RELUCTANT SAMURAI?
PARTNERING WITH JAPAN TO COMBAT TERRORISM

by

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Dr. Donald A. MacCuish

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# Illustrations

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Introduction

To enhance our Asian alliances and friendships, we will look to Japan to continue forging a leading role in regional and global affairs based on our common interests, our common values, and our close defense and diplomatic cooperation.

—President Bush

National Security Strategy, September 2002

Japan has also provided historic support to the campaign against terrorism.

—President Bush

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003
Wounded Cowboy and Reluctant Samurai?

The tragedies of 11 September 2001 brought into focus the United States’ and Japan’s shared common values and vulnerability to asymmetric attacks by terrorists. It was as if a flash of lightning from out of the blue illuminated shared fears around the world. Memories of the Aum Shinrikyo (Aum Supreme Truth) sarin-gas attack on the subway system of Tokyo in March 1995 intensified the horror felt by the Japanese people as they watched the World Trade Center attack on television. ¹ The impact hit home for them upon learning 24 Japanese citizens died in the attacks along with approximately 3,000 other victims.² Al-Qaeda’s attacks forced the civilized world to respond to a new kind of threat—strategic terrorism.³ Neither compromise nor negotiation is sought or possible between al-Qaeda and the civilized world. Al-Qaeda seeks a perpetual war. The civilized world’s nations must combat this threat together to defeat it.

Though wounded as a nation, the United States chose to lead a campaign with its allies against the global terrorism waged by al-Qaeda.⁴ Japan was the first nation to deploy forces to support the United States-led Operation ENDURING FREEDOM against al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan.⁵ Such an act of courage surely befits the legacy of samurai (professional warriors famous throughout Japanese history).⁶ This display of courage exercised for a righteous cause is consistent with the samurai’s code of honor, bushido (literally means, “way of the

⁵ Saunders, 151.
fighting knight”). Since Japan’s defeat in World War II, the military ethos of the samurai was suppressed and repressed in their national defense policy. The purpose of this research report is to examine what Japan’s military has done and might do to help the world combat terrorism in the current age of globalization. Before examining the restraints and constraints on the Japanese military’s contributions to and potential for combating global terrorism in future sections, the nature of modern warfare and societal vulnerabilities are defined in the remainder of this section. Also, significant terms are clarified and important questions are raised at the end of this section.

In the post-Cold War era, the United States military’s dominance in conventional terms is obvious. Only a foolish foe would choose to use their military’s force in direct opposition (i.e., a strategy of symmetry) against the United States military. Instead, a clever foe will use asymmetry, “a strategy in which one party to a dispute avoids the other’s strengths and attacks its relative weaknesses.” Examples of an asymmetric warfare strategy are al-Qaeda’s spectacular suicide terror attacks, which are designed to spread fear throughout the civilized world. The budget for al-Qaeda’s attacks on 11 September 2001 was $400,000. The cost to the United States includes approximately $2 trillion caused by the attacks and $323 billion for military operations in the War on Terrorism (WOT) launched in response from September 2001 to January 2006. The asymmetry in purely economic terms is astonishing. Traditional methods of countering an asymmetric threat are containment and deterrence. These methods do not apply to al-Qaeda, because it is a non-state actor waging a global campaign of strategic terrorism by

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7 Ibid, 29.
exploiting the very networks that drive globalization.\textsuperscript{11} Therefore, the risky method of preemption may be necessary to counter this threat before it does more damage.\textsuperscript{12}

The changing nature of war includes not only apocalyptic terrorists like al-Qaeda. Consider the “Perfect Storms” of interrelated threats that are brewing, according to Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Dr. John Hillen:

failed governments, ethnic stratification, religious violence, humanitarian disasters, stateless militants, cataclysmic regional crises, proliferation of dangerous weapons, lagging economies, unintegrated and disenfranchised populations, transnational crime, illicit sub-national power structures, poorly or ungoverned spaces, and destabilizing bulges of uneducated and unemployed youth.\textsuperscript{13}

Winning wars in this complex context requires the integrated application of all the elements of national power from many countries. Traditional roles for actors in military, political and diplomatic domains will continue to blur. Strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare will keep compressing and overlapping.\textsuperscript{14} Rapid accomplishment of the required complex integration and application of national power via global partnerships is critical to the security of a vulnerable, globalizing world facing a daunting mix of challenges.

The global network processes underpinning the global economy include interrelated sectors: finance, shipping, communication, technology, transportation and energy. Al-Qaeda embeds operations into these processes to leverage resources, prevent identification and dissuade attack.\textsuperscript{15} What makes the problem even more difficult is the reality that 85\% of global infrastructures are privately owned, operated and controlled. Therefore, governmental elements

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
of national power usually lack the exquisite insight required to create effective campaign plans to combat terrorism, without causing possibly greater collateral effects spanning the globe.\textsuperscript{16} Forty senior-level executives from various public and private sectors gathered in January 2005 at the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and found, “The only means of defeating global terrorism is via a coordinated, synchronized and seamless plan that uses all elements of national power.”\textsuperscript{17}

Probably the most important sector of the global network underpinning the global economy is energy.\textsuperscript{18} If the United States is addicted to oil, as President Bush stated in his 2006 State-of-the-Union Address, then Japan is fiendishly addicted to it, especially from the Middle East.\textsuperscript{19} Japan is the largest by-volume importer of crude oil from the Middle East, with the United States falling just behind. More telling is the statistic that Japan relies on getting 89\% of its oil from the Middle East, while the United States gets 26\% of its oil from that turbulent geopolitical region.\textsuperscript{20} This reliance, coupled with the globalization of the energy security system and the need to protect the global energy network, makes the United States’ economy vulnerable and Japan’s economy extremely vulnerable to shocks, such as al-Qaeda’s attacks.\textsuperscript{21}

To ensure clarity, some key terms are defined below. They come from the recently released \textit{National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism} (NMSP-WOT) by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{15} Lt Col Darryl R. Williams, “Combating Global Terrorism: Bringing All Elements of National Power to Bear,” PowerPoint presentation, USMC War College, 11 January 2006.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 69.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Yergin, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, 70-77.
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Combating terrorism: Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.22

Elements (or instruments) of national power: Diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement;23 private sector, media, academia;24 and, political.25

Terrorism: The calculated or threatened use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.26

Weapons of Mass Destruction or Effect (WMD/E): Broad range of adversary capabilities that pose potentially devastating impacts. Includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and enhanced high-yield-explosive weapons, as well as other, more asymmetrical “weapons.” They may rely more on disruptive impact emphasizing mass effects than destructive kinetic effects to produce strategic outcomes.27

The CJCS also articulated three strategic priorities to win the War on Terror that can help guide a partnership with Japan to do so:

1. Information, perception and how and what we communicate are critical.
2. Assist others to create an environment where terrorism will not flourish.
3. Favor solutions that integrate and coordinate our efforts with the work of others.28

Additionally, he recently asked three important questions, for which this research paper will provide some answers:

1. How do we fight an enemy inside of countries with whom we are not at war?
2. What is it we can do collectively that would be more effective and more efficient, with regards to fighting the war against international terrorists and violent Islamic extremists?
3. How might we better build coalitions?29

23 Ibid.
24 Williams.
25 Hillen.
26 Pace, 37.
27 Ibid.
Given Japan and the United States face a common asymmetric threat of strategic terrorism with shared vulnerabilities in an increasingly complex global security environment, it seems natural that both nations would benefit from partnering together to combat terrorism. The next section addresses restraints and constraints on Japan’s use of its military element of national power to combat terrorism. Despite these restraints and constraints, Japan has contributed military resources to what is becoming a “Long War” against al-Qaeda and its associates. Those contributions are discussed. After examining those contributions, the collision of the al-Qaeda threat with an energy-security vulnerability problem (i.e., maritime terrorism and piracy in the Strait of Malacca) is analyzed. Ideas are proposed for how, focusing on its military instrument of national power, Japan can work with the United States and other countries to manage shared vulnerabilities. Answers to the above questions from the CJCS are discussed, especially with regards to Japan, where relevant and in the conclusion.

A Sheathed Sword

Only a warrior chooses pacifism; others are condemned to it.

—Anonymous

Several restraints and constraints limit Japan’s use of its military element of national power to partner with the United States to combat terrorism. They are Japan’s Constitution, the Yoshida Doctrine, the nature of the United States-Japan Alliance, economic pressures, different threat perceptions, a desire for an independent identity and Japan’s World War II legacy.

MacArthur’s Revenge

General Douglas MacArthur and his staff drafted a post-World War II constitution for occupied Japan in January 1946. The Diet and General MacArthur agreed to a final version in November 1946, which went into force in May 1947. It is a so-called peace or pacifist constitution, because of the two paragraphs comprising Article IX of the document:

1. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.¹

While it appears straightforward that pacifism is the logical Japanese national security principle resulting from Article IX, the constitutional restraints on Japan’s armed forces in achieving national security are still open to wide interpretation. The narrowest interpretation is Japan is not allowed to have a military. A more open interpretation is that forces can be maintained for self-

defense purposes, but not for aggression. Based upon the latter interpretation and a law passed by the Diet in 1954, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) were formed out of the post-occupation National Safety Forces.

Any military capability maintained beyond the minimum required for self-defense has been interpreted as unconstitutional “war potential.” The inherent right to collective self-defense with Japan’s allies is interpreted to not be permitted by its constitution, as doing so would require more forces than those necessary for self-defense. Therefore, the constitution restrains the use of Japan’s military in defense of other nations. This interpretation of a ban on collective self-defense is viewed, by many in the current Diet, as a convenient way to avoid Japan having to sending troops around the globe to support its most important ally, the United States. In October 2000, a high-level, bipartisan study group from the United States reported, “Japan’s prohibition against collective self-defense is a constraint on the alliance. Lifting this constraint would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation.” Given the language of the constitution and political sensitivities, for each use of military forces beyond self-defense, the leaders of Japan must obtain: a favorable constitutional interpretation from the Diet; a special law for the purpose passed by the Diet; a political declaration of the importance to Japan from the Prime Minister; and, an international mandate (e.g., United Nations Security Council Resolution [UNSCR]) or legitimization under the Japan-United States Mutual Security Treaty.

While talk of amending the constitution was once taboo, recent opinion polls in Japan indicate 60% to 70% of the population support changing it to reflect Japan’s status as a global

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2 Ibid, 29.
4 Nishi Osamu, “Bringing Article 9 into the Twenty-first Century,” Japan Echo, August 2005, 34.
5 Deming, 3.
6 Ibid., 6.
power. The changes they support maintain the pacifist ideal, but clarify the right to self-defense and allow collective self-defense to maintain international peace and security. However, changing the constitution is easier said than done. The constitution remains unchanged, since enactment nearly 60 years ago. Article XCVI of the constitution details the amendment procedures. First, the proposed amendment must be approved by two-thirds of both houses of the Diet. Second, the approved amendment must then pass a national referendum with a majority of the votes. This amendment process has never been attempted.

Make Money, Not War

After World War II, Japan’s economy was devastated. The Prime Minister for most of the time from 1946 to 1954 was Yoshida Shigeru. To rebuild Japan, he put forth the idea of transforming Japan into a peaceful merchant state under the protection of the United States. Being a lightly armed commercial state allowed Japan to focus on economic and financial recovery, instead of rebuilding its military, too. This idea is known as the Yoshida Doctrine. Part of the Yoshida Doctrine was a limit on defense spending to 1% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that still exists to the present day. Over time, Japan became prosperous and highly skilled diplomatically. Money and diplomacy became its preferred tools for ensuring Japanese national security throughout the Cold War.

During the Gulf War of 1990, Japan practiced what many derisively called “checkbook diplomacy.” Instead of sending troops to help defend the Middle Eastern oil supplies upon which much of its prosperity relies, Japan contributed $13 billion to coalition efforts to eject the

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7 Nobuaki, 31.
8 Ibid., 30.
10 Saunders, 153.
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.\textsuperscript{11} Some wondered why young men and women from the United States and other militaries risked life and limb to protect oil for Japan; effectively making them mercenaries. Embarrassed and shocked, Japan belatedly sent minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in April 1991.\textsuperscript{12} The limits of the Yoshida Doctrine became glaring in the post-Cold War era.

Another example of the limits of the Yoshida Doctrine relates to Japan’s approach to terrorism and other threats. Without an offensive military capability, Japan is forced to negotiate with or appease terrorists and tyrants. For example, when radical Islamic terrorists kidnapped Japanese citizens in Kyrgyzstan in 1991, the Japanese government secretly paid up to $6 million in cash for their release.\textsuperscript{13} That amount could fund 15 attacks like 11 September 2001. In recent dealings with the North Korean tyrant, Kim Jong-il, some accuse Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of appeasement by offering Japanese “humanitarian assistance” in exchange for Jong-il ceasing threatening behavior.\textsuperscript{14} An article on Japan’s counter-terrorism policy by the Director of Japan’s Foreign Policy Bureau’s International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Division, Mizukoshi Hideaki, advises when dealing with terrorists having a regional agenda, “Political negotiation is an acceptable and effective way to eradicate terrorism and bring about long-term peace and stability.”\textsuperscript{15} Many might argue negotiation with any terrorists begets more terrorism.

**Shield, But No Sword**

After the United States’ occupation of Japan ended in 1952, the security alliance between the two countries began with the signing of the Japan-United States Mutual Security Treaty. It compels the United States to defend Japan without a reciprocal requirement for Japan to defend

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 152.
\textsuperscript{12} Funabashi, *Japan Quarterly*, 15.
\textsuperscript{13} Loretta Napoleoni, *Terror Incorporated* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), 175.
\textsuperscript{14} Saunders, 151.
the United States.\textsuperscript{16} This asymmetric bilateral relationship, coupled with a pacifist constitution, led to the development of a Japanese military equipped solely for defensive operations. For example, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) currently lacks aerial-refueling tankers or ground-attack capabilities, because that combination would allow long-range strikes.\textsuperscript{17} Japan’s military can use a “shield,” but not a “sword.” The United States would provide the swords should the need arise. In addition to restraints on the Japanese military’s use of swords, Prime Minister Takeo Miki’s Cabinet went even further and barred arms exports in 1976.\textsuperscript{18} Japan cannot sell swords, either. This ban on exports reduces the size of defense industry production runs, drives up per-unit cost and reduces the Japanese military’s budget space.

\textbf{It’s the Economy, Stupid}

Constraints from the Japanese economy limit the military’s ability to transform to meet new security challenges, even if constitutional restraints were removed. The defense budget was cut in the last three years, with a 1\% decline in fiscal year 2005. A noted Japanese commentator, Dr. Yoichi Funabashi, sums up the problems facing Japan as the “3 Ds”: deflation, debt and demography.\textsuperscript{19} Since the “bubble economy” of the 1980s “popped” in 1990, the Japanese economy experienced four recessions, deflationary pressures and the highest unemployment rate since World War II of 5\%.\textsuperscript{20} Budget deficits currently equal 48\% of federal spending.\textsuperscript{21} A demographic “time bomb,” the largest percentage of elderly people in world (i.e., 25\%) and low

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birthrate, is ticking towards a pension crisis, huge population drop and 20\% GDP fall by 2025.\textsuperscript{22}

High oil and natural gas prices further reduce the budget available for defense spending.\textsuperscript{23}

Japan’s geopolitical-economic model is described by what Professor Kaoru Sugihara of the University of London terms, “The Oil Triangle,” and is depicted in figure 1 below.

![The Oil Triangle](image-url)

**Figure 1 The Oil Triangle**\textsuperscript{24}

The primacy of oil in Japan’s economic policy is called “resource diplomacy” by Pulitzer Prize-winning author and energy expert, Daniel Yergin.\textsuperscript{25} The need to secure access to Middle Eastern

\textsuperscript{22} Saunders, 158.
\textsuperscript{23} Matthews and Zhang, 41.
\textsuperscript{24} Kaoru Sugihara, “Japan, the Middle East and the World Economy,” in *Japan in the Contemporary Middle East*, Kaoru Sugihara and J. A. Allan, eds. (London: Routledge, 1993), 2.
oil has put Japan on the opposing side of the United States over issues concerning Israel and Iran. Oil is the “Achilles’ heel” of the world’s second largest economy as it limps along.

**Same Problem, Different Perception**

Even after the Aum Shinrikyo and al-Qaeda attacks, the Japanese perception of the terrorism problem is police should contain “radicals” and “antisocial groups” committing terrorism. Japanese society as a whole exhibits low awareness of terrorist threats and does not perceive an immediate danger from terrorists. The greater fear of some Japanese scholars is an “overreaction” to the threat by using the military to lead counterterrorism efforts. Specifically, the military might use unnecessary force on citizens and an excessive influence of the military threatens democracy. An anti-military sentiment is prevalent in Japanese society and constrains the military’s perceived appropriateness in combating terrorism.

**Don’t Stand So Close To Me**

The standing of the United States in the minds of many in Japan and Asia plummeted with the unilateralism, exceptionalism and disdain for multinational agreements and international institutions evident in the preemptive invasion of Iraq and rejections of the Kyoto Treaty and International Criminal Court. Many Japanese people are weary of the sexual assaults, jet noise, pollution and $5-billion-per-year cost associated with hosting 50,000 United States military

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26 Rapp, 120.
30 Kramer, 23.
personnel at bases in Japan. Al-Qaeda or other enemies of the United States could target those bases. Some fear by standing too closely with their ally, the United States, Japan could be targeted, too. Indeed, al-Qaeda threatened Japan with terror attacks, given its support of the United States-led invasion of Iraq. Dr. Michael Green, an East Asian affairs expert and advisor to President Bush, cautions, “Adversaries of the U.S. will increasingly use asymmetrical threats against perceived weak links in the American armor—including U.S. allies.” Listening to and acting on the concerns, complaints and fears of our allies, like those above, are consistent with the CJCS’s WOT priorities and answers to his question on how to build better coalitions.

**Their Fathers’ Sins**

Japan’s World War II legacy still constrains the role its military can play in the global fight against terrorism. Around 20 million Asians died from Japanese military aggression and atrocities during the 1930s to 1940s. Despite unequivocal apologies, reparations, grants and loans from post-World War II Japanese leaders (e.g., Prime Minister Koizumi’s latest apology on 15 August 2005—the 60th anniversary of Japan’s surrender), Asian peoples and governments remain suspicious of any remilitarization of Japan. Time has yet to heal the sword’s wounds.

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33 Ogasawara, 14.
Unsheathing the Sword

*Mental bearing (calmness), not skill, is the sign of a matured samurai. A samurai, therefore, should neither be pompous nor arrogant.*

—Tsukahara Bokuden

Faced with emergent national-security threats and despite restraints and constraints on the use of its military element of national power, Japan responded to the threats with courageous contributions. The Japanese military is developing its capabilities to contribute even more towards international peace and security. Japan is on the path to becoming a more normal and respected global power that the United States can effectively partner with to combat terrorism.

Awaking the Samurai

If the 1990 Gulf War did not awake Japan from the “dream world” of unilateral pacifism, the launch of a Taepodong ballistic missile by North Korea over its territory in August 1998 surely turned it into a “nightmare.” This traumatic event justified a reexamination of Japanese defense policy and led Japan to join the United States in ballistic missile defense (BMD) development.¹ In addition to this ballistic missile launch, North Korea has: probed Japan’s air and sea defenses with fighter aircraft and gunboats; kidnapped Japanese citizens; conducted spying; and, claims to have developed nuclear weapons.² In this already primed atmosphere and just three months after the 11 September 2001 attacks, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) chased and sank a North Korean spy ship, killing its 15-person crew. This sinking was

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² Saunders, 150.
the first deadly conflict the JSDF took part in since World War II.\textsuperscript{3} The action occurred after laws were passed by the Diet concerning responses to the North Korean missile firing and 11 September 2001 attacks. The first law in 1999 allowed for JSDF to support United States forces during a crisis in the region and the second law in 2001 allowed the JSDF to be used by the Prime Minister for the WOT.\textsuperscript{4}

Determined not to repeat the embarrassment of sending only big checks and late minesweepers during the 1990 Gulf War, Japan was the first ally to deploy in support of the United States-led Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in October 2001. The JMSDF deployed three warships and two tanker supply ships to provide rear-area support to coalition operations in Afghanistan and maritime interdiction operations (MIO) against al-Qaeda’s illicit activities in the Indian Ocean. The warships provided protection for the coalition fleet and tankers supplied $150 million worth of fuel (i.e., 50\% required by the fleet), as of November 2005.\textsuperscript{5} Rear-area support also included intra-theater airlift using JASDF C-130s and Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) force protection at United States military bases in Japan.\textsuperscript{6}

The internationally controversial, United States-led, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM challenged Japan to overcome many restraints and constraints on deploying troops into a semi-combat zone. After a UNSCR and a special law in the Diet passed, several site surveys and months of planning and training, about 600 JGSDF troops deployed to Samawa, Iraq during January 2004. They arrived heavily armed, saddled with constrictive rules of engagement and in need of force protection by Dutch and Australian troops.\textsuperscript{7} The purpose of their mission, only


\textsuperscript{5} Brookes.

\textsuperscript{6} Saunders, 152.

\textsuperscript{7} Rapp, 113.
supported by 10% of the Japanese public, was and still is: reconstruction of water-treatment plants, power stations and hospitals; delivery of fire trucks, ambulances, medical equipment and supplies; and, election assistance. These troops put faces on the $1.5 billion spent for Iraq’s reconstruction from $5 billion pledged by the Japanese government for that purpose. Further out of sight, but crucial to the success of Japan’s first mission into hostile territory since World War II, are 200 JASDF personnel flying three C-130s from Kuwait and JMSDF logistics support.

**Sharpening the Sword**

In terms of aggregate defense spending on and quality and capabilities of military forces, Japan is second only to the United States. The exception is Japan’s ground forces, which are not as capable, because of constitutional restraints and the natural protection from ground attack afforded an island nation. Since Japan wants to play a more active role in international peace and security and seeks to partner with the United States to combat global terrorism, its military is developing more capabilities. These capabilities are: BMD; intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); force projection and heavy lift; amphibious operations; and, precision strike. A rapid-reaction force, dubbed the Central Readiness Group, comprising 4,000 personnel will be created within four years. To employ these capabilities, the JSDF is re-organizing to present forces in a Joint Task Force structure to foster interoperability with the United States.

The BMD will include ground-based PAC-3 Patriot missiles with X-band radars and sea-based SM-3 missiles onboard Aegis destroyers. The ISR systems include Japanese versions of Predator uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAV) and the launch of three national security satellites by

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8 Linda Sieg, “Japan Troops Samurai Abroad on Aid Mission,” *Reuters,* Tokyo, 29 June 2004 and Brookes.
9 Brookes.
12 Farrer, 51.
2009. Force projection and heavy lift will come from the purchase of Boeing KC-767 aerial-refueling tankers for current and future fighter aircraft and the addition of aerial-refueling capability to 160 C-130 transports. Osumi class helicopter- and landing-craft-capable transport ships and the delivery of two 16DDH class small “pocket” aircraft carriers in 2008 will support amphibious operations. These pocket aircraft carriers could accommodate the vertical, short take-off and landing (VSTOL) F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and their deployments would entail great political sensitivities. The precision-strike capabilities being developed include the purchase of Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) kits for their F-2 fighter aircraft (i.e., Japanese version of F-16) and Tomahawk cruise missiles. The F-22A Raptor is currently being evaluated by the JASDF to meet their precision strike and ISR needs.

Lastly, Japan’s contribution of elements of its national power (e.g., military, intelligence, law enforcement and diplomatic) to the United States-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to deny WMD/E and their delivery means from terrorists’ hands by combined MIO is a prime example of teamwork. This contribution and others by Japan should be publicly heralded by the CJCS as how to collectively fight international terrorists and build better multilateral coalitions.

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13 Ibid., 50.
14 Brooke, 6 and Matthews and Zhang, 44.
15 Matthews and Zhang, 44.
16 Rapp, 110.
17 Brooke, 8.
18 Rapp, 110 and Farrer, 50.
Ninjas, Pirates, Assassins and Smugglers

*It is easy to kill someone with a slash of a sword. It is hard to be impossible for others to cut down.*

—Yagyu Munenori

The economic and energy security of Japan and the world is extremely vulnerable to a growing threat of piracy and terrorism along the global shipping route through Southeast Asia. Together, Japan and the United States can combat this threat by using elements of national power in concert. Keys to success are ISR, private sector and maritime special operations capabilities.

**Chokepoint of the Samurai**

Most of the energy and raw materials Japan needs to support its economy pass through the Strait of Malacca. Many factors converge to make it the “key chokepoint” for Japan. It is located between Indonesia’s Sumatra, Malaysia’s Malay Peninsula and the island nation of Singapore (please see figure 2 below for its depiction on a map). The strait is 900 kilometers in length and only 500 meters wide at its narrowest point in the East. The minimum depth is 23 meters, leaving very little clearance for the bottom of fully laden tanker ships that draw 19 to 22 meters. The coastal areas bounding the strait comprise an archipelago of thousands of small islands. Through this geographic funnel flows much of the world’s economy.

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3. Pak, 18.
Figure 2  The Strait of Malacca

The strait is the most constricted strait in the world and only the English Channel is busier. More ships pass through the Strait of Malacca than the Suez and Panama Canals combined. A high density of ships ranging from fishing trawlers to supertankers congests the strait. Each year approximately 63,000 ships pass through the strait with as many as 900 ships in a single day. Japanese companies own 20% of those ships. Spurred by Asian economic growth, traffic and wait times are rising as the number of tankers and container ships pouring

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6 Pak, 6.
into the strait increases by 8% to 10% per year.\textsuperscript{10} Those ships carry half of the world’s merchant tonnage (i.e., 1.5 billion tons per year) and half of the world’s oil flow (i.e., 10.3 million barrels per day in 2002).\textsuperscript{11} From that flow, comes 80% of Japan’s oil.\textsuperscript{12} Two thirds of the world’s liquid natural gas (LNG) stream (i.e., 7 trillion cubic feet per year in 2002), of which Japan is the world’s largest consumer, passes through the strait.\textsuperscript{13} It is predicted the flow of oil will double and LNG will triple by 2025.\textsuperscript{14} Coal and iron ore occupy the next largest tonnage after oil and LNG. A third of the world’s overall trade transits the strait, which has raw material and energy going to and goods coming from Asia.\textsuperscript{15} Trade continues to increase each year.

Any disruption of the flow of ships through the Strait of Malacca would have adverse effects on the Japanese and global economies. Natural hazards, human errors or attacks on ships could result in a physical barrier to traffic or a decision to divert ships from the strait. An example of what could occur can be shown from a catastrophic collision in the northern part of the strait in September 1992. The supertanker \textit{Nagasaki Spirit} collided with the container ship \textit{Ocean Blessing}. The resulting fire and explosion killed all onboard the \textit{Ocean Blessing}.\textsuperscript{16} If the ship(s) had sunk in the middle of the narrowest part of the strait, traffic would have stopped while work to clear the strait hastily occurred. The alternate sea route between the Indian Ocean and South China Sea is 1,600 km longer, if a ship is able to divert before entering the sea-lanes for the Strait of Malacca.\textsuperscript{17} That distance equates to 15% longer or three days extra transit times

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{9}“The Piracy Threat to Japan,” \textit{The Japan Times}, 17 March 2005.
\item \textsuperscript{12}EIA.
\item \textsuperscript{13}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{14}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{15}Halloran, 2003.
\item \textsuperscript{17}Blanche.
\end{itemize}
for half the world’s merchant fleet. Ships would also lose easy access to the major port in Singapore for en-route logistic support.

If the strait’s closure was prolonged, Japan would be the most effected nation in the world. There is currently not enough excess supply in the world’s supertanker capacity to meet an increased demand for it. When the Suez Canal was closed in 1967 during a conflict between Israel and Egypt, tanker-shipping rates shot up 500%. Given the higher volumes passing through the Strait of Malacca today, even higher tanker rate increases should be expected. This situation could cause sharp increases in global oil prices and shortages in Japan. Global shipping freight rates would rise due to longer transit times and higher fuel costs. Insurance rates would increase depending mainly upon the cause of the closure. For instance, if the sinking was due to attacks on ships, insurance rates could rise drastically. The prices on consumer goods would go up due to increased transportation costs; given the average wholesale cost of goods includes 10% for transportation (some goods have transportation costs as high as 60%). With its complex orchestration of global supply chains, this type of disruption in the global shipping network could jeopardize the global economy’s reliance on just-in-time inventory management. By comparison, the closure of West Coast shipping ports in the United States in 2002 due to a labor dispute cost $1 billion per day. A prolonged closure of the Strait of Malacca could cost tens of billions of dollars.

18 Pak, 12 and Bateman, February 2005, 37.
19 Pak, 7.
20 Ibid., 11.
21 Ibid., 14.
22 Ibid., 11.
23 Ibid., 13.
Scourge of the Strait: Pirates and Smugglers

Pirates and their abettors, smugglers, have plagued the world throughout history. For many reasons, they are experiencing resurgence in the Strait of Malacca. In addition to their resurgence, there is concern over interaction between them and al-Qaeda and affiliated extremists. The nexus of these actors can potentially undermine the political and economic stability of Asia or result in a major environmental or humanitarian disaster. Many factors are related to the resurgence and changing scope and nature of pirates and smugglers in the strait.

The Asian economic crisis of 1997 to 1998 hit the countries in Southeast Asia very hard, especially Indonesia. To this day, the resulting economic hardship creates a criminal incentive and leaves local governments unprepared and ill equipped to patrol and police the waters and coasts of this archipelagic region. Making the situation more difficult, the Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) has waged an armed insurgency against the government of Indonesia since the 1970s in an effort to establish an independent Islamic state. A major tsunami devastated Banda Aceh in December 2004, further exacerbating the economic hardship in Indonesia. Lastly, Indonesia’s government and armed forces are known for mismanagement, corruption and human rights abuses. Some allege collusion between pirate syndicates and local officials taking advantage of the increasing commercial traffic in the strait.

With 25% of its piracy incidents, Indonesia is the world’s most pirate-prone nation. Most

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28 Ibid.
of Indonesia’s reported pirate attacks occur in the Strait of Malacca.\textsuperscript{32} Since statistics began being recorded in 1991, the human toll in the strait is hundreds of hostages taken and people killed, seriously injured and assaulted; among them were many Japanese citizens.\textsuperscript{33} The economic cost of piracy to shipping companies, including some Japanese companies, is about $1 billion per year.\textsuperscript{34} Indonesia’s government loses billions of dollars per year to piracy and smuggling.\textsuperscript{35}

Disturbing recent trends indicate pirates in the strait are being better armed by arms smugglers with assault rifles (AK-47s and M-16s) and anti-armor weapons (rocket-propelled grenades [RPGs]).\textsuperscript{36} They are also executing more sophisticated and ruthless attacks. Many fear pirates may cause an environmental or humanitarian disaster, if they tie up, murder or remove a tanker ship’s crew during an attack.\textsuperscript{37} Doing so would make it a rogue ship with an unskilled and/or uncaring pirate or nobody at the helm as it plies through crowded, dangerous waters.\textsuperscript{38} The 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill comes to mind; except this dreaded disaster in the strait would occur in a global shipping chokepoint. Others fear pirates, smugglers and terrorists working together to hijack ships in the strait to create an illicit fleet of phantom ships.\textsuperscript{39} The poorly regulated shipping industry, ill-patrolled maritime frontiers between states unwilling to cooperate on jurisdictional issues and non-universal legal definitions of piracy and terrorism allow these transnational criminals to carry out logistics operations and attacks at sea and on land.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid and The Japan Times.
\textsuperscript{34} Chalk.
\textsuperscript{35} “Toothless, Ruthless and Hard to Reform,” The Economist.
\textsuperscript{38} Chalk.
\textsuperscript{39} Herbert-Burns and Zucker and Orszag-Land.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid and John S. Burnett, Dangerous Waters (New York: Plume, 2003), 299.
Al-Qaeda’s Suicide Pirate: Captain Blackbeard Badawi

Throughout history, pirates have declared war against the civilized world and used terror to satisfy their greed.\textsuperscript{41} Therefore, it should not be surprising that another group at war with civilization, al-Qaeda, would work with pirates to achieve its political and ideological goals. In fact, many of the pirates in the Strait of Malacca are actually members of GAM (i.e., terrorist insurgents) using piracy to gain funds by ransoming hostages and selling ships and cargos they seize.\textsuperscript{42} They should be sympathetic to al-Qaeda’s goal of re-establishing the Islamic Caliphate. Though probably not willing to conduct suicide attacks like the faithful Hashishin (i.e. assassins) of the Caliphate,\textsuperscript{43} they would at least be willing to take al-Qaeda’s money for: hijacked phantom ships; stolen documentation and equipment; passage for operatives, weapons and explosives; or, expertise on how to conduct a maritime attack in the strait. Al-Qaeda has links to the region through Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyya (JI), which perpetrated significant terror attacks: October 2002 in Bali, August 2003 in Jakarta and October 2005 in Bali.\textsuperscript{44} JI is thought to have developed a maritime-attack capability and will likely target the region’s vital sea-lanes.\textsuperscript{45}

Recently, the commander of the United States Navy’s Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, said, “One of my nightmares would be a maritime terrorism attack in the Strait of Malacca. Symbolically alone,…it would have tremendous negative impact,

\textsuperscript{42} Herbert-Burns and Zucker.
\textsuperscript{43} H. John Poole, \textit{Tactics of the Crescent Moon} (Emerald Isle, N.C.: Posterity Press, 2004), xxvi.
economically.”

Maybe the admiral was reflecting on a warning from Osama bin Laden, who taunted, “By God, the youths of God are preparing for you things that would fill your hearts with terror and target your economic lifeline until you stop your oppression and aggression.”

Shipping in the Strait of Malacca is probably one of the most exposed economic lifelines underpinning our global economy. Al-Qaeda is no stranger to maritime terrorism. Besides having a small fleet of phantom ships, it has experience conducting attacks at sea. The mastermind behind those attacks is an al-Qaeda core member from Yemen, Jamal al-Badawi. Al-Badawi is of the same ilk as the infamous pirate master, Captain Blackbeard; except his crews lust for Allah’s heavenly rewards, instead of worldly plunder.

The first-known maritime attack launched by al-Qaeda failed on 3 January 2000, when a boat-bomb overloaded with explosives by al-Badawi sank as it approached its target, the USS Sullivan, docked at the port of Aden in Yemen. Not deterred by failure, al-Badawi adjusted his calculations and sent another boat-bomb, crewed with two suicide pirates and loaded with over half a ton of explosives, against the USS Cole as it arrived in the port of Aden on 12 October 2000. The attack killed 17 and wounded 35 sailors and nearly sank the destroyer. Al-Qaeda felt compelled to comment on the asymmetry of the attack by announcing it cost $5,000 and inflicted hundreds of millions of dollars worth of damage to the United States defense system.

Surely emboldened by the successes of the 11 September 2001 attacks and earlier attack on the USS Cole, several members of JI were arrested in December 2001 during the final phases of

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49 Puchala, 5-6.
50 Schweitzer and Shay, 134-135.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., 136.
planning attacks in Singapore, to include targeting United States vessels coming into port. The arrests resulted from videotapes of the plans found in al-Qaeda safe houses in Afghanistan.

Al-Badawi commanded another suicide boat-bomb attack campaign that was to be launched from the coast of Morocco against United States and United Kingdom vessels as they passed through the Straits of Gibraltar. Based upon information obtained from detainees in Guantanamo and the Saudi Arabian government, Moroccan authorities arrested the al-Qaeda cells on 12 May 2002, before they could load explosives on the boats. In the Summer of 2002, Saudi Arabian security services thwarted, what could have been a scene from the recent movie Syriana, an attempt by al-Qaeda to attack the Ras Tanura port and pipeline complex. Al-Badawi’s suicide pirates struck the French-flagged supertanker Limburg in the Arabian Sea off the coast of Yemen on 6 October 2002. The small, explosives-laden boat blew a hole in the side of the vessel, catching it on fire and causing 90,000 barrels of oil to spill. “Captain Blackbeard” al-Badawi and many in his band of suicide pirates were captured in November 2002 and later tried and sentenced to death by a Yemeni court in September 2004. Before the sentence could be carried out, he and 22 others escaped from prison via a 140-yard tunnel on 3 February 2006. While he was in prison, an intriguing pirate attack occurred on 26 March 2003 in the Strait of Malacca. Heavily armed pirates boarded the Indonesian-flagged chemical tanker Dewi Madrim off the coast of Sumatra. They navigated the ship through the strait for an hour, before departing with the captain and first mate as captives. Ransom was not requested and the captives remain missing. Some theorize this event was a rehearsal for a dramatic terror attack.

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53 Ibid., 192-193.
54 Ibid., 196-197.
55 Blanche.
56 Ibid.
57 Schweitzer and Shay, 135.
59 Orszag-Land.
Ninjas versus Assassins

Japan has warned it will do everything in its power to protect its vital trade routes. Offers by Japan to train and equip the maritime security forces of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have been successful. Malaysia’s Maritime Enforcement Agency accepted a patrol ship from Japan in March 2006 and has conducted joint training with the Japanese Coast Guard since 1992. Japan’s offers to assist in actual maritime patrols within the Strait of Malacca were quietly and politely rebuffed. A similar offer made by the United States in June 2004 caused leaders in the predominately Muslim nations of Indonesia and Malaysia to protest the offer as an affront to their sovereignty. Despite Japan’s sensitive “diplomatic style” in its approach to working with the coastal nations of the strait, it may need to consider how it will react to the continued hijackings and kidnappings of its Japanese-owned, -staffed and -flagged vessels (e.g., the tugboat Idaten in March 2005). Instead of appeasing pirates and terrorists, Japan should use its modern-day ninjas, Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) and new Special Operations Group (formed in March 2004), to actively protect its vital interests in the Strait of Malacca.

60 Blanche.
62 Rapp, 119.
64 The Japan Times.
Conclusion

The government of Japan is firmly resolved to strive for the eradication of terrorism.

—Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
Statement immediately after September 11, 2001 attacks

We will accomplish our mission in a disciplined and dignified manner befitting the nation of the way of the warrior.

—Colonel Koichiro Bansho, Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces
Commander of Japanese contingent deployed to Samawa, Iraq

Unleash the Samurai

The famous United States Army strategist, Colonel Harry Summers, once rhetorically asked in 1991 if it was wise for the United States to push Japan to play a military role in the world. His answer was, “It is unwise for the USA to be pushing Japan to play a military role in the world, because there is a strong element of anti-Westernism in the nation’s psyche that could turn Japan into a Frankenstein’s monster.” The author of this research paper begs to differ with Colonel Summers. Japan is already an unnatural nation. This condition is not because of its psyche. It is a nation of unbalanced national powers, because its United States-imposed, post-World War II constitution trapped a nation with a proud warrior tradition in a straitjacket of pacifism and passivity. That straitjacket has outlived its usefulness in a world of transnational, asymmetric threats requiring civilized nations to partner all of their elements of national power.

A recent statement by the United States ambassador to Japan, Thomas Schieffer, highlights the current view of many in the United States. He explained that the United States
spends 10 times as much on defense as Japan and wondered how Japan can fund its defense and stick to the de-facto 1% of GDP defense spending constraints.\(^2\) In view of direct threats by al-Badawi and his JI affiliates like Imam Samudra’s declaration that they will, “exterminate the citizens of the United States and its ally Japan,”\(^3\) it seems Japan’s efforts to counter current threats are not enough. The time has come for Japan to amend its constitution, lift its limit on defense spending and end its ban on arms exports. The United States must assist on these things.

The Yoshida Doctrine has been discredited and its assumptions are no longer valid. Japan cannot be solely a nation of peaceful merchants anymore. It needs courageous warriors to help ensure international peace and its national security in an increasingly dangerous world. Japan has apologized enough for the sins of its fathers and atoned for them in honorable ways. The uses of the “war-guilt” card by other nations in the region are crass attempts to hold a global power down, as they jockey for new positions in the regional balance of power. Tokyo’s Governor, Shintaro Ishihara, who represents many in Japan with a growing sense of nationalism and desire to make Japan a “normal” nation, recently asked, “When will we recover our national virtue…the spirit and the backbone of the samurai?”\(^4\) The most important things the United States can do to win the WOT are: listen to our allies; respect their fears and hopes; and, praise and encourage their efforts to build resilient national and international systems that protect our virtues against terror. Doing so with humility will bring honor to both cowboys and samurai.

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3 Hideki, 55.


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