INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES: SHOULD THE UNITED STATES PROVIDE SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO ITS NEW “STRATEGIC PARTNER”? 

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE 
Strategy 

by 

RICHARD G. PETERSEN JR., MAJ, USA 
B.S., San Jose State University, San Jose, California, 1995 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
2007 

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES: SHOULD THE UNITED STATES PROVIDE SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO ITS NEW “STRATEGIC PARTNER”?


U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
1 Reynolds Ave.
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

The US needs a strategic partner in Asia to promote both regional stability and the security of the US homeland and to prevent the rise in the influence of a powerful Asian state from opposing US interests. Therefore, one must have a better understanding of how continued security assistance to India’s military may or may not promote US interests and determine if such assistance should continue. This thesis will attempt to answer the question: Should the US provide security assistance to India’s military? This thesis will focus on four driving factors behind Indo-US relations: Indian self-image, nuclear security, regional security, and economics. This thesis will then analyze these factors in terms of national interests, strengths, and weaknesses and use them to construct possible scenarios for the future of Indo-US relations. The most likely scenario will be selected by determining the implications of each scenario and evaluating indicators from current events. The most likely scenario will support the conclusion of this thesis.

India, Strategic Partnership, Security Assistance, Nuclear, Economics, Regional Security, South Asia
Name of Candidate: Major Richard G. Petersen Jr.

Thesis Title: India and the United States: Should the United States Provide Security Assistance to Its New “Strategic Partner”?

Approved by:

______________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Michael D. Mihalka, Ph.D.

______________________________, Member
William C. Lambert, M.I.A.

______________________________, Member
LtCol John M. Rochelle

Accepted this 15th day of June 2007 by:

______________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES: SHOULD THE UNITED STATES PROVIDE SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO ITS NEW “STRATEGIC PARTNER”? by Major Richard G. Petersen, 111 pages.

The US needs a strategic partner in Asia to promote both regional stability and the security of the US homeland and to prevent the rise in the influence of a powerful Asian state from opposing US interests. Therefore, one must have a better understanding of how continued security assistance to India’s military may or may not promote US interests and determine if such assistance should continue. This thesis will attempt to answer the question: Should the US provide security assistance to India’s military?

This thesis will focus on four driving factors behind Indo-US relations: Indian self-image, nuclear security, regional security, and economics. This thesis will then analyze these factors in terms of national interests, strengths, and weaknesses and use them to construct possible scenarios for the future of Indo-US relations. The most likely scenario will be selected by determining the implications of each scenario and evaluating indicators from current events. The most likely scenario will support the conclusion of this thesis.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis has been a lengthy and difficult project to complete. I would like to thank my thesis committee: Dr. Michael Mihalka, Mr. William Lambert, and LtCol John Rochelle. Their advice and guidance were invaluable to me as I undertook a project for which I had no previous academic experience. I would also like to thank my instructor, Mr. Robert Walz, who encouraged me to begin this thesis and inspired me with the idea that an Army logistian could and should successfully complete this project. Finally, I would like to thank my wife Marris, who, as with all my endeavors, put her love and support behind me and my work.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .......... ii
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iv
ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................................... xi
TABLES .......................................................................................................................... xiii

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................1

Research Question ...........................................................................................................1
Key Terms........................................................................................................................1
Background ......................................................................................................................2
Purpose and Importance of the Study ..............................................................................3
Assumptions .....................................................................................................................3
Scope and Limitations ......................................................................................................4
Delimitations ....................................................................................................................5
Summary ..........................................................................................................................5

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ..............................................................................8

Introduction ......................................................................................................................8
India’s Global Self-Image .................................................................................................8
Indian National Security Objectives ................................................................................9
India’s View of Its Region ...............................................................................................10
India’s View of the US .....................................................................................................11
  President Truman .........................................................................................................12
  President Eisenhower ...................................................................................................13
  Presidents Kennedy and Johnson ..............................................................................14
  President Nixon ..........................................................................................................15
  Presidents Ford and Carter .........................................................................................17
  Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton .......................................................................18
Nuclear Security and Assistance ....................................................................................20
  Current Status ............................................................................................................20
  India’s View of Nuclear Proliferation .........................................................................22
Regional Security ............................................................................................................23
  India’s Relationship with Pakistan ............................................................................23
  Source of Conflict ......................................................................................................23
  Nuclear Tests ..............................................................................................................24
Growth of Power on Indian Terms ................................................................. 53
US Strengths .................................................................................................. 54
Recognized Global Power ............................................................................ 54
Indian Strengths ............................................................................................. 54
Geographical Location in South Asia .................................................................. 54
Democracy and Ability to Reform Itself .......................................................... 54
US Weaknesses ............................................................................................... 55
Attaches Conditions to Its Friendship ............................................................ 55
Inconsistent in its Dealings with India over Time .............................................. 55
Indian Weaknesses .......................................................................................... 55
Global Powers Do Not Uniformly Acknowledge India’s Power and Potential 55
History of Backwardness and Inability to Change ............................................. 56
Nuclear Security and Assistance ...................................................................... 57
US Interests ...................................................................................................... 57
Nuclear Nonproliferation ................................................................................... 57
Security of the Homeland and of US Interests .................................................. 57
Indian Interests ................................................................................................ 58
Energy Independence .................................................................................... 58
National Identity Backed with Strength ........................................................... 58
India is Viewed as a Nuclear Power by Other Nations ...................................... 58
US Strengths .................................................................................................. 59
Ability to Impose Conditions .......................................................................... 59
Indian Strengths ............................................................................................... 59
Ability to Call Itself a Nuclear State ................................................................. 59
Ability to Shape Regional Events .................................................................... 60
US Weaknesses ............................................................................................... 60
Other Nations can Provide Nuclear Technology .............................................. 60
Indian Weaknesses .......................................................................................... 60
Not Able to Influence Nuclear-Related Organizations ..................................... 60

Source: Mark R. Wilcox and Bruce W. Menning, Guide to the Strategic Estimate
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Command and General Staff College, 2006) 5 ........ 61

Regional Security ............................................................................................ 61
US Interests ...................................................................................................... 62
Neutralized Terror Groups with No Safe Havens .............................................. 62
Maintain US Influence in the Region ............................................................... 62
Use of the Indian Ocean.................................................................................. 62
Stability of Pakistan ....................................................................................... 63
Indian Interests ............................................................................................... 63
Preeminence in the Indian Ocean ................................................................. 63
Stability of Pakistan ....................................................................................... 63
US Strengths .................................................................................................. 64
Global Power ................................................................................................. 64
Ability to Impose its Will ............................................................................... 64
Indian Strengths ............................................................................................... 65
Ability to Shape Regional Events .................................................................... 65
Positive Relations with Iran ............................................................................. 65
US Weaknesses ................................................................................................... 65
  Dependence on and Adherence to Pakistan .................................................. 65
  Operation Iraqi Freedom ................................................................................. 65
Indian Weaknesses ............................................................................................ 66
  The Indian Army ............................................................................................. 66
  Jammu and Kashmir ....................................................................................... 66

Source: Mark R. Wilcox and Bruce W. Menning, Guide to the Strategic Estimate
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Command and General Staff College, 2006) 5. ........ 67

Economics ........................................................................................................... 67
US Interests .......................................................................................................... 67
  Markets for US Products and Services .......................................................... 67
Indian Interests .................................................................................................... 68
  Economic Growth ........................................................................................... 68
  Growth of Global Power ............................................................................... 68
  Effective Competition with China ................................................................ 68
  Maintenance of the US as India’s Largest Trading Partner ......................... 69
US Strengths ....................................................................................................... 69
  Largest FDI Provider to India ......................................................................... 69
  India’s Largest Trading Partner ................................................................... 70
Indian Strengths .................................................................................................. 70
  Large and Growing Middle Class ................................................................. 70
  High Tech Work Force .................................................................................. 70
  Government Ability and Willingness to Implement Market Oriented Reforms 70
US Weaknesses ................................................................................................. 71
  Conditions on Economic Partnership with the US ........................................ 71
Indian Weaknesses ............................................................................................ 71
  Of the Population 80 Percent Lives in Poverty ................................................ 71
  Poor History of Effective Economic Reform ................................................. 71
  Poor Infrastructure ......................................................................................... 72

Source: Mark R. Wilcox and Bruce W. Menning, Guide to the Strategic Estimate
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Command and General Staff College, 2006), 5. ....... 72

Addition of Scenario Logics ............................................................................... 72
India’s Global Self-Image .................................................................................. 73
  U.S Status Quo ............................................................................................... 73
  US Different, but Better ............................................................................... 73
  US Worse ........................................................................................................ 73
Indian Status Quo ............................................................................................... 74
  Indian Different, but Better .......................................................................... 74
  Indian Worse ................................................................................................. 75

Nuclear Security and Assistance ..................................................................... 76
  U.S Status Quo ............................................................................................... 76
  US Different, but Better ............................................................................... 76
  US Worse ........................................................................................................ 77
Indian Status Quo ............................................................................................... 77
**ACRONYMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J&amp;K</td>
<td>Jammu and Kashmir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense (India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSG</td>
<td>Nuclear Suppliers Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1. Litzler Cartoon.............................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.

Figure 2. Graduation Photo.......................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>India’s Global Self-Image</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Nuclear Security and Assistance</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Regional Security</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5</td>
<td>Revised Global Self-Image</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6</td>
<td>Revised Nuclear Security and Assistance</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7</td>
<td>Revised Regional Security</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8</td>
<td>Revised Economics</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Research Question

The topic of this thesis is US strategic partnership with India. This thesis will attempt to answer the question: Should the US provide security assistance to India’s military?

This study will subdivide the research question into four secondary questions: How does India’s global self-image drive its relations with the US? How do nuclear security and nuclear assistance affect relations between India and the US? How does India’s role in the security environment of south Asia align or conflict with the US’s role in south Asia? and What economic factors come into play between the US and India?

Key Terms

Security Cooperation. The US Department of Defense defines security cooperation as activities with allied and friendly nations that build relationships to promote specified US interests, build allied and friendly nation capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access.¹

Security Assistance. This study will frequently refer to the term security assistance. Security assistance is a subset of security cooperation. Security assistance programs allow the transfer of military hardware and services to friendly-allied nations through sales, grants, leases, or loans to help these nations to defend against aggression, to share the burden of defense against common adversaries, and to help foster regional
stability. Security assistance includes delivery of weapon systems to friendly-allied nations, providing US service school training for international students, providing advice for improving a nation’s defense capabilities, and providing advice on maintaining regional stability.²

**Hard Power.** Hard power is the ability of a nation to exercise influence with inducements, threats, or both. Military strength and economic resources are examples of sources of hard power. Hard power is important for nations that have developing economies, are developing military strength, or both.³

**Soft Power.** Although related to hard power, soft power is different. Soft power is the ability of a nation to influence others through the attractiveness of ideas, success, or culture. Soft power is important for “postindustrial” or “information age” societies.⁴

**Background**

A great deal has been written recently about warm relations between India and the US. Further research reveals that India and the US have entered into or are in the process of negotiating several bi-lateral agreements. According to a US Department of Defense news release, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and former Indian Minister of Defense Mukerjee signed the New Framework for the Defense Relationship in June of 2005.⁵ This agreement formalizes a defense partnership between India and the US to support common interests in security and stability, defeating terrorism, preventing weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and protecting the free flow of commerce. Also according to the US Department of Defense, former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and former Defense Minister Mukerjee signed the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Agreement in January of 2006. This agreement encourages cooperation in
scientific exchanges and joint development of military technologies and makes
improvements in the interoperability of the US and Indian militaries. The US Department
of Defense has also made note of the successful execution of a naval exercise between
India and the US in September and October of 2005, the Cope India air exercise between
the Indian and US Air Forces in November 2005, and a company sized exercise with the
Indian and US armies in the Himalayas in January 2006. An illustration of the positive
benefits of Indo-US cooperation was the joint effort to aid the victims of the tsunami of
December 2004. Additionally, according to the US Department of State’s Directorate of
Defense Trade Controls, the US is selling military systems and hardware to India.

Purpose and Importance of the Study

Stability in Asia is critical for US success in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).
The US would like a strategic partnership in Asia to promote regional stability, the
security of the US homeland, and to prevent the growth in the influence of a powerful
Asian state from opposing US interests. Therefore, this paper seeks to provide a better
understanding of how continued security assistance to India’s military may or may not
promote US interests and security and determine if such assistance should continue.

Assumptions

This study will make three basic assumptions for scenario development and
analysis from which to draw a conclusion to the thesis research question.

The first assumption is that India and China will become economic rivals and this
rivalry will deepen in the coming decades. The combined populations of India and China
represent approximately one third of the world’s population. These two nations have
economies that are rapidly developing, and both nations are moving to preserve access to the resources (particularly energy resources) necessary to sustain growing economies. India and China both possess nuclear weapons and are equipping their militaries with strategic weapon systems for greater power projection. Relations between India and China directly influence their respective relations with Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and the Persian Gulf.  

The second assumption is that India will remain a relatively stable democracy with a growing economy until the middle of this century. Although India has many internal problems, a growing economy raises the overall standard of living for the citizens of a nation. Rising standards of living in India will promote the stability of democracy in India. 

The third assumption is that the US led GWOT will continue for the near future. The US has fought the GWOT for over five years since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The US fights this war on many fronts that include partnership with nations around the globe. The US is confident that the eventual outcome will be victory; however, given the many facets of the conflict that do not directly involve traditional military action, it cannot be clearly determined when the GWOT will be concluded. 

Scope and Limitations 

This thesis will explore India’s policies toward Pakistan, China, Russia, and Iran, and will explore the background of Indo-US relations and their status. The emphasis in studying the relationship between India and the US will be on India’s global self-image, nuclear security and assistance, the regional security of south Asia, and economics. This work will analyze how US and Indian interests, strengths, and weaknesses interplay and
draw conclusions via scenario analysis about how the US should continue to provide security assistance to India to promote US interests.

**Delimitations**

This thesis will omit discussion of terrorism and energy security as driving factors behind Indo-US relations. These driving factors were originally considered to make six driving factors for analysis. Research revealed that the US and India do not share a common terrorist threat; therefore, terrorism is not a driving factor behind Indo-US relations. Energy security is not a strong driving factor behind Indo-US relations, because it amounts to simple supply and demand in the global market for energy.

This study will omit discussion of Indian relations with southeast Asia. India’s relations with southeast Asia and their implications for the US incorporate enough information to form their own study; therefore, this study will omit them to preserve its scope. This study will not contain detailed discussion of Indian relations with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal. Although these relations are important, they too are large enough to form their own studies; therefore, this thesis will address these relations only if they support the scope of this study.

**Summary**

The US needs a strategic partnership in Asia to promote regional stability, the security of the US homeland, and to prevent the growth in the influence of a powerful Asian state from opposing US interests. The US currently views India as the strategic partner needed for promoting US interests in Asia. This study will examine India’s key relations in Asia and examine how US security assistance to India factors into them. This
study will conclude, through scenario analysis, if the US should engage in security assistance to India’s military. In chapter 2, “Literature Review,” this thesis will review pertinent written work to lay out the background of the six driving factors of Indo-US relations analyzed in this thesis.


2Ibid.


4Ibid., 61.


10 Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding, eds., The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 6, 26, 33, 41, 47, 52, 60, 83, 135, 139, 141, and 160

11 Gurcharan Das, “The India Model,” Foreign Affairs, July-August 2006, 2-16


CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This study subdivides the research question into four secondary questions. How does India’s global self-image drive its relations with the US? How do nuclear security and nuclear assistance affect relations between India and the US? How does India’s role in the security environment of south Asia align or conflict with the US’s role in south Asia? What economic factors come into play between the US and India? Answering these questions gives a better understanding of how continued security assistance to India’s military may or may not promote US interests and security and relate this to whether or not such assistance should continue.

This chapter is divided into sections aligning with this thesis’s four secondary research questions: India’s Global Self-Image, Nuclear Security and Assistance, Regional Security, and Economics. Each section reviews books, periodicals, and Internet resources that support the secondary research questions of this work. Later chapters of this thesis will draw upon this material for analysis.

India’s Global Self-Image

In her essay “A Changing India” found in South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances edited by Michael R. Chambers, Teresita C. Schaffer outlines India’s change from the ideas of its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. India is now a nation with nuclear weapons and seeks permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council. Schaffer also contends that the US has replaced Russia as India’s major
extra regional partner. These are major changes from when India sought influence through leadership of the Non Aligned Movement.¹ *The India-China Relationship* edited by Frankel and Harding wrote that, according to India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, India would become a “great power” and involve herself in the affairs of Asia and of the Indian Ocean region.²

India seems to be trying to realize Jawaharlal Nehru’s vision. On its official website, the US State Department describes India as a nation on the rise and a power in Asia to reckon with. This has helped pave the way for recent Indo-US security cooperation.³ The US Department of State’s website “Background Note: India” says that India boasts an Army of 1.1 million men and is modernizing itself. The Indian Navy, as the US State Department continues to say, is the most capable in the region and is fully capable of projecting power in the Indian Ocean region. The Indian Air Force is in the process of transforming into a twenty-first-century force with such aircraft as the SU-30MKI.⁴

**Indian National Security Objectives**

India sees itself as a significant actor in a dynamic global security environment within which south Asia is a significant region. India’s Ministry of Defense, on its official website, makes specific note of the presence of terrorist and fundamentalist forces in its region as a major reason for India’s vigilance in preparing to face challenges to its national security. The Indian Ministry of Defense specifically lists the activities of Pakistan, drug trafficking, proliferation of small arms, and radical groups gaining access to weapons of mass destruction as challenges to Indian security.⁵
The Indian Ministry of Defense lists seven national security objectives: (1) defending the country’s borders as defined by law and enshrined in the Constitution; (2) protecting the lives and property of its citizens against war, terrorism, nuclear threats, and militant activities; (3) protecting the country from instability, religious, and other forms of radicalism and extremism emanating from neighboring states; (4) securing the country against the use or the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction; (5) development of material, equipment, and technologies that have a bearing on India’s security, particularly its defense preparedness through indigenous research, development, and production to overcome restrictions on the transfer of such items; (6) promoting further cooperation and understanding with neighboring countries and implementing mutually agreed confidence building measures; and (7) pursuing security and strategic dialogues with major powers and key partners.6

India’s View of Its Region

On its official website, the Indian Ministry of Defense views Pakistan as the main challenge to Indian Security. India believes that nearly every terrorist act or activity directed at India has some connection to Pakistan. India ascribes the creation of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to Pakistan and lists the revival of “jehadi” activities in Afghanistan as a threat to India. India frequently refers to Pakistani supported terrorist activities in Kashmir as a “proxy war” against India, and accuses Pakistan of anti-India operations in Bangladesh and Nepal.7

The Indian Ministry of Defense spells out its security concerns in the south Asia region. India characterizes its relations with Bangladesh as that of “affinity and occasional friction” due to boundary disputes, Indian insurgent groups on Bangladeshi
territory, and Islamist elements in the Bangladeshi government. Maoist insurgency and Pakistani backed terrorist elements are India’s concerns in Nepal. The Government of India states that it is firmly committed to lasting peace through reconciliation of all competing elements in Sri Lanka. Military government and insurgent bases inside Myanmar (Burma) are security concerns for India, and India and Bhutan share historically warm relations.8

India’s View of the US

The Indian Ministry of Defense makes positive note of recent warm relations between India and the US. India likens the 13 December 2001 terrorist attack against its parliament to the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US and points to them as strengthening Indo-US cooperation in combating terrorism. The Indian Ministry of Defense describes recent bilateral, military exercises between India and the US as “mutually beneficial.” India sees security concerns for itself in the US-led war in Iraq due to a large Indian expatriate population in Iraq, India’s access to energy resources, and deepening of the divide between the Muslim and non-Muslim world.9

Relations between India and the US since Indian independence in 1947 might best be described as cyclical. In his book *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies*, Dennis Kux ascribes these cycles to differences in historical, social, and economic experiences between the two nations. India and the US have simply not always had the same national security interests. Kux asserts that since India’s independence, the one thing that India and the US have consistently had in common is political democracy.10

11
President Truman

India gained its independence from Great Britain during the Truman administration, and it was here that relations between the US and India began to diverge. As India and Pakistan split into two separate nations, the US was more concerned with the new threat of the Soviet Union and the containment of communism. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru pursued a foreign policy of “non-entanglement”; he also wished to prevent newly independent India from becoming subservient to any foreign power, including the US.11

In July of 1947, just prior to India’s full independence, Prime Minister Nehru met with Dr. Henry Grady, the first US Ambassador to India and expressed several concepts for the new India. Nehru stated that he wished for good relations between the US and India without India aligning with any particular power bloc. Nehru expressed India’s attraction to the Soviet Union as an example of how India could make progress in the modern world (although Joseph Stalin did not hold Nehru in high regard and India objected to the Soviet Union’s dictatorial regime). Nehru also stated that industry in India would be nationalized, and he expressed his concern that US economic power might somehow impinge on India’s sovereignty. In the initial months of India’s independence, India was not a priority of US foreign policy.12

By the end of the Truman administration, Indo-US relations had begun their pattern of “estrangement.” The US did not view India and Pakistan’s dispute over Kashmir as affecting US interests, but this was a significant issue to India. The US seriously considered arms sales to Pakistan with the aim of containing the Soviet Union, but India felt that the threat of communism was over stated. India and the US maintained
fundamental policy differences over Palestine and the creation of Israel, Indonesia, and Indo-China. Economic aid from the US was sluggish to begin, and India’s insistence on “neutralism” exacerbated its “estranged” relations with the US.13

President Eisenhower

During President Eisenhower’s first term in office, the Korean War, the Kashmir issue, Pakistani overtures to the US, and warming relations between India and the Soviet Union further strained Indo-US relations. Prime Minister Nehru disagreed with how the US proposed to settle the Korean War as the presence of Indian troops to handle North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war was snubbed by South Korea’s Syngman Rhee. US Secretary of State Dulles and Vice President Richard Nixon openly courted Pakistan over India, supported US arms sales to Pakistan, held India’s non-alignment policies in contempt, and disliked Jawaharlal Nehru. The US did not take India’s side in the Kashmir dispute, but the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev supported India’s position on Kashmir as well as India’s claim to the Portuguese colony of Goa.14

Indo-US relations improved somewhat during Dwight Eisenhower’s second term. President Eisenhower made a state visit to New Delhi and successfully improved relations between the US and India. The US increased economic aid to India, and the US expressed some support for India in its burgeoning troubles with China. At the close of the Eisenhower presidency, Prime Minister Nehru felt that Eisenhower better understood India’s desire to remain non-aligned in world affairs.15
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson

India viewed the election of John F. Kennedy as President of the US over Richard Nixon in 1960 as a positive development. Kennedy was considered more sympathetic to the concerns of developing nations, and the Kennedy administration pledged $1 billion in aid to India. Kennedy wanted to build more cooperative relations with India; although, Prime Minister Nehru still had some reservations about building too close a relationship with the US.16

Nuclear cooperation between the US and India made its debut during the Kennedy administration. India was constructing its Tarapur nuclear power plant, and the Kennedy administration saw no ideological problems with negotiations between the US and Indian Atomic Energy Commissions. Although India was concerned about losing its sovereignty to foreign controls, India agreed to use only US supplied uranium in its Tarapur plant in exchange for US acceptance of India’s security controls.17

Relations between India and the US cooled during the presidency of Lyndon Johnson. President Johnson viewed US relations with India in terms of containing communist expansion. The Johnson administration used food aid as a means of leveraging India (seemingly in response to Indira Gandhi’s public comments against US involvement in Vietnam); this promoted the notion among Indians that America’s help had strings attached. During the Johnson Administration, India did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India felt that the US would not support its legitimate defense needs in light of India’s conflicts with China and Pakistan, and the US was disappointed with India’s lack of economic progress.18
President Nixon wished to avoid any additional complications to his foreign policy, thus US relations with India suffered during his administration. The Nixon administration was dedicated to improving US relations with China, and did so at the expense of its relations with India. India exploded its first nuclear device just three months prior to President Nixon’s resignation from office.\textsuperscript{19}

In December of 1970, India and Pakistan held elections. These elections were the first for Pakistan and the fifth for India since independence from Great Britain. The Awami League, a party in East Pakistan favoring autonomy for East Pakistan, won a majority in Pakistan’s national assembly. By March of 1971, negotiations over the degree of autonomy that East Pakistan would enjoy broke down, and Pakistani President Yahya Khan outlawed the Awami League and initiated a military crackdown in East Pakistan.\textsuperscript{20}

Initially thousands, later millions, of refugees from East Pakistan poured into West Bengal, creating a burden for India. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared that the flood of refugees transformed an internal Pakistani problem into a problem between India and Pakistan. India began to covertly support the \textit{Mukti Bahini} guerrilla force in East Pakistan and prepared the Indian Army for possible military action against Pakistan.\textsuperscript{21}

The US under the Nixon administration publicly pushed for a peaceful settlement to the situation, but privately wanted to deal carefully with Pakistan since President Nixon had personal regard for Pakistan and needed Pakistan’s involvement in his administration’s attempts at détente with China. Nixon’s upcoming trip to China was a closely guarded secret, and Henry Kissinger was the only official in the administration.
who knew of this visit and of Pakistan’s critical role in it. As a result, the Department of State did not receive clear guidance from the White House as to how to deal with what were perceived as human rights abuses in East Pakistan by the Pakistani government. The State Department suspended arms export licenses to Pakistan in response; however, the Department of Defense did not realize that the suspension only affected licensing and not exports agreed to prior to the license suspension. The Department of Defense gave Indian government officials the incorrect impression that all arms exports to Pakistan had been suspended. When India and the US Congress discovered that a number of US ships were set to depart New York for Pakistan, relations between India and the US soured.22

India and the Soviet Union signed a friendship treaty on 9 August 1971 after Henry Kissinger’s trip to China in July of 1971, and a message from Kissinger to the Indian ambassador to the US made it clear to India that the US would not side with India if China responded militarily to any Indian intervention against Pakistan. President Nixon, from this point on, tended to regard India as a Soviet client state.23

In December 1971, Pakistani and Indian forces fought; India recognized the Awami League as the government-in-exile of Bangladesh and defeated the outnumbered Pakistani forces in about a week. Relations between India and the US deteriorated further. President Nixon considered Soviet support of India’s actions to be an attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to humble a US “ally” and thus discredit US policy in Asia. President Nixon believed that an Indian attack into West Pakistan was planned, so as a show of strength, the carrier USS Enterprise and its associated vessels were sent into the Bay of Bengal as Task Group 74. Task Group 74’s public mission was to facilitate the evacuation of US citizens from Dacca in East Pakistan/Bangladesh; Task Force 74’s real
mission was to show US force to India and the Soviet Union and to assure China of US steadfastness.24

Presidents Ford and Carter

During Gerald Ford’s short presidency, Secretary of State Kissinger attempted to heal some of the damage caused during the Nixon administration. This healing process stalled as the US considered lifting its arms embargo to Pakistan and as Prime Minister Indira Gandhi fought for her political survival. Simultaneously, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission debated continued US uranium shipments to India for its Tarapur power plant in response to India’s 1974 nuclear test.25

Jimmy Carter entered office with the intent of pushing nonproliferation and human rights in his foreign policy. Prior to his election, Carter had been critical of the conduct of US nonproliferation policy. In spite of this, Carter tried to allow the export of nine tons of enriched uranium for the Tarapur plant based on Prime Minister Desai’s assurance to the US that India would cease developing nuclear weapons and would consider discussing nonproliferation agreements. The 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act in the US Congress jeopardized this arrangement. The act required that any nation receiving nuclear technology from the US must place all of its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) standards. India regarded the possibility of interrupted shipments of uranium to be a violation of the Tarapur Agreement initiated during the Kennedy administration; Prime Minister Desai stated that India would be free to do whatever was in its best interests in response. The issue was not resolved; the US’s overall nonproliferation efforts were weakened and relations with India did not advance.26
Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton

Indo-US relations improved during the Reagan administration in spite of mutual, historical distrust of one another. The US’s efforts to re-arm Pakistan and assist the Afghan resistance against Soviet occupation demonstrated the superiority of US military hardware to India, and the Indian government began looking for ways to diversify the military hardware available to it. The US wanted to curb Soviet influence in south Asia.\textsuperscript{27} The US eased restrictions on technology transfer to India during the Reagan years, and Indira Gandhi and later her son and successor Rajiv Gandhi paid three state visits to Washington.\textsuperscript{28}

George H.W. Bush brought foreign affairs experience as well as a friendship with Rajiv Gandhi with him to the Presidency. The elder Bush’s presidency saw not only the successful expulsion of invading Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991 but also marked the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the US as the only remaining super power in the world. As India shifted toward a market driven economy, it was unclear just how India would fit into the “new world order.”\textsuperscript{29}

In their essay “The Emergence of Indo-US Defense Cooperation” found in *Engaging India: US Strategic Relations with the World’s Largest Democracy*, Jyotika Saksena and Suzette Grillot describe what have become known as the “Kickleigher Proposals.” Restrictions on technology transfer from the US to India began to ease somewhat during the Reagan administration; however, India and the US had very different views on how they should carry out a defense relationship. In response to the evident need to implement confidence-building measures, the history of distrust between India and the US, and a need for consultation on matters of regional security, Lieutenant
General Claude M. Kickleighter created what would become the “Kickleighter Proposals.” These proposals included reciprocal army chief of staff visits, military officer symposiums, and Indo-US Executive Steering Group (ESG), senior command and staff exchanges, and reciprocal schooling. The ESG was established in January 1992 and led to the first joint, military exercises between India and the US.  

According to “India-US Relations,” a Congressional Research Service report by K. Alan Kronstadt, the events of 11 September 2001 were a catalyst to expanding relations between India and the US. After the attacks of September 2001, India offered the full use of its bases to the US to support counter-terrorism operations. On 22 September 2001, President George W. Bush lifted all remaining nuclear test related sanctions. President Bush and then Prime Minister Vajpayee met in November of 2001 and agreed to expand and accelerate Indo-US cooperation on a variety of issues including regional security and civilian nuclear safety. In July of 2005, Indian Prime Minister Singh visited Washington, and Prime Minister Singh and President Bush issued a joint statement on Indo-US cooperation. President Bush reciprocated this visit with a trip to India in March 2006 during which the two leaders discussed further strengthening the relationship between India and the US. The Bush administration vowed to “help India become a major world power in the twenty-first century.”

“It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world” is the opening sentence of The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006. This strategy, published in March of 2006, lays out the agenda for protecting the people of the US against further attacks. The strategy declares that the
goals of the US include ending tyranny and promoting democracy around the world as ways to secure the US homeland. Partnership with other democracies, use of sanctions, assistance to nations with similar values, and security assistance with qualifications are some of the means spelled out in the strategy. The document states that nations with the same values and commitments as the US are our closest allies.34

According to The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006, the US goal in the region is “for the entire region of south and central Asia to be democratic, prosperous, and at peace.” The Bush administration views India as a nation with similar values to the US and as a nation with the same commitment to “freedom, democracy, and the rule of law.” This document indirectly states that the US also expects India to play a part in global affairs in concert with the US by referring to India’s “global obligations.”35

**Nuclear Security and Assistance**

As stated previously, nuclear cooperation between the US and India made its debut during the Kennedy administration. India was constructing its Tarapur nuclear power plant, and the Kennedy administration had no objections to negotiations between the US and Indian Atomic Energy Commissions. Although India was concerned about losing its sovereignty to foreign controls, India agreed to use only US supplied uranium in its Tarapur plant in exchange for US acceptance of India’s security controls.36

**Current Status**

The Indian nuclear tests that took place on 11 and 13 May 1998 prompted then US President Clinton to impose sanctions on India pursuant to the 1994 Nuclear
This act prohibited US financial assistance, mandated official US opposition to non-basic human needs through international financial institutions, barred export licenses for US munitions and “certain dual use items,” and prohibited defense sales to India.

According to the Congressional Research Service report “India-US Relations” by K. Alan Kronstadt, the 1998 nuclear tests prompted US Deputy Secretary of State Talbott and Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh to engage in discussions that the US hoped would bring India in line with US arms control and nonproliferation goals. After these discussions began, US President Bill Clinton paid a visit to south Asia in March of 2000. The US and India started a joint working group on counter-terrorism that still meets regularly, and President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee agreed to Indo-US cooperation on arms control. As stated previously in this chapter, on 22 September 2001, President George W. Bush lifted the remaining sanctions that the Clinton administration imposed on India in response to its 1998 nuclear tests.

According to “US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative,” a fact sheet released by the US Department of State’s Bureau of Public Affairs, the Bush administration recognized India’s rising demand for energy and entered into the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. The agreement helps “meet India’s surging energy requirements in an environmentally friendly manner” and decreases “India’s dependence on foreign oil and gas imports, such as those from Iran.” The initiative references bringing India into the “nuclear nonproliferation mainstream,” in spite of India not being a signatory to the NPT. The US House of Representatives followed up in July 2006 with a resolution enabling civil nuclear cooperation between India and the US.
On 18 December 2006, President Bush signed the “Henry Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act” into law. President Bush praised the bill for helping to strengthen energy partnership between the US and India, promoting economic growth, and “paving the way for India to join the global effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.” The nuclear cooperation authorized by this act cannot commence until India and the US finalize a nuclear cooperation agreement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) gives its approval, and India finalizes a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

On 19 December 2006, the Hindustan Times criticized certain aspects of the Hyde Act implying that they are unfair to Indian interests. According to the Hindustan Times, section 103 of the act states that the US should work with the other members of the NSG to prevent the transfer of enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water technologies to India and that the US should prevent the transfer of nuclear materials from other NSG members if India fails to comply with this law.

The US is not the only country from which India can obtain nuclear assistance. On 25 January 2007, the Islamic Republic News Agency posted the news that India and Russia had entered into an agreement to construct four nuclear reactors in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Indian Prime Minister Singh referred to Indo-Russian nuclear cooperation as a vital aspect of their “strategic partnership.”

India’s View of Nuclear Proliferation

In “Security Environment – an Overview,” found on the Indian Ministry of Defense’s official website, India views itself as a nuclear state. India claims to support global nuclear disarmament, and is not interested in a nuclear arms race. The Indian
Ministry of Defense states that its nuclear arsenal is for self-defense and for the preservation of India’s sovereignty in the future.\textsuperscript{47}

**Regional Security**

**India’s Relationship with Pakistan**

By far the most important and difficult of India’s foreign relations is that which it shares with Pakistan. Tensions between India and Pakistan date back to British India’s independence from Great Britain and have far-reaching consequences both for the south Asia region and for the world as a whole.

**Source of Conflict**

Much has been written about the troubles between India and Pakistan, but the US State Department best sums up the root cause of conflict between the two nations. In 1947, as the sub-continent was partitioned into Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India, the Hindu Maharaja of the northwest state of Jammu and Kashmir decided to align his princely state with the new India; the majority of Jammu and Kashmir’s population is Muslim, and this forms the core of the matter.\textsuperscript{48} India claims that subsequent elections in Jammu and Kashmir since that time have re-affirmed Jammu and Kashmir’s alignment with India; however, Pakistan disputes this claim and insists that United Nations resolutions calling for self-determination in Jammu and Kashmir be honored. This issue has lead to two wars between India and Pakistan (one in 1947, the other in 1965), the Kargil Incursion in 1999, and the creation of Bangladesh (out of what was East Pakistan) in 1971.\textsuperscript{49}
The India-Pakistan Conflict: an Enduring Rivalry edited by T.V. Paul also describes the basis for rivalry between India and Pakistan. In his introductory essay in “Causes of the India-Pakistan Enduring Rivalry,” T.V. Paul writes that three states (Jammu & Kashmir, Hyderabad, and Junagadh) initially decided to remain independent from both India and Pakistan upon partition of the two countries in 1947. Jammu and Kashmir was the most difficult due to its proximity to the new nation of Pakistan, a majority Muslim population, and a Hindu Maharaja (Hari Singh). Maharaja Hari Singh chose to keep Jammu and Kashmir independent at first but requested assistance from India in October 1947 when insurgents from Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province (assisted by the Pakistani Army) invaded the state. This led to Indian intervention and a war between India and Pakistan that lasted until late 1948. The United Nations sponsored a ceasefire between India and Pakistan on 1 January 1949 that established the “Line of Control” running west to east through Jammu and Kashmir. The Line of Control places about two thirds of the disputed region under Indian control and the other third under Pakistani control. The Pakistanis refer to their portion of Kashmir as “Free Kashmir.” T.V. Paul points to this issue as fundamental to understanding the conflict between India and Pakistan.50

Nuclear Tests

According to India’s Emerging Security Strategy: Missile Defense and Arms Control by Stephen F. Burgess, India tested its first nuclear device with a “peaceful” detonation. India continued with its nuclear program, and it soon became apparent that Pakistan also had a nuclear weapons program. India and Pakistan both began to develop ballistic missiles in the 1980s. An arms race was now on between the two countries; a
Pakistan supported insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir worsened the situation in 1989. In 1990, Pakistan harbored the notion that India was planning to invade. Burgess also states that Pakistan postures its defenses with an eye toward India’s rising power and influence. It is also important to note that India and Pakistan have not signed or ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. Neither nation has acceded to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996.

In 1997, India and Pakistan laid out outstanding issues between the two nations in bi-lateral talks upon which future discussions would center. Then, as now, the status of Jammu and Kashmir was the major obstacle to continued dialog. In September of 1997, continued talks broke down over continued peace and security in Jammu and Kashmir. In May of 1998, India and Pakistan conducted separate nuclear tests, resulting in US sanctions on both nations from the Clinton administration.

According to Strategic Survey 2004/5 edited by Jonathan Stevenson, both India and Pakistan have active missile development and testing programs. In 1999, India and Pakistan entered into the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding under which both nations agreed to keep one another informed of their missile programs. A sister publication to Strategic Survey, The Military Balance 2005-2006 edited by Christopher Langton states that since 2004, India has tested its Agni II (range 2000 Km with 1,000 Kg payload) and Prithvi II and III (range 250 and 350 Km with payloads of 500 Kg and 1000 Kg respectively) ballistic missiles in separate tests. Additionally, India has conducted three tests of its supersonic cruise missile, the Brahmos, from both sea and land based platforms. The Brahmos can carry a 300-kilogram payload a distance of 290 kilometers. Pakistan has tested the Ghauri I, Hatf III, and Shaheen I and II ballistic missiles and its
own cruise missile, the Babur. These Pakistani systems have comparable payload and ranges to those of India.\textsuperscript{57}

**The Kargil Incursion**

In May of 1999, in spite of renewed bi-lateral talks earlier that year in February, Pakistan backed insurgents pushed their way south into Indian administered Kashmir near the city of Kargil. This event again escalated tensions between India and Pakistan and nearly led to a full-scale war between the two nations.\textsuperscript{58}

**Musharraf Comes to Power**

Pervez Musharraf became the leader of Pakistan in a coup, overthrowing President Nawaz Sharif in October of 1999. Musharraf resumed talks between India and Pakistan with then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee. Relations between the two countries were again complicated by a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, which India claimed was sponsored by Pakistan. However, efforts to normalize relations between India and Pakistan were revived in 2003 when Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistani President Musharraf agreed to a ceasefire along the west-east Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir.\textsuperscript{59} This ceasefire faces difficulties in both India and Pakistan, however, the two nations continue to talk including several face-to-face meetings between President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh.\textsuperscript{60}

**Pakistan and Terrorism**

In his book *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism*, Daniel Byman describes how Pakistan sponsors and aids a variety of terrorist organizations, particularly those operating in Jammu and Kashmir. India’s conventional military strength and
economic power far exceed those of Pakistan; therefore, Pakistan must attempt to entangle India in counter-insurgency operations as a means of furthering Pakistani goals in Kashmir. Recently, Indian Prime Minister Singh announced in October 2006 that India had “credible evidence” that the Pakistani intelligence service planned the train bombings that took place in Mumbai on 11 July 2006. The terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba carried out the bombings.

India’s Relationship with China

Of equal importance to India’s relationship with Pakistan, is India’s relationship with China. The US Department of State says that China claims to be committed to internal economic reforms and an opening to the outside world. China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at a rate of 10 percent per year between 1990 and 2004 making China the world’s fastest growing economy. This has placed China as the world’s third largest trading nation, after the US and Germany. As a result of this enormous economic growth, China became the second largest consumer of energy (after the US) in 2003 and became a net importer of oil (primarily from the Middle East) in 1993.

According to the US Department of State, China’s military capabilities are also on the rise. Although much of China’s military capabilities derive from 1960’s era technologies and systems, China has acquired former Soviet Sovremenny class destroyers, SU-27 and SU-30 fighter aircraft, and former Soviet Kilo class diesel submarines. The Military Balance 2005-2006 shows that China has the means to deliver nuclear and conventional warheads using ballistic missiles in three major range classes: intercontinental, intermediate, and short range.
India and China have and are developing strategic military capabilities. Both nations have economies that are growing at a rapid pace. Growing economies require natural resources (especially energy resources) and the means to preserve access to them as well as access to markets, and here is the most important aspect of Indo-Chinese relations.

**China as a Threat to India and Vice Versa**

*Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments* summarizes China’s relationship with India. Shortly after India’s nuclear test of May 1998, then Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes publicly stated that China rather than Pakistan was India’s primary external threat. He referred to Chinese military alliances and activities in Pakistan, Myanmar, and Bangladesh as “encirclement” of India. However, in subsequent meetings in mid-2000, Indian and Chinese officials stressed areas of common interest.66

*Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments* goes on to say that an atmosphere of “mutual distrust, particularly over potential future strategic competition...” exists in the relationship between India and China. China has some fear of “encirclement” from India, in particular, the possibility of a new Indo-US partnership. China has backed the development of the Port of Gwadar in Pakistan as well as ground links between China’s Yunnan Province and the Bay of Bengal in Burma (Myanmar). China may be aiming to reduce its dependence on the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea for shipping and increasing its presence in the Indian Ocean region. Both China and India have used the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to strengthen their strategic positions relative to one another.67 Stephen F. Burgess in *India’s Emerging Security Strategy: Missile Defense and Arms Control* adds that Chinese development of second-strike
nuclear capability could lead to an arms race as India tries to deal with the possibility of Chinese dominance in the region.  

In “Perception and China Policy in India” written by Steven A. Hoffman and found in The India-China Relationship edited by Frankel and Harding, Hoffman asserts that China is perceived as a potential threat to the future security of India. Historically, China’s threat to India rose from border disputes. He states that Indian strategic thought does not view China and its military power to be a threat in the short term, but it may in the long term, especially if China acquires the military capabilities that it currently seeks. Hoffman continues that the next core view of Indian strategic thought toward China centers on the differing world view of China, as evidenced by Indo-Chinese border disputes and the transfer of weapons technology (particularly for weapons of mass destruction) from China to Pakistan. He adds that there is an Indian perception that China will fail to acknowledge Indian influence beyond south Asia, and a fourth core perception holds that China and India, in spite of the first three perceptions, can have mutually beneficial diplomacy with one another. In Hoffman’s writing, a key component of these four perceptions is a Chinese unwillingness to acknowledge India as a nuclear power coupled with weapons technology transfer to Pakistan.

“One Sided Rivalry: China’s Perceptions and Policies Toward India” written by Susan L. Shirk and found in The India-China Relationship edited by Frankel and Harding indicates that shortly after India’s 1998 nuclear tests, a letter from then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to then US President Bill Clinton was leaked by the New York Times. It cited China and its weapons transfers to Pakistan, border disputes with India, and Chinese possession of nuclear weapons as the reasons for India’s re-assertion of itself as
a nuclear power through resumed testing. This notion shocked the Chinese government which otherwise greeted India’s May 1998 nuclear tests with only mild disapproval.

Shirk also writes that China tends to view India’s growth with some contempt. Quoting an unnamed Chinese official, Shirk says that China is proud of its economic reforms and growth and regards them as superior to those of an “immature democracy” with too many competing political parties, too much military spending, and internal dissent.\(^{70}\)

Indian and Chinese Common Ground

*Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments* also indicates that Sino-Indian relations have shown some improvement since the late 1990s. China and India have had disputes over the status of Tibet, Sikkim, and parts of Kashmir (particularly the eastern portion of the region). In 2003, then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited China; subsequently, China recognized Sikkim to be part of India, and India conceded Tibet to be part of China. India and China held talks in January of 2005 during which they agreed to address their various border disputes and their mutual interests at the global level. This was followed in April of 2005 with eleven economic and social agreements and mutual resolve to settle the 3,500-kilometer India-China border. Additionally, India may be a potential market for Chinese made consumer goods, while China could be a market for Indian food products.\(^{71}\)

In “Perception and China Policy in India” written by Steven A. Hoffman and found in *The India-China Relationship* edited by Frankel and Harding, contrasts the potential “China is not hostile” notion with a notion that “China is hostile” in Indian thought. In illustrating support for an Indian notion of a non-hostile China, he points out that China finds itself in a strategic dilemma. On one hand, China does not desire an all
out conflict between India and Pakistan in which China may be forced to choose one side over the other. On the other hand, China may want to have Pakistan in its court to balance against India’s concurrent and competitive rise to power with China.72

India’s Relationship with Russia

Russia is a significant actor in Asian affairs. India’s relationship with Russia extends back to the Cold War and the days of the former Soviet Union. This relationship complicated India’s historical relations with China.73 According to Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments: Russia, Russian policy toward India has centered on mutual interests with results beyond mere arms trade. Russia, like China, has supported India’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Arms trade has formed Indo-Russian relations in the recent past, but Russian diplomats have pushed Indo-Russian interests in energy and communications with some success.74

India’s Arms Supplier

According to Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments, approximately 80 percent of India’s military hardware is of Russian origin, and in 2004 alone, India purchased more than $1 billion worth of equipment from Russia, most notably sixteen MiG 29 fighters. From 2006 through 2008, Russia is forecast to supply India with another $5 billion worth of military hardware. Indian dependence on Russian defense hardware may be a means of Russian influence over India. India agreed in 2004 not to re-export Russian military technology to quiet Russian fears of Indian infringement on the intellectual property of the Russian defense industry.75
An Additional Energy Source

Also addressed in *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments* is the possibility of India’s rising demand for energy resources (especially oil and natural gas) being met by sources in Russia. India’s stake in Russian energy may rise from $1.7 billion currently to an estimated $5 billion. Indian officials have expressed interest in acquiring stake in Russian energy companies and exploration. As stated previously, on 25 January 2007, the Islamic Republic News Agency posted the news that India and Russia had entered into an agreement to construct four nuclear reactors in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.

India’s Relationship with Iran

According to “India-Iran Relations and US Interests,” a Congressional Research Service Report to the US Congress, India needs energy resources to fuel its growing economy, and Iran is a potential supplier for India’s increasing demand. Unlike the US, India does not view Iran as a threat, and will not easily cease relations with Tehran. In January 2003, India and Iran signed the New Delhi Declaration in which the two nations decided to cooperate in “agreed areas” including defense. Both Iran and India supported the US ousting of the Taliban from Afghanistan. Iran viewed radical Sunni control of Afghanistan to be a threat to Shiite rule at home, and India viewed the Taliban as another form of the Islamic terrorism that it faces in Kashmir. Iran and India are both supporting various reconstruction and aid projects within Afghanistan.

Shia versus Sunni

According to *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments: Iran*, Sunni Muslims are the predominant sect of Islam in Pakistan; conversely, Iran is dominated by Shia Islam. Iran
has expressed concern over the Shia minority in Pakistan in the past. This distinction was evident during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, when Pakistan lent its support to the Sunni, ethnic Pashtuns while Iran primarily supported the Shia Hazarra. Although the relationship between Pakistan and Iran improved somewhat with the start of the Musharraf presidency, Sunni versus Shia issues may arise again in the future between Pakistan and Iran. Since India stands in a persistent state of conflict with Pakistan, Iran may view India as an ally of convenience.79

Economics

According to the US Department of State and according to Gurcharan Das in his article “The India Model” featured in the July-August 2006 issue of Foreign Affairs, the Indian government began to implement market oriented economic reforms in 1991.80 India’s GDP for the year ending 31 March 2006 was 8.4 percent and is expected to be between 7.8 percent and 8.3 percent for the year ending 31 March 2007.81 A variety of factors including poor infrastructure, government bureaucracy, and labor market difficulties hamper India’s economic growth. The US is India’s largest trading and investment partner, and the US provided approximately $134.7 million in development assistance to India. Additionally, the World Bank is expected to double aid to India to about $3 billion per year for improvements to India’s infrastructure, education system, health, and rural issues.82

“India-US Relations,” a Congressional Research Service Report to the US Congress states that the US is India’s largest trading and investment partner. The US exports civilian aircraft, business and telecommunications equipment, gemstones and jewelry, fertilizer, and chemicals to India; the US imports cotton clothing, textiles,
gemstones, and jewelry from India. US Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in India totaled $11 billion in 2006. This report notes the need for India to continue with removing barriers to trade with the US, particularly high tariffs, and the report mentions the US-India CEO Forum.83

In March 2006, the US-India CEO Forum, which was formed pursuant to an agreement between US President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Singh during Prime Minister Singh’s visit to Washington in July 2005, issued a report entitled “US-India Strategic Economic Partnership.” The US-India CEO Forum is composed of ten executives each from India and the US representing prominent corporations in their respective countries. In this report, the US-India CEO Forum recommended six “priority initiatives” for India and the US to consider in order to facilitate expanded trade between the two countries. The initiatives are promotion of trade and industry, creation of an infrastructure development fund, promote technology exchange in agriculture, biotechnology, and nanotechnology, partner in skills development, set up an Indo-US center for industrial research and development, and establish a dispute resolution mechanism.84

Summary

This chapter has reviewed pertinent literature that provides background to this thesis’s four secondary research questions organized into four categories: (1) India’s Global Self Image, (2) Nuclear Security and Assistance, (3) Regional Security, and (4) Economics. The third chapter of this thesis, “Methodology”, will discuss how this thesis synthesizes the information laid out in this chapter into scenarios for analysis in chapter 4.


6Ibid.

7Ibid.

8Ibid.

9Ibid.


11Ibid.,51, 55.

12Ibid.,57, 68.

13Ibid., 67-68, 78, 87, 89.

14Ibid., 99-123, 128-129.

15Ibid.,172-173.

16Ibid.,181-186.

17Ibid.,189.

19Ibid., 279, 314-318.

20Ibid., 289-290.

21Ibid., 291-292.

22Ibid., 293-294.

23Ibid., 294-296.

24Ibid., 302-307.

25Ibid., 327, 330, 335, 339-341.

26Ibid., 345, 349, 356-373.


29Ibid., 444.


33Kronstadt, India-US Relations, 4.


35Ibid., 39.


37US Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “Background Note: India,” Internet.
38 Rennack, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law, 36.

39 Kronstadt, India-US Relations, 3-4.


44 Kronstadt, India-US Relations, 14.


48 US Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “Background Note: India,” Internet.

49 Ibid.


38

52 Ibid., 29-30.


55 US Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “Background Note: India,” Internet.


58 US Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “Background Note: India,” Internet.

59 Ibid.

60 Stevenson, Strategic Survey 2004/5, V.


62 Kronstadt, India-US Relations, 1.

63 US Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “Background Note: India,” Internet.

64 Ibid.


67 Ibid.


72 Hoffman, “Perception and China Policy in India,” 46.


75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.


81 US Department of State, “Background Note: India,” Internet.


CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

Introduction
Purpose of Chapter

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methodology used to make a conclusion to this thesis’s research question. This study will make and support its conclusions based on scenario development and analysis. The steps used in defining the research question, defining the relevant factors to the research question, deriving scenarios for comparison, and concluding upon the most likely scenario are based on the concepts outlined in *The Art of the Long View* by Peter Schwartz. The concepts outlined in “Guide to the Strategic Estimate” by Mark R. Wilcox, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army (Retired) and Bruce W. Menning, PhD will be used to augment the steps laid out in *The Art of the Long View* and make them more suited to building scenarios dealing with the global strategic environment.

Chapter Organization

This chapter is composed of three main sections: (1) Introduction, (2) Steps in the Methodology, and (3) Chapter Summary. Steps in the Methodology is the most important section of this chapter. Steps in the Methodology will restate the research question, list the four driving factors of Indo-US relations, describe how these driving factors will be compared and evaluated, describe how scenarios for comparison will be extracted, and set the stage for analysis of scenarios in chapter 4 of this thesis.
Basis for the Methodology

In his book, Peter Schwartz discusses the need to make choices in the present while having an idea about what these choices may bring about in the future. Scenarios are tools that take into account uncertainties (risks and realities) rather than simply following current trends into a presumed future outcome. Indo-US relations, if examined only on their surface, lead one to believe that only a positive outcome can result from them; therefore, this thesis will use scenario analysis to take into account uncertainties in Indo-US relations in order to recommend better courses for the US to follow.¹

The methodology of this thesis will also incorporate elements from “Guide to the Strategic Estimate” by Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Mark R. Wilcox and Bruce W. Menning, PhD. This thesis ultimately relates to security assistance to India’s military. The steps for scenario analysis found in *The Art of the Long View*, in their basic form, are best suited for a corporate business setting; therefore, the steps for scenario analysis found in *The Art of the Long View* will be modified with elements from “Guide to the Strategic Estimate” to make them suitable for use in the global strategic setting.² The Steps in the Methodology section of this chapter will indicate when elements from “Guide to the Strategic Estimate” are used.

Schwartz lists eight steps for scenario analysis. The first step in scenario analysis is to Identify the Focal Issue or Decision. To accomplish this first step, Schwartz states that one must “begin with a specific decision or issue, then build out toward the environment.” Identifying things that decision makers must deal with in the near future and identifying their long-term influence are also important to identifying a focal issue or decision.³
The second step in scenario analysis is to list Key Forces in the Local Environment. In this step, the important factors that influence the success or failure of the focal issue or decision are listed. Decision makers take into account factors such as current events, assumptions about the focal decision, and known facts surrounding the focal decision in this step.  

The third step in scenario analysis is to list Driving Forces. This step involves listing trends affecting the factors that a decision maker identifies in step two of Schwartz’s methodology. The decision maker should attempt to find out what is behind the factors identified in step two. This step relies heavily on extensive research.

The fourth step is to Rank by Importance and Uncertainty. In this step, the decision maker ranks the key factors and driving forces according to two criteria: their importance to the success or failure of the focal issue or decision and the degree of uncertainty surrounding them. Schwartz says that the decision maker should identify two or three factors that are most important and most uncertain.

Schwartz’s fifth step is Selecting Scenario Logics. In this step, the decision maker determines “axes” along which possible scenarios will differ. The differences in each scenario must be meaningful to decision makers. In this step, once the axes of each scenario are determined, a matrix can be used to identify the scenarios and fill in their details.

The sixth step is Fleshing Out the Scenarios. In this step, scenario details outlined in a matrix formed in step five are then assembled into a narrative format. The result is a set of scenarios that are distinguishable from one another based on the factor identified in steps two and three.
In step seven, the decision maker identifies Implications. The decision maker can now see how the focal decision or issue plays out in each scenario. A decision that looks good in only one of many scenarios can be characterized as a “high risk” decision. Conversely, a decision that plays out well in several or all scenarios is a “low risk” decision.9

The eighth and final step in scenario analysis is the Selection of Leading Indicators and Signposts. After “fleshing out” the scenarios and analyzing their implications, the decision maker identifies indicators that would show which scenario is beginning to come into reality. By doing this, the decision maker can more readily implement a scenario that answers the focal decision or issue to the decision maker’s advantage.10

Steps in the Methodology

1. Define the Research Question

The first step in the methodology of this thesis is to define the research question. Chapter 1 of this thesis stated and defined the research question. The research question for this thesis is: Should the US provide security assistance to India’s military?

Stability in Asia is critical for US success in the GWOT. The US would like a strategic partnership in Asia to promote both regional stability and the security of our homeland and to prevent the rise in the influence of a powerful Asian state from opposing our interests.11 Therefore, one must have a better understanding of how continued military security assistance to India’s military may or may not promote US interests and security and relate this to whether or not such assistance should continue.
2. Define Driving Factors and Their Key Elements

The second step in the methodology of this thesis is to conduct research related to this thesis’s research question and determine the driving factors of Indo-US relations and the key elements behind them. This step includes a determination of known facts as called for in “Guide to the Strategic Estimate.” Known facts will include elements of the global strategic environment, current events, stated national strategies, and national security policy. As outlined in chapter 2 of this thesis, research has revealed that India’s global self-image, nuclear security and assistance, regional security, and economics are the driving factors of relations between India and the US.

3. Chart Driving Factors and Key Elements

The third step in the methodology for this thesis is to chart the driving factors of Indo-US relations relative to their key elements on a matrix. In chapter 4, each driving factor will be charted on its own matrix; the format for this matrix is borrowed from “Guide to the Strategic Estimate.” The matrix will feature the US and India on parallel horizontal axes. The matrix will have three vertical columns aligning with the horizontal axes for the US and India. The columns will be titled Interests, Strengths, and Weaknesses. The horizontal axes and vertical columns will form blocks in the matrix into which the key elements composing US interests, strengths, and weaknesses and Indian interests, strengths, and weaknesses will be placed. These key elements will be listed in each block in the order of their importance. Chapter 4 of this thesis will feature these charts.
4. Select Scenario Logics

The fourth step in the methodology of this thesis is to select scenario logics. In chapter 4, three additional columns will be featured on the charts described in step three. Their titles are Status Quo, Different but Better, and Worse. These titles come from The Art of the Long View, and will form additional blocks in relation to the horizontal axes for the US and India on the charts. Each block will feature likely actions taken by the US and India in the status quo, different but better, and worse logics. These logics are defined below.

**Status Quo.** This logic indicates actions that are not different from what India and the US are doing now.

**Different, but Better.** This logic indicates an action that is fundamentally different from an action that is currently being taken, but that may result in conditions that are favorable to both India and the US.

**Worse.** This logic also indicates an action that is fundamentally different from actions that are currently being taken, but that may lead to conditions that are detrimental to the interests of the US, India, or both.

5. Extract Three Scenarios

The fifth step in the methodology for this thesis is to extract three scenarios. This step uses the completed charts created in steps three and four and extracts three scenarios from them. The scenario titles will be aligned with the scenario logics described in step four. From each driving factor chart, the actions listed under the status quo, different but better, and worse logics will be combined with all actions under the same logic (i.e. all status quo actions together, all different but better actions together, etc.) When all actions
under the same logic from each driving factor chart are combined, they will be put into narrative format and form three scenarios: Status Quo, Different but Better, and Worse. The three scenarios are defined below.

**Status Quo.** This scenario describes Indo-US relations on the basis that the key elements of the driving factors of these relations do not change significantly.

**Different, but Better.** This scenario illustrates fundamental changes in the key elements of the driving factors of Indo-US relations; however, these changes are beneficial to both India and the US.

**Worse.** This scenario also features fundamental changes in the key elements of the driving factors of Indo-US relations, but these changes lead to conditions that are detrimental to either the interests of India or those of the US.

6. Determine Implications

The sixth step in the methodology for this thesis is to determine the implications of each of the scenarios derived in step five. This step will take place in chapter 4. Each scenario will include a statement of what each scenario implies for Indo-US relations. These statements will lead into the indicators for Step 7 below.

7. Evaluate Indicators

The seventh and final step in the methodology for this thesis is to evaluate indicators. This step will list and evaluate indicators or warning signs that will show which scenario is emerging in relations between India and the US. This thesis will use this step to make a determination of which scenario is most likely to occur and draw its conclusions and recommendations from this. A final, modified scenario statement will be
made if the indicators show that the base scenarios do not exactly fit into reality. This step will take place at the end of chapter 4.

Chapter Summary

This chapter has outlined the methodology from which this thesis will answer its research question. The methodology is composed of seven steps: (1) Define the Research Question, (2) Define Driving Factors and their Key Elements, (3) Chart Driving Factors and Key Elements, (4) Select Scenario Logics, (5) Extract Three Scenarios, (6) Determine Implications, and (7) Evaluate Indicators. The results of this process will be the identification of the most likely scenario for Indo-US relations. From this scenario and its leading indicators will come an answer to the thesis question: Should the US provide security assistance to India’s military?

---


4 Ibid., 227.

5 Ibid., 227-228.

6 Ibid., 228.

7 Ibid., 229-230.

8 Ibid., 230-231.

9 Ibid., 231-232.

10 Ibid., 232-233.

CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

Introduction
This chapter will draw upon the material from the “Literature Review” for scenario analysis. The four driving factors of Indo-US relations will be defined and analyzed in order to form three possible scenarios for the course of relations between the US and India. This chapter will describe the implications of these scenarios and discuss indicators that show which scenario is most likely to take place. This chapter will conclude with a most likely scenario. This chapter contains six major subsections: (1) Analysis of Driving Factors, (2) Addition of Scenario Logics, (3) Extract Three Scenarios, (4) Implications, (5) Evaluate Indicators, and (6) Summary.

Analysis of Driving Factors
This section will break down and describe each driving factor in terms of US interests, strengths, and weaknesses and Indian interests, strengths, and weaknesses. Each interest, strength, and weakness will be described for both the US and India. Each driving factor sub-section will then feature a chart that displays the defined interests, strengths, and weaknesses for the US and India for easy comparison. This section constitutes Step 3 of this thesis’s methodology.

India’s Global Self-Image
The first driving factor of Indo-US relations is India’s view of itself and its role in global affairs. India views itself as a rising power in the world. India’s emphasis on sovereignty, acknowledgement as a global actor from other countries, and desire to be the
dominant power in the Indian Ocean region drive its self-image. The US is still fighting the GWOT, needs allies in Asia to win, and has its own view of how India should fit into world affairs.

**US Interests**

India Aligned with the US

The US needs a nation in Asia with enough common interests to engage in a strategic partnership to promote regional stability, the security of our homeland and to prevent the rise in the influence of a powerful Asian state from opposing US interests.\(^1\) Chinese power is growing and, this growth is often considered to be contrary to the US.\(^2\) India is already a regional power in south Asia, and a democracy; therefore, these aspirations could be viewed as comparable to those of the US.

The Bush administration views India as a suitable strategic partner to the US. In the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001, India offered the full use of its bases to the US to support counter-terrorism operations.\(^3\) On 22 September 2001, President George W. Bush lifted all remaining nuclear test-related sanctions.\(^4\) In reciprocal meetings with one another, President Bush and former Prime Minister Vajpayee agreed to expand and accelerate Indo-US cooperation on a variety of issues including regional security and civilian nuclear safety, and the two leaders discussed further strengthening of the relationship between India and the US.\(^5\)
Indian Interests

Bolstered National Strength

India must find means to grow and make a significant place for itself in the world. India is now a nation with nuclear weapons and seeks permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council. India’s GDP is forecasted to grow at 7.4 percent is expected to be $928 billion over the course of 2007; this will continue if India continues to implement market oriented economic reforms. India is already a regional power in south Asia with the capability to grow into a global power. India must grow in this way if it is to satisfy the needs of 1.1 billion people and maintain its economic growth.

India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, predicted that India would become a “great power” and involve herself in the affairs of Asia and of the Indian Ocean region. This appears to have happened. India has an Army of 1.1 million men and is modernizing itself. The Indian Navy is the most capable in the region and is fully capable of projecting power in the Indian Ocean region. The Indian Air Force is in the process of transforming into a twenty-first -century force with such aircraft as the SU-30MKI.

US Friendship with Few or No Strings Attached

The US places expectations on its allies; friendship with the world’s sole remaining superpower comes with the understanding that the US ally plays by American rules. The Bush administration has pushed for greater strategic cooperation between the US and India. This cooperation has many potential benefits for India; however, the Bush administration expects India to play a part in global affairs in concert with the US by referring to India’s “global obligations.”
The Bush administration labels Iran as a “tyrannical regime.” India needs Iran as an energy source as its economy, and thus demand for energy, grows. The Bush administration and many members of Congress do not want to see close relations between India and Iran, in spite of the Bush administration’s recognition of India’s need for energy. President Bush initiated renewed civil nuclear assistance to India, although India is not a signatory to the NPT, in part to prevent India from looking to Iran to satisfy its energy needs. Iran views India as a valuable partner and will try to prevent outside powers from weakening that relationship. A test of US ability to engage in partnership without imposing too many conditions on the partner will be put to the test if India still chooses to participate in a proposed natural gas pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan. Similarly, India may re-assess whether strategic partnership with the US is indeed in its interests if the US attempts retribution on India for participating in such a project.

Respect and Acknowledgement from Powerful Nations

If India aspires to grow, its growth will be helped by recognition from the powerful nations of the world. This recognition should include acknowledgement of India as a nuclear state and concession that India can indeed maintain a significant place in the global economy. Respect and acknowledgement for India may also come in the form of serious consideration for India to gain permanent member status on the United Nations Security Council.

The Bush administration vows to “help India become a major world power in the twenty-first century” and views India as a nation with similar values to the US and as a nation with the same commitment to “freedom, democracy, and the rule of law.” These high accolades come with the expectation of India’s alignment with the US.
time, respect and acknowledgement of what India perceives as its place in the world from the US will come only when convenient for the US. Unconditional acknowledgement of India’s role in the world from the US is in India’s better interests.

Similarly, it is in India’s interest for China to take India’s self-image seriously. China tends to view India’s growth with some contempt. In spite of this, Sino-Indian relations have shown some improvement since the late 1990s. In 2003, then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited China; subsequently, China recognized Sikkim to be part of India, and India conceded Tibet to be part of China. India and China held talks in January of 2005 during which they agreed to address their various border disputes and their mutual interests at the global level. This was followed in April of 2005 with 11 economic and social agreements and mutual resolve to settle the 3,500-kilometer India-China border. Additionally, India may be a potential market for Chinese made consumer goods, while China could be a market for Indian food products.

Growth of Power on Indian Terms

The 1998 Indian nuclear tests took place in spite of the threat of sanctions imposed by then US President Bill Clinton India has still managed to gain favor with the Bush administration and receive civil nuclear assistance from the US. This has given increased legitimacy to India’s power and global status. The development of nuclear weapons in India is an example of how India can gain power on Indian terms.

Economic growth is another example of increasing India’s power on India’s terms. In order to grow into a global power, India must have the hard power of a strengthened economy. India has taken economic reform upon itself, and will certainly continue to do so.
US Strengths

Recognized Global Power

The US is the world’s only super power. The US possesses both hard and soft power and uses them to shape world events to the advantage of the US.\(^{25}\)

Indian Strengths

Geographical Location in South Asia

India’s geographic position is an advantage in the driving factor of India’s global self-image. India’s geographic position makes it an attractive and potentially important strategic partner. The Indian subcontinent dominates the Indian Ocean; access to the Indian Ocean is essential for the US to carry out operations in south Asia, east Africa (particularly the Horn of Africa), and southeast Asia. The Indian Ocean is essential for access to petroleum from the Gulf region of the Middle East, and it is essential for access to the Strait of Malacca as the main sea route to the South China Sea and to the Pacific Ocean. India borders with Pakistan, whose support is crucial to the US’s GWOT in Afghanistan, and India sits adjacent to the central Asian republics whose energy resources are becoming more and more important.\(^{26}\)

Democracy and Ability to Reform Itself

India is a democracy and has the ability to reform itself. Although India has historically shown a “Hindu” rate of change, particularly in economic performance, India is demonstrating its potential to the world.\(^{27}\) As India aspires to a greater status in the world, its democratic government makes it naturally attractive to the US. Support from
the world’s only super power is a strength for India in the driving factor of India’s global self-image.

**US Weaknesses**

Attaches Conditions to Its Friendship

As previously covered in this section, the US expects its friends and allies to play by America’s rules. India is no exception. The Bush administration has touted the benefits of strategic partnership with India for the US, but the US expects India to live up to its “global obligations.” India’s “global obligations” may not be enough of an inducement to shy away from nations like Iran, which India needs as an energy source. Since important partners can be pushed away from the US, attachment of conditions upon allies is a weakness for the US in the driving factor of India’s global self image.

Inconsistent in its Dealings with India over Time

Indo-US relations have been cyclical since 1947. The US has not always viewed India favorably and has often been friendlier to Pakistan’s interests. This has created some resentment and distrust of the US within India that can only be dispelled by demonstrable benefits to India.\(^{28}\) The inconsistent history of positive relations with India over time is a weakness for the US in the driving factor of India’s global self-image.

**Indian Weaknesses**

Global Powers Do Not Uniformly Acknowledge India’s Power and Potential

India is not uniformly acknowledged as a serious player on the global stage.\(^{29}\) India does not fit the commonly held definition of a nuclear state even though it possesses nuclear weapons.\(^{30}\) Fault is found with India’s attempts at economic reform
and growth, particularly from China.\textsuperscript{31} India’s bid to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council has met with frustration.\textsuperscript{32} This is a weakness for India in the driving factor of India’s global self-image.

History of Backwardness and Inability to Change

Since independence in 1947, India has struggled to grow. India was saddled with an essentially socialist economy and burdened with a huge government bureaucracy for decades.\textsuperscript{33} Additionally, India has been slow to produce its own military hardware, relying on sales from other nations.\textsuperscript{34} India’s poor history of effective, positive growth is a weakness for India in the driving factor of India’s global self-image. Table 1 below compares all of the preceding US and Indian interests, strengths, and weaknesses under the driving factor of India’s global self-image.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. India’s Global Self-Image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>India's Global Self Image</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nuclear Security and Assistance

Nuclear security and assistance is the second driving factor of Indo-US relations. Both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is in the security interests of the US. India also needs energy to fuel its rapidly growing economy. The US does not want India to power its growth with energy resources from Iran, so the US is willing to provide nuclear assistance to India in spite of the fact that India is not a signatory to the NPT.

US Interests

Nuclear Nonproliferation

Nuclear nonproliferation is in the interests of the US. The fewer nations in the world that possess nuclear weapons or the capability to produce them, the easier it will be for the US to maintain its position as the only remaining superpower in the world. From the US’s point of view, nations that already have nuclear weapons should commit to nonproliferation. This is what the US is attempting to do in its relations with India.\(^{35}\) India has not and is not likely to accede to the NPT; however, India has both nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants.\(^{36}\) The US has served its interest of nonproliferation by giving India civil nuclear assistance under the condition that India work within the “nonproliferation mainstream.”

Security of the Homeland and of US Interests

From the point of view of the US under the Bush administration, nuclear nonproliferation equals greater security of the US homeland. Fewer nations with nuclear
weapons capabilities equate to fewer nations that can threaten US interests around the
globe and threaten US territory.

Indian Interests

Energy Independence

Although India generates most of its electricity with domestic coal supplies, India is highly dependent on foreign sources of energy.\(^{37}\) India imports between 100,000 and 150,000 barrels of oil per day from Iran. This constitutes 7.5 percent of Iran’s total oil exports and 85 percent of all Iranian exports to India.\(^{38}\) India’s rising demand for energy (especially oil and natural gas) may be met by sources in Russia. India’s stake in Russian energy may rise from $1.7 billion currently to an estimated $5 billion. Indian officials have expressed interest in acquiring a stake in Russian energy companies and exploration.\(^{39}\)

National Identity Backed with Strength

India wishes to be viewed with respect in the world.\(^{40}\) India uses its nuclear arsenal to do this. Using nuclear power will also add to India’s strength by meeting India’s growing demand for energy as India’s economy grows.\(^{41}\)

India is Viewed as a Nuclear Power by Other Nations

India views itself as a nuclear state. India claims to support global nuclear disarmament, and is not interested in a nuclear arms race; however, India has a nuclear arsenal for “self-defense” and for the preservation of India’s sovereignty in the future. India claims the right to test nuclear weapons if it serves the interests of India.\(^{42}\)
Not only does India have nuclear warheads, but India also has the means to deliver them. India, since 2004, has tested its Agni II (range 2000 Km with 1,000 Kg payload) and Prithvi II and III (range 250 and 350 Km with payloads of 500 Kg and 1000 Kg respectively) ballistic missiles in separate tests. Additionally, India has conducted three tests of its supersonic cruise missile, the Brahmos, from both sea and land based platforms. The Brahmos can carry a 300-kilogram payload a distance of 290 kilometers.\footnote{43}

**US Strengths**

**Ability to Impose Conditions**

The US has the ability to impose conditions on other nations. It can do so with India. The US can shut off any beneficial cooperation to India if India does not act in accordance with US goals. The US can impose conditions on its own, or it can use a variety of global institutions to do so.

**Indian Strengths**

**Ability to Call Itself a Nuclear State**

Regardless of any definition to the contrary, India is indeed a nuclear state. India has 69 strategic missile systems: 24 intermediate range Agni 2 & 3 ballistic missiles and 45 short-range Prithvi 1, 2, & 3 ballistic missiles under its Strategic Forces Command.\footnote{44} These missiles and the nuclear warheads they can carry form India’s most potent strategic military capability. This capability gives India its justification to refer to itself as a nuclear state.
Ability to Shape Regional Events

Although India’s economy must develop further, India has many of the hard power tools it needs to influence events in its region. India has one aircraft carrier and two more on the way, a developing ability to fire the Brahmos cruise missile from the sea, a 1.1 million-man army with intent to modernize, and an air force that is also modernizing.45

US Weaknesses

Other Nations can Provide Nuclear Technology

The US is not the only country in the world that can provide nuclear assistance to India. On 25 January 2007, India and Russia entered into an agreement for four Russian nuclear reactors to be constructed at Kundankulum in Tamil Nadu province.46 This clearly demonstrates that India will deal with other nations for its benefit and not just the US. The US has attached conditions to its nuclear assistance to India; Russia simply signed an agreement with India when Russian President Vladimir Putin visited New Delhi. The fact that India can go elsewhere for nuclear assistance if the US imposes too many conditions is a weakness for the US in the driving factor of nuclear security and assistance.

Indian Weaknesses

Not Able to Influence Nuclear-Related Organizations

India is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council and has an inherent disadvantage at shielding itself from UN sponsored sanctions for its nuclear activities. India is not a member of the NSG; this has created difficulties for India in obtaining
nuclear materials.\textsuperscript{47} India has nuclear facilities that are not under the watch of the IAEA, which can serve to cast suspicion on India’s nuclear intentions.\textsuperscript{48} The inability to influence various world nuclear organizations is a weakness for India in the driving factor of nuclear security and assistance. Table 2 below compares all of the preceding US and Indian interests, strengths and weaknesses under the driving factor of nuclear security and assistance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nuclear Security and Assistance</th>
<th>National Interests</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
<td>Nuclear Nonproliferation; Security of the Homeland and of US Interests</td>
<td>Ability to Impose Conditions</td>
<td>Other Nations Can Provide Nuclear Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>India</strong></td>
<td>Energy Independence; National Identity Backed with Strength; India Viewed as a Nuclear Power by other Nations</td>
<td>Ability to Call Itself a Nuclear State; Ability to Shape Regional Events</td>
<td>Not Able to Influence Nuclear Related Organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Regional Security**

Regional Security is the third driving factor of Indo-US relations. Pakistan is critical to US success in the Global War on Terror; therefore, improved relations between India and Pakistan are in the security interests of the US. Indian pre-eminence in the Indian Ocean region and emergence as a global actor appears, on the surface, to be complementary to US strategic interests.
US Interests

Neutralized Terror Groups with No Safe Havens

Neutralization of transnational terror groups along with elimination of any safe havens in south Asia is in the national interest of the US. The attacks of 11 September 2001 were made possible because al Qaeda and other associated movements found safe haven in Afghanistan. The US is fighting a major part of the GWOT in south Asia to render trans-national terror groups ineffective and attempting to eliminate their safe havens. Improvements in the security environment in south Asia are thus complementary to the interests of the US.

Maintain US Influence in the Region

The US must preserve its ability to influence south Asia and the Indian Ocean region. Since regional stability in south Asia has an impact on the US led GWOT operations in south Asia, it is necessary for the US to influence the region. The economic and military growth of India will affect the stability of this region as well; maintaining influence in the region will keep the US from being forced away from its interests in the Indian Ocean region by India if it grows powerful enough in the future to do so. As long as the US must import oil and natural gas to meet its energy needs, the US must retain the ability to influence south Asia and the Indian Ocean region as a whole.

Use of the Indian Ocean

Access to the Indian Ocean is essential for the US to carry out operations in south Asia, East Africa (particularly the Horn of Africa), and southeast Asia. The Indian Ocean is essential for access to petroleum from the Gulf region of the Middle East, and it is
essential for commercial and military access to the Strait of Malacca as the main sea route to the South China Sea and to the Pacific Ocean. Greater regional stability makes it easier for the US to benefit from the Indian Ocean.51

Stability of Pakistan

India stands at odds with Pakistan, but the US needs Pakistan to remain stable. Pakistan gives some support to US operations in Afghanistan as part of the greater GWOT.52 There are many terrorist organizations operating from Pakistan’s territory, and many of these organizations are opposed to the leadership of Pervez Musharraf.53 It is unclear how or if Pakistan would continue to support the GWOT if Pervez Musharraf were overthrown. A serious deterioration in Indo-Pakistani relations could have an adverse effect on the US led GWOT.

Indian Interests

Preeminence in the Indian Ocean

It is in India’s interest to be the pre-eminent power in the Indian Ocean. India relies on oil and natural gas imports to fuel its growing economy; the sea-lanes leading to the Persian Gulf and to southern Iran are essential for this. There has been some indication in the past that India fears the rise of power of China as a threat to the sovereignty of India; becoming the dominant power in the Indian Ocean could deter such a threat and grant India peer competitor status with China.54 Dominance in the Indian Ocean is the best way to secure commercial access to the sea-lanes that connect India to the rest of the world.
Stability of Pakistan

The stability of Pakistan is in the interests of India. Pakistani President Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Singh have, with some serious complications, kept their two nations from major armed conflict in recent years. Even though Pakistan is India’s main rival and the greatest chance for a nuclear exchange in the region exists between these two countries, the Bush administration states that the US will attempt to maintain useful relations with both Pakistan and India; however, the greater strategic alliance will be with India and not Pakistan. The US needs Pakistan to remain stable, and India can benefit from partnership with the US; therefore, India needs Pakistan to remain stable.

US Strengths

Global Power

The US has the power to influence events across the globe. Of particular relevance to the regional security in south Asia are America’s military power projection capabilities, its global economic influence, and its ability to attract nations into coalitions.

Ability to Impose its Will

The US has the ability to impose its will on other nations. The US can shut off any beneficial cooperation or assistance to a nation in the south Asia region that does not act in accordance with US goals. The US can impose its will on its own, or it can use a variety of global institutions to do so.
Indian Strengths
Ability to Shape Regional Events

As previously addressed, India has many of the hard power tools it needs to influence events in its region.

Positive Relations with Iran

India and Iran have positive relations with one another. Outside powers will not break them easily. A country that is a friend of India, but an enemy of Iran could either alienate India or benefit from India’s friendship and indirectly influence Iran. This potential benefit makes this element a strength for India in the driving factor of regional security.

US Weaknesses
Dependence on and Adherence to Pakistan

The US’s’ dependence on Pakistan for the GWOT is a weakness for the US. Pakistan’s government could change and become extremely hostile to the US’s goals in the region with very little advance warning. This weakness is intensified if the US wishes to engage in long-term partnership with India, since Pakistan is India’s chief rival.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

India sees security concerns for itself in the US led war in Iraq due to a large India expatriate population in Iraq and India’s need to maintain access to energy resources. India views the Iraq war as a deepening of the divide between the Muslim and non-Muslim world. If India and the US continue to engage in strategic partnership, and
India does not view the US lead war in Iraq to be a war against terrorism, then Operation Iraqi Freedom is a weakness for the US in the driving factor of regional security.

**Indian Weaknesses**

**The Indian Army**

India boasts an Army of 1.1 million men broken out into six regional command headquarters, one training command, 11 Corps headquarters (three strike corps and 8 holding corps). Although India’s Army has plans to modernize, much of the Indian Army is in a reserve status and is built around older systems such as the T-72 tank, the BMP 1 and 2 fighting vehicle, only about 150 self-propelled artillery pieces. The condition of India’s army may cause some to doubt the power of India.

**Jammu and Kashmir**

India’s long standing conflict with Pakistan over the status of Jammu and Kashmir is the main feature of the rivalry between the two countries and the most likely source of nuclear war in south Asia. Although India and Pakistan have avoided major conflict in recent years, a clash between the two nations is still a very real possibility. Table 3 below compares all of the preceding US and Indian interests, strengths and weaknesses under the driving factor of regional security.
Table 3. Regional Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Security</th>
<th>National Interests</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Neutralized Terror Groups with no Safe Havens; Maintain US Influence in the Region; Use of the Indian Ocean; Stability of Pakistan</td>
<td>Global Power; Ability to Impose its Will</td>
<td>Dependence on and Adherence to Pakistan; Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Pre-eminence in the Indian Ocean; Stability of Pakistan</td>
<td>Ability to Shape Regional Events; Positive Relations with Iran</td>
<td>Indian Army; Jammu and Kashmir</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Mark R. Wilcox and Bruce W. Menning, Guide to the Strategic Estimate (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Command and General Staff College, 2006)*

Economics

The US is India’s largest trading partner; therefore, economics is the fifth driving factor behind Indo-US relations. The growth of India’s economy will depend on its trading partners and will be affected by economic competition with China. Indian economic growth is a major factor behind India’s self-image and its foreign policy, especially its dealings with the US.

US Interests

Markets for US Products and Services

India represents a huge opportunity for growth in trade for the US.\(^6\) India’s GDP for the year ending 31 March 2006 was 8.4 percent and is expected to be between 7.8 percent and 8.3 percent for the year ending 31 March 2007. India is the world’s twelfth largest economy with a GDP of approximately $797 billion. FDI to India has been on the
rise in recent years, and India is making efforts to reform its government bureaucracy, improve its inadequate infrastructure, and improve its economic policies. The US principally exports laboratory chemicals, civilian aircraft, advanced machinery, cotton, fertilizers, iron scrap, and computer hardware to India. The US imports textiles and finished garments, internet based services, agricultural products, gemstones, leather products, and chemicals from India.\textsuperscript{61}

Indian Interests

Economic Growth

India must raise the standard of living for a large, growing population. Economic growth is the vehicle for doing this. India’s population is approximately 1.1 billion people and growing at a rate of 1.3 percent per year. Approximately two thirds of India’s people are dependent on agriculture, yet agriculture accounts for only twenty-one percent of India’s GDP.\textsuperscript{62}

Growth of Global Power

In order to grow into a global power, India must have the hard power of a strengthened economy. India needs to continue reforms such as favorable regulation of foreign direct investment, free movement of people, reduction of tariffs, modernization of India’s financial sector, and safeguarding intellectual property rights. India’s infrastructure must improve in its physical features and how they are regulated.\textsuperscript{63}

Effective Competition with China

This thesis assumes that China and India will become economic rivals and that this rivalry will deepen. China and India both have economies that are rapidly
developing, and both nations are moving to preserve access to the resources to sustain

growing economies. China claims to be committed to internal economic reforms and an
opening to the outside world. China’s GDP grew at a rate of 10 percent per year between
1990 and 2004 making China the world’s fastest growing economy. This has also placed
China, after the US and Germany, as the world’s third largest trading nation.

Maintenance of the US as India’s Largest Trading Partner

The US is India’s largest trading and investment partner; it is in India’s interests
to maintain and improve this. Economic partnership between India and the US is an
important part of strategic cooperation. In 2006, the US exported $10.1 billion worth of
goods to India, and imported $21.8 billion from India. In 2007, the US continues to
import more from India than it exports. This trade is small compared to US-China trade
valued at $235 billion, yet in spite of this, the US remains India’s largest trading partner.
There is tremendous potential for trade growth if both India and the US implement
market access improvements and reduce trade barriers such as tariffs; additionally, the
US can facilitate this growth by easing licensing requirements on high technology goods
to India.

US Strengths

Largest FDI Provider to India

The US accounts for approximately 13 percent of India’s FDI. This amounted to
more than $5 billion dollars from 2005-2006. The Government of India, through its
Foreign Investment Promotion Board, in some industries will allow investments of up to
100 percent foreign equity.
India’s Largest Trading Partner

The US is India’s largest trading partner. As previously discussed, it is in India’s interest to maintain this; therefore, this is a strength that the US possesses in its relations with India.\textsuperscript{69}

Indian Strengths

Large and Growing Middle Class

India’s middle class numbers approximately 325-350 million and is growing. Middle class citizens have disposable incomes. A middle class that is already larger than the population of the entire US is a lucrative and attractive market for trade.\textsuperscript{70}

High Tech Work Force

In spite of government and infrastructure difficulties, India’s economy is modernizing in software and hi-tech services. Software exports from India reached a value of $22 billion dollars in the fiscal year ending in 2006, and business process outsourcing exports are expect to grow by 27-30 percent during 2006-2007.\textsuperscript{71}

Government Ability and Willingness to Implement Market Oriented Reforms

The Government of India is attempting to make market oriented reforms to foster the growth of the Indian economy. These reforms include liberalizing foreign investment, deregulating industry, reducing import tariffs and other trade barriers, modernization of the Indian financial sector, adjusting government fiscal policies, and improving intellectual property rights.\textsuperscript{72} The ability and willingness of the Government of India to make necessary reforms to enable India’s economic growth is a strength for India.
US Weaknesses

Conditions on Economic Partnership with the US

The US attaches conditions to its partnerships with other nations. The US government, in promoting economic partnership with India, will insist that India align itself to US interests. The conditions of US friendship are a weakness for the US in its relations with India.

Indian Weaknesses

Of the Population 80 Percent Lives in Poverty

Of India’s population 80 percent lives in poverty (less than $2 per day), and two thirds depend on India’s agricultural sector for their livelihood. Improving the condition of these people is a daunting task for the Government of India. This factor is an impediment to India achieving greater pre-eminence in the world, and is a tremendous barrier to India’s economic growth. This is a weakness for India.73

Poor History of Effective Economic Reform

Despite India’s more recent efforts at economic reform, India has a poor history of government sponsored economic progress. The “Hindu rate of growth” was brought on during the administration of India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Inefficient government bureaucracy, over-regulation of the private sector, price and production controls, and powerful labor unions stifled India’s productivity and discouraged foreign investment. India suffered from these factors until real, positive reforms began in the early 1990s. Although the economic environment in India seems to be improving, India’s
economy still suffers from a perception of backwardness. The Government of India’s poor history of dealing with its economy is a weakness for India.74

Poor Infrastructure

As discussed previously, India suffers from substandard infrastructure. A nation’s economy cannot grow without adequate transportation features, electrical, and water services. Until investment in India’s infrastructure catches up, poor infrastructure will continue to be one of India’s weaknesses.75 Table 4 below compares all of the preceding US and Indian interests, strengths and weaknesses under the driving factor of economics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4. Economics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economics</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Mark R. Wilcox and Bruce W. Menning, Guide to the Strategic Estimate (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Command and General Staff College, 2006), 5.*

**Addition of Scenario Logics**

This section will describe statements of action for both the US and India pursuant to each driving factor in a status quo, different but better, and worse scenario. This
section will feature a revised driving factor chart containing the action statements of each
nation compared to its corresponding interests, strengths, and weaknesses. This section
constitutes Step 4 of this thesis’s methodology.

India’s Global Self-Image

U.S Status Quo

Under this scenario logic, the US continues bi-lateral relations with India but
continues to try shape these relations more closely to US interests. This action is based on
a US need for India to be aligned to the goals and objectives of the US. The US uses its
strength as a recognized global power, but its weaknesses of placing conditions on friends
and applying inconsistent policies toward India over time place this logic in status quo
category for the US.

US Different, but Better

Under this scenario logic, the US continues bi-lateral relations with India but
makes concessions to India’s view of itself. The US taps into its strength of global power,
but overcomes its weakness for trying to mold allies and partners strictly to US views.
Overcoming this weakness places this logic in the different but better category for the
US.

US Worse

Under this scenario logic, the US alienates India by trying too hard to impose US
conditions and causes another down cycle in Indo-US relations. In this action, the US
tries too hard to serve its interest of keeping India aligned with US policies and attaches
conditions to partnership with India that India cannot or will not keep because they
conflict with how India views its role in global affairs. India then views US actions as anti-Indian and Indo-US relations enter yet another period of estrangement. This logic falls into the worse category for the US.

**Indian Status Quo**

Under this scenario logic, India accepts US friendship, but continues with other activities that suit Indian interests, and tries to gain global recognition as a power in its own right. This action is based on India’s needs for bolstered national strength, unconditional US friendship, acknowledgement from the world’s powerful nations, and power growth on Indian terms. India’s main strengths in this logic are its geographical location and being a democracy with the ability to reform and grow; however, India is not uniformly acknowledged as a nation with the potential to grow more powerful and has a history of backwardness and inability to change. These factors place this logic for India in the status quo category.

**Indian Different, but Better**

Under this scenario logic, India accepts US friendship and keeps the US happy with some concessions to the will of the US; India conducts its other relations in such a way as to gain global recognition of India’s view of its role in the world. India’s strengths in this logic remain its geographical location and being a democracy with the ability to reform and grow; however, India begins to gain acknowledgement as a nation with the potential to grow more powerful and as a nation with the ability to overcome its history of backwardness and inability to change. This places this logic in the different but better category for India.
Indian Worse

Under this scenario logic, India aligns itself too closely with the US at the expense of recognition and help from other powerful nations. India’s actions fail to serve its needs for bolstered national strength, unconditional US friendship, acknowledgement from the world’s powerful nations, and power growth on Indian terms. Although India takes advantage of its geographical position and its democracy, India becomes viewed as a client state of the US and not as a fully independent and powerful nation. India’s power only grows, or fails to grow, in concert with the fortunes of the US and not due to India’s full control of its destiny. These factors place this logic in the worse category for India.

Table 5 below adds the scenario logics of status quo, different but better, and worse to the interests, strengths, and weaknesses of the US and India under the driving factor of India’s global self-image.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5. Revised Global Self-Image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India's Global Self Image</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nuclear Security and Assistance

U.S Status Quo

Under this scenario logic, the US leverages India with civil nuclear assistance, but India still cooperates with Russia for additional civil nuclear assistance. The US achieves its interest of nuclear nonproliferation with India, because India submits itself to the conditions of the Hyde Act. This in turn adds to the security of the US homeland and US interests in the region because India will probably not be the source of nuclear proliferation to anti-US nations or entities in the region. This is the result of the US’s ability to impose its conditions on friendly nations, but because Russia can also provide nuclear assistance to India without the same type of conditions that the US imposes, India continues to acquire civil nuclear assistance from Russia. These factors place this logic into the status quo category for the US.

US Different, but Better

Under this scenario logic, the US leverages India with civil nuclear assistance in such a way as to keep India in the US camp and away from additional Russian civil nuclear assistance. The US achieves its interest of nuclear nonproliferation with India, because India submits itself to the conditions of the Hyde Act. This in turn adds to the security of the US homeland and US interests in the region because India will probably not be the source of nuclear proliferation to anti-US nations or entities in the region. This is the result of the US’s ability to impose its conditions on friendly nations, and in this case, the US is so successful that India does not obtain additional civil nuclear assistance from Russia. These factors place this logic into the different but better category for the US.
US Worse

Under this scenario logic, the US imposes too many conditions on India and pushes India toward Russian civil nuclear assistance and away from the US notion of the “nonproliferation mainstream.” Strenuous efforts from the US to serve its nuclear security interests with India lead India to move away from nonproliferation on US terms. India works more closely with Russia to satisfy its nuclear energy needs, because Russia does not entangle India with conditions that it cannot or will not meet; this is also brought about by India’s inability to influence international organizations that can accept or reject India’s civil nuclear program. These factors place this logic in the worse category for the US.

Indian Status Quo

Under this scenario logic, India accepts US and Russian nuclear assistance and upholds herself as a nonproliferator and a nuclear state. In this action, India serves its national interests of energy independence and consideration as a nuclear state. India can in fact be called a nuclear state, and in this action, India gets the best of both worlds. India acquiesces to US conditions, receives civil nuclear assistance, and is touted by the US as a nation that is in the “nonproliferation mainstream.” India also receives nuclear assistance from Russia that comes with no conditions. India is already engaging in this balancing act, so this logic falls into the status quo category for India.

Indian Different, but Better

Under this scenario logic, India keeps US assistance and keeps the US satisfied with India’s compliance with US conditions. India also maintains Russian assistance.
This logic does not greatly differ from the logic in the status quo category, except in this logic, there is no serious doubt from the US about India’s status as a trustworthy nuclear state that does not proliferate. This factor places this logic in the different but better category for India.

**Indian Worse**

In this scenario logic, India loses US nuclear assistance in favor of that from Russia. Although India can still obtain civil nuclear assistance from Russia free from conditions, India loses US and thus world recognition as a nonproliferator and trustworthy nuclear state. Since the connection between US civil nuclear assistance and strengthened legitimacy as a nuclear state would be lost, this logic falls into the worse category for India. Table 6 below compares all of the preceding US and Indian interests, strengths and weaknesses under the driving factor of nuclear security and assistance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nuclear Security and Assistance</th>
<th>National Interests</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
<th>Status Quo</th>
<th>Different, but Better</th>
<th>Worse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Nuclear Nonproliferation; Security of the Homeland and of US Interests</td>
<td>Ability to Impose Conditions</td>
<td>Other Nations Can Provide Nuclear Technology</td>
<td>Leverages India with nuclear assistance, but India still cooperates with Russia</td>
<td>Leverages India with nuclear assistance in such a way as to keep India in the US camp and away from excessive Russian assistance</td>
<td>The US imposes too many conditions on India and pushes India toward Russian civil nuclear assistance and away from the US notion of the &quot;nonproliferation mainstream.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Energy Independence; National Identity Backed with Strength; India Viewed as a Nuclear Power by other Nations</td>
<td>Ability to Call Itself a Nuclear State; Ability to Shape Regional Events</td>
<td>Not Able to Influence Nuclear Related Organizations</td>
<td>Accepts US and Russian nuclear assistance; upholds herself as a non-proliferator and a nuclear state</td>
<td>Keeps US assistance; keeps the US satisfied, but does not completely lose Russian assistance; gains US and global recognition as a non-proliferator</td>
<td>Loses US nuclear assistance in favor of that from Russia; loses US and thus world recognition as a non-proliferator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Regional Security**

**U.S. Status Quo**

In this scenario logic, the US continues bi-lateral relations with India. The US continues to support peaceful Indian aims and tries to calm Indo-Pakistani relations; however, the US tries to keep Indian actions consistent with US goals and objectives. These actions serve the US interests of neutralizing terror groups, maintaining US
influence in south Asia, preserving US access to the Indian Ocean, and keeping Pakistan stable. This occurs in spite of the US’s adherence to Pakistan (India’s chief rival) and the disagreement between the US and India caused by continuation of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This logic falls into the status quo category for the US.

**US Different, but Better**

Under this scenario logic, the US continues its current course of relations with India, but manages to satisfy the Indian need for respect of its power and role in the world. These actions still serve the US interests of neutralizing terror groups, maintaining US influence in south Asia, preserving US access to the Indian Ocean, and keeping Pakistan stable. Under this logic, the US does not insist strongly for Indian adherence to the US view of what India should do. For example, under this logic, the US would recognize that India must maintain good relations with Iran in spite of whatever US relations with Iran might be. Actions like this would keep India and the US as strategic partners without interfering with India’s peaceful dealings in its own region; therefore, this logic falls into the different but better category for the US.

**US Worse**

In this scenario logic, the US pushes for too much from India and drives India into closer relations with Russia and Iran to counter China and Pakistan. These actions fail to serve the US interests of neutralizing terror groups, maintaining US influence in south Asia, preserving US access to the Indian Ocean, and keeping Pakistan stable. The price of useful strategic partnership with the US becomes too high, so India moves closer to useful, easier relations with Iran and Russia instead of the US. India no longer looks to
the US as a strategic partner in its efforts to compete with the rise of Chinese power and India’s continuing rivalry with Pakistan. This places this logic into the worse category for the US.

**Indian Status Quo**

In this scenario logic, India cooperates with the US but continues to work for favorable relations for India in the south Asia region. India takes measures that serve its interests of pre-eminence in the Indian Ocean and the stability of Pakistan. India uses its ability to act in regional affairs and its positive relations with Iran to counteract its disadvantage of a weak army and India’s continued rivalry with Pakistan centered on Jammu and Kashmir. This actions place this logic in the status quo category for India.

**Indian Different, but Better**

Under this scenario logic, India still cooperates with the US and gains full benefit from partnership with the US without extensive US leverage over India’s other dealings. This keeps India’s involvement in regional security mostly on Indian terms. India still takes measures that serve its interests of pre-eminence in the Indian Ocean and the stability of Pakistan. India continues to use its ability to act in regional affairs and its positive relations with Iran to counteract its disadvantages of a weak army and India’s continued rivalry with Pakistan centered on Jammu and Kashmir. In this logic, India is more effective at serving its interests, because India can operate mostly in accordance with its own aims and objectives that are backed by strategic partnership with the US. These factors place this logic into the different but better category for India.
Indian Worse

In this scenario logic, India alienates the US and fails to gain recognition as a rising global power to support its aims in the region. India cannot serve its interest of pre-eminence in the Indian Ocean region, because India does not have the full backing of the US as a strategic partner. Pakistan becomes emboldened over Jammu and Kashmir, and India, without sufficient US backing, is not recognized as a global actor when compared to China. These factors place this logic into the worse category for India. Table 7 below compares all of the preceding US and Indian interests, strengths and weaknesses under the driving factor of regional security.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Security</th>
<th>National Interests</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
<th>Status Quo</th>
<th>Different, but Better</th>
<th>Worse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Neutralized Terror Groups with no Safe Havens; Maintain US Influence in the Region; Use of the Indian Ocean; Stability of Pakistan</td>
<td>Global Power; Ability to Impose its Will</td>
<td>Dependence on and Adherence to Pakistan; Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
<td>Continues bilateral relations with India; supports peaceful Indian aims in the region as long as they are consistent with US aims; tries to calm Indo-Pakistani relations</td>
<td>Continues current relations with India, but satisfies Indian need for respect of its power and role in the world.</td>
<td>Pushes for too much from India and drives India into closer relations with Russia and Iran to counter China and Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Pre-eminence in the Indian Ocean; Stability of Pakistan</td>
<td>Ability to Shape Regional Events; Positive Relations with Iran</td>
<td>Indian Army; Jammu and Kashmir</td>
<td>Cooperates with the US but continues to work for favorable relations for India with others in the South Asia region.</td>
<td>Cooperates with the US and gains full benefit from the US without extensive US leverage over India's other dealings; maintains partnership on Indian terms.</td>
<td>Alienates itself from the US and fails to gain recognition as a rising global power to support its aims in the region.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Mark R. Wilcox and Bruce W. Menning, Guide to the Strategic Estimate (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Command and General Staff College, 2006), 5.*
Economics

U.S Status Quo

Under this scenario logic, the US continues to promote Indian economic growth as part of its greater strategic partnership with India. The US serves its primary economic interest of access to markets for US products and services by using its strengths of being the largest FDI provider to India and being India’s largest trading partner. The US still exhibits its weaknesses of imposing its conditions on economic partners. These factors place this logic into the status quo category for the US.

US Different, but Better

In this scenario logic, the US continues to promote Indian economic growth as part of its greater strategic partnership with India. The US still serves its economic interests, but the US does not impose conditions upon India that it cannot or will not honor. This action places this logic into the different but better category for the US.

US Worse

In this scenario logic, the US simply fails to follow through on its promises to India for improved economic cooperation. This places this logic into the worse category for the US.

Indian Status Quo

India continues to make market oriented reforms that are hampered by its infrastructure development not keeping pace. India continues to try to serve its economic interests of growth, effective competition with China, and maintenance of the US as its largest trading partner. India still maintains its middle class and its high tech work force.
The Indian Government continues to make market oriented economic reforms, but India’s infrastructure, under the control of government bureaucracy, does not develop quickly enough to keep pace with the growth of the Indian economy. As a result, new investments in India’s economy stall, and so does the growth of the Indian economy. These factors place this logic into the status quo category for India.

**Indian Different, but Better**

In this scenario logic, India continues to make market oriented reforms and is able to improve its infrastructure at a pace that is complementary to its economic growth. Foreign Direct Investment grows. India continues to try to serve its economic interests of growth, effective competition with China, and maintenance of the US as its largest trading partner. India maintains its middle class and its high tech work force. The Indian Government succeeds in making market oriented economic reforms, and India makes the necessary improvements to its infrastructure at a rate that helps the Indian economy grow. As a result, investment in the Indian economy grows, and so does the Indian economy. These factors place this logic into the different but better category for India.

**Indian Worse**

Under this scenario logic, India does not adequately address the proper government reforms for improved trade with the US stifling further economic growth. India fails to serve its economic interests, because the Indian Government does not make appropriate economic reforms or does not make them in a timely manner. As a result, economic cooperation with the US does not develop into anything more than it already is, continued investment in India stagnates, the Indian infrastructure does not grow.
adequately, and the Indian economy continues to fail to meet its potential. These factors place this logic into the worse category for India. Table 8 below compares all of the preceding US and Indian interests, strengths and weaknesses under the driving factor of economics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economics</th>
<th>National Interests</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
<th>Status Quo</th>
<th>Different, but Better</th>
<th>Worse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Markets for US Products and Services</td>
<td>Largest FDI Provider to India; India's Largest Trading Partner</td>
<td>Conditions on Economic Partnership with the US;</td>
<td>The US continues to promote Indian economic growth as part of its greater strategic partnership with India.</td>
<td>The US continues to promote Indian economic growth as part of its greater strategic partnership with India.</td>
<td>The US fails to follow through on its promises to India for improved economic cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Economic Growth; Growth of Global Power; Effective Competition with China; Maintenance of US as Largest Trading Partner</td>
<td>Large and Growing Middle Class; High Tech Work Force; Government Ability and Willingness to Implement Market Oriented Reforms</td>
<td>Eighty Percent of the Population Lives in Poverty; Poor History of Effective Economic Reform; Poor Infrastructure</td>
<td>India continues to make market oriented reforms and is able to improve its infrastructure at a pace that is complementary to its economic growth. Foreign Direct Investment grows.</td>
<td>India continues to make market oriented reforms and is able to improve its infrastructure at a pace that is complementary to its economic growth. Foreign Direct Investment grows.</td>
<td>India does not adequately address the proper government reforms for improved trade with the US stifling further economic growth.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Extract Three Scenarios

In this section, the scenario logics will be extracted from each of the preceding driving factors charts to form a scenario statement. There will be one statement each for the status quo, different but better, and worse categories. Extract Three Scenarios will
feature a scenario statement for a status quo scenario, a different but better scenario, and a worse scenario based on the driving factor charts modified with scenario logics. This section constitutes Step 5 of this thesis’s methodology.

Status Quo

The US continues bi-lateral relations with India but continues to shape these relations to US terms. India accepts US friendship, but continues with other activities that suit Indian interests; India still tries to gain global recognition as a rising global power. India accepts US and Russian nuclear assistance and upholds herself as both a nuclear nonproliferator and a nuclear state. The US leverages India with nuclear assistance, but India still cooperates with Russia for additional nuclear assistance. The US supports peaceful Indian aims in the south Asia region. The US tries to calm Indo-Pakistani relations and tries to keep Indian actions on US terms. India cooperates with the US but continues to work for favorable relations for India in the south Asia region. The US continues to promote Indian economic growth as part of its greater strategic partnership with India. India continues to make market oriented reforms that are hampered by its infrastructure development not keeping pace with potential economic growth. India continues to court the US and Russia for nuclear assistance and tries to deal with the potential repercussions from US.

Different, but Better

The US continues bi-lateral relations with India but makes concessions to India’s view of itself. India accepts US friendship and keeps the US happy with some concessions. India conducts its other relations in such a way as to gain global recognition
as a rising global power. The US leverages India with nuclear assistance in such a way as to keep India in the US camp and away from excessive Russian assistance. India keeps US nuclear assistance and keeps the US satisfied with its compliance with US terms, but does not completely lose Russian nuclear assistance. India gains US and some global recognition as a nuclear non-proliferator and as a nuclear state. The US satisfies the Indian need for respect of its power and role in the world. India cooperates with the US and gains full benefit from the US without extensive US leverage over India’s other dealings thus maintaining Indian terms for regional security. The US continues to promote Indian economic growth as part of its greater strategic partnership with India. India successfully makes market oriented reforms and is able to improve its infrastructure at a pace that is complementary to its economic growth. Foreign Direct Investment grows.

Worse

The US alienates India by forcing itself too hard and causes another down-cycle in Indo-US relations, or India aligns itself too closely with the US at the expense of recognition and help from other powerful nations. The US imposes too many nuclear conditions on India and pushes India toward Russian civil nuclear assistance. India does not follow the US notion of nonproliferation. India subsequently loses US nuclear assistance in favor of that from Russia and loses US and thus world recognition as a nuclear non-proliferator and a legitimate nuclear state. The US drives India into closer relations with Russia and Iran to counter China and Pakistan in India’s view of regional security. India, therefore, alienates the US and fails to gain recognition as a global power to support its aims in the region. The US fails to follow through on its promises to India
for improved economic cooperation, and India does not adequately address the proper
government reforms for improved trade with the US stifling further economic growth.

**Implications**

Implications will describe what each scenario could mean for the US and assess
how the US should react to each scenario. This chapter will end with a summary leading
into the fifth and final chapter of this thesis. This section constitutes Step 6 of this thesis’s
methodology.

**Status Quo**

There are two main implications of the status quo scenario. The first is that India
will deal with various nations for its benefit and not just the US. The second is that India
will not submit itself to outside influences that detract from India’s view of itself and its
role in the world. India’s dealings with Iran, Russia, and the US yield indicators that can
show the emergence of the status quo scenario.

**Different, but Better**

The different but better scenario also has two main implications. Like the status
quo, the different but better scenario implies that India will deal with various nations for
its benefit, but under the different but better scenario, India will deal primarily with the
US for its benefit. The second implication of the different but better scenario is that India
will sometimes submit itself to outside influences to promote India’s view of itself and
role in the world. The importance of the US as an economic partner for India provides
indications of the different but better scenario.
Worse

The worse scenario has one main implication. India will not submit itself to any outside influence that hinders the development of India’s self-image and role in the world order. Civil nuclear assistance from the US, how the US deals with Indo-Iranian relations, and how the US really views the status of India give indicators of the worse scenario.

Evaluate Indicators

Evaluate indicators will describe events or conditions that could show which scenario begins to play itself out in the future. Fourteen leading indicators will reveal which of the three main scenarios plays itself out. The fourteen indicators are described below. This section constitutes Step 7 of this thesis’s methodology.

India’s Bid to Join the UN Security Council

India wishes to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council with veto power. Permanent Security Council membership would indicate that India is a significant and powerful nation in the world. Security Council membership would also constitute recognition of India as a nuclear state. If India makes no real progress toward membership on the UN Security Council, then the status quo scenario is indicated. If India makes meaningful progress toward membership, then the different but better scenario is indicated. Finally, if nations fight Indian Security Council membership, then the worse scenario is indicated.

India has seriously lobbied for permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council since the mid-1990s. Although India has garnered some support for its bid, India’s efforts have not yet been successful. Britain, France, and Russia have shown
some support to India, but China has reservations about Indian permanent membership.\textsuperscript{77} The US is somewhat non-committal about the Security Council membership of its new “strategic partner.” The US opposed a proposed vote to expand the Security Council in 2005.\textsuperscript{78} US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated in 2006 that the US understands that India meets the criteria for Security Council membership, but Security Council reform is not a US priority at this time.\textsuperscript{79} This indicator ties back into the driving factors of India’s global self-image, nuclear security and assistance, and regional security. This indicator shows no real progress toward permanent UN Security Council membership for India; therefore, this indicator shows the status quo scenario is beginning to take place.

**US Acknowledgement of India’s Place in the World**

For Indo-US strategic partnership to work, the US must acknowledge that India is a powerful nation with a significant part to play on the world stage. This acknowledgement must stand even when India’s actions are not in full compliance with what the US thinks they should be. If the US is tolerant yet somewhat critical of some of India’s actions that are not in line with those of the US, then the status quo scenario is indicated. If the US is fully tolerant of all of India’s actions, then the different but better scenario is indicated. If the US shows signs of punishing India’s actions that are not aligned with those of the US, then the worse scenario is indicated.

The US will place conditions on India for its partnership with the US. The US does not want India to engage in positive relations with Iran; this is a major piece of US nuclear assistance to India. The Hyde Act implies that the US can take punitive measures against India for not going along with the US and its goals.\textsuperscript{80} India has demonstrated in the recent past that the US cannot strong arm India, and India will engage in partnership
The US will not readily back down from what it views as obligations for India, so US actions indicate that the worse scenario, especially for the US is taking shape. This indicator ties back to the driving factor of India’s global self-image.

2008 US Presidential Election

The presidency of George W. Bush will end on 20 January 2009. It is unclear who will be the next president of the US. Since the US presidential election will not take place until November of 2008, it is unclear in early 2007 who the leading contenders for the presidency will be. Popular Democratic candidates include Illinois Senator Barrack Obama and New York Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton. The Republican Party features Arizona Senator John McCain and former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani. Out of all of these candidates, only Senator McCain substantively discusses the importance of US engagement with the nations of Asia; he refers to the US and India as “natural allies.” Senators Clinton, Obama, and McCain all voted “yea” on House Resolution 5682 (which became the Hyde Act) when it came before the Senate. This indicator does not yet show the different but better or worse scenarios; however, given the senate voting record of three of the candidates, the status quo scenario seems to be playing out. This indicator ties into all of the driving factors of this thesis.

2007 Indian Elections

Six of India’s 28 states will hold elections in 2007; the most important of which will take place in Uttar Pradesh, which holds about one seventh of India’s parliamentary seats. India’s two main political parties are the Congress Party (which is the current
ruling party of India via the United Progressive Alliance coalition) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The Congress Party has ushered in many of India’s most significant reforms; the BJP tends toward Hindu nationalism and an India based on Hindu ideals. A swing toward Hindu nationalism in India will make India less likely to align itself with US objectives.  

It is unclear which of these parties would hold sway in the Uttar Pradesh election, and significant changes in India’s parliament could lead to changes in the political concessions the ruling party must make; therefore, the 2007 elections in India could alter how India continues to engage in partnership with the US.  

This indicator remains in the status quo scenario until the Indian election process has played itself out in 2007. This indicator ties back into all the driving factors of this thesis.

India in the “Nonproliferation Mainstream”

Whether or not India remains in what the US views as the nuclear “nonproliferation mainstream” is a major leading indicator. If Indian actions are consistent with the US “nonproliferation mainstream,” then both the status quo and different but better scenarios are indicated. If India shows signs of not staying within the US “nonproliferation mainstream,” then the worse scenario is indicated.

Regardless of definition, India is a nuclear state. India has not entered into the NPT, because India maintains for itself the right to develop and possess nuclear weapons as a credible deterrent, yet India has not defined what it believes to be a credible deterrent. India has also not made any firm commitment to suspending uranium enrichment activities/capabilities, and not all of India’s reactors would be placed under IAEA safeguards pursuant to the US civil nuclear assistance. India could be in a position to build more nuclear weapons while being viewed as a responsible nuclear state under
US sponsorship, without sacrificing Indian sovereignty by entering into the NPT. The Hyde Act restricts sales of fuel enrichment/reprocessing and heavy water production equipment to India, yet the Hyde Act allows the President to override these conditions. India need only tread carefully with the US, the IAEA, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group; India can use its relations with Iran to leverage the US onto its side. Failing even this, India can still acquire its nuclear needs from Russia without conditions. This indicator shows that India does not necessarily need to remain in the US’s “nonproliferation mainstream.” This indicator ties back to India’s global self-image, nuclear security and cooperation, and regional security and indicates the worse scenario.

**US Reaction to Indo-Iranian Relations**

For Indo-US strategic partnership to work, the US must accept India’s relations with Iran. If the US is tolerant yet somewhat critical of some of India’s relations with Iran, then the status quo scenario is indicated. If the US is fully tolerant of all of India’s relations with Iran, then the different but better scenario is indicated. If the US shows signs of punishing India for its relations with Iran, then the worse scenario is indicated.

The US does not want India to engage in positive relations with Iran. As stated previously, the Hyde Act implies that the US can take punitive measures against India for not going along with the US and its policies toward Iran. India has demonstrated in the recent past that the US cannot strong arm India, and India will engage in partnership with whatever nations it chooses. The US will not soon back down from what it views as obligations for India, so US actions indicate that the worse scenario, especially for the US is taking shape. This indicator ties back to the driving factor of India’s global self-image.
Nuclear Assistance to India

India’s massive need for energy drives it towards nuclear power, and outside nuclear assistance, to meet those needs. If India continues to acquire nuclear assistance from both the United States and Russia, then the status quo scenario is indicated. If India acquires nuclear assistance primarily from the US, then the different but better scenario is indicated. If India foregoes nuclear assistance from the US in favor of assistance from Russia, then the worse scenario is indicated.

As previously discussed, India is in the process of acquiring civil nuclear assistance from the US under the recently enacted Hyde Act. India has also recently entered into an agreement with Russia for the construction of four additional nuclear reactors in India. This indicator shows the status quo scenario, since India is working toward nuclear assistance from both the US and Russia. This indicator ties back to the driving factor of nuclear security and assistance.

Indo-Pakistani Relations

India’s relations with Pakistan are the most likely cause of conflict in the south Asia region and shape India’s foreign policy. The course of these relations is a leading scenario indicator. If Indo-Pakistani relations remain the same, then the status quo scenario is indicated. If Indo-Pakistani relations improve, then the different but better scenario is indicated. If Indo-Pakistani relations deteriorate, then the worse scenario is indicated.

Indo-Pakistani relations seem to be remaining static. India and Pakistan remain in a persistent state of conflict over the status of Jammu and Kashmir despite some effort by both governments to make progress toward peace. Anti-India terrorism still takes place,
Indian Industrial Regulation Reform, Indian Infrastructure, Status of US-India Trade, Reduction of Trade Barriers, US Investment in India, and Indian Government Fiscal Policies

These final six indicators are inter-dependent and tie back to the driving factor of economics; therefore, they are defined together. If India continues to make market oriented economic reforms that, but Indian economic growth shows signs of stagnation, then the status quo scenario is indicated. If India continues to make market oriented economic reforms, and the Indian economy continues to show a high level of growth, then the different but better scenario is indicated. If India fails to make the appropriate market oriented economic reforms causing Indian economic growth to stagnate, then the worse scenario is indicated.

India, under the Congress Party led United Progressive Alliance, shows signs of continuing to make the right economic reforms in India to foster growth. India is considering industrial deregulation and changes in its banking laws. Reduction of trade barriers between the US and India is being taken seriously. Economic partnership shows the most promise for mutual benefit in an Indo-US partnership. These indicators show a strong slant toward the different but better scenario in Indo-US relations in the driving factor of economics.
Summary

The majority of the preceding indicators demonstrate that the status quo scenario is the most likely to take place in the future of Indo-US relations; however, some of the indicators show that some elements of the status quo scenario must be modified, because they show a tendency toward the different but better or worse logic. Therefore, the most likely scenario for the future of Indo-US relations is as follows:

Modified Status Quo

The US will begin to alienate itself from India causing another down-cycle in Indo-US relations. India accepts US friendship where it feels appropriate but continues with other activities that suit Indian interests. India still tries to gain global recognition of its own self-image. The US insists on conditions for civil nuclear assistance that India cannot or will not meet; therefore, India favors Russian civil nuclear assistance and moves away from the US notion of the “nonproliferation mainstream.” India eventually loses recognition as a responsible nuclear state from the US and much of the world. The US continues to support peaceful Indian aims in the region as long as they are consistent with US aims and tries to calm Indo-Pakistani relations. India continues to work for favorable relations for Iran. The US continues to promote Indian economic growth as part of its greater strategic partnership with India. India continues to make market oriented reforms and is able to improve its infrastructure at a pace that is complementary to its economic growth. Foreign Direct Investment grows.

The fifth and final chapter of this thesis will discuss the implications of this most likely scenario. Recommendations for US actions will also be made based on this
scenario. Finally, an answer to this thesis’s research question, Should the US provide security assistance to India’s military?, will be determined.

---


8Nayar and Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status, 52.


12Ibid.


24Ibid., 52.

25Ibid., 34-36.


33 Gurcharan Das., “The India Model,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2006, 1-16


44Ibid., 236.


51Ibid., 197.


US Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “Background Note: India,” Internet.

Ibid.


Frankel and Harding, *The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know*, 6,26,33,41,47,52,60,83,135,139,141,160

US Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “Background Note: India,” Internet.


US Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “Background Note: India,” Internet.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


74 Das, “The India Model,” 4-6.


77 Ibid.


[candidate website] (Hillary Clinton for President Exploratory Committee, 2007, accessed 4 April 2007); available through http://www.hillaryclinton.com/about/senator/. Internet.


85Kronstadt, India-US Relations, 11.


89Ibid.


92Kronstadt, India-US Relations, 21-22.


CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Introduction

This chapter will discuss the results of chapter 4 and draw a conclusion to this thesis’s research question: Should the US provide security assistance to India’s military? This chapter will also discuss answers to the four secondary research questions.

The purpose of this thesis has been to answer the question: Should the US provide security assistance to India’s military? This study then divided the research question into four secondary questions. How does India’s global self-image drive its relations with the US? How do nuclear security and nuclear assistance affect relations between India and the US? How does India’s role in the security environment of south Asia align or conflict with the US’ role in south Asia? What economic factors come into play between the US and India? Two additional secondary questions were considered (Do India and the US have common goals in fighting terrorism? How does energy security drive relations between India and the US?) but were delimited because they did not significantly strengthen this thesis. This thesis then discussed pertinent literature relating to each secondary research question in chapter 2. Chapter 3 of this thesis laid out the methodology for organizing the information reviewed in chapter 2 into potential scenarios for Indo-US relations which were then refined into one modified scenario.

Based on the analysis in chapter 4 of this thesis, the most likely scenario for relations between India and the US is as follows:

The US will begin to alienate itself from India causing another down-cycle in Indo-US relations. India will accept US friendship where it feels appropriate but will
continue with other activities that suit Indian interests. India will continue to try to gain
global recognition of its own self-image. The US will insist on conditions for civil
nuclear assistance that India cannot or will not meet; therefore, India will favor Russian
civil nuclear assistance and move away from the US notion of the “nonproliferation
mainstream.” As a result, India will eventually lose recognition as a responsible nuclear
state from the US and much of the world. The US will continue to support peaceful
Indian aims in the region as long as they are consistent with US aims and will try to calm
Indo-Pakistani relations. India will continue to work for favorable relations with Iran. The
US will continue to promote Indian economic growth as part of a greater partnership with
India. India continues to make market oriented reforms and is able to improve its
infrastructure at a pace that is complementary to its economic growth. Foreign Direct
Investment in India will grow.

Implications of the Most Likely Scenario

There are two main implications of this scenario for relations between India and
the US. The first is that India will deal with various nations for its benefit and not just the
US. The second is that India will not submit itself to outside influences that detract from
India’s view of itself and its role in the world. These are the two most important things to
remember about India and how it interacts with the other nations of the world.

Secondary Research Questions

The most likely scenario and its implications help to answer the secondary
research questions of this thesis. The answers to the secondary research questions lead to
an answer to the main research question of the thesis.
How does India’s global self-image drive its relations with the US? India’s self-image drives all of its actions with all nations, not just the US. India views itself as a nation that is rightfully becoming powerful; India will seek alliances and partnerships that enhance this rise to power and gain recognition of what India views as India’s place. Relations between India and the US will be driven by how much respect and acknowledgement of India’s power the US is willing to give.

How do nuclear security and nuclear assistance affect relations between India and the US? Nuclear security and assistance have a profound impact on relations between India and the US, and this issue is closely related to India’s self-image. In Indian terms, part of being a powerful and respected nation is the right to have a nuclear program, civilian and military. India has taken measures to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials, but India is a non-proliferator on Indian terms and not in the “nonproliferation mainstream.” This is not likely to change, because India simply does not need US nuclear assistance in the long term. US civil nuclear assistance to India is nothing more than an attempt to use India to contain Iran disguised as good nuclear policy and concern for global warming. The language of the Hyde Act is an affront to India’s self-image, and India will only cooperate as long as it is convenient to do so.

How does India’s role in the security environment of south Asia align or conflict with the US’s role in south Asia? India’s role in the security environment of south Asia conflicts with that of the US. India’s persistent state of conflict with Pakistan conflicts with the US’s need for Pakistan to support (such as it may be) the GWOT. US relations with Pakistan have historically been a sore point between India and the US, and there is no indicator that this will not be so in the future. India has a positive relationship with
Iran, but Iran is openly hostile to the US. The US will probably continue to try to contain
Iran, but India, because of its crushing need for energy resources, cannot afford to have
Iran contained. This is the second serious conflict between US and Indian interests in the
region.

What economic factors come into play between the US and India? The US is
India’s best partner for fostering the growth of the Indian economy. There is tremendous
potential for American investors to profit from the “ground floor” opportunity that India
represents. The Government of India, however, has a lot of work to do internally to foster
growth, so the opportunity for India is not without significant risk. Economic ties
between India and the US are the best way to foster partnership between these two
nations.

Thesis Conclusion

Should the US provide security assistance to India’s military? In terms of
providing or selling military equipment to India, the answer to this question must be no.
There are too many conflicts in the driving factors of Indo-US relations for the answer to
be yes. The American way is not necessarily the Indian way. The US will not recognize
that another great nation is in many ways the equal of the US; US partners are junior
partners, and this directly conflicts with India’s view of itself. India will remain a nuclear
state on its own terms and not on those of any other power. India’s role in the security
environment of south Asia differs from that of the US, especially when it comes to
Pakistan and Iran. The US should continue to provide other aspects of security assistance
to India such as service school exchanges, advice for maintaining regional stability, and
combined military exercises.
Given the differences between the US and India, it would be unwise for the US to provide India with military capability that would give India the ability to counter US interests in south Asia. The US has the propensity to drive India away from alliance with the US. India has the will and the ability to go its own way if the US presses for too much. There is great potential for friendship and cooperation between India and the US, but there is equal potential for conflict.

Economic partnership is the bright spot in relations between India and the US. Partnership between the US and India should focus here instead of on nuclear nonproliferation and regional security. American business can profit from India’s potential, and India, with the right government reforms, can elevate the overall standard of living of the Indian people. A healthy economy that benefits all Indians is the better way for the US to secure its interests in south Asia.

Strategic partnership between India and the US is a seductive idea. India and the US are both democracies that share the English language. Both nations gained their independence from Great Britain; therefore, one assumes that India and the US share many of the same concepts of freedom and world-view. In the US, China and its rise to power are viewed with some consternation; this makes partnership with India even more attractive. The US and India should indeed have friendly relations with one another, and both nations should work together to prevent a destructive rivalry between them; therefore, security assistance activities that do not involve equipment sales should continue.

Although the US and India are far from being enemies, references to India and the US as “natural allies” are inappropriate. India and the US do not share all of the same
goals and interests. The US, therefore, should not provide military equipment as part of its security assistance to India’s military.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Banerji, Arun Kumar, ed. The Gulf War and the Energy Crisis in India. Calcutta and New Delhi, India: School of International Relations and Strategic Studies, Jadavpur University, 1993.


**Government Documents**


_________. “Congressional Notification.” In US Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. US Department of State official website. Washington,


Internet Sources


Periodicals

Carter, Ashton B. “America’s New Strategic Partner?” Foreign Affairs, July-August 2006, 33-44.


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
US Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Dr. Michael D. Mihalka
DJMO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Mr. William Lambert
DJMO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

LtCol John M. Rochelle
DJMO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
1. Certification Date: 15 June 2007

2. Thesis Author: MAJ Richard G. Petersen, Jr.

3. Thesis Title: India and the United States: Should the United States Provide Security Assistance to its New “Strategic Partner”?

4. Thesis Committee Members: 

   Signatures: 

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:

   A   B   C   D   E   F   X    SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

   If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:

   EXAMPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitation Justification Statement</th>
<th>Chapter/Section</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Military Support (10)</td>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Technology (3)</td>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Operational Use (7)</td>
<td>Chapter 2</td>
<td>13-32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

   Limitation Justification Statement / Chapter/Section / Page(s)

   / / 

   / / 

   / / 

   / / 

   / / 

   / / 

   / / 

   7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature: ________________________________
STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:

2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government.
3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.
4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.
6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.
7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.
8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.
9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority.
10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).