EMERGING REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE INSURGENCY IN THE
NIGER RIVER DELTA REGION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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2007

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**Thesis Title:** Emerging Requirements For US COIN: An Examination Of The Insurgency In The Niger River Delta Region.

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Since early 2002, the U.S. military has relearned COIN at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war for both special operations and conventional forces in order to meet the security and stability requirements of both Afghanistan and Iraq post major combat operations. While the U.S. military is now developing a comprehensive COIN strategy and practice suitable to the specific requirements of those theaters, variations of insurgency are growing, or are already established, in areas of the world critical to US national security interests and which are wholly dissimilar from these campaigns. The evolving insurgency in the Niger River Delta region of Nigeria is and will continue to threaten U.S. national security interests in terms of regional political stability and access to strategic resources.

This thesis proposes that the U.S. military’s experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq, both at the tactical and operational levels, have not established an adequate skill set to overcome the challenges of COIN presented in the Niger River Delta and will require changes in service doctrine, organization, training, material, and leader development to prevail in this unique COIN environment.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

EMERGING REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. COIN: AN EXAMINATION OF THE INSURGENCY IN THE NIGER RIVER DELTA REGION.
by MAJ Brian Lionberger, 132 pages.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis would not exist without the direct and indirect efforts of more people that there is space here to credit. However, I would like to specifically thank my thesis committee for their efforts to keep me on mission throughout a busy academic year and my colleagues at the Center for Army Lessons Learned without whose support, assistance and friendship I would never have put pen to paper.

Finally, and most importantly, I credit this work to the tireless and unwavering support from my wife Amy. Without her love, steady support, encouragement, and understanding throughout this project, and past deployments to far off lands, I would never have achieved so much.
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<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events</td>
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<td>COMA</td>
<td>Coalition for Militant Action</td>
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<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leader Development, Personnel, and Facilities</td>
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<td>EPMESIII</td>
<td>Environment, Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information Operations, Insurgent</td>
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<td>Government of Nigeria</td>
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<td>Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta</td>
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<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>Mission, Enemy Terrain, Troops, Time, Civil Considerations</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Insurgencies have been a part of warfare throughout history, in every case differing in scope, agenda, objective, and composition. In most conflicts, conventional forces have engaged in combat simultaneously with opposing conventional forces and insurgents of one type or another, while in some cases, conventional forces engaged only insurgents in direct combat, though these cases are the minority. In the past 150 years of modern military history, insurgents have had many different names, including border ruffians, militias, guerrillas, partisans, maquis, chetniks, terrorists, paramilitaries, and irregular forces.

Though despite their various names, they all exist within a common framework. Insurgents challenge conventional military forces with unconventional tactics, usually with inferior numbers, weapons, communications, training, logistics, medical services and with tenuous support from contested civilian populations. Their enduring presence on the battlefield, either as a derivative to a conventional conflict or alone against a conventional force, directly correlates to their incidence of success. While insurgencies require an uncommon combination of conditions to begin, once started, they are extremely pernicious and difficult to stop. Typically, conventional forces have lacked the organizational structure, logistics and intelligence architecture to effectively transform their application of combat power from the relatively straightforward proposition of defeating another conventional force to the defeat of an insurgent force.
From the end of the Vietnam War until early 2002, counterinsurgency (COIN) was a core function of only a select group within the U.S. special operations community. In 1975, the U.S. Army had shelved the COIN doctrine, training, and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) developed during the Vietnam era to allow for an Army-wide focus on mid-to-high intensity combat against large armored and mechanized formations in a European or desert environment. The lessons of COIN from Vietnam, by 2001, had passed from the Army’s tacit knowledge-base as soldiers from that era left the service for retirement. From 1975 to late 2001, the only significant COIN experience for the U.S. military was limited to special operations forces conducting foreign internal defense in El Salvador in the 1980s. The doctrine available to U.S. forces for COIN in this period was limited to single service-oriented documents that discussed low intensity conflict (LIC) against a rural based insurgency and discussed a successful strategy in terms of destroying the insurgent’s combat forces rather than with winning the hearts and minds of the civilian population that those insurgents were attempting to influence.

Since early 2002, the U.S. military has had to relearn COIN at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war for both special operations and conventional forces. The security instability in the aftermath of the successful conventional campaigns against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, served as the catalyst for this renewed emphasis on an old mission. The post-Taliban period in Afghanistan and the post-Saddam period in Iraq are characterized as fragile democracies challenged by growing insurgencies where the U.S. execution of stability and reconstruction strategy initially lacked a COIN element. While the U.S. military is now developing a comprehensive COIN strategy and practice suitable to the specific
requirements of Afghanistan and Iraq, variations of insurgency are growing, or are already established, in areas of the world critical to U.S. national security interests and which are wholly dissimilar from these campaigns. The COIN requirements for these other insurgent operational environments (IOE) may prove incompatible with the Department of Defense’s current set of Afghan or Iraqi-focused solutions.

In December of 2006, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps released a jointly authored publication to fill the gap in service doctrine with respect to counterinsurgency. Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, also known as Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, was the first attempt in over 20 years to address the requirement for a commonly implemented doctrine that meets the needs of the two services primarily engaged in COIN operations world-wide. While it is not a theater specific handbook for either Afghanistan or Iraq and is meant to provide general principles and guidance to the services for application in a wide variety of COIN applications, it does integrate elements of COIN campaigns from contemporary operations within a theoretical framework. This new doctrine comes at a time when U.S. national interests, weak or failed states and insurgent aspirations all intersect in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

Africa’s importance to U.S. national security has grown dramatically under the Clinton and Bush administrations. Since the beginning of de-colonization in the 1950s, the U.S. had not committed significant forces to a long-term military effort on the continent of Africa. In the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) considered Africa, which falls within its area of responsibility, less the Horn of Africa and Madagascar, to be an economy of force effort and a secondary priority from their primary purpose of deterring Soviet aggression in Europe. Most notable among the
limited contingency operations executed on the continent include hostage rescue, humanitarian assistance and noncombatant evacuation operations. In late 1964 and early 1965 the U.S. Air Force provided tactical airlift for Belgian paratroopers to rescue hostages in Stanlyville, Congo (Odom 1988). In 1992, U.S. forces airlifted humanitarian aid to Somalia under the authority of UN resolution 767 (Bauman 2002). Operation Provide Relief transformed into Operation Restore Hope by the end of 1992 where U.S. forces led a coalition effort to provide the security needed to complete the initial humanitarian assistance mission (Bauman 2002). U.S. forces conducted multiple noncombatant evacuation operations from 1991 to 2002 to extract American citizens and others from Liberia, Somalia, the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, and Cote D’Ivoire (USEUCOM 2007). From the U.S. national perspective, crises that occurred in Africa would never command the attention, resources, and commitment that a crisis in Western or Eastern Europe would. Now, along with other regions of Africa, as the Gulf of Guinea’s strategic influence on the U.S. and U.S. allies grows, its security has become a key part of the U.S. National Security Strategy and, like the enduring presence in the Horn of Africa, may see a semi-permanent deployment of U.S. forces in the near future.

Nigeria is the fifth largest provider of oil and petroleum products to the United States, currently providing 8.5% of total U.S. oil imports, and the most for any single African producer (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2007). Cote D’Ivoire is the largest regional refiner of crude oil, and Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are also major participants in the West African petroleum industry. The region, however, is beset with political instability and internal conflict, ranging from banditry and ethnic militarism to
active and well organized insurgent movements. Regional neighbors such as Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone are either embroiled in internal conflict or are in the immediate post-conflict recovery stage and reestablishing societies that suffered almost total destruction in the past decade.

Figure 1. Nigeria with the Delta Region highlighted – Based on a UN Map of Nigeria

Gulf of Guinea insurgencies are a product of their environment; a unique blend of geographic, social, political, and military conditions that are distinctly different from the rest of the world. Because of this unique operating environment, insurgencies and
counterinsurgent operations will present a set of challenges that may be unknown to the U.S. military with an Afghan and Iraqi insurgency baseline. Some challenges may differ from that baseline only in scope, application, and effect, and some may be completely new. It is therefore likely that the presentation of insurgency in the Gulf of Guinea context and its specific requirements for an effective COIN campaign may not match the U.S. military’s current COIN experiences and competencies.

The growing insurgency in the Niger River Delta region of Nigeria can trace its roots back to the 1967-1970 Nigerian Civil War where ethnic tensions, violent political change at the federal level, re-partitioning or the creation of new of state governments, and the control of strategic resources caused the Igbo ethnic group within Nigeria to consolidate in their ancestral homeland in the south east of the country and secede, forming the state of Biafra. Today, many of the same root causes to the civil war are fueling the tensions and conflict seen in Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta states. The federal government controls the oil revenues from the Delta region and returns almost nothing in the way of profits back to the local communities. The share of oil revenue that comes back to the state and local governments is almost completely consumed by endemic corruption that reaches into every corner of government. The enduring ethnic tensions, combined with heavy-handed police and military response to civil unrest, the crushing poverty, and the general availability of small arms and light weapons has created the current state of instability. This overarching disenfranchisement for the lower economic class in the Delta region and their total inability to gain redress through the political process has made their choice to become insurgents the only choice available in many cases. In the early 1990s, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP)
was the first organized response from the multi-ethnic Delta region against the actions of the Nigerian federal government and foreign oil companies. In 1995, when the Nigerian government executed the leaders of MOSOP on allegedly fabricated murder charges, other more militant groups began to emerge. The Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Bakassai Boys, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Coalition for Militant Action (COMA), the Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF), and the Prince Igodo Gang, to name just a few, emerged onto the scene. While there is some evidence to indicate that these groups are partly organized and financed by local and regional authorities as private militias, they have conducted kidnap for ransom operations and theft of crude oil on a large scale (oil bunkering) to finance their existence. Not unlike the localized nature of inner city gangs in the U.S., these insurgent groups have established territories and compete with each other for the illicit profits from kidnapping and bunkering, but are not coordinated and synchronized with each other against their common enemy, the Government of Nigeria.
The U.S. military’s experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq, both at the tactical and operational levels, have not established an adequate skill set to overcome the challenges of COIN presented in the Niger River Delta (NRD) and will require changes in service doctrine, organization, training, material, and leader development to prevail in this unique COIN environment.

In order to examine the thesis, this study will answer the primary question; What new doctrinal, organizational, training, material, or leader development (DOTML) challenges or variations on existing DOTML requirements will COIN in the Niger River Delta present at the tactical and operational level as compared to recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq? The secondary, or enabling, questions necessary to arrive at an
answer for the primary question require a description of the NRD IOE and a description of the Government of Nigeria’s (GoN) response to insurgencies in order to determine the current problem-set. Using problem-set as a point of departure, this study will examine how current U.S. COIN doctrine plus the COIN experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq satisfy the requirements of the NRD IOE problem-set.

Assumptions

The primary assumption in this study is that the U.S. will commit forces as a part of a coalition for COIN operations in NRD region within the next decade to protect U.S. national security interests. Those interests are or will be rooted in the exploration, extraction and production of oil. A secondary, but still critical assumption is that the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) will forward deploy forces to the Gulf of Guinea region to provide focus and national emphasis for operations on the continent and in the contiguous waters of Africa.

Key Terms

Conventional Forces (CF). Those regular active or reserve military forces established by a sovereign nation to provide security and to conduct offensive operations in support of national objectives. These forces wear a distinctive uniform, have a common training experience and perform operations in accordance with a commonly understood doctrine or procedure.

Counterinsurgency (COIN). Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (U.S. Army FM 1-02 2004).
DOTMLPF. A problem-solving construct for assessing current capabilities and managing change using the dynamics of doctrine, organization, training, material, leader development, personnel and facilities (FM 1 2005).

Economy of Force. One of the nine principles of war: Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts (U.S. Army FM 1-02 2004).

Gulf of Guinea. The area of the African continent that includes the following countries and their territorial waters; Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo.

Institution. An established organization or corporation (as a bank or university) especially of a public character (Merriam-Webster 2006).

Insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (U.S. Army FM 1-02 2004). For the purposes of this study, an insurgency is an asymmetric struggle between a non-state element and the state authority where the non-state element employs non-lethal and lethal means to alter political, economic and power relationships to redress a specific set of grievances.

Insurgent operational environment (IOE). The operational environment particular to an insurgency described by the dynamics of Environment, Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure and Insurgent (EPMESI3).

Niger River Delta. The region of Nigeria comprised of Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta states and bounded on the west by the Benin River, the east by the Imo River and fed predominantly by the discharge of the Niger River in across low flood plains to the Atlantic.
Oil Bunkering. Oil theft, known in Nigeria as "illegal bunkering," involves siphoning crude oil or condensate gas from pipelines and then transporting the fuel, mainly by barge, for sale to operators of trucks and ships bound for markets throughout Africa, Europe and Asia (Jane’s Information Group 2006).

Special Operations Forces (SOF). Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations (U.S. Army FM 1-02 2004).

Limitations

This study will examine U.S. COIN doctrine and execution at the tactical and operational levels of war as conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq, and apply those experiences to the conditions and requirements of the developing insurgency in the Niger River Delta region of Nigeria. This study will describe Nigerian government COIN in order to complete the tactical and operational picture. This study will also examine the role of non-state actors in the NRD region, including multinational oil companies, the media, and organized criminal enterprises.

Delimitation

This study will not address the U.S. COIN experience in Vietnam or El Salvador. This study will not address the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone or Côte d’Ivoire. This study will not examine the Pan-Sahel Initiative, or its successor, the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative. This study will not examine the 2004 coup attempt in
Equatorial Guinea or Nigerian-Cameroonian tensions over the Bakassai Peninsula. This study will not examine Islamic extremism in Nigeria.

Significance of the Study

The competition between nations for strategic resources will increase as the world “shrinks” in terms of growing urbanization, global communications and the mobility of individuals and commodities. As already disenfranchised elements of national populations are increasingly marginalized in the drive towards globalization, those groups will more likely turn to insurgent struggle to gain redress, particularly in regions with weak governance and availability of small arms and light weapons. Now more so than in the past, insurgents in remote areas can directly threaten U.S. national security interests without necessarily threatening the destruction of their host nation. Therefore, while an insurgency in a remote corner of an African (or Latin American or South East Asian) nation may not substantively threaten the host government’s survival, those insurgent’s requirements for redress may come into direct conflict with U.S. national security interests. In order to restore the integrity of U.S. national security, such insurgencies may compel a response by the joint and interagency efforts of the U.S. military to participate in, or to independently conduct, COIN operations. Given that all insurgencies are unique in context and conduct, the COIN methodology from one operational experience may only be partially applicable to or be completely incompatible with the next COIN requirement. This study will illustrate that COIN in the Gulf of Guinea context will differ significantly from COIN in Afghanistan or Iraq, and given the evolving nature of the insurgency in Nigeria, the adaptations necessary to prepare the
current force for these COIN challenges will impact the uniformed services across the DOTML domains.

In the next chapter, I will examine the extant body of work on insurgency and counterinsurgency as it bears on this study. Within that examination, I will highlight relevant works on COIN theory and doctrine, the African tradition of insurgencies and COIN, recent U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, and specific works on the growing insurgency in the NRD. This literature review will provide the reader with some insight into the vast body of work on counterinsurgency and some selected pieces that either reinforce my analysis, or provide contrast in theory, or specific situation.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature of insurgency and COIN is vast by any standard. It encompasses the military, political, civil, sociological, psychological, historical and journalistic perspectives on insurgency and COIN, and provides every possible political interpretation of events, from the radical to the conservative. While insurgencies are not specifically 20th century phenomenon, the majority of the literature addressing either insurgency or COIN is the product of modern thinkers; soldiers, statesmen, and academics, though there are numerous historical works on insurgency pre-1900, most of the literature, histories included, cover modern insurgency and counterinsurgency.

This chapter will provide the reader with a brief overview of works relevant to the examination of U.S. military preparedness to conduct COIN in the Niger River Delta. In terms of this study, I will group relevant works into; the theory and doctrine of insurgency and COIN, insurgency and COIN in Africa since 1960, insurgency and COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001, and insurgency and COIN in the Niger River Delta. The section on theory and doctrine will examine various analytical frameworks in use today. The section on insurgency and COIN in Africa will highlight the unique characteristics that this continent imposes on conflict, including the process of decolonization and liberation struggles. The section on Afghanistan and Iraq will provide the reader insight into the academic and professional military works on the ongoing insurgency in those two theaters specifically as to how they shape the U.S. military’s capability to conduct COIN elsewhere. Lastly, the section on insurgency and COIN in the...
Niger River Delta will highlight the available works on this emerging insurgency, limited mostly to academic papers, periodical reporting, and mainstream journalism.

The methodology for selecting one work over another for inclusion in this chapter is a subjective test of each work’s currency and relevancy to this research question. While this methodology may exclude many works with great insight, the scope of this study requires the imposition of limits. In the third section, insurgency and COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001, for any cited Department of Defense products that are either labeled Unclassified but For Official Use Only (FOUO), or classified at any level, I will limit the review to the Unclassified and publicly releasable synopsis of said publications.

Counterinsurgency Theory and Doctrine

*FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (2006) is the current multi-service doctrine for U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps conduct of COIN operations. This manual combines the theory and history of insurgency and counterinsurgency with the actions, programs, and tactics developed as a result of four years of COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq. In acknowledging the highly variable nature of insurgencies, the authors take a general approach to the deconstruction of insurgency and the considerations necessary for the design of a successful COIN campaign. The manual describes a counterinsurgency campaign as a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations, conducted along multiple lines of operation and constantly adjusted to the prevailing circumstances and enemy action by adaptive leaders. It however, avoids the “play book” approach so common in the doctrine publications of the 1980s-1990s and does not proscribe a set of procedural solutions for a specific insurgency but addresses
the characteristics of insurgencies and COIN strategies in general. FM 3-24 goes on to
discuss the U.S. military’s role as nation builders; assisting the re-establishment of
governance, rule of law, civil institutions, local security forces, and infrastructure and
basic services. It also describes the extensive coordination and cooperation necessary
with a wide range of intergovernmental, indigenous, and international agencies in the
successful prosecution of a COIN strategy and the leader mindset required for success.
FM 3-24 will provide this study with the basic doctrinal framework within which the U.S.
military would conduct a COIN in the Niger River Delta Region in the future.

*Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse* by Bard O’Neill
(2006). In the second edition of his 1990 work, which represents his more than 40 years
of the study of insurgency and COIN, the author provides us with a framework for the
analysis of insurgencies and terrorism past and present. O’Neill begins by contextualizing
insurgencies in the modern world, mostly through a discussion of the dynamics of the
national and international arenas where insurgencies exist. He moves on to describe nine
types of insurgencies as derived from their motives and *modus operandi* and the
difficulties, dangers and necessity in classifying an insurgency along these lines. He
spends the remainder of the book deconstructing insurgencies using the factors of
insurgent strategies, physical and human environment, popular support, organization,
external support, and the nature of governmental response to a specific insurgency. This
is an excellent work in general and the analytic model useful in any
insurgency/counterinsurgency environment. This work will figure prominently in the
later analysis of the Niger River Delta insurgency.
The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War by LTC John McCuen, USA (1965) is one of the first U.S. works on insurgency and counterinsurgency that addresses the complete equation of the psychological, political and military aspects of what the author calls counterrevolutionary warfare. LTC McCuen arrived at three basic conclusions in the preparation of this work; 1. far too many people do not really understand the problem [of insurgency], 2. the concept and principles of this strategy are clearly defined even though their application differs from country to country, and 3. a governing power [including a third-party proxy power] can defeat any revolutionary movement if it adapts the revolutionary strategy and principles and applies them in reverse. He organizes his work into sections on the theory, practice and keys to victory in counterrevolutionary warfare. In the book, he uses elements of several case studies to illustrate his points; including the French experience in Algeria, the French and U.S. experiences in Vietnam, and the Greek civil war. A fundamental component of his application of theory is the emphasis on the development and engagement of local or indigenous civil structures including law enforcement, governance and the economy, in counter-organizing, counter-terrorism and counter-guerilla operations. He points to a counter-insurgent center of gravity in the ability to govern all areas of a country and not abdicating control of rural and remote areas to the insurgent. The book is endorsed with a forward by Sir Robert Thompson, the head of the British Advisory Mission to Vietnam and late of the Malay Emergency. An additional endorsement of his work lies in the fact that the defense forces of both Southern Rhodesia and South Africa embraced McCuen’s work as the basis for their successful COIN doctrine and campaigns design, enabling both counterinsurgent governments to effectively interdict and disrupt insurgent campaigns (O’Brien 1998).
In *Resisting Rebellion*, author Anthony James Joes (2004) discusses insurgencies from the eighteenth century Vendee rebellion in France to Chechnya in 2004, and in the Americas, Africa, Europe and the Middle East. Like O’Neil, he proposes an analytic framework to determine the nature of an insurgency, its causal conditions and fundamental makeup of social and political factors, and how to develop an effective COIN campaign to counter it. His main argument is that the overarching characteristic of a successful COIN strategy is conciliation. He argues that a mixture of military action (the minority effort) and a comprehensive political campaign to legitimize and resolve the insurgent complaints will serve to divorce the rank and file insurgent from the leadership, and external supporters from the cause (Joes 2004). In combination with O’Neil and McCuen, this work will provide some of the analytic structure for this study.

*Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* by David Galula (1964) is widely regarded as a classic guide on how to defeat an insurgency. COL Galula, a French Army officer with counterinsurgency experience in Indochina, Greece, Algeria and China, begins by analyzing the fundamental nature of insurgency, or revolutionary war, and the conditions necessary for an insurgency to develop. He analyzes the two dominant models of insurgency; the orthodox communist model and the bourgeois nationalist model. He continues with a discussion of insurgent movements under conditions he terms “cold” and “hot” revolutions. The primary discriminators between cold and hot are the legality of the insurgency and the insurgency’s use of violence as a tool. He provides generalized courses of action to approach the cold and hot insurgencies, complete with suggestions for lethal and non-lethal targeting. Galula concludes the work with a discussion of the tasks and elements of operational design necessary for a successful
COIN campaign. He emphasizes both the necessity for an interagency approach to COIN operations and the importance of the non-kinetic and IO aspects. This work will provide additional analytic framework to the study and also a different national perspective, as the O’Neil’s, McCuen’s and Joes’ works are all American authors.

*Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* by LTC John Nagl, USA, (2005) addresses the question of how militaries adapt to changing circumstances in the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Nagl compares the development of British COIN doctrine and application in the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 and French and American COIN doctrine that evolved over the course of the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975 by using both primary and secondary sources from both conflicts. Nagl proposes that organizational culture is the essential factor to a military’s ability to learn from unanticipated conditions. Nagl concludes that the British army was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of COIN during the Malayan Emergency than the U.S. Army was from the Vietnam conflict. He attributes British success to the organizational characteristics created by UK history and national culture and the British Army’s experience as a colonial police force throughout the commonwealth. This experience, he argues, imbued the British with a higher acceptance of difference of opinion in organizational decision-making, subordinate or “bottom-up” feedback from operations, and organizational flexibility. He does, though, recognize the vast differences between the two theaters, where the French and U.S. were fundamentally unable to isolate the insurgents from external support due to long borders with nations sympathetic to the insurgent, versus the British ability to isolate the entire Malay peninsula with the Royal Navy. LTC Nagl’s
work will support the description of the U.S. military’s learning and applying COIN lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq, and how those skills would be applied to an insurgency in a very different theater.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Africa since 1960

_Counterinsurgency in Africa: the Portuguese Way of War, 1961-1974_ by John Cann (1997) is the first comprehensive account in English describing how the Portuguese Armed Forces prepared for and conducted counterinsurgency campaigns in their African colonies. Beginning in 1961, the Portuguese committed their national will to defeat liberation movements in Angola, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and Cape Verde with a military that had not seen combat since the end of WWI. The author examines, in detail, how Portugal defined and analyzed multiple insurgent threats, how it developed national policies and military doctrine, and how it applied those instruments in the African colonial environment. Cann describes Portuguese efforts to develop a power projection capability, the infrastructure necessary for COIN campaigns in three dissimilar colonies, and operational execution over lines of communication extending thousands of miles from their home country. This work is essential to understanding insurgency in the African sense, and some of the requirements for a non-African nation to conduct COIN.

_African Guerrillas_ edited by Christopher Clapham (1997) examines the relationships between African insurgencies and the societies in which they develop, the principles upon which the insurgencies are based, and the relationship between those insurgencies and the world, both regionally and internationally. Clapham has assembled works by leading experts on Africa and conflict, examining the insurgencies in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia and the Congo. Of particular
note in this collection is the underlying premise that the insurgencies developing Africa experienced were fundamentally shaped by the colonial experience and the institutions of governance that evolved from post colonial independence. More so than simply language, the culture, character and military traditions of the former colonial powers can be seen in the insurgent movements even early in the 21st century. This book is an excellent source of comparative case studies and will provide some context to the analysis of the insurgent groups in the Niger River Delta.

*My Command* by General Olusegun Obasanjo (1980) is a major contribution to the history of the Nigerian Civil war from 1967 to 1970. This book is essentially an autobiographical account of his experiences as the commander of the 3rd Marine Commando Division conducting operations in southeast Nigeria, which included the Niger River Delta region. The author provides a background and context for the Biafran secession and the social and cultural causes for the conflict that, while may be slanted given his position in the Nigerian leadership, none-the-less gives a comprehensive picture of the causes. In later chapters he describes the mobilization of the federal forces, the adversarial international diplomatic environment because of effective Igbo information operations, the conduct of operations at the Brigade and Division levels, the introduction of foreign fighters on the side of the secessionists, and the successful conclusion of the war. The parallels from that period to today are striking, and not because General Obasanjo is today Nigeria’s second term President Obasanjo, but because of the still deep social divide between the Nigerian government and military and the various ethnic groups in the Niger River Delta. The effectiveness, popular support and morale of the Nigerian military was low in 1967, as it is today, and international support today is tied to
performance measures in human rights and effective governance, as it was in 1967. This work will provide substantial insight into the Nigerian response to insurgency, and a historical baseline from which to measure performance today.

*West Africa’s Security Challenges*, edited by Adekeye Adebajo (2004) is a comprehensive work on the subject of security, governance, insurgency and social conflict in West Africa. The authors, all experts in their fields, provide the context for discussion by describing the regional characteristics of West Africa and the role of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The authors go on to describe the challenges or causes for conflict, addressing governance, civil-military relations, economic instability, the availability of small arms and light weapons, and the role of child soldiers in many of these conflicts. Finally, there is a description of the role of the United Nations, the Untied States, British, French influence and actors in the region and a vision of the future of security structures in this vital region. The value of this collection is in its contemporary material. It is not a historical examination of the 1970s or 1980s, but a focused analysis of the current sources and consequences of instability in the region. Readers will be able to draw parallels between the civil conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire and future conflicts in countries that share social, resource or religious instability.

*Warriors at Work: How Guinea Was Really Set Free* by Mustafah Dhada (1993) is a balanced and nonpartisan examination of the Bissau-Guinean people's struggle against the Portuguese for independence. Dhada focuses on the role of popular support in the insurgent struggle and the creation of an indigenous nation state structure that would replace the Portuguese colonial government when the insurgents achieved their goals of
supplanting the colonial power. Dhada's focus on the mechanics of this process provides insight into what made the Bissau-Guinean revolution effective, unique, and as a potential model for other insurgents to emulate. Dhada presents a non-romanticized view of Amilcar Cabral and strips away the communist liberation rhetoric to examine the primary insurgent groups, their common and divergent interests and the ultimate cause for Portuguese withdrawal from Guinea-Bissau. This excellent examination of one insurgent struggle will serve to provide a structural model to examine the insurgent groups in the Niger River Delta.

*No Fist is Big Enough to Hide The Sky: The Liberation of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde: Aspects of an African Revolution* by Basil Davidson (1981) is a seminal work, originally published in 1969 and updated in 1981, on the successful insurgency in Guinea-Bissau. The author combines first-hand research and travel to the region with an analytic model to examine the insurgent struggle. His methodology includes the questions; Why?, How?, Under what precise conditions?, and By what political principles and organization? He had extensive access to the insurgent leadership as he spent considerable time conducting first-hand observations of the Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) before independence, and witnessed first-hand the Portuguese application of COIN doctrine. Given the first-hand account and rigorous analysis of the insurgency, Davidson’s book is a critical work in the understanding of insurgency in West Africa. The parallels in this book with the multi-ethnic makeup of the Niger River Delta, the similarities in response to insurgency by the Portuguese and the Nigerian government, and the similar terrain will provide critical insight into the Nigerian insurgency.
*Guerrilla Struggle in Africa: An Analysis and Preview* by Kenneth W. Grundy (1971) is primarily focused on insurgency and guerrilla struggle in southern Africa, but constitutes an excellent comparative analyses of insurgent struggles throughout the continent. The author discusses the insurgencies against colonial powers in Kenya and Algeria, against the White minority governments in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, and against the post-colonial governments in the Congo and Sudan. He discusses the aspects of political violence and guerrilla warfare that characterize many post-colonial African nations in his examination of insurgencies; target regime, political goal, group appeal, and political-military methodology. Though he does not provide a preview of insurgencies to come, despite the implication of the title, his research and comparative analysis of past insurgencies are useful to any study of present African insurgent conflicts.

*Lessons From Contemporary COIN: The Rhodesian Experience* by Bruce Hoffman, Jennifer Taw and David Arnold (1991) is a RAND Arroyo Center report commissioned by the Commandant of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College to examine the lessons from Rhodesian COIN operations between 1965 and 1980, and determine the relevance of those lessons to the U.S. Army. The authors examined four areas common to most insurgencies, and therefore applicable to future U.S. Army COIN efforts elsewhere in the world. The primary areas of inquiry are; security force organization and C3; countermeasures to suppress urban terrorism; rural pacification and security; and intelligence collection, collation [analysis] and dissemination. This study provides an examination of an African insurgency and the COIN campaign to combat it in order to highlight actual or perceived gaps in the U.S.
Army’s capability to conduct COIN itself. The authors’ conclusions indicate that the U.S. Army, while in the midst of providing COIN support to the government of El Salvador, was unable to shed its focus on high intensity conventional combat and implement a coherent and effective COIN doctrine and strategy. This work will provide some comparative insight into the current U.S. Army institutional bias against COIN and serve to highlight some of the challenges that will be faced in the Niger River Delta.

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq Since 2001

This section contains mostly papers from independent think-tanks and those products produced by the U.S. military. Given the ongoing nature of the Global War on Terrorism, some of the publications herein are marked For Official Use Only (FOUO) and, as such, are not available to the general public. Therefore, for publications from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), I will only provide the document’s executive summaries or introductions rather than descriptions of specific content in order to protect the information in accordance with Department of Defense regulations and policies.

The Developing Iraqi Insurgency: Status at the End of 2004 by Anthony Cordesman (2004) is an outstanding paper produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), detailing the Iraqi insurgency and drawing parallels with the insurgency in Afghanistan. This work outlines the coalition forces’ strategy for defeating the Iraqi insurgency and identifies a range of tactical operations that coalition forces have employed. Mr. Cordesman’s work also describes coalition operational metrics and battlefield statistics and highlights the insurgent’s tactical adaptability and employment of information technology.
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq by Bruce Hoffman (2004) is a Rand study describing the unique and network-centric nature of the Iraqi insurgency. The Rand study proposes the theory that the U.S. governmental doctrine developed to counter an insurgency, that can be described in terms of fixed organizational relationships, is ineffective because the insurgency in Iraq is a loose confederation of opportunistically allied insurgent groups with different and sometimes competing agendas. The author proposes that there is no identifiable insurgent chain of command that can be systematically attacked in the Iraqi insurgency, as the French were able to do against the Algerian insurgents. The implication for counterinsurgency in Iraq is that Coalition forces must adapt to an extremely flexible, widely dispersed, and semi-autonomous insurgent organization with no personality-based center of gravity. The relevance of this piece to the research question is; “Will this style of insurgent organization migrate to other zones of conflict, and will the U.S. military see this type of organization again?”

The Ongoing Lessons of Afghanistan by Anthony Cordesman (2004) is another excellent CSIS report, this time addressing Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. This study is broken into conventional and asymmetric (read COIN) phases of the conflict, providing background and lessons learned for each phase. The assessment focuses mostly on coalition actions, systems and organizations, and describes the effects on the enemy and the lasting effect of those actions given an adaptable enemy’s vote on the reaction or counteraction. The study addresses strategic, operational and tactical levels of war, with highlights on the actions of external actors such as Pakistan and NATO. It discusses OEF as an asymmetric war fought by sides with fundamentally different goals and perceptions using radically different methods and fought as a theater
battle in a broader global struggle against terrorism. This work provides the study with additional data on the conduct of COIN in the War on Terrorism, and allows a fuller comparison of skill sets against requirements for the insurgency in the Niger River Delta.

*CALL Handbook 02-08, Operation Enduring Freedom TTP*, by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (2002). This handbook is part of a Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commanding General (CG) initiative to provide units with lessons from past conflicts and from current operations that are relevant to the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) and specifically the Afghan theater of operations. To a lesser extent, this handbook supports operations in the Horn of Africa and in the Philippines. This handbook provides a description of the COE, tactics, techniques, and procedures that apply to U.S. and coalition operations in Afghanistan, an introduction to Afghanistan, and country studies of Somalia, Yemen, and the Philippines.

*CALL Handbook 03-35, Operation Enduring Freedom II* by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (2003). The purpose of this handbook is to provide units with current information from OEF for units and personnel preparing to deploy to that theater. The handbook provides information and tactics, techniques and procedures from several sources, including Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180), the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), and observations, insights and lessons collected by CALL. This handbook is a companion to *CALL Handbook 02-08 Operation Enduring Freedom TTP*, and provides additional country information on Afghanistan, a discussion of Anti-Coalition TTPs, and information that is applicable to all aspects of coalition operations against remnants of the Taliban.
CALL Initial Impressions Report 04-13, Operation Iraqi Freedom CAAT II by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (2004). The purpose of this publication is to provide U.S. Army units and personnel with updated information on selected conditions within the Operation Iraqi Freedom AOR. This publication focused on CJTF-7 and selected subordinate units conducting operation in Iraq in February and March 2004 and focused topically on civil-military operations to include engineering, civil affairs, logistics, and information operations at the brigade echelon and below. This publication provides insight into elements of the U.S. COIN effort in Iraq, and some of the key issues of interest to commanders and staff throughout the AOR.

CALL Special Edition 06-01, Advising Foreign Forces by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (2006). The purpose of this publication was to provide a practical reference guide for individuals and units to use in preparation for missions as trainers and advisors to foreign military units. The publication includes TTPs successfully used by both United States Army SOF and conventional forces in conducting foreign military training (FMT). This publication is less a reference, in the true sense of the word, and more a compilation of vignettes related by personnel who had completed tours advising Iraqi Army and Police units and the relevant experiences they had. This publication continues the tradition of “soldier lore” as a key aspect of training and preparing personnel for unusual or abnormal tasks and assignments. It provides this study with a framework with which to gauge U.S. Army conventional forces’ ability to conduct this aspect of COIN in the Niger River Delta.

CALL Newsletter 07-01, Tactical Intelligence by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (2007). The purpose of this publication is to examine the generation, analysis,
dissemination and actions flowing from intelligence at the tactical level in stability and support operations in a COIN environment. This publication offers a mix of information from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and trends observed in units training for deployment to those theaters. The primary message of this publication is that effective and timely intelligence establishes the conditions for effective operations, both lethal and non-lethal, in a COIN environment. The authors provide some insight into the intelligence issues and challenges currently faced by U.S. Army units in a COIN environment at the tactical level, many of which will be applicable to future COIN in the Niger River Delta.

CALL Handbook 07-06, Southern Afghanistan COIN Operations by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (2007). The purpose of this handbook is to provide guidance to the commanders and staffs of combined-arms forces that have a primary mission of eliminating insurgent forces. It discusses the nature of organized guerilla units and underground elements and their supporters. This handbook provides information on organization, training, and TTPs combined-arms forces, in conjunction with civil agencies, can employ to destroy large, well-organized insurgent forces in active COIN conflicts.

CALL Handbook 07-11, Provincial Reconstruction Teams by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (2007). The purpose of this publication is to describe the roles and missions for the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) developed by coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The PRT’s mission is to assist Iraq’s provincial governments in developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, to promote increased security and rule of law, to promote political and economic development, and
to provide the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2006). In a general sense, the PRTs meet all the requirements to challenge the insurgent for influence over the population, less combat operations. The term PRT is used in both theaters, but an Iraqi and an Afghan PRT are very different in mission scope. This publication describes the PRT mission in these theater contexts (capacity building in Iraq and capability building in Afghanistan), and their role in coalition post-conflict stability and reconstruction efforts.

*CALL Special Study 07-16, From Zero to Blue* by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (2007). The purpose of this special study is to provide a template for U.S. military planners to reestablish a collapsed police force. An essential task in COIN is the establishment or reestablishment of effective law enforcement capability. In both Afghanistan and Iraq this task has fallen, in some measure, to coalition military forces. This publication provides guidance and recommendations to non-military police units who are required, by mission or necessity, to perform this role typically performed by civilian law enforcement or Department of State within the rubric of nation building. While this publication essentially provides a single method to accomplish this task, the template can be tailored to meet the specific requirements of a regional application.

*The Iraq War and Lessons for COIN (DRAFT)* by Anthony Cordesman (2006). This draft CSIS report addresses the evolution and transformation of the Iraqi insurgency between 2003 and 2006. The author discuss the emergence of the insurgency immediately after the end of major combat operations in 2003, the Coalition’s efforts to describe, measure, and quantify the insurgency or insurgencies and to counter the violence in a systematic fashion. A section on the composition of the insurgency provides
insight into the possibility that the Coalition is faced with multiple, simultaneous
insurgencies representing a spectrum of ethnic, religious, national and trans-national
actors. Mr. Cordesman concludes with an enumeration of strategic lessons learned from
COIN in Iraq, all of which have application, either directly or by extrapolation, to the
operational level of war.

The Insurgency in the Niger River Delta Region of Nigeria

There are limited academic resources extant that describe the insurgent
operational environment, the Nigerian government’s COIN strategy and the insurgent
groups in the Niger River Delta Region. The resources that do exist are limited to studies,
information papers, and reports by organizations involved in human rights and
government accountability monitoring, organizations providing security assessments to
business operating in Nigeria and current news reporting and magazine articles by
journalists. The only primary sources are interviews with western oil field personnel
having direct contact with the insurgents and or the Nigerian military and police forces in
the region.

The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigeria’s Delta Unrest published by the International
Crisis Group (2006) is a comprehensive study of the current security situation in the
Niger Delta Region. The International Crisis Group is an independent, non-profit, non-
governmental organization working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy
to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. The authors examine the colonial history of the
region, the marginalization of the local ethnic groups by the failures of the Nigerian
federal and state governments to provide essential basic services and the exploitation of
natural resources by the Nigerian federal government and foreign oil companies. They
provide a series of recommendations through this study that essentially “line up” with the principles and strategies of counterinsurgency, minus the military action. This report is based in part on the interviews of primary sources by ICG researchers in the field. It is an excellent primer to the region.

_The Warri Crisis: Fueling Violence_ published by Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2003) is a study detailing the conditions and causal agents to the violence and instability in present-day Nigeria. They have focused on the western portion of the Niger River Delta region, referred to as the Warri region, for the major city in this state. The report describes the lack of governance, the dominance of personal agendas, corruption and organized crime contending for profits from oil exploration, and the prevalence of armed violence for different factions to gain or maintain control of this valuable resource. As HRW characterizes the level of violence in the Delta region as a war, they were unable to directly investigate all aspects of the crisis. However, one HRW field researcher had unique access to the conflict zone, due to personal background that is not explained, and implies to the reader that he was involved with the Nigerian police or oil companies in the region. Therefore, the study is very well documented and supported by primary sources.

_Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria’s Rivers State_ published by Human Rights Watch (2005) is a study of the cultural aspects of violence, access to small arms and light weapons, and the tradition of ethnic resistance to centralized and non-representative government in the eastern part of the Niger River Delta, centered on Port Harcourt. The study amplifies and completes _The Warri Crisis_ published in 2003, and delves into the emergence of armed groups in the Delta region. Like the previous study,
this one also provides insight into the social and political causes for this conflict and some insight into future action of the government and the insurgents.

*Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty* published by International Crisis Group (2006) is a background study on Nigeria that provides a framework for future ICG studies on the Delta Region and the inter ethnic tensions in Plateau state. This paper provides a synopsis of Nigerian history, transition to independence, the legacy of military coups and the ethnic divisions that influence every aspect of life in Nigeria. The paper concludes with the next milestone for Nigeria, the 2007 elections, where there is great potential for instability. This is an excellent primer on Nigerian history and context.

*Security Assistance in Nigeria* by LTC Kenneth Prendergast (2003) is a strategy research project from the U.S. Army War College that argues for an increased and enhanced security assistance program between the U.S. and Nigeria. The author articulates the existing challenges in Nigeria, as well as the threats in the region and the world that can influence the stability of Nigeria, and, consequently, U.S. national security interests. The author proposes that now is the time for increased engagement with Nigeria in order to encourage them to develop the essential social structures (governance, health, economic and military) that support their own security and, by extension, U.S. national security interests.

*The Globalization of Private Security: Nigeria Country Report* by Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams (2005) outlines the key issues surrounding the provision of private security in Nigeria, focusing in particular on Lagos and the oil industry in the Niger River Delta. It provides an overview of the private security sector; what it is in terms of size and composition, what market and public security dynamics
created it, how it is controlled or legislated by Nigeria and how it services its wide range of domestic and international business clientele. The study further examines the relationship between the private security sector and public institutions like the police and military. The study concludes with a discussion of the inevitable merging of private and public security apparatus in a social and political environment characterized by corruption and ethnic intolerance. It is an excellent work on a subject that has received little scholarly attention. This paper will provide insight into the study from the aspect of the external actors in the insurgent operational environment of the Niger River Delta.

Chop Fine: The Human Rights Impact of Local Government Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers state, Nigeria by Human Rights Watch (2007). This HRW report on corruption at the local and state governmental level in Rivers state of Nigeria illustrates essential elements of the insurgent operational environment that directly contributes to the likelihood of a classic insurgency emerging in the Niger River Delta. The endemic corruption uncovered by HRW in its four week field research to the 23 local governments of Rivers state in 2006 provides the essential element of “cause” to the emergence of an insurgency. The report outlines corruption that compromises all categories of public governance; economic, public health, education, infrastructure, investment and economic, and illustrates the environment within which COIN operations will have to be conducted, and some of the requirements for that future COIN campaign.

Conclusion

This literature review demonstrates that a considerable body of work on the theory, practice and history of insurgency and counterinsurgency is available to us today. Within the constraints of this study’s primary research question, there still remains a
considerable amount of directly relevant works, and works that provide useful contrast or comparison. The doctrine of counterinsurgency is less well represented, but for fundamentally valid reasons. One military should only have one doctrine for COIN, and only so many national militaries actually develop formal written doctrine. Of the works in this subset, there is solid representation. Of COIN in Africa since 1960, there is also a significant body of work in the theoretical genre, and slightly less in the descriptive literature of specific insurgencies or counterinsurgencies. With respect to COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq, the available works are less theoretical and more historical of analytic review in nature in order to provide the “essential lessons learned” to enable organizational knowledge sharing. The body of lessons learned is growing as those conflicts continue, but most are in need of proper contextualization and validation to make them applicable to other regions and situations. Lastly, the body of literature on the insurgency in the Niger River Delta region of Nigeria is paltry in quantity and only a few examples meet basic standards of objectivity, validity and analytic rigor. This study will strive to fill a part of this knowledge gap.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

The previous chapter examined works from the significant literature of insurgency and COIN that directly relate to the thesis that the experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq, at the tactical and operational levels, has not established an adequate skill set for the U.S. military to overcome the challenges of conducting COIN operations in the Niger River Delta, and will require changes in service doctrine, organization, training, material, and leader development to prevail in this unique COIN environment. The examination of the literature provided foundation and context for the analytic model that will describe the ethnic insurgency or insurgencies in the NRD, the Government of Nigeria’s COIN efforts, U.S. COIN doctrine, and U.S. COIN performance in Afghanistan and Iraq. This chapter will develop the qualitative analytic model and its application to each of the secondary questions, and establish a process to synthesize those factors in order to answer the primary research question.

As illustrated in the last chapter, there are many specific methodologies available to examine an insurgency or a counterinsurgency campaign. While none of the general methodologies available provide the level of detail required by this study and many do not account for some of the specific conditions of the NRD IOE, elements from several methodologies will be incorporated into this model.

The U.S. Joint doctrinal concept of an Operational Environment (OE) is “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander” (JP 1-02 2003).
Application of this concept by all services to the present, general world situation and out
to the year 2020 is commonly referred to as the Contemporary Operational Environment,
(COE). The COE is a framework within which actual and potential adversaries and peer
competitors of the U.S. can be analyzed in terms of their impact upon, and threat to,
national security. Within the concept of OEs and the general framework of the COE,
Joint doctrine calls for services to analyze potential contingency operations areas and to
develop a specific analytic framework for those real or potential contingencies, thus
providing the basis for intelligence preparation of the battlefield and campaign design.
The operational environment is described and evaluated using the variables of political,
military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information with the addition of physical
environment and time (PMESII-PT) (U.S. Army 2007). From the reference point of the
Contemporary Operational Environment, there further exist two sub-categories; the
Conventional Operational Environment and the Insurgent Operational Environment.
While these two sub-types of OEs share characteristics and qualities, they are generally
distinguishable from each other in terms of the adversary’s sovereign status
(Conventional) or lack thereof (Insurgent) and the adversary’s choice of military means.
Within this expanded framework of Operational Environments, and their impact on the
DOTMLPF domains, the instability in the Niger River Delta clearly falls into the
category of an Insurgent Operational Environment.

Analytic Model

The analytic model for this study is a variation on the system of systems
analytical tool PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and
Information) developed by U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) as a part of the
Operational Net Assessment process found in their Effects Based Approach to Operations (Joint Warfighting Center 2006). In order to fully develop this IOE, and to provide the clarity and detail demanded by the basic research question, the elements of Environment and Insurgent are added as separate categories to the basic PMESII construct. The addition of Environment as a separate category will provide detail on the physical (natural and man-made) environment that directly and indirectly shapes all other elements of the model. The addition of Insurgent as a separate category will allow an in-depth examination of the various insurgent groups. A more precise handling of the Military category will focus solely on the lawfully constituted military organizations of the Nigerian government. For the purpose of this study, the Military element will be articulated in terms of the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material and Leadership descriptive domains. The resultant analytic framework is EPM(DOTML)ESII-I.

The first E in the model, Environment, is broken down into terrain and marine topography (surface condition, vegetation, and water features), climate, and weather (temperature and humidity, precipitation, winds, clouds, and visibility) of the NRD. Environment will describe the naturally occurring, man-modified, and man-made physical structures and weather phenomena that shape all of the following descriptive categories. Political will describe the factors of national, regional and local government, political parties and participation, the elements of ethnicity or clan affiliation and the influence of international and non-state actors in the political process. Military will address only the aspects of doctrine, organization, training, material and leadership for the Nigerian Army, Air Force, Navy, and law enforcement agencies. The second E is for Economic, and will describe the industry, agriculture, and service sectors, national
imports and exports and the role of strategic resource such as metals, and crude or refined petrochemicals. A significant aspect of the Economic factor is the role played by international business in legitimate local or national ventures, and criminal enterprise in the shadow economy and international capital flight. Social will be articulated in terms of social structures or class, demographic distribution including ethnicity and tribe/clan affiliations, local and national historical context and the aspect of leadership, both popularly selected and appointed. It will include the aspects of enabling systems (e.g. health care and education) and affinity groups (e.g. professional associations, unions, internally displaced persons, etc.). Infrastructure is comprised of the physical networks of roads, railways and waterways, plus other key features, including airfields, ports, utilities (e.g. power generation and transmission, and telecommunications) and public places (e.g.: religious structures, public gathering places, public (government) buildings) and the physical processes of the manufacturing element of the Economic factor. The second I, Information, will describe the physical facilities of collecting, exchanging, and storing information (e.g. telecommunications and Internet connectivity, etc.), and GoN and insurgent Information Operations (IO).

The final I in the EPMESII-I is for Insurgent. Insurgent is necessary because PMESII, created to analyze an adversary nation state, does not adequately address the characteristics unique to an insurgent group, and actually dismantles an insurgent group between military, social and political categories, diluting the importance of the insurgent as an actor in the IOE. Insurgent is further broken down into the components of ideology, objective, organization, operations, funding, information operations, support
and recruiting, a compilation of the factors used to describe an insurgency by Bard O’Neil, John McCuen and Anthony Joes.

In U.S. Joint doctrine, an insurgent is a member of a political party who rebels against established leadership and an insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02 2003). Bard O’Neil, in Insurgency and Terrorism defines an insurgency as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics (O’Neil 2006). Finally, Galula defines insurgency as a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order (Galula 1964). None of these definitions adequately addresses the requirements of the NRD IOE. This study will use a variation on the O’Neil definition to describe the insurgent and insurgency. For the purposes of this study, an insurgency is an asymmetric struggle between a non-state element and the state authority where the non-state element employs non-lethal and lethal means to alter political, economic and power relationships to redress a specific set of grievances.

This study will apply the EPM(DOTML)ESII-I analytic framework as required to the four secondary questions (SQ). Some applications will be the full measure of characteristics, and some will use abbreviated or the original construct of PMESII. For SQ1, describe the insurgent operational environment in the Niger River Delta region, EPM(DOTML)ESII-I is applied in its full form. The answer to this question is a comprehensive understanding of the insurgents and their environment, both the physical
environment (naturally occurring and man-made) and the Socio-Political structures that comprise Nigerian society in the NRD region. The data set are commissioned studies (e.g.: RAND, CSIS, etc.) and reports of NGOs (e.g.: Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group, etc.), journalistic reporting, Nigerian government and insurgent IO products, and regional histories and country guides.

For SQ2, *describe the Government of Nigeria’s (GoN) response to insurgencies.* PMESII is applied in its original form, without the Environment and without the Insurgent. The primary data set are commissioned studies (e.g.: RAND, CSIS, etc.) and reports of NGOs (e.g.: Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group, etc.), journalistic reporting, Nigerian government and insurgent IO products, and regional histories and country guides.

For SQ3, *how does U.S. COIN doctrine apply to the Niger River Delta IOE?*, the PM(ED)ESII structure is used to conduct a qualitative review of service (U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps) doctrinal publications in common use since 2001.

For SQ4, *what U.S. COIN experiences from Iraq (OIF) and Afghanistan (OEF) are applicable to the NRD IOE?*, the full analytic framework, EPM(DOTML)ESII, will be applied to the data set, but where the environment of Nigeria is different from the environment of Iraq or Afghanistan that difference and its potential modifying effect on lessons from Iraq or Afghanistan will be annotated. The primary data set will include the formally published service lessons learned, commissioned qualitative studies by analytical organizations (e.g. RAND, CSIS, AWC) and academic analytical works from the staff colleges of the uniformed services.
Synthesis

The objective of this study is to determine the skill set that the U.S. military will be required to execute in future COIN in the Niger River Delta but does not currently possess. While the determination of needed but non-existent organizational or individual skills is not necessarily a problem of mathematics, some basic mathematical principles will clarify this objective. The IOE in the NRD and the Government of Nigeria (GoN) historical response to insurgencies are the two variables in the equation that describe the COIN problem-set. The variables of the IOE and the GoN response tend to have a multiplicative rather than a canceling effect for several reasons. First and foremost is that the insurgency in the NRD, which appeared in its modern form in 1990, continues to exist in 2007 despite the GoN’s best efforts to destroy it. Secondly, most elements of the current GoN COIN campaign serve to exacerbate the causative factors rather than resolve them. For example, insurgents attacked and killed several policemen in 1999 near the town of Odi in Bayelsa state in response to the earlier deaths of Ijaws in Lagos by Yourba militants (International Crisis Group 2006). The GoN responded by completely destroying the village of Odi and killing several hundred citizens as a reprisal measure to punish the local population (multiplying effect) rather than capturing or killing the perpetrators of the crime (canceling effect). Conversely, the GoN unevenly focuses resources on infrastructure development in Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states to address basic health services needs. However, due to the endemic corruption and ethnic bias in local government, those developmental funds are stolen and the already marginalized populations are unable to benefit from these initiatives while local leadership profit personally, resulting in further separation between the people and the government.
The counterbalancing variables of U.S. COIN doctrine and the skills that U.S. forces have developed and implemented in Afghanistan and Iraq will aggregate rather than have a multiplicative effect as both variables exist independently of the other. These variables, when summed, will subjectively counterbalance or cancel the effect of the problem-set in part or whole, resulting in a list of needed skills or a null set.

Figure 3. Equation depicting the relationships of the Secondary Questions to each other and to the Primary Question.

The null set is the optimal result to this thesis from the perspective of the uniformed services of the United States, specifically, that the requirements of COIN in the NRD are already addressed or accounted for by current capabilities, resulting in no additional requirements in the DOTML domains. In this ideal case, the only variations from the existing COIN skill set for an NRD campaign would be regional factors of language cultural awareness which are a standard variable of U.S. contingency operations. Where the null set is not achieved, the synthesis will result in a list of skills, capabilities and competencies required but currently not available or resourced for U.S.
forces to prevail in a COIN campaign in the Niger River Delta as a part of a multinational effort to defeat the insurgency and restore stability and security to the region.

The next chapter, Analysis, will examine the secondary questions along the EPMESIII categories using data available in the public domain and official government sources and will synthesize those elements in accordance with the model described in Chapter 3, Methodology. This chapter will result in either validation of the null set alternative, or will generate patterns and trends of skills required by the NRD IOE but not currently available to U.S. forces in terms of doctrine, doctrine, organization, training, material or leader development.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

Through the examination of several preliminary or framing questions, this study will synthesize the areas where current U.S. doctrine, organization, training, material, and leader development cannot provide effective capabilities to counter to the challenges posed by the NRD IOE. Those framing questions; describe the insurgent operational environment of the Niger River Delta; describe the GoN’s response to insurgencies; determine how U.S. COIN doctrine applies to the NRD IOE; and describe U.S. experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq that satisfy the requirements of the NRD IOE, will be examined in detail along the dynamics of EPMESIII, and result in DOTML recommendations in the conclusion of the study.

Describe the Insurgent Operational Environment of the Niger River Delta Region.

In describing and analyzing any insurgency, regardless of where and when it occurs, the logical start-point is with an examination of the physical, political, and social environment in which the insurgent, the counterinsurgent, and the causal factors of instability exist. This environmental examination is not only key to reaching any conclusion about the nature of an insurgency, but is also a fundamental prerequisite to developing effective counterinsurgent strategies. The effort placed upon a clear and objective understanding of the elements of who, where, why and how of an insurgency enables the effective application of service doctrine(s) to COIN campaign design. Therefore, I will begin this analysis of the insurgency in the Niger River Delta with an
examination of the Niger River Delta Insurgent operational environment, or NRD-IOE, using the EMPESIII analytical model.

E₁ - Environment

According to the delimitations of the World Wildlife Organization, the Niger River Delta swamp forest is contained in an area roughly resembling an upright triangle, with the town of Aboh on the Niger River being the northernmost tip. The Benin River forms the western boundary and the Imo River forms the eastern boundary. The swamp forest is separated from the Atlantic Ocean by a band of mangroves which can reach up to 10 km inland. The total area of the Niger River Delta is approximately 5,600 square miles and contained within three states; Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta (Were 2001).

The surface configuration of the Niger River Delta is a combination of local clays and alluvial soils transported from the upriver African savannah, and bisected by the Niger, Benin and Imo rivers. The generally low relief of the area accounts for the meandering and frequent shifting of the Niger River and its tributaries, with the majority of the area continuously flooded. Those areas in the northern portion of the river delta area that are not continuously flooded experience complete inundation during the annual Niger River flood period, annually from October through December (Ibid.). Vegetation in the delta includes costal mangroves, characterized by salt-tolerant tree and other plant species ranging from small shrubs to tall trees (World Wildlife Fund 2006), and inland swamps and forests, densely vegetated and giving way only to a limited road and rail network and small communities clinging to the relatively stable areas of dry ground. The mangrove belt along the Atlantic coast and the inland swamplands are criss-crossed by a lattice of small streams and creeks; either tributaries to the Niger, Benin and Imo rivers or
flood-induced backwaters, that make travel by canoe and small boat the central means of transportation and segment the area into island-like enclaves. The cities of Port Harcourt in the eastern extreme of the triangle and Warri in the west are the only significant urban centers, and are both on the very edge of permanently dry areas. South and west of these cities lie the rural and permanently submerged regions of the delta, though both cities lie more than 30 miles from the Atlantic coastline.

The central feature of the Niger River Delta is the waterways. The Niger, Benin and Imo rivers are all navigable from the coast deep into Nigeria by all but the largest shipping, and the intricate network of creeks and channels in the Delta region rival the road networks of Los Angeles, Sao Palo, New York or New Delhi in complexity and level of use by the local population for work, social activities and communication. Conversely, the impact of the maritime terrain on this region is manifest in the rural, underdeveloped and aqua-culture focus of the inhabitants. While oil exploration is conducted throughout the delta, it is an externally driven aspect of the region’s economy and in direct conflict with the cultural and social identity of the indigenous peoples. The region is dramatically underdeveloped when compared to adjacent states to the north. By first world, western standards, the transportation infrastructure, road and rail networks and airports are all underdeveloped, poorly maintained and geographically segmented by the dominant regional feature, the waterways.

The climate of the Niger Delta is characterized by a long rainy season from the end of March beginning of April through October. Precipitation increases from the north of the delta (with an average of 98 inches) to the coastal area where mean annual rainfall averages around 157 inches, making it one of the wettest areas in Africa (Barbour et al.
Along the Atlantic coast, thunderstorms are prevalent, impacting approximately 100 days per year (Jane’s Information Group 2007). The wet season peaks in July, and the only dry months are January and February. However, even during this dry period an average monthly mean of 6 inches of rainfall is recorded in the delta. Along the Atlantic coast, thunderstorms are recorded over 100 days per year, relative humidity rarely dips below 60% and fluctuates between 90% and 100% for most of the year. During most of the rainy season cloud cover is nearly continuous resulting in 1,500 mean annual sunshine hours from a mean potential of 4,057 hours, with 234 days with significant cloud coverage, and an average annual temperature of approximately 82° F (Barbour et al. 1982). The high rainfall, coupled with the volume of water flowing into the delta region from the Niger, Benin and Imo rivers, not only limits available dry land for agriculture or urban development, but creates a higher than normal rate of natural infrastructure degradation. Roads are washed-out, rail beds compromised and airfields rendered unusable far more regularly and rapidly than other, drier parts of West Africa. The annual requirement for infrastructure maintenance and rehabilitation outpaces capability and budgets, contributing to the generally poor state of civil infrastructure and its attendant disincentives to economic growth and business investment.

P - Political

Nigeria, a former British colonial possession, is a federal republic composed of 36 States, and a Capital Territory, with an elected president and a bi-cameral legislature. The presidential system of government has three distinct branches; the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The executive arm of government, at the federal level, consists of the President, the Vice-president and the Federal Executive Council, while at
the state level, it is made up of the Governor, the Deputy Governor and the state Executive Council. The legislature is also found at the federal and state levels. The federal legislature is comprised of a 109 seat Senate and a 360 seat House of Representatives. Combined, the two are known as the National Assembly. At the state level, the legislature is known as the House of Assembly, with one in each of the 36 states. There are 774 local governments throughout the Federation representing the third-tier of government (Nigeria 2004).

Since gaining independence in 1960 from Britain, Nigeria has undergone almost continuous organizational and constitutional turmoil and transformation. The country became independent with a national government and three major sub-divisions in 1960, and has evolved into a sophisticated federal system with a capital territory and 36 state administrations, with the most recent state, Bayelsa, created in 1996 through the subdivision of the now defunct Bendel state. In that evolutionary process, Nigeria experienced five military administrations and three constitutions, with the most recent constitution ratified by the National Assembly in May of 1999 in an effort to return the nation to civilian rule and address the systemic corruption that had compromised previous civilian and military regimes.

The realized actions of the Nigerian political system, as opposed to the potential functions, from the federal down to the local government level, provides the primary causal factors for the birth and continued growth of NRD instability and the consequent insurgency. By any other country’s standards, the Nigerian political system is completely corrupt. On the Corruption Perceptions Index, maintained by Transparency International, Nigeria ranks 142 out of 163 countries evaluated and is tied with Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan
and Sierra Leone in terms of systemic corruption in governance, business and health services (Transparency International 2006). Corruption extends into every aspect of Nigerian political and social life, with every process of determination, selection, equity and justice being compromised by influence and intimidation. The elements of society without the means to participate in this process are thoroughly marginalized and those elements of society with the means to participate are able to retain an unfair advantage in the distribution of power, wealth and privilege. In order to gain an appreciation of the mechanisms and impact of governmental corruption at the state and local level, Human Rights Watch conducted field research in Rivers state in 2006 with shocking results. The head of one Port Harcourt-based civil society organization, for example, declared to Human Rights Watch that the state’s local government chairs “have no goals, no objectives, nothing they want to accomplish. Ninety-nine percent think of local government as nothing more than an opportunity to get paid to do nothing” (Human Rights Watch 2007).

Since the 1999 constitution was implemented, and several anti-corruption organizations at both the federal and state governmental levels have been established, there has been little net change in the overall attitude and actions of Nigerians at all levels of power and business. Though there have been criminal prosecutions of hundreds of officials at the state and local level for corrupt practices, the phenomenon is so widespread as to touch virtually ever member of government, the dominant political parties, the judiciary, and many segments of the business sector. Though less brazen now than before 1999, corruption continues to shape, both directly and indirectly, the lives of all Nigerians. Despite the resources and time put into the anti-corruption campaign, a major
reason for the stubborn persistence of corruption is the perceived conflict of interests on
the part of those driving the reform movement (Agbn 2004). Corruption has become
entrenched in the cultural identity of the nation, and has reinforced the division of the
“haves and have-nots,” contributing to the primary motivations of the insurgents in the
NRD and elsewhere. Even at the writing of this thesis, the Nigerian national elections, the
second set of consecutive presidential elections, were characterized by international
observers as being thoroughly corrupt and hopelessly unverifiable. Human Rights Watch,
which directly observed the electoral process in April 2007 concluded that Nigeria has
not held a free and fair general election since the end of military rule [in 1999] (Human
Rights Watch 2007).

M - Military

Nigeria currently fields one of the largest military forces on the continent of
Africa. The Nigerian defense establishment is organized along western lines, with an
Army, a Navy, and an Air Force as the dominant services, a smaller and functionally
organized police force, and a multi-disciplinary intelligence community (Jane’s

The Army is the largest service and has the largest mission in the Nigerian
defense establishment. It has an estimated strength in excess of 60,000 and is in midst of
a downsizing from over 80,000, at the end of 1999, to an objective end strength of
approximately 50,000 at a date to be determined. The Army’s primary formations are
oriented to the four geographical regions of the country to provide internal security for
crises that exceed the capabilities of law enforcement, and against external threats. The
Army has four divisions; one Armored, two Mechanized Infantry, one Composite
Division, a Separate Brigade of Presidential Guards, four Artillery brigades which include cannon artillery and air defense artillery capabilities, one Paratroop Brigade and one Commando Battalion. The divisions and artillery brigades are almost certain to be under strength at all levels and under funded in general, with the Presidential Guards, Paratroop, and Commando formations receiving first priority due to their leadership security and strategic response roles. Some institutional challenges that result from under-funding, under-manning and a culture of corruption include ineffective or nonexistent training, no emphasis on maintenance, and leadership/discipline problems. According to an audit conducted in 2002 by the private security assistance firm, MPRI, "78 per cent of the [Nigerian] army equipment is non-operational. The training of the troops had been virtually halted." Some military exercises have been resurrected but the majority of the training army personnel actually get comes from peacekeeping operations (Ibid.). The Nigerian Army draws many of its military characteristics from its former colonial power, the United Kingdom, but has evolved as a service along the DOTMLPF domains to address their specific national and environmental requirements. Some of the limitations on this service development have been involvement in past military governments, successful or abortive coup d’états, and the pervasive culture of corruption and personal enrichment. The net effect on the service is low morale, indiscipline, low standards of operational readiness and once the force is committed to a mission, leaders have challenges at all levels in restraining tactics employed versus requirements of the rules of engagement (ROE).

The Navy is organized into Western and Eastern Commands, with the Western Command operating the Lagos Navy Base and the Eastern Command, headquartered in
Calabar, operating bases westward to Warri in Delta state. The Navy possesses a variety of blue water surface combatants; three frigate or corvette types, eight fast attack or large patrol craft, one mine sweeper and one Landing Ship Tank (LST) in addition to numerous small coastal patrol vessels operated by the Coast Guard, a formation subordinate to the Navy. With the exception of coastal patrol craft acquired in the past decade, all other Nigerian Navy Ships are not seaworthy for lack of maintenance, loss, or craft laid-up pending refurbishment and upgrade. The Navy has a small air arm, equipped with BO-105 and Lynx helicopters, Dornier and Fokker fixed wing maritime patrol aircraft, all believed to be non-operational, and a recent acquisition of four Agusta A190 aircraft for maritime patrol in the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria signed a contract in 2006 with Israeli Aeronautics Defense Systems to develop a maritime surveillance and costal defense network comprised of unmanned aerial systems for day/night surveillance and reconnaissance, maritime patrol aircraft equipped with synthetic aperture radar, ten coastal radar stations, and most importantly, command and control centers at Western Command, Eastern Command, and Navy headquarters capable of controlling unmanned missions and receiving real-time surveillance data. In recognition of the piracy/oil theft problem in the Niger Delta the government has released funding and allowed the Navy to deploy its six 25ft Defender class response boats to stop illegal oil movement and attacks on oil rigs. In the 12 months to July of 2004, the Nigerian Navy impounded more than 20 vessels and arrested 90 people for oil theft. In a unusual operation that speaks well of its capability, the Nigerian Navy stormed and recaptured two offshore platforms in November 2003 that had been seized by militants. The navy's efforts are supported by the
Customs Service, which has formed a strike team of 500 men outfitted with 4×4 vehicles and fast boats and supported by three light aircraft (Ibid.).

The Air Force is organized into a Tactical Air Command, a Training Command and a Presidential Airlift Fleet. The Tactical Air Command is primarily responsible for the command, control and employment of Air Force combat elements in support of the ground commander. The Air Force possesses Jaguar and MiG-21 fighter/ground attack and Alpha Jet light attack fixed wing combat aircraft, Hercules and Alenia G222 transport aircraft, Dornier maritime patrol aircraft, and Mi-35 attack and Super Puma utility helicopters. The Jaguar and MiG-21s have in all likelihood not flown operationally in the past ten years, and are considered to be unavailable for combat operations. The Alpha Jets were acquired as a trainer, but were employed in a light ground attack in support of Nigerian forces in Sierra Leone, and are believed to be the only fixed wing combat aircraft available to the Nigerian government while new aircraft are being acquired from China. The NAF has similar problems of maintenance and operational availability with the transport aircraft and some of the rotary wing fleet. However, the Mi-35 trainers and attack helicopters are relatively new and have not suffered the typical fate of un-maintained Nigerian aircraft (Ibid.).

Nigerian police forces are similar in general organization to police forces throughout the western world, though in Nigeria, there are no state or local police forces, with all uniformed police officers on the rolls of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF). The almost 300,000 strong NPF includes specialized organization such as the Mobile Police Force, Special Fraud Unit, Marine Police Force, Port Security Police, Counter Corruption Squad, Customs Police, and Border Police. Since 2002, the NPF has a presidential
mandate to grow the force from 180,000 to over 570,000 in response to the exposition of crime and ethnic violence throughout the nation. To that end, the Mobile Police, the NPF’s paramilitary organization charged with responding to violent organized crime and incidents of ethnic violence, has grown significantly, and become universally unpopular due to their liberal rules of engagement and alleged “shoot-to-kill” policy (Ibid.).

The Nigerian intelligence community is a shadowy and poorly understood organization, with little hard information on subordinate organizations and areas of responsibility. Information available in open sources describes a Coordinator of National Security controlling and synchronizing three complimentary intelligence organizations; the State Security Service (SSS), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), and the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI). The SSS is a secret police organization with arrest powers, formed under previous military governments, and focuses on intelligence collection against Nigerian subversive groups. The NIA serves as Nigeria’s counterintelligence agency at home and their intelligence collection apparatus abroad. The DMI is a renamed and possibly restructured version of the older Defense Intelligence Agency, responsible for domestic and international military intelligence support (Jane’s Information Group 2007d).

The dominant theme in the Nigerian defense establishment is material and facilities decay and lack of operational capability among the services, including the police and intelligence services. A second theme is the slow adaptation to emerging threats. All services, struggling with the legacy of involvement in repressive military regimes or coups attempts to replace those regimes (e.g. Abacha and the Nigerian Air Force), are struggling with low morale, indiscipline, political marginalization, reduced
budgets, and internal corruption to the extent that they are very slow to react to emerging threats, such as the growing militancy in the NRD and inter-ethnic strife throughout the country. This institutional rot is coupled with or a causal factor for the physical decay of material and facilities to the point that the government must re-purchase systems, facilities and equipment that, with proper maintenance and support, would have had a long life. The operational result of this defense establishment culture is an overall lack of reliability on the existing Nigerian services to pre-empt threats, or even effectively react to threats already in their midst.

The 82nd Division, one of two composite divisions in the Nigerian Army, is headquartered in the city of Enugu in Enugu state and has arrayed its subordinate brigades and battalions throughout Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Atak, Cross River, Edo, Imo, Akwa Ibom, Benue, and Takum states. This is the formation with the regional responsibility for security of the NRD and tasked with confronting and destroying the emerging insurgency. The 82nd Division’s task organization includes all elements of the Army, and contributes two battalion size units in a TACON relationship to Joint Task Force Restore Hope, headquartered at the Warri Naval Base in Delta state.

The 82nd Division is a typical Nigerian Army formation in that it is chronically undermanned, under funded and under equipped and yet tasked with the full range of missions found in counterinsurgency. The Division, as the representative of the Army, is the lead agency in the COIN effort in the NRD and employs all the instruments of national power; diplomatic, information, military and economic. The division’s general lines of operation in the NRD include interdiction of insurgent lines of communication, direct action in response to insurgent operations, population control, and personnel
recovery in concert with Nigerian Police and local government. The division has been responsible for more than one incident of collective civil punishment when soldiers destroyed the villages as retaliatory measures against communities perceived as supporting the insurgents.

In 2003, at the specific direction of President Obasanjo, the Nigerian military created Joint Task Force Restore Hope (JTF-RH) with the mission of eliminating organized ethnic violence against the petroleum industry in the NRD. The Task Force is composed of five task groups; Army, Air Force, Navy, Nigerian Police and State Security. The Army commitment is one infantry battalion assigned and two in a TACON command and control relationship from the 82nd Division. The Navy commitment is the basing facilities at Warri Naval Base, the NNS Aradu, a Merko 360 Frigate, the NNS Siri, a Combattante-class Fast Attack Craft, the NNS Kjanwa and the NNS Ologbo, Balsam-class patrol boats, numerous small patrol craft capable of operating in the shallows of the Delta waterways and creeks, and four utility helicopters from the Naval Air Wing (Adeyemi 2005). The Air Force commitment includes the five operational Mi-35 attack helicopters stationed at Port Harcourt and the four lift helicopters stationed at Benin City in Edo state. The Nigerian Police Force assigned six Mobile Police squadrons to JTF-RH for patrolling and population control, and the State Security Service has an element of unknown size and composition providing HUMINT support to the JTF commander (Jane’s Information Group 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c).

Despite the Joint nature of the unit, the high visibility of the mission at the upper echelons of the Nigerian defense establishment, and the direct link between the JTF commander and the President, this unit has had limited tactical and no operational effect
on the operations of criminal elements and insurgent in the Delta region. Like all other
Nigerian military formations, they are hampered by funding problems, poor maintenance,
low morale and ineffective leadership at the unit level. The JTF commander is hampered
by the command relationship with two thirds of his maneuver forces. Two of the three
infantry battalions are TACON to the JTF and remain under the administrative control of
the 82nd Division. The commander is also constrained in the flexibility and conduct of
operations due to a restrictive rules of engagement and the requirement for presidential
approval to conduct many operations. The subordinate commanders of all services,
extcept for the SSS, are constrained by leader’s and soldier’s lack of confidence when
pitted against insurgents who have a better understanding of the physical and cultural
environment of the Delta, and who are generally better equipped, trained and led.

Both the 82nd Division and JTF Restore Hope, the primary military formations in
the NRD, are tactically and operationally ineffective against the various bands of
insurgents and organized crime because of failures in leadership, maintenance readiness
and training. Leaders at all levels are unwilling to engage the militants or criminal bands
either in meeting engagements or when the militants initiate contact. Nigerian leaders and
units lack the confidence in themselves and their training to conduct any combat
operations without an absolute certainty of victory. In many cases, this can be seen as the
primary reason the Nigerian Army conducts “indirect operations” against the militants,
by conducting offensive operations against civilian populations deemed to be insurgent-
friendly or providing support and sanctuary to insurgents/criminals. The doctrine of
separating the insurgent from the population in order to weaken and fracture the
insurgency is, in many cases, carried out by eliminating the population in question.
Though the economy of Nigeria today is dominated by the petroleum industry, agriculture is the primary activity of a majority of the population and the manufacturing and service sectors are beginning to show modest growth and market stability. In 1960, at independence, Nigeria’s economy was agriculture-based and it was a significant food exporter. Since the discovery of oil, and extreme economic mismanagement by corrupt civilian and military regimes, Nigeria has evolved into a single industry economy, stunting the development of the manufacturing and service sectors, and allowing the agriculture component to decay. Now, the economy is heavily dependent on the oil sector, which accounts for about 20 percent of GDP, about 95 percent of export earnings, and about 80 percent of government revenues, and the country is a net food importer (Coleman and Azevedo 2007). In 2000, Nigeria received 99.6% of its export income from oil, making it the world’s most oil-dependent country (Ross 2003).

While agriculture (including livestock, forestry and fishing) is still the main activity of the majority of Nigerians and accounts for about 40 percent of GDP, the largely subsistence agricultural sector has not been able to keep up with the rapid population growth, and the country has not been self-sufficient in food since the 1970s. A program to rebuild export agriculture (coffee, cocoa, cashews, rubber, and palm products) has yielded fairly strong growth but nearly 60 percent of its population, or about 95 million people, still live in poverty (Coleman and Azevedo 2007).

The Nigerian economy is an excellent example of the phenomenon among developing nations known as the Dutch Disease where the exploitation of a resource like oil artificially drives up the prices for goods and services that would be used in the
competing manufacturing and agriculture sectors, and reducing those products’ competitive edge in the world markets, and those sectors suffering in comparison to the success of the oil industry. The local business sector slowly migrates from manufacturing and agriculture to the oil service sectors, further reducing economic diversity and increasing dependence on a single industry. Some of the component pieces of this trend of economic stagnation caused by oil include; economic volatility, crowding out manufacturing and agriculture sectors by reducing profitability for industries that employ large numbers of unskilled workers, enhancing inequality, undermining democracy, and sparking violent conflict (Ross 2003).

The states of the NRD are all dominated by the oil industry, though prior to the 1960s, these states were agri- and aqua-culture exclusively. In Rivers state, agriculture remains the largest economic sector in terms of workers, but this majority includes subsistence farmers who grow crops or harvest fish from the rivers primarily to survive. There is little in the way of corporate farms that achieve a profit through economy of scale and use of technology and while there are state sponsored or controlled agricultural efforts, they do not yield a significant market crop. Rivers is one of the biggest producers in the Nigerian oil sector, accounting for over 40% of Nigeria crude oil production. There are also many petrochemical related industries in the state (Rivers state 2006). Bayelsa state is another major oil and gas producing state, contributing over 30% of Nigeria’s oil production. However, the principal occupations, in terms of numbers of people involved (like Delta state) are fishing, farming, palm oil, logging, trading, palmwine tapping, carving & weaving (Bayelsa state 2006). Delta state claims to be the leading producer of crude oil and natural gas in Nigeria, and while the numbers, when compared to the other
states in the NRD may or may not support that claim, Delta has a sizeable agricultural sector, including subsistence farming, rubber and palm products (Delta state 2006).

The significance of the oil sector versus the agriculture sector is in its impact upon the lives of the local population and its catalytic effect upon the NRD instability. The oil industry extracts resources (profit) from the delta region without commensurate return to the local economy and with significant damage to the environment. Oil spills directly impact the ability of subsistence farmers and fishermen to make a living. Oil well gas flaring is conducted at a level that measurably raises the local air temperature and allegedly precipitates a particularly strong acid-rain (Friends of the Earth 2005). The physical infrastructure of oil production means that lands used for agriculture or under private ownership are used by pumping stations, pipelines, and support facilities, and in many cases without appropriate compensation to local land owners. Lastly, the oil industry is not a significant direct employer of local unskilled laborers. The oil companies have limited requirements for unskilled laborers, and the limited availability of workers with the correct skill-sets results in a high degree of reliance of on Nigerians from other states and on expatriates to fill the work force (Ross 2003). While there are many service contracts from the oil companies to local businesses specializing in oil field services, there is relatively little direct benefit to the largest sub-group of Nigerian society, the indigenous Delta population.

S - Social

Society and culture in Nigeria is defined in the large part by tribal affiliations. While Nigeria is an emerging democracy, where affiliations to the state and or a political
party is becoming a solvent to the bonds of tribe and ethnicity, those original cultural structures are still in place, viable and important to understanding Nigeria as a whole.

The Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba and the Ibo are the dominant ethnic groups and are arrayed in the North, the Southwest and Southeast respectively. Around and interspersed among the three giants are some 200 or more smaller distinct ethnic groups that either form coalitions with the dominant groups, or are effectively marginalized politically, economically and socially. Many Hausa-Fulani, who dominate the northern two-thirds of the country, consider themselves Nigeria’s natural leaders. The Yoruba are about evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, while the Ibo are mostly Catholic (Political Risk Services 2005).

Nigeria is wracked by cultural tension fueled by extreme poverty and a decaying national infrastructure. The classic conflicts between religions and regions pit the predominantly Muslim northern population against the predominantly Christian south. The north has historically dominated Nigerian political and military power structures at the federal level, at the expense (either perceived or actual) of the other regions. The south, at least since the late 1950s, has provided the bulk of the Nigeria’s foreign exchange in the form of oil revenues, and seen little of that income reinvested in the quality of life, infrastructure, and employment opportunities and perceive that those revenues were unfairly apportioned to the north. The fact that all regions of Nigeria suffer equally with crushing poverty, lack of essential services and infrastructure does little to reduce the tensions.

Primary level education is free and compulsory for all children, but the requirement is rarely enforced, particularly in the north. Declining school enrollment is
caused by the steady deterioration of public schools and by increased economic pressures on families. Schools are plagued by violence between students of different ethnic or religious backgrounds. Inadequate food, housing, and educational materials have also triggered violence on university campuses. The higher education system virtually collapsed because of inadequate funding and political conflict (Ibid.).

The WHO classified the Nigerian health system as one of the world’s worst, ranked 187th out of 191 health systems. The 38-year average for healthy life expectancy is also low in the world, ranking at 38th out of 191 countries. State governments are responsible for providing health services and manage public hospitals in urban areas. In the five western states, free health care has been available since the late 1970s. Despite such measures, public health care is often inadequate, supplies are scarce, and in some cases, medical personnel are poorly trained. There are many private health care facilities, but the cost of their services is beyond the reach of most Nigerians. The HIV/AIDS virus has reached epidemic proportions, and the infant mortality rate is quite high, 71 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2004. A lack of sanitation and inadequate access to clean water plagues nearly all the country. Rural streams are polluted by poisons and detergents. Wells that are often the only source of water in urban areas are often fouled by seepage from nearby latrines. Flooding threatens many cities during the rainy season. Many die from waterborne diseases and other infectious maladies, such as meningitis and malaria (Ibid.).

Though the dominant ethnic group in the NRD is the Ijaw, the Delta’s lesser known and often marginalized ethnic groups include the Ogoni, Izom, Urhobo, Isekiri and dozens of smaller but ethnically distinct groups. The recent history of instability in
the NRD began with Ogoni political activism against the Nigerian government and the international oil companies over the equitable distribution of oil revenues. In 1990, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) issued a demand to the Nigerian government in the form of an Ogoni Bill of Rights. This peaceful resistance and demand for equality was violently resolved by the Nigerian Army and the Abacha government in the mid-1990s (International Crisis Group 2006).

I1 - Infrastructure

The infrastructure of Nigeria, defined as those civil or municipal structures or systems necessary to support the routine functioning of government, society and the economy, can be characterized, in general, as in an advanced state of decay. Decades of government mismanagement, consumer overuse, and inadequate capital investment in maintenance or expansion has resulted in a national infrastructure that is unreliable, obsolescent, and inadequate for the demands of the continent’s largest population and one of its strongest economies. The status of infrastructure in the Niger River Delta is even direr when the petroleum industry’s infrastructure, particularly in the more remote areas, is taken into account.

The basic categories by which U.S. forces conducting COIN assess a region or nation’s essential services infrastructure include the ability to process sewage; generate potable water; produce and distribute electricity; collect, consolidate and manage trash; provide basic medical care and services; and establish schools and provide basic education. This assessment or measurement of essential services is known by the acronym SWET-MS. In almost every measure in the NRD, the Nigerian governmental system has failed to provide the basic essential services at any acceptable level. Potable
water is not available in a majority of the small Delta villages. Inhabitants draw water from the creeks and rivers in the area for drinking, cooking, bathing and washing despite the visible presence of oil industry contaminants, human waste, trash and residue of commercial shipping. The reliance on a compromised water source for all essential human intake increases the occurrence of illness among the rural population, though there is limited at best medical care available to anyone outside the primary urban centers, and even in those locations, health care services are plagued by absent medical staff, theft of equipment and pharmaceuticals, and no support infrastructure for long term in-patient care (Human Rights Watch 2007). Even if there were adequate medical facilities in the NRD, access to medical services is limited by the absence of a reliable transportation network. Road networks in the NRD support basic commerce; finished goods, agriculture products and the oil industry. For the subsistence farmer or fisherman deep in the mangrove, visiting a doctor can mean a several day canoe paddle to Port Harcourt, Warri or Yenagoa. Lastly, the trash and sewage services are limited at best, with much of the sewage from urban areas and large villages being discharged directly into the waterways, along with a significant portion of garbage that does not find a secondary use as building materials for lower class residents.

Beyond the basic requirements of essential services infrastructure, the economy depends upon elements of commercial or economic infrastructure to continue functioning, including transportation networks and nodes (roads, rails, waterways, ports and airfields), telecommunications systems (voice and data) and petroleum industry systems of collection, movement and processing.
Nigeria has an extensive road network of over 113,000 km of various types of roads; 51,000 km of highways, 31,000 km of primary roads and 20,000 km of secondary roads, of which, only a total of 31,000 km are paved and all weather. Since that assessment was made in 1991, the common wisdom is that most of the 31,000 km of paved roads have degenerated into broken or gravel surfaces due to overuse and poor maintenance (Jane’s Information Group 2007). While there is no accurate data for the total road network in the NRD, there exists a secondary road network, constructed by the oil industry and designed to support their operations. While this is an additional network, maintained at a reasonable standard, most of the roads do not support social or economic patterns of traffic, and are thus of limited use in many cases to the average Nigerian citizen (Essential Action 2000). What this secondary network does provide, though, is a means of access for the criminal practice of oil theft from pipelines known as oil bunkering.

Nigeria had, under British administration and before independence, a modest rail network of over 3,500 km of 1-meter gauge rails. Since independence, the rail network has been overused, through the expanding requirements of a developing nation, and neglected because of mismanagement and corruption. The rail system provides passenger and cargo services, with millions using the system in the Lagos area annually. By western standards, the maintenance readiness of the locomotives and other rolling stock, the track maintenance and overall safety procedures are shockingly inadequate. By the early 1990s, the railway system was on the verge of total failure. The Nigerian government signed a $25 billion (U.S.) contract with China's Civil Engineering Construction Corporation in 1996, which is a 25 year program initiated to rehabilitate the rail network,
construct new lines, rehabilitate locomotives, provide new rolling stock, and install modern switching, signaling and communications networks. By 2021, all state capitals will be connected via rail to the capital, Lagos, Warri and Port Harcourt (Jane’s Information Group 2007).

The Niger and Benue Rivers and northern portions of the Delta region comprise an inland system of over 8,600 km of navigable waterways. However, because of shallow drafts, silting and no dredged channels, this waterway network is not navigable all the way to the Atlantic Ocean. With the exception of ferry service to cross these large rivers, there is little commercial use of the inland waterways, with the more cost-effective means of transportation being over-the-road trucks. Given the initiative to rehabilitate the rail network, there will be little incentive to develop the waterways for commercial use. However, pilots and navigation aids are in place to enable a significant level of primary and secondary oil industry traffic to travel from the Atlantic coast up rivers and estuaries to Warri, Port Harcourt, and a large number of oil field facilities in the NRD. Because of the capital investment by the oil industry, facilities at Warri, Port Harcourt, Escravos and Forcados are modern and well maintained.

Air transportation nodes within Nigeria include the main airports at Lagos, along the Atlantic coast, and Kano in the north. There are regional all-weather airfields at Port Harcourt, Benin City, and Yenagoa in the NRD, but most have limitations on time of use (usually day time only) and weather restrictions. In the case of Port Harcourt, Benin City, and Yenagoa, these airfields are serviced by regional airlines and used by the military for unit basing (Jane’s Information Group 2007c).
Telecommunications infrastructure in Nigeria, and in the NRD in particular, is an unreliable capability that has not kept pace with potential economic development, both in the public and private sector. Prior to 2002, of the 700,000 fixed or landlines installed throughout the country, only some 500,000 were connected to a viable service and as of December 2003, the number of fixed lines increased to 900,000 but with an unknown number actually in operation. At the same time, cellular subscribers totaled over 3.8 million (Jane’s Information Group 2007). As the Nigerian telecom sector privatized in the late 1990s, cellular companies began building infrastructure and as of April 2007, Nigeria, by purchasing the equipment and launch services from China, has placed its own telecommunications satellite in geosynchronous orbit over the nation.

The Internet, arguably an insurgent’s best means of international communications for its relative ease and anonymity of access, is only beginning to establish itself throughout Nigeria as the poor infrastructure of the past is being replaced by modern, wireless services country-wide. Even in the heart of the NRD, a weak cellular signal can be detected providing communications capability to the lowest level of an insurgent organization (Inskeep 2005).

I₂ – Information Operations

Both the government and the various insurgent groups conduct strategic and operational level information operations (IO) targeted at domestic and international audiences and using multiple means of communications to disseminate their messages. It can be argued that the Nigerian government’s current performance at international IO is just as poor as it was in the Nigerian Civil War of 1967 through 1970. In that conflict, the secessionist state of Biafra, composed of today’s Rivers, Cross River, Imo and Anambra
states, conducted a strategic information operations campaign that successfully influenced the U.S., UK, and a number of other African and non-African nations to provide tacit or active governmental support and active civilian NGO support, to include mercenary activity, against the Nigerian government. Nigerian government IO efforts during that conflict were virtually non-existent, allowing the rebel message to be told on rebel terms. Nigeria, in the conduct of COIN in the NRD today, is struggling against the damage of those past IO campaigns in the form of bias which is firmly established in the international community that the Nigerian COIN fundamentally violates international convention and law.

The militants in the NRD demonstrate a thorough understanding of information operations at the strategic and operational level. The militants’ target audiences include the Nigerian government, Nigerian civil population, Nigerian military units in the NRD, international oil companies operating in the NRD, the national and international media, and international political community.

The militants employ a variety of means to disseminate their IO message. The Internet is used by MEND and COMA extensively to issue statements directly to the national and international media, influence and editorialize through expatriate special interest group websites, and is probably used to issue direct communications to oil companies and the Nigerian government. IO targeted to the Nigerian civil population, the military in the NRD, and the international political community is typically released via Internet electronic mail to Nigerian and/or international media organizations for secondary transmission to the intended audiences.
An example of the types of IO messages released by insurgent groups for national consumption is the statement released concerning an insurgent attack in April of 2007. The Coalition for Militant Action (COMA), in a statement released to The Daily News of Lagos, claimed responsibility for killing four soldiers from JTF Restore Hope on 16 April 2007 in retaliation for a 10 April JTF ambush of a COMA boat in the Cawthorne Channel in Rivers state resulting in two militant casualties. The statement claims that COMA had been able to obtain the names of all JTF soldiers involved in the 10 April ambush, and threatened to target them personally for retribution; "We have been able to get the names of all members of the JTF team who carried out the [attack]. No one will be spared in the onslaught." (Jane’s Information Group 2007e). This type of IO attack serves several insurgent purposes. First, the insurgents are linking their actions to government action resulting in death, as if to imply they are defending themselves which confers an element of legitimacy upon themselves in the national and international communities. Second, the insurgents attack the soldier’s morale by threatening personal consequences for soldiers who conduct operations against them. Lastly, the insurgents attack the confidence of the Nigerian military leadership by acting with impunity and extracting more casualties than those they suffer, demonstrating the invincibility of the insurgent and the futility of COIN.

The insurgents target an international audience with their IO messages associated with the kidnapping of expatriates and the interruption of oil production. Both of these acts are linked within insurgent IO in that they both show the insurgents operational freedom. They are able to kidnap expatriates at will from their homes, place of work on the shore or on any oil platform up to 25 miles from the coast, and interrupt the primary
function of the presence of those expatriates, the extraction of crude oil. The fact that the insurgents have released all hostages taken since 2003 unharmed and well cared for demonstrates their mercy and western values to an international audience. They are showing that despite being exploited by the government and the oil companies, they, the insurgents, have no ill will toward those individuals they are “forced” to kidnap. In a 19 May 2007 story carried in The Vanguard, a Lagos-based Nigerian newspaper available in print and Internet versions, kidnapped American oil workers interviewed at an undisclosed location in Delta state empathized with their insurgent captors;

   “[We] totally understand now the reason why militants in the Niger-Delta are up in arms against the government, declaring emphatically that that there is no human being with blood flowing in his veins that will not be provoked to carry arms if he is treated like an animal, the way Niger-Deltans are being treated.”

   While the spontaneity of the hostage’s statements can be challenged, and the question of pre-written insurgent messages being repeated under duress and/or insurgent influence on the reporter can be debated, the story represented an insurgent-only side to the fundamental question of NRD instability. Stories like this are carried daily by a vigorous and relatively unrestrained Nigerian journalistic community, and because of the World Wide Web, available internationally. The general consistency of these messages, their high frequency, and an absolute lack of a government counterpropaganda effort confers an indisputable legitimacy to the insurgent.

   Government of Nigeria IO efforts targeted at the instability in the NRD are limited in scope and frequency and do not support a strategic IO campaign to either preempt or counter the insurgent IO campaign. The government does not engage international audiences with a consistent message or methodology. The strategic IO campaign design includes statements issued at the presidential level and engagement
between the President and foreign diplomatic representatives. The general IO theme contends that there is no insurgency in the NRD and that the instability is created by criminal elements operating outside the law for purely economic motives. In a statement released by the Nigerian Government on 28 November 2006, where Nigerian President Obasanjo was receiving the new Italian Ambassador, Mr. Massimo Baistrocchi, President Obasanjo stated; “we will do as much as possible to save lives, but we will not abandon the area to bandits…after initial protests due to the inevitable pains, Nigerians have realized the benefits of the reforms and we have put in place human structures to continue, while legislation has been provided to keep the reforms going” (Nigeria 2006).

There is a limited to no operational level and no tactical level government IO campaign. The rebels have achieved a tacit legitimacy in the Nigerian press throughout the country and the government has done little below the presidential level to counter those effects. The centrality of the IO campaign in the office of the President is the weak-link in the governmental IO effort and one that is easily exploited by a media-savvy insurgency.

I₃ – Insurgent

There is no single insurgent organization operating in the NRD, there are many. In addition to the groups commonly accepted as insurgents, there are private political militias, ongoing criminal enterprises that employ paramilitary violence, and vigilante groups formed to fill the security vacuum that exists in the rural parts of the NRD. This section will not address all of these sub-groups in great detail, but will describe the more prominent groups where there is sufficient data to do so. Here, as in many other emerging IOEs, the dataset describing the various insurgent groups and non-state actors is incomplete at best, and at worst contains contradictory, false and misleading information.
Within the general geographical limits of the NRD, there are seven identified major insurgent groups including; the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Coalition for Militant Action (COMA), the Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC), the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Ijaw National Congress (INC), the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Congress (FNDIC), the Martyrs Brigade, and the Niger Delta Peoples Salvation Front (NDPSF). Of these seven groups, it is believed that a parent-child relationship exists between the NDPVF and the MEND and the INC and the FNDIC. A competitor relationship exists between COMA and MEND, and the JRC is working to establish an umbrella organization and unify the major groups. The Martyrs Brigade appears episodically in media reporting but its relationship with the other insurgent groups and its ideology and objective remain unclear. Two groups are clearly identified as a pro-government vigilante forces, the Bakassai Boys and the Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV), and there are numerous militias serving Nigerian organized crime, international criminal elements, and acting on behalf or at the direction of local and state political figures or traditional ethnic leaders.

This study will examine the linkages between the prominent insurgent movements, but will focus discussion on the dominant group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta primarily because there is evidence to suggest that the MEND is the reincarnation of the NDPVF under new leadership, and that some of the fringe groups are actually MEND operating with organizational covers in order to maintain operational security and deny order of battle intelligence to the Nigerian military.
The MEND is an Ijaw based ethnic insurgent group that evolved directly from the disbanded or dormant NDPVF. The NDPVF, founded by Alhaji Dokubo-Asari in 2004, was the Ijaw continuation of the Ogoni insurgent struggle led by Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) between 1990 and 1995. MOSOP began a program of non-violent resistance to and protest of the Nigerian government’s oil policy and the activities of oil companies in the NRD in the late 1980s. Between 1990 and 1995, MOSOP became more radicalized and ultimately violent, resulting in the arrest, trial, and execution of Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP leaders under the Abacha regime. Asari was a two-time law student at the university in Calabar who ultimately dropped out in 1998 and became involved in Niger Delta ethnic activism and politics. A catalyzing event for Asari seems to be the 1990 through 1995 MOSOP resistance efforts. He became the first vice president of the Ijaw Youth Congress in 1998, ultimately becoming president in 2001. Despite several assassination attempts by rivals within the IYC, Asari retained the leadership role and continued on a radicalization program with the motto, “Resource Control and Self Determination by Any Means” with the implication being a preference for armed struggle (Jane’s Information Group 2006). After a political split with the Rivers state governor in 2004, Asari left the IYC and took to the mangrove swamps to begin recruiting among the disaffected Ijaws youths to form the basis of the NDPVF. Throughout 2004, the NDPVF’s violent campaign against the oil companies and the Nigerian government precipitated a significant reaction, both from the Nigerian military and from a newly formed pro-government militia, the Niger Delta Vigilantes under Ateke Tom. In late 2004, Asari signed a cease fire agreement with the government and NDV and reentered the NRD political scene. In September 2005 Asari
was arrested on charges of treason and plotting armed insurrection against the Nigerian government. After his arrest, he called on his supporters to suspend attacks, resulting in the NDPVF dormancy (Marquardt 2006).

The MEND conducted its first major operation in the NRD on January 11, 2006 when it abducted employees of Royal Dutch Shell Oil from an offshore oil rig and held them for 19 days in the mangrove swamp. Since that time, MEND has conducted operations of increasing complexity, sophistication and effect, including kidnap for ransom, infrastructure destruction, direct combat action against Nigerian military, raids on the institutions of governance, and information operations. The MEND is building its base through a combination of recruiting, oil bunkering, and extortion of oil companies and other oil bunkerers.

The credibility the MEND has achieved as the largest and most prolific insurgent group in the NRD is a result of two general conditions. First, their information operations are the most effective of all the identified or proclaimed insurgent groups. The MEND regularly issues statements, threats, claims of responsibility, and demands to the Nigerian government though the Nigerian media via a primary representative in South Africa, known only by his pseudonym, Jomo Gbomo. Second, the Nigerian government makes almost no counterpropaganda effort to deny MEND the legitimacy they have demanded and received in the media. The GoN, alternating between half-hearted efforts to label the MEND as nothing more than bandits or simply ignoring them, has allowed MEND to dominate the information battlespace and enhance their legitimacy on their own terms.
Ideology

Traditional religious beliefs are a central part of the Niger Delta militant’s identity. Though they worship several different manifestations of a single supreme being, Egbesu, a force of vengeance and natural justice, is the most significant to the Ijaw militant movements, and in fact one movement is called the Egbesu Boys. Combined with an ethnic chauvinism, the Ijaw militant sees himself as a force of justice and a protector, under the divine sponsorship of Egbesu, of his community. The poor performance and organizational frictions within the Nigerian military and security services serves to reinforce that belief. This warrior culture, view of ethnic superiority, and resistance to the outside influence of other ethnic groups and alien political power structures has solidified the Ijaw will to seek a solution through the force of arms (Jane’s Information Group 2006).

MEND, as the major element in the insurgency, expresses their ideology in three basic demands of the Nigerian government; the release of Asari from prison, the receipt of 50% of oil revenues pumped out of the NRD, and the total withdrawal of Nigerian military from the NRD (Hanson 2007). The MEND vision of an end-state to the insurgency is greater autonomy of the Ijaws through the state political system, the NRD remaining a part of the Nigerian nation but not necessarily in the form of the existing states, economic growth and improved quality of life for all NRD residents through appropriate and just investments of oil revenues, and a greater accountability of international oil companies operating in the NRD.
Objective

The operational objective of the MEND et al., is to deny the GoN the proceeds of the oil resources in the NRD, resulting in a nationwide budgetary and economic crisis, forcing concessions and recognition of MEND as a political equal. In an undated e-mail, Jomo Gbomo stated “Our aim is to totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government to export oil…” (Jane’s Information Group 2006). To achieve this, the MEND has adopted four logical lines of operation; destruction of oil production capacity in the NRD to deny GoN revenues; kidnapping of essential staff (especially foreign workers) for ransom and the disruption effect on oil production; direct combat action against Nigerian military and security services to deny them freedom of movement and secure basing in the NRD; information operations to establish the legitimacy of the cause and to erode GoN authority in the region.

Organization.

The leadership of MEND is strikingly unclear, and this is where MEND departs the well trodden path of insurgent evolution. Where most recognized insurgencies have recognizable leadership, the MEND seems to have learned from the demise of Asari and the NDPVF. Being too public results in the death or detention of key leadership. The MEND is in a “transmit only” mode when it comes to engaging the media, allowing no two-way contact with international media. Most foreign journalists receive information from one MEND representative -- Jomo Gbomo. Jomo Gbomo is believed to be a pseudonym of someone located outside Nigeria and with ready internet access. The relationship between Jomo Gbomo and MEND leaders inside the NRD is undertermined. Other individuals known by the names Brutus Ebipadei and Major-General Godswill
Tamuno, have all communicated with the press and claimed a leadership roles in the group (Hanson 2007). A Cynthia Whyte has issued statements on behalf of MEND, and beginning in late 2006, on behalf of the JRC, claiming a leadership role over MEND, COMA and the Martyrs Brigade. This unclear and sometimes contradictory organizational structure may or may not be by design, but has the effect of obscuring the actual militant leadership structure and enhancing the operational security of key individuals (Jane’s Information Group 2006).

Niger Delta groups are capable of rapid change within short time periods. Although command and control is believed to be hierarchical, leaders are frequently deposed or replaced by rivals. This elasticity can be attributed to at least two factors: internal strife within organizations over the proceeds of criminal and political activities and the semi-democratic tradition among Ijaw and other Delta language groups of choosing tribal leaders on a rotational basis (Ibid.).

The exact order of battle of the MEND, or any insurgent group in history, will probably never be known. However, the MEND and its associated coalition partners are believed to be in possession of upwards of 100 boats, thousands of SALW, and between 500 and 2,500 active insurgents. The support structure of this insurgent movement, ranging from those providing tacit support through auxiliary elements conducting intelligence collection, sustainment and information operations, is undetermined but likely to be in the thousands of people. Asari…stated in 2004 that he owned 67 boats, each armed with two light machine guns and more than 3,000 rifles (Best and von Kemedi 2005). MEND is able to maintain its secrecy because of sympathy derived from the resonance their purpose has with the NRD ethnic population. Government
crackdowns have only bolstered that sympathy and driven recruits (Hanson 2007) into the ranks of the militias and insurgent bands.

Operational.

NRD militants and organized criminal enterprises are daily gaining valuable tactical experience against the Nigerian military, state security services and private security organizations. The constraints, fairly or unfairly, that those security forces operate under provide militants with a significant tactical advantage, and explain some of the “one-sided” victories that the militants have enjoyed in the 2005-2007 timeframe. Rules of engagement, strictures of law, and the mission to secure and protect infrastructure spread out over 70,000 square miles of mangrove swamp and open ocean allows the militants to select the time and place of confrontation and to mass insurgent combat power against identified weaknesses. MEND can choose the time and place to conduct infrastructure attacks as there are approximately 1,000 oil wells and over 6,000 km of pipeline within the NRD. Damage to oil infrastructure has resulted in a 25% drop in oil exports or approximately 500,000 barrels of oil per day (Marquardt 2006). Throughout 2005 and into 2007, MEND has targeted oil infrastructure to support their operational objectives, and targeted the instruments of Nigerian national power to create an unstable environment in the NRD. The militants employ watercraft as the primary means of mobility and a wide range of small arms and light weapons, AK-47s up to 14.5mm heavy machine guns and RPGs. MEND’s reach includes all areas of the mangrove, all waterways from Warri to Calabar and the urban centers of Warri, Port Harcourt, Yenagoa and Calabar. MEND is expanding operations into the Bight of Biafra and Bight of Benin, where they have targeted oil platforms in their kidnap and ransom
line of operation. In April 2007, immediately after the Presidential elections, MEND conducted three simultaneous attacks on oil infrastructure to demonstrate an increased direct action capability to the new government, and there is some suspicion that the MEND was responsible for the dynamite attack on the Yenagoa residence of the Vice President Elect in the same week (Oyadongha, and Omonobi 2007).

On January 28, 2007, a MEND force of over 50 fighters, operating from several speedboats, attacked multiple targets within the center of Port Harcourt to secure the release of Sobomabo George, a MEND leader detained the day prior. In the course of the attack, the militants conducted an initial diversionary attack on the prison compound to draw all available police and security service personnel away from the primary targets; the State Criminal Investigations Department and the Port Harcourt Central Police Station. Once the NPF was decisively engaged at the prison with the diversionary effort, MEND committed its main effort, concealed in the waterfront area, against the primary targets. The NPF redeployed forces and committed elements of the Mobile Police and attack helicopters from the NAF’s 97 Special Operations Group at the Port Harcourt Airfield. In the end, the MEND rescued George and in the course of the operation liberated over 125 detained criminals from the diversionary and primary targets. NPF losses included several officers killed, multiple police vehicles destroyed or damaged, the Central Police Station destroyed and an unspecified number of civilian bystanders killed in the crossfire and explosions. An unknown number of civilian casualties resulted from the NAF’s Mi-35 attack helicopter supporting of the Mobile Police. According to MEND statements post fact, the militants sustained no killed or injured in the operation, and were successful in retrieving their leader safely (Ekeinde 2007).
Funding.

MEND conducts oil bunkering and kidnap-for-ransom operations, collects movement fees, or “taxes”, from other groups conducting oil bunkering, and extorts oil companies in exchange for protection from attack on their facilities and personnel in order to generate operational funds. Nigerian law prohibits the payment of bribes as a part of the crackdown on corrupt practices in business and even specifically disallows deducting such payments on corporate income tax. Most of the major oil companies publicly state that they do not pay protection money to the militia. This is likely for several reasons; it is illegal and invites scrutiny by GoN authorities, and there are so many groups operating in the NRD that to pay one would invite all to make the demand. However, many smaller service companies operate under less stringent guidelines and some have publicly admitted making such payments. "Community development" assistance can also end up in the hands of Delta militia groups, sometimes allegedly with the connivance of corrupt oil industry middle managers and Nigerian officials (Jane’s Information Group 2006).

A tertiary source of funds, according to some Ijaw leaders, comes in the form of remittances from members of the Niger Delta diaspora in Britain and the United States. A few Ijaw militants in favor of building a secessionist movement have publicly admitted seeking financial assistance from unnamed foreign powers in return for promises of future oil concessions, although it is unclear whether any such assistance has been forthcoming (Ibid.). Though it is likely that there are regional actors in West Africa that would fund a group that could promise future concessions in an independent or semi-
autonomous NRD, but presently this is not likely because of the stated objectives and insurgent inability to exert continuous control anywhere in the NRD.

Information Operations

"Our aim is to totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government to export oil... it must be clear that the Nigerian government cannot protect your [oil companies] workers or assets. Leave our land while you can or die in it." (Ibid.). The MEND has pursued a multidisciplinary approach to information operations centered around their kidnap for ransom line of operation. MEND, to date, has not mistreated or killed any hostages that they have successfully abducted. In one incident an expatriate oil worker was killed alongside several Nigerian soldiers during a oil platform seizure, likely the unintended victim of crossfire. In all cases of successful abduction, MEND has treated the hostages relatively well, and effected release within 30-40 days in each case. The hostages return to GoN and employer control carrying, and in most cases seeming to believe, the MEND themes and messages of mistreatment, underdevelopment and governmental ethnic prejudice.

Ijaw political groups, including the IYC, have branches in the United States and Britain although it is unknown whether these branches have direct links to militant activities in the Delta (Ibid.). These branches maintain Internet presences in order to disseminate insurgent IO products without the pressure a West African-based diaspora would face from governments sympathetic to the Nigerian government’s dilemma.
Support and Sustainment

All of the militant and criminal groups operating in the NRD obtain small arms and light weapons (SALW) through a variety of sources. The primary means for arming and equipping a militant organization is via smuggling into the NRD from extra-Nigerian sources. Decades of almost constant strife in West and Central Africa and poor regional mechanisms post-conflict to resolve the flood of SALW has generated a tremendous secondary market in used weapons. Nigeria is unable to protect its borders from intrusion by smugglers and arms merchants with an available and untraceable commodity, such as oil, to exchange for weapons and with the unchecked demand for weapons, this secondary market will only continue to grow. The three most notorious points of entry for illicit SALW…is the port city of Warri in Delta state (Agboton-Johnson, Ebo & Mazal 2004).

Other means of obtaining weapons, while illegal, are also effective for the Delta militants, criminals and political gangs. MEND and other groups have conducted raids on police posts not only to eliminate pieces of the state security apparatus, but to also seize weapons, ammunition and equipment. Finally, representatives of state governments and the Nigerian security apparatus itself are responsible for distributing SALW to militant groups for their own purposes. Security agents from conflict areas have also been known to be suppliers of SALW to their related ethnic militias (Ibid 2004). For example, in 1992, a customs official gave out 16 G3 rifles to youths as his own contribution to the Niger Delta cause (Akparanta 1999). Finally, the Nigerian government has authorized an exception to the 1959 Firearms Act which restricts the manufacture, possession, and repair of firearms to the government, to allow the oil companies to import weapons to
equip Nigerian supernumerary police securing oil company facilities. These weapons, like those of the Nigerian Police Service, are subject to loss, theft or sale to militia forces (Ibid 2004).

Though there is very little data on the subject, the insurgents, and criminals, etc, conduct low level HUMINT to collect data on potential targets, the activities of the Nigerian military and security services, and to provide early warning for security and defense of their swamp camps. There is unconfirmed reporting from Nigerian media sources that the militants employ children in the role of passive intelligence collectors.

The militants operating in the NRD employ very little technology that requires specialized maintenance. Weapons are maintained by the individual, but when deemed non-serviceable, are replaced from the robust smuggling network. Boats are a staple item of commerce and agriculture/aquaculture in the NRD and can be maintained or repaired without the requirements of an identifiable and targetable logistics capability. Tactical communications are in the form of cellular telephones, another expendable item. There is a weak signal in many parts of the mangrove swamp from land based cell towers in Warri, Yenagoa and Port Harcourt, and limited Internet access in Warri and Port Harcourt for strategic communications (Inskeep 2005). The addition of the NIGCOMSAT launched in April 2007 by the Chinese space agency will provide improved cellular phone coverage and Internet access in the Delta but will probably also constitute a threat to insurgent operations security.

Recruiting

There is little publicly available and specific data on the recruiting habits of the NRD insurgents. Given the overriding concerns for operational security, like their
approach to leadership protection, the MEND does not reveal identities of its rank and
file and conducts all recruiting clandestinely. What is known is that MEND and other
NRD insurgent movements restrict recruitment to specific ethnic groups (Ijaw, Itsikiri,
Urhobo, etc.), for obvious reasons, former Nigerian military personnel, politically and
economically disenfranchised youths in the university age brackets, and criminals with
socially acceptable backgrounds. The insurgent force does fluctuate in size between the
week-day and week-end because of an element that maintains legitimate occupations and
lives during the work week but who revert to insurgent status on the weekend. These
“commuter guerillas” travel into the mangrove to linkup with full-time insurgents and
conduct operations or training when not working their “regular” job (Jane’s Information
Group 2006). This “commuter guerilla” represents a point of vulnerability for the
insurgent, as these members can be targeted for HUMINT collection and exploitation and
represents a capability in that this group provides near real time intelligence on the
Nigerian military and security service activities and movements in the villages and towns.

The instability in the Niger River Delta region can be summarized in terms of the
elements of a failed state, or at lease an ungoverned space. While Nigeria is not the
extreme example of a failed state like Somalia, there are indicators that the governance of
the NRD may be an example of failing governance. Elements of a failed state include 12
social, economic and political indicators.

Social Indicators

1. Mounting democratic pressures.

2. Massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons creating
complex humanitarian emergencies.
3. Legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia.

4. Chronic and sustained human flight.

Economic Indicators

5. Uneven economic development along group lines.

6. Sharp and/or severe economic decline.

Political Indicators

7. Criminalization and/or delegitimization of the state.

8. Progressive deterioration of public services.

9. Suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law and widespread violation of human rights.

10. Security apparatus operates as a "state within a state".


12. Intervention of other states or external political actors.

(Fund for Peace 2007).

In the NRD, we see all of these elements in play to one degree or another except measures two and four, pertaining to massive and chronically internal displaced peoples. The NRD has not manifested those measures yet. However, the trend with the other ten measures will likely result in a chronically displaced people over time. In April 2007, Nigeria conducted state and federal elections that were widely dismissed as fraudulent. Election-related violence throughout the country did not deter the citizens from making attempts to vote, and in many cases those attempts were never actualized (Human Rights Watch 2007b). The pressure for democratic reform and open participation in the political process is clear. The NRD is a strong example of uneven economic development along
group lines and a sharp or severe economic decline. The overall *modus operandi* of the oil industry in Nigeria, and how the revenue from it is handled, is an illustration of uneven economic development. Agriculture, service, and manufacturing sectors not related to oil production is in decay and is in conflict with the oil production. Finally, the political indicators are all fulfilled in good measure with a delegitimized and corrupt government, the failure of rule of law complete with extrajudicial violence and executions, the autonomy of the military and security services and the failure of the government to provide essential services. The final indicator, intervention by other states or other political actors, is already being fulfilled with Nigeria courting both the U.S. and China for security assistance, nation building and developmental assistance. The potential for the current instability to grow beyond the ability of the GoN to regain control of the region is rapidly increasing or may have passed, depending on which assumptions and measures are employed.

**Describe the Government of Nigeria Response to Insurgencies.**

The GoN has responded to insurgencies and organized paramilitary criminal activity in a consistent fashion over the past 41 years, since the 1966 start of the civil war. The GoN has always employed active, repressive, and lethal measures in response to these crises, despite the cost and consequence. The results of implementing the “strong man” approach to insurgency or ethnic violence has typically included; great suffering for the Nigerian citizens, conditions for the further empowerment of violent ethnic, political, or religious minorities, and little to no resolution of the causal factors of those incidents. In terms of a schism between the government and the governed, the GoN is paying the price in the NRD for the outcome of the 1966-1970 civil war and decades of repression.
This section will examine GoN COIN strategies in response to incidents of ethnic and religious violence in Northern Nigeria and the oil insurgency in the NRD using the analytic framework of PMESII. The elements of E1 (Environment) and I3 (Insurgent) will not be addressed in this section because of previous treatment of the NRD environment and the almost imperceptible impact those factors have on the strategies employed by the GoN in resolving insurgent crises.

Inter ethnic and religious violence in 2004 in Plateau state of Nigeria is a clear example of the GoN’s COIN strategy. This combination of violent incidents throughout Plateau state, and later Kano state, were not perpetrated by an insurgent group. They operated more along the lines of ethno-religious violence as seen in 2001 in the City of Jos, Plateau state and the Balkans and Rwanda in the 1990s. However, these incidents of violence remain within the general scope of this study in that the perpetrators were non-state actors pursuing an agenda outside accepted and legal political action.

The violence in Plateau and Kano states in 2004 has its roots in earlier inter-ethnic and religious violence elsewhere in Nigeria. It is fundamentally a dispute over political power and ethnic preference between indigenous Christian farmers and non-indigenous Islamic cattle herders. The conflict in 2004 began as a dispute over stolen cattle near Yelwa, Plateau state, and involved the murder of several Jawara Christians by Muslim Fulani and or Gemai herders. In retaliation for the murders, Christian residents of a nearby town murdered several Fulani and somewhere in the process, four Nigerian Police Force officers were murdered. While there is conflicting reports as to who began the violence that followed, the town of Yelwa was attacked on the morning of February 24, 2004. In the ensuing violence, seventy five Christians were murdered by Muslim herders.
Over the next few months, tensions increased when on May 2, 2004, a large group of well-armed Christians surrounded and attacked Yelwa, resulting in over 700 Muslim inhabitants being killed in two days (Human Rights Watch 2005a). President Obasanjo declared a state of emergency on May 18th, 2004, suspended the Plateau Governor, Deputy Governor and State House of Assembly, and appointed a retired Army Major General as interim administrator for a period of six months. Less than 10 days after the killings in Yelwa, Muslim violence against Christians occurred in Kano, Kano state in retaliation for the murders of Muslims in Yelwa. Some 200 people were killed in the initial rioting and violence, but the death toll increased when the military and police entered the city to quell the rioting. In this case, as in Yelwa, the military and police did not intervene until 24-36 hours after the killing began (Ibid.).

P – Political

While there was no government political response to the killings in Yelwa in February and Kano in the middle of May 2004, the May 2nd violence in Yelwa resulted in concrete political action on the part of the federal government. President Obasanjo appointed an interim administrator to the Plateau state government with new and unprecedented legal authority to conduct police operations to restore the peace. The administrator, Mr. Alli, established the Plateau Peace Program, a six month plan to restore peace and stability to the region. The Peace Program called for a dialogue between religions, amnesty and financial incentive to surrender weapons, commissions to study the underlying causes of the tensions; citizenship, land use, religious harmony, etc, and for a truth and reconciliation commission be established to encourage a public discussion on what happened and who was victimized. All but the final part was
implemented, and violence in central Nigeria has not recurred in the intervening years (Ibid.).

There has been no such attempt to establish a similar process to the Plateau Peace Program in the NRD. The GoN’s position that the militia violence in the NRD is nothing more than confederations of criminal bands precludes the issues from gaining any traction as legitimate national political crises. The GoN’s fielding of JTF Restore Hope in 2003 to protect the oil industry and destroy the criminal element precludes a peaceful resolution to the NRD crisis.

M - Military

In the Muslim attack on Christians in Yelwa on February 24th, with the exception of the four policemen who were killed early on, there was no police presence in the town throughout the day. Several hours after the attacks began, the Nigerian Army responded and was, by late afternoon, to secure the town and prevent additional acts of violence. However, the Army is not empowered to investigate crimes and arrest suspects, so there was limited investigating and no individuals charged related to the attack. The Nigerian government both at the state and federal level failed to take any action to resolve the incident. The NPS eventually returned to the town (Ibid.).

During the attack by a Christian mob against Muslim inhabitants of Yelwa on May 2, 2004, an attack that Human Rights Watch maintains was carefully planned and involved Christian residents of Yelwa and the surrounding towns, the military was alerted by inhabitants to the first two murders. Over the span of several hours, a Christian mob of several thousand people surrounded the town, divided into three groups and attacked from three different directions. In the ensuing violence, over 700 Muslim residents of
Yelwa were murdered. In this case, like the preceding February, the police were not present and the Army did not intervene for 24-36 hours, arriving at about 1200 on May 3rd. The Army had reports of violence in Yelwa on the 2nd, and deployed forces to the nearby village of Shendam first where they were told by Shendam authorities that the situation was calm in Yelwa and the Army was not needed. The Army element returned to their garrison. On the 3rd, a resident of Yelwa escaped and was able to alert the Army, who dispatched forces to Yelwa again. Once the Army appeared, the attacking mob dispersed. The Army did not apprehend any of the attackers. The police post in Yelwa had allegedly been abandoned that April despite clear evidence that tensions were again mounting and that violence was imminent. In an interview conducted by Human Rights Watch, residents of Yelwa on February 24th informed the police commissioner of the vacant police post, and were told the officers were evacuated because the local situation was a threat to their safety (Ibid.). In the post-mortem to the May 2-3 attacks, the police commissioner stated that the Yelwa police post was staffed by the normal complement of twelve officers. They had chosen not to intervene because the attack took place at night and because there were thousands of attackers, an overmatch for twelve officers. This action does not explain the failure to communicate the situation to higher authorities.

Military and police reaction to the violence in Kano ten days later can only be described as brutal. Military and Mobile Police units were operating under “shoot on sight” orders when confronting rioters, and a number of extrajudicial killings are attributed to the efforts to restore order in Kano (Ibid.).

Nigerian authorities have taken a different approach to insurgent actions in the NRD. In 1999, several Yourba policemen in Bayelsa state were kidnapped killed by
“hoodlums” in retaliation for the murder of Ijaws in Lagos at the hands of Yourba militants earlier in the year. The government demanded the town of Odi to turn-in the perpetrators and when the deadline had passed, the Nigerian military responded brutally. The Army troops entered Odi with tanks and armored vehicles and destroyed every building in the town, killing, by conservative estimates, several hundred residents. President Obasanjo, speaking about the incident, did not criticize the soldiers and did not offer an apology (International Crisis Group 2006). In another incident, in February 2005, the Ijaw town of Odioma was raided by a combined force of army and police who burned down hundreds of homes; at least 15 people were reported killed. In the case of Odi and Odioma and the army's destruction of villages the central state of Benue in 2001, the chain of command has remained unclear. President Obasanjo was widely criticized for publicly defending the operations (Jane’s Information Group 2006).

E – Economic

In both the Plateau and Kano ethno-religious violence of 2003 and the insurgency in the NRD from 1990 to present, the GoN has not established comprehensive economic structures or systems to address the causes of instability. In Plateau and Kano, the economic causes were the access to indigenous citizen rights and benefits, and in the NRD, the economic motivation for insurgency is the lack of equity in distribution of oil revenues versus the economic downturn of all other sectors of the economy. While there was some progress in establishing commissions to discuss the causes of the May 11-12 violence in Yelwa, no such efforts were made in Kano (Human Rights Watch 2005a). The GoN’s economic approach to resolving ethnic and insurgent grievances remains one of its most underutilized and potentially best tools to reestablish regional stability.
S – Social

Within the EPMESIII model, social causality of conflict and social tools and programs to address insurgent grievances are an essential component and necessary to understand the basic motivations of the key populations. Data on the non-political social aspects of these conflicts is simply not available for this study. There is anecdotal evidence that the method of selection of tribal leadership is one contributing factor in the Yelwa violence of February 2003. Ethnic and tribal boundaries, both physical and economic, are the causes of inter-tribal violence in the NRD hidden behind the backdrop of the inequity between the NRD peoples as a whole and the GoN’s control of profits from the oil sector. For that reason, this category will go unexamined in the question of GoN responses to insurgency.

I₁ – Infrastructure

In the case of the Plateau and Kano states incidence of ethno-religious violence, the question of infrastructure was not a causal factor. With the exception of the lack of or failure by police services in Yelwa in February and May 2003, the aspect of infrastructure is an unresearched part of these incidents. In terms of the NRD, the question of inadequate infrastructure is a significant portion of the insurgent’s grievances. As described in previous sections, the NRD infrastructure is either non-existent or in an advanced state of decay with no comprehensive programs in place to rectify multiple and multivariate infrastructure shortcoming. In light of this GoN position, non governmental organizations have assumed the role of providing infrastructure, but in a much smaller scale that the GoN could sponsor or execute directly if the political will existed to implement national level programs. In addition, the oil companies have sponsored low
level infrastructure projects in an attempt to ameliorate the adversarial positions held by local tribe and clan leadership. All the major oil companies have contributed to village infrastructure projects, focusing on health care and education. The unintended consequence of this oil company and NGO-driven program to improve NRD infrastructure is an ever widening separation between the people of the NRD and the GoN. When asked why oil companies should be expected to provide for communities when it is the government’s job to collect taxes and offer services and an equitable regulatory framework, many Delta residents reply: government officials are inaccessible, live far away and do not care (International Crisis Group 2006).

I2 – Information Operations

In the violence in Plateau state during February 2004 there was no significant GoN information operations effort. The incident was undoubtedly covered by the Nigerian domestic media, and potentially throughout the Muslim world because of the Christian versus Muslim theme. There was no attempt by the government to leverage or shape public perceptions and opinions. However, on May 18th, President Obasanjo described the situation in Palteau state as “near mutual genocide,” and discussed the suspension of the Plateau state Governor, Deputy and State House in terms of a complete failure by state leadership to peacefully resolve the growing tensions between Christian and Muslim and that their actions may have actually inflamed the situation demonstrated government openness and transparency when viewed along with the actions of the Administrator and the Plateau Peace Process. Government had acted to take ownership of the solution to the grievances of the combatants and broadcast that action in an IO

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campaign that demonstrates and solidifies their legitimacy to the civil population (Human Rights Watch 2005a).

In the NRD, the Nigerian government has taken a completely different approach. There is no proactive IO campaign to delegitimize the insurgent and support government legitimacy. As stated in the IO portion of the previous section, the insurgent has pursued an aggressive and proactive IO strategy to enhance their legitimacy both internationally and domestically. The GoN has not.

The Government of Nigeria has designed COIN campaigns, since the return to civilian rule in 1999, in a reactive and largely lethal manner. The application of the instruments of Nigerian national power has been weighted heavily toward the military and kinetic solution versus an integrated and interdisciplinary approach combining military force with political, social and economic programs designed to eliminate the source of the insurgents’ grievances. Instead, the government’s kinetic solutions have further driven a wedge between the people and a government that they can no longer identify with, one that less and less addresses their basic needs. The GoN is seen as a distant entity that does not represent the people, one that is easily portrayed by various insurgent groups as detached from the reality of the average Nigerian’s daily life, and one that prefers repression and violent domination as the solution to what are basically socio-politico-economic problems. To this end, the government has created far more insurgents since 1999 than incipient insurgent groups could have ever identified and developed themselves. The GoN’s execution of their COIN campaign in the NRD has, in effect, manufactured the insurgent they are seeking to destroy. In an attempt to “kill their way to
victory” the GoN is creating an endless supply of insurgents and sustains the instability that could ultimately destroy them.

**Problem-Set Synthesis and its Implications for U.S. COIN**

The questions of the nature of the Niger River Delta Insurgent Operational Environment, combined with the Government of Nigeria’s response to past and current insurgencies, provides one with the problem-set that future U.S. COIN operations in the NRD will have to address, either in a coalition with the GoN, or in a coalition of regional partners upon the complete failure of the Nigerian state. The premise of this study is the former framework within the next decade, or no later than 2017, with the U.S. as the supporting partner with a GoN lead. Along the lines of EPMESIII, there are several significant challenges that must be accounted for by U.S. COIN doctrine, or the operational and tactical experiences shared throughout the services charged with conducting COIN operations.

**Environmental challenges:**

1. Dense mangrove swamplands, continuously flooded forests
2. Complex waterways, creeks and channels
3. Severe weather (heavy rainfall, thunderstorms and cloud cover)
4. High temperatures and humidity
5. Polluted environment

**Political challenges:**

1. Overall lack of legitimacy in governance
2. Compromised electoral procedures
3. Pervasive corruption at all levels of the state.
4. Uneven/inequitable distribution of national resources
5. Political institutions and parties polarized along ethnic lines
6. A tradition of violence in political activities

Military and Security Service challenges
1. Ineffective and corrupt leaders
2. Inadequate individual and unit training
3. Avoids direct confrontation with insurgents and militants
4. Manning, material, and funding shortcomings
5. Inept maintenance program
6. Limited interservice synchronization
7. Limited operational agility, forces tied to security of key infrastructure
8. Leadership condones brutality and does not implement effective ROE

Economic challenges:
1. Oil sector dominance of NRD economic development
2. Other economic sectors marginalized by the oil sector
3. Corruption and preferential business practices
4. Organized criminal enterprises; theft of oil sector product and profits

Social challenges:
1. Ethnic strife, multi ethnic regions and multiple language requirements
2. Inadequate essential services (SWET-MS)
3. Corruption
4. Traditional versus organizational leadership
5. Crime and unemployed /disaffected youth
Infrastructure challenges:

1. Inadequate existing infrastructure to support essential services
2. Decaying and poorly maintained infrastructure
3. Overuse of existing infrastructure, lack of capacity
4. Oil infrastructure difficult to secure, protect and maintain

Information Operations challenges:

1. No GoN IO campaign
2. Nigerian military operations tend to compromise legitimacy
3. Insurgent’s sophisticated and effective IO strategy

Insurgent challenges

1. NRD insurgents defy classic definitions of insurgents/insurgency
2. Multiple and different insurgent organizations in NRD IOE
3. Increasing insurgent operational capability and capacity
4. Interrelationship between insurgents, criminal enterprises, ethnic militias, and political gangs

How does U.S. COIN doctrine apply to the NRD IOE?

U.S. COIN doctrine has experienced phases of emphasis throughout the past 120 years. COIN was commonly known as Small Wars, or petite guerre, in the period from 1889 through 1935, with the doctrine drawn primarily from the operational experience of the U.S. Marine Corps in the Philippines, the Caribbean and Latin America, and China. The first doctrinal publication resulting from this period was the USMC’s 1940 Small Wars Manual. Throughout the duration of WWII, a war of annihilation, COIN operations were not conducted by the allies, with the exception of Allied forces hunting the isolated
remnants of the Japanese Imperial Army in New Guinea and the Philippines conducting
guerilla operations between 1944 and 1945. The next major evolution of U.S. COIN
document occurred when the U.S. Army established Special Forces as a component of the
U.S. Army, and developed a doctrine to support them in the early 1950s. That doctrine
was tested to a limited extent in Korea and was proven in Vietnam. The Vietnam conflict
produced a variety of COIN doctrinal works applicable to the Army as a whole, all of
which fell out of common use among conventional forces in 1976 with the publication of
FM 100-5, Operations. COIN doctrine through the remainder of the 1970s, and into the
1990s only received minor emphasis and revision in the conventional force Army, with
the release of FM 90-8 Counterguerilla Operations in August of 1986 and FM 7-98
Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict in October of 1992. The U.S. Marine Corps
produced similar publications, including the January 1980 FMFM 8-2 Counterinsurgency
Operations. Joint service doctrine formally begins in 1991, and Joint Forces Command’s
(JFCOM’s) first COIN-related publication JP 3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense was first released in June of 1996. In 2006, the
U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps produced FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency as the basic
ground forces multi-service doctrine for COIN. This manual was shaped by recent
campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and GWOT operations in the Horn of Africa and the
Philippines. At the Joint forces level, as already mentioned, JFCOM produced JP 3-07.1
and related works, and is in the process of developing Joint COIN doctrine.

Since there is no published Joint doctrine for COIN, and JP 3-01.7 discusses the
strategic roles, responsibilities and characteristics of FID without providing operational
level doctrine, this study will restrict the examination of U.S. doctrine to FM 3-24
Counterinsurgency in the application of U.S. COIN doctrine to the NRD IOE. The challenges identified in the preceding section will shape this examination using the aspects of the EPMESIII analytical model. Because doctrine is the “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives” (JP 1-02 2007) and not influenced by conditions of the operational environment, the E1 (Environment) has been eliminated from this portion of the analysis.

P – Political

FM 3-24 provides an inadequate doctrinal framework to address the primary political challenges in the NRD IOE. In articulating the key COIN participants and their likely roles, the doctrine presupposes an IOE where U.S. forces can work with and in support of a minimally functioning and legitimate host nation government. This assumption requires that a segment of the population supports the existing government and adheres to a set of legal precepts and shared ethics. With this core, U.S. COIN doctrine can work to develop and improve the existing political system. The basic nature of the NRD lies outside these assumptions. The NRD has been politically polarized since the emergence of MOSOP in 1990. The government’s looting of the area’s natural resources and the local political structure’s complete loss of popular support has created separation between the NRD and the GoN more akin to an occupation by a foreign power. In this absence of a legitimate governing structure, political figures are more akin to warlords, accountable to no one and maintained in power through military and paramilitary force.
M – Military

Doctrine describes the importance of training and employing host nation security forces as a pillar to any successful COIN strategy. The lack of a credible and effective security structure is a fundamental assumption in COIN strategic design. If it were invalid, the insurgents would never have to emerge from the latency stage. Given the clear evolution of insurgent capability and capacity in the NRD, and earlier descriptions of the lack of an effective Nigerian military or security service, any U.S. involvement in COIN in the NRD would have a significant foreign internal defense (FID) requirement. FM 3-24 devotes considerable emphasis on this standard line of COIN operations and provides a detailed and comprehensive doctrinal basis that addresses many of the identified NRD challenges.

E – Economic

The multi-service doctrine does not adequately address economic development in general, and does not address the scope of systemic and potentially deliberate economic underdevelopment that can be found in the NRD IOE. The doctrinal treatment of economic development is similar in the treatment given to implementing programs of good governance. The assumption is that change can be effected at the local level by U.S. military forces, and in the case of the NRD, this is a wholly invalid assumption. Economics for a region large enough to support an insurgency typically involve a scale of economy that cannot be influenced in the short term by a relatively small commitment of U.S. forces. In the NRD, economic issues, such as oil sector dominance and the suppression of development in other economic sectors, corruption and preferential business practices, and the effect of organized criminal enterprises, have been evolving in
the wrong direction for over 40 years and require national level emphasis and international level (e.g. UN, World Bank, IMF, etc.) support. While the doctrine discusses stimulation of the micro economy with employment and businesses linked to the presence of U.S. forces, this is generally unsustainable economic development. Once U.S. forces depart, those businesses that were focused on providing goods and services specific to the U.S. presence will fail. The artificially inflated expectations of that business sector or work force will be abruptly reduced, potentially providing personnel and information operations themes for renewed insurgent activity. The doctrine discusses the Provincial Reconstruction Team approach used in Afghanistan and Iraq. While this is an example where military, in conjunction with other elements of national and international power, combines for nation-building, it is a technique whose long term success and supportability is undetermined.

S – Social

The current doctrine is a significant evolutionary step forward from the 1980 and 1990 doctrinal efforts in that it delves relatively deeply into factors of culture and social structures that are common world-wide. Not only does the doctrine examine the application of intelligence preparation of the battlefield to an insurgent environment, but the COIN principles, imperatives and some of the COIN paradoxes established in the fundamental theory of the doctrine support greater cultural and social understanding at all echelons of the services. While the doctrine, appropriately does not tie itself to the NRD IOE, it indirectly addresses many of the identified challenges of this insurgency. The doctrine recognizes the importance of understanding cultural and social structures and systems on their own and not from a U.S. perspective. It discusses the importance of the
reestablishment of essential services in a balanced and equitable manner for the region and its linkage to support for the government, along with some aspects of non-western concepts of leadership, values, and power relationships.

I₁ – Infrastructure

FM 3-24 addresses two principle aspects of infrastructure. The first is the restoration of essential services as a logical line of operations to support the civil population’s quality of life and the government’s legitimacy. The second is infrastructure that will be used directly by U.S. forces to support COIN operations. In both cases, the doctrine does not address the basic physical requirements, and is unable to reflect the complexity and scale of effort required in an environment like the NRD. Questions of inadequate existing infrastructure to support essential services, decaying and poorly maintained infrastructure, overuse of existing infrastructure, and a lack of capacity-growth to support the pace of economic development all erode the government’s legitimacy, and are all outside the scope and abilities of conventional U.S. forces to influence.

The doctrine addresses the essential services logical line of operation (LOO) in general terms, advising it is an important component of a COIN strategy, but not describing the inherent complexities associated with nation-building. Just a few of these complexities are; project management, funding sources and restrictions, the cultural impact of restoring or not restoring an essential service to one group before another, and the economic impact upon the immediate area and neighboring regions in the short and long-term. Infrastructure is linked to economic and cultural dynamics and consequently provides ample opportunity for significant successes and dramatic failures in the overall
COIN strategy. Despite the implication in the doctrine, restoration of critical infrastructure is not a U.S.-led or run process, nor is it a process for the generalist. All of the SWET-MS are technical services and require a technical design to restoration project management and execution. The education, background and professional certifications required to perform in this role typically are not found in military formations below Corps level or outside the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. While U.S. military forces may be the initial capability provider to establish rudimentary services, the process to sustain permanent restoration of essential services is a political process, first and foremost, involving numerous political, ethnic, bureaucratic and aid-agency representatives each with different and competing priorities and agendas. It is lastly, and appropriately, a technical project with a specific and measurable endstate in terms of time and capacity.

I₂ – Information Operations

U.S. COIN doctrine and the conduct of Information Operations in a COIN environment demonstrates the importance and relationship of an effective IO campaign to other logical lines of operation especially in respect to the insurgent and the host nation government. The doctrine addresses each of the challenges of the NRD IOE, accounting for the lack of an effective GoN IO effort. It also addresses the implications of GoN military actions providing effective IO themes and messages to the insurgents and damage to the government’s rudimentary IO efforts, and the consequences and challenges of an effective and comprehensive insurgent offensive IO campaign.

The emphasis in the doctrine of IO serving as the adhesive that bonds the lines of operation into a strategic whole demonstrates the effect that inappropriate host nation or U.S. actions have on the COIN end-state and government legitimacy. Issues in the NRD
of Nigerian military reprisals against civilians for successful insurgent actions, the military’s poor performance in action with the insurgents, and the insurgent’s ability to conduct operations when and where they choose all serve the insurgent’s IO campaign. The insurgent’s ability to package and disseminate those themes and messages illustrates the doctrine’s emphasis on rapid and multi-media dissemination. The GoN absence of an IO effort, including the essential counterpropaganda aspect, yields the IO battlespace to the insurgent. If principles and methodologies articulated in FM 3-24 were consistently implemented simply within the NRD, a measurable impact on the perceptions of governance would be observed. If the Nigerian military implemented a comprehensive IO campaign as described in the doctrinal principles in FM 3-24, the insurgents would see the evolution of their capacity and capability reduced or halted.

I3 – Insurgent

FM 3-24 describes an insurgency using the definition from Joint doctrine. It is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (U.S. Army 2006). The definition is then expanded to include the protracted nature of insurgencies, a duality of political and military domains. It pulls back on the requirement to actually overthrow a constituted government and replaces it with the struggle for control and legitimacy between the insurgent and the constituted government, occupying power or other political authority. This expanded definition tends to account for all the fundamental dynamics of the NRD IOE with the exception that it implies the end-state is a yes or no proposition of whether the insurgent does or does not increase his control of society, governance, territory, etc. It does not account for the integration of the phenomenon of failed states or ungoverned spaces and a
government’s inability to influence those regions. The Niger River Delta is rapidly becoming a place where Nigerian political, military, and law enforcement authority fails to control or even effectively influence the lives of the inhabitants. It is a place where the competing objectives and ideologies of multiple insurgent groups is combined with political militias and ongoing criminal enterprises taking advantage of the power vacuum created as the government looses legitimacy and effect. The reality of the NRD is that of a failed space where government authority is present but ineffective and competing insurgent groups are divided in purpose over secessionist or reformist/participatory agendas, not the replacement or destruction of the existing political system.

**What U.S. COIN experiences from Iraq and Afghanistan are applicable to the NRD IOE?**

As stated in the introduction, the U.S. military, since 2001, has had to relearn COIN at the tactical and operational levels of war. The new strategic paradigm of insurgent threats in Afghanistan and later in Iraq presented the U.S. with an unfamiliar problem for which it was, initially, unprepared for. In order to rapidly develop the skills demanded by this new threat, the U.S. military found itself in a position where it had to “learn by doing” in a counterinsurgency role while searching the historical record for the hard-won lessons of past conflicts.

In that time, the U.S. military has made tremendous progress in developing, institutionalizing, and disseminating a broad range of skills to conduct COIN at the tactical and operational levels in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The continuing contributions from these theaters to the COIN body of knowledge is, in effect, shaping and specializing U.S. forces as a regional (read Middle Eastern/Central Asian) COIN force at the expense
of broader institutional competencies applicable to IOEs in other cultural and physical settings.

The experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq are generally applicable to, and account for, many of the requirements of the NRD IOE. There exists however, shortfalls that translate into service capability gaps. This section will examine those experiences along the lines of EPMESIII, with the M (Military) further subdivided into the areas of Doctrine, organization, Training, Material, and Leader Development.

E1 – Environment

U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq provide limited input to doctrine and applicable TTPs to account for the specific environmental requirements presented by the NRD IOE. Because large scale operations have not been conducted in an environment similar to the NRD since combat operations concluded in Vietnam in the early 1970s, there is little available institutional knowledge to apply to this future requirement. Additionally, the primary feature of the NRD, the mangrove swamp and systems of waterways, is completely outside the personal experience of the vast majority of U.S. Army and USMC personnel.

The USMC deployed a small craft company to Iraq in 2004 to conduct riverine operations along the Euphrates River and provided fire support, assault support, patrolling, blocking, reconnaissance, and raid transportation support to U.S. and Iraqi Security Force (ISF) units (USMC 2006a). This unit was deactivated in 2005 and responsibility for this function was assigned to the Navy’s Expeditionary Combat Command as a core function. While there is no remaining dedicated riverine capability in
either the Army or Marine Corps, selected engineer bridge units retain the small boat
skills essential to this tactical capability.

P – Political

U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq included service member interaction
with the elements of a compromised political environment, but has generated little in the
way of useful inputs to doctrine or well documented TTPs. The military remains unable
to come to grips with government loss or lack of legitimacy or the sub-issues of
corruption, political violence, ethnic polarization, and the politicization of the distribution
of resources. Military officers are not typically trained to perform the diplomatic or
political functions of Department of State personnel. Military officers train to lead
soldiers in combat against definable enemies in support of political objectives and are out
of their “comfort zone” in diplomatic situations. The military’s apolitical tradition tends
to support this mind-set. However, an overwhelming lesson learned from operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq is that military officers will be required to function in the political
arena from the local up through the national level. Many cite the failure to identify the
soci-political indicators of an incipient insurgency in Iraq post the 2003 invasion and
arrest its growth to the lack of military leadership at the appropriate levels in the political
process (Hoffman 2004).

A clear understanding of the political environment, both actors and agendas, is
essential to effective COIN campaign design. Far too often, policymakers, analysts, and
intelligence experts approach the subject of counterinsurgency by trying to oversimplify
the situation, underestimate the risks, and exaggerate the level of control they can achieve
over the course and outcome of the war (Cordesman 2006a). At the tactical level,
maneuver commanders are generally not trained in the political and social complexities and subtleties of their area of responsibility. This failure to understand the local political structures and actors has resulted in practices serving to alienate host nation civilians and leaders who may have been initially supportive of coalition efforts (CALL 04-13).

Finally, many existing political authorities in both Afghanistan and Iraq were deemed unpalatable to the West’s vision of a post-conflict democracy and were removed. This wholesale dismantling of existing administrative bureaucracy triggered social chaos and insecurity, though different in scale between Afghanistan and Iraq. This shortcoming in post-conflict planning is a lesson that is directly applicable to the NRD. The U.S. should rely as much as possible on local government and expand its role and capability as soon as possible, though this means working with local leaders that are not democratic, fall short of Western ideals, or are traditional in nature (Cordesman 2006c).

M – Military

As previously stated, the Military component of EPMESIII is described in terms of elements of the DOTMLPF domains; Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, and Leader Development, to fulfill the Military element of EPMESIII.

Doctrine

The planning for the invasion of Iraq, with the objective of regime change, did not account for the potential development of a post conflict insurgency. The evolution of the Iraqi insurgency is well beyond the scope of this study, but is an indicator that doctrinal shortfalls are present in current U.S. service doctrine. The conscious decision on the part of the military to stop planning for the almost certain post-conflict nation building stems
from the dogma that the U.S. military does not perform those kinds of missions. This mindset retains an iron grip on the institutional military despite the legacy of operations in the Balkans in the 1990s. The reality, given the scope of subsequent operations both in Afghanistan and Iraq, shows that the uniformed services will always be intimately involved in post-conflict reconstruction (Cordesman 2006a). This trend in modern military operations demonstrates the need for doctrine, and the follow-on aspects of organization, training and leader development, be revised and expanded in scope to provide the appropriate tools for the junior leader to succeed in a COIN environment. Roles for the military have expanded to establishing interagency organizations to facilitate civil reconstruction and the reconstitution of military and law enforcement forces. Afghanistan and Iraq have provided a breadth of TTPs on both of those topics, but doctrine, and doctrinal products to support future operations in the NRD IOE are not currently available. Examples include the Provincial Reconstruction Teams established throughout Afghanistan and Iraq, refugee returnee operations in Bosnia Herzegovina, and military support to national elections in Kosovo, just to name a few.

**Organization**

From the Joint Task Force level downward, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, units have found themselves under-resourced for the exigencies of COIN in terms of personnel and equipment. Unit organizational design is based on conducting high intensity combat against a similarly equipped and manned opponent in a linear battlefield structure. When faced with conducting operations in a non-contiguous battlefield over geographical distances more appropriate for an organization two echelons higher, many units have had to augment their basic manning structure to ensure mission success. In many cases,
platoon and company sized organization operate independently from parent formations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. These non-contiguous areas of operations (AORs) within the higher formations’ contiguous AORs create a requirement for additional command and control, intelligence, and logistical support functions. In addition to these relatively predictable additional requirements comes the extensive civil-military functions that now have to be accomplished at all echelons. These civil military requirements are derived primarily from the political, economic, and social dynamics of those IOEs, but are typically filled by available but not necessarily qualified personnel.

**Training**

Experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq in training the reconstituted security services has generated tremendous material from which to formulate expanded doctrine and training support packages. As security services, including the military, civil police, border forces, and intelligence apparatus were purged and then reconstituted, the coalition training program was executed as only a secondary effort to coalition forces destroying insurgents. This secondary effort stemmed from the implications of U.S. COIN doctrine that a U.S.-only and relatively cookie-cutter approach to reestablishing security services would be executed, without significant adaptations to the local environment. The systemic problems resulting from this generalized approach included; inconsistent training programs, material deficiencies and lack of support structure, the corrosive effects of corruption and ethnic divisions on unit formation and others. As training programs received more and more scrutiny in the U.S., and the requests from the Afghan and Iraqi governments for greater capacity and quality grew, coalition command emphasis focused on the various training programs, and many systemic problems were
identified and resolved. Now, both within Afghanistan and Iraq, a sophisticated and comprehensive training program exists to establish security services along western lines, able to conduct full-spectrum operations and participate in coalitions. The only remaining variable in these theaters is the time required to establish security services that are self perpetuating and able to assume the full mantle of national defense. Incorporation of all that the U.S. military has learned in those operations will be generally applicable to the NRD IOE with specific tailoring for environment and cultural factors.

Material

Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have illustrated the requirement for material solutions to tactical problems encountered by U.S. forces. The difficulty of mobility in the mountainous regions of Afghanistan has developed the requirement for a variety of capabilities including; better all terrain vehicles, lightweight crew served weapons, counter mortar radars, small unmanned aerial vehicles, improved communications, and lighter, smaller, and more enduring batteries (Cordesman 2004b), just to name a few items. Operations in Iraq have established requirements for mine and explosive proof vehicles, better communications for urban environments, larger and more robust unmanned aerial vehicles, and greater protection against small arms fire for rotary wing aircraft. While these material solutions to tactical problems may or may not be directly applicable to the NRD IOE, the process of identifying solutions to IOE requirements requires the careful analysis of the physical environment and the nature of the adversary. Some of the material lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq that address mobility, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, information management and communications, and protection are likely directly applicable to the NRD IOE. However,
the further U.S. military planners refine the requirements of the NRD IOE, the longer the list of material gaps becomes.

**Leader Development**

Stability and reconstruction operations in a COIN environment require Army units at all levels to coordinate directly with non-defense national agencies (CALL 06-27). The efficient application of this axiom, which should come as no surprise after experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, presupposes leaders trained at the appropriate echelons and in the applicable political, social and economic disciplines. Leader development for COIN, particularly at the brigade combat team and lower, requires a balance of tactical skills with the ability to integrate the other instruments of national power into a COIN approach. Leaders must enter a COIN environment already prepared to operate and coordinate with all elements of the JIIM community, and not be playing the dangerous and unforgiving game of learn-by-doing that some have done in current operations. Further, a combination of the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has illustrated the need for specialized forces with area and language skills and the fact that nation-building and stability operations are now aspects of the military profession that no competent officer can ignore (Cordesman 2006b).

On the whole, the M (or Military) element of EPMESIII, offers two significant insights into the question of relevant experiences from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq being applicable to the NRD IOE. The first is that many of those experiences provide validation of current doctrine or identify gaps within the doctrine. In many cases TTPs have emerged to overcome those gaps and can form the basis for revisions in doctrine, or the development of focused applications of doctrine for specific operational
environments. Second, the process of organizational learning, adaptation and improvisation to accomplish the mission is a clear strength of U.S. forces and is an excellent barometer of the gaps within all the DOTMLPF domains. These lessons learned provide solution sets within their operational context, and provide insight into operational capability gaps for future applications of COIN.

From this point forward, the examination along the lines of EPMESIII will resume with E₂ (Economic) aspects.

E₂ – Economic

U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq has provided limited experiences that will address the requirements of the NRD IOE. The economies of both Afghanistan and Iraq are impacted almost not at all by the combined weight of Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, and other economic incentives to aid in economic systems recovery. Economies compromised by years of mismanagement, corruption and theft require significant top-down attention to resolve systemic problems. No amount of CERP funds or local contracting for goods and services to the coalition forces will fundamentally change, let alone improve, the economy in a lasting sense.

The insurgents in both Afghanistan and Iraq have adopted a strategy to reduce the effectiveness of any attempts by the government or international community to improve the economy through direct aid or infrastructure projects. Through a campaign of targeting aid workers and their projects, the insurgents have driven up the costs for personal and project security and effectively delayed project completion in this way. They have forced a massive reprogramming of aid into short-term, security-oriented activity, and well over 20% of aid spending now goes simply to providing security for aid
activity (Cordesman 2006a). Further, the insurgents continue to engage in, and with,
criminal enterprises for direct funding and to diminish government efforts at economic
reform. By way of engaging in criminal and corrupt practices, the insurgents obtain
funding for operations that the insurgents of 40 years ago received from state sponsors of
insurgencies.

S – Social

U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have provided a generation of service
members with first hand experiences operating with a dissimilar culture in joint and
multinational COIN operations. However interesting these anecdotal experiences are,
little has been accomplished in the way of preparing U.S. forces to effectively influence a
host nation’s social structures and systems to achieve a specific objective. The U.S. may
never be able to precipitate any change in the social fabric in Afghanistan or Iraq, in the
present, or Nigeria in the future. We may be required to accept social institutions that are
divisive, unjust and counterintuitive to effective COIN operations. It is maintained by
many that the U.S. can encourage political, economic, and social changes, but cannot
implement them (Cordesman 2006a). The social challenges of the NRD include ethnic
tensions, anti-social behavior of a large unemployed population, the conflict between
traditional ethnic leadership and political party leadership, and the ever present corrupt
nature of Nigerian society. Many similarities between Nigeria and Afghanistan and Iraq
could be made, but the U.S. has enjoyed little success influencing those theaters along
social lines. Moreover, little has been captured in the way of TTPs or inputs to service
document. In recognition of the importance of cultural and social factors to understanding
environments and adversaries, the USMC established the Center for Advanced
Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL) in January of 2006 with the mission to ensure Marines are equipped with operationally relevant regional, cultural, and language knowledge to allow them to plan and operate successfully in the joint and combined expeditionary environment (USMC 2006b). However, no similar capabilities have been established with the other services, and the CAOCL is only in its formative stages with the majority of material devoted to current rather than future operations.

\[ I_1 \text{ – Infrastructure} \]

The infrastructure challenges of the NRD IOE include inadequate infrastructure to support essential SWET-MS services, decaying infrastructure due to overuse, environmental erosion and lack of maintenance, and the difficulty in securing critical oil infrastructure from attack or pilferage. The scope of infrastructure challenges is simply staggering, with the entire region at risk for further irreparable decay and the impact of the loss of those capabilities on the civil population and economy.

U.S. experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq are similar in scope, with Afghanistan already an underdeveloped nation having experienced a Soviet invasion and a fundamentalist government disinterested in infrastructure development and maintenance. Iraq is similar in that the nation was fairly modern with adequate infrastructure damaged by a despotic regime that diverted funds for development and maintenance into personal bank accounts. The effect of that infrastructure on post-conflict governments is corrosive, as they inherit the problem but do not have the capability to fix it, despite civilian expectations that the new government will make immediate improvements in the quality of their lives. The challenges of providing critical
infrastructure immediately become challenges of legitimacy for the new government and U.S. forces.

U.S. forces have little experience with the macro economics and major construction effort associated with the infrastructure rehabilitation required in the NRD IOE, or in Afghanistan and Iraq. The military does not possess the capability themselves to conduct these projects, and has even less experience in managing these projects, except for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACE), who specialize in major civil engineering efforts. However, the ACE typically does not deploy to conduct nation-building in a COIN environment. The conventional field military finds itself again in a role that is outside their experience and education baseline. The military does not possess the skill-sets needed to address the types of infrastructure rehabilitation needed to reestablish government legitimacy in the NRD. Mismanagement of a project on the part of the U.S. military serves to delegitimize the government and provide the insurgent with an IO success story.

\[ I_2 \] – Information Operations

U.S. forces have conducted offensive and defensive IO operations in Afghanistan and Iraq with mixed results. While the services are developing efficient means to plan, prepare, and produce products for print, radio or telephone transmission to support IO objectives, the cultural barrier still prevents effective execution of IO when not endorsed by the host nation government. The lack of true cultural expertise, at best, reduces the effectiveness of an IO product and at worst, supports insurgent IO themes and messages. The doctrinal concept of information operations, as a combat multiplier, seems to be universally misunderstood at nearly every level of the Army. The common misconception
of IO is that it is another staff stovepipe with undefined and unresourced missions, a vertical staff effort that does not seem relevant to combat operations (CALL 04-13).

U.S. forces have also learned, through experiences in Afghanistan or Iraq, that the host nation government’s approach to IO can be very effective or very destructive towards coalition COIN objectives. In the case of the NRD, the Nigerian government’s attitude that the insurgents are merely criminals feeds the division between the federal government and the local populations. While the solution is obvious to all, U.S. forces may or may not convince the Nigerian government to change its attitudes and information operations efforts to attempt a reconciliation with the insurgents. These same phenomena are seen in Iraq today. The lesson from this aspect of warfare is that the host nation must WANT to do a better job of IO and must WANT to reconcile with the rebels.

I3 – Insurgent

The insurgent challenges in the NRD IOE include an insurgency that defies classic definitions and contemporary experience. There are multiple independent insurgent groups, an increasing insurgent operational capability and capacity, and unknown relationships between insurgent groups, criminal enterprises, ethnic militias and political gangs. COIN operations in Afghanistan and Iraq provide comparable experiences with the insurgent in the NRD IOE. U.S. forces initially applied obsolescent models to describe the insurgencies evolving in Afghanistan and Iraq, models that did not reflect the realities of these IOEs. In analyzing the organization of insurgents in Iraq, a concept of warfare involving flatter, more linear networks rather than the pyramidal hierarchies and C2 systems that have governed traditional insurgent organizations began
to emerge (Hoffman 2004). Both the CENTEOM insurgents and the AFRICOM
insurgents have abandoned the model of the 1960s and adapted to the globalized and
networked world. It took time for U.S. COIN theory to catch-up to the realities of these
IOEs, but it has, and understanding about these new insurgencies is growing.

These insurgents attack structures of governance, create alliances of convenience,
exploit regional media, maintain a strategy of constant attrition, employ forms of
attack that provoke overreactions from the COIN forces, conduct terror operations
against political leaders and NGOs, create sanctuaries, attack nation building
efforts and confuse the identity of attackers (Cordesman 2004a).

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, insurgent groups coordinate their activities with
apolitical criminal groups, ethnic militias formed from the perception that the government
to cannot protect them, and those armed factions that provide muscle for local and
regional political factions. All of these characteristics apply to the activities of the
MEND, COMA and the JRC. Though removed by thousands of miles, and in a dissimilar
environment, there are strong parallels between the insurgents, and thus, many U.S.
experiences with Afghan and Iraqi insurgents will provide insight into understanding the
NRD insurgent.

In the final chapter, this study will consolidate the findings of this chapter into a
list of recommendations to resolve capability gaps organized along the doctrine,
organization, training, material and leader development domains.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

As stated before, this section will provide a list of recommendations to fill capability gaps in the doctrine, organization, training, material and leader development domains. The majority of these recommendations are pre-emptive in nature and would have the greatest effect if implemented before the NRD becomes a critical crisis area of the world.

The U.S. Army and to a lesser extent, the U.S. Marine Corps, does not possess an adequate skill-set at the tactical and operational levels to succeed in COIN operations in the NRD IOE. Current doctrine and institutional experience has enabled and prepared the services to effectively locate, engage and destroy the combatant elements of an insurgency, but not to address its root causes.

The greatest gaps in U.S. COIN capability are found in the requirement to eliminate or reduce the root socio-economic causes of insurgency. While doctrine states that COIN is an interagency effort, with the military serving in a support capacity versus as the lead and integrator, recent history in Afghanistan and Iraq argue otherwise. In both theaters, the military is executing its doctrinal role to provide security. However, it has also assumed a military-governance role due to a lack of depth in the Department of State (DoS) and coalition government effort. The elimination of social, economic and political causes for insurgency cannot be affected in any meaningful way by military action alone, even military action that is non-lethal and on behalf of the appropriate but absent Joint Interagency Industry and Multinational (JIIM) community. Any COIN operation without
a meaningful strategy to address those areas will result in endless cycles of
counterguerilla operations and paramilitary police actions whose only result will be to
empower new regional insurgents and ignite widespread conflict and instability in the
Gulf of Guinea.

Recommendations

The recommendations of this study are intended for application to the NRD IOE,
and only for those forces that have Nigeria in their area of responsibility for contingency
planning. There may be some application, in a general sense, to other Gulf of Guinea
nations, or to other similar physical environments, with the appropriate adjustments in
context. However, as discussed in this study and acknowledged by doctrine, these
recommendations cannot be applied directly to another IOE because of the individual and
specific nature of every insurgency. While the analytic model of this study may be useful
to those examining other insurgencies, there are no shortcuts in describing an IOE. The
wholesale copying from another IOE based on superficial similarities is as dangerous as
not doing the analysis at all.

The Army, in its role as proponent for multi-service COIN doctrine, must further
develop the concepts of military support to governance, macro and micro economic
rehabilitation, and security service restructuring. While these are typically roles for the
DoS or U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), the uniformed services have
to be prepared to take the lead on these aspects of COIN when required. Any additional
document where uniformed services are executing roles in lieu of DoS or AID must find its
genesis in that agency’s doctrine. The services must extend the doctrinal concepts
articulated in FM 3-24 into a product that is appropriate for conducting COIN in the
NRD. This targeted doctrinal product will enable commanders at all levels to translate national objectives for COIN into comprehensive and complete logical LOOs for the IOE. This product, sharing many of the characteristics of a combatant commander’s contingency plan, differs in that it will begin from a basis in doctrine and apply IOE conditions, rather than spring from crisis and seek a doctrine that appears to, more or less, fit the situation.

At the operational and tactical levels, doctrine must be developed that account for the extremes of the NRD environment. The Army currently lacks doctrine for littoral or riverine operations at the brigade combat team down through platoon level, and the source of environmental doctrine, FM 90-5 *Jungle Operations*, was last published in 1982. With changes in doctrine as the start point, the other domains of DOTML can evolve to prepare the forces for the NRD IOE.

**Organization**

1. Establish a JTF HQ under AFRICOM to begin planning, preparation and coordination for COIN operations in the NRD and other Gulf of Guinea IOEs.

2. Enhance the civil military capacity and capability within the brigades and battalions to enable CMO linkages down to the village and up to the regional level.

3. Modify brigade down to squad level organization to enable riverine maneuver and movement, and comprehensive logistical support to foreign internal defense efforts.

4. Enhance intelligence architecture at the brigade level and below to improve human intelligence (HUMINT) capability, and vertical and horizontal intelligence sharing in a joint and coalition structure.
Training:

1. Include Joint, Interagency, Industry, and Multinational elements in brigade down to the platoon level exercises.

2. Develop a riverine operations training capability to support brigade down to squad level preparation for this environment.

3. Develop comprehensive and realistic training for the execution of civil-military programs at the brigade down to platoon level, leveraging the JIIM community.

4. Adapt air assault and air movement training to a riverine environment from brigade down to platoon level, with an emphasis on sustainment functions.

Material:

1. Field watercraft systems to the brigade down to the squad level.

2. Develop and field JIIM-capable communications systems at the brigade down to platoon level.

3. Develop standardized equipment packages and associated sustainment to resource foreign internal defense programs and eliminate the “catalog and purchase request” approach.

4. Develop and field engineer gap-crossing systems appropriate for establishing ground lines of communication in a mangrove swamp environment.

5. Develop and field wide-area wireless data/voice networks that will support U.S.-only and coalition operations in an environment where commercial telecommunications architecture is non-existent.
6. Field greater water purification and power generation capability to the brigade through platoon levels to facilitate operations in an austere, geographically compartmentalized, and isolated region.

7. Develop ISR systems that are effective in a riverine and jungle environment, accounting for high temperatures, high moisture content and humidity, and the heavy vegetation of the mangrove forest.

**Leader Development:**

1. Conduct leader and staff-oriented professional development at the brigade level and below focused on the political, social, and economic systems, structures and gaps of the NRD IOE. Capitalize on opportunities for cultural immersion in Nigeria whenever possible.

2. Integrate the JIIM community pertinent to the NRD into JTF and lower echelon planning and unit training. Establish programs for semi-permanent or episodic personnel exchanges.

3. Conduct leader and staff-oriented certification in the design, implementation and assessments of civil-military programs at the national, down to local levels.

This list of DOTML recommendations in no way accounts for all of the requirements of the NRD IOE, or current service capability gaps in COIN. It does, however, represent the major areas that the services must address in order to be successful in even marginally conducting COIN in the NRD, either in partnership with the GoN and regional neighbors, or unilaterally in the event of a complete failure of governance. The fundamental challenge to implementing these recommendations rests at the national policy level where recognition of the requirement and potential courses of
action are made. Less that senior policy level direction, the uniformed services can only
take a generalist approach and will be adopting these DOTML recommendations only
after a crisis is recognized, and as always, in a severely time and resource constrained
basis.


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