The current structure of the United States elements of national power creates significant interagency coordination problems, leading to a less efficient unity of national effort. The primary hurdle to interagency coordination lies not in the grand strategic formulation of policy, but in the theater-strategic and operational implementation of such policy. The National Security Council lacks the political will and the current capacity to handle the volume of interagency coordination required. The lack of interagency coordination creates significant deficiencies in national effort during periods of transition from military to civil control and vice versa. The Department of Defense has instituted Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) and Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOC) in an attempt to solve these deficiencies; however both solutions have significant limitations and are not fully effective.

This paper provides a five step process of reform that standardizes regional department alignment, creates an IA command and control structure, eliminates bureaucracy and redundancy, shifts funding to deficient capabilities, and develops IA education, career placement, and planning, which could significantly reduce interagency coordination issues and more effectively harmonize the instruments of national power.
FIVE STEPS TO SOLVING THE INTERAGENCY COORDINATION PROCESS

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

Five Steps to Solving the Interagency Coordination Process

The current structure of the United States elements of national power creates significant interagency coordination problems, leading to a less efficient unity of national effort. The primary hurdle to interagency coordination lies not in the grand strategic formulation of policy, but in the theater-strategic and operational implementation of such policy.

The National Security Council lacks the political will and the current capacity to handle the volume of interagency coordination required. The lack of interagency coordination creates significant deficiencies in national effort during periods of transition from military to civil control and vice versa. The Department of Defense has instituted Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) and Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOC) in an attempt to solve these deficiencies; however both solutions have significant limitations and are not fully effective.

This paper provides a five step process of reform that standardizes regional department alignment, creates an IA command and control structure, eliminates bureaucracy and redundancy, shifts funding to deficient capabilities, and develops IA education, career placement, and planning, which could significantly reduce interagency coordination issues and more effectively harmonize the instruments of national power.
Attaining our national objectives requires the efficient and effective use of the diplomatic, informational, economic, and military instruments of national power supported by and coordinated with those of our allies and various intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and regional organizations. Successful interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination enables the USG [United States Government] to build international support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared international goals.¹

The current structure of the United States elements of national power creates significant interagency coordination problems, leading to a less efficient unity of national effort. The primary hurdle to interagency coordination lies not in the grand strategic formulation of policy, but in the theater-strategic and operational implementation of such policy. Although there has been significant research into identifying interagency coordination problems, there have been few recommendations about how to effectively and efficiently institute reform. This paper will provide a five step process of reform that could significantly reduce interagency coordination issues and more effectively harmonize the instruments of national policy.

THE PROBLEM

According to Joint Doctrine, the main day-to-day forum for interagency (IA) coordination of national security policy is the National Security Council (NSC) Policy Coordination Committees (PCC).² However, the PCCs lacks the capability and the political will for efficient coordination. As a result, the critical tie between policy formulation at the grand strategic level and IA policy implementation at the theater-strategic and operational levels of warfare becomes uncoordinated and inefficient.

The NSC is a politically sensitive environment.³ As such, members of the NSC PCCs often push IA decisions to higher levels of the NSC (the Deputies Committee and then the Principles Committee).⁴ The Secretaries (at the Principles Committee level) have the opportunity to make IA decisions and solve disputes between the different executive departments. However, IA
coordination within the NSC can become personality driven by individual cabinet members. If IA matters cannot be resolved by the Secretaries, the President holds the ultimate decision making authority. There is no authority to ‘break the tie’ between competing departmental agendas below the Presidential level.

Even if the PCCs or NSC gained the political will to enforce contentious IA decisions, they simply lack the capacity to handle the enormous volume of coordination required to maximize the effectiveness of elements of national power. As the United States has emerged from the Cold War as the primary world power, it has seen global responsibilities increase exponentially; many of which are non-traditional in nature. “Mission success now depends on more than dominance on the battlefield. In fact, the ever-increasing dominance of the U.S. military in combat operations has forced our enemies to search for weaknesses outside of traditional battlefields.” This emergence of nontraditional threats requires a volume of IA coordination beyond the capacity of the NSC. This is evident in the unconventional warfare we fight today in the Global War on Terrorism, where achieving our national objectives necessitates a thorough understanding of regional and national cultural experience. A misunderstanding of the motivating factors of a religion or country can lead to gross errors in planning and executing operations.

For example, if the regional Combatant Commander (CCDR) conducting current stability and reconstruction operations had a military benefit in restoring a particular region of a country, yet the State Department had competing priorities for an alternate region, the CCDR would have to first vet his request for State Department support (in coordination with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)) through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Subsequently, that request would be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense and then to the
appropriate NSC PCC. The PCC realizing that there are political considerations for choosing one department over the other would then forward the request to the NSC Deputies Committee which would forward it to the NSC Principles Committee. Secretaries of Defense and State, feeling each of their causes equally critical, cannot reach an agreement, and the IA decision is ultimately made at the Presidential level.

Currently, operational IA decisions are made at the highest levels of government, doctrinally reserved for strategic policy development. This forcing of operational decisions to the strategic level removes regional expertise from the decision making process which often results in an under-informed decision. Therefore, IA coordination, especially at the day-to-day level, becomes unreasonably lengthy, loses regional expertise, and overweights the capacity of the NSC and executive branch.

**THE RESULT**

The outcome of failed IA coordination results in individual exertion of national power and inefficient unity of national effort. An example of departmental effort throughout the doctrinal six phases of war is shown in Figure 2. Classically, Phase 0 (Shaping) activities primarily rely on significant State Department efforts and are conducted until a threat is identified. Once a threat is identified and operations move to Phase 1 (Deterrence), State Department efforts continue, and other departments increase their focus on the emerging threat (i.e. Department of Commerce investigates possible sanctions). Additionally, the Department of Defense (DoD) increases their deterrence effort through mobilization and presence. When hostilities begin in Phase 2, the military is approaching maximum effort and the State Department typically decreases diplomatic negotiations. Other agencies continue their increasing efforts against the threat (e.g. Department of Treasury seizes funds). This trend continues throughout Phase 3 until
Phase 4 when stabilization operations begin. During this phase the military begins moving from direct combat operations to providing security, and the State Department renews concerted diplomatic efforts with the new or existing regime. Phase 5 completes the transition from military authority back to civil authority and eventually operations return to the shaping phase.

Individually, all departments are efficient at conducting their associated operations. However, without appropriate IA coordination throughout all phases of planning and execution, we are left with significant ‘valleys’ of national effort during transitions from civil to military authority and vice versa. This is particularly evident between deterrence and seizing the initiative and between stabilization and transition back to civil authority.

“Reconstruction activities in Iraq are a case in point. The military, the Coalition Provisional Authority, and USAID all undertook major projects. There was no shared vision, no common operational planning, and no integrated contracting or human capital management process. As a result, these organizations learned lessons on the job and adapted, but they did not keep up with the changing security environment in the country, and after spending billions of dollars, there was very little to show for the investment.”

As a result of department’s individual unsynchronized efforts, we are left with the maximum uncoordinated national effort line shown in Figure 3. However, if we could synchronize national efforts across all departments, individual efforts would be cumulative and would result in a significant increase in maximum coordinated national effort shown in Figure 4. This depicts the critical nature of ensuring that all executive departments are driven and synchronized by common national goals and is representative of the capability that could be achieved through effective IA coordination.

**DoD ATTEMPTS**

The DoD has been a leader in recognizing a significant deficit in IA organization and has attempted to make ad hoc corrections to compensate for system shortfalls. DoD, as a result of
being assigned the majority of resources and funding, has been looked to as the model to correct IA coordination issues. One proposed solution has been the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). However, there are two significant limitations imposed on the JIACG which prohibit it from fully solving the IA problem.

1. The JIACG is a DoD lead group with no tasking authority of civil organizations. “They cannot task civilian agency elements or personnel, reorganize civilian agency elements, prioritize the efforts of civilian elements, or unilaterally commit agency resources.”

2. Participation in the DoD led JIACG is entirely voluntary. This presents two distinct problems. First, U.S. Joint Forces Command states, “there is a ‘hesitant buy-in’ by the civilian agencies, who perceive ‘coordination’ with the DoD as tantamount to ceding control.” Second, since participation is not mandated, civilian organizations can simply choose not to participate if they don’t agree with the military course of action. It is not possible, absent legislation, to mandate non-DoD participation.

There are several instances of JIACG successes, however, most examples are cases of humanitarian assistance or disaster relief. JIACG proponents are quick to site examples of Hurricane Katrina and the Southeast Asian Tsunami relief as successes. This result is the standard only for such instances where there are minimal competing IA interests and all departments are dedicated to a common mission. There are few examples of completely effective JIACG coordination in other operations. The JIACG is, and will remain, absent presidential directive or legislation, an ad hoc solution that lacks commitment throughout all departments of the executive branch. As such, it lacks the capability to effectively coordinate IA efforts in cases of competing departmental agendas or priorities.
While the JIACG is the CCDR’s organization for theater-strategic level IA coordination, the operational level construct within the Joint Task Force (JTF) is the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). The same problems with the JIACG are found within the CMOC. It remains a military led coordination effort with its primary mission of carrying out guidance and instituting the Joint Force Commander’s decisions regarding Civil-Military Operations. The CMOC merely provides a forum for voluntary IA informal discussions, but has no coordinating authority over civilian organizations. The result is simply a place for IGOs and NGOs to place their requests of military resources, with little fully coordinated IA effort.

The primary problem with current IA coordination fora is that decisions are based strictly on consensus. From the NSC, to the JIACG, to the CMOC, there is no one person with the authority to direct and coordinate IA efforts. It is impractical to expect the President to direct IA coordination from the grand strategic level. As a result, the President has recently called for ideas for centralizing IA control such as creating a ‘war czar’ who will have the authority to effectively synchronize all elements of national power. The Chairman of the JCS, Gen. Peter Pace, has also called for significant IA reform and Secretary of Defense Gates indicated that “the lack of IA collaboration during the war in Iraq highlights the need to compel cooperation the way the Goldwater-Nichols Act helped [military] services work together in the 1980’s”. It is clear that a deficiency in IA coordination has been identified at all levels of the U.S. Government.

**RECOMMENDED SOLUTION**

To address, the shortfalls of the current system, this paper recommends a 5 step process to coordinate IA reform.

1. Align executive branch government agencies
2. Designate IA command and control structure
3. Reduce bureaucracy / redundancy
4. Shift funding to deficient capabilities
5. IA education, career placement, and planning

ALIGNING GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

There are numerous executive branch departments that subdivide the world geographically to obtain a regional focus of effort. Referencing Figures 5-9, it is evident that the National Security Council, the DoD\textsuperscript{13}, the State Department, Department of Treasury, and USAID, all divide their regional bureaus along different political borders. As a result, significant coordination seams are created between the departments.

To remove the obstacles created by these seams it is necessary to realign all executive departments to common regional boundaries. One recommendation is provided in Figure 10. This recommendation applies the strength of each department’s current regional organization while attempting to correct shortfalls. For example, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) currently controls the region highlighted in orange in Figure 6. As a result, it is currently involved in three major regional wars in the Global War on Terrorism (Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa). Conversely, the ‘forgotten command’ of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is 1/3 the size of CENTCOM with only a fraction of the resources. Clearly, realigning closer to State Department bureaus would create a more equitable distribution of responsibility in the Middle East, while absorbing the smaller SOUTHCOM into NORTHCOM. Conversely, the formation of the newly created U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) will more efficiently coordinate African continent concerns (excluding Egypt which continues to be a significant influence in the Middle East, and is expected to remain under CENTCOM control).
In this instance it is more logical that the State Department realign in accordance with the Department of Defense.

THEATER STRATEGIC EXAMPLE:

Under the current structure, if IA coordination was necessary to coordinate overflight rights from U.S. land based aircraft carrying reconstruction supplies from Turkey to Afghanistan, it would require coordination with numerous bureaus throughout several departments. Coordination would involve two separate military combatant commanders (EUCOM and CENTCOM), two State Department Bureaus (Near Eastern Affairs, and South Asian Affairs), two NSC PCCs (European Affairs, and South and Central Asian Affairs), and two USAID offices (Europe and Eurasia, and Asia / Near East). That’s eight branches in four different departments that could be simplified to less than four with standardized regional alignment.

The benefits of simplifying IA coordination through standardization of regional bureaus far outweigh individual departmental agendas. Synchronizing boundaries between departments can provide cultural expertise across all elements of national power and maximize the efficiency of governmental effort.

DESIGNATE AN IA COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE

Joint publication 0-2 states:

“There is no overarching interagency doctrine that delineates or dictates the relationships and procedures governing all agencies, departments, and organizations in interagency operations . . .There is no oversight organization to ensure that the myriad of agencies, departments, and organizations have the capabilities to work together.”

This quote identifies a critical error in the attempt to harmonize the instruments of national power. As long as IA coordination is simply built on consensus, solutions will continue to be uncommitted and incoherent. The Joint Doctrine model for coordination between military and
nonmilitary organizations for foreign operations is shown in Figure 11. It is immediately apparent that most all of the relationship lines are ‘coordinating’ dashed lines. There is no command authority to coordinate the military efforts (shown on the left of the chart) with diplomatic efforts (shown on the right of the chart) below the presidential level. There is a necessity to create an official at the operational level of warfare that can make and enforce interdepartmental decisions. “What made Goldwater-Nichols work was that one person made the decisions at the end of the day; that was the Secretary of Defense.”

The recommendation to correct this deficiency is to establish a regional director position below the cabinet level, but above regional departmental authority (i.e. State Department Bureaus, CCDRs). The construct for this command structure is displayed in Figure 12. This regional director would report directly to the NSC on regional issues. Subordinate commands would be organized by national effort; a diplomatic affairs bureau (diplomatic), a strategic communications bureau (information), a regional combatant command (military), and a bureau of economic affairs (economic). The director would be given the authority and funding to regionally coordinate these four branches of national power.

The regional director would be responsible for translating strategic national policy into theater-strategic implementation, and ensuring a single coherent U.S. national posture was distributed throughout the region. Furthermore, regional director responsibilities would include building IA consensus, establishing unifying goals, fostering mutual need and interdependence, and considering long and short-term objectives while making recommendations to the NSC regarding national strategic policy formulation.

The regional director should be politically appointed by the president and have significant expertise in both military and diplomatic operations. Experience across this broad spectrum will
ensure that the director has the necessary credibility to command and control his subordinates. Examples include General Anthony Zinni and Admiral Joseph Prueher who both served as a regional CCDR and went on to serve the U.S. diplomatically.

Regional bureau personnel and resources would be provided by the ‘parental’ department (i.e. State Department would provide their Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) bureau to the Director of Near Eastern Affairs). The current State Department organization is shown in Figure 13. Under this construct, State Department organization would reflect the changes shown in Figure 14. All highlighted blocks would move or provide a portion of their assets for regional director usage. Bureaus highlighted in green would provide representation to regional bureaus of economic affairs, yellow to regional diplomatic affairs bureaus, and blue to regional strategic communications offices. The result would be a State Department that maintained the remaining structure for administrative coordination (Figure 15). Field bureaus assigned to the regional commander would report to him operationally, while administratively coordinating through their respective Undersecretaries in the State Department.

Supporting providers such as STRATCOM, SOCOM, TRANSCOM, JFCOM, and USAID would maintain a role similar to their current positions as illustrated in Figure 16. In this example, SOCOM would continue to report directly to the JCS and Secretary of Defense. However, similar to their current structure, they would coordinate asset allocation through the regional director and directly support their regional military equivalent (CCDR). Similarly, USAID would continue to coordinate through the State Department, but handle regional request for assistance through the regional director, and directly support their diplomatic regional equivalent (regional diplomatic affairs office).

THEATER STRATEGIC EXAMPLE:
Figure 17 shows how a standard regional command and control structure would look for the newly organized Near Eastern Affairs. The director would have four unique branches, one for each element of national power.

Near East Command (NECOM) would represent the military branch. Having already undergone joint reform, it will look similar to current CCDR organization, with the exception of a portion of Information Operations (IO). Computer Network Operations (CNO), typically conducted by the military and the National Security Agency (NSA), are more appropriately moved to the Strategic Communication Bureau where computer defense, attack, and exploitation efforts would more effectively be used to provide a unified regional message.

The Diplomatic Affairs-Near East bureau would consist of current State Department regional offices supplemented with diplomatic offices from NSC, Department of Energy, Department of Commerce, Department of Justice, etc. Additionally, the State Department’s current IGO office would be expanded to handle NGO coordination.

The Bureau of Economic Affairs-Near East would coordinate all economic instruments of national power including the tracking of terrorist financing, economic trade and commerce, economic development (which would contain a USAID representative), and building U.S. regional economic policy. The bureau would have a large Treasury Department representation, supplemented by Department of Commerce, Justice, Transportation, and the NSC.

The Strategic Communications Bureau-Near East would be a compilation of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Intelligence, and Counter-intelligence agencies from across the spectrum of government departments. It would be responsible for providing a unified regional message of U.S. policy, and would have representation from nearly all cabinet departments as
well as the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigations, NSA, and the NSC.

**REDUCE BUREAUCRACY / REDUNDANCY**

The “interagency coordination process tends to be bureaucratic and diffused, inhibiting the concentration of power within a small or select group of agencies.”\(^{17}\) Reduction of this bureaucracy will not only maximize decision timeliness, but also more efficiently utilize assets while saving resources. Bureaucracy in the IA is typically caused by individual agendas. “Individual agency perspective and agendas complicate policy development. Protection of their institutional prerogatives is oftentimes an important driver of the various U.S. Government agencies’ position.”\(^{18}\) This further highlights the importance of appointing a regional director who understands the individual agendas of competing departments and can reduce bureaucracy through building IA consensus.

Additionally, as the regional director construct is implemented, redundancy of effort will also become more readily apparent. It is evident that upon initial research that there are several departmental public affairs offices that become redundant in the proposed regional construct. Furthermore, most departments coordinate individual intelligence requirements through independent sources, rather than vetting them through a common intelligence agency that more accurately depicts the larger intelligence situation. Once the regional directorate is established and functioning, the regional director can readily identify and reduce duplication of effort, further minimizing governmental bureaucracy.

**THEATER STRATEGIC EXAMPLE:**

Again, referencing Figure 17 to highlight potential regional command and control structure for the Director of Near Eastern Affairs, there are several departmental offices which appear to
be capable of consolidation to reduce bureaucracy. The Human Affairs office under the
Diplomatic Affairs bureau would be consolidated from the current State Department office of
Global Affairs, and NSC representation from both the Democracy and Human Rights, and
Infectious Disease PCCs. Similarly, the office of Economic Policy and Business Affairs under
the Bureau of Economic Affairs would consolidate the Department of Treasury offices of
Economic Policy and International Affairs with the Department of State’s office of Economic
and Business Affairs with the Department of Commerce’s office of Economic Analysis.
Furthermore, the office of Public Affairs under the Strategic Communications Bureau would
combine representation from nearly all executive departments including State, Treasury, Justice,
and Defense.

**SHIFT FUNDING TO DEFICIENT CAPABILITIES**

The decision of how to allocate regional funding should be given to the regional director, and
following the reduction of bureaucracy and elimination of redundancy, he could shift his
‘surplus’ finances to deficient areas. National funding would look much the same as it does
today with Congress apportioning a budget to executive departments which would then
subdivide and allocate portions to regional directors. With regional directors in control of their
funding, they will be in a better position to distribute resources where they are most needed
based on the current situation in the region. Ultimately Congress may choose to apportion
money directly to the regional director based on national effort to minimize interdepartmental
funding conflicts.

**THEATER STRATEGIC EXAMPLE:**

The Director of Near Eastern Affairs, recognizing a long term shift in national focus in his
region from continuing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to SSTR operations, could
appropriate a larger portion of funding to his diplomatic and strategic communications bureaus leading the transition and reconstruction effort. Similarly, the Director of African Affairs may choose to shift funding from diplomatic efforts and humanitarian aid towards a military effort in a region like Darfur.

**IA EDUCATION, CARRER PLACEMENT, AND PLANNING**

IA education and career placement will become a necessity, in much the same way that Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and Joint Staff tours did following Goldwater-Nichols. There have been several efforts to increase IA training by numerous departments, particularly State and Defense. The National Defense University’s ITEA team has made recommendations for mandating training and education for military and civilian authorities, fully assigned with IA skill code qualifiers. In the standard military career timeline, this is perhaps best placed in the normal progression following JPME, Joint Staff placement, and tactical command. Whereas, many senior military officers return to a second follow-on joint tour, a portion of these candidates would be considered for IA positions, working directly for the regional commander, or in IA placement in Washington, D.C. They would then return to their normal military progression of major command, armed with IA experience (see Figure 18). Additionally, providing IA training for both military and civilian departments will increase the number of qualified personnel available for the regional director position.

IA coordination needs to be incorporated at the inception of planning.

“CENTCOM’s Strategic Lessons Learned document on Operation Iraqi Freedom implicitly recognized that a thoroughly integrated interagency effort at all levels from Tampa to Tikrit, instituted from the very beginning of policy formation and campaign planning, would have resulted in a far more efficient and effective Phase 4 campaign.”
Military personnel that have gained IA experience through education and career placement should be incorporated into planning, giving the Joint Planning Group (JPG) an increased IA capacity and providing the best opportunity for operational success. Ideally, the JPG would eventually become an Interagency Planning Group (IAPG), fully staffed with members from all bureaus working under the regional director. Only then will we be able to fully integrate all elements of national power throughout all phases of operations.

Thorough consideration should be given to IA training, education, planning, and staffing to enable continued reform of the IA process. Many of the lessons learned from the JPME process should serve as a baseline for development and implementation.

COUNTER-ARGUMENTS

*Why don’t we just get the NSC to coordinate interagency? That’s their job.*

There is no doubt at any level of the current U.S. government that IA coordination is not working as effectively as it should. The NSC is overwhelmed by politics and lack of capacity. Additionally, the NSC should remain at the grand strategic level of policy development. Providing a regional director will be the crucial link between strategic development and operational implementation of policy. Furthermore, the NSC lacks the regional expertise required to coordinate phase 4 and 5 operations that would be provided through a regional construct.

*Why don’t we just continue to develop the JIACG and CMOC concepts?*

Both concepts are voluntary DoD led efforts with no tasking or coordination authority. Additionally, some IGOs and NGOs prefer not to be placed under ‘military control’ and exercise their choice of walking away from the organization.
You will never get military and civil agencies to work together. They are unique organizations with individual traditions and agendas that are better left separated.

All agencies in the executive branch work for the same person; the President. They are responsible for implementing his national strategic policies. Although the executive branch is organized functionally, all departments should all be working toward the same national goals. The United States can no longer afford to have individual uncoordinated effort. Civilians may not prefer military structure, but at the end of the day, someone below the strategic level has to make IA decisions. Having a civilian / retired military regional director with the creditability to coordinate numerous agencies is an example of how to unify varying departmental agendas. Furthermore, IA education, training, and career placement will continue to give departments a better understanding of other agency traditions and expertise to better facilitate unifying effort and goals.

The implementation of this plan requires significant political will.

It requires nothing short of Presidential Directive or legislation to implement. However, the current political situation (the president with a little less than two years left in his second term) may provide the perfect opportunity for such political will. The U.S. Government must appoint and enable a single leader to coordinate IA decisions. If it doesn’t occur now, we may lose the political will for up to 5-7 years.

Congress has no interest in promoting cooperation between federal agencies. They appropriate funds by departments which are overseen by congressional committees.

Congress can continue to appropriate funds by departments. Departments will then subdivide their funding to the regional director based on requirements. Congress will maintain the same oversight they currently possess with the added benefit of having a single point of
contact responsible for regional policy implementation, in the director. Additionally, this oversight can now be provided by regional and cultural experts that are aligned with all other executive branch departments. If they choose, congressional committees can receive one brief per region instead of individual briefings from numerous departments.

**CONCLUSION**

The current structure of the United States elements of national power creates significant IA coordination problems, leading to a less efficient unity of national effort. The primary hurdle to IA coordination lies not in the grand strategic formulation of policy, but in the theater-strategic and operational implementation of such policy. The NSC lacks the political will and capacity to handle IA coordination. Although the DoD has recognized the deficiency and created ad hoc solutions, they remain military-led, voluntary, and with no authority to task other government agencies. By implementing a five step process of standardizing regional alignment, creating an IA command and control structure, eliminating bureaucracy and redundancy, shifting funding to deficient capabilities, and developing IA education, career placement, and planning, the goal of harmonizing all elements of national power can be met.
ENDNOTES

2 Joint Publication 3-08, p. x.
4 See NSC structure Figure 1 (From Joint Publication 3-08 p. II-4)
6 Christopher Briem, “Joint is Dead: What is Next?” United States Naval Institute, Proceedings, Jan 2004, Vol. 130, Iss. 1, p. 56.
9 Thompson, p. 67.
10 Thompson, p. 67.
11 Joint Publication 3-08, p. III-17.
12 DiMascio, p. 2.
13 Based on current estimations of the formation of AFRICOM
15 DiMascio, p. 2.
17 Joint Publication 3-08, p. I-7.
18 Joint Publication 3-08, p. I-8.
20 Thompson, p. 71.
APPENDIX A:

ILLUSTRATIONS


### National Security Council Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office of the Secretary of Defense</th>
<th>Joint Staff</th>
<th>Department of State</th>
<th>Other Executive Branch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>President, Vice President, Secretary of the Treasury, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of Central Intelligence, Chief of Staff to the President, Assistant in the President for Economic Policy, Attorney General, Director OMB, Counsel to the President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>Secretary of the Treasury, Director of Central Intelligence, Chief of Staff to the President, Attorney General, Director OMB, Counsel to the President, Chief of Staff to the Vice President, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor, et al.</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense or Undersecretary for Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Secretary of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and other deputies of Principals</td>
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<table>
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<th>DEPUTIES COMMITTEE</th>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense or Undersecretary for Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Secretary of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and other deputies of Principals</td>
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### Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs)

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<tr>
<th>PCCs - Regional</th>
<th>PCCs - Functional</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Eurasia</td>
<td>Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>International Development and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East and North Africa</td>
<td>Global Environment</td>
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<td>Africa</td>
<td>International Finance</td>
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<td>Transnational Economic Issues</td>
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<td>Counterterrorism and National Preparedness</td>
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<td>Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning</td>
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<td>Arms Control</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Intelligence and Counterintelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Records Access and Information Security</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 1*
The Spectrum of Engagement

Phase of Warfare

- State Department
- Department of Defense
- Other Departments
Maximum Uncoordinated Effort

Level of Involvement

Phase of Warfare

Figure 3
Proposed Interagency Geographic Restructuring

Figure 10
MODEL FOR COORDINATION BETWEEN MILITARY AND NONMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS - FOREIGN OPERATIONS

Figure 11
Interagency Professional Education (IAPE) Timing in Career Progression

Service Officer Development Focus

Joint Development Focus

Interagency Development Focus

Primary PME

Intermediate PME

Senior

IA Professional Education

Capstone

Pinnacle
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


