Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa

Updated December 7, 2007

Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
# Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa

**Title and Subtitle:**
Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa

**Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es):**

**DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT:**
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

**Security Classification of:**
- Report: unclassified
- Abstract: unclassified
- This Page: unclassified

**Limitation of Abstract:**
Same as Report (SAR)

**Number of Pages:**
40

**Mandated Reporting:**
- OMB No. 0704-0188
- Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa

Summary

On February 6, 2007, the Bush Administration announced its intention to create a new unified combatant command, U.S. Africa Command or AFRICOM, to promote U.S. national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding waters. U.S. military involvement on the continent has been divided among three commands: U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). As envisioned by the Administration, the new command’s area of responsibility (AOR) will include all African countries except Egypt. AFRICOM was officially launched as a sub-unified command under EUCOM on October 1, 2007, and is expected to become fully operational as a stand-alone command by September 30, 2008.

In recent years, analysts and U.S. policymakers have noted Africa’s growing strategic importance to U.S. interests. Among those interests are Africa’s role in the Global War on Terror and potential threats posed by uncontrolled spaces; the growing importance of Africa’s natural resources, particularly energy resources; and ongoing concern for Africa’s many humanitarian crises, armed conflicts, and more general challenges, such as the devastating effect of HIV/AIDS. In 2006, Congress authorized a feasibility study on the creation of a new command for Africa to consolidate current operations and activities on the continent under one commander.

As currently envisioned by the Department of Defense (DOD), AFRICOM’s mission will be to promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the region through improved security capability and military professionalization. When directed by national command authorities, AFRICOM's military operations would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises.

DOD has signaled its intention to eventually locate AFRICOM on the continent, and U.S. officials are consulting with strategic partners in the region to identify a suitable location for the command’s headquarters. The new command will operate from Stuttgart, Germany until facilities in Africa are secured. DOD has stressed that there are no plans to have a significant troop presence on the continent.

The 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in East Africa highlighted the threat of terrorism to U.S. interests on the continent. Political instability and civil wars have created vast ungoverned spaces, areas in which some experts allege that terrorist groups may train and operate. Instability also heightens human suffering and retards economic development, which may in turn threaten U.S. economic interests. Africa recently surpassed the Middle East as the United States’ largest supplier of crude oil, further emphasizing the continent’s strategic importance. This report provides a broad overview of U.S. strategic interests in Africa and the role of U.S. military efforts on the continent as they pertain to the creation of AFRICOM. Although the command is still in the early stages of its development, a discussion of AFRICOM’s mission, its coordination with other government agencies, and its basing and manpower requirements is included. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Contents

Issues for Congress .......................................................... 1

The DOD Proposal for a New Africa Command .......................... 4
  Changes to the Unified Command Plan .................................. 4
  Combatant Command “Plus”? ............................................. 4
  Interagency Coordination .................................................. 6
  Structure and Footprint ................................................... 8
    Headquarters Location .................................................. 9
    Manpower .............................................................. 11
    Cost ........................................................................ 11

U.S. Strategic Interests in Africa ........................................... 11
  Current U.S. National Security Strategy Toward Africa ............ 12
    Oil and Global Trade .................................................... 13
    Maritime Security ........................................................ 14
    Armed Conflicts .......................................................... 15
    Terror ...................................................................... 15
    HIV/AIDS ................................................................. 16

U.S. Military Assistance and Security Cooperation in Africa: An Expanding
  Role ........................................................................ 17
    Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) ........ 18
  Security Assistance .......................................................... 19
    Operation Enduring Freedom: Trans Sahara (OEF-TS)/Trans Sahara
      Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) ............................. 21
    International Military Education and Training (IMET) ............ 21
    The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
      Program (ACOTA)/ Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) 22

Regional Perspectives .......................................................... 22

Congressional Interest and Oversight Issues ............................ 24

Related CRS Reports .......................................................... 27

Appendix 1. History of U.S. Military Involvement in Africa ........... 29

Appendix 2. Instances of the Use of U.S. Armed Forces in Africa, 1950-2006 31

Appendix 3. Acronyms .......................................................... 37

List of Figures

Figure 1. Proposed Area of Responsibility for Africa Command ....... 28
Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa

Issues for Congress

President George W. Bush formally announced the creation of a new Unified Combatant Command (COCOM) for the African continent on February 6, 2007, reflecting Africa’s increasing strategic importance to the United States. The Department of Defense (DOD) organizes its command structure by dividing its activities among joint military commands based either on a geographic or functional area of responsibility. DOD currently has five geographic commands and four functional commands. U.S. military involvement in Africa has been divided among three geographic commands: European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM). As contemplated by the Administration, the new command’s area of responsibility (AOR) will include all African countries except Egypt, which is expected to remain in the AOR of CENTCOM. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was launched with initial operating capability (IOC) as a sub-unified command under EUCOM on October 1, 2007 and is expected to reach full operating capability (FOC) as a stand-alone unified command by September 30, 2008. AFRICOM’s first commander, Army General William E. “Kip” Ward, former Deputy Commander of EUCOM, was confirmed by the Senate on September 28, 2007.

As proposed by DOD, AFRICOM’s mission will be to promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the region through improved security capability and military professionalization. Another key aspect of the command’s mission is its supporting role to other agencies’ and departments’ efforts on the continent. When


2 A unified combatant command is defined as “a command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” according to DOD’s Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
directed by national command authorities, the command’s military operations would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises.3

The Administration’s motivation for the creation of a new unified command for Africa evolved in part out of concerns about DOD’s division of responsibility for Africa among the geographic combatant commands. The division reportedly has created problems in coordinating activities among the three regional commands. Although some military officials have advocated the creation of an Africa Command for over a decade, recent crises have highlighted the challenges created by “seams” between the COCOMs’ boundaries. One such seam lies between Sudan (within CENTCOM’s AOR), Chad and the Central African Republic (within EUCOM’s AOR), an area of increasing instability. The United States, acting first alone and later as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has provided airlift and training for African Union (AU) peacekeeping troops in the Darfur region of Sudan, and although CENTCOM has responsibility for Sudan, much of the airlift and training has been done by EUCOM forces.

In addition, close observers say that EUCOM and CENTCOM have become overstretched particularly given the demands created by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Commander of EUCOM, whose current AOR includes 92 countries, testified before Congress that

the increasing strategic significance of Africa will continue to pose the greatest security stability challenge in the EUCOM AOR. The large ungoverned area in Africa, HIV/AIDS epidemic, corruption, weak governance, and poverty that exist throughout the continent are challenges that are key factors in the security stability issues that affect every country in Africa.4

His predecessor, General James Jones, pointed out in 2006 that EUCOM’s staff were spending more than half their time on Africa issues, up from almost none three years prior.5

AFRICOM faces myriad challenges, both in its establishment and its operation. Some of these challenges may become issues for Congress. Members of Congress have expressed interest in the creation of an Africa Command, and in 2006, Senator Russ Feingold introduced legislation requiring a feasibility study on the establishment of a new command for Africa. Key oversight questions for Congress relating to the command include the following.

- Is an Africa Command necessary or desirable? Is its mission well-defined?
- How are U.S. strategic interests influencing the size and scope of the U.S. military footprint on the continent, and what effect will the

---

3 The official website for Africa Command can be found at [http://www.africom.mil/].
4 Testimony of General Craddock to the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19, 2006.
creation of a new Africa Command have on future U.S. military operations in Africa?

- How are AFRICOM and U.S. military efforts in Africa perceived by Africans and by other foreign countries, including China?

- What are the costs associated with both the creation and eventual operation of AFRICOM?

- What role, if any, will contractors play in AFRICOM’s operations?

- What are the Administration’s plans for the development of AFRICOM’s interagency process and, in particular, how closely are the State Department and DOD coordinating on plans for the command and on U.S. military efforts in Africa in general? Will AFRICOM’s enhanced integration of non-DOD USG agency personnel into the command necessitate statutory changes?

- How will AFRICOM address the intelligence community’s need to realign its resources directed toward the continent?

- How will the Administration ensure that U.S. military efforts in Africa do not overshadow or contradict U.S. diplomatic and development objectives? Should conflict prevention activities be an essential part of DOD’s mandate, and are they sustainable?

- What are the authorities granted to U.S. Chiefs of Mission regarding combatant command activities in the countries to which they are posted, and are these authorities sufficient?

- How prominent will counter-terrorism operations and programs be, particularly relative to the peacekeeping training and support components in AFRICOM’s mandate? Would some DOD-implemented counter-terrorism programs be more appropriately implemented by other U.S. agencies?

- Are the legal authorities guiding DOD’s implementation of security cooperation reform programs sufficient? Do any of these authorities hinder the U.S. military’s ability to conduct these programs?

- What efforts does DOD take to ensure that the training and equipment provided to African security forces is not used to suppress internal dissent or to threaten other nations?

This report provides information on AFRICOM’s mission, structure, interagency coordination, and its basing and manpower requirements. Because the command is still in the planning phase, many of the details regarding these issues are still being determined by the Administration. The report also gives a broad overview of U.S. strategic interests in Africa and the role of U.S. military efforts on the continent as they pertain to the creation of a new Africa Command.
The DOD Proposal for a New Africa Command

Changes to the Unified Command Plan

The mission of geographic commands is defined by a general geographic area of responsibility (AOR), while the mission of functional commands is the worldwide performance of transregional responsibilities. There are currently five geographic combatant commands: European (EUCOM), Pacific (PACOM), North (NORTHCOM), Southern (SOUTHCOM), and Central (CENTCOM) Commands. There are four functional COCOMs, including Transportation (TRANSCOM), Special Operations (SOCOM), Joint Forces (JFCOM) and Strategic (STRATCOM) Commands. As mentioned above, DOD responsibilities for Africa are currently divided among three geographic commands. EUCOM, based in Germany, has 42 African countries in its AOR; CENTCOM, based in Florida, covers eight countries in East Africa, including those that make up the Horn of Africa; and PACOM, based in Hawaii, is responsible for the islands of Comoros, Madagascar, and Mauritius.

The creation of a new combatant command requires changes by the President to a classified executive document, the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which establishes responsibilities and areas of responsibilities for the commanders of combatant commands. Changes to the UCP are usually initiated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), who presents a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. After the Secretary’s review, a proposal is presented to the President for approval. The most recent Unified Command to be established is NORTHCOM, which was created in 2002, after the September 11 terrorist attacks, to protect the U.S. homeland. The UCP is reviewed at least every two years, as required by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433). The review in 2006 recommended the establishment of an Africa Command as a unified combatant command. A new functional command, a unified Medical Command, is reportedly also being considered. Congress has, on occasion, taken legislative action that has led to changes in the UCP.

Combatant Command “Plus”?

Some DOD officials have referred to the proposed Africa Command as a combatant command “plus.” This implies that the command would have all the roles and responsibilities of a traditional geographic combatant command, including the ability to facilitate or lead military operations, but would also include a broader “soft power” mandate aimed at building a stable security environment and would

---

6 Western Sahara is considered an “Area of Interest.” For more information see CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara: Status of Settlement Efforts, by Carol Migdalovitz.

7 For more information see [http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/unifiedcommand].

8 For more information on changes to the UCP see CRS Report RL30245, Military Changes to the Unified Command Plan: Background and Issues for Congress, by William C. Story.

incorporate a larger civilian component from other U.S. government agencies to address those challenges. According to the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.” The Department of Defense, identifying instability in foreign countries as a threat to U.S. interests, issued DOD Directive 3000.05 in 2005, defining stability operations as a “core U.S. military mission” that “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.” Although U.S. armed forces have traditionally focused on “fighting and winning wars,” defense strategy is now evolving to look at conflict prevention, or “Phase Zero,” addressing threats at their inception through increased emphasis on theater security cooperation (TSC) and capacity building of partners and allies.

As General Bantz Craddock, Commander of EUCOM, noted in his confirmation hearing, Africa in recent years has posed “the greatest security stability challenge” to EUCOM, and “a separate command for Africa would provide better focus and increased synergy in support of U.S. policy and engagement.” In the view of AFRICOM’s architects and proponents, if U.S. agencies, both military and civilian, are able to coordinate more efficiently and effectively both among themselves as well as with their African partners and other international actors, they might be more successful at averting more complex emergencies on the continent. AFRICOM’s new commander, General William Ward, views the Department of Defense’s role in Africa as part of a “three-pronged” U.S. government approach, with DOD, through AFRICOM, taking the lead on security issues, but playing a supporting role to the Department of State, which conducts diplomacy, and USAID, which implements development programs. Ward does see AFRICOM playing a greater role in development activities than other commands, but has emphasized that its role will remain one of supporting USAID’s development and humanitarian objectives.

AFRICOM’s proactive approach to deterring or averting conflict reflects an evolution in DOD strategy that has been outlined extensively in government

---

10 DOD defines stability operations as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.”

11 DOD, Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, November 28, 2005. The directive also clarifies that DOD sees its role in U.S. government plans for SSTR as a supporting one: “Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”

12 Some analysts view four traditional phases for a military campaign: deter/engage, seize initiative, decisive operations, and transition. DOD officials have recently begun using a phrase, “Phase Zero” to encompass efforts prior to the first phase aimed at preventing the conflict. For more information on the Phase Zero strategy and TSC, also known as peacetime engagement, see General Charles Wald, “The Phase Zero Campaign,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 43, 4th Quarter 2006, available at [http://www.ndu.edu/inss].

13 Advance Questions for General Bantz J. Craddock, USA, Nominee for United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 19, 2006.
documents, but operationalizing that broad mandate may prove difficult. As one foreign policy expert points out, “the mission of AFRICOM will necessarily require a major break with conventional doctrinal mentalities both within the armed services themselves and between government agencies.” As one DOD official explained, “We want to help develop a stable environment in which civil society can be built and that the quality of life for the citizenry can be improved.” The prospect that the Department of Defense will focus less on fighting wars and more on preventing them engenders mixed feelings elsewhere in the government. While many at the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) welcome the ability of DOD to leverage resources and to organize complex operations, there also is concern that the military may overestimate its capabilities as well as its diplomatic role in Africa, or pursue activities that are not a core part of its mandate. Some argue that the highly unequal allocation of resources between the Departments of Defense, State, and USAID, hinder their ability to act as “equal partners” in a “3D” security framework and could lead to the militarization of development and diplomacy.

The mission of the proposed Africa Command might be most closely compared to that of Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which is responsible for U.S. military efforts in Central and South America. SOUTHCOM’s mission, as defined by DOD, is to ensure the forward defense of the United States through security cooperation, counter-narcotics operations, humanitarian assistance, and monitoring and support for human rights initiatives in the region. Like SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM is expected to supervise an array of operations that relate to U.S. strategic interests but are not combat-related, unlike EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM, which have traditionally been more focused on preparing for potential warfighting operations. One DOD official has suggested that the U.S. government could consider the new command successful “if it keeps American troops out of Africa for the next 50 years.”

**Interagency Coordination**

The Bush Administration has noted that the proposal for the new command represents an evolution in the involvement of other U.S. government agencies in the DOD planning process. Interagency coordination of U.S. security policy involves a

---

14 While the Phase Zero approach to ensuring national security has been accepted by much of the DOD leadership, discussion is ongoing within the Department about how best to use the U.S. military in a conflict role.


18 Comments by Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Ryan Henry at a Public Meeting of USAID’s Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA) on May 23, 2007.
variety of offices and actors in Washington, DC, and in the field. In Washington, the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) serves as the primary liaison for the Department with DOD. Its counterpart at DOD is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA). USAID recently created the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) within the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) to coordinate agency policy with DOD and the State Department for humanitarian relief and post conflict reconstruction efforts. USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Operations Liaison Unit (OLU) and the geographic bureaus’ missions manage the operational coordination with DOD for those activities.

At the regional level, State’s PM Bureau appoints senior officials known as Foreign Policy Advisors (POLADs) to serve as advisors to combatant commanders and other military leaders to “provide policy support regarding the diplomatic and political aspects of the commanders’ military responsibilities.”19 Like the State Department, USAID places OFDA military liaison officers with COCOMs that routinely provide humanitarian and disaster relief coordination; OMA also currently has policy advisors with CENTCOM, EUCOM, SOCOM, and SOUTHCOM.20 The State Department, intelligence and other government agencies also designate representatives to Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) within several of DOD’s COCOMs to facilitate the interagency process. The JIACG is a relatively new concept, created out of a request by CENTCOM’s former commander, General Tommy Franks, in 2001, to “execute and influence policy, but not to make it, and to establish new interagency links, but not to replace habitual relationships or traditional chains of command.”21

At the country level, DOD assigns defense attachés to serve as military liaisons at embassies around the world. These attachés serve on interagency embassy Country Teams, which are led by the U.S. ambassador in each country. Many embassies also have an Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), led by a military officer who reports to the ambassador and the COCOM, to coordinate security assistance activities with the host country’s defense forces.22 USAID OFDA deploys military liaison officers as part of a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to affected countries during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations when there is a civil-military component involved.

According to DOD officials, the new command will seek greater interagency coordination with the State Department, USAID, and other government agencies and

---

19 For more information on Foreign Policy Advisors (formerly known as Political Advisors), see [http://www.state.gov/t/pm/polad/].
20 According to USAID officials, OMA aims to eventually place advisors with all of the combatant commands.
22 According to interviews with DOD officials, the United States currently has 13 ODCs in Africa (not including Egypt) and over 20 defense attaches in U.S. embassies on the continent.
will have a larger non-DOD civilian staff (possibly up to one quarter of the total staff) than has been traditional with other combatant commands. Those involved in the creation of AFRICOM aim to build upon initiatives in NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM to improve the interagency process, but EUCOM Commander General Bantz Craddock suggests this command will be “the pioneer” for a new approach that the other commands may later adopt. Non-DOD civilian staff positions within AFRICOM will include senior leadership positions, senior advisors or liaisons (including the Foreign Policy Advisor, a Development and Humanitarian Assistance Advisor, and a senior Treasury Department representative), and subject-matter experts embedded with the headquarters staff. During his confirmation hearing, General Ward testified that he did not believe any statutory changes were necessary to incorporate “detailed” non-DOD personnel into the command. Nevertheless, AFRICOM officials report that filling those interagency positions may be more challenging than first anticipated. Although lawyers from several of the departments/agencies are finalizing agreements that will facilitate the assignment of non-DOD civilians to AFRICOM, to date few have been permanently assigned.

Following General Ward’s confirmation, a senior U.S. diplomat, Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates, was appointed as Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA), a new post equivalent to that of a deputy commander. Yates, who had previously served as U.S. ambassador to Burundi and Ghana and most recently as the Foreign Policy Advisor to EUCOM, is the first non-DOD civilian to be integrated into the command structure of a unified command. The DCMA will direct AFRICOM’s civil-military plans and programs, and will be responsible for the policy development, resource management and program assessment of AFRICOM’s various security cooperation initiatives. Coordination of the command’s activities with other U.S. government agencies will also fall under the DCMA’s duties. Navy Vice Admiral Robert Moeller, who led AFRICOM’s transition team, will now serve as Yates’ military equivalent, Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO). The DCMO will be responsible for the implementation and execution of the command’s programs and operations. To maintain the military chain of command, one deputy commander position will always be held by a military officer, but DOD statements suggest that AFRICOM’s DCMA role will always be held by a Senior Foreign Service Officer. Both Deputies will have supervisory authority for the civilian and military personnel in their respective offices.

Structure and Footprint

DOD officials emphasize that the new command is still under development; many details regarding the command’s structure and footprint have yet to be determined. As mentioned above, AFRICOM’s final headquarters location has not been identified, and a move to the continent may not occur for several years. AFRICOM has yet to determine the locations for sub-regional offices that it seeks to

---

23 As in the case of Foreign Policy Advisors (POLADs), the Department of Defense and the respective department or agency will establish an agreement regarding the relationship between the staff member and the command.

establish. DOD suggests there are no plans to establish any new military bases in Africa. Principal Under Secretary of Defense Ryan Henry has asserted that the creation of the new command reflects an “organizational change,” rather than a change in “basing structure or troop positions on the continent.”

At present, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) has a semi-permanent troop presence at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti with more than 1,500 U.S. military and civilian personnel in residence. The U.S. military recently signed a five year lease with the Djiboutian government for Lemonier, with the option to extend the lease for two more five-year terms. The command authority for CJTF-HOA, currently under CENTCOM, will be transferred to AFRICOM in 2008 and will continue to be used as a Forward Operating Site. The United States military has access to a number of foreign air bases and ports in Africa and has established “bare-bones” facilities maintained by local troops in several locations. The U.S. military used facilities in Kenya in the 1990s to support its intervention in Somalia and continues to use them today to support counter-terrorism activities. DOD refers to these facilities as “lily pads,” or Cooperative Security Locations, and currently has access to locations in Algeria, Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.

Headquarters Location. There is ongoing debate over where to base AFRICOM. EUCOM is currently the only geographic combatant command whose headquarters are located outside of the United States. Given that the majority of countries that will be transferred to AFRICOM’s new AOR are currently under the responsibility of EUCOM, and that consequently a majority of the personnel working on Africa issues were already based in EUCOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, DOD determined that AFRICOM’s headquarters would be initially located at the American base in Germany as well.

Prior to Secretary Gates’ announcement of the command’s establishment, there was speculation that an Africa Command might be permanently located in Europe, or in the United States, like the other commands. Locating the headquarters within the AOR, on the other hand, would have several benefits in terms of proximity. Flight time from Germany to Nairobi, Kenya, for example, is approximately 8 hours, and flight time from Germany to Johannesburg, South Africa is approximately 11 hours. Flight time from Washington, DC to the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia is approximately 16-20 hours. Deploying AFRICOM’s staff in close geographic proximity to their African counterparts and to U.S. diplomatic missions on the continent could enable more efficient interaction.

On the other hand, some initial reaction to locating the Africa Command on the continent has been negative. There are concerns, both domestically and internationally, that moving the command to Africa might be the first step in an alleged U.S. military agenda to establish a larger footprint on the continent. DOD

---

25 U.S. military facilities on the island of Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, will remain under the AOR of PACOM.

officials have stressed that the location in question would be a staff headquarters rather than a troop headquarters, and have suggested that they are planning a dispersed regional headquarters model, with several small locations spread across the continent to lessen the U.S. presence and burden in any one country. Some speculate that DOD might consider co-locating those facilities with the headquarters of the continent’s regional and sub-regional organizations to link AFRICOM with the AU’s nascent regional security architecture (see Security Assistance below). EUCOM currently has military liaison officers (LNOs) at the African Union headquarters in Ethiopia and with ECOWAS in Nigeria. Those presences are likely to be expanded under the new command, and additional liaison offices may be attached to other sub-regional organizations, regardless of whether DOD adopts the dispersed headquarters concept.

The Department of Defense has developed criteria for determining the ultimate location(s) for AFRICOM in coordination with the Department of State. U.S. officials are currently in consultations with African countries that have a security relationship with the United States and have reportedly already received offers to host the command from several of them, including, most publicly, Liberia. Other strategic partners, such as South Africa and Algeria, have expressed reluctance to host the new command, possibly out of concern over a permanent foreign military presence within their borders. In North Africa, for example, there are concerns that an American military presence might embolden domestic terrorist groups. Some African governments that consider themselves to be regional hegemons may perceive a permanent American military presence, whether staffed by civilians or troops, to be a rival for political or military power in their sphere of influence.

At the forefront of DOD considerations in determining the host country (or countries) will be providing for the safety and security of several hundred American personnel who will staff the command and their families. Living standards in Africa are among the lowest in the world, and DOD would prefer a politically stable location on the continent with good access to health care and schools and relatively low levels of corruption. Ease of access to regional and international transportation, along with proximity to the African Union, African regional organizations, and U.S. government hubs on the continent is also being considered. Locating U.S. soldiers permanently in a foreign country will be predicated on the host country’s approval of a Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA), a legal document negotiated by the State Department to define the legal status of U.S. personnel and property while in that country, and a bilateral non-surrender agreement, commonly known as an Article 98 Agreement, to protect American servicemen from prosecution by the International Criminal Court. Some advocacy groups hope that DOD will consider potential host countries’ human rights record among other criteria.

27 Comments by Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Ryan Henry at a Public Meeting of USAID’s Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA) on May 23, 2007.
28 For more information on Article 98 agreements, see CRS Report RL31495, U.S. Policy Regarding the International Criminal Court, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
**Manpower.** Manning a new command is a challenging task, particularly in a time when defense resources and personnel are stretched thin by engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the number of personnel needed to staff a combatant command varies, DOD officials estimate that the average command ranges from 500 to more than 1,000 personnel (exclusive of supporting intelligence architecture). The manpower requirement for the new Africa Command is still being reviewed, but early reports suggest the command will be relatively small, perhaps between 650 and 760. Including intelligence and other support requirements, the command's size would be in the 1200-1800 range. Sourcing this manpower to facilitate the aggressive timeline to meet full operational capacity is proving difficult, according to AFRICOM officials. Many of the personnel for the new command are being transferred from EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM. The armed services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) are also developing proposals to establish service component headquarters which would support the new command. In essence, the Services must pay two manpower bills — they must fill AFRICOM headquarters requirements and also staff the service component headquarters. Current service component headquarters proposals range from approximately 100 to 350 personnel.

**Cost.** Start-up costs for Africa Command in FY2007 were approximately $51 million, and the nascent command’s budget for Fiscal 2008 (October 1, 2007, to September 30, 2008) is estimated at $75.5 million. AFRICOM's budgetary needs will increase substantially when the command begins its move to the continent, given the construction and/or acquisition of physical infrastructure and other start-up costs.

### U.S. Strategic Interests in Africa

#### Africa and the Unified Command Plan

Africa was not included in the U.S. military command structure until 1952, when several North African countries, including Libya, were added to the responsibilities of U.S. European Command because of their historic relationship with Europe. The rest of the continent remained outside the responsibility of any command until 1960, when Cold War concerns over Soviet influence in newly independent African countries led the Department of Defense to include Sub-Saharan Africa in the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), leaving North Africa in EUCOM. The Unified Command Plan was revised again in 1962 by President John F. Kennedy, and responsibility for Sub-Saharan Africa was transferred to a newly-created Strike Command (STRICOM), which was responsible for operations in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia. STRICOM was redesignated as Readiness Command (REDCOM) in 1971, and its responsibility for Africa was dissolved, leaving Sub-Saharan Africa out of the combatant command structure until 1983. Under the Reagan Administration, U.S. military involvement in Africa was largely dominated by Cold War priorities, and the Administration’s “containment” policy led DOD to divide responsibility for Africa into its current configuration among three geographic commands.

---

29 These figures do not necessarily include contractors working at command headquarters.

30 These estimates were provided to the author by AFRICOM officials in November 2007.
Issues on the African continent have not historically been identified as strategic priorities for the U.S. military, and U.S. military engagement in Africa has been sporadic.\textsuperscript{31} According to one defense analyst, “during the Cold War, United States foreign policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa had little to do with Africa.”\textsuperscript{32} After the fall of the Soviet Union, many U.S. policymakers considered the U.S. military’s role and responsibilities on the continent to be minimal. In 1995, the Department of Defense outlined its view of Africa in its U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, asserting that “ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.”\textsuperscript{33} In 1998, following terrorist attacks on two U.S. embassies in East Africa, the United States conducted a retaliatory attack against a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan that Clinton Administration officials initially contended was producing precursors for chemical weapons for al Qaeda. The embassy bombings, and the retaliatory strike against Sudan, are considered by many analysts to be a turning point in U.S. strategic policy toward the region.

**Current U.S. National Security Strategy Toward Africa**

The Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy of 2002 reflected a need for a more focused strategic approach toward the African continent: “In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States — preserving human dignity — and our strategic priority — combating global terror.” To address these challenges, the document asserted that U.S. security strategy must focus on building indigenous security and intelligence capabilities through bilateral engagement and “coalitions of the willing.”\textsuperscript{34} The White House’s most recent National Security Strategy, issued in 2006, goes further, identifying Africa as “a high priority of this Administration,” and “recogniz(ing) that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies.”\textsuperscript{35}

The establishment of the new Africa Command reflects an evolution in policymakers’ perceptions of U.S. strategic interests in Africa. In 2004 an advisory panel of Africa experts authorized by Congress to propose new policy initiatives identified five factors that have shaped increased U.S. interest in Africa in the past

\textsuperscript{31} For an overview of the history of U.S. military involvement in Africa, see Appendix 1. Appendix 2 provides a list of instances in which U.S. military forces have deployed in conflict situations in Africa since World War II.


Some U.S. officials have recently argued that environmental security should be added as a national security issue, particularly as it relates to Africa. One DOD official testified before Congress that climate change served as a “threat multiplier” in Africa, using Nigeria, Sudan, and Somalia as examples and asserting, “beyond the more conventional threats we traditionally address, I believe we must now also prepare to respond to the consequences of dramatic population migrations, pandemic health issues and significant food and water shortages due to the possibility of significant climate change.” Testimony of General Charles Wald, Member, Military Advisory Board, at a hearing on Climate Change and National Security Threats by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 9, 2007.

Oil and Global Trade. The United States has sought to increase its economic relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, and trade between the United States and Africa has tripled since 1990. In 2000, the Clinton Administration introduced a comprehensive U.S. trade and investment policy for the continent in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA; Title I, P.L. 106-200). AGOA has been amended by Congress on several occasions, most recently in 2006. Natural resources, particularly energy resources, dominate the products imported from Africa under AGOA. Africa recently surpassed the Middle East as the United States’ largest supplier of crude.

Nigeria is Africa’s largest supplier of oil, and is the fifth largest global supplier of oil to the United States. Instability in the country’s Niger Delta region has reduced output periodically by as much as 25%. World oil prices rose above $60 per barrel in April 2007 after the country held disputed national elections and above $70 per barrel in May 2007 after attacks on pipelines in the Delta. President Bush announced in his 2006 State of the Union Address his intention to “to replace more than 75 percent of our oil imports from the Middle East by 2025,” echoing a commitment made in 2002 “to strengthen [U.S.] energy security and the shared prosperity of the global economy by working with our allies, trading partners, and energy producers to expand the sources and types of global energy supplied, especially in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspian region.” A senior DOD official reportedly commented in 2003 that “a key mission for U.S. forces (in Africa) would be to ensure that Nigeria’s oil fields... are secure.” In spite of conflict in the Niger

36 Some U.S. officials have recently argued that environmental security should be added as a national security issue, particularly as it relates to Africa. One DOD official testified before Congress that climate change served as a “threat multiplier” in Africa, using Nigeria, Sudan, and Somalia as examples and asserting, “beyond the more conventional threats we traditionally address, I believe we must now also prepare to respond to the consequences of dramatic population migrations, pandemic health issues and significant food and water shortages due to the possibility of significant climate change.” Testimony of General Charles Wald, Member, Military Advisory Board, at a hearing on Climate Change and National Security Threats by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 9, 2007.


38 For more information, see CRS Report RL31772, U.S. Trade and Investment Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa: The African Growth and Opportunity Act and Beyond, by Danielle Langton.


42 Greg Jaffe, “In Massive Shift, U.S. Is Planning To Cut Size of Military in Germany,” Wall (continued...)
Delta and other oil producing areas, the potential for deep water drilling in the Gulf of Guinea is high, and analysts estimate that Africa may supply as much as 25% of all U.S. oil imports by 2015. 43

**Maritime Security.** Africa’s coastlines, particularly along the Gulf of Guinea, the Gulf of Aden, and the west Indian Ocean, have been highly susceptible to illegal fishing, illegal trafficking, and piracy in recent years. 44 The inability of African governments to adequately police the region’s waters has allowed criminal elements to smuggle people, drugs, and weapons and dump hazardous waste, and has opened maritime commerce and off-shore oil production facilities to the threat of piracy and sabotage. In 2005, the Bush Administration introduced its National Strategy for Maritime Security, identifying the freedom of the seas and the facilitation and defense of commerce as top national priorities and indicating plans to fund border and coastal security initiatives with African countries. 45

The United States government, represented by members of EUCOM, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, the State Department, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), has engaged its African partners in a number of ministerial conferences on maritime security, and is currently conducting several activities to increase the capability of African navies to monitor and enforce maritime laws. The U.S. Navy has increased its operations in the Gulf of Guinea to enhance security in the region, although those operations have been sporadic. 46 Through its Global Fleet Stations (GFS) concept, the Navy has committed itself to more persistent, longer-term engagement (see information on the African Partnership Station in Security Assistance below). In the waters off the coast of East Africa, the Combined JointTask Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is working with the Navy and with coalition partners in Coalition Task Force 150 (CTF-150), which conducts maritime security operations to protect shipping routes in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, the

---

42 (...continued)  

43 Central Intelligence Agency, *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Non-government Experts*, December 2000. This prediction implies that previously higher sub-Saharan African shares of U.S. oil imports will be eclipsed and then surpassed. Previously, when absolute levels of U.S. oil imports were lower, Africa provided a higher percentage of annual U.S. imports (e.g., about 19.53% in 1990 and about 18.47% in 1995) than it has during the past five years. For more information, see also African Oil Policy Initiative Group, *African Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African Development*, January 2002.

44 According to the International Maritime Bureau, the waters off the coast of Nigeria had the third highest number of attacks worldwide in 2006, after Indonesia and Bangladesh. ICC International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report 2006*, January 2007.


Armed Conflicts. Africa has been beset by political conflict and instability over the last fifty years, causing human suffering on a massive scale and retarding economic, social, and political development. Although the number of conflicts in Africa has decreased in recent years, the continent is home to a majority of the United Nations’ peace operations, with six missions currently underway. Four African countries, Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa have consistently ranked in the top 10 troop contributing countries to U.N. peacekeeping operations in recent years. African militaries also contribute troops to peace operations conducted by the African Union and regional organizations like ECOWAS. Despite a willingness to participate in these operations, many African militaries lack the command and control, training, equipment, and logistics capability to effectively participate in such efforts. Instability in Africa has demanded substantial humanitarian and defense resources from the international community, and the United States and other donor countries have acknowledged the utility and potential cost-effectiveness of assisting African forces to enhance their capabilities to participate in these operations. In 2004 the G8 introduced the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a multilateral, five-year program that aims to train 75,000 troops, a majority of them African, by 2010.

Terror. Current U.S. security policy is driven in large part by the Global War on Terror (GWOT), which the Bush Administration has identified as a top national security priority. Terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya in 1998, on targets in Mombasa, Kenya in 2002 and most recently in Algeria and Morocco in 2007 have highlighted the threat of terrorism in the region. DOD officials have emphasized the need to work with African governments to counteract the threat, claiming “Africa has been, is now, and will be into the foreseeable future ripe for terrorists and acts of terrorism.” Of primary concern to policy makers is the possible challenge posed by “ungoverned spaces,” defined as “physical or non-physical area(s) where there is an absence of

47 Coalition partners involved in CTF-150 include the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Pakistan and the United States.

48 For further discussion on the indirect costs of instability, see CRS Report 97-454, Peacekeeping Options: Considerations for U.S. Policymakers and the Congress, by Marjorie Ann Browne, Ellen Collier, and Nina M. Serafino, p. 5.

49 Current operations in Africa include UNMIS (Sudan), UNOCI (Cote d’Ivoire), UNMIL (Liberia), MONUC (Dem. Rep. Of Congo), UNMEE (Ethiopia and Eritrea), and MINURSO (Western Sahara).


state capacity or political will to exercise control.”53 The Administration has linked these areas indirectly to terrorist threats, asserting:

Regional conflicts can arise from a wide variety of causes, including poor governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, tribal rivalries, and ethnic or religious hatreds. If left unaddressed, however, these different causes lead to the same ends: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists.54

In addition to failed states providing a potential “safe haven” for terrorists, there is evidence to suggest terrorist groups may have profited from the collapse of state administrative and security institutions in Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 1990s by trafficking gemstones during Sierra Leone’s civil war. Reports suggest that al Qaeda used the proceeds from its “conflict diamond” trade as a funding source for its operations.55 State Department officials have identified failed states such as these as an “acute risk” to U.S. national security.56

**HIV/AIDS.** According to the United Nations, there were almost 25 million HIV-positive Africans in 2006, representing 63% of infected persons worldwide.57 HIV/AIDS is the leading cause of death on the continent and was identified in 2004 by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell as “the greatest threat of mankind today.”58 The rate of infection in some African security forces is believed to be high, reportedly between 40%-60% in the case of Angola, for example, raising concerns that those forces may be unable to deploy when needed.59 The Bush Administration has placed priority on efforts to combat HIV/AIDS, committing over $15 billion through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Twelve of PEPFAR’s 15 focus countries are in Africa.60 As part of the Administration’s efforts, DOD has established the DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) with African armed forces, which is administered by the Naval Health Research Center in San Diego. DHAPP supports programs in over 20 countries that do not receive PEPFAR funds.

58 Speech by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell at the Gheskio Clinic, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, April 5, 2004.
60 For more information, see CRS Report RL33584, *AIDS in Africa*, by Nicolas Cook.
U.S. Military Assistance and Security Cooperation in Africa: An Expanding Role

The Department of Defense conducts a wide variety of activities in Africa in support of U.S. national interests. Operational activities may include, but are not limited to, humanitarian relief,61 peacekeeping, counter-narcotics, sanctions enforcement, demining, non-combatant evacuations (NEOs), and maritime interdiction operations (MIOs).

In addition to traditional contingency operations,62 the U.S. military implements a number of efforts aimed at increasing the capabilities of African militaries to provide security and stability for their own countries and the region as a whole. Several of these DOD-implemented initiatives are part of foreign military assistance programs funded by the State Department that “help to promote the principles of democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.”63 In addition to providing funding, the State Department gives overall guidance and direction for the programs. The United States military also occasionally provides advisors to peacekeeping missions on the continent; U.S. military advisors from CJTF-HOA are currently assisting the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). U.S. forces routinely conduct a variety of bilateral and multilateral joint exercises with African militaries through such programs as Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). U.S. forces also conduct joint exercises as part of disaster assistance and maritime security training.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) was created in 1999 as one of DOD’s five regional centers for strategic studies. It conducts a variety of academic activities for African, American, and European military and civilian officials aimed at promoting good governance and democratic values, countering ideological support of terrorism, and fostering regional collaboration and cooperation in the African defense and security sectors. ACSS, which is based in Washington, DC, opened an annex at the U.S. embassy in Ethiopia in 2006 and is planning future annexes elsewhere on the continent.64 DOD initiated another multi-nation forum, the Africa Clearinghouse, in 2004 under EUCOM. The Africa Clearinghouse, modeled after EUCOM Clearinghouses for Southeast Europe and the South Caucasus, provides a

61 General Ward, in his confirmation hearing, has testified that "The U.S. military is not an instrument of first resort in providing humanitarian assistance but supports civilian relief agencies...The U.S. military may be involved when it provides a unique service; when the civilian response is overwhelmed; and civilian authorities request assistance. The USAID Office of Disaster Assistance validates all such requests for U.S. military assistance. Our role in this context will not change."

62 DOD defines a “contingency operation” as a military operation in which members of the Armed Forces are or may become involved, either by designation of the Secretary of Defense or by law, in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing force.

63 For more information on U.S. Foreign Military Training programs, see the Department of State’s website at [http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2006/].

venue for the United States to coordinate its actions with other nations involved in security cooperation in Africa to maximize limited resources, synchronize security assistance, and avoid duplication of efforts.

The United States sells military equipment to African governments through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, implemented by the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The U.S. government also provides loans (the United States waives repayment of these loans for African countries) to foreign governments to finance the purchase of such equipment through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. Equipment is also provided to select African countries through the African Coastal and Border Security Program (ACBSP) and the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program.

U.S. counter-terrorism strategy on the continent is addressed through a number of these initiatives, but U.S. counter-terrorism efforts may also include, at one end of the spectrum, programs to address the root causes of terrorism, and, at the other end, military operations to destroy terrorist targets through military strikes. The United States is placing increasing emphasis on Information Operations (IO) in Africa, which use information to improve the security environment and counter extremist ideology through military information support teams deployed to U.S. embassies. IO activities in Africa have included website initiatives such as Maghrebia. Some question whether activities such as these should be a part of DOD’s mandate, or whether they might be more appropriately managed by other U.S. agencies.

Administration officials argue that AFRICOM will not only allow the U.S. military to better coordinate these operations and programs, but that it would also allow DOD to better coordinate with other U.S. agencies, like the State Department, USAID, the Department of Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigations and others, as well as with other governments, like those of Britain and France, which are also providing training and assistance for African security forces. DOD suggests that the new Africa Command will build on the experiences of the U.S. military’s only forward presence in the region, Combined Joint Task Force — Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), located in the East African nation of Djibouti.

**Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).** In October 2002, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) developed a joint task force to focus on “detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the region,” and to provide a forward presence in the region. Approximately 1,500 short-term rotational U.S. military and civilian personnel make up CJTF-HOA, which covers the land and airspace in Kenya, Somalia, Sudan,

---


66 The website can be found at [http://www.magharebia.com].

67 For more information, see [http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/resources/english/facts.asp].
Seychelles, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Yemen, as well as the coastal waters of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean. CJTF personnel train the region’s security forces on counter-terrorism, collect intelligence, serve as advisors to peace operations, conduct activities to maintain critical maritime access to Red Sea routes, and oversee and support humanitarian assistance efforts. During 2007, the Task Force has provided military assistance and training to Ugandan military forces deployed in support of the African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia. As part of this effort, CJTF-HOA worked with non-governmental organizations to provide medical supplies to the Ugandan forces for assistance to the people of Mogadishu. CJTF-HOA has supported at least 11 humanitarian missions, including the airlift of humanitarian assistance supplies to Ethiopia and Northern Kenya. CJTF-HOA also conducts civilian-military operations throughout East Africa as part of an effort to “win hearts and minds” and enhance the “long-term stability of the region.” These civil-military operations include digging wells and building and repairing schools, hospitals, and roads, and are also part of a broader CENTCOM mission to “counter the re-emergence of transnational terrorism.” Some observers question whether some of these activities might be more appropriately coordinated by a civilian agency or non-governmental organization than by the U.S. military.

Security Assistance

Building partnership capacity is a key goal of U.S. military strategy in Africa and will consequently be a key mandate for AFRICOM. At present, military experts believe that no African nation poses a direct threat to the United States or is expected to; consequently an Africa Command would focus less on preparing U.S. forces for major combat in the AOR. Instead, the command would concentrate much of its energies and resources on training and assistance to professionalize local militaries so that they can better ensure stability and security on the continent. As one DOD official has asserted, “its principle mission will be in the area of security cooperation and building partnership capability. It will not be in warfighting.” Officials stress that U.S. training programs aim to encourage respect for human rights and for civilian authority, key shortcomings for many African security forces.

The U.S. government provides security assistance to African militaries through both bilateral and multilateral initiatives. During the 1990s, the United States provided military training through several programs, including the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) program, the African Regional Peacekeeping Program (ARP), and International Military Education and Training (IMET). Some of this training has been provided by the U.S. Army 3rd and 10th Special Forces Groups, which have worked with African militaries since 1990. Training has also been provided by contractors.

69 For more information, see [http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/resources/english/facts.asp].
70 For more information on CJTF-HOA activities, see [http://www.hoa.centcom.mil].
Under the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP), U.S. states’ and territories’ National Guard units have paired with several African countries to conduct a variety of security cooperation activities. As of June 2007, SPP included five U.S-African partnerships: Utah and Morocco, North Dakota and Ghana, California and Nigeria, Wyoming and Tunisia, and New York and California.

The African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are regional security organizations that EUCOM has worked with. U.S. military efforts also aim to support the development of the African Union’s African Standby Force (ASF), a multinational peacekeeping force composed of regional brigades organized by the continent’s Regional Economic Communities. The AU anticipates the Force being operational by 2010 with a standby capacity of 15,000 to 20,000 peacekeepers. The ASF and its regional brigades are not intended to be standing forces, but will instead draw from pre-identified forces of member states. U.S. military assistance also includes efforts to improve information sharing networks between African countries through programs such as EUCOM’s Multinational Information Sharing Initiative, which donor and aid organizations can in turn use to warn of and be warned of possible crises.

In October 2007, U.S. Naval Forces Europe launched a new initiative, the African Partnership Station (APS). Under the initiative, a navy ship, the USS Fort Henry, has been deployed to the Gulf of Guinea from fall 2007 to spring 2008 to serve as a continuing sea base of operations and a “floating schoolhouse” from which to provide assistance and training to the Gulf nations. Training is expected to focus on maritime domain awareness and law enforcement, port facilities management and security, seamanship/navigation, search and rescue, leadership, logistics, civil engineering, humanitarian assistance and disaster response. Six European partners and several U.S. government agencies, including the Coast Guard and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), are now partnering with the Navy to use the Station, which is considered by the Navy to be a "delivery vehicle for interagency, international, and NGO assistance to West and Central Africa," for their own training and development initiatives. The APS will have a minimal footprint onshore, and will conduct repeat visits to ports along the Gulf.

---


73 The ASF is divided into North, West, Central, East, and South Regional Brigades, which are organized by the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS/CEMAC), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), respectively.


Several of the other major current bilateral and multilateral security assistance programs implemented by DOD in Africa are listed below (the list is not inclusive). These programs will fall under the mission of the new Africa Command.

**Operation Enduring Freedom: Trans Sahara (OEF-TS)/Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP).** In 2002, the Department of State launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) program to increase border security and counter-terrorism capacities of four West African nations: Mali, Chad, Niger, and Mauritania. In 2005, the Bush Administration announced a “follow-on” interagency program to PSI. According to the State Department, the Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (formerly Initiative) is “aimed at defeating terrorist organizations by strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region’s security forces, promoting democratic governance, discrediting terrorist ideology, and reinforcing bilateral military ties with the United States.” Under the American military component, Operation Enduring Freedom - Trans Sahara, implemented by EUCOM, U.S. forces work with their African counterparts from Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia to improve intelligence, command and control, logistics, and border control, and to execute joint operations against terrorist groups. U.S. and African forces have conducted joint exercises such as Exercise Flintlock to improve security partnerships initiated under PSI and TSCTP.

**International Military Education and Training (IMET).** In 1949 the U.S. government began providing training to foreign militaries under the Military Assistance Training Program (MAP) and through Foreign Military Sales (FMS), which allows countries to pay for their own training. MAP was succeeded in 1976 by IMET, which provides training at U.S. military schools and other training assistance for foreign military personnel on a grant basis through funding from the Department of State. A subset of IMET training, Expanded IMET (E-IMET), provides courses on defense management, civil-military relations, law enforcement cooperation, and military justice for military as well as civilian personnel. In FY2007 IMET is expected to train 1,400 African military officers. The Department of State also provides training through its Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. The President’s FY2008 Budget Request includes $18.3 million in IMET funds for African countries and $14.5 million in FMF (these figures include IMET and FMF funding for Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia, but not Egypt).

---

76 Other authorities used for DOD training include the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (Title 10, USC, Sec. 166(a)), the DOD Regional Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program (Title 10, USC, Sec. 2249(c)), the Air Force’s Aviation Leadership Program (Title 10, USC, Sec. 9381-9383), training with U.S. Special Forces (Title 10, USC, Sec. 2011), and disaster response training under Title 10, USC, Sec. 2561.


78 For more information on IMET, see CRS Report RS20506, *The International Military Training and Education Program*, by Richard F. Grimmett.
The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA)/Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). In 1996, the Clinton Administration proposed the creation of an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), an African standby force that would be trained and equipped by the United States and other donor nations. The initiative was not well received on the continent, and was later reintroduced as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), a bilateral training program designed to improve the capabilities of individual African countries’ militaries to participate in multilateral peacekeeping operations. ACOTA, which replaced ACRI in 2002, aims to upgrade the peace-enforcement capabilities of African militaries. ACOTA provides Peace Support Operations training, including light infantry and small unit tactics, and focuses on training African troops who can in turn train other African units. In 2004, ACOTA became a part of GPOI. GPOI attempts to address some of the factors limiting African militaries’ ability to contribute to peace operations by conducting a variety of programs, events, and activities oriented on peacekeeping capacity building. Among these programs is an effort to foster an international transport and logistics support system for African and other region’s forces. The United States coordinates its peacekeeping training and assistance programs with other G8 countries through a G8 Africa Clearinghouse. While the State Department is the executive agent of GPOI and ACOTA, the DOD provides small military teams for special mentoring assistance to ACOTA training events. According to the State Department, over 60,000 peacekeepers from Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia have received ACOTA training since the program’s inception. The President’s FY2008 Budget Request includes $40.26 million for ACOTA and $7.26 million in GPOI funds for Africa Regional Headquarters Support to the AU and ECOWAS.

Regional Perspectives

U.S. reaction to the proposed creation of a new command for Africa has been largely positive, although concerns have been raised. In Africa, on the other hand, perceptions of the new command are more mixed. There is considerable apprehension over U.S. motivations for creating AFRICOM, and some Africans worry that the move represents a neo-colonial effort to dominate the region militarily. U.S. military efforts on the continent have been seen as episodic, leading some to
question a more sustained focus from DOD now. Reports of U.S. air strikes in Somalia in early 2007 and U.S. support for Ethiopia’s military intervention there have added to those concerns. Many have viewed U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in Africa with skepticism, and there appears to be a widespread belief that the new command’s primary goals will be to hunt terrorists and to secure U.S. access to African oil. U.S. foreign policy analysts have focused increased attention on China’s role in Africa in recent years, and such attention has led some to question whether an Africa Command might be part of a new contest for influence on the continent.

Among several African governments and militaries, on the other hand, AFRICOM has been received with cautious optimism. They view increased American attention to the continent’s problems as a positive move, potentially bringing increased resources, training, and assistance. U.S. foreign military assistance has increased in recent years, and military training programs under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and the Regional Defense Counter-terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) in Africa have steadily been on the rise.

DOD and State Department officials involved in the creation of Africa Command continue to consult with African nations to discuss their plans for the command. Those involved in the consultations have stressed that the goal of the visits has been to solicit African views and explain the rationale behind AFRICOM’s creation, rather than to find a suitable location for its headquarters. In April 2007, senior officials visited Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, Ghana and Senegal. Following their visit, one DOD official noted that despite some initial “misconceptions,” they had not encountered “any specific resistance to the idea.” In June 2007, they visited Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, and Djibouti, and held discussions with African Union officials. The delegation also held meetings with 40 foreign defense attachés serving in Paris. African officials reportedly gave “positive feedback about the design and mission of AFRICOM” and advised the delegation that DOD should consider how AFRICOM could complement the AU’s regional security structure. More recently, in September 2007, DOD hosted an representatives from the African Union, African regional security organizations, and over 35 African governments in Virginia to further explain its plans for the command and to solicit input from attendees. Analysts suggest U.S. officials should closely consult with these governments to ensure that AFRICOM reflects a mutual exchange

---

of interests and is seen to foster a closer alliance rather than serving as an avenue for the U.S. to dictate policy to African governments.

AFRICOM’s new commander has acknowledged the need for his staff to continue their public relations campaign to allay concerns.88 In late October 2007, members of the Pan-African Parliament, the legislative body of the African Union, voted in favor of a motion to “prevail upon all African Governments through the African Union (AU) not to accede to the United States of America’s Government’s request to host AFRICOM anywhere in the African continent.”89 West African military chiefs, following a November 2007 conference in Liberia, issued a cautious response to the U.S. government's proposal for the command, saying that AFRICOM "had not been fully understood" by African countries and requesting "further sensitization by the United States authorities at the highest political level." ECOWAS's Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security did suggest that "everybody welcomes and supports the idea, but we want that direction to come from the heads of state."90

**Congressional Interest and Oversight Issues**

As noted above, AFRICOM faces myriad challenges, both in its establishment and its operation. Some of these challenges may become issues for Congress. Some Members of Congress have expressed interest in the creation of an Africa Command, and in 2006, Senator Russ Feingold introduced S.Amdt. 4527 to the FY2007 National Defense Authorization bill (S. 2766) requiring a feasibility study for the establishment of a new command for Africa. The amendment was included in the legislation, which passed the Senate in June 2006. The Senate expressed its support for AFRICOM in S.Rept. 110-77, which accompanied S. 1547, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008. The report did, however, raise questions regarding authorities needed to stand up and staff the command; authorities and funding mechanisms for interagency staff; location; planned staffing levels; and anticipated costs. The Africa Subcommittees of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs both held hearings on AFRICOM in August 2007. Following General Ward's confirmation as commander, the House Armed Services Committee held a hearing to discuss the command in November 2007. Congress has expressed its concern regarding unanswered questions surrounding AFRICOM's mission in S.Rept. 110-85 accompanying H.R. 2642, the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008 and in the Conference Report 110-477 to H.R. 1585, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008.


89 Some details of the debate are included in “Gaborone Succeeds At PAP As Sebetela is Booed,” All Africa, October 29, 2007.

Given that a large part of AFRICOM’s mandate will be to build the indigenous capacity of African defense forces, the ease with which the command can conduct security cooperation programs will be key to its success. DOD officials suggest that inefficiencies exist in the authorities through which funding is provided for the military’s TSC activities.91 Military officials have argued that the applicable laws need simplification to allow the combatant commands greater flexibility to respond to emerging threats and opportunities. Some have raised concerns, though, that modifying the administrative authorities could interfere with the Department of State’s diplomatic decisions or bilateral relationships. The U.S. military faces other policy restrictions, including Article 98 restrictions, in its operations with some African governments and militaries.92 At the same time, DOD is also concerned about possible gaps in servicemen protections for U.S. troops operating on the continent (see Headquarters Location above).

The establishment of a new unified command will require both financial and human resources, although the Department of Defense anticipates that much of those will be redirected from the existing commands. Military resources have been stretched by major theater operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, making troop readiness and costs associated with standing up a new command a critical issue for Congress.93 Staffing the command at the interagency level may also require additional resources from Congress — some officials at the State Department and USAID have already expressed concern about their departments’ inability to provide the number of civilian staff to the command envisioned by the Department of Defense, and that concern that has been echoed by some within DOD.94 Some observers have

---

91 Authorities provided to DOD under Title 10, USC, cannot be generally used for training or equipment programs, whereas Title 22 funds, which are controlled by the State Department, but which include some DOD-implemented programs like FMF and IMET, cannot be used to fund military operations. In the FY2006 Defense Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-163), Congress gave DOD expanded funding and authorities under Title 10, USC, Section 1206 and 1207 to address lengthy administrative and procurement delays. Section 1206 authorities allow DOD to directly fund some security cooperation activities. In FY2006, DOD obligated $6 million for a Regional Maritime Awareness Capability initiative in the Gulf of Guinea and $6 million for activities in conjunction with TSCTP through 1206 assistance. At the request of Senator Richard Lugar, the Government Accountability Office compiled a report, Section 1206 Security Assistance Program — Findings on Criteria, Coordination, and Implementation, in February 2007.

92 In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 17, 2007, EUCOM Commander Bantz Craddock expressed concern that Article 98 restrictions could affect long-term U.S.-African security relationships and hinder the logistical capability of countries that do not sign Article 98 agreements to participate in regional peacekeeping efforts.

93 Congress has, in the past, prohibited funding for combatant commands. For example, under the FY1982 DOD Authorization Act (P.L. 97-252), Congress prohibited the use of funds for the integration of the Army’s Military Traffic Management Command and the Navy’s Military Sealift Command into a new unified transportation command, at the request of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff.

94 EUCOM Commander Bantz Craddock told a Defense Writers Group forum on May 18, 2007, “It will be difficult to get subscription and participation by the interagency.” Other
cautioned that AFRICOM could develop independent institutional imperatives that demand resources regardless of need, rather than reflecting genuine strategic interests.

The development of AFRICOM’s interagency process may be of particular interest to Congress. In the House Report to accompany H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act of FY2008, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence expressed concern with interagency coordination on Africa, calling it “flawed” and suggesting that the intelligence community needed to realign its resources to “better understand the threats emanating from this region.” DOD officials point out that there are no legally binding requirements for agencies to coordinate their activities, which could make AFRICOM’s “pioneering” interagency process more challenging, should other agencies not have the resources to participate adequately.95 Because the command’s role will be to support U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa, close coordination with the State Department will be critical to the success of AFRICOM. Some have suggested that because the State Department organizes its efforts bilaterally while DOD organizes regionally, that coordination may be challenging and may require some “internal bureaucratic changes” within the State Department.96

Observers have expressed concern that U.S. military efforts on the continent must not be allowed to overshadow U.S. diplomatic objectives. A 2006 Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Report found that

As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs... U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense’s focus on war fighting.97

Senator Feingold, in a speech before the Senate, expressed his support for the Africa Command, but cautioned that it must “contribute to, not define, the U.S. Government’s overall strategy and objectives for the continent.”98 Likewise, Senator Richard Lugar has suggested that AFRICOM could help the U.S. military develop a “more sophisticated understanding of a region that is ever-changing and highly complex,” but has also cautioned, “with greater expertise created within a new regional command, the hope is that there would be few disagreements between the

94 (...continued)
concerns have been expressed to the author in interviews with Administration officials.

95 Some of the challenges in coordinating a more effective interagency process were outlined by John Hamre, President of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in a hearing, “Organizing Department of Defense Roles and Mission Requirements,” held by the House Armed Services Committee on June 20, 2007.


97 Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign, December 15, 2006.

two Departments on the appropriateness of security assistance to specific African nations. But undoubtedly, some differences of opinion will occur.\(^9\) As DOD stands up the new command and as AFRICOM becomes operational, Congress may exert its oversight authority to monitor the command’s operations to ensure they support, rather than guide, the United States’ political, economic, and social objectives for the continent.

**Related CRS Reports**


---

Figure 1. Proposed Area of Responsibility for Africa Command

Source: Department of Defense, adapted by CRS.
Appendix 1. History of U.S. Military Involvement in Africa

The United States maintained Wheelus Air Base near Tripoli, Libya from the 1940s until 1971 with an estimated 4,000 American personnel. Wheelus served primarily as a bomber base for missions to Europe and as an Air Force training location, although U.S. forces from the base did provide emergency humanitarian assistance to earthquake and flood victims in Libya and Tunisia in the 1960s.

Africa was not included in the U.S. military command structure until 1952, when several North African countries, including Libya, were added to the responsibilities of U.S. European Command because of their historic relationship with Europe. The rest of the continent remained outside the responsibility of any command until 1960, when Cold War concerns over Soviet influence in newly independent African countries led DOD to include Sub-Saharan Africa in the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), leaving North Africa in EUCOM. The Unified Command Plan was revised again in 1962 by President John F. Kennedy, and responsibility for Sub-Saharan Africa was transferred to a newly-created Strike Command (STRICOM), which was responsible for operations in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia and located at McDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. STRICOM was redesignated as Readiness Command (REDCOM) in 1971, and its responsibility for Africa was dissolved, leaving Sub-Saharan Africa out of the combatant command structure until 1983. Under the Reagan Administration, U.S. military involvement in Africa was largely dominated by Cold War priorities, and the Administration’s “containment” policy led DOD to divide responsibility for Africa into its current configuration among three geographic commands.

In the 1980s, the U.S. military was involved in repeated skirmishes with Libyan jets in territorial disputes over the Gulf of Sidra, and those engagements later escalated as Libya was implicated for supporting international terrorism. On April 15, 1986, the United States initiated air strikes against multiple military targets in Libya under the code name Operation El Dorado Canyon to “inflict damage to Qadhafi’s capability to direct and control the export of international terrorism;” several civilian targets including the French Embassy in Tripoli were also inadvertently hit.

---

100 Other former U.S. military installations in North Africa included Kenitra Naval Air Station, also known as Port Lyautey, and several Naval Communication Relay Stations in Morocco, as well as three airbases: Nouassur, Sidi Slimane, and Ben Guerir.

After the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy toward Africa was driven by President George H. W. Bush’s vision of a “New World Order”102 and later by President William J. Clinton’s policy of “assertive multilateralism.”103 U.S. military involvement in Africa was dominated by the deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia to secure humanitarian operations, first in 1992 under the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF), also known as Operation Restore Hope, and later under the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II.104 U.S. military efforts in Somalia were unprecedented on the continent — over 25,000 U.S. soldiers were deployed by President George H.W. Bush under UNITAF, which was led by CENTCOM and included forces from 24 other countries.

The number of U.S. troops was significantly reduced under President Clinton as operational responsibility was shifted from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. In October 1993, U.S. Special Operations soldiers in the U.S.-led Task Force Ranger engaged Somali militia forces in the battle of Mogadishu, which ultimately resulted in the deaths of 18 American soldiers and hundreds of Somalis.105 President Clinton ultimately ordered the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia in March 1994, the same month that a limited U.S. deployment of 3,600 soldiers was dispatched to Central Africa to assist in humanitarian efforts for Rwandan refugees and to provide protection for humanitarian supplies in Rwanda.106

In 1995, DOD outlined its view of Africa in its U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, asserting that “ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.”107 While the U.S. military was deployed almost annually during the 1990s to conduct Non-Combatant Evacuation and Repatriation Operations (NEO) in African countries that had become politically unstable, other contingency operations108 involving U.S. forces in Africa in latter half of the 1990s were limited.

104 For more information, see CRS Report RL30065, Somalia: Background and U.S. Involvement Through the 1990s, by Theodros Dagne and CRS Report RL30184, Military Interventions by U.S. Forces from Vietnam to Bosnia: Background, Outcomes, and “Lessons Learned” for Kosovo, by Nina M. Serafino.
105 Twenty-nine American soldiers ultimately lost their lives as a result of the conflict in Somalia.
106 Although the mission was deemed successful in alleviating the starvation and disease that threatened the refugees, many have been highly critical of the United States, the United Nations, and others for not doing more to attempt to avert the genocide that occurred in Rwanda that year. See, for example, Col. Scott R. Feil, “Could 5,000 Peacekeepers Have Saved 500,000 Rwandans?: Early Intervention Reconsidered,” ISD Reports, Vol. III, No. 2, April 1997.
108 According to DOD, a military operation that is either designated by the Secretary of (continued...)
In 1998, following the attacks on two U.S. embassies in East Africa, the United States conducted retaliatory cruise missile attacks against a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan that Clinton Administration officials initially contended was producing precursors for chemical weapons for al Qaeda.

In 2003, the United States responded to calls to intervene in Liberia’s civil war by deploying a U.S. Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) off the coast of Liberia to provide assistance to the ECOWAS mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) through Joint Task Force Liberia, under the command of EUCOM. Out of an estimated 5,000 U.S. forces deployed to the area under Operation Sheltering Sky, only approximately 200 U.S. soldiers came ashore.

Appendix 2. Instances of the Use of U.S. Armed Forces in Africa, 1950-2006


1964 Congo. The United States sent four transport planes to provide airlift for Congolese troops during a rebellion and to transport Belgian paratroopers to rescue foreigners.

1967 Congo. The United States sent three military transport aircraft with crews to provide the Congo central government with logistical support during a revolt.

1978 Zaire. From May 19 through June 1978, the United States used military transport aircraft to provide logistical support to Belgian and French rescue operations in Zaire.

1981 Libya. On August 19, 1981, U.S. planes based on the carrier U.S.S. Nimitz shot down two Libyan jets over the Gulf of Sidra after one of the Libyan jets had fired a heat-seeking missile. The United States periodically held freedom of navigation exercises in the Gulf of Sidra, claimed by Libya as territorial waters but considered international waters by the United States.

1983 Egypt. After a Libyan plane bombed a city in Sudan on March 18, 1983, and Sudan and Egypt appealed for assistance, the United States dispatched an AWACS electronic surveillance plane to Egypt.

1983 Chad. On August 8, 1983, President Reagan reported the deployment of two AWACS electronic surveillance planes and eight F-15 fighter planes and ground logistical support forces to assist Chad against Libyan and rebel forces.

1986 Libya. On March 26, 1986, President Reagan reported to Congress that, on March 24 and 25, U.S. forces, while engaged in freedom of navigation exercises around the Gulf of Sidra, had been attacked by Libyan missiles and the United States had responded with

---

108 (...continued)

Defense as a contingency operation or becomes a contingency operation as a matter of law: title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 101 (a)(13).

109 For more information, see CRS Report RL32243, Liberia: Transition to Peace, by Nicolas Cook.

110 Covert actions, disaster relief, and routine alliance stationing and training exercises are not included in this list. Most instances listed since 1980 are summaries of U.S. military deployments reported to Congress by the President as a result of the War Powers Resolution.
missiles.  

1986  
*Libya.* On April 16, 1986, President Reagan reported that U.S. air and naval forces had conducted bombing strikes on terrorist facilities and military installations in Libya.

1989  
*Libya.* On January 4, 1989, two U.S. Navy F-14 aircraft based on the *U.S.S. John F. Kennedy* shot down two Libyan jet fighters over the Mediterranean Sea about 70 miles north of Libya. The U.S. pilots said the Libyan planes had demonstrated hostile intentions.

1990  
*Liberia.* On August 6, 1990, President Bush reported that a reinforced rifle company had been sent to provide additional security to the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, and that helicopter teams had evacuated U.S. citizens from Liberia.

1991  

1992  
*Sierra Leone.* On May 3, 1992, U.S. military planes evacuated Americans from Sierra Leone, where military leaders had overthrown the government.

1992  
*Somalia.* On December 10, 1992, President Bush reported that he had deployed U.S. armed forces to Somalia in response to a humanitarian crisis and a U.N. Security Council Resolution determining that the situation constituted a threat to international peace. This operation, called Operation Restore Hope, was part of a U.S.-led United Nations Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and came to an end on May 4, 1993. U.S. forces continued to participate in the successor United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), which the U.N. Security Council authorized to assist Somalia in political reconciliation and restoration of peace.

1993  
*Somalia.* On June 10, 1993, President Clinton reported that in response to attacks against U.N. forces in Somalia by a factional leader, the U.S. Quick Reaction Force in the area had participated in military action to quell the violence. On July 1 President Clinton reported further air and ground military operations on June 12 and June 17 aimed at neutralizing military capabilities that had impeded U.N. efforts to deliver humanitarian relief and promote national reconstruction, and additional instances occurred in the following months.

1994  
*Rwanda.* On April 12, 1994, President Clinton reported that combat-equipped U.S. military forces had been deployed to Burundi to conduct possible non-combatant evacuation operations of U.S. citizens and other third-country nationals from Rwanda, where widespread fighting had broken out. By September 30, 1994, all U.S. troops had departed from Rwanda and surrounding nations. In the Defense Appropriations Act for FY1995 (P.L. 103-335, signed September 30, 1994), Congress barred use of funds for U.S. military participation in or around Rwanda after October 7, 1994, except for any action necessary to protect U.S. citizens.

1995  
*Somalia.* On March 1, 1995, President Clinton reported that on February 27, 1995, 1,800 combat-equipped U.S. armed forces personnel began deployment into Mogadishu, Somalia, to assist in the withdrawal of U.N. forces assigned there to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). This mission was completed on March 3, 1995.

1996  
*Liberia.* On April 11, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress that on April 9, 1996 due to the “deterioration of the security situation and the resulting threat to American citizens” in Liberia he had ordered U.S. military forces to evacuate from that country “private U.S. citizens and certain third-country nationals who had taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy compound....”

1996  
*Liberia.* On May 20, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress the continued deployment of U.S. military forces in Liberia to evacuate both American citizens and other foreign personnel, and to respond to various isolated “attacks on the American
Embassy complex” in Liberia. The President noted that the deployment of U.S. forces would continue until there was no longer any need for enhanced security at the Embassy and a requirement to maintain an evacuation capability in the country.

**1996 Central African Republic.** On May 23, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress the deployment of U.S. military personnel to Bangui, Central African Republic, to conduct the evacuation from that country of “private U.S. citizens and certain U.S. Government employees,” and to provide “enhanced security for the American Embassy in Bangui.”

**1996 Rwanda and Zaire.** On December 2, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress that to support the humanitarian efforts of the United Nations regarding refugees in Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region of Eastern Zaire, he had authorized the use of U.S. personnel and aircraft, including AC-130U planes to help in surveying the region in support of humanitarian operations, although fighting still was occurring in the area, and U.S. aircraft had been subject to fire when on flight duty.

**1997 Congo and Gabon.** On March 27, 1997, President Clinton reported to Congress that, on March 25, 1997, a standby evacuation force of U.S. military personnel had been deployed to Congo and Gabon to provide enhanced security for American private citizens, government employees, and selected third country nationals in Zaire, and to be available for any necessary evacuation operation.

**1997 Sierra Leone.** On May 30, 1997, President Clinton reported to Congress that on May 29 and May 30, 1997, U.S. military personnel were deployed to Freetown, Sierra Leone, to prepare for and undertake the evacuation of certain U.S. government employees and private U.S. citizens.

**1998 Guinea-Bissau.** On June 12, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress that, on June 10, 1998, in response to an army mutiny in Guinea-Bissau endangering the U.S. Embassy, U.S. government employees and citizens in that country, he had deployed a standby evacuation force of U.S. military personnel to Dakar, Senegal, to remove such individuals, as well as selected third country nationals, from the city of Bissau. The deployment continued until the necessary evacuations were completed.

**1998 Kenya and Tanzania.** On August 10, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress that he had deployed, on August 7, 1998, a Joint Task Force of U.S. military personnel to Nairobi, Kenya, to coordinate the medical and disaster assistance related to the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He also reported that teams of 50-100 security personnel had arrived in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to enhance the security of the U.S. Embassies and citizens there.

**1998 Afghanistan and Sudan.** On August 21, 1998, by letter, President Clinton reported to Congress that he had authorized airstrikes on August 20th against camps and installations in Afghanistan and Sudan used by the Osama bin Laden terrorist organization. The President did so based on what he viewed as convincing information that the bin Laden organization was responsible for the bombings, on August 7, 1998, of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

**1998 Liberia.** On September 29, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress that on September 27, 1998 he had, due to political instability and civil disorder in Liberia, deployed a stand-by response and evacuation force of 30 U.S. military personnel to augment the security force at the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, and to provide for a rapid evacuation capability, as needed, to remove U.S. citizens and government personnel from the country.

**1999 Kenya.** On February 25, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress that he was continuing to deploy U.S. military personnel in that country to assist in providing security for the U.S. embassy and American citizens in Nairobi, pending completion of renovations of the American embassy facility in Nairobi, subject of a terrorist bombing in August 1998.
On May 12, 2000, President Clinton, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution” reported to Congress that he had ordered a U.S. Navy patrol craft to deploy to Sierra Leone to be ready to support evacuation operations from that country if needed. He also authorized a U.S. C-17 aircraft to deliver “ammunition, and other supplies and equipment” to Sierra Leone in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations there.

On September 24, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” and “Senate Joint Resolution 23” that in response to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon he had ordered the “deployment of various combat-equipped and combat support forces to a number of foreign nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas of operations.” The President noted in efforts to “prevent and deter terrorism” he might find it necessary to order additional forces into these and other areas of the world....” He stated that he could not now predict “the scope and duration of these deployments,” or the “actions necessary to counter the terrorist threat to the United States.”

On September 26, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that U.S. “combat-equipped and combat support forces” have been deployed to the Philippines since January 2002 to train with, assist and advise the Philippines’ Armed Forces in enhancing their “counterterrorist capabilities.” He added that U.S. forces were conducting maritime interception operations in the Central and European Command areas to combat movement, arming or financing of “international terrorists.” He also noted that U.S. combat personnel had been deployed to Georgia and Yemen to help enhance the “counterterrorist capabilities” of their armed forces.

On September 20, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that U.S. “combat-equipped and combat support forces” have been deployed to the Philippines since January 2002 to train with, assist and advise the Philippines’ Armed Forces in enhancing their “counterterrorist capabilities.” He added that U.S. forces were conducting maritime interception operations in the Central and European Command areas to combat movement, arming or financing of “international terrorists.” He also noted that U.S. combat personnel had been deployed to Georgia and Yemen to help enhance the “counterterrorist capabilities” of their armed forces.

On September 20, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that U.S. “combat-equipped and combat support forces” have been deployed to the Philippines since January 2002 to train with, assist and advise the Philippines’ Armed Forces in enhancing their “counterterrorist capabilities.” He added that U.S. forces were conducting maritime interception operations in the Central and European Command areas to combat movement, arming or financing of “international terrorists.” He also noted that U.S. combat personnel had been deployed to Georgia and Yemen to help enhance the “counterterrorist capabilities” of their armed forces.

On September 26, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that in response to a rebellion in Cote d’Ivoire that he had on September 25, 2002 sent U.S. military personnel into Cote d’Ivoire to assist in the evacuation of American citizens and third country nationals from the city of Bouake; and otherwise assist in other evacuations as necessary.

On March 20, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” as well as P.L. 107-40, and “pursuant to” his authority as Commander-in-Chief, that he had continued a number of U.S. military operations globally in the war against terrorism. These military operations included ongoing U.S. actions against al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan; collaborative anti-terror operations with forces of Pakistan in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area; “maritime interception operations on the high seas” in areas of responsibility of the Central and European Commands to prevent terrorist movement and other activities; and military support for the armed forces of Georgia and Yemen in counter-terrorism operations.

On June 9, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that on June 8 he had sent about 35 combat-equipped U.S. military personnel into Monrovia, Liberia, to augment U.S. Embassy security forces, to aid in the possible evacuation of U.S. citizens if necessary. The President also noted that he had sent about 34 combat-equipped U.S. military personnel to help secure the U.S. Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, and to assist in evacuation of American citizens if required. They were expected to arrive at the U.S. embassy by June 10, 2003. Back-up and support personnel were sent to Dakar, Senegal, to aid in any necessary evacuation from either Liberia or Mauritania.

On August 13, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that in response to conditions in Liberia, on August 11, 2003, he had authorized about 4,350 U.S. combat-equipped military personnel to enter Liberian territorial waters in support of U.N. and West African States efforts to restore order and provide humanitarian assistance in Liberia.

On September 19, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that U.S. “combat-equipped and combat support forces” continue to be deployed at a number of locations around the world as part of U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. American forces support anti-terrorism efforts in the
Philippines, and maritime interception operations continue on the high seas in the Central, European, and Pacific Command areas of responsibility, to “prevent the movement, arming, or financing of international terrorists.” He also noted that “U.S. combat equipped and support forces” had been deployed to Georgia and Djibouti to help in enhancing their “counterterrorist capabilities.”

2004 Terrorism/Bosnia and Haiti. On March 20, 2004, the President reported to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of multiple on-going United States military deployments and operations “in support of the global war on terrorism (including in Afghanistan),” as well as operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Haiti. In this report, the President noted that U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea. He further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,900 personnel); in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about 1,100 personnel); and approximately 1,800 military personnel were deployed in Haiti as part of the U.N. Multinational Interim Force.

2004 Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia/Iraq. On November 4, 2004, the President sent to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in support of the global war on terrorism.” These deployments, support or military operations include activities in Afghanistan, Djibouti, as well as Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In this report, the President noted that U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea. He further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,800 personnel); and in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about 1,000 personnel). Meanwhile, he stated that the United States continues to deploy more than 135,000 military personnel in Iraq.

2005 Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia. On May 20, 2005, the President sent to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in support of the global war on terrorism,” as well as operations in Iraq, where about 159,000 U.S. military personnel were deployed. U.S. forces are also deployed in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea, and Djibouti assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities” of these nations. The President further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,700 personnel). Approximately 235 U.S. personnel are also deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia.

2005 Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia/Iraq. On December 7, 2005, the President sent to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in support of the global war on terrorism,” and in support of the Multinational Force in Iraq, where about 160,000 U.S. military personnel were deployed. U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region — Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Djibouti — assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities” of these nations. The President further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,700 personnel). Approximately 220 U.S. personnel were also deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as “counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia.”

2006 Terrorism threat/Kosovo/Bosnia/Iraq. On June 15, 2006, the President sent to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in support of the
war on terror,” and in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as part of the Multinational Force (M.F.) in Iraq. About 131,000 military personnel were deployed in Iraq. U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to support necessary operations against al-Qaida and other international terrorists operating in the region. U.S. military personnel continue to support the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The U.S. contribution to KFOR was about 1,700 military personnel. The NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo was established in November 22, 2004 as a successor to its stabilization operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to continue to assist in implementing the peace agreement. Approximately 250 U.S. personnel were assigned to the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo to assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as “counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia.”

2006

*Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia.* On December 15, 2006, the President sent to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in support of the war on terror,” in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as part of the Multinational Force (M.F.) in Iraq. About 134,000 military personnel were deployed in Iraq. U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to support necessary operations against al-Qaida and other international terrorists operating in the region, including Yemen. U.S. military personnel continue to support the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The U.S. contribution to KFOR was about 1,700 military personnel. The NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo was established in November 22, 2004 as a successor to its stabilization operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to continue to assist in implementing the peace agreement. Approximately 100 U.S. personnel were assigned to the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo to assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as “counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia.”

## Appendix 3. Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACBSP</td>
<td>African Coastal and Border Security Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSS</td>
<td>Africa Center for Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF-HOA</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTFP</td>
<td>Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>Excess Defense Articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOC</td>
<td>Full Operating Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPOI</td>
<td>Global Peace Operations Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>Initial Operating Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIACG</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Coordination Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANTCOM</td>
<td>Atlantic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIO</td>
<td>Maritime Interception Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Non-Combatant Evacuation and Repatriation Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>Northern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF-TS</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom — Trans Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>USAID Office of Military Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDCOM</td>
<td>Readiness Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATCOM</td>
<td>Strategic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRICOM</td>
<td>Strike Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSCOM</td>
<td>Transportation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSC</td>
<td>Theater Security Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSCTP</td>
<td>Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>U.S. United Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSOM</td>
<td>U.N. Operation in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>