual.¹⁶ The low-intensity conflict doctrine emerging in the late 1980s, based on such campaigns as the U.S. involvement in El Salvador, highlighted the fact that doctrine was still not developed beyond the lessons of Vietnam.¹⁷ FM 90-8 was accorded a lower profile than other doctrinal training manuals and did not receive force-wide dissemination.

By the 1990s, despite involvement in Latin and Central America, and the Army's publishing of FM 100-20, *Low Intensity Conflict* (published in 1981), a comprehensive and consolidated COIN doctrine did not emerge due to institutional competition and lack of force-wide understanding of the importance of COIN.¹⁸ Through the 1990s, U.S. involvement in Somalia, Haiti, and West Africa was subject to competing doctrinal approaches depending on the service. Organizations like Special Forces and Civil Affairs focused on the importance of connecting targeting with psychological operations to influence the population, but conventional force manuals downplayed such aspects in lieu of more direct action against insurgents. In 1995, after almost a decade of studying doctrine for counterinsurgency and low intensity conflicts, Joint Publication JP 3-07, *Military Operations Other Than War* was published with few changes and clearly indicating COIN was subordinate to war-fighting doctrine.¹⁹ With few significant changes, U.S. doctrine was entering the 21st Century with principles little different from that it had in the mid-20th Century.

FM 3-24 Developmental History

In late 2003 combat in Iraq and Afghanistan caused the Army to recognize a need for a comprehensive and "joint" manual covering counterinsurgency. Lieutenant General William Wallace, then the Commander of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas tasked the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) to rapidly develop a manual to support COIN operations. CADD published an interim manual, FMI 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations* dated October 2004.²⁰ In October of 2005, a new CAC Commander, Lieutenant General David Petraeus ordered CADD to develop a more permanent doctrine. A short timeline for development was established and arrangements made so that the manual, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, could be reviewed by a very unique group of personnel. The group would bring together journalists, human rights advocates, academics, and counterinsurgency operators from across the U.S. Open input from organizations normally not associated with U.S. Army doctrine development was unusual. The manual was also being shared and collaboratively developed with the United States Marine Corps. This also was not been the traditional method. FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (also identified as MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency for the United States Marine Corps*) was formally published in December 2006.

Introduction to FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*

FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* merges traditional counterinsurgency approaches with other new concepts such as technological advancement, economic and cultural globalization, and the spread of extreme ideologies.²¹ FM 3-24 emphasizes the need for a sustained, intellectually-based counterinsurgency campaign design. The chapters of FM 3-24 are divided into the two key areas of concern: counterinsurgency campaign design (Chapters 1-5) and military support activities (Chapters 6-8 and Appendices). The remainder of this chapter will identify and analyze the critical aspects of campaign design and compare them to French experiences in Algeria.

Chapter 1, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*

Chapter 1 of FM 3-24 defines and describes the complex concepts of warfare referred to as insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN).²² Chapter 1 lays the basis for understanding the evolution, motivation, and approaches of insurgencies, defining the relationship between complex cultural issues and the political and economic issues generally identified in insurgencies. It identifies the primary objective of COIN forces: legitimacy of their operations and the protection of the population. The most notable section of this chapter is the “Paradoxes of Counterinsurgencies”, which illustrates the counterintuitive nature of COIN operations.

FM 3-24 identifies nine paradoxes that counter traditional U.S. views on the conduct of warfare. Not to be used as a checklist, these maxims provide insight into the challenging and often conflicting nature of insurgencies. The paradox of “Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing” is a particularly conflicting consideration in addressing COIN operations.²³ In other words, despite their importance in achieving security, military actions alone cannot achieve strategic success. Military operations are only part of a comprehensive effort required to change the root causes of an insurgency.

French efforts at the tactical level were extremely successful in nearly eliminating the ALN by 1958, and to some degree, marginalizing the FLN political power within Algeria at the same time. Indochina lessons had taught the French that more than military efforts were required to defeat an insurgency. Territorial and military re-organization was focused to counter the insurgency. Political and economic change allowed French forces to regain the initiative against the FLN/ALN by 1956.²⁴ Many aspects of the French efforts were successful: dramatic increases in man-power,

quadrillage and re-settlement removed portions of the population from influence of the insurgents; the SAS deprived the insurgents of mobility and provided actionable intelligence for the French to exploit. These efforts showed the sustained attempts by the French to counter the problems of civil administration through other than military means.

Despite recognizing the importance of other than military efforts and the attendant paradox of COIN operations, the French Army could not gain the confidence of enough Algerians to counter the political actions of the FLN/ALN. Excessive violence and torture, political isolation, and the inability to understand the insurgents negated French tactical successes. French information operations had only limited success within Algeria, and they did not find an answer to FLN propaganda efforts in the international community. Ultimately, French military success against the insurgents did not matter as the FLN achieved its objectives politically.

Chapter 2, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency: Unity of Effort in Integrating Civilian and Military Activities*

Chapter 2 of FM 3-24 focuses on the lines of efforts both civilian and military organizations use to conduct counterinsurgency operations. It focuses on the principles required to integrate the activities of both types of organizations, identifying the necessity for unity of effort and unity of command integrated between the civilian and military. Ultimately, according to FM 3-24, both civilian and military efforts must be combined in a comprehensive strategy to counter the insurgency.

Integration between civilian and military agencies and activities requires a mutually shared approach on the COIN efforts.²⁵ FM 3-24 states that “military efforts are necessary and important to counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts, but they are only

effective when integrated into a comprehensive strategy employing all instruments of national power.”²⁶ Integration requires military forces to meet the local populace’s fundamental needs, as well as complimenting any operations by other than military means. Military forces must be integrated with other agencies of the government fighting the counterinsurgency, other nations’ involved in the conflict, international governmental organizations (IGOs such as the United Nations), non-governmental organizations (Red Cross, Red Crescent, Doctors Without Borders), private corporations, and other diplomatic, economic, and informational organizations. As an example, military organizations do not traditionally have the knowledge and capability to restore economic systems or have the resources to develop nationwide educational systems. Civilian activities and organizations are more capable in that regards and should take the lead supported by military capabilities such as security and construction.

FM 3-24 does identify the difficulty of maintaining unity of effort when the nature of counterinsurgency operations shifts between military and civilian authorities on a regular basis. To keep the unity of effort, FM 3-24 stresses the importance of gaining and maintaining an understanding of the environment, including the insurgents, the affected populace, and different counterinsurgency organizations. FM 3-24 focuses on leadership, coordination, and liaison efforts as being the principal means for sustaining unity of effort and developing a broader understanding of the operational and strategic environment. This requires a concerted effort by the military to interact on a direct level with governmental, diplomatic, private, religious, economic, and informational organizations.

Another important element to integration of military and civilian addressed within

chapter 2 of FM 3-24 is the integration mechanisms required to bridge the gap between civil and military organizations. How does the Department of State or the Red Cross work with the military to support counterinsurgency efforts? While FM 3-24 is founded on a U.S. government interagency approach, and thus highlights U.S. policy and procedures, it does not disregard the overall value of international coordination in general and does state that regardless of method, international coordination is essential to counterinsurgency operations.²⁷ FM 3-24 offers two methods of inter-agency operations: 1) identify existing coordination mechanisms and incorporate them into a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan, or 2) establish an internal coordination mechanism that interacts on its own with existing organizations.²⁸ At the Theater or higher level, elements like the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) or Ambassadorial Country Team facilitate that role by establishing representation in a continually-manned center by all agencies.²⁹ At divisional level, elements like the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) can be established to do the same mission, albeit without a command and control capability for non-military organizations. These elements are intended to act as mechanisms that bring together the disparate agencies and organizations necessary to conduct counterinsurgency operations.

Using the framework of *la guerre révolutionnaire*, the French military understood there was a need to integrate civilian activities with military activities. Lessons of Indochina had brought home the fact that the military needed to adjust its organization and external relationships to accomplish the counter-revolutionary tasks associated with defeating an insurgency; those tasks clearly identified other than military means to be successful. There were three primary efforts to accomplish that integration between

civilian and military.

The first effort required a territorial reorganization of French forces within theater. The political divisions of Algeria were clearly understood by the French military, and the French efforts to incorporate military and political authority into single individuals or headquarters allowed for a smooth transition to the existing political boundaries.³⁰ The territorial organization was designed “to adapt the military organization exactly to the civilian administrative establishment.”³¹ The military, as the situation progressed, sub-divided into corps areas of Oran, Constantine, and Algiers which were further broken down into zones, sectors, and subsectors that roughly paralleled the administrative departments, or *arrondissements*, of the civilian government.³² In the rural areas, much of the civil administration fell under military control. Still, in most cases the top military commander within each zone was, at least on paper, subordinate to the civilian authority in Algiers and was expected to work with the civilian leadership.

Secondly, the establishment of the *Sections Administratives Spécialisées* (SAS) was intended to re-establish links between the Muslim population of Algeria and the civil administration, particularly in the rural areas where municipal systems were sparse or non-existent (later, the *Sections Administrative Urbaines* or SAU was established to do the same in urban centers). As covered in the previous chapter, the SAS supervised reorganization of communities, provided security through patrolling, indigenous troop training, and intelligence, infrastructure development, and education programs after combat forces had completed pacification of an area.³³ The SAS developed work projects, fortified villages, distributed food and medical aid. Outside of the operational

chain of command, but linked to his particular sector or zones military authority, the SAS military chief shared command and effort with a civilian SAS chief.

A third key effort was in the form of psychological operations. Both the military and civilian leaders were pre-occupied with the use of psychological persuasion and counter-psychological operations to influence the population in Algeria.³⁴ As early as March of 1955, psychological bureaus were established in the staffs at district and division level with the purpose of aiding the civilian authority in their campaign to persuade the indigenous population to the French side.³⁵ The creation of organizations like the *Comite Restreint d'Action Psychologique* brought together cabinet level personnel with military commanders at the operational and strategic level.³⁶ These organizations integrated governmental directives with psychological operations to counter the insurgency propaganda.

French efforts at integrating the military and government demonstrated an understanding of FM 3-24, but were a failure in meeting the objectives outlined in the manual. By organizing military districts to align with civilian administrative districts, the French established a system that should have resulted in integration. But the shortage of civilian administrative staff and the over-reliance on military commanders to administer to the districts resulted in poor integration of civilian and military functions in countering the insurgency. The SAS provided an excellent organization for civil-military support. However, the SAS relied heavily on conventional forces or auxiliary military forces for manpower, labor, and resources. The SAS were effective in integrating civilian and military activities, but were highly dependent on the capabilities and personalities of the officers leading the team. The civilian members on the SAS teams were never trained or

fully staffed. Psychological operations, as FM 3-24 states, are “vital to focusing effort to protecting and influencing the population.”³⁷ For the French, vague and broad directives from the civilian authority and autonomous action by the military reduced the effectiveness of integration. Psychological efforts became widely varied by region, zone, or district and the individual commanders broadly interpreted their mandates to influence the population. Because of this, French PSYOPS failed to win the population from the insurgents.

Chapter 3, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency: Intelligence in Counterinsurgency*

As FM 3-24 states, “effective intelligence drives effective operations.”³⁸ Chapter 3 of FM 3-24 describes the intelligence requirements specific to counterinsurgency operations. A significant portion of FM 3-24 is focused on intelligence operations relating to counterinsurgency efforts. FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, states “intelligence assists the commander in visualizing his battle space.”³⁹ No warfare requires more accurate, timely, and difficult intelligence to visualize the battlefield than counterinsurgency operations. Insurgencies differ from block to block, region to region, even nation to nation. However, since the battleground of both the insurgent and counterinsurgent is, foremost, focused on influencing or garnering support of a populace, nowhere is it more diverse than at the local level. The intricate complexities of insurgencies, therefore, require a detailed intelligence picture.

Section II of Chapter 3 of FM 3-24 continues to identify that intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is vital to COIN operations. IPB allows a staff (in the case of a counterinsurgency, both military and civilian staffs) to develop an estimate of the operating environment and generate the intelligence requirements needed to support

operations.⁴⁰ FM 3-24 states that IPB must describe the effects of the operational environment.⁴¹ It further breaks the operational environment down into three key parts: 1) terrain analysis, 2) weather analysis, and 3) civil considerations. The predominant area for intelligence requirements in COIN fall within civil considerations. FM 3-24 defines aspects of civil considerations that need to be developed and analyzed: 1) society, 2) social structure, 3) culture, 4) language, 5) power and authority, and 6) interests.⁴² Critical to further developing the necessary intelligence is the understanding that unsatisfied interests (political, security, economic), if allowed to remain unanswered, will turn into grievances. Unresolved grievances lead to violence on the part of the insurgent. Identifying those grievances is paramount to being able to counter those grievances. Grievances have objectives, motivations, and a means of generating popular support or tolerance. Intelligence efforts must focus on these grievances.

Initially, the French forces believed they faced a small, communist-agitated group predominantly made up of criminal and outlaw elements. There was a strong belief that a small, criminal element was the primary cause behind the violence. As the violence grew, many in the French military focused on the socialist make-up of the FLN as a communist group determined to overthrow the legitimate, Christian-based rule of a western power. While there was a push for economic and political reform from the liberal French government in Paris, the prevailing understanding of events was reflected by the *pied noirs* whose objective was to maintain control and direction of Algeria.⁴³ While the initial attacks of the FLN/ALN in 1954 did not draw the majority of the Muslim population to their cause, their grievances still resonated: nationalism and independence from France. Earlier, the French Algerian Statue of 1947 tabled five

important reforms which Muslims had demanded for years: 1) suppression of the *communes mixtes*, 2) replacement of military government of the Saharan territories with civil departments, 3) recognition of Arabic as an official language alongside French, 4) separation of church and state for Muslims, and 5) electoral enfranchisement for Muslim women.⁴⁴

At the highest levels of the French government and military, there was a reluctance to accept the insurgency for what it was, and accept that the nation was at war. The French violated the tenets of FM 3-24 in that they did not grasp the over-riding grievance of the insurgency, namely a deep desire for sovereignty. The pre-occupation with communism and lack of understanding of the perceived grievances of Algerians forced the French to respond to the symptoms of the insurgency, not the cause, and thus were never able to fully counter the revolutionary movement of the insurgency.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

The purpose of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations (ISR) is to develop the intelligence needed to address the issues driving the insurgency.⁴⁵ The localized nature of insurgencies put a higher focus on intelligence gathered by human intelligence sources (HUMINT), either through co-opted personnel, collaborators, or through interrogation of human sources. Detainees and insurgent defectors are critical to HUMINT collection. Only HUMINT can give information on the internal workings of an area, an insurgent group, or local political/social ties. FM 3-24 identifies the necessity of immediate tactical questioning by soldiers on the ground, but clearly states that the majority of effort should be done by trained interrogators fully within U.S. and international law.⁴⁶

The French built multiple, overlapping layers of HUMINT to provide information. Using local loyal Algerians, turned former FLN members, paid informers, and aggressive interrogation, the French built detailed networks.⁴⁷ The French even used indigenous troops (*harkas*) and the sustained presence of the SAS within an area to build intelligence networks. Much of the HUMINT gleaned provided actionable intelligence that drove tactical operations. Population surveillance, both overt and covert, was also highly developed by the French military.⁴⁸ The intelligence staff within military organizations became the critical staff link in driving operational planning. The HUMINT efforts of the French provided a detailed documentation of the population; the French understood that the insurgents operated in the population.⁴⁹ Capitalizing on HUMINT, the French established methods and procedures that enabled them to quickly turn intelligence into action by rapid dissemination to their mobile strike groups. HUMINT efforts by the French produced a detailed layout of the FLN and the ALN being nearly completely defeated by 1960.⁵⁰

However, despite success, the French violated the principles identified in FM 3-24 because the harsh interrogation techniques used to develop excellent HUMINT included torture. The rule of law in interrogation and detention policies was ignored completely by the French. The use of torture had several unintended consequences for the French. First, it became widely publicized in the French and international media, and thus, de-legitimized French efforts. It also undercut support at home for continuing the conflict in Algeria. Ultimately, however, the use of torture in developing HUMINT defeated the French's own counterinsurgency doctrine. The population was alienated from the French, in some cases pushing people to the side of the insurgent who might not

otherwise have gone over.

Chapter 4, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency: Designing Counterinsurgency Campaigns*

Chapter 4 of FM 3-24 provides considerations for designing counterinsurgency campaigns and operations. This chapter deals with defining the nature of the conflict the counterinsurgency forces must deal with and the often complex interdependencies of diverse aspects of the environment. Knowing how and why an insurgency started is vital to establishing a program to counter it. Additionally, counterinsurgency campaigns are generally long-term affairs and require a campaign designed to sustain efforts over many months or years by addressing both the immediate security needs and core issues of the insurgency.

FM 3-24 identifies design as being the ability to visualize the campaign by transitioning from problem-setting to problem solving.⁵¹ Counterinsurgency design is a continuous process of identifying the nature of the insurgency and applying standard and non-standard methods of military capabilities against the problem. The issue is that design must be informed (as well as informs) by the information generated by actual operations. The design requires an intellectual framework to assist planning and execution. Ultimately, to develop a design for counterinsurgency, organizations must clearly understand the complex environment and address the core issues. Those core issues may be economic or political and therefore, difficult for military organizations to address.

The French military was quick to defeat the rebellion of 1945; within 5 days of the violence in Setif, the pseudo-rebellion was completely defeated.⁵² However, in 1954, the French were slow to react, and were still engaging the ALN two years later.⁵³ There

were not enough forces available to garrison the entire country, and the French administrative network was weak and poorly manned and equipped in 1954. The first French responses were based on a belief that only small groups were responsible, mostly criminal in nature, and thus the responses should be in the form of police work and constabulary law enforcement. As the French military establishment became actively involved in security, their orders were “guarantee the security of the frontiers, protect all inhabitants, and to destroy the OPA and the *maquis* units of the ALN.”⁵⁴ The simplicity of these orders belies the essential weakness and lack of a planned design to counter the growing insurgency. Throughout the early years of the insurgency, the design for COIN operations in Algeria was based on the attempt to enforce the application of the 1947 Algerian Statute, which was a program of reforms that would have removed the mixed communes, given more political participation to the Muslim population, and worked at economic and social reform.⁵⁵ Additionally, the military was unclear on how to apply combat power and focused efforts along conventional lines, using the input of Indochina veterans’ to design a loose counterinsurgency plan. Poor intelligence available to the military was blamed on lack of effort by the civil administration. Even as late as 1955, the French had no official recognition of a state of war in Algeria.⁵⁶ Ultimately, the French considered Algeria an internal problem, and did not incorporate civil and military approaches to the design of a comprehensive strategic plan.

By 1956, with General Salan appointed as Resident-Minister and Command-in-Chief in Algeria, a design of counterinsurgency operations followed which incorporated a plan of pacification and defeat of ALN/FLN forces.⁵⁷ This included a build-up of forces, institution of *quadrillage* and an increase in SAS units, and removal of safe havens and

defense of the borders by mobile forces.

French military and civil authorities violated FM 3-24 in that they did not visualize, and then articulate a vision of how to counter the growing insurgency. FM 3-24 identifies that a key linkage exists between developing a design for counterinsurgency operations and planning sustained operations.⁵⁸ Without a clear design, it becomes increasingly difficult to institute operations and insure those operations fit with the overall counterinsurgency objectives. The French military establishment failed to develop an ideology to counter the insurgency. Having failed to correctly interpret the signs of the danger before the outbreak of hostilities, they were slow to adopt a firm policy. Once *la guerre révolutionnaire* was informally applied to the insurgency, the French further failed to link the military designs with civilian designs for the counterinsurgency and the ultimate objective of the French efforts in Algeria. The French military was too controlling of all aspects of the counterinsurgency, and increasingly distrustful of civilian authority. Design efforts remained uninformed and prevented the French from creating a comprehensive strategy to counter the FLN/ALN.

Chapter 5, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency: Executing Counterinsurgency Operations*

Chapter 5 of FM 3-24 provides basic principles and tactics for executing counterinsurgency operations. It highlights the five over-arching requirements for success: 1) comprehensive strategy between U.S. and host-nation forces with collective effort to restore government legitimacy, 2) control of operational area for security, 3) focus effort on population centers, 4) insurgent military apparatus destroyed and politico-administrative network disrupted, and 5) effective information operations (IO) employed.⁵⁹ Vital to executing counterinsurgency operations is the need to maintain

information operations throughout the spectrum of effort.

The critical aspect of information operations is psychological operations (PSYOPS). To execute counterinsurgency operations and defeating an insurgency, it is an absolute requirement to execute information operations. In fact, all efforts must be synchronized to the information operations (IO) since the message of the counterinsurgent is designed to influence the population from supporting or participating in the insurgency as well as reinforcing the legitimacy of the counterinsurgency efforts. IO is often the decisive operation, and if properly used, neutralizes the insurgent propaganda, false claims, and destabilizing influence. FM 3-24 identifies the necessity of tailoring IO to specific locations and an audience, insuring it addresses the concerns of the populace.⁶⁰ These concerns can differ from location to location.

Throughout the conflict in Algeria, the French Army recognized the essential value of PSYOPS. Organizations like the *Bureau Deuxième* or 5th Bureau were detailed to executing operational-level PSYOPS in concert with tactical level operations as well as augmenting strategic level efforts.⁶¹ Specific training was included for those attending the counterinsurgency training school as well as the SAS members being assigned in theater. Leaflet drops and loudspeaker operations were integrated into all levels of execution. The French used collaborators and turn-coats to take false information to the insurgents. They were also quick to publicize internal conflicts and atrocities of the insurgents. The over-arching concept was that the Muslim masses (native Algerians) need to be inoculated against the insurgents (FLN).⁶² The French were very experienced and developed extremely diverse methods for legitimizing their efforts and countering the insurgent's efforts to influence the population.

The French failed to validate FM 3-24 in their efforts at information operations. While French efforts at information operations at the tactical level were generally successful, their harsh methods in interrogations, use of torture, and reluctance to address FLN propaganda efforts in the international media resulted in failure. For every IO effort to legitimize French government and counterinsurgency operations, their use of torture and *regroupement*, and lack of sensitivity to Islamic institutions defeated any successes achieved. The French were unsuccessful in meeting what FM 3-24 states as the “issues and concerns” of the populace. Additionally, with little or no economic and political reform occurring, French support to the population and themes of acceptance of the Muslim people were countered and de-legitimized.

Conclusion

Many of the principles put forward in FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* were clearly understood by the French as a result of their lessons learned from experience in Indochina. However, many of the critical principles were either ignored or poorly analyzed as the French developed their approach to counter the insurgency within Algeria. The French use of excessive violence, failure to address international attention and condemnation, and a general lack of understanding of the grievances expressed by the insurgents resulted in a failed counterinsurgency design. The French further violated FM 3-24 in that, while producing and managing excellent intelligence throughout the conflict, they did not recognize the potential backlash and counter-productive aspect of the harsh methods employed to gain that intelligence. French efforts were designed to focus on the population, an area described in FM 3-24 as the principle concern for the counterinsurgency forces. Yet, their methods were counter to maintaining that

relationship and support of the population.

¹LTC David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria: 1956-1958*, Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2006, pg. 5. Originally published in 1963.

²Andrew J. Birtle, *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Doctrine, 1942-1976*, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2006, pg. 4. Description of the extensive but confusing lexicon of definitions relating to COIN or counter-revolutionary warfare commonly identified in the 20th Century.

³Dr. Wray Ross Johnson, *From Counterinsurgency to Stability and Support Operations: The Evolution of U.S. Military Doctrine for Foreign Internal Conflict, 1961 – 1996*, PhD diss., Florida: Florida State University, 1997; Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Services, Florida State University, 1998, pg. 30. As American expansion moved westward, conflict and clashes between Indian tribes and U.S. government forces occurred. Informal dissemination was the principle means for passing on tactics against the North American Indians.

⁴Andrew J. Birtle, *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Doctrine, 1942-1976*, pg. 8.

⁵*Ibid.*, 8. Western military traditions placed a dim view on guerillas who violated the laws of war and hid their true identity.

⁶*Ibid.*, 10. Air attacks and encirclement deemed most effective against elusive irregular foe.

⁷*Ibid.*, 20.

⁸*Ibid.*, 134. COL Russell Volkmann is attributed with many of the changes in FM 31-20, *Operations against Guerilla Forces*, since he was a veteran of the fall of the Philippines and was an organizer of the Filipino resistance against the Japanese leading to the U.S. invasion.

⁹*Ibid.*, 135.

¹⁰Dr. Wray Ross Johnson, *From Counterinsurgency to Stability and Support Operations: The Evolution of U.S. Military Doctrine for Foreign Internal Conflict, 1961 – 1996*, 103. Additionally, from endnotes (174): “The importance of this construct, as contained in FM 100-5, is that within the hierarchy of U.S. Army field manuals, “100” series manuals establish overarching precepts and serve as the foundation for subordinate doctrine, as well as force design and professional military education.”

¹¹Andrew J. Birtle, *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Doctrine, 1942-1976*, 143.

¹²*Ibid.*, 165.

¹³*Ibid.*, 420. “*Internal development*” was also substituted for counterinsurgency in writings of the time.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 424.

¹⁵Dr. Wray Ross Johnson, *From Counterinsurgency to Stability and Support Operations: The Evolution of U.S. Military Doctrine for Foreign Internal Conflict, 1961 – 1996*, 113.

¹⁶Andrew J. Birtle, *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Doctrine, 1942-1976*, 482.

¹⁷Dr. Wray Ross Johnson, *From Counterinsurgency to Stability and Support Operations: The Evolution of U.S. Military Doctrine for Foreign Internal Conflict, 1961 – 1996*, 222.

¹⁸Mr. Clint Ancker, interview by author, conducted at CADD, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (14 August 2007). Interview was with director of doctrine writing for U.S. Army. Proponent agencies within the branches of the Army are given responsibility for development and review.

¹⁹Dr. Wray Ross Johnson, *From Counterinsurgency to Stability and Support Operations: The Evolution of U.S. Military Doctrine for Foreign Internal Conflict, 1961 – 1996*, 283.

²⁰Mr. Clint Ancker, interview by author, conducted at CADD, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (14 August 2007).

²¹Dept. of the Army, FM (Field Manual) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, (Washington, D.C.: US Army Training and Doctrine Command 2006), vii. From the Preface published through CADD at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

²²*Ibid.*, 1-1. From chapter description above Paragraph 1-1.

²³*Ibid.*, 1-28. Paragraph 1-156.

²⁴Andrew A. Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1972, 231. French military and political reforms, in addition to the formal acceptance of a conflict internally within the French Algerian leadership, allowed the initiative to counter the FLN to begin.

²⁵Dept. of the Army, FM (Field Manual) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 2-1. Paragraph 2-2.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 2-1. Paragraph 2-1.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 2-10. Paragraph 2-44.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 2-10. Paragraph 2-47.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 2-10. Paragraph 2-47.

³⁰Peter D. Jackson, “*French Ground Force Organizational Development for Counter-Revolutionary Warfare Between 1945 and 1962*”, MMAS diss., Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, Masters of Military Art and Science, 2005, 85.

³¹*Ibid.*, 85.

³²George Armstrong Kelly, *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947 – 1962*, Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1965, 175. *Commune mixtes* and *arrondissements* were re-organized several times during the course of the war. Many times the military was responsible for the reorganization more than the civil authority.

³³Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine*, New York, NY: Praeger, Inc., 1964, 47.

³⁴George Armstrong Kelly, *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947 – 1962*, 186. In the strictly military hierarchy, PSYOPS personnel were organized down to battalion level...sometimes below that.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 184.

³⁶*Ibid.*, 186.

³⁷Dept. of the Army, FM (Field Manual) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 2-5. Paragraph 2-18.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 3-1. Paragraph 3-3.

³⁹Dept. of the Army, FM (Field Manual) 2-0, *Intelligence*, (Washington, D.C.: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2004), 1-1. Paragraph 1-1.

⁴⁰Dept. of the Army, FM (Field Manual) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 3-2. Paragraph 3-7.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 3-3. Paragraph 3-18.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 3-4. Paragraph 3-19.

⁴³Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954 – 1962*, New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1977, 14. Sometimes referred to the “White Man’s Burden” by the *piéd noirs*.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 69. The five reforms were voted on 27 August 1947 in a vote of 328 to 33 with 208 abstentions. The 15 Muslim deputies were included in the abstentions.

⁴⁵Dept. of the Army, FM (Field Manual) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 3-24. Paragraph 3-121.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 3-27. Paragraph 3-137.

⁴⁷Louis A. DiMarco, “Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Revolutionnaire in the Algerian War”, *Parameters* 36, no. 2 (Summer 2006), 69.

⁴⁸Karl Goetzke, *A Review of the Algerian War of National Liberation Using the US Army’s Current Counterinsurgency Doctrine*, MA diss., Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 2005, 9.

⁴⁹DiMarco, “Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Revolutionnaire in the Algerian War”, *Parameters* 36, no. 2 (Summer 2006), 69.

⁵⁰James R. Rogers, “Tactical Success is Not Enough: The French in Algeria, 1954 – 1962”, MMS diss., Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, 2004, 15. From a military standpoint, the ALN was operating by 1960 in very small-sized elements, dependent on deception and night for operational security.

⁵¹Dept. of the Army, FM (Field Manual) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 4-2. Paragraph 4-3, taken from Figure 4-1: Design and Planning Continuum.

⁵²Andrew A. Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1972, 141. It took only 5 days from the outset of the incident at Setif in 1945 to quell the violence. Harsh, retributive tactics were used.

⁵³Edgar O’Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection 1954 – 1962*, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1967, 203.

⁵⁴Andrew A. Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 142.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 143.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 154. The colons continued pressure dissuaded French authority to implement planned reforms and abolish military tribunals.

⁵⁷Martin S. Alexander, eds., *France and the Algerian War, 1954-62: Strategy, Operations, and Diplomacy*, London: Frank Cass, 2002, 9.

⁵⁸Dept. of the Army, FM (Field Manual) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 4-2. Paragraph 4-3.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 5-1. Paragraph 5-2.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 5-8. Paragraph 5-19. There are 7 identified task categories within IO: 1) ensure IO is synchronized at all levels and nested with interagency strategy; 2) identify all the audiences and their news cycles; 3) manage the local population's expectations; 4) develop common themes consistent with HN government; 5) coordinate/ provide a comprehensive assessment of the information environment; 6) remember actions always speaks louder than words; 7) work to establish and sustain transparency.

⁶¹Edgar O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection 1954 – 1962*, 95.

⁶²Martin S. Alexander, eds., *France and the Algerian War, 1954-62: Strategy, Operations, and Diplomacy*, 42.

CHAPTER 4

MILITARY SUPPORT ACTIVITIES TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

There is a paradox about the protracted ‘official silence’, the denial by French authorities that events in Algeria were a war: for those experiencing it at the sharp end and were in no doubt. What was taking place in Algeria was bloody, violent, dangerous and undeniably militarized.¹

Martin Alexander, *France and the Algerian War*

The focus of this chapter is the analysis of Chapters 6-8 (and the Appendices) of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. These chapters address the military support activities required for counterinsurgency operations. These chapters address tactical understanding of the approaches to counterinsurgency operations, providing organizations with guidelines for action and resource recommendations for applying combat power.

Chapter 6, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*: Developing Host-Nation Security Forces

Chapter 6 covers various aspects of developing HN security forces, including recruiting, training, and sustaining, as well as the required coordination with U.S. forces. It addresses the challenges of developing host-nation (HN) security forces. Fundamental to successful counterinsurgency operations is establishing legitimate government that has the support of the population. The government must be able to address the root causes of the insurgency to establish its legitimacy. Often, one of the root causes is security for the population. Developing military and police forces able to provide security is critical to protecting legitimate governance.

Developing a doctrine for employment by HN security forces is the first step to developing a training program for the organizations. Without an accepted doctrine, there is no effective means for training and developing a competent security force within the

HN. FM 3-24 identifies the difficulty inherent in organizing native or HN security forces. Socio-economic issues, cultural factors, historical traditions, security circumstances, and integration with U.S. forces are all challenges when organizing HN forces.² The goal of the counterinsurgency force is a HN with capable security forces that integrate command, intelligence, logistics, and operations into a structure that is practical for the HN. Typically, HN security forces are, at least initially, more effective at the local or provincial level, especially when the civil infrastructure is damaged or non-existent.

The French military used indigenous personnel in a variety of roles to mitigate the intensive man-power requirements of their counterinsurgency efforts. Because of the long-standing relationship of Algerian support to the French Army, Arab and Berber personnel regularly served in active units of the military. Civilian police and security forces employed Muslim personnel to augment rural village constabulary offices with company-sized paramilitary forces. These self-defense militias were incorporated into the *quadrillage* system aligned with nearby French Army forces for command and control and support. The SAS employed indigenous personnel in the so-called *Maghzen* auxiliaries for security of the SAS teams in the rural areas, to provide detailed information on local affairs and tribal concerns, and as intelligence collection assets from local communities.³ The *Maghzen* became effective intelligence collectors and were further employed as security forces across an area once pacification efforts were successful. The French also employed a significant number of military auxiliaries, known as *harkas*.⁴ The *harkas* were generally employed as local defense and as tracker and long-range surveillance units under French military control with French cadre in a

command positions. Initially conducting local patrolling in conjunction with French police and military units, the *harkas* expanded in their missions as they become more competent to include intelligence collection, surveillance, and strike missions against FLN/ALN supply networks, units, and leadership operating in remote locations. As targets for conventional forces decreased over time, the *harkas* became vital to striking the guerilla elements as their knowledge of terrain and ethnic background provided the capability to operate in areas French regular forces could not.

By 1959, the French had employed over 200,000 Arab and Berber personnel within the security forces: approximately 28,000 *harkas*, 17,000 *Maghzen*, 17,000 self-defense militiamen, and 9,000 mobile rural protection police.⁵ While not specifically identified as host-nation personnel because of the relationship of Algeria politically to France itself (a recognized province of France), the indigenous personnel filled the same role as HN personnel would. The French successfully validated the principles of FM 3-24 in their usage of these forces by keeping these forces limited to their resourced and trained capabilities, synchronizing their actions with local operations and objectives, and employing the indigenous personnel to fill shortages in knowledge of the local environment. By capitalizing on their familiarity and knowledge of culture and terrain, basing the indigenous personnel near their homes, increasing their pay, and insuring that they were actively involved in civil-military operations, the French ensured the success of these forces. They employed the indigenous forces throughout Algeria. The intelligence collection capability alone proved of great value, and many indigenous forces became capable of operating independently of French control thus freeing up French man-power for additional operations. The indigenous personnel were one of the keys to the military

defeat of the ALN.

Chapter 7, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency: Leadership and Ethics*

Chapter 7 focuses on the leadership tenets and ethical decision-making challenges inherent in counterinsurgency operations. This chapter identifies the key connection between leadership and ethics in counterinsurgency operations. Establishing a leadership climate that is adaptive and exercises critical judgment helps mitigate the ambiguous nature of counterinsurgencies and reduce potential damaging acts.⁶ Use of excessive or indiscriminate force can alienate a population, which deprives the counterinsurgent of popular support and tolerance. Leadership must be restrained, patient, and maintain a continual presence among subordinates to help identify the complex ethical issues where preserving life and dignity occurs against the backdrop of violence and aggressive combat operations.

Developing information on an enemy is difficult in any military operation. In counterinsurgency operations, detentions and interrogations provide one of the most useful means for gathering intelligence on a threat. However, detentions and interrogations are a challenge in counterinsurgencies due to the difficulty of identifying combatants from innocent civilians, since insurgents do not generally wear uniforms and are identical in appearance to the population they operate in. Chapter 7 provides ethical guidelines for conducting interrogations and limits on detentions. Using U.S. law and military regulation to proscribe treatment to detainees, the section focuses on the tactical level, clearly stating that abuse of detainees, unethical means of detention and interrogation, and inhumane treatment are not in accordance with U.S. policy and practice. Leadership at all levels is responsible for ensuring the counterinsurgent

conforms to these policies. If they do not, use of such illegal means can only exacerbate the situation and produce negative effects for U.S. forces. Leadership must exercise ethical decision-making that preserves human dignity while balancing operational requirements. Failure to do so results in the loss of moral legitimacy and undermines the counterinsurgency effort.

By 1957, the French use of arbitrary arrests and detentions of suspected sympathizers was widespread. Many arrests occurred through informants. Most arrests occurred from arbitrary sweeps or from military operations. The jails and prisons were filled to capacity with limited judicial action being taken in a timely manner. Several detention camps were established in Oran and Algiers to hold detainees taken during sweeps and as part of raids on suspected cells and targets.⁷ Additionally, as part of the pacification process, the wholesale movement of communities into *regroupement* areas had an un-intended consequence of creating the “prison-like” environment of a detention center. In detention centers, interrogation methods were often harsh, involving many methods generally illegal under the Geneva Conventions. Justifying their actions as legitimate, units like the 10th Parachute Division developed very successful methods for using torture to gain actionable intelligence at the tactical level.⁸

French methods of detention and interrogation used in Algeria completely violated the tenets of FM 3-24. The French authority’s widespread dissolution of civil law allowed the French to apply combatant status to just about anyone they detained, reducing their legal rights even more. French military and civilian leadership tacitly approved of such measures, justifying it as a necessity of the conflict. Additionally, the use of *regroupement* in rural areas or the “Blue Caps” (Algerians forced to inform or paid

to keep track and report on activities in an area) taking control of apartment complexes or housing sections in urban centers amounted to an institutional effort at systematic detention of whole communities.⁹ Many arbitrary arrests resulted in torture or the threat of torture for the detainee, despite the fact that many detained were not actively supporting the insurgency. Many Algerians became active supporters after their treatment in detention. Torture, despite sometimes producing effective intelligence, resulted in the loss of the moral legitimacy of the French, domestically and internationally. Ultimately, the tacit condoning of torture by French leaders at all levels undermined the legitimacy of French efforts within the international community, discredited their strategic objectives, caused internal fragmentation and degradation of the ethical climate among the army and pushed many Algerians to actively support the insurgency. French use of torture over-shadowed the successful defeat of the insurgency at the tactical level and created a vulnerability to propaganda for their efforts.

Chapter 8, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency: Sustainment

Chapter 8 covers several important aspects of support operations and military support activities to counterinsurgency operations. The first part of the chapter covers logistical considerations and significant differences compared to conventional combat operations. Because counterinsurgency operations may require rapid and complex resourcing by military forces with non-military or non-traditional means, logistics considerations become more varied and difficult. Additionally, the need to provide humanitarian support to the HN is a critical component of gaining and maintaining popular support. For both these reasons, logistics operations in a counterinsurgency environment are more complex and difficult to balance than high-intensity or mid-

intensity conflicts.

FM 3-24 indicates that U.S. military logistical support should not be exclusively engaged in providing essential services to a local population despite the critical effect that could have in maintaining or gaining support and tolerance of the population. U.S. forces can, however, assist HN forces in establishing essential services which promote governance and create stability for a population. HN civil administration and non-governmental organizations must include planning and development of the intensive logistics required in that process. Chapter 8 focuses on first assessing the logistic requirements and then identifying the critical elements needed for logistics support to restore essential services. Where possible, FM 3-24 directs U.S. forces to transition as quickly as possible to HN lead and control of logistical efforts to further develop the legitimacy of the HN government. The manual states that logistics support from the counterinsurgent force is critical to restoring essential services, but even more critical in establishing legitimacy and countering insurgent information operations.

As troop numbers increased in Algeria for the French, the attendant logistics requirements to sustain the force increased as well. By 1958, with nearly 400,000 troops in Algeria, French efforts to sustain themselves were massive. The French military resourced their conventional forces, built a massive defensive zone along the Mordane Line, pushed forces into static positions throughout the country as part of the *quadrillage*, and equipped their mobile strike groups with helicopters and ground assets.¹⁰ These were purely military logistics requirements. The requirement to address social and economic issues with support and aid was conducted on a much smaller scale. Principally, the French used the SAS (and later SAU) to be the conduit for logistics

support to their efforts at governance.¹¹ Administration across all of Algeria had been, from the start, chronically short and under-manned. The SAS had been designed to dovetail civil-military efforts with military pacification.¹² Once pacification was complete, the SAS would form the nucleus for civil administration and economic development within an area, which could range in several kilometers square. Work projects, distribution of food and aid, educational development, and medical development were part of the tasks associated with the SAS mission in the rural or under-administrated areas.

French logistics support to governance was not conducted in accordance with the principles of sustainment identified in Chapter 8 of FM 3-24. While the SAS was established to coordinate civil-military operations and bring administration to areas without governmental infrastructure, they were not adequately resourced and equipped to complete those tasks. The SAS depended entirely on the regular Army for its operational and logistics support even though the SAS was aligned under French civil authority in Algeria.¹³ Manual labor and communications infrastructure was required from external support agencies that were not always willing to cooperative. French civilian authority was reluctant to provide the necessary funding to the SAS and other agencies operating in the rural, and some cases, urban areas. Additionally, the French military made limited inroads into developing an a stable and operating infrastructure that was more flexible and not so reliant on European administrators.

Appendix A, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency: A Guide to Action*

Appendix A provides broad outlines of how to translate the lessons of the previous chapters into practice. FM 3-24 states that the key to incorporating those

lessons into operations is successful planning and preparation prior to and during a units' deployment. "Execute action" is described by FM 3-24 as putting "*a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress.*"¹⁴ Expressed as "maxims" or succinct formulations of rules of conduct, FM 3-24 provides 17 "rules" for action which range from *Establish and Maintain a Presence or Avoid Hasty Actions*, to *Conduct Civil-Military Operations* and *Fight the Enemy's Strategy*.¹⁵ Each rule focuses on approaching the challenges of COIN operations at the local or "community" level while maintaining simplicity in the approach. Of particular importance is the rule of *Remembering the Global Audience*. FM 3-24 identifies that world perception of operations, even at the lowest level, can have immeasurable effect on over-arching strategy and national objectives. Good relationships with and use of the media can provide a counter to the often effective use of all forms of media by the insurgency. Actions of individual soldiers have great potential impact both in perception and influence on the population. A single instance can have great impact. Insurgent uses of propaganda can dramatically influence public opinion, both locally and globally. Execution of counterinsurgency operations must take into account the broad capabilities the insurgent has to influence public opinion, including the ability to distribute false information. Every action, even in the most remote locations within a theater, can have a tremendous impact on perceptions and opinions.

France largely viewed their actions and operations in Algeria as an internal problem. As early as 1955, the External Delegation of the FLN (the political arm of the FLN based in Cairo) persuaded other friendly Arab countries to bring the issue of Algerian independence before the UN General Assembly.¹⁶ The French response was to

walk out in protest stating that the issue was an internal matter. Both the United States and members of the non-aligned nations within the UN consistently abstained from voting on the issue of Algeria and were not courted by the French for support. Without the perceived support of the U.S. or other member-nations of the UN, French efforts in Algeria were viewed as illegitimate. Additionally, French military authorities and civil administrators prevented world media outlets from reporting from inside Algeria on a regular basis. This also reduced the legitimacy of French involvement.

The French approach to the global audience was in sharp contrast to FM 3-24. French political and military leaders repeatedly argued against any outside involvement in what they believed to be an internal issue. Additionally, whenever media outlets within Algeria, and occasionally in France, wrote about or spoke out against French policy and actions, they were closed or shut-down. The continued reporting by the FLN and other groups of the atrocities, brutality, and repression of rights of Algerians were put forth in highly public forums like the UN, and continued to tarnish France's claim to their legitimate role of maintaining Algeria as part of the republic. French dialogue with other nations on Algeria did not exist, and they never publicly addressed the issues of repression and colonialism. These actions caused French operations to lose legitimacy. Strife in France itself increased over the course of direction of the conflict, and world opinion turned against the perceived colonial policies of France.

Appendix B, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency: Social Network Analysis*

Appendix B focuses on providing more proscriptive means for identifying and evaluating the threat. It adds to the previous sections on intelligence preparation of the battlefield and details the difficult process of building and analyzing the social networks

the population and the insurgent operate in. The more the counterinsurgency forces understand about the operational environment, the more quickly and correctly decisions can be made in the actual execution of counterinsurgency operations. Appendix B describes analytical tools used to develop a more detailed understanding of the threat and the environment the threat operates in.

Because insurgencies focus on population influencers and social dynamics, it is difficult for foreign conventional forces to develop an understanding of the threat's operational environment. Social network analysis is a tool for analyzing the individual insurgent, the organizational make-up of the insurgency, and how each insurgent interacts with one another and the population at large. Appendix B of FM 3-24 provides several different methods for developing tools to identify patterns of relationship and interaction between the physical and social environment of an area and the insurgency. Essentially, the goal is to use different graphical tools (see Figures 2 and 3) to link networks, be it social or organizational, to one another. By identifying linkages between different nodes (nodes can be individuals, social relationships, or political relationships), counterinsurgency forces can visualize the relationships to provide a better understanding of the enemy. Social network analysis formalizes the informal and often disparate relationships between elements of the insurgency and presents them graphically. It allows the counterinsurgent to place relationships in context to one another and provide structure to the complex mosaic of the insurgent hierarchical structure and organization. Insurgencies do not operate or behave like normal social networks counterinsurgents may be accustomed to. Understanding the networks facilitates the targeting or influencing of the insurgent networks.




Figure 2. Example of Simple Network

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Figure B-10, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.: US Army Training and Doctrine Command 2006, pg. B-15).




Figure 3. Example of Link Diagram

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Figure B-16, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.: US Army Training and Doctrine Command 2006, pg. B-21).

Based on experiences from Indochina and the growing support and acceptance of *le guerre révolutionnaire* as a viable approach to revolutionary war, the French developed a model of the factors that they faced in Algeria.¹⁷ The French focused on the population and its support to the insurgency, understanding that the allegiance of the population was crucial to defeating the insurgency. At the strategic level, French efforts at social network analysis focused on identifying the insurgent leadership and their objectives. Against the backdrop of the Cold War, the French linked geographical and ethnic factors to identify the causal factors of the insurgency and the individual motivations of the FLN leadership. Believing that a Marxist-ideology was the driving influencer, the French developed their counterinsurgency model on the basis of

combating that ideology.¹⁸ French civil-administrative and military efforts were designed to separate the insurgency from the population; understanding that without French governmental and military presence throughout the rural areas of Algeria, the insurgency would be able to successfully influence and gain support of the population. The French clearly understood that modern warfare was “an interlocking system of action-political, economic, psychological, and military.”¹⁹

At the tactical level, the French used intelligence and psychological operations to develop information and an understanding of the relationships between individuals, the cells they commanded and controlled, and their relationship to the community they operated in. Interrogation of detainees and skillful use of informants were the primary means for building that picture. Using a top-down approach, French intelligence organizations in Algeria built an extensive break-down of the insurgency linkage mechanisms. Additionally, the French had extensive knowledge of local culture and history, having been in Algeria since 1830. Their understanding of local relationships was highly developed and very accurate.

Much of the French Army embraced the concept that counterinsurgency warfare was an absolute and therefore matched their understanding of the enemy and how to combat him.²⁰ Despite the problem of their theoretical hypothesis incorrectly identifying the root causes of the insurgency, French efforts were in line with the tenets of FM 3-24 because they clearly understood the relationship between the insurgency and the population. The French placed an emphasis on social network analysis: recognizing that regional, tribal, and political relationships are indicators and identifiers of insurgent leadership and planned objectives. However, because the French incorrectly identified

the basic causes of the insurgency, their strategic approach never addressed the center of gravity of the insurgency. Still, at the tactical and operational level, the ability to fully develop social networks resulted in an excellent picture of the FLN leadership and the ALN organization. This led to effective targeting (see Figure 4). The complex nature of North African social and cultural networks was well defined as the French had been involved in the administration and governance of Algeria for over 100 years by the time of the conflict.




Figure 4. Example of French SNA of FLN in Algiers, 1958.
 Source: Trinquier, Roger. *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*. (Figure 2, London: Praeger, 1964, 9 & 12).

Appendix C, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency: Language and Indigenous Personnel

Appendix C identifies the importance and challenge of developing and employing interpreters and host-nation linguists to assist the counterinsurgent. The need for language specialists, interpreters, and a need to understand the local language generally exceeds the capabilities a conventional military organization has to communicate with the population. External support is a necessity for U.S. forces as they operate in a

counterinsurgency environment. Appendix C identifies areas of focus for developing linguist capability and the challenges associated with employment of linguists.

When language barriers exist, linguists and interpreters become an important capability to overcoming those challenges. FM 3-24 identifies several critical considerations in selecting appropriate interpreters for the mission. A basic set of criteria must be met. It begins with properly evaluating the background and potential security risk the interpreters may present. Additionally, once vetting is complete, it is important to determine the capabilities of the interpreters. The interpreter must be fluent in both the native language and the English language. Also important is ensuring the social and religious (or economic and cultural) status of the interpreter does not hinder the communication with the target audience. Reliability, gender, compatibility, race, loyalty, technical capability, and intellectual capacity are all vital areas critical to an interpreter's effectiveness.²¹ Communicating with a population through a third person is difficult. Therefore, it is critical to insure interpreters meet strict criteria and that U.S. forces understand the challenges and capabilities of interpreters in order to maximize effectiveness.

French use of indigenous troops and auxiliaries was extensive during the conflict. French forces and civil authority had been present in Algeria since 1830. The French trained the members of the SAS and leaders in the mobile strike groups in Arabic and the regional dialects of the Berber tribes. Yet, despite an attempt to speak Arabic, and the subsequent cultural assimilation associated with an understanding of a language, the predominant language spoken during the conflict was French. French was the official language of Algeria during the time of the conflict.²² The French relied heavily on *harka*

troops to develop intelligence and information on areas, particularly rural areas in Algeria. The *harkas* were members of the local community and were capable of operating throughout an assigned area. Most spoke French and Arabic as well as regional dialects.

French efforts were in line with the principles identified in FM 3-24 at maximizing their use of indigenous personnel for cultural understanding and communication. Both Arabic and French were standard languages used by both the population and military forces, particularly elements like the SAS and SAU. The regional Berber dialects were translated by the personnel like the *harkas* that made up a large portion of the security forces recruited by the French. Muslim and Berber troops had historically served in French military organizations since the French presence in Algeria.

Appendix D, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*: Rule of Law

The adherence to recognized legal standards is vital requirement for counterinsurgency forces. Appendix D focuses on the legal considerations that must be taken into account to conduct operations. Law and policy of the U.S. govern military actions and greatly influences all operations. From rules of engagement (ROE) to regulations on budgeting, legal considerations must be understood and disseminated across all levels of organizations engaged in the operations. Appendix D covers some of the basic and broad policies and laws that affect or guide U.S. forces conducting COIN operations. Appendix D identifies 11 critical areas for understanding legal considerations. These include: 1) authority to assist a foreign government, 2) authorization to use military force, 3) rules of engagement, 4) Law of War, 5) roles in

internal armed conflict, 6) laws and rules for detention and interrogation, 7) enforcing discipline of U.S. forces, 8) humanitarian relief and reconstruction, 9) training and equipping foreign forces, 10) claims and *solatia*, and 11) establishing the rule of law.²³ Each section addresses the basic legal considerations necessary for conducting operations.

Establishing the rule of law is the fundamental goal of counterinsurgency operations.²⁴ Maintaining security, developing the legitimacy of the HN government, assisting the HN in developing democratically-based law for its population, and protecting basic human rights are the key aspects of establishing the rule of law. To be successful, the rule of law must be transparent to all, developed at the local, regional, and national level, and not isolate or marginalize any one ethnic or social group among the overall population. Establishing the rule of law allows for the transition from conflict to peace, and should de-legitimize or remove the insurgent's ability to influence the population. The insurgent focuses on disrupting the rule of law to further his own policies and ideology. Legitimate rule of law employed fairly and equitably prevents the insurgent from promoting their agenda, which is generally that the insurgency is more suited to providing the rule of law than the government. Throughout history, insurgencies have promoted their agenda by focusing on the lack of legitimacy (be it real or perceived) and equality of a government, and that provides both a recruiting tool and a propaganda theme for the insurgency.

French efforts at establishing and improving the rule of law in Algeria were focused on two areas. First, the French attempted to expand on the reforms of the 1947 Algerian Statute which focused on dismantling the *mixed communes*, providing for

Algerian Muslims to be granted a larger voice in the government, providing economic reforms, abolishing *colon*-controlled courts and legal dominance, and giving voter rights to Algerian women.²⁵ Secondly, the French recognized a need to change the ponderous administrative and political system in Algeria, which again was designed to reduce *colon* control of civil administration and economic organizations.²⁶ In 1956, Governor-General Lacoste attempted to further rule of law by attracting more Arabs and Berbers into government service and state-controlled industries.²⁷ Other parallel reforms in 1955 and 1956 included reorganization of medical assistance to all Algerians, abolition of special taxes on items like food and sugar, and courting more Muslim representatives to the judiciary.²⁸ Elections at the local level were set-up by the SAS to help elect Arab and Berber representatives as mayors and prefects and bring the population into closer contact with the government, supporting the legitimacy of the civil authority among the population.

Despite the periodic pushes for legal and governmental reform, the French failed to meet the requirements identified in FM 3-24. Repeated, relentless pressure by the *colons* prodded French authorities away from judicial and administrative reform. In late 1955, that pressure succeeded in allowing military tribunals to become the primary arena for dealing with the large number of detainees the military were seizing in operations.²⁹ The French civil authority continually bowed to *colon* and military pressure, repealing many of the legal reforms designed to provide equitable treatment. More and more the military gained control of all aspects of civil authority. By 1957, French military units like the 10th Parachute Division used force and threats to break up demonstrations and strikes, even forcing businesses to open at gun point.³⁰ Widespread detentions without

due process were commonplace. The civilian authority had limited or no oversight of or control over the military. Use of torture, beatings, and other forms of intimidation became nearly institutionalized by the military and undermined any efforts at establishing rule of law. The failure to establish the rule of law completely alienated the population and negated any successes the French had achieved.

Appendix E, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency: Airpower*

Appendix E identifies air power as an important combat multiplier in conventional operations. While it is equally important in counterinsurgency operations, airpower is more difficult to employ in that environment. Counterinsurgency operations, by their nature, require focused targeting and precision use of combat power or they may produce unintended and un-desired outcomes. Too much destruction or excessive use of force can push a population away from tolerance and support, and to active support of the insurgency. Appendix E explains the potential roles and usages as well as the planning considerations for employment of airpower in the counterinsurgency to reduce that possibility.

Airpower usage in counterinsurgency operations is broken down by FM 3-24 into six key areas: 1) strike role, 2) intelligence collection, 3) air and space information operations, 4) airlift, 5) command structure, and 6) building host-nation airpower capability.³¹ Of the key areas, none can accomplish as many tasks successfully as airlift capability. The employment of both fixed- and rotary-wing can provide significant advantages, allowing counterinsurgency forces to rapidly “deploy, reposition, sustain, and redeploy forces, resources, and equipment.”³² Using both air-land and airdrop methods of delivery for troops and equipment, counterinsurgency forces can operate in

austere areas normally controlled by the insurgent, and sustain them for extended periods. Airlift can also meet every line of operation from combat operations (moving forces rapidly into an area) to information operations (bringing in humanitarian aid). Airlift allows counterinsurgent forces to be more mobile, maintain the element of surprise, bring rapid and extensive firepower to bear, and reduce the vulnerability of forces if they are relieved of slower ground movements.

From the start, French forces set out to build air capability specially designed for the counterinsurgency environment.³³ Developing de-centralized command and control for air assets, the French military fielded new American and French helicopters and incorporated them into their methods for clearing insurgent areas and conducting rapid, detailed reconnaissance. The helicopter provided the French the capability to employ their mobile strike groups quickly. In Algeria, the French were positioned to conduct air assaults of up to two battalions at a time almost everywhere.³⁴ Additionally, the French maximized their use of piston-driven, fixed-wing propeller aircraft for close air support (CAS) and reconnaissance. Operating from austere areas, with minimal maintenance, French air assets could maintain constant surveillance coverage over large sections of Algeria. The smaller, more maneuverable aircraft provided excellent fire support to small elements engaged with guerilla elements of the ALN.

FM 3-24 recommendations on air power in the counterinsurgency fight validate French efforts with aviation in Algeria. Building aviation platforms to be mobile, lighter, and capable of multiple roles (reconnaissance, lift, attack), the French maximized their capabilities in conducting counterinsurgency operations. Moving troops and supplies quickly, with little warning kept insurgent forces off-balance and vulnerable to

destruction. Constant surveillance limited the ability of insurgent forces to maintain freedom of movement and reduced their ability to mass for attacks. Additionally, the French understood that bombing and aerial attacks alone could not completely defeat the enemy, and often provided the insurgent with issues to be exploited by propaganda. Because targeting is difficult in counterinsurgency operations, the French focused their airpower efforts on rapid movement of men and material and surveillance.

Conclusion

The French understanding and application of military support activities in a counterinsurgency was congruent with many of the premises identified within FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. Once again, the lessons of Indochina, as well as trial and error in Algeria, informed the French understanding of the nature and requirements of the counterinsurgency in Algeria. The French military grasped the complex environment of social and ethnic relationships in Algeria and how those relationships identified the leadership of the insurgency. Additionally, the French reorganized their force to meet the low-intensity conflict of Algeria; maximizing their usage of air power, and employing and utilizing indigenous personnel. However, French understanding was rarely seen above the tactical level. Strategically, they did not understand the nature of the war. Many of the critical concepts applicable at the strategic level were not effectively applied. The French justification of torture, failure to address the global audience to reduce the negative effects of the insurgent propaganda, and a systematic ignorance of the criticality of sustaining legitimacy through rule of law all undermined French efforts. French efforts were designed to focus on the population, an area described in FM 3-24 as the principle concern for the counterinsurgency forces. Yet, their methods countered their

strategy on maintaining the relationship and support of the population.

¹Martin S. Alexander, eds., *France and the Algerian War, 1954-62: Strategy, Operations, and Diplomacy*, London: Frank Cass, 2002. 4.

²Dept. of the Army, FM (Field Manual) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, (Washington, D.C.: US Army Training and Doctrine Command 2006), 6-8. Paragraph 6-34.

³Peter D. Jackson, “French Ground Force Organizational Development for Counter-Revolutionary Warfare between 1945 and 1962’, MMAS diss., Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2005, 98.

⁴Edgar O’Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection 1954 – 1962*, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1967, 65.

⁵Peter D. Jackson, “French Ground Force Organizational Development for Counter-Revolutionary Warfare between 1945 and 1962”, 99.

⁶Dept. of the Army, FM (Field Manual) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 7-4. Paragraph 7-18.

⁷Edgar O’Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection 1954 – 1962*, 150.

⁸*Ibid.*, 80. About 10,000 troops of the 10th Paratroop Division, commanded by General Massu, entered the Casbah and ruthlessly pursued the ALN/FLN networks.

⁹Andrew A. Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1972, 242.

¹⁰Karl Goetzke, “A Review of the Algerian War of National Liberation Using the Army’s Current Counterinsurgency Doctrine”, MA diss., Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 2005, 10.

¹¹Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina and Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine*, New York, NY: Praeger, 1964, 50.

¹²George Armstrong Kelly, *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947 – 1962*, Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1965, 180.

¹³*Ibid.*, 181.

¹⁴Dept. of the Army, FM (Field Manual) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, A-4. Paragraph A-23.

- ¹⁵Ibid., A-4 thru A-8. Paragraph's A-24, A-45, A-49.
- ¹⁶Edgar O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection 1954 – 1962*, 61.
- ¹⁷George Armstrong Kelly, *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947 – 1962*, 164.
- ¹⁸Louis A. DiMarco, “Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Revolutionnaire in the Algerian War”, *Parameters* 36, no. 2 (Summer 2006), 74.
- ¹⁹LTC Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, London: Praeger Security International, 2006, 5.
- ²⁰George Armstrong Kelly, *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947 – 1962*, 164.
- ²¹Dept. of the Army, FM (field Manual) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, C-2 thru C-3. Paragraph C-9 thru C-17.
- ²²Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954 – 1962*, New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1977, 31.
- ²³Dept. of the Army, FM (Field Manual) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, D-1. Paragraph D-2.
- ²⁴Ibid., D-8. Paragraph D-38.
- ²⁵Andrew A. Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 154.
- ²⁶Ibid., 145.
- ²⁷Ibid., 149.
- ²⁸Ibid., 149.
- ²⁹Ibid., 154.
- ³⁰Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954 – 1962*, 191.
- ³¹Dept. of the Army, FM (Field Manual) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, E-1 thru E-5.
- ³²Ibid., E-4. Paragraph E-19.
- ³³Martin S. Alexander, eds., *France and the Algerian War, 1954-62: Strategy, Operations, and Diplomacy*, 68.
- ³⁴Peter D. Jackson, “French Ground Force Organizational Development for Counter-Revolutionary Warfare between 1945 and 1962”, 95.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

At some point in the counterinsurgency process, the static units that took part initially in large-scale military operations in their area will find themselves confronted with a huge variety of nonmilitary tasks which have to be performed in order to get the support of the population, and which can be performed only by military personnel, because of the shortage of reliable civilian political and administrative personnel.¹

David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*.

French doctrine development for COIN warfare, although addressing the attendant requirements of military organizational change, was primarily drawn from a belief in the importance of the social and psychological factors at play within a population. These factors were the impetus for the revolutionary wars of the time, and French experiences had been sharply defined by their efforts in countering guerilla forces in Indochina, as well as the geo-political landscape resulting from the growing Cold War standoff. Despite understanding the paradoxes of counterinsurgencies, extensive employment of indigenous personnel, excellent social network analysis at the tactical level, and innovative use of airpower, the French withdrew from Algeria. FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, addresses many of the areas that caused French efforts in Algeria to be unsuccessful. FM 3-24 identifies the critical aspects of COIN and provides a fundamental guide for achieving success by focusing efforts on those areas. Within FM 3-24, the focus on unity of effort, humane and law-based approaches to intelligence operations, detailed approaches to information operations, and extensive efforts at legitimacy through rule of law and governance make the manual an effective guide to combating insurgencies.

French Operational Alignment with FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*

Several important French efforts in their counterinsurgency operations clearly fall in line with principles articulated within FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. One of the most critical similarities is the understanding of the nature of paradoxes inherent in counterinsurgency warfare. Indochina had taught the French that more than the application of combat power is required to counter revolutionary war. FM 3-24 identifies, primarily from historical comparison, nine paradoxes common to insurgencies. David Galula, a veteran of Algeria and counterinsurgency expert, describes two laws of counterrevolutionary warfare applied to Algeria, namely “that support of the population is necessary for both the counterinsurgent and the insurgent” and the “intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.”² These “laws” correspond to the paradoxes identified in FM 3-24: “*The More Successful the Counterinsurgency Is, the Less Force Can be Used and the More Risk Must be Accepted*” and “*Some of the Best Weapons for the Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot.*”³ The ramification of this understanding of the paradoxical nature of counterinsurgencies led to the French military taking a more active role in non-traditional areas like governance, education, and politico-psychological action. FM 3-24 describes the same requirements, putting emphasis on reduction of excessive force and identifying that tactical success guarantees nothing in the strategic outcomes. Again, this highlights the contradictory nature of counterinsurgency warfare which requires less application of combat power and more of other elements of national power: diplomatic, economic, and informational.

A second critical area of validation between French efforts in Algeria and principles within FM 3-24 is in the use and employment of indigenous personnel

(described as Host Nation personnel in FM 3-24). The French military and police put great effort into recruiting and developing indigenous personnel for the security forces, and later for administrative development. The use of *harkas* and others provided additional man-power as well as regional and local knowledge and intelligence not easily developed by the military. Capitalizing on their familiarity and knowledge of culture and terrain, basing the indigenous personnel near their homes, increasing their pay, and insuring they were actively involved in civil-military operations, the French employed these forces to great success. FM 3-24 is clear in identifying the importance of employing host-nation or indigenous personnel in the counterinsurgency effort. It furthers legitimacy of the counterinsurgent, as well as strengthens the military and intelligence capability.

A third critical area where French efforts and FM 3-24 converge is the emphasis on social network analysis (SNA). As FM 3-24 states, “social network analysis is a tool for understanding the organizational dynamics of an insurgency and how best to attack it or exploit it.”⁴ As an example, in the Battle of Algiers in 1957, the French developed an understanding that the bricklayers within the Casbah were extensively used to build weapons caches and hide explosive charges within masonry.⁵ By targeting the bricklayers through interrogation, subversion, and enlistment, the French effectively reduced the number of attacks within the city, identified caches and bomb-making factories, and killed or captured many cell members of the FLN. This type of social network analysis was common-place across Algeria, at least at the tactical and operational level, and falls in line with the tenets of FM 3-24. By developing a picture of the social environment and then working to identify patterns of action by the insurgents

within that social environment, the French could focus their efforts more effectively.

A final critical area where French efforts validate the guidance in FM 3-24 is in the employment of air power in counterinsurgency warfare. As FM 3-24 states, effective leaders can “use airpower in roles other than delivering ordnance.”⁶ The French understood that all aspects of air power— strike capability, intelligence collection, and airlift— were vital and traditionally did not have a well-developed doctrine for employment. Moving troops and supplies quickly, with little warning kept insurgent forces off-balance and vulnerable to destruction. Constant surveillance limited the ability of insurgent forces to maintain freedom of movement and reduced their ability to mass for attacks. Additionally, the French understood that bombing or aerial attacks alone could not completely defeat the enemy, and in most cases would provide the insurgent with propaganda to be exploited. Because targeting is so difficult in counterinsurgency operations, the French focused their air efforts on rapid movement of men and material and surveillance.

French Operational Divergence from FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*

The primary objective of counterinsurgency operations is to neutralize the insurgent, then establish a secure environment. Doctrine expects that military forces conduct a wide range of offensive, defensive, and stability operations to pursue those ends. While key aspects of French efforts in Algeria converge with the doctrinal tenets of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, there are critical differences between FM 3-24 and French experiences where their efforts either contradict the manual or failed to achieve the desired result suggested in the manual. Those critical differences seemingly fit into one of four over-arching categories: 1) unity of effort, 2) ethically-conducted intelligence

operations, 3) information operations, and 4) legitimacy of effort.

Unity of Effort

Several aspects of French efforts against the FLN in Algeria contradict the emphasis on unity of effort in FM 3-24. FM 3-24 requires unity of effort: counterinsurgency operations synchronized between civilian and military objectives to combat the threat and its influence on the population. The French failed to establish a comprehensive strategy such that military effort and civilian effort complimented one another. By not addressing economic and political issues, ignoring or putting off social reform, and solely resourcing and executing military tasks to combat the insurgency, French civilian and military activities were not synchronized and remained uncoordinated. They did not achieve unity of effort which, in turn, produced an ineffective strategy. Additionally, the integration mechanisms required to synchronize the military and civilian activities that were employed were either under-resourced or dominated by the military authority in Algeria. Organizations like the SAS tried to employ both civilian and military activities to achieve success, but relied too heavily on military augmentation and were under-staffed in civilian personnel. Under-resourced, units like the SAS could not provide fair and competent governance to Algeria further undermining popular support. Vague and broad directives from the civilian authority and autonomous action by the military sent mixed messages to the population and inhibited integration.

Adding on to the failure to integrate and synchronize military and civilian activities was the absence of a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign plan that included both civilian and military lines of operation. A counterinsurgency campaign

plan requires a continuous process of identifying the nature of the insurgency and applying standard and non-standard methods and military capabilities against the problem. Without a clearly articulated counterinsurgency plan understood by both the military and civilian authority, unity of effort was impossible. The French military controlled too many aspects of the counterinsurgency, and was increasingly distrustful of civilian authority which created a less than ideal environment to develop a comprehensive campaign design.

Ethically-Conducted Intelligence Operations

FM 3-24 identifies civil considerations as one of the most important aspects of developing intelligence in the counterinsurgency environment. The French adapted their intelligence operations to meet their understanding of how to combat revolutionary wars, putting the focus on influencing and gaining the support of the population. Despite this understanding of the importance of civil considerations in intelligence operations, and contrary to the guidance in FM 3-24, French methods of developing intelligence alienated the population. A critical part of developing intelligence is the understanding of the grievances of the population. Countering grievances allows the counterinsurgent to remove potential areas of exploitation by the insurgent. French pre-occupation with Communism as a root cause and a lack of understanding of the real grievances of the Algerians forced the French to respond to only the symptoms of the insurgency, not the cause. Thus, the French were never able to fully counter the revolutionary movement of the insurgency. The French did not accept that Arab nationalism was more of a catalyst for the insurgency than Communism or agrarian reform.

French efforts to develop human intelligence (HUMINT), while successful in

producing intelligence, actually resulted in further alienation of the population from the French cause. The methods employed in interrogation and detention was extremely harsh. The use of torture, mass detention, and coercive psychological operations defied the French's own counterinsurgency doctrine. The population was alienated from the French by the unethical treatment, which in some cases pushed people to the side of the insurgent who might not otherwise have gone over. It also adversely affected the moral integrity of the French military itself, further degrading intelligence efforts, as the French Army questioned itself and lost support from home and abroad. The unethical approach to HUMINT produced an environment that ignored or violated the rule of law.

Information Operations

FM 3-24 identifies effective information operations (IO) as being those that use consistent themes based “on policy, facts, and deeds- not claims of future plans.”⁷ The French were unsuccessful in meeting what FM 3-24 states as the “issues and concerns” of the populace. Harsh methods in interrogations, use of torture, and lack of response to FLN propaganda efforts in the international media, all demonstrated a lack of appreciation of the importance of IO. For every IO effort to legitimize French government and counterinsurgency operations, widespread French use of torture, *regroupement*, and lack of sensitivity to Islamic institutions validated the insurgents' IO messages. Additionally, little or no economic and political reform further de-legitimized the French IO efforts which made claims not supported by facts.

The French refused to dialogue on Algeria with other nations, and never addressed the issues of repression and colonialism to the world community. Thus, the French alienated the international audience. These actions caused the French COIN

operations to lose legitimacy; caused dissension in France over Algeria policy; and negatively influenced world opinion against the objectives of France in Algeria.

FM 3-24 identifies the importance of media relations in the IO campaign. French authority did not maintain an open discourse with the media despite the reports of unethical conduct and harsh treatment of the population. This was thoroughly exploited by the insurgents. By closing newspapers or preventing stories to be published, the French also undermined the rule of law (a tenet being freedom of speech), traditionally a cornerstone of Western democracies. This added to negative international opinion, delegitimized the war in the eyes of the French people, and highlighted the Algerian population's unmet expectations of equality and reform.

Legitimacy of Counterinsurgency Effort

FM 3-24 states that the “key requirement to achieve legitimacy for the government is good governance.”⁸ Good governance provides stability and security, has the tolerance and support of the population, and counters insurgent efforts at propaganda and resources exploitation. In Algeria, French civilian authority was reluctant to provide the necessary funding to improve infrastructure and administrative organization. Groups like the SAS that were successful in civil-military efforts, required augmentation and support from the armed forces to execute their mission. That augmentation did not always come. Additionally, the French military made limited inroads into developing an infrastructure that was more flexible and not so reliant on European administrators. Tremendous amounts of resources were expended in man-power and material to provide defensive structures and combat the insurgents in direct action. However, very little was provided to the non-military capabilities so vital to countering an insurgency (such as

health development, economic subsidies, and judicial administration). Without an equal approach in resourcing both civilian and military efforts, legitimacy of those efforts was lost.

The same loss of legitimacy occurred in the establishing and maintaining of the rule of law. Use of torture, beatings, and other forms of intimidation became institutionalized by the military and undermined any efforts at establishing rule of law. Due process, a cornerstone of Western democracies, was ignored by the military and poorly enforced by the civil authority. The population's intolerance of such actions reduced their support of French counterinsurgency forces. The loss of legitimacy alienated the population and countered any material successes the French had against insurgent military capability.

Contrasts between French Efforts and FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*

There are many similarities in approach, effort, and experiences between French counterinsurgency efforts in Algeria and the principles identified in FM 3-24. It stands to reason that similarities would exist, as much of FM 3-24 is based on historical analogy and lessons learned from previous revolutionary wars. However, much like the French before Algeria, U.S. doctrine development came only after U.S. military forces were engaged against a complex insurgency. During the comparative analysis between FM 3-24 and the French efforts in Algeria, two critical areas not previously identified become apparent. First, there are several sections in FM 3-24 that address issues not considered or identified by the French in the development of their counterinsurgency doctrine (including both informal theory and doctrinal employment) in Algeria. Second, there are several methods employed by the French that were highly successful and worthy of

emulation by future counterinsurgents but not mentioned within FM 3-24.

Shortfalls in French Efforts

Counterinsurgencies are, by their nature, very personal, localized conflicts where individual relationships and actions can have effects at all levels of warfare; tactical, operational, and strategic. The power of modern weapons means that even a small number of insurgents with minimal weaponry can, with effort and some luck, create serious challenges to conventional militaries. In Algeria, many of the French problems were in three key areas: 1) legal/ethical considerations, 2) doctrine disseminated at the individual soldier level, and 3) logistics support to counterinsurgency operations. These three problem areas relate to individual effort as much as organizational approaches. Individual soldiers and leaders require freedom of action in relation to the population.

Much of the French failures can be attributed to tactical methods employed that, despite success, resulted in strategic failure. FM 3-24 devotes a chapter (Chapter 7) to addressing the legal considerations and ethical actions required in a counterinsurgency. U.S. doctrine clearly articulates the importance of adherence to strict guidelines of international law, U.S. policy and regulation, and legal precedence. The French did not address such considerations. In many cases, they attempted to justify their actions by citing the nature of the enemy and enemy terror tactics. The French suspended the rights of the individual in their single-minded pursuit of the FLN/ALN. Much of their army were conscripts, and received very limited training on legal considerations. With the intense desire of the military to atone for their loss in Indochina and attendant loss of honor, the French believed that all methods were acceptable in their execution of operations. Because the French did not focus training on legal considerations, leaders at

all levels allowed a poor ethical climate to be established. Frustration developed from the characteristics of the insurgency: unclear enemy, terrorism, and lack of popular support. This contributed to the moral decay of French conduct. FM 3-24 establishes the importance of understanding the legal considerations to avoid those same pitfalls.

Along with legal considerations, FM 3-24 also uses several sections (Chapter 1, Appendix A, and Appendix D, and within parts of all other chapters) to address the fact that counterinsurgency operations should focus to the lowest level, meaning the individual soldier. Many of the principles within FM 3-24 address the importance of the individual soldier, not necessarily the organization, and the impact individuals can have on operations. French efforts showed an extreme lack of understanding of the nature of the conflict at the lowest level, particularly with conscripts making up the majority of the forces in Algeria. Limited training was given to the individual soldier, and thus, limited means for mitigating harsh or brutal methods were established within the military. Again, the justification of methods rested on the belief that to fight an insurgent enemy means more brutal actions had to be taken.

A third shortfall for the French appears in the area of logistics. FM 3-24 provides a detailed chapter (Chapter 8) on the logistical considerations required for sustained counterinsurgency operations. It includes more than just the military logistics. It discusses the requirements for infrastructure, governance, and host nation development and the intensive logistics nature of such support. For the French, most of their logistics operations supported the military effort. Shortages to the civil-military, administrative, and governance effort regularly impacted the capabilities of organizations like the SAS. The French identified, up front, that their priority was first to defeat the enemy, and then

address the other concerns. However, as events proved, this prioritization hurts the legitimacy efforts so vital to successful counterinsurgency operations.

Shortfalls in FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*

While FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* has become a vital tool in informing commanders and soldiers of the basic principles of counterinsurgency warfare, it is not a perfect manual. There are three areas that require additional development.

First, the French were extremely successful in their reorganization of the military and territorial administration. FM 3-24, based on a broader approach to defining counterinsurgencies, does not address the issues of organization. The alignment of military forces along political and demographic lines within a country is vital to ensuring flexibility in distribution of forces, limit redundancy in mission tasking, and allow for focus to the non-linear aspect of counterinsurgency operations. Organizing counterinsurgency forces along pre-existing political lines is important because it aligns civil and military areas of responsibility, reduces redundancy in resourcing, and promotes unity of effort.

Second, French employment of SAS/SAU proved extremely successful in Algeria. Their range of capabilities, the ability to provide both services and intelligence, and the interaction with the population resulted in success in many areas of the country. The SAS brought administration to areas lacking in the fundamental services. The SAS accorded a more central role in unifying military operations with civilian administration, security restoration, indigenous troop recruiting, and development of intelligence on both insurgents and population. FM 3-24 does not address the potential to units that develop a similar capability. Many of the areas of success attributed to the SAS would be

traditionally carried out by special operations forces of the U.S. in foreign internal defense (FID) missions. Yet, training and development of host-nation forces are increasingly falling into the core competencies of conventional active and reserve units. FM 3-24 should provide a more detailed breakout of that capability, allowing leaders and soldiers at the lowest level to employ such methods.

Finally, French efforts in psychological operations (PSYOPS) – referred to as *action-psychologique*– proved extremely successful in Algeria when applied correctly. FM 3-24 provides very limited guidance on the application of psychological operations. In most cases, branch-specific manuals address these concerns. However, the great success the French enjoyed at the tactical level illustrates the need to synchronize tactical IO themes with operational and strategic objectives, in broad terms. IO must be understandable to the lowest level, so potential effects conventional forces could result from proper application of psychological operations. PSYOPS training should be incorporated into officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) training at unit level, because they are the personnel that will execute a counterinsurgency effort.

Conclusion

La guerre révolutionnaire was the unofficial doctrine of the French military in Algeria. Embraced by veterans of Indochina, the French military sought to employ a counter-revolutionary concept that focused on other than military means to defeat an insurgency. Using constructive, destructive and politico-psychological action, the French military hoped to separate an undecided population from the minority groups fomenting the insurgency in Algeria. Much of that informal doctrine proved highly successful, particularly at the tactical level, but the strategic situation forced withdrawal from Algeria

by 1962. Alone, French successes, in such areas as use of indigenous forces and airpower, detailed social network analysis, and an intellectual understanding of the paradoxes of insurgencies were not sufficient to achieve success in the COIN environment. *La guerre révolutionnaire* did not provide the French enough direction to avoid or overcome mistakes in execution of COIN operations. FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, focuses on key areas where French efforts failed to achieve success. Unity of effort, ethically-conducted intelligence operations, subtle but effective use of information operations, and a standard of legitimizing governance and maintaining rule of law are aspects in FM 3-24 that differ from French operational practice. The negative effects stemming from failure in these areas outweighed any COIN efforts that proved successful for the French in Algeria. The analysis of key differences between French efforts and the stated principles within FM 3-24 indicate the manual is a superior guide for effective COIN operations. FM 3-24 puts greater emphasis on addressing the grievances of the insurgent, more focus on support to the population, and stresses a deep understanding of the complexities of information operations in legitimizing international opinion.

There are no guarantees that had the French possessed and employed such a manual as FM 3-24, the end state would have been any different. Still, the analysis of FM 3-24 compared to French practices indicates the manual is a more comprehensive guide to effective COIN strategy. Because it is comprehensive and flexible, it is a good assumption that it would have had a positive effect on French operations in Algeria. In addition to the doctrine, widespread dissemination, lowest level training for the soldiers in the prerequisite skills of counterinsurgency, adequate resources, and combat patience

are still required to conduct successful counterinsurgency operations. Even given these, political realities may preclude accomplishment of all the tasks necessary for success.

Regardless, FM 3-24 is a combat-multiplier for any counterinsurgent force.

Today's operating environment is more complex and difficult than that faced by the French in Algeria. FM 3-24 must be designed to support that evolving environment. Certainly, there are elements of FM 3-24 that can be improved. Some aspects of successful French COIN efforts are not adequately covered in the manual. These areas should be incorporated into future updates of FM 3-24 to continue to adapt to the ever-changing operating environment. Yet, FM 3-24 is clearly the single best source for COIN doctrine ever produced. It provides the armed forces a centralized reference, in great detail, for applying combat power to the challenges of counterinsurgency operations.

¹LTC David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, New York: Praeger, 1964, 94. Focus of population support is through civil-military means, by the military, but just through military means.

²*Ibid.*, 78-79. Galula identifies a total of 4 laws (his description) of counterinsurgent warfare: 1) The support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent; 2) Support is gained through an active minority; 3) Support from the population is conditional; 4) Intensity of effort and vastness of means are essential, 74-86.

³U.S. Dept. of the Army, FM (Field Manual) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, Washington, D.C.: US Army Training and Doctrine Command 2006, 1-27. Taken from paragraphs 1-151 and 1-153 respectively; 2 of the 9 maxims listed.

⁴*Ibid.*, B-10. Paragraph B-29.

⁵General Paul Aussaresses, *The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Algeria, 1955-1957*, New York: Enigma Books, 2002, 152. General

Aussaresses describes how following certain professions lead to the development of intelligence (through observation) of terrorist networks.

⁶U.S. Dept. of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, E-1. Paragraph E-3.

⁷Ibid., 5-8. Paragraph 5-22.

⁸Ibid., 5-15. Paragraph 5-44.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Ageron, Charles-Robert. *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*. New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc., 1991.
- Alexander, Martin S., and J.F. V. Keiger, eds. *France and the Algerian War, 1954-62: Strategy, Operations, and Diplomacy*. London: Frank Cass Pub., 2002.
- Antal, John and Maj. Bradley Gericke, edited. *City Fights: Selected Histories of Urban Combat from World War II to Vietnam*. New York: Random House Publishing, 2003.
- Asprey, Robert. *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*. 2 Volumes. New York: William Morrow, 1994.
- Aussaresses, Paul, General. *The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Algeria, 1955-1957*. New York, NY: Enigma Books, 2002.
- Beckett, Ian F. W. *Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: Guerillas and Their Opponents since 1750*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2003.
- ., eds. *The Roots of Counter-Insurgency: Armies and Guerilla Warfare, 1900-1945*. New York, NY: Blandford Press, 1988.
- , and John Pimlott, eds. *Armed Forces and Modern Counterinsurgencies*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1985.
- Betts, Richard K. *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*. New York: Columbia University Institute of War and Peace Studies, 2002.
- Birtle, Andrew J. *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*. Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2006
- . *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942 – 1976*. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History U.S. Army, 2006.
- Clark, Michael K. *Algeria in Turmoil: A History of the Rebellion*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.
- Connelly, Matthew. *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

- Corum, James and Wray Johnson. *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2003.
- Ellis, John. *From the Barrel of a Gun: A History of Guerilla, Revolutionary, and Counter-insurgency Warfare from the Romans to the Present*. London: Greenhill, 1995.
- Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. New York: A. Praeger, Publisher, 1964.
- . *Pacification in Algeria 1956 – 1958*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation Publishing, 2006.
- Heggoy, A. Andrew. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1972.
- Henissart, Paul. *Wolves in the City: The Death of French Algeria*. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1970.
- Horne, Alistair. *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1977.
- Kelly, George Armstrong. *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947-1962*. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1965.
- Larteguy, Jean. *The Centurions*. New York, NY: Dutton and Co., 1962.
- McDougall, James. *History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Merom, Gil. *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Metz, Helen Chapin, eds. Library of Congress, *Algeria: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1994.
- Metz, Steven. *Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995.
- and Raymond Millen. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Re-conceptualizing Threat and Response*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2004.
- Morgan, Ted. *My Battle of Algiers: A Memoir*. New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2005.

- O'Ballance, Edgar. *The Algerian Insurrection 1954 – 1962*, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1967.
- O'Neill, Brad E. *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005.
- Paret, Peter. *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine*. New York: Praeger, 1964.
- , eds. *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Pickles, Dorothy. *Algeria and France: From Colonialism to Cooperation*. New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger Publishing, Inc., 1963.
- Pimlott, John. *The French Army: From Indochina to Chad, 1946-1984*. Excerpted in Beckett, I. and J. Pimlott. *Armed Forces and Modern Counterinsurgency*. London, UK: Beckenham Publishing, 1985.
- Sarkesian, Sam C., eds. *Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare*. Chicago, IL: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1975.
- Sulzberger, C. L. *The Test: De Gaulle and Algeria*. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1962.
- Taber, Robert. *War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerilla Warfare*. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2002.
- Talbott, John. *The War without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980.
- Thompson, Leroy. *The Counterinsurgency Manual: Tactics of the Anti-Guerrilla Professionals*. Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2002.
- Tierney, John J., Jr. *Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2006.
- Trinquier, Roger. *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*. London: Frederick A. Praeger Publishing, Inc., 1964.
- Willis, Michael. *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History*. New York: New York University Press, 1998.

Periodicals

- Alwin-Foster, Nigel R.F. "Changing the Army for Counter-insurgency Operations." *Military Review* 85, no. 6 (Nov-Dec 2005): 2-15.

- Cassidy, Robert M. "The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counter-Insurgency." *Parameters* 36, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 47-62.
- Campbell, James D., Lieutenant Colonel. "French Algeria and British Northern Ireland: Legitimacy and Rule of Law in Low-Intensity Conflict." *Military Review* 85, no. 4 (Mar-Apr 2005): 2-5.
- DiMarco, Louis A. "Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and *Guerre Revolutionnaire* in the Algerian War." *Parameters* 36, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 63-76.
- Martin, Gilles. "War in Algeria." *Military Review* 85, no. 4 (Jul-Aug 2005) 51-57.
- Harrison, Martin. "Government and Press in France During the Algerian War." *The American Political Science Review* 58, no. 2 (June 1964): 273-285. (Accessed 23 October 2007), (URL: <http://links.jstor.org/sici?=-0003-0554%28196406%2958%3A2%3C273%3AGAPIFD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z>)
- Reed, Brian. "A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency." *Parameters* 37, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 19-30.
- Sepp, Kalev I. "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency." *Military Review: Counterinsurgency Reader*, Special Edition (October 2006), 8-12.
- Starry, Don A. "La Guerre Revolutionnaire." *Military Review* XLVII, no. 2 (February 1967) 61-70.

Dissertations/Thesis

- Bowman, Stephen Lee. "The Evolution of United States Army Doctrine for Counterinsurgency Warfare: From World War II to the Commitment of Combat Units in Vietnam." PhD diss., Duke University, 1985; Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Services, Duke University, 1989. Microfiche.
- Goetzke, Karl. "A Review of the Algerian War of National Liberation Using the US Army's Current Counterinsurgency Doctrine." USAWC Strategy Research Project Masters diss., Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 2005. CARL Library Hardcopy.
- Gougeon, Francois-Marie, "The 'Challe' Plan, Counter-Insurgency Operations in Algeria 12/1958-04/1960." MMS diss., USMC Command and Staff College, 2005.
- Jackson, Peter Drake. "French Ground Force Organizational Development for Counter-Revolutionary Warfare between 1945 and 1962." MMAS diss., Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 2005.
- Johnson, Wray Ross. "From Counterinsurgency to Stability and Support Operations: The Evolution of U.S. Military Doctrine for Foreign Internal Conflict, 1961 – 1996."

- PhD diss., Florida: Florida State University, 1997; Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI Dissertation Services, Florida State University, 1998. Microfiche.
- Peterson, Gregory D. "The French Experience in Algeria, 1954-1962: Blueprint for US Operations in Iraq." SAMS Monograph diss., Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, 2004.
- Riggs, Robert M. "Counter-Insurgency Lessons from the French-Algerian War." MMS diss., Newport, Rhode Island: Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, 2004.
- Rogers, James R. "Tactical Success is not Enough: The French in Algeria, 1954 – 1962." MMS diss., Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, 2004.
- Rose, Donald Gregory. "Peace Operations and Counterinsurgency: The United States Military and Change." PhD diss., Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 2000; Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Services, University of Pittsburgh, 2001. Microfiche.
- Towers, John W., Lieutenant Colonel. "The French in Algeria, 1954-1962: Military Success, Failure of Grand Strategy." USAWC Strategy Research Masters diss., Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 2002. CARL Library Hardcopy.

Government Documents

- U.S. Department of the Army. *Field Manual 2-0, Intelligence*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2004).
- U.S. Department of the Army. *Field Manual 3-0, Operations*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2001).
- U.S. Department of the Army. *Field Manual 3-06, Urban Operations*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003).
- U.S. Department of the Army. *Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003).
- U.S. Department of the Army. *Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 2006).
- U.S. Department of the Army. *Field Manual 7-100.1, Opposing Force Operations*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2001).

U.S. Department of Defense. *Joint Operations Manual 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2003).

U.S. Department of Defense. *Joint Publications 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1996).

United States Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987.

Other Documents

House, Jonathan M. "Overview of the Algerian Conflict." Excerpted from Command and General Staff College, Student Reader, W100 Advanced Warfighting and Operations Course (Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Command and General Staff College, 2006) W118RA 1-13.

Johnson, Sheila K. "Why Algeria Should Be on the Minds of Pentagon Generals." *History News Network*, (09 August 2003): <http://hnn.us/articles/1673.html> (accessed 17 September 2007).

Pontecorvo, Gillo, *The Battle of Algiers!* special ed. DVD. Directed by Gillo Pontecorvo. 1966. Algiers (Casbah), Algeria: Criterion Collection, Criterion Studios, re-released 2004.

McHale, Shawn. "Torture Didn't Work for the French in Algeria Either." *History News Network*, (21 June 2004): <http://hnn.us/articels.5458.html> (accessed 14 July 2007).

Morgan, Ted, "Algeria and Iraq: Yes, There are Parallels." *History News Network*, (20 August 2006): <http://hnn.us/articels.22954.html> (accessed 14 July 2007).

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

LTC (Ret.) Louis A. DiMarco
Department of Military History
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

LTC (Ret.) Joseph D. G. Babb
Department of Joint, Multi-National, and Interagency Operations
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Dr. (Ph.D.) Gary J. Bjorge
Department of Military History
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301