MARINE CORPS JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT POLICY AND O-7 JOINT SERVICE OFFICER REQUIREMENTS

by

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June 2007

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# Marine Corps Joint Officer Management Policy and O-7 Joint Service Officer Requirements

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SERVICE OFFICER REQUIREMENTS

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This study constituted a qualitative analysis of current Marine Corps Joint Officer Management policy. The research was conducted at the request of Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps to review current policies and their effectiveness in supporting the requirements in the FY 05 NDAA, that all O-7 nominees be Joint Service Officer qualified prior to promotion by September 30, 2008. The Marine Corps Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps provided all categorical data (O-4 through O-7), the majority of which represents 2006, as well as limited historical data representing 2003 to 2005. The data showed a high degree of effectiveness of the current policies, and that an increase in JPME II seats at the O-4 level would significantly increase the percentage of qualified JSO’s. Currently, the number of JSO qualified Brigadier Generals is just above 50 percent. Over the next year’s time, the Marine Corps must reach 100 percent JSO qualification of Brigadier Generals. A follow-on study is needed to forecast O-7 continuation rates utilizing specific, career progression data to further support the FY 05 NDAA stipulation.
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I. INFORMATION AND BACKGROUND

A. INFORMATION

The United States’ philosophy and doctrine concerning joint military capabilities and effectiveness has become the dominant factor in both defense training and education. Recent military operations in Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan have demonstrated the need for American military forces to operate comfortably and proficiently in multiservice, multinational, and interagency environments. The integral part to this transformation lies with American military officers, as they control the key command and control aspects within this environment. In 2000, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published their vision to transform the military to a higher degree of jointness. In their document, *Joint Vision 2020*, the importance of joint training and education was stated as follows:

To effect transforming and enduring changes to our joint military capabilities, the experimentation and implementation process must include construction of a wide range of scenarios and imaginative conflict simulations to explore the shape of future operations....The linchpin of progress from vision to experimentation to reality is joint training and education—because they are the keys to intellectual change. Without intellectual change, there is no real change in doctrine, organizations, or leaders. Thus, the implementation process is dependent upon incorporating concepts validated by experimentation into joint professional military education programs and joint exercises. In this
way, individual Service members and units become a joint team capable of success across the full range of military operations.¹

The Marine Corps’ perception of the importance joint capability and effectiveness on future mission accomplishment is illustrated in its 21st Century Strategy:

...Our aims are to evolve maneuver warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures to fully exploit the joint operational concepts articulated in Joint Vision 2020; and evolve our war fighting concepts to enhance our ability to participate as partners in joint and allied concept development and experimentation.²

Recently, with Congressional approval, the Fiscal Year 2005 National Defense Authorization Act mandated all military officers selected to the grade of O-7 be qualified in joint experience and education to the level of Joint Service Officer (JSO). This mandated requirement will take effect on September 30, 2008. All branches of the military are working to comply under the same constraints; availability of approved joint duty assignments, limited seats available for joint education, and current/forecasted operational tempo resulting from the Global War on Terror.

This research will analyze the effectiveness of the current Marine Corps Joint Officer Management procedures in meeting O-7 Joint Service Officer requirements, based upon several current constraints in the officer progression cycle. Additionally, attempts will be made to identify “chokepoints” in the current system and possible alternative solutions to meeting the JSO requirements.

1 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, 2000.
2 Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Strategy 21, 2000.
B. BACKGROUND

1. Joint Policy History

Title 10, Section 668 (a) of the U.S. Code defines joint matters as; “Matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea and air forces; national military strategy; strategic and contingency planning; and the command and control of combat operations under unified command.3

Prior to the mid 1980’s, the Department of Defense suffered from severe service parochialism. Each service branch concentrated primarily on their mission and capabilities alone, without much regard to the capabilities and limitations of the other branches. Additionally, joint matters, to include staffing of joint billets, were not viewed as critical to future mission success. Services, for the most part, did not send their best and brightest performers to fill these billets. Joint tours were believed to be career ending for an individual and a black hole for the experience and proficiency the services wanted to maintain. Operational deficiencies in Operations Eagle Claw (Iran hostage crisis, 1979) and Urgent Fury (Grenada, 1983) highlighted to Congress the disjointedness in the nation’s joint war fighting capability. Legislation would be needed to ensure future mission success with regards to joint capability and joint units were being staffed by educated and experienced service members.

3 United States Code, Title 10, Section 668 (a).
The Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) became the “starter’s pistol” in DoD’s race to achieve an efficient joint war fighting capability.

Title 10, Chapter 38, requirements
- Establishes a “joint specialty” in joint matters
- Joint Specialty Officers (JSO) qualify through JPME II and experience in a joint duty assignment (JDA)
- SecDef must define JDAs as positions that provide significant experience in joint matters
- SecDef must maintain a list of all such positions, the JDAL
- SecDef must fill approximately half of JDAs with JSO or JSO nominee
- SecDef must designate not less than 800 JDAs as “critical”
- SecDef must fill critical JDAs with JSOs
- SecDef must ensure officers in JDAs and JSOs are promoted comparably to peers in service assignments
  - Joint organizations get a fair share of quality officers
  - Officers are not penalized for joint duty
- Officers must serve one full tour in a JDA to be eligible for promotion to general or flag rank (O-7) (Chapter 36, Section 619a.)

Figure 1. Sample GNA Reforms

Figure 1 shows a portion of the Secretary of Defense’s responsibilities brought about by the GNA reform. The spirit of the GNA was on improving joint operational

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4 United States Code, Title 10, Chapter 36, Section 619a, and Chapter 38. SecDef responsibilities for JOM/JPME.
capability which gave Joint Officer Management supervision and coordination responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Unified Combatant Commanders. Management control of joint assignments and education were taken away from the services and their respective service chiefs.

Since its inception, this legislation has spawned a new generation of joint warfighting doctrine. The importance of this transformation has changed the way crises and conflicts are conducted in today’s global environment. Not only must military officers be proficient in multiservice environments, but interagency and multinational ones as well. Successful joint operations in Iraq, Somalia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan lend credence to the transformational reform ideas of the GNA. In order to promulgate future success, joint education and experience must be considered a priority by both the individual service member and his/her service organization. In an attempt to decrease fears of negative career progression as a result of joint duty, the GNA specified that “JSOs as a group must be promoted at a rate not lower than that of officers assigned to their service’s headquarters.”

2. Joint Service Officer (JSO) Qualifications

Joint Service Officer is a designation bestowed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) upon an individual officer who has completed Joint Professional Military Education I and II along with a successful tour in a

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designated Joint Duty Assignment. All officers are nominated, in writing, by their respective service to OSD. According to the GNA 50 percent of all Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) billets are to be filled with JSO qualified individuals, and 100 percent of critical joint assignments. However, each service may submit waivers for each fiscal year that do not exceed 10 percent of the total officers selected for JSO in each pay grade in that fiscal year. The 10 percent of officers who receive waivers must show proof of extenuating circumstances that deterred them from meeting proper requirements. This is quite a demanding stipulation purposely directed to ensure the services buy into joint education and experience.

This research will concentrate on the availability of meeting JSO qualifications for all Brigadier General selects in the United States Marine Corps. The FY 2005 NDAA requires all O-7 nominees, effective September 30, 2008, to possess the JSO qualification. Currently, the only officers who are nominated without meeting all of the JSO requirements are the 10 percent, previously mentioned, and those officers with occupational specialties of Lawyer and Acquisition Professional.

3. Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)

Joint professional military education is preferred as a prerequisite to being assigned a billet from the JDAL. The Joint Chiefs of Staff highlight this intent in their Instruction 3500.01C:

Personnel selected for joint assignments will be trained prior to reaching their duty location...Professional development is the product
of a learning continuum that comprises training, experience, education, and self-development. The role of professional military education is to provide the education needed to complement training, experience, and self-development to produce the most professionally competent individual possible.6

The majority of officers receive JPME I through intermediate (Major/O-4) level Professional Military Education. JPME II, on the other hand, is more restricted because of limited resident education programs. The Marine Corps only recognizes limited resident education courses and no non-resident courses as qualification for JPME II certification. At the intermediate level (Major/O-4), JPME II certification is limited to attendance at the 10 week, resident Joint and Combined Warfighting School-Intermediate (JCWS-I). Senior level (O-5/O-6) JPME I and II certifications are recognized through completion of Service Senior level Colleges (SLC); Marine Corps War College, Air War College, Army War College, Naval War College, and College of Naval Warfare. Additionally, Senior level JPME II certification can be obtained by completing the Joint and Combined Warfighting School-Senior (JCWS-S). Currently, the Marine Corps fills 100 percent of allotted JPME II school seats on an annual basis, along with additional school seats being acquired from services that cannot fill due to operational commitments.

6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3500.01C, Joint Training Policy and guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States, 2006.
4. Joint Duty Assignment (JDA)

The Department of Defense defines Joint Duty Assignment as, “An assignment to a designated position in a multiservice or multinational command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three military departments. The preponderance of a joint officer’s duties involve producing or promulgating national military strategy, joint doctrine, joint policy, strategic plans, or contingency plans, or to commanding or controlling operations under a combatant command.”

All officially designated JDAs are contained on the JDAL. As mentioned earlier, 50 percent of JDAs are, by OSD directive, to be filled by qualified Joint Service Officers or officers nominated for JSO status. The total number of billets on the JDAL has increased from 8,200 in 1987 to in excess of 9,000 today.

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Figure 2. Comparison of JDAL to O-4 through O-10 EndStrength\textsuperscript{8}

Figure 2 shows the increasing number of JDAL billets, as defense focus has turned to joint war fighting, compared with a decreasing O-4 through O-10 officer end strength. Given recent history, it is imperative to note that regardless of how officer end strength is affected; the push for increasing joint qualified officers has become the reality of today’s Department of Defense.

Historically, the Marine Corps has made significant contributions to officer assignments on the JDAL, maintaining a staffing policy of approximately 90 percent of its allocated positions.\textsuperscript{9} As of fiscal year 2006, the Marine Corps was allocated 669 billets on the JDAL for pay grades O-4 through O-6, staffing at 93 percent.\textsuperscript{10} For the

\textsuperscript{9} Data collected from Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, Marine Corps.
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
purpose of this research, JDAs below the grade or O-4 or above the rank of O-7 will not be examined. Joint Duty Assignments for General/Flag Officers are considered nominations, not service-specific fills.

5. Marine Corps Joint Officer Management

Currently, the Marine Corps has no service-specific, written policy or directive governing its Joint Officer Management. Instead, the Marine Corps utilizes all Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) doctrine, directives, and strategic policies (Joint Visions 2010 and 2020). To date, there is no Marine Corps Joint Officer Management Order being written, nor are there plans to do so.

C. PURPOSE

This study will evaluate the effectiveness of the current Marine Corps Joint Officer Management procedures as they relate to Joint Service Officer qualifications for General Officer selects. The objective is to determine whether the current officer career progression, as it pertains to joint service experience and education, will support the requirements for mandatory Joint Service Officer qualification for General/Flag Officers as directed by the Fiscal Year 2005 National Defense Authorization Act.

D. ORGANIZATION

Chapter II will contain a literature review of related studies concerning Joint Officer Management and strategic approaches for increased qualifications in all four military branches of service.
Chapter III will explain sources for current Marine Corps joint officer data, methodology used, and provide an analysis of the data.

Chapter IV will conclude this study by attempting to identify current process efficiency toward meeting forecasted Joint Service Officer requirements. Recommendations will be included to guide future Marine Corps studies concerning this topic.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. OVERVIEW

There have been numerous studies on Joint Officer Management of the reserve and active duty forces. These studies provide a broad outlook on joint criteria credibility, as well as proposed strategic approaches to meet Department of Defense (DoD) “jointness” goals. Although they look at all branches of the military inclusively, they contain information relevant to the specificity of this research.

In this chapter, a review is done to gain insight on the current situation regarding Joint Officer Management. This review, will provide a summary of each study, focus on the purpose of the research, models and types of data used, and conclusions/recommendations. Additionally, this chapter will summarize the Fiscal Year 2005 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which is the basis for Joint Service Officer requirements at the General/Flag Officer level.

B. FISCAL YEAR 2005 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

This act was enacted by the One Hundred Eighth Congress and is known by the title, “Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005.” This legislation amended numerous Joint Officer Management sections under Title X of the U.S. Code. Most importantly, was the change to Section 533 of Title X:
SEC. 533. JOINT REQUIREMENTS FOR PROMOTION TO FLAG OR GENERAL OFFICER GRADE.

(a) EFFECTIVE Date for Joint Specialty Officer Requirement.—Subsection (a)(2) of section 619a of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking “September 30, 2007” and inserting “September 30, 2008.”

This legislation applied a mandated deadline for meeting requirements for the grade of O-7 in all four services. Although congress understands the need to push our military towards jointness, the realization of current operational tempo and its effect on personnel assignments resulted in the new September 2008 deadline. Nonetheless, since Title X was amended by this act, Joint Officer Management, Joint Professional Military Education, Joint Duty Assignment, and Joint Service Officer designation have become increasingly significant to active duty Colonels looking for selection to Brigadier General in the Marine Corps.

C. ACTIVE DUTY JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT


In their study Who is “Joint?” New Evidence from the 2005 Joint Officer Management Survey, Kirby et al. intend to “…provide an overview of the survey responses, including the extent to which officers believe that their assignments provide them with joint experience or require them to have

prior joint education, training, or experience.” 12 This study was conducted to enhance the foundation of knowledge for future research on joint officer management concerning experience requirement and education qualifications of potential assignees to joint billets. At most, this study serves as an overview for responses to the above mentioned survey.

The survey was conducted via web based application and directed towards three types of “joint” billets. The types of billets addressed are:

- Billets currently on the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL)

- Non-JDAL billets in external organizations that have some billets on the JDAL

- Internal Service billets not on the JDAL that were nominated by the services as providing joint experience or requiring joint experience or education13

Approximately 30,000 billets were surveyed and responses were received from 21,214. Thus, the response rate for the survey was approximately 71 percent. The Marine Corps respondents accounted for only 0.3 percent of the sample.

The authors addressed a number of topic categories in their summation. For instance, when measuring the “jointness” of a billet, Kirby et al. selected four tasks as units of measure—(1) providing strategic direction and

13 Ibid.
integration; (2) developing/ assessing joint policies; (3) developing/ assessing joint doctrine; and (4) fostering multinational, interagency, or regional relations. Not surprisingly, JDAL and Non-JDAL billets in external organizations were at the top of each category. Additionally, Marine Corps billets ranked higher than all other services on every measure.

Another important measure researched in the study considered the joint education and experience required for billet assignment. Approximately 70 to 80 percent of respondents felt as though their billet efficiency required both joint education and experience. Internal service organization billets were slightly lower in ranking the importance, approximately 60 percent. For Marine Corps assignments, 80 percent ranked joint education and experience as critical to assignment.

Finally, when measuring joint experience provided by a billet, the authors concentrated on the level of experience that billet provided towards multinational, multiservice, and interagency matters. JDAL billets resulted in the majority of experience with the three areas, 87 percent gained experience in multiservice matters while 65 to 75 percent gained multinational and interagency experience. Approximately 70 percent of Marine Corps billets in non-service organizations were reported to provide multiservice experience. “JDAL billets rank first on every indicator,

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Educational agencies, CENTCOM JTF billets, and billets in the geographic commands rank very high on providing significant experience in all three areas.”15

2. Study by Thie, Harrell, Yardley, Oshiro, Potter, Schirmer, and Lim (2005)

In 2005, RAND National Defense Research Institute published the study by Thie et al. titled, “Framing a Strategic Approach for Joint Officer Management.” Their purpose in conducting this study was to develop a strategic approach that would “…provide overarching guidance on officer training and development in joint matters to best meet DoD’s mission and goals in the context of evolving combatant commander and service requirements, revolutionary changes in technology, and a dramatic cultural shift in the military.”16 In short, the authors do not believe that all branches of the military will take the necessary steps to ensure they meet national policy requirements for training joint officers.

The data used in the study consisted of longitudinal data collected from officer personnel files across all four military branches. The information consisted of joint experience and education, Joint Service Officer qualifications, and proportion of Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) billets per service. Important to note, the authors concentrated, for the most part, on those individuals whose military occupation specialty have had the preponderance of

joint duty requirements. Additionally, Thie et al. conducted personal interviews with officers currently filling joint billets, those with past experience, and personnel from each branch’s joint officer management office. The interviews provided insight on the positive and negative aspects of the current joint officer development system.

As the intent was not to provide an “end all” solution to the difficulties of training joint officers, the authors chose to provide a strategic framework that will identify processes that need to be followed. Thie et al. recognized that all four branches of military are getting progressively more joint with every passing year, but perhaps not as efficiently as they could be. The authors conclude that their needs to be DoD benchmark concerning the characteristics needed in a joint officer (e.g. multinational, multiservice, interagency). Once the benchmark is identified, all branches of the military need to conduct a thorough examination of personnel files in order to measure current progress in meeting the benchmark. Only after an accurate picture of current status is obtained can a model then be implemented to forecast probability of meeting future goals. The authors noted that it is important to ensure that models account for the two predominant constraints in joint officer development, number of Joint Duty Assignment billets and Joint Professional Military Education II school seats.
D. RESERVE JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT

1. Study by Thie, Harrell, Kirby, Crego, Yardley, and Nagda (2006)

In 2006, RAND National Defense Research Institute published a study by Thie et al. titled, “Framing a Strategic Approach for Reserve Component Joint Officer Management.” The purpose for this study was to continue the research from the previously mentioned study on the active component, in order to account for the decreased limitations faced by reserve officers, vice the active component, as they strive to meet joint education and experience standards. The authors focus on “framing a strategic approach to reserve joint officer management that (a) addresses the requirements for and the supply of joint officers for the reserve component and (b) accounts for the unique constraints of and challenges to reserve joint officer management.”

The authors used the same 2005 Joint Officer Management Census Survey as previously used in Kirby, et al.’s survey on the active component, discussed earlier in the chapter. Restated, this survey analyzed approximately 21,000 current billets, joint or potentially joint.

The author’s concentrated their efforts by focusing on reserve active-status list officers and their qualifications. They discovered that, currently, there is minimal information in personnel data systems as to the joint education and experience of these officers. Thie, et

al. suggest that a one time data inventory be conducted to capture this missing information and consistent updates follow periodically. Additionally, the authors make general recommendations as to a proper strategic approach for joint officer management. The base of their recommendations is to detect current and projected overages and shortages of joint qualified reserve officers, followed by policy implementation to match the requirement with the current inventory.
III. DATA SOURCES, GENERAL METHODOLOGY, DATA ANALYSIS

A. DATA SOURCES

The data for this research was assembled from the Joint Officer Management database operated by the Joint Officer Management Office, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. For the purpose of this research, the data was restricted to Field Grade Officers (O-4 through O-6). Although limited JDAL billets exist for pay grades O-1 through O-3, JPME II school seats are unavailable, thus, junior officers will not be included in the scope of this research. Since FY 05 NDAA requires that O-7 selects be JSO qualified before nomination, very little data was analyzed for this pay grade. The majority of the data represented is for fiscal year 2006. Unfortunately, limited historical data was available. The original analysis was to compare similar data categories over recent years to establish accurate patterns within each data category, but, only 2006 data was available for the analysis.

As shown in Table 1, the categories of information collected and considered relevant to this research are broken down by pay grade and include; current active duty officer inventory, JSO (full/partial) active duty officer inventory, promotion rates (general), Joint Service Officer (full/partial) promotion rates, JPME II school seats, and allotted JDAL billets.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the extent of historical Joint Officer Management (JOM) data available for this research. Historical data was limited to the following categories; Number of full/partially JSO-qualified Marine Corps officers and Joint Primary Military Education II (JPME II) seat allotment and fill rates. None of the historical data was available to be analyzed by pay grade.

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18 Data collected from Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, Marine Corps.
As shown in Figure 3, the number of fully qualified Joint Service Officers has continued to increase over the past 3 years, from 347 in 2004 to 439 in 2006. However, also evident is the sudden decrease from 2005 to 2006 in those field grade officers who were partially qualified, minus the JPME II certification. The data showed there was no peculiar reasoning behind the sudden drop in the partially qualified numbers, other than the typical voluntary/involuntary attrition and information gaps.

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19 Data collected from Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, Marine Corps.
Figure 4 shows the recent trend in JPME II allocated and filled Marine Corps school seats. The number of allocated resident school seats to the Marine Corps has remained the same in recent years, 54 annual JPME II seats. The data showed a noticeable increase in seats filled which are continually increasing.

B. METHODOLOGY

The methodology for this study will consist of an analysis of current Marine Corps Joint Officer Management policy and statistical data in order to understand the effectiveness of these policies on Joint Service Officer requirements and provide recommendations for areas of improvement in order to reach the goals set forth by the Fiscal year 2005 National Defense Authorization Act. The primary data for this policy analysis will be the 2006 Joint

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20 Data collected from Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, Marine Corps.
Officer Management data, shown previously in Table 1. Each portion of the categorical data will be segregated for further analysis.

C. DATA ANALYSIS

The vast majority of Marine Corps officers (O-4 through O-6) who serve in JDAL billets and JPME II resident school seats will be the focus of the data. Additionally, it is imperative that the Marine Corps concentrate on these pay grades in order to fully qualify all potential Brigadier General nominees as Joint Service Officers.

1. Current Marine Corps Active Duty Officer Inventory

![Figure 5. Marine Corps Field Grade Officer Inventory](image)

The number of Marine Corps field grade officers serves as the base from which all other descriptive statistics could be drawn. Not surprisingly, over half of all field grade officers in the Marine Corps are at the O-4 level.

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21 Data collected from Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, Marine Corps.
Additionally, the pay grade of O-5 contains approximately 30 percent of field grade officers and approximately 11 percent at the O-6 level.

2. Full/Partially JSO-Qualified Officers

![Major/O-4 JSO Breakdown](chart.png)

Figure 6. Major/O-4 JSO Qualification Breakdown

![Lieutenant Colonel/O-5 JSO Breakdown](chart.png)

Figure 7. Lieutenant Colonel/O-5 JSO Qualification Breakdown

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22 Data collected from Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, Marine Corps.

23 Ibid.
Figures 6, 7, and 8, show the breakdown of full and partially qualified Joint Service Officers by pay grade. According to the data, although it contains the largest inventory of officers, the grade of O-4 shows the highest percentage of officers with no JSO qualifications at approximately 97 percent. The highest percentage of in-grade inventory having full JSO qualification surfaces at the O-6 level. The relationship between pay grade and extent of JSO qualification is justified, primarily, by time in service and additional billet and educational opportunities.

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24 Data collected from Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, Marine Corps.
3. Promotion Rates

Table 2. Field Grade Officer Promotion Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0-4</th>
<th>0-5</th>
<th>0-6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promotion rates (general)</td>
<td>90.00%</td>
<td>70.00%</td>
<td>52.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion rates (Full/partial JSO)</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>83.30%</td>
<td>80.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data shown in Table 2 represents both the general promotion rate for field grade officers, as well as the promotion rate for full/partially qualified field grade officers. As discussed earlier, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that all personnel taking the opportunity to fill joint billets and resident schools should be promoted, at a minimum, at the same rate as their peers. Figure 9 shows the evidence that Marine Corps officers at the O-5 and O-6 levels, with full or partial JSO qualifications, are being promoted at a rate significantly above that of their peers. However, it is impossible to derive the amount of influence JSO qualifications actually had on these promotions. It is possible that many of those who were promoted with JSO qualifications would have been promoted without any joint experience or education.

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25 Data collected from Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, Marine Corps.
4. Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) Inventory

Figure 9 represents the 2006 JDAL billet inventory for Marine Corps field grade officers, showing that the majority of billets are allocated for the O-4 level. However, more than 80 percent of Marine Corps JDAL billets are staffed at the O-4 or O-5 pay grades. Although the data stands alone as a snapshot in time, the overall billet allocations do not change significantly from year to year. Evidence of this was shown in Figure 2, where JDAL inventory increased by approximately 800 billets in the time between 1987 and 2007. Initially, this upward trend was seen as alarming when coupled with a decrease in overall end strength of pay grades O-4 through O-10 during the same time period. Limited historical data was available to forecast what, if any, the recently approved force structure increase (Global

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26 Data collected from Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, Marine Corps.
War on Terror) will have on future JDAL billet inventory. Although likely to increase, it is difficult to predict the rate at which it will increase.

5. Joint Primary Military Education II (JPME II) Availability/Fills

![Bar chart showing JPME II seat fills for AY 2006]

Figure 10. JPME II Attendance for AY 2006

As the second half of the requirement for Joint Service Officer qualification, JDAL billet experience being the other, JPME II school seat data is integral to analyzing current Marine Corps Joint Officer Management policies and procedures. The annual Marine Corps JPME II seat allocation has remained steady at 54 over the last 3 years. The Joint Officer Management Office was unable to provide the actual breakdown of those seats by pay grade. As Figure 10 shows, the Marine Corps continues to fill seat levels above allocation. According to the data, the primary target of JPME II assignments is at the O-5 level, which more than doubles the seats filled annually by officers at the O-4 level. The O-6 level registers half as many annual seats as officers at the O-5 level.

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27 Data collected from Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, Marine Corps.
the O-4 level officers. Presumably, the reason for this disparity is that most officers received their JPME II at the O-5 level. The data shows that, at the O-5 level, officers have more varied opportunities to acquire JPME II education when compared to officers at the O-4 and O-6 level. As previously examined, the largest inventory of Marine Corps field grade officers exist at the O-4 level, but they have the least frequent opportunity to attend the only resident school that will certify them at the JPME II level, the Joint and Combined Warfighting School-Intermediate (JCWS-I).

6. General Officer Categorical Data

Table 3. Joint Officer Management Categorical Data for Marine Corps Brigadier Generals/O-7s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Inventory Active Duty Officers</th>
<th>40</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partially qualified JSO (No JPME II)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full JSO qualification</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion rates (general)</td>
<td>1.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion rates (Full/partial JSO)</td>
<td>6.30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As this research focuses on the analysis of the Marine Corps Joint Officer Management system and its effectiveness in meeting Joint Service Officer requirements for O-7 nominees, inclusion of categorical data for this pay grade seemed logical. Table 3 above illustrates some basic, categorical data for Marine Corps O-7s similar to data displayed earlier in this chapter. Interesting to note is the large proportion of Brigadier Generals with full or

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28 Data collected from Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, Marine Corps.
partial JSO qualification (92.5 percent); 57.5 percent are fully qualified Joint Service Officers, and 35 percent are partially qualified (minus JPME II education). Additionally, given the promotion rates to O-7 (1.2 percent), and the current statistical rate of promotion for the aforementioned full/partially qualified JSO (6.3 percent), the data shows tremendous progress towards meeting the requirement of 100 percent JSO qualified O-7 nominees. What the data does not show are JDAL billet inventory and JPME II school seat allocation and fill rates. Assignment and allocation for O-7s to both categories is nominative and not predetermined, thus statistically significant data was not available.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

The Fiscal Year 2005 National Defense Authorization Act requires that all officers, nominated for promotion to the pay grade of O-7, meet Joint Service Officer (JSO) qualifications, effective September 30, 2008. The goal of this research was to examine the Marine Corps’ effectiveness in meeting this JSO requirement by analyzing Marine Corps Joint Officer Management (JOM) policy and historical data. A Department of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions and Directives review found no Marine Corps JOM policy or guidelines. Additionally, Marine Corps Active Duty Officer (O-4 through O-7) categorical data, sufficient for 2006 and limited for 2003 to 2005, was provided by the Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

The data showed that current Marine Corps JOM procedures are effective in providing the education and billet experience needed to create Joint Service Officers but efficiencies can still be found. Approximately 90 percent of the current inventory of Brigadier Generals appear to be fully or partially JSO qualified. A lack of JPME II was found to be the reason for partial qualifications. The data clearly shows the increase in Joint Service Officers as pay grade increases from O-4 to O-6. Although the preponderance of JDAL assignments are allocated to O-4 level officers, the majority of opportunities for JPME II attendance lies in the O-5 and O-6
level. The research strongly shows that, although the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) intended to have officers attend JPME II prior to being assigned to a JDAL billet, all officers in the pay grades O-4 through O-7 (within the sourced data), having JDAL billet credit, were partially JSO qualified due to lack of JPME II certification. Although the Marine Corps annually fills more than its allotted school seats, this lack of JPME II seats appears to the “chokepoint” in meeting the FY 05 NDAA requirement of O-7 JSO qualification.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES

As the research shows, JPME II certification is the constraint between partial and fully qualified Joint Service Officers. Also, the Marine Corps’ Joint Officer Management policies would benefit from the following recommendations:

- Collect, centralize, and maintain Joint Officer Management categorical information on all Active Duty officers in the Marine Corps to provide accurate and timely data.
- Work with other branches of DoD to create additional JPME II opportunities for the O-4 level officers prior to assignment in a joint billet.
- Despite current and future operational tempo, continue to staff the JDAL above 90 percent.

In the coming years, the Joint Service Officer requirement for promotion to O-7 will become a high visibility issue with regards to O-6 retention in the Marine Corps. A future study may be needed to model continuation rates of O-7 Joint Service Officers, taking into account Time in grade, retention statistics, and self-selection criteria.
LIST OF REFERENCES


Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3500.01C, Joint Training Policy and guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States, 2006.

Data Source: Joint Officer Management Office, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.


United States Code, Title 10, Section 668 (a), Chapter 36, Section 619a, and Chapter 38. SecDef responsibilities for JOM/JPME.
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