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14. ABSTRACT There is a gap between strategy and tactics of the United States in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): a lack of operational leadership with tasking authority and an imbalanced application of the instruments of national power. This balance is critical to the success of the United States in the GWOT. An early indicator of potential failure in the GWOT is the deteriorating situation in Iraq. An historical basis for reform is the creation of the Joint Staff and more recently the United States Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) effort to synchronize the GWOT for the Department of Defense (DoD). Balance is best accomplished in an interagency organization representing all instruments of national power, with tasking authority over all agencies of the United States Government, a focused mission of the GWOT, and superb leadership. It must demonstrate the same attributes so successfully employed by USSOCOM within the DoD of collaboration, flexibility, and innovation. With significant reorganization, the National Counterterrorism Center can become this organization.					
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**BALANCING THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER
AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN THE GWOT**

by

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Major / USA

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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10 MAY 2007

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Balancing the Instruments of National Power At the Operational Level in the GWOT

An Operational Leadership Gap

There is a strategic level plan for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT); at the tactical level, success is evident in many areas of the GWOT. There is a gap between strategy and tactics: a lack of operational leadership with tasking authority and an imbalanced application of national power.¹ This balance is critical to the success of the United States in the GWOT. The deteriorating situation in Iraq is a result of this gap and an early indicator of potential failure in the GWOT. The source of this imbalance is the initial military centric approach the United States Government (USG) took to the GWOT and the subsequent development and implementation of the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Efforts to correct the imbalance led to the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) which has an intelligence centric mission and no tasking authority. A basis for reform is the creation of the Joint Staff and more recently United States Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) effort to synchronize the GWOT for the Department of Defense (DoD). Using the creation of the Joint Staff and USSOCOM's GWOT synchronization efforts as a model, empowering a significantly revised NCTC that has the authority to task all elements of the USG will balance the application of national power and sustain effective progress in the GWOT.

Early Indicators of Failure in the GWOT

The lack of leadership with tasking authority and the failure to balance the application of national power is currently evident in Iraq. The Iraq Study Group reported on the situation in Iraq in the spring of 2007: "No single official is assigned responsibility or held

¹ The instruments of national power are at a minimum diplomacy, information, military, and economic.

accountable for the overall reconstruction effort.”² Currently there is a reported presidential effort to appoint a “White House implementation manager for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan”³ with “‘tasking authority,’ or the power to issue directions, over other agencies.”⁴ Thus far the position remains unfilled. John J. Sheehan, a retired Marine Corps General Officer who declined the position, stated, “There has to be linkage between short-term operations and strategic objectives....”⁵ That linkage missing from USG efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan is the operational leadership with tasking authority which is needed to balance the application of national power. The same argument can be made at the operational level in the GWOT: a leader with tasking authority across the USG for the GWOT will balance the application of national power in accordance with the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*.

The Creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

There is also historical basis for radical change in a time of crisis: the Joint Chiefs of Staff was developed to address leadership shortcomings stemming from the global implications of World War II.⁶ There are several parallels between World War II and the GWOT: the nature of the conflict, the need for focused application of national power, and an uncertain initial organizational structure. World War II was third generation warfare, characterized by technological advances and maneuver warfare introduced at the end of World War I. Third generation warfare required joint military operations. Prior to the

² Baker, James A., III, et al. *The Iraq Study Group Report*. United States Institute of Peace, 6 December 2006, 58. <http://www.usip.org/isg/>

³ Sheehan, John J. “Why I Declined To Serve.” *The Washington Post*, 16 April 2007. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/15/AR2007041500564.html>

⁴ Baker, Peter and Thomas E. Ricks. “3 Generals Spurn the Position of War 'Czar'.” *The Washington Post*, 11 April 2007. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/10/AR2007041001776.html>

⁵ Sheehan, John J. “Why I Declined To Serve.” *The Washington Post*, 16 April 2007.

⁶ Cole, Ronald H., et al. *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*. Washington, DC: 1995, 3. <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/history/jcspart1.pdf>

creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there was very little joint military effort, particularly at the national level: each service conducted its operations mostly in parallel. In response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff was a military initiative begun in February, 1942, but it did not realize its current structure until August, 1949, after several reconfigurations.⁷ The GWOT is a shift to fourth generation warfare characterized by network centric asymmetrical warfare.⁸ As World War II required a joint military effort, the GWOT requires a focused interagency effort. Six years into the GWOT and several leadership structures later, the USG is still searching for a viable solution to the leadership of the GWOT and the application of national power is military centric.

The Source of the Imbalance in the Application of National Power

The initial selection of the Department of Defense (DoD) as the lead federal agency for the GWOT is the source of the imbalance in the application of National Power. Unclassified descriptions of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-9, *Combating Terrorism*, imply that the DoD is the lead federal agency for the war on terror.⁹ NSPD-9 was written prior to 9/11. It was refined and implemented on October 25, 2001.¹⁰ It was reported that NSPD-8, *National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism*, called for a balanced approach to the lead of the GWOT but the President never

⁷ Cole, Ronald H., et al. *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*. Washington, DC: 1995, 3-7.

⁸ 3rd and 4th generation warfare are still being defined and delineated. The definitions here represent the author's opinion. For more on this subject see Lind, William S., et al. "The changing face of war: Into the fourth generation." *Marine Corps Gazette*. November 2001, 65-68.

⁹ NSPD-9, *Combating Terrorism*, October 25, 2001, is classified. Description from a press briefing by McClellan, Scott. White House Press Briefing. Washington, DC: White House, 1 April 2004. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040401-4.html#16>

¹⁰ Testimony of U.S. Secretary Of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to the 911 Commission, March 23, 2004, 7. http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/rumsfeld_statement.pdf

implemented the directive.¹¹ Therefore, the center of gravity for the USG's GWOT effort remained the military through 2004.

Executive Order 13354 of August 27, 2004, established the NCTC with a focus on terrorism intelligence and gave it an additional task to plan and coordinate counterterrorism actions.¹² This was the first attempt at balancing the instruments of national power. However, examining both the executive order and the task organization of the NCTC, it is apparent that the NCTC is primarily an intelligence organization reporting to the Director of National Intelligence.¹³ Although the NCTC was tasked to "assign operational responsibilities to lead agencies for counterterrorism activities....," the executive order also stated the NCTC "...shall not direct the execution of operations."¹⁴ Therefore, the NCTC has coordinating authority only.

As of the spring of 2006, the NCTC had not produced a counterterrorism plan as directed by Executive Order 13354. In 2006 a revised *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* reinforced the tasking to the NCTC to be "... responsible for developing, implementing, and assessing the effectiveness of strategic operational planning efforts to achieve counterterrorism objectives."¹⁵ In addition the President released the classified NSPD-46 which is reported to also have directed the NCTC to produce a plan for the GWOT

¹¹ Scarborough, Rowan. "White House Having Trouble Creating Top War Post." *Washington Examiner*, 19 April 2007. http://www.examiner.com/a-682637~White_House_having_trouble_creating_top_war_post.html

¹² U.S. President. *National Counterterrorism Center Executive Order 13354*. Washington, DC: White House, 27 August 2004. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-5.html>. Additional information about the NCTC can be found on the organization's website: (http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/about_nctc.html)

¹³ Brock, Kevin R. "National Counterterrorism Center." PowerPoint. Arlington, VA: 17th Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium, March 2006, Slides 3 and 4. www.dtic.mil/ndia/2006sollic/brock.pdf

¹⁴ U.S. President. *National Counterterrorism Center Executive Order 13354*. Washington, DC: White House, 27 August 2004.

¹⁵ U.S. President. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington, DC: White House, September 2006, 20. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf>

within 90 days of NSPD-46's release.¹⁶ The result is the classified National Implementation Plan.¹⁷ Each department also contributed supporting plans that are nested with the National Implementation Plan.¹⁸ This plan bridges the operational gap between strategy and tactics as the result of decisive Presidential directives.¹⁹ The planning gap is decisively being corrected. Now the operational leadership gap and lack of tasking authority needs the same decisive direction.

In addition to the DoD and the NCTC, the National Security Council (NSC) plays an important part in the coordination of the GWOT. NSPD – 1, *Organization of the National Security Council System*, established a functional Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness. PCCs are responsible for: “Management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government ... the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy.”²⁰ The NSC also plays a critical role in the oversight of operational responsibilities assigned by the NCTC in accordance with Executive Order 13354: “Agencies shall inform the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council of any

¹⁶ Robinson, Linda. “Revising the Old Plan.” *U.S. News & World Report*, 27 March 2006. <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060327/27iran.htm>

¹⁷ Office of the Director of National Intelligence. *Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan*. Washington, DC: November 2006, xvi. <http://www.ise.gov/docs/ise-impplan-200611.pdf>

¹⁸ Schissler, Mark O. “The Global War on Terrorism: The Long War.” Laurel, MD: Precision Strike Technology Symposium, 17 October 2006, Slide 27. http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2006psa_psts/schiss.pdf

¹⁹ Brock, Kevin R. “National Counterterrorism Center.” PowerPoint. Arlington, VA: 17th Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium, March 2006, Slide 5. www.dtic.mil/ndia/2006solic/brock.pdf

²⁰ U.S. President. *Organization of the National Security Council System. National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-1*. Washington, DC: White House, 13 February 2001. <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm>. See also Perl, Raphael. *Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 11 April 2003, 14. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/19858.pdf>

objections to designations and assignments made by the Center in the planning and coordination of counterterrorism activities.”²¹

As presented above, it is not really clear who is in charge. It is clear that the NCTC, USSOCOM, and the NSC/PCC are responsible for planning and coordinating. It is also clear that no single entity has over all tasking authority to lead the GWOT utilizing “...the application of all instruments of national power...” in accordance with the 2006 *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*.²²

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* was first released in February 2003 and updated in March 2006. In addition to defining the USG’s strategy, the document also contains the strategic vision of al-Qaida, the United States’ principal enemy in the war on terror. Understanding the strategies involved and the definitions of terrorism and insurgency emphasizes the need for a balanced application national power.

The USG’s strategic vision as described in the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* is: “The defeat of violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society; and the creation of a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them.”²³ The long term goal of the USG is “The advance of freedom, opportunity, and human dignity through democracy....”²⁴ The USG’s short term priorities of action are: “Prevent attacks by terrorist network.... Deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them.... Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states....

²¹ U.S. President. *National Counterterrorism Center Executive Order 13354*. Washington, DC: White House, 27 August 2004.

²² U.S. President. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington, DC: White House, September 2006, 7. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf>

²³ U.S. President. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington, DC: White House, September 2006, 7. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf>

²⁴ U.S. President. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington, DC: White House, September 2006, 14. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf>

Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror.”²⁵ The strategy clearly calls for a balanced application of the instruments of national power, and it is evident that no one department can address all of these goals, tasks, policies, visions, and strategies to defeat terrorism.

It is arguable given the strategic vision of this enemy and the definitions of terrorism and insurgency that in fact this is a war on an insurgency which currently employs the tactic of terrorism. The definition of terrorism is “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”²⁶ The definition of an insurgency is: “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.”²⁷ The strategic vision of al-Qaida as stated in the *National Strategy on Combating Terrorism* is threefold:²⁸

1. ...expel Western power and influence from the Muslim world and establish regimes...
2. ... launch additional attacks against not only the United States, its allies and partners, but the Muslim world itself.
3. ... establish a single, pan-Islamic, totalitarian regime that stretches from Spain to Southeast Asia.

²⁵ U.S. President. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington, DC: White House, September 2006, 11-17. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf>

²⁶ U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* Joint Publication (JP) 1-02. Washington, DC: CJCS, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 1 March 2007), 540. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf

²⁷ U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* Joint Publication (JP) 1-02. Washington, DC: CJCS, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 1 March 2007), 265.

²⁸ U.S. President. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington, DC: White House, September 2006, 5. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf>

The significance of these definitions is that no reputable counterinsurgent discussion recommends a predominately military solution to a counterinsurgency effort.²⁹ Instead the recommendation is a balanced application of the instruments of national power.

However, the USG had to start somewhere as indicated in NSPD-9 with the selection of the DoD as the lead federal agency for the GWOT in 2001. The selection of the DoD as the lead agency was not a bad initial, interim solution. In comparison to much of the rest of the USG, the DoD was resourced for counterterrorism, already involved in counterterrorist operations, and experienced in both counterterrorism and insurgencies. The arrangement appears to have remained in effect until 2004 with the establishment of the NCTC, although in reality it continued until late 2006 with the revision of the *National Counterterrorism Strategy* and the release NSPD-46.³⁰ The DoD, through USSOCOM, continues to lead the GWOT in conjunction with NCTC.³¹

USSOCOM: A Model in DoD for the USG

In July 2002 the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) tasked USSOCOM to build a campaign plan to synchronize the application of military power in the DoD's GWOT effort. Over the next three years USSOCOM worked hard to address the concerns of all other combat commanders while the DoD revised USSOCOM's authorities. The combatant commanders wanted USSOCOM to have coordination authority only, and not to have tasking authority over them. It took a decisive Presidential decision to task the Commander of USSOCOM as the lead combatant commander for the GWOT. The *2004 Unified Command*

²⁹ For additional discussion see U.S. Army. *Counterinsurgency*. Field Manual (FM) 3-24. Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, December 2006, 2-1.

³⁰ Robinson, Linda. "Revising the Old Plan." *U.S. News & World Report*, 27 March 2006. <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060327/27iran.htm>

³¹ United States Special Operations Command. *United States Special Operations Command Posture Statement*. Headquarters, USSOCOM, 2006, 7. www.socom.mil/Docs/2006%20USSOCOM%20Posture%20Statement%20final.pdf.

Plan states that USSOCOM is: "... the lead combatant commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other combatant commanders."³² Selection of one combatant commander to be the lead commander was the legal and doctrinal solution for the DoD to synchronize the application of military power in the GWOT.

Using the Joint Staff as an Armed Forces General Staff to lead the GWOT was not an option available to the SecDef because Title 10 of US Code specifically prohibits the Joint staff from commanding military operations.³³ Without a change in US law, using the Joint Chiefs of Staff to synchronize the application of military power in the GWOT is not an option. Even with a change in law, empowering the Joint Staff to assume the responsibilities of leading the GWOT effort for the DoD does little to balance the application of national power.

The selection of USSOCOM is also in accordance with Joint Doctrine. The President or SecDef can order a combatant commander to design and execute a global plan.³⁴ The selection of USSOCOM resulted in the 7500 series plans that describe USSOCOM's unified military plan for GWOT. All combatant commanders are required to submit supporting plans.³⁵ The selection of USSOCOM to lead the GWOT for the DoD was a prudent decision given the circumstances and options available in 2004.

³² The source document, the *2004 Unified Command Plan*, is classified. See United States Special Operations Command. *United States Special Operations Command History*. Headquarters, USSOCOM, 2007, 16. http://www.fas.org/blog/secretcy/2007/04/special_operations_command_a_t.html

³³ US Code Title 10 (Armed Forces), Subtitle A (General Military Law), Part I (Organization and General Military Powers), Chapter 5 (Joint Chiefs of Staff), Section 155 (Joint Staff) paragraph (e) (Prohibition of Function as Armed Forces General Staff) states "The Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority."

³⁴ U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operation Planning*. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 26 December 2006, I-22-23. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf

³⁵ Schissler, Mark O. "The Global War on Terrorism: The Long War." Laurel, MD: Precision Strike Technology Symposium, 17 October 2006, Slide 26. http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2006psa_psts/schiss.pdf

USSOCOM was formed to combat terrorism and it remains one of USSOCOM's areas of expertise. Unlike other combatant commands, USSOCOM is not bounded by geographic constraints and many Special Operations Force (SOF) units were already combating terrorism globally. Most importantly, USSOCOM, by nature of the organization's culture, is flexible and "thinks outside the box." As a result, USSOCOM has significantly changed since 2002 to meet the requirements of leading the GWOT, establishing a model that can be applied in the interagency.

USSOCOM created the Center for Special Operations (CSO) at its headquarters specifically to address the operational lead of GWOT, and expanded the staff at each combatant commander's SOF Component and the staff of the Joint Special Operations Command. The budget for USSOCOM has increased over 100 % since the start of the GWOT.³⁶ The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review recommended a 33% increase in most types of existing SOF units. Several entirely new units, such as the Marine Special Operations Command, are in the process of being fielded.³⁷

Some of USSOCOM's initiatives are not purely military in nature. "Sovereign Challenge" is a USSOCOM and United States Strategic Command initiative. It provides a forum for foreign diplomats (primarily military attachés), "interested in sharing information

³⁶ United States Special Operations Command. (USSOCOM) "Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 Budget Estimates." PowerPoint, February 2002, Slide 2.

http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2003/budget_justification/pdfs/operation/fy03_USSOCOM_Cover.pdf and United States Special Operations Command. (USSOCOM) "Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 Budget Estimates." PowerPoint, February 2006, Slide 3.
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2007/budget_justification/pdfs/operation/O_M_VOL_1_P_ARTS/USSOCOM.pdf

³⁷ U.S. Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, DC: Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 6 February 2006. <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/>, 44-45. See also Vickers, Michael G. "SOCOM's Missions and Roles." Testimony to United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, 29 June 2006, 2. <http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/schedules/Vickers%20Testimony%202006.29.06.pdf>

relevant to protecting the sovereignty of their respective nations from terrorism.”³⁸

“Sovereign Challenge” is the inspiration of a former career US Foreign Service officer who now works at USSOCOM. “Sovereign Challenge” and other USSOCOM initiatives illustrate several critical themes: collaborative; unique and innovative approaches; and, inherently interagency operation. “Sovereign Challenge” represents the move to a balanced application of national power.

Options for the USG GWOT Lead

USSOCOM will continue to effectively lead the military forces of the United States through unity of command in the GWOT. USSOCOM will also coordinate many of the diplomatic, information, and economic efforts of the USG through unity of effort.³⁹ As the GWOT’s center of gravity shifts from the military effort to the diplomatic effort, the situation calls for an innovative approach. There are several options to lead the GWOT: interagency reform; designate one cabinet level department as the lead federal agency; an entirely new organization; or empowering an existing interagency organization with tasking authority.

Some say that the root of the problem is the need for reform among the departments of the USG. There is substantial debate and call for the reform, or “transformation,” of not only the DoD but other departments of the government as well. Interagency reform has far reaching impacts affecting all branches of the government and can only be accomplished by new law. This important topic will take a great deal of time to generate the legislation and

³⁸ Sovereign Challenge website. <http://www.sovereignchallenge.org/AboutUs/tabid/57/Default.aspx>

³⁹ U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Joint Publication (JP) 0-2. Washington, DC: CJCS, 10 July 2001. “Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.” (III-1) Where as unity of effort “...requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), and among nations in any alliance or coalition.” (I-3) The critical difference is a lack of tasking authority associated with unity of effort. The current USG approach to the GWOT is unity of effort.

actually effect the required changes in the USG. A longer term example of legislation driven reform is the Goldwater Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 which forced the DoD to truly become joint. The DoD is still working hard to conform to those laws over 20 years later. Interagency reform is not a timely solution to balancing the application of national power in the GWOT.⁴⁰

The USG's traditional method for solving complex problems is to designate one cabinet level department or portion of a department the lead federal agency. This is a valid option but as noted in this paper, there are two distinct disadvantages. First, the construct for the lead federal agency utilizes unity of effort and coordination authority instead of unity of command and tasking authority. Tasking authority is the key to balancing the application of national power. Second, designating one instrument of national power to lead the GWOT is counterintuitive to achieving the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. The goals, tasks, policies, visions, and strategies are beyond the scope of one specialized department.

Creating a new organization is not recommended for many of the same reasons interagency reform is not the solution to balancing the application of national power in the GWOT. As seen with the NCTC, the Department of Homeland Security, and other sweeping government initiatives, new organizations by their nature have difficulty getting grounded, gaining momentum, and integrating with existing organizations. There is no need for an entirely new organization but rather empowering an existing one with tasking authority for the GWOT over all agencies of the USG.

⁴⁰ For more discussion on interagency reform, see <http://www.csis.org/isp/bgn/> *Beyond Goldwater Nichols*; <http://www.ndu.edu/I TEA> Interagency Transformation, Education and Analysis; and Mills, John R. "All Elements of National Power': Re-Organizing the Interagency Structure and Process for Victory in the Long War." *Strategic Insights*, Volume V, Issue 6 (July 2006). <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2006/Jul/millsJul06.asp>

The NCTC could effectively lead the GWOT with significant adjustments and reorganization to the command structure, authorities, and mission. The NCTC is definitively an interagency effort already. The operational level plan for the GWOT has a solid foundation in the NCTC's National Implementation Plan and USSOCOM's 7500 series plans.⁴¹ Using the strengths of USSOCOM as a model, the required changes are a flexible and agile interagency organization representing all instruments of national power, tasking authority over all agencies of the USG, a focused mission of the GWOT, and most importantly, led by strong leaders.

Required Changes to Make the NCTC Effective

The key to the reorganization of the NCTC is the leadership. It would consist of senior representatives from each department who have legitimacy in their parent organization and across the government to execute tasking authority. Using the military's span of control construct of one leader to three to five subordinates, the command structure of the NCTC should have top level leadership consisting of a representative of each element of national power: diplomacy, information, military, and economic. The leadership should be nominated by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of National Intelligence.⁴² A representative from the Commerce or Treasury departments or a political appointee from the private industry sector who provides global business experience could be the economic representative. In addition, there are strong arguments for including the Departments of

⁴¹ Vickers, Michael G. "SOCOM's Missions and Roles." Testimony to United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, 29 June 2006, 2. <http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/schedules/Vickers%20Testimony%202006.29.06.pdf>

⁴² Information is an instrument of national power. Currently there is no information department in the USG. The equivalent, the United States Information Agency (USIA) was disbanded in 1999 and has not been replaced. The author uses intelligence in place of information here because of the importance of intelligence in the GWOT. For a good description of the instruments of national power see Mills, John R. "All Elements of National Power': Re-Organizing the Interagency Structure and Process for Victory in the Long War." *Strategic Insights*, Volume V, Issue 6 (July 2006). <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2006/Jul/millsJul06.asp>

Justice or Homeland Security in this top level leadership.⁴³ The leadership must have the vision to establish such an organization and be able to morph it into a valid entity. A version of an interagency command structure is being considered for the recently approved Africa Command. Leadership across the USG sees utility in including leadership that represents the non-military instruments of national power in what have traditionally been considered military organizations.⁴⁴

The old adage “someone has to be in charge” is not always true, even in a military model. Again, the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as an historical example: Admiral Leahy nominally filled the position of Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, but in reality acted as the Chief of Staff for the President of the United States.⁴⁵ Designating a single leader is one option, but a more viable option in the interagency community is to have the leadership reach a consensus and then execute the resulting decision. Either option will answer the need for an operational level leadership with tasking authority at a reorganized NCTC.

Currently there is no one organization or entity of the USG that is solely focused on execution of the GWOT on a global scale with tasking authority over all agencies of the USG. The GWOT is one of several concurrent and competing missions at USSOCOM. Also, outside of the military USSOCOM has no tasking authority over other USG agencies.

⁴³ The instruments of national power are defined as all of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military. U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Homeland Security*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-26. Washington, DC: CJCS, 2 August 2005, GL-9. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_26.pdf However, the White House defines the instruments of national power as “...diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, and financial and military tools...” U.S. President. *9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges*. Washington, DC: White House, September 2006, 1. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/waronterror/2006/waronterror0906.pdf>

⁴⁴ Feingold, Russ. “Creation of a U.S. Africa Command.” Congressional Record, Senate. Washington, DC: 110th Congress, 1st Session, 10 January 2007

⁴⁵ Cole, Ronald H., Lorna S. Jaffe, Walter S. Poole, and Willard J. Webb. *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*. Washington, DC: 1995, 4-6.

The NCTC is focused on the GWOT, but it has coordination authority only and it is organized primarily as an intelligence organization. It is essential that the reorganized NCTC has complete tasking authority over all agencies of the USG and maintains its focus.

Small, flexible, and agile organizations are better suited for counter-insurgency operations. Initial reorganization at the NCTC must be limited in terms of people, authorities, and capabilities. As the NCTC deliberately reorganizes and masters its new authorities, it will grow at a pace which will self-sustain the organization's quality and effectiveness. Inherent to a counter-insurgency situation is the speed at which the insurgency transforms. This deliberate reorganization of the NCTC will ensure it retains the required agility and flexibility to effectively engage an insurgency. While maturing its new authorities might take some time, the focus of a reorganized NCTC will continue to be the long war of GWOT not just the immediate challenge of Iraq and Afghanistan. Deliberate reorganization of the NCTC will enable the organization to overcome many challenges – not only external but internal as well.

Challenges

Another challenge will be resourcing. Another budget could be authorized by Congress, or each department could provide a scaled percentage of their budgets. The easier part of the resourcing challenge is solving the fiscal budget: a much more difficult resourcing challenge will be manning. Reorganizing at a manageable pace will substantially mitigate the personnel shortages – allowing for both quality recruiting and promotion from within.

One of the most significant challenges a true operational level interagency organization will face is meshing many different planning techniques. There are many approaches to facilitate planning, such as having liaison officers from the departments who

translate different planning techniques into a common language. Decentralized planning is critical to the success of the proposed organization. Those plans would be synchronized, de-conflicted, and cross tasked at the operational level. Reconciled plans and subsequent action will be a good initial metric that a reorganized NCTC is successful.

It is important to identify the measures of success prior to the reorganization of the NCTC. Metrics are often controversial and too many metrics are confusing. But within each department there are a few salient metrics that are irrefutable in nature. Such metrics should reflect a more balanced approach to the GWOT and a marked change in the enemy's strategy or tactics.⁴⁶ Metrics are important to help shape the future of organizations.

Future Initiatives

The proposal presented here is not all inclusive. This proposal presents the essential requirement: operational level leadership with tasking authority. There are a number of other considerations such as the role of a coalition in the GWOT, the potential GWOT strategy-policy mismatch at the national level, and incorporating lessons learned from the private sector.

What is missing from a reorganized NCTC is the US coalition partners' contribution. This contribution must be accomplished in a different forum, like the United Nations' Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force.⁴⁷ Coalition liaison officers will have their places in a reorganized NCTC to be sure, but the purpose of this reorganization is to develop and execute the intentions of the United States with a unified approach. This is the same construct that was so effectively employed in World War II. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was a US organization which contributed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff which was an allied

⁴⁶ The insurgent will respond to effective counterinsurgent measures but has little need to respond to ineffective measures.

⁴⁷ For more information on the United Nations' counterterrorism efforts see <http://www.un.org/terrorism/>

organization. Regardless, through the relationship with the Department of State and various country teams, the input of other nations will be inherent.

There are a number of debates about the quality of the national strategy and a possible strategy-policy mismatch.⁴⁸ Once the proposed organization is established it can make policy and strategy recommendations. Most businesses collect feedback from members of its team and customers and pass the feedback up to the next higher level of control in a manner so as to improve performance. This organization could use that business practice to adjust the national strategy.

Many other examples of lessons learned, or best business practices, can be drawn from the experience of industry as it simultaneously tackled transforming in the information age and globalization. There are many parallels between industry's experience with asymmetrical challenges, decentralized operations in numerous foreign countries with both state and non-state actors, many of them both overtly and discreetly related. For example industry rewards success with significant financial compensation. Does the USG need to develop similar rewards for success and if so, what constitutes successes and what are the appropriate awards?

Mauritania – A Lost Opportunity

The need for operational level leadership with tasking authority was clearly demonstrated when Mauritania requested US assistance to combat terrorism inside the African country. The USG took too long to respond to the detriment of the counter-terror

⁴⁸ There is a debate beyond the scope of this paper on the quality of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The debate includes discussion on whether the national strategy is a strategy or policy as well as a possible policy-strategy mismatch. For more information, see Pollock, John. "A War Like No Other: Al Qaeda and the U.S. Strategy for Combating Terrorism." Research paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 12 December 2005. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/ksil466.pdf> and Morris, Michael F. "Al-Qaeda as Insurgency." Research paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA: 18 March 2005. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1039.pdf

operations because of a lack of operational leadership with tasking authority.⁴⁹ The decision cycle will be much faster if a single entity has tasking authority to perform GWOT activities, especially if that entity is focused solely on the GWOT and has strong leadership.

The balanced application of the instruments of national power is critical to the success of the United States in the GWOT. Creating operational level leadership with tasking authority to balance the application of national power in the GWOT has historical legitimacy found in the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II. However the operational environment differs greatly today with the globalization of 4th generation warfare. Therefore, an innovative approach to the problem is required. This is best accomplished in an interagency organization representing all instruments of national power, with tasking authority over all agencies of the USG, a focused mission of the GWOT, and superb leadership. It must demonstrate the same attributes so successfully employed by USSOCOM within the DoD of collaboration, flexibility, and innovation. With significant reorganization, the NCTC can become this organization. To be sure there are numerous challenges for any such endeavor, so it is time to make audacious moves.

⁴⁹ O'Connell, Thomas W. "Defense Perspectives: The War on Terrorism." Arlington, VA: 17th Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium, March 2006, Slide 10. "Mauritania: This Muslim-majority GWOT partner requested assistance disrupting an Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist organization. It took almost two months to reconcile U.S. authorities -- severely limiting the scope and effectiveness of operations."
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