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Center for Research on Military Organization, University of Maryland

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NOTE: The findings in this Technical Report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position, unless so designated by other authorized documents.
The Center for Research on Military Organization undertook a multi-year research program on the impact of social change on the performance of Army units and of Soldiers after the end of the Cold War in Europe and the first Gulf War. We were concerned with the shift from deterrence and defense to contingency operations, the adjustment of young adults to the military, the demographic diversity of the military, the impact of the history and culture of our military and the armed forces of other nations, and the utilization of behavioral science as a dimension of the expert knowledge of the military profession. A year after the initiation of this program, the events of September 11 2001 changed the nature of American military organization/mission. We conducted research on Soldiers during periods of contingency operations, when six-month deployments in successive years signified high operational tempo, and a period of continuous operations, when year-long deployments, including large numbers of reserve component personnel became more common. During this period, we studied enlistment propensity, motivations to serve, and work attitudes among American youth, adjustment to the Army, civil-military relations, gender and racial integration, organizational change, leadership, and the utilization of behavioral science knowledge.
SOCIAL STRUCTURES AFFECTING ARMY PERFORMANCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

The research program executed under this contract was based on a proposal submitted by the Center for Research on Military Organization (CRMO) at the University of Maryland in response to an ARI Broad Agency Announcement calling for research on social structures affecting Army performance. The Army recognizes that its ability to man, train, and use the force is affected by changes in American society, such as demographic trends, that impact on its military, as well as social trends that transcend the boundary between the civilian and military sectors of society, such as changing gender roles and family patterns. These changes and trends were the focus of the research.

Procedures:

The program of research carried out under this contract included: analysis of large scale sample surveys of American civilian populations ranging from high school seniors and military veterans to the general American labor force; surveys of American military units including continuing analysis of surveys conducted under prior ARI contracts as well as new data collections and analysis of surveys of American and foreign militaries; field observations of Soldiers and units in training situations and on deployments; and comparative and historical archival materials on issues such as gender integration and sexual orientation integration in military forces. We also undertook a comparative and historical analysis of the role of behavioral science in military organization, particularly in the area of leadership.

Findings:

In our research on American youth, we addressed the hypothesis, widely published in the social sciences and in the press in the 1990s, that a “culture gap” was developing between America and its armed forces. We did not find empirical support for the hypothesis. We did find that propensity to serve in the military was declining steeply among African-American youth, and that perceptions of racial and gender discrimination in the military were increasing among high school seniors. We also found that family formation, gender, and enlistment interact: for low propensity men, marriage increases the likelihood of enlistment, while for high propensity women, it decreases likelihood of service. We also documented youth’s job characteristic preferences, and found that they had not changed much during three decades, but that there was a convergence between high propensity and low propensity youth. We compared the preferences of service academy plebes with those of high school seniors and found that responsibility and participation in decision-making were important to the plebes and to seniors who expected to go to college and to serve in the military, and that extrinsic job rewards, leisure time, and job security were less important to military-oriented youth than to others.

In our research on Soldiers, we found that most, but not all, Soldiers who participated in peacekeeping in the 1990s accepted the first-generation peacekeeping norms of impartiality and minimum use of force, and that these attitudes, as well as reenlistment intentions, were not affected by number of peacekeeping deployments. The Soldiers we studied after the initiation of
the Global War on Terrorism retrospectively reported low enlistment propensity when they were in high school. When we sought to identify their major enlistment motivations, we found that a desire for adventure, service to the country, and patriotism predominated, while economic incentives were less important.

Our research program on diversity suggests that the armed forces have lagged behind the broader American society, and behind other nations, in gender and sexual orientation integration, and have used closure mechanisms such as arguments regarding the negative effects of diversity on unit cohesion, to focus military recruitment on traditional sources of personnel. However, as the labor force has become more diverse, so too has the military. One of the consequences of increasing gender integration has been an increase in the number of women who are veterans. Our research shows that African-American women who have served in the volunteer force do as well as their peers who did not serve in terms of civilian income. By contrast, white non-Hispanic women veterans do less well. Civilian women who work in local labor markets where there is a major military presence likewise experience an earnings decrement due to the influence of the military on the local economy.

Our research has documented important organizational changes in the military, including downsizing and reduced budgets, even as deployments have been increasing. Downsizing has been shown to be consequential for the mental health of military personnel and their wives. It has also produced greater dependence on reserve components, with implications for reserve personnel, their families, and their employers. We have also seen an increase in dependence on civilian contractors to perform tasks previously performed by military personnel. These changes have all had an impact on the nature of civil-military relations in America. As a rational approach to understanding these changes, we have seen an increase in the degree to which military services draw upon behavioral science knowledge in dealing with organizational issues.

Utilization and Dissemination of Findings:

CRMO staff engage in frequent interaction with senior personnel representing the Army, her sister services, and the Department of Defense. These interactions provide opportunities to present findings from our research program. For example, during the period of this contract, Professor Mady W. Segal met with Mrs. Eric Shinseki on 3 January 2002 to discuss Army family research. On 4 April 2003, Professors David R. Segal and Mady W. Segal met with General John Keene (Army Vice Chief of Staff), LTG John LeMoyne (Army DSCPER), and LTG Dick Cody (Army DCSOPS) to discuss human resource management issues in the Army. During the summer of 2003, Professor Meyer Kestnbaum participated in the Secretary of Defense Summer Study at the Naval War College on “The Military Officer in 2030,” and Professor David R. Segal made a presentation to the study group. On 21-22 October 2003, Professor David R. Segal helped facilitate a joint service workshop on force transformation for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Professor David R. Segal also met with Admiral Vern Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations, and his Executive Advisory Panel on 19-21 May 2004 at Great Lakes Naval Training Center to present CRMO research findings regarding young Americans and military service. Subsequent meetings have indicated that our research has had an impact on the armed services. For example, in a meeting in May 2007, Mrs. Shinseki confirmed that Mady Segal’s input influenced the way in which Army family patterns were viewed in the Office of the Chief
of Staff. The U.S. Naval Academy is in the process of thoroughly revising the way in which leadership is taught, drawing more heavily on the behavioral sciences than has been the case in the past. And organizational principles drawn from our research have been captured in Army doctrine through the inclusion of an appendix on social network analysis in the new Army Field Manual on insurgencies.

CRMO also reports research results directly to ARI. For this contract, that was done at In Process Reviews on 26 July 2001 and 11 January 2005. We also frequently present our findings at research conferences sponsored by the military services and the Department of Defense. Research conducted under this conference was presented at the Global Leadership Conference at the United States Military Academy on 1-2 March 2001, and at the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute Research Symposium on 6-7 December 2001 at Patrick Air Force Base, FL.
# SOCIAL STRUCTURES AFFECTING ARMY PERFORMANCE

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Social Structures Affecting Army Performance

Introduction

The first few years of the twenty-first century saw a major transformation of the American armed forces and the armed forces of other nations (particularly industrialized democratic states), and even broader major hypothesized changes in the nature of American military organization and the relationship between the military and American society. Further, these changes have been hypothesized to affect the performance of America’s Army and of American Soldiers.

In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in Europe, and of the Gulf War in the Middle East in the late twentieth century, social theorists were positing the advent of postmodern society and a new postmodern form of military organization (Moskos, Williams, & Segal, 2000). Elements of this postmodern perspective included increasingly small forces with reduced budgets (Segal & Babin, 2000); coalition-based multinational military operations, more concerned with peacekeeping than with war fighting (Whitestone & Segal, 2007); and a convergence between military and civilian institutional structures. While this perspective posited increasing similarity between military service and civilian employment—a derivative of other recent theories of institutional and occupational military organization (Moskos, 1986)—an alternative theoretical perspective suggested that a gap was opening between American military culture and the broader mainstream culture of American society. This gap was hypothesized to be manifested primarily in a politicization of the American military, producing a homogeneously conservative military institution that was estranged from the American political system and put at risk our normative assumptions about civilian control of the military and the nature of American military professionalism (Feaver & Kohn, 2001).

Other changes that had implications for the military were going on as well. Women were continuing to enter the labor force and seek equal treatment in employment. Young men were increasingly seeing their family roles as having equal importance to their work roles in defining their identities. Opportunities for minorities were opening up in the civilian labor market, while at the same time, high school graduates were increasingly aspiring to achieve higher levels of education before entering the labor market, rather than immediately seeking post-secondary school employment.

And then, on 11 September 2001, the Al Queda terrorist network launched successful attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, and on the Pentagon in Washington, using hijacked civilian airliners as weapons. These attacks led the United States to retaliate militarily against Al Queda, as well as the Taliban government of Afghanistan, which gave refuge to Al Queda, as the first battle in a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). America’s national security posture changed from one of national defense and support of contingency operations to one of preemptive war against perceived perpetrators of terrorist acts and those who protected them. On the basis of intelligence interpretations of the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the United States launched a preemptive attack on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003, initiating our longest and largest military engagement since the Vietnam War.
In the context of the relative quiet of the start of the new millennium, the Center for Research on Military Organization at the University of Maryland, with support from the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, had undertaken a multifaceted four year research program in 2000 to help understand the nature and consequences of the changes in America's youth, American civilian institutions, America's Army, and the relationships among these trends. The outbreak of the Global War on Terrorism then became an intervention in the socio-historical processes we sought to understand, as our focus shifted from a nation at peace and an Army involved in contingency operations to a nation at war and an Army involved in continuous operations. One major focus of the research program dealt with the attitudes and behaviors of American youth, particularly those who aspired to serve in the military and those who actually served, particularly as compared to those who followed other post-secondary school trajectories, such as civilian employment or higher education.

A second focus of our research program has been on the adjustment of young adults to the military. When this project was begun, the American armed forces were involved in contingency operations to a higher degree than ever before, and a major concern was the impact of deployment tempo for these operations on Soldiers and on the Army. High deployment tempo was then regarded as multiple six-month deployments in successive years. Invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq occurred early in the contract period, and a force configured for contingency operations was required to undertake continuous operations, frequently involving back-to-back deployments of more than a year, with increasing support from civilian contractors and from the reserve components. The six-month deployments of the era of contingency operations began to look leisurely.

A third focus of our research program is diversity in the military population. While we have been primarily concerned with gender diversity in the American armed forces, we have noted parallels with other diversity dimensions as well. Our diversity research has also intersected with our research in comparative military organization. We have studied the gender integration process as well as the sexual orientation integration process in the armed forces of other nations—particularly those with which we are likely to be involved in coalition operations, as well as the historical processes that have led the military to be regarded as a gendered institution.

A fourth focus of our research is on historical and comparative military sociology. Here we seek to understand the culture and traditions in which the military is embedded, as well as the dynamics of other nations' armed forces and their relationships to their host societies. An important facet of this research program is to understand changing military organization. A fifth and relatively small component of our research is the utilization of behavioral science, and particularly sociology, by military forces.

Attitudes and Behavior of American Youth

Much of our research in this area has been undertaken in collaboration with colleagues at the University of Michigan, using the data base afforded by the Monitoring the Future (MtF) research program. MtF has surveyed about 16,000 high school seniors every spring since 1975, collecting data on the primary military recruiting market: young Americans who will soon be
high school graduates. Sub samples of each year’s graduating class are then followed up for several years after graduation. Analyses of these data under an earlier Army Research Institute contract (DASW010K0016) had focused on the relationship between enlistment propensity and actual enlistment behavior; trends in enlistment propensity over time and as they varied by race, gender, and ethnicity; predictors of enlistment other than propensity; and attitude differences regarding patriotism, nationalism, conservatism, and traditionalism between young men who went into the military as compared to those who went into civilian employment or higher education (D. R. Segal, 2000, pp.4-7).

Under the current contract, we followed up this earlier research using the MtF data to address the “culture gap” thesis mentioned above. Specifically, we were concerned with the degree to which young Americans who entered the military were more highly politicized than American military personnel in earlier eras, monolithically conservative, and distrustful of civilian policy-makers, as the thesis suggested. We compared young men who served with their peers who did not with regard to these attitudes both in their senior years in high school and four years after graduation. Of the large volume of research that the “culture gap” thesis produced, this was the only research of Soldiers in the enlisted ranks, although enlisted personnel comprise 85% of the force (D. R. Segal et al., 2001a).

We did find a higher level of politicization among military personnel than the literature on the American military suggests was the case in the past. We attribute this largely to increasing military professionalization in the volunteer force era, and regard politicization to be a consequence of professionalization. However, we found no empirical support for the most troubling of the hypotheses of the “culture gap” approach. The most conservative post-high school trajectory was college attendance, not military service, and those who went into the military, rather than being estranged from the polity, had the highest levels of trust in government. The young military population reflected American society, with increasing conservativism among the youth cohort during the 1980s, followed by decreasing conservativism among both military and civilian youth later in the twentieth century. Our findings in opposition to the culture gap thesis were consistent with other research on the purported gap (e.g., Dowd, 2001). It is notable that while the culture gap thesis had received a great deal of attention from policy-makers, the media, and social scientists during the salad days of the late 1990s, the major report on the theory (Feaver & Kohn, 2001) was published on 12 September 2001, and sank quickly into oblivion.

We also used the MtF data base to explore young Americans’ perceptions of the racial climate and the gender climate of the military. The propensity of young African-American men and women to serve in the military had declined markedly in the early 1990s, as had actual African-American enlistment (see Appendix A1-A4). Our analysis showed that perceptions of racial discrimination in the military had increased in the 1990s—more among young civilian White men and women than among young Blacks (see Appendix A5-A6). Perceptions of gender discrimination also increased during this period (see Appendix A7). The good news for the military was that these increased perceptions of racial and gender discrimination were expressed primarily by high school seniors with low propensities to serve in the military. They were not shared by those who expected or wanted to serve. The bad news, however, is that as propensity to serve continues to decline, particularly in the African-American community, success in
recruitment increasingly becomes dependent on the services' ability to enlist low propensity men and women. There are not sufficient numbers of high propensity youth to fill enlistment goals (D. R. Segal et al., 2001b).

At the interface of our research programs on youth attitudes and diversity, we used the MtF data to further explore the relationship between gender, propensity to serve, and actual service (M. W. Segal et al., 2001). We have previously shown that propensity to serve is lower among women than among men, but that women are more likely to want to serve than to expect to serve, suggesting that there are structural obstacles to their serving (see Appendix A8-A9). More women desire to serve, and expect to serve, than are actually recruited. The relationship between propensity and actual service is weaker for women than it is for men, and this relationship has not increased over time. In general, background characteristics and educational achievement and plans are less predictive of women’s propensity and enlistment than is the case for men, with the exceptions of race and ethnicity effects, which are higher for women. Family formation interacts with propensity and enlistment differently for women than for men and is stronger than for men. High propensity women who start families do not enlist. On the other hand, low propensity men who start families are somewhat more likely to enlist, possibly because of the family benefits associated with military service.

Building on our earlier research on the work-related values of American youth, we used the MtF data to explore the value placed on job characteristics that are indicative of a willingness and desire to assume positions of leadership, the degree to which these values have changed over time, and the degree to which youth with positive propensities to serve in the military differ on these desired job characteristics from youth who do not desire or expect to serve in the military (Trainor et al., 2001). The job characteristics that were related to proclivity for leadership included having a job that people look up to and respect, that provide opportunities to be creative, that provide opportunities to participate in decision-making, that has high status and prestige, that is worthwhile to society, and that has an opportunity to be directly helpful to others.

In general, the job characteristics most important to high school seniors were what we might call comfort traits rather than these leadership-related characteristics. Indeed, preference for leadership-related job characteristics seems to have declined over time. These young Americans wanted interesting work, steady jobs, and having a secure future. Over half of the young men and women surveyed aspired to jobs with these characteristics. By contrast, facing problems that are difficult and challenging was the lowest ranked of 24 characteristics, and was identified as very important by fewer than 15 percent of young men and women.

There were very few changes in these preferences among young Americans during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. There were small increases in preferences for high status, respected jobs in which people can make decisions. However, preferences decreased the most for results-oriented and people-oriented jobs: traits that we associate with leadership proclivity.

Youth with high propensities to serve in the military differ from their low propensity peers in their preference for jobs that are well-respected, difficult, and challenging, as well as those that offer opportunities to learn new skills. However, on most characteristics, there has been a convergence of preferences between high and low propensity young adults.
The next step in our research program on the implications for the military of attitude and value change in American youth was to compare the MtF data with comparable data from a military population. We compared data on the importance of a range of job characteristics from the April 2002 national administration of MtF (n=13,544 high school seniors) with data from a sample of incoming Plebes in the U.S. Naval Academy Class of 2007 (n=203). The Naval Academy students were surveyed during the first week of Plebe Summer indoctrination, using a research instrument adapted from MtF instruments. The plebes were then followed up at the end of Plebe Summer to assess change (D. R. Segal, 2004). The civilian high school seniors were classified on the basis of whether they expected to go to college and to serve in the armed forces, go to college but not serve in the armed forces, serve in the armed forces but not go to college, and neither serve in the armed forces nor go to college.

We found that intrinsic rewards (interesting and self-actualizing work) was the most important value for all groups (high school seniors and plebes), and there were no significant differences among them. Influence characteristics (responsibility and participation in decision-making) was most important for the Naval Academy plebes, followed by the high school seniors who expected to go to college and to serve in the military. Extrinsic job rewards, leisure time, and job security were less important to the Naval Academy plebes than to the civilian high school students. The plebes consistently expressed a stronger preference for work that would be a central part of their lives than did the high school seniors.

Adjustment to the Military and to Military Missions

As noted earlier, at the outset of this research program, the Army was concerned about the impact of repeated six-month deployments for peacekeeping and other contingency operations on Soldiers’ attitudes. During the 1990s, the Army had begun experimenting with the use of reserve component personnel on these operations, and one of the issues we addressed was how active Army personnel felt about others participating in contingency missions. Using data collected from the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) after deployments for Hurricane Andrew relief, Somalia, and Haiti during a three year period, we measured Soldiers’ attitudes toward peacekeeping, morale, and reenlistment intentions (Reed & Segal, 2000). We found that most Soldiers accepted the basic norms of first-generation peacekeeping (impartiality and minimum use of force) and regarded it as an appropriate military mission, but significant minorities did not. Most attitudes were unaffected by number of deployments, or by rank, or by occupational specialty. The greatest effects were on judgments of who should perform peacekeeping missions. These Soldiers felt that civilians should not perform peacekeeping operations, but this judgment weakened with increasing numbers of deployments. These Soldiers—predominantly infantrymen—believed that military police were appropriate personnel for peacekeeping. And they believed that reservists could perform peacekeeping missions as well as active-duty Soldiers.

Number of deployments did have an impact on morale. As the number of deployments increased, Soldiers’ self-reports of morale decreased. Many Soldiers reported being bored on peacekeeping missions, and noted that these missions are hardest on married Soldiers with
families. Interestingly, number of deployments did not have a significant effect on reenlistment intentions.

We were also interested in whether long-term participation in peace operations had an effect on the culture of the Army—whether a peacekeeping culture was emerging in the Army’s combat units, at the tip of the spear. A decade of observations, interviews, and surveys of Army units serving as the American contingents to the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai Desert in support of the Camp David Accords suggested that combat Soldiers, while they adapted well to peacekeeping missions, did not alter their definitions of mission, but rather came to understand peacekeeping within the framework of their more usual combat mission (D. R. Segal, 2001).

Subsequently, after the initiation of the Global War on Terrorism, we surveyed first-term Soldiers in two infantry battalions at Fort Lewis, Washington prior to their deployment to Iraq. These Soldiers were assigned to Stryker units—part of the Army’s organizational transformation. The Army was experiencing recruiting difficulties, propensity to serve was low, and we wanted to know if the shortage of high propensity young men was showing up in combat units. We also wanted to know what was motivating the Soldier of the twenty-first century to enlist, and how enlistment motivations and propensity were related. In addition, we wanted to see if the structure of enlistment motivations was captured by Moskos’s dualistic Institutional and Occupational models of service (Woodruff, Kelty, & Segal, 2004).

A large majority of the Soldiers we surveyed report having low enlistment propensities at the end of their secondary school years. Seventy percent had not planned to join the military. While this figure seems high, it is consistent both with the known decline in propensity to serve in the American youth population, and with figures that come from research we are conducting in other military units—both Army and Navy.

When we analyzed the structure of motivations to serve that these young men retrospectively reported, we found it was not fully captured by the dichotomous Institutional/Occupational typology. In particular, the desire to get money for college, which is a major motivation for service, appeared to be neither Institutional nor Occupational, but rather was part of a third future-oriented dimension.

In the main, with the exception of the educational incentive, the major retrospective motivators for these young men were Institutional: a desire for adventure or challenge (74%), service to the country (66%), patriotism (55%), desire to be a Soldier (46%). Economic incentives such as enlistment bonus (36%) were far less important. These institutional factors were significantly related to propensity to serve. So too was the third future-oriented factor. The economic dimensions were unrelated to propensity to serve.

Research on Diversity

As noted earlier, we considered gender issues in our research on enlistment propensity and actual enlistment (M. W. Segal et al., 2001). Our research on gender integration also intersected with our research program in comparative military institutions. We applied Segal’s (1995) theory of factors affecting women’s military participation (which was developed under an
earlier ARI contract) in three very different national contexts (Australia, Mexico, Zimbabwe) to explore the generalizability of the theory (Iskra et al., 2002). The original theory was developed shortly after the end of the Cold War in Europe, and focused on societal and institution-level variables in the military, in culture, and in social structure.

Applying the theory to a new set of nations, in a different historical context, suggested that while the original model fit in a general sense, given the wider range of nations considered, and changing historical circumstances, the theory needed to be expanded, with some of the original variables revised, additional variables added, and new hypotheses incorporated into the theory. For example, as a result of our new analysis, with regard to the effect of culture, we added the hypothesis that the greater the emphasis on power, authoritarianism, hierarchy and conformity, the more limited women’s participation in the military. We added a variable for the function of the armed forces, with the hypothesis being that the more offensive or aggressive the function or purpose of the armed forces is perceived to be, the more limited women’s participation. The more defensive the armed forces are perceived to be, the greater will be women’s participation. We added a political dimension and the hypothesis that states that with stable, well-defined, legitimate civilian led governments, women’s participation in the armed forces will be greater than in states where the military as an institution exercises substantial influence over the political process (Iskra et al., 2002).

Regarding diversity in the United States and in the American armed forces, we analyzed the heterosexual and masculine culture of the military and its role in creating and sustaining gender and sexuality stratification in American society, and the implications both for women’s military roles and sexuality in the military (Bourg and Segal, 2001). The military remains one of the few places in society where restrictions on employment, speech, and behavior can legally be based on gender and sexuality. However, demographically, the American armed forces have become dependent on the participation of women. Moreover, during wartime, women’s military roles tend to expand, and discharges for homosexuality tend to decline, reflecting a wartime dependence on personnel who violate traditional warrior stereotypes.

Following up on this research, we address the implications of the increasing diversity of the military and of American society for the military profession and military leadership (Segal and Bourg. 2002). Public perceptions of and support of the Army are influenced by personnel diversity. We have seen in our discussion of youth attitudes that perceptions of discrimination in the military have increased over time, suggesting that the military is having difficulty showing the nation that it is following the lead of other American professions and adapting its personnel policies to an increasingly diverse population. The Army’s relationship with society, as well as its effectiveness, are enhanced by successful “leveraging of” or "capitalizing on” diversity by Army leaders at all levels, i.e., turning diversity into an advantage by using it to enhance performance and social acceptance. We present recommendations that research shows would assist in capitalizing on diversity (such as holding leaders accountable for their decisions affecting diversity, recognizing the effects of discriminatory policies and working to mitigate the negative effects, and having leaders publicly communicate their commitment to making integration work effectively.
We also argue that rather than capitalizing on diversity, the Army has resisted reflecting the increasing diversification of the population and leveraging diversity by raising the specter of decreased cohesion if the force becomes more diverse (Segal and Kestnbaum, 2002). Over time the cohesion argument has been used as a closure technique to argue against racial integration, gender integration, and sexual orientation integration. The cohesion argument has been rooted in three reports of World War II era research, one of which reflects POW interrogations rather than research, one of which discusses research that may not have been conducted at all, and one of which presents data that do not support the argument.

The expert behavioral science knowledge on which military professionals draw should be based on the best data and theory that the behavioral sciences have to offer (Segal and Kestnbaum, 2002). In the realm of cohesion, this means rejecting arguments based on the social cohesion that was discussed in the World War II research, which calls for homogeneity of personnel but has not been shown to be related to military effectiveness, and to focus instead on task cohesion—bonding built upon the recognition of peers’ contributions to effective performance—which can accommodate diversity and evaluates individuals and groups on the basis of performance criteria rather than social characteristics.

An example of the closure process opposing diversification can be found in Iskra’s (2003) research on the reasons for excluding women from service on U.S. Navy submarines: a debate that recently took place as a new generation of submarines was being discussed. The Navy has undergone three earlier iterations of gender integration: the enlistment of women at all, the decision to allow women to serve at sea on non-combatant vessels, and the decision to allow women to serve on combatant ships. Given that these earlier iterations resulted in successful gender integration, Iskra sought to determine if the arguments to keep women off submarines were any different than those offered in earlier iterations. Iskra found that although Navy women have been serving successfully at sea for a quarter of a century, the arguments to continue their exclusion from submarines have not changed significantly, and are based on gendered ideology and stereotypical expectations regarding women’s roles as mothers, caregivers, and sexual partners. There were clear gender differences with regard to attitudes regarding the expansion of women’s military roles.

A clue to the institutional roots of gender discrimination is found in Kestnbaum and Mann’s (2004) analysis of hegemonic masculinity in modern war. They argue that the emergence of a new set of state-based practices of war-making during ‘the age of democratic revolutions’ provided the critical impetus for the elevation of duty, sacrifice, honor, courage and camaraderie to a central place in culturally dominant meanings of masculinity. The key to this transformation lay in the new relationship forged by the state between citizenship and Soldiering during revolutionary war—one that not only fundamentally shaped the content, contours and contradictions of the culturally dominant ideal of western masculinity, but also revealed the peculiar persistence of the new elements of that ideal even in the face of lived experience of Soldiers and civilians that routinely disconfirmed it.

In contrast to the hyper-masculine nature of the American military, which has affected both gender integration and sexual orientation integration, M. W. Segal (2004) notes that cross-nationally, nations that have more fully incorporated women into their armed forces are more
likely to incorporate gay men and lesbians as well, and that where fuller integration has taken place, there is no evidence of negative impacts on military effectiveness.

Our research on gender extended to the impact of military service on the post-service well-being of women veterans, as part of our extensive research program on the military in the life course (Cooney et al., 2003). We found that among women who served during the volunteer force era and subsequently returned to civilian life, African-American women veterans maintained equivalent socio-economic status to their peers who did not serve. By contrast, white non-Hispanic women veterans earned significantly less than their non-veteran counterparts on returning to civilian life. Military service no longer seems to provide an advantage, as it once did, for groups that start out with lower levels of human capital, such as women and racial minorities.

Women veterans were not the only group of women to be disadvantaged by the gendered nature of the military. So too were the civilian women who work in the environs of military facilities, many of whom are the spouses of male military personnel. Analyzing the economic impact of military presence on local labor markets, Booth (2003) estimated that civilian women’s annual income decreases five percent for every increase of ten percent in local military presence, with military wives bearing a special burden.

**Historical and Comparative Dimensions**

When this contract was begun, almost three decades into the current volunteer force era, the issue of military conscription in America was primarily of academic interest. In the subsequent years, as the Army has experienced recruiting difficulties in both the active and the reserve components, even as the administration, the Department of Defense, and the military services have denied any interest in returning to military conscription, both the mass media and American youth (and their parents) have voiced concern about reinstatement of a military draft. Kestnbaum’s research on compulsory military service in Europe and America has helped frame our understanding of military conscription.

Kestnbaum (2002a) argues that cross-nationally, citizen conscription emerged in democratic states not as a system imposed from above, but rather from popular mobilization. In the American case, compulsory citizen service originated not during the Civil War, which has been the conventional wisdom, but rather during the American Revolution. Moreover, it was realized not in the compulsory militia dating from the colonial period (from which the National Guard evolved), but rather from federally mandated conscriptions of citizens into the Continental Army.

The Revolutionary birth of citizen conscription helps us to understand the very roots of the American military tradition. This mobilization also reflects the fact that a revolution in war occurred around the end of the eighteenth century. Having been largely ushered out of armed conflict in the process of state-building over the previous three centuries, ordinary people were suddenly and strikingly brought to the very center of war between states. The key to understanding this revolution in war is to make sense of it in terms of the relationship between two distinct historical transformations: the emergence of state-led military mass mobilization
and the reconstruction of the enemy in generalized terms, such that the wide swath of 'the people' including non-combatants were subject to direct and intentional attack.

Each of these transformations arose from a peculiar historical conjuncture, the first occurring during the American War of Independence and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1774-1815) and the second during the American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification (1861-1871). Military mass mobilization was the product of a politics of incorporation—a politics of participation within combatant states bound up with the inclusive character of regimes and expressly political idioms of group membership. The generalization of the enemy emerged in response to military mass mobilization but was governed by a politics of homogenization projected across territorial borders, in which membership in the political community ruled by an opposing state rather than the role one played in an opponent’s war-effort became decisive.

In both of these sets of politics, the institution of national citizenship played an especially significant part, providing the terms in which the involvement of ordinary people in armed conflict was articulated and given meaning and relations among the state, the military and society and between belligerents were constructed (Kestnbaum, 2002b). Kestnbaum (2003) has argued that this sort of historical institutional analysis is necessary for understanding the military officer of the future.

We have noted above our comparative research on gender integration (Iskra et al., 2002; Kestnbaum & Mann, 2004), as well as on force sizes and defense budgets (Segal & Babin, 2000). One consequence of these latter trends has been organizational downsizing, which has consequences for former service members and their families, as well as continuing service members who have survived the downsizing process. We studied these processes in the context of the Russian Army, the officers of which served initially in the Red Army, and then lost their jobs in the Russian Army as a consequence of the end of the Cold War in Europe. Downsizing in the Russian Army, unlike its counterpart processes of military downsizing and base realignment in the United States in the 1990s, had some of the characteristics of a plant closing. Bases were closed, units were deactivated, and their members thereby became unemployed.

We compared the quality of life and mental health of officers and their wives under four conditions: those who survived downsizing; those still in the army but expecting to leave; those who left and found civilian employment; and those who left and had not yet found civilian jobs (Rohall et al., 2001). The officers reporting the highest quality of life were not the survivors of downsizing, but rather those who had left the army and found civilian jobs. The same pattern held for their wives. With regard to mental health, the group reflecting the highest levels of depression, anxiety, and hostility were those Soldiers who were still in the army but were expecting to leave, while the group reporting the least distress was the employed veterans. Again, the same pattern held for the officers’ wives. The economic circumstances of the Russian Army were such that leaving through downsizing produced no more distress than surviving downsizing. This fact may make Russia’s proposed transition from a conscription-based force to a professional force difficult to achieve.
Changing Military Organization

The major theoretical perspective used to analyze armed forces cross-nationally in the early 21st century has been postmodernism (Moskos, Williams, & Segal, 2000). However, the application of this perspective, which the social and behavioral sciences adopted from the humanities, has been controversial. Booth et al. (2001) suggest that while substantial changes clearly are taking place in military organization, there is little evidence to suggest that they break with modern organizational forms. Indeed they assert that the observed changes are quintessentially modern in nature, emerging as the result of rational and purposeful adaptations to environmental contingencies. Empirically, application of the postmodern template to a range of nations, including Kenya (Kelty, 2003), Sudan (Bierman, 2003), India (Woodruff, 2003), Japan (Kurashina, 2003a), and Colombia (Danza, 2003) has failed to detect a cross-national tendency toward postmodernism—a tendency that the globalistic assumptions of postmodernism would require.

There have nonetheless been important changes in military organizations and missions, beyond the downsizing and budgetary constrictions mentioned earlier (Segal & Babin, 2000). Modern industrial nations in general have become more dependent on reserve forces than they were during the Cold War, and in the United States, ongoing combat operations have drawn on the reserves to a greater extent than at any time since World War II, and to a greater extent than at any period when their use was not combined with conscription for military mobilization. Kurashina, Kestnbaum, and Segal (2004) point out that this affects the way we calculate the degree of military mobilization in society, and by including the reserves in this calculus, we develop a fuller understanding of the transformation of the military over the last century. Moreover, the changes that have taken place in military organization and military missions have important implications for the relations between military forces and the families of their members (Segal & Segal, 2003). Increasingly career-oriented forces mean the age of the force increases, with more personnel married, with children, and increasingly aging parents dependent upon them. Increasing deployment tempo means more family separation. Increasing use of reserve forces means that the families of these personnel require special attention. And advances in communications technology produce possibilities for communication between forward deployed troops and the home front that are at the same time assets and challenges for military leadership.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 played a major role in precipitating the continuous military operations that have required the reserve mobilization referred to, and we have attended to the implications of the changing conceptualization of terrorism that these operations reflect. Prior to the 2001 attacks, the United States defined terrorism in terms of criminal acts rather than acts of war, even when the targets of terrorism were themselves military. When American embassies in Africa were bombed, when U.S. Air Force buildings in Saudi Arabia were attacked, even when the U.S.S. Cole was attacked in Yemen, the attacks were referred to as criminal acts, and the United States sent the F.B.I. rather than military forces to deal with them. The response was put in the jurisdiction of our institutions of criminal justice. By contrast, when the United States defined the response to the 11 September 2001 attacks as the first battle in a Global War on Terrorism, the change was more than metaphorical. Not only was the response military, but the change had important implications for the American legal system and for civil-military
relations (Hunter et al., 2004). The response was made the jurisdiction and mission of the military, requiring a shift from the contingency operations of the 1990s to the continuous operations of the 21st century. With this shift, the boundary between the criminal justice system and the military justice system became more ambiguous.

**Behavioral Science and the Military**

The smallest element in our research program is an attempt to understand the development and utilization of behavioral science knowledge by military forces. D. R. Segal (2003) documented the growth of military sociology in the United States, starting with the mobilization of sociologists by the War Department in World War II, and the impact of events such as the end of conscription and the end of the Cold War in Europe on sociological understanding of military manpower and professionalism, civil-military relations, diversity, and military families. Kurashina (2003b) presents a parallel description of the situation in Japan, where military behavioral science is both less developed and less utilized, due in part to the anti-military posture of Japanese society, and the anti-sociological posture of the Japanese self-defense establishment.

An important facet of this research program has been analysis of the use of behavioral science generally, and sociology specifically, in the teaching of leadership at military academies. Working under this contract, Trainor and Iskra (2003) analyzed how the U.S. Naval Academy has shifted the balance between technical training and professional education over time, with the study of leadership slowly evolving from a "great leaders and great battles" approach to recognition of the contribution of the behavioral sciences in the teaching of leadership. The Naval Academy now approximates more closely the leadership education model used by West Point, sending officers for graduate degrees in sociology and psychology prior to reporting to the academy to teach. To date, four Navy officers have been selected for such positions prior to reporting to Annapolis to serve as Permanent Military Professors of Leadership. Two of them have completed their degrees, both at the University of Maryland. One of them is now the Head of the Department of Leadership, Ethics, and Law.
Appendix

Figure A1. Trends in Propensity to Enter The Armed Forces:
High School Seniors, 1976-2005, Black Males

Figure A2. Trends in Propensity to Enter The Armed Forces:
High School Seniors, 1976-2005, Black Females
Figure A3. African American Men as a Percentage of NPS Male Enlisted Accessions, by Service, FY2000-2003

Figure A4. African Americans as a Percentage of NPS Female Enlisted Accessions, by Service, FY2000-2003
Figure A5. Perceptions by White High School Seniors that the Military Discriminates against African Americans, by Gender (MtF 1976-2004)

Figure A6. Perceptions by African American High School Students that the Military Discriminates against African Americans, by Gender (MtF 1976-2004)
Figure A7. Perceptions by High School Seniors that the Military Discriminates against Women, by Gender (MtF 1976-2004)

Year


Percentage

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Males - Females

Figure A8. Trends in Propensity to Enter The Armed Forces:
High School Seniors, 1976-2005, Females

Class Year


Percentage

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

- Definitely Won't - Probably Won't - Probably Will - Definitely Will
Figure A9. Trends in Propensity to Enter The Armed Forces:
High School Seniors, 1976-2005, Males
References


