

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**RECONCILING COUNTERINSURGENCY WITH CIVIL WAR:
A STRATEGY FOR STABILIZING IRAQ**

by

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ABSTRACT

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The complex nature of war in Iraq is best explained as a civil war overlaid by global insurgency. The U.S. is focused on Sunni extremists fighting a global insurgency amongst various local and national Iraqi factions struggling for power. Thus, current counterinsurgency (COIN) methods are inconsistent. Civil war can be successfully concluded by third parties through the provision of harm and benefit. The strategy set forth considers sectarian enmity as a consequence of civil strife rather than its cause. A theory of civil war violence is applied to establish control and political cohesion at the community level. This strategy focuses military effort to resolve Iraqi civil conflict at the local level. Diplomatic effort focuses on leveraging Sunni-Shi'a fears of widespread civil war to marshal regional support for U.S. efforts. If the Iraqi people choose civil war, the U.S. must rely on the fact that war can ultimately resolve conflict and produce a stable environment despite the implications for the Global War on Terror.

RECONCILING COUNTERINSURGENCY WITH CIVIL WAR: A STRATEGY FOR STABILIZING IRAQ

'Cutting the Gordian Knot' – to solve a difficult problem in a direct or forceful way.¹

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.

— Carl von Clausewitz, On War²

The U.S. situation in Iraq can be likened to the fabled *Gordian Knot* – conditions are so complex that they seem unsolvable. However, unlike Alexander, the U.S.'s swift, decisive blow failed to solve the puzzle as it did not follow through with a force to control and stabilize Iraq. It is clear that the nature of war in Iraq has not been fully appreciated. On the surface, Iraq is a civil war intermixed with foreign actors and non-state actors; specifically, the U.S., Iran, Turkey, and Sunni and Shi'a extremist groups. Within the Iraqi population are Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurd families, clans, and tribes divided and subdivided into factions. All of these are struggling for position and power in the absence of a dictator whose legacy of coercion, fear, and intrigue lingers. This has led to war in Iraq being characterized as *mosaic* – shifting and varying conditions ranging from safe to dangerous, prosperous to poor, and hopeful to hopeless.³

The U.S. administration and military have been slow to comprehend the evolving nature of war in Iraq as it has transitioned through stages of collapse caused by the removal of Saddam Hussein. The U.S. military has sequentially/hesitantly/slowly shifted focus from latent regime elements, to countering an "insurgency," and now must control/contain civil war. Further, U.S. assessments and plans are distorted by the domestic politics prefacing a Presidential election. As U.S. politicians demand short term success and argue over how to withdraw U.S. troops, Iraqi politicians argue over how to unify, govern, and create security for their people. Given the complexity of Iraq and U.S. domestic constraints on time and effort for the next two years, the U.S. strategy must be adjusted for Iraqi civil war.

Applying the theories of Professors Monica Duffy Toft and Stathis N. Kalyvas⁴ while drawing upon research of Iraqi culture and history, counterinsurgency (COIN), as well as the author's personal experience in Ar Ramadi, Iraq,⁵ this paper offers a strategy to stabilize Iraq. It is organized into four parts. The first provides summaries of Toft's theory for the provision of harm and benefit and Kalyvas' theory of civil war violence. The second part assesses U.S. COIN methods in Iraq and the third part outlines a strategy to stabilize Iraq. The paper

concludes with a logic to leverage regional support and implications for the Global War on Terror given a U.S. withdrawal.

The Provision of Harm and Benefit

In opposition to terminating civil war by negotiated settlements or ceasefires, *Give War a Chance* is the label generally given to arguments promoting military victory as the best path to durable peace.⁶ The premise is that “military victories should be more stable than negotiated settlements for balance of power reasons: with one side defeated, the loser’s capacity to re-ignite a war should be low.”⁷ This thesis was supported with empirical analysis of ninety-one civil wars.⁸ Expanding the data base to include one hundred thirty-four civil wars, revolutionary wars, and insurgencies, Toft has clarified the analysis and findings.⁹ She found that negotiated settlements are three times more likely to result in conflict recurrence than are military victories. But also, they “seem to cause postwar governments to become less democratic over time.” On the other hand, decisive military victory produces longer periods of peace and better prospects for postwar development than negotiated settlements. Interestingly, she found that rebel military victories, as opposed to victories by the incumbent government, were even more durable and led to more liberal reforms.¹⁰

She explains these findings by a theory of harm and benefit. As Wagner contends, military victories clearly decide who controls the capability to harm. The difference lies in the control of benefit. Governments who win militarily have little incentive to change how the population is treated. Rebels, however, must create and rebuild institutions of governance that have domestic support but also appeal to the international community. “Rebel victories thus provide both key factors of potential harm and benefit.”¹¹ Toft’s contention is that there ought to be ways that third party negotiators can ensure the provisions of harm and benefit in negotiated settlements also; thus ending the conflict sooner. While logical, this theory still requires the condition that the belligerents want to stop fighting or see the potential harm in continued fighting as significant.

The obvious questions for Iraq are: when will the Iraqis be ready for peace? And who are the rebels (ones most likely to deliver a durable peace and democratic qualities of government)? Toft’s theory implies that future peace and prosperity require both an effective security force (provision of harm) and a viable economy with a fair distribution of wealth and power (provision of benefit); or a clear military victor with a return to domination by one group – like the Sunnis for the past six hundred years. To answer these questions and understand how harm and benefit might work in Iraq, an internal theory for civil war is needed. Kalyvas provides such a theory.

The Logic of Violence – How Harm and Benefit are Provided

Kalyvas' work is novel. In *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, he details a theory that “treats violence as endogenous to civil war” and provides convincing evidence that violence is not necessarily connected to a war's presumed causes.¹² In general, populations do not have the means for nor are they predisposed to commit violence directly. But indirectly through denunciation, “civil war offers irresistible opportunities to harm everyday enemies...it privatizes politics.”¹³ The motivations for denunciation are usually independent of “the grand causes of the war or the goals of the belligerents.”¹⁴ A person's ambition, vengefulness, or survival instinct is not inextricably tied to religion, ethnicity, or an idealism.

With a wide range of empirical and anecdotal evidence, Kalyvas shows that the *provision of harm* effectively reduces or resolves violence at the local level.¹⁵ Also, while the perceptions or feelings of the population cannot be accurately measured, patterns of violence at the local level are an indication of control. Furthermore over time, control leads to collaboration. If the faction in control is the winning side, then communities accept the control and support the administration directing it. Thus, violence in civil war has a transformative effect on communal society. Kalyvas' theory allows us to understand civil wars as “state-building processes.”¹⁶

By analyzing local social interactions, Kalyvas shows that violence is a tool useful for both the population and the armed faction. Indiscriminate violence is counterproductive for both. As a result, there is a progression from indiscriminate toward “selective” (discriminate) violence.¹⁷ Applying these observations, Kalyvas designates five zones that indicate the effectiveness of control. Differentiated by the balance of power, these zones are: zone 1 - “incumbents exercise full control;” zone 2 - “incumbents exercise secure but incomplete control;” and, zone 3 - parity exists between incumbent and rebel forces. Rebel controlled zones 4 and 5 are reflections of zones 2 and 1 respectively.¹⁸

Kalyvas specifies seven “causal paths” that lead from control to collaboration (and thus support) in zones where control is firmly established. These are: coercion, shielding, mechanical ascription, credibility of rule, the provision of benefits, monitoring, and self-reinforcing by-products.¹⁹ The definitions are listed in Table 1, Causal Paths to Collaboration. When control is first established, coercion produces little popular collaboration.²⁰ The remainder of the people sit on the fence (avoid committing) until a clear winner is evident. From this start point, the other six causal paths represent separate and mutually reinforcing efforts to expand the base of collaboration. The controlling faction must ensure that the population is afforded every opportunity to switch sides. The underlying premises are that most people will choose

Coercion – relies upon the principle of “survival maximization.” Coercion deters defection; opponents flee, are neutralized, or switch sides.

Shielding – control protects the collaborators against reprisals by rival factions. People are more forthcoming with information if they feel safe.

Mechanical ascription – mechanisms of control are socialized in the community; collaboration becomes more accepted as participants influence their social circle.

Credibility of rule – control signals credibility through immediate sanctions and, in the longer term, sanctions and benefits.

Provision of benefits – expectation of economic and/or political advantage gained from siding with the winning side.²¹

Monitoring – control facilitates direct monitoring of population which then leads to responsive administration/governance.

Self-reinforcing by-products – control spawns a “self-reinforcing dynamic” as the community gains the reputation for factional support; it is then reinforced by political or economic success. Control can set community expectations.

Table 1: Causal Paths to Collaboration

safety and security over danger and that “civilians would rather side with the (expected) winner than loser.”²² Widespread collaboration combined with the perception of winning results in increased support for the controlling force and their governing administration.

Toft and Kalyvas approach civil war from opposite ends of the spectrum. However, their theories are complementary. At the macrolevel, Toft defines the conditions for conflict termination that have the best potential for durable stability. At the community level, Kalyvas’ theory describes how to achieve conditions for people to realize the benefit of peace and the harm in continued sectarian violence as well as a basis for grass-roots political unity.

What do these theories mean for an occupied country with multiple, competing factions (divided along traditional tribal, sectarian, and ethnic cleavages), hostile foreign extremists (reinforcing select cleavages), an unproven military, and a fledgling government? To answer this question, it is useful to identify some of the major problems the U.S. has to date. What follows is an assessment of operations through the lens of the Army’s and Marine’s newest manual, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.

COIN in Iraq

The joint Army and Marine effort that resulted in FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, was long overdue. Not surprisingly, the FM offers the general approaches to fighting nationalist

insurgencies (specifically in Algeria and Vietnam) in the context of current U.S. military operations.²³ It recognizes that victory, especially in COIN, is a political condition. It emphasizes the primacy of political factors and legitimacy in the solution to an insurgency. The manual also emphasizes the importance of unity of effort between political, military, and economic agencies in order to synchronize governance, security force, and civil affairs efforts (like the Civil Operations and Rural Development System [CORDS] employed in Vietnam). Most importantly however, FM 3-24 echoes a principle found in all COIN references: “cultural knowledge is essential to waging successful counterinsurgency.”²⁴ Thus, the Sunni mindset must be a key consideration for how the U.S. applies COIN in Iraq. In fact, the Sunni mindset invalidates two fundamentals of COIN doctrine and indicates why current operational methods have been ineffective.

FM 3-24 lists two aspects of COIN that do not hold true in Iraq: an established host nation government and homogenous population perceptions. Germane to the definition of insurgency, the assumption of an established host nation government (and police force or mechanism to enforce security) ignores the historical and cultural perceptions of the Sunnis.²⁵ In effect, this works to alienate them. Furthermore, the U.S.’s priority of effort has always been fighting and reacting to the extremists; not securing the people. This priority has only exasperated the security problems in Iraq.

Not understanding Iraqi history and culture, it is easy for Americans to assume that the people have a normal distribution of feelings and perceptions toward the insurgency.²⁶ This is a common generalization made by historians and civil war theorists to describe macro-level, unitary causes of conflict along “modular themes of religion, ethnicity, or class.”²⁷ Given FM 3-24’s historical bias to post-WWII insurgencies, U.S. leaders may incorrectly graft simple generalizations on Iraqis. For example, making the assumption that the Iraqi government is an established and credible institution is not true for Iraq. There are multiple mindsets between the Sunnis, Shi’a, and Kurds and no agreement on what legitimate government is nor who an insurgent is. The complexity of perspectives in a Sunni population, with respect to two issues, illustrates this point: 1) the Shi’a government and 2) the presence of U.S. forces. Sunni attitudes toward the Shi’a government are not straightforward – people either for, against, or undecided are fence-sitting to wait for a leader or party who can take and hold power. Until then, they take the opportunity and risk of settling old scores with violence.

As Kalyvas shows, the cost of violence and benefit of security transform individual preferences, choices, behavior, and identity.²⁸ Thus, it is too simplistic to categorize Sunni motivations as extremist, resistance, fence-sitting, or pro-U.S. Perceptions change due to

perceived threat to self/family; the opportunity to gain power, position, and or wealth; and based on the sense of hope.

The fact that the Shi'a government made few ovations for sectarian reconciliation only reinforced and converted more people to an anti-government mindset. At the same time, attitudes toward U.S. presence were more diverse. Family relationships and tribal loyalty explain the primary contradictions. For example, an Iraqi who was *pro-U.S.* and *anti-extremist* would most likely act differently if his brother or cousin were a resistance fighter working with extremists. In this case his true feelings may be *pro-U.S.* and *extremist tolerant* but his decisions and actions would indicate he was somewhere between *neutral* and *anti-U.S.* and *extremist tolerant*. The range of attitudes with respect to the U.S. and extremists reflects peoples' fears, as well as the influence of the family/clan and or tribe. Contradictory events, propaganda, or rumors would often change a perception; but not the general mindset. Changing the mindset requires collective experiences of emotional significance and a great deal of time.²⁹ Taking the time to influence the specific populations in Iraq is a method that has been pursued sporadically if at all.³⁰ Currently, U.S. forces in Iraq operate in ways that counter progress.

Another aspect of COIN operations assumes the presence of a host nation security force. The U.S. had a number of problems that caused the reform/transformation of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to be ineffective.³¹ But more significantly, U.S. security sector reform (SSR) efforts have been neutralized by the fearful and discordant mindsets of the Iraqis, both within the ISF organizations and the populations they are intended to protect. The Iraqi population's conflicting mindsets are the defining feature of the ISF. They undergo six weeks of training that does little to subrogate tribal, sectarian, and ethnic prejudices to a nationalist ideal. Fear, prejudice, and family/tribal allegiance still guide their decisions and actions when confronting security issues. Often the result is refusal to work, desertion, or abusive/brutal acts.³² National ISF cannot be formed until political unification occurs or at least a sizeable social support base for sectarian and ethnic reconciliation is formed.

While the U.S. has increased the number of Iraqi military forces, the training, equipping, and mentoring of local police has made little progress. The assumption that U.S. contractors could, either locally or nationally, build a respected force that worked *to serve and protect* the Iraqi people irrespective of family, tribe, sect, or ethnicity was and is false. Sunni people expect little from local police who historically were the least disciplined and trusted element of Saddam's security forces.³³ Often, police were little more than corrupt thugs who enforced the regime's rule at street level. Iraqis expect them to wear a uniform and brutally enforce simple

directives or act in a manner that does not jeopardize their family or tribe. When placed under U.S. control, Iraqis expect local police to wear the uniform and little else.³⁴ The local police are tools of local politics.

Meanwhile, the ISF have reinforced Sunni fears of Shi'a control and reprisal. For Sunnis, the fledgling Iraqi government can be seen to rely on illegitimate security forces – the U.S. and/or Shi'a militias. Hence, as the IA becomes larger and more effective as a security force, the less likely it is that the Shi'a government will negotiate a power-sharing deal with the Sunnis.³⁵ An illegitimate government has significant implications from the U.S.'s perspective. If there is not a host nation government to rationalize the presence and need for a foreign army, the people will resist. Furthermore, they will continue to resist unless U.S. interests and policy objectives, the reasons for the presence of U.S. troops, appeal directly to the Iraqi people. Very few Iraqis believe that the U.S. and Iraqi interests are common.

Neither FM 3-24 nor any other historical COIN reference advocates that counterinsurgents should minimize contact with the people, focus only on killing/capturing insurgents, and ignore local issues or needs. However, the consolidation of U.S. forces on forward operating bases (FOB), frequently concentrating units to overwhelm the enemy in one area, and increasing the size of the unit's area of operation have all worked to reduce the amount of contact with the Iraqi people.³⁶ As U.S. units continue to collapse on fewer and fewer FOBs, there is correspondingly less U.S. presence amongst the population. Furthermore, moving units frequently from one hot spot to another ensures that any effect that U.S. forces have is temporary at best. This problem is compounded by the six to twelve month unit rotations to and from home bases.³⁷ All of these decisions and actions add up to less interaction with and protection for the population.

In a type of warfare where personal relationships with the people and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) are keys to success, the discontinuity of presence prevents progress. The only way for the U.S. to positively influence the mindset of an Iraqi is to build a relationship with him; this requires frequent visits and hours of socializing. As U.S. units are less familiar with the Iraqi people, they have less opportunity to affect the misperceptions of Americans as occupiers with imperial designs or the conflicting mindsets of the Iraqi people. In the end, the lack of U.S. presence emboldens the enemy and causes the people to feel less secure.

Such are the conditions of civil war and insurgency in Iraq. U.S. efforts have failed to change the general Sunni mindset that perceives the greatest threat as the ISF loyal to a Shi'a regime. Shi'a enmity toward Sunni has not been affected. Nor have Arab-Kurdish prejudices been weakened. The Sunni population is also suffering from lack of leadership. The U.S.'s extensive de-Ba'athification crippled Sunni society by outlawing its most influential leaders.

Those that do step forward in leadership roles risk themselves and their families to extremist coercion and extortion.³⁸ The future does indeed look bleak to Iraqi Sunnis. The current U.S. effort must be adjusted for the complexities of civil war and focus on the Iraqi people to rebuild society.

The U.S. has failed to cleanly sever the Iraqi Gordian Knot. Cleaving only the binds of Saddam's security apparatus, U.S. efforts have released and dispersed armed tribes and militias to struggle for position, power, and survival. Extremists have seized loosed ends to hold the knot tight and continue to grip the people in fear. Institutional structures, around which the knot is laced and made fragile by Saddam's corrosive regime, prove too unsteady for the strains of conflict. Pulling and pushing on various parts inconsistently, the U.S. has failed to meet expectations or even free the Iraqi people.

A Strategy for Stabilizing Iraq

Kalyvas' theory of civil war violence describes the conditions of Iraq accurately and explains the mosaic nature of conflict alluded to throughout FM 3-24.³⁹ The majority of Iraqi-Iraqi violence results from local/communal interactions and can be explained in terms of selective and indiscriminate actions motivated by political and/or criminal gain.⁴⁰ Traditional causes of civil wars such as ethnicity or ideology account for only a portion of total violence. Kalyvas' answer is that solutions must take into account the local nature of conflict. Additionally, his research indicates that the *provision of harm* is useful in reducing this communal violence and developing a solution. Thus, the question for the U.S. is how best to clearly establish control in the minds of Iraqis and reduce the localized violence. Once control is established, effort focuses on building support through collaboration, unifying the people behind moderate leaders, and positioning them to negotiate a power-sharing arrangement with Baghdad. As Iraqis adapt to the politics of zone 1 control, finding and capturing extremists becomes easier.

Conditions must change drastically in order to challenge and control the Sunni mindset – fear of, moral superiority over, and inevitable struggle with the Shi'a. Thus, any theory of victory must provide for strategies to allay fears, unify politically, and give hope for the future. Additionally, given U.S. domestic politics, these strategies must be accomplished within the next two years and without increasing troop levels. For all of these requirements, the U.S. must make a concerted effort at controlling the Sunni population, organizing it politically, and leveraging the threat of open civil war.

Distributing the Force

The U.S. commitment to Iraq is far too small to control Iraq. However, control of the Sunni population can be accomplished by massing U.S.-led coalition forces (CF: U.S. battalions paired with ISF battalions) on Sunni population centers within the three provinces outside Baghdad where the majority of violence occurs.⁴¹ Here CF forces would establish martial law in Sunni population centers to establish security. The key points of this strategy are to: 1) communicate control to the people appealing to their belief that force = control = security; 2) protect the people from Sunni extremist and Shi'a retribution; and 3) earn the trust and confidence of the people. This will require the establishment of curfews, movement control checkpoints, and platoon/company-sized outposts amongst the population.

The U.S. units must be especially sensitive to the interactions between the population and the ISF. There will undoubtedly be accusations of sectarian prejudice. The U.S. commander will need to tighten control of the Shi'a elements but also force a negotiated understanding between local leaders and the ISF commander.⁴² For this reason, the U.S. commander must be in the lead until the local leader(s) and ISF commander can find common ground through moderate perspectives. This will be the basis to exclude both Sunni and Shi'a extremists.

Baghdad and the other fourteen provinces would be handled differently. With its mixed population centers, the capital would need to be secured by Iraqi-led CF working to reduce sectarian violence. The remaining thirteen provinces would be controlled by ISF and whatever CF partners still remain in Iraq. These provinces represent an economy of force measure in order to mass on the Sunni population centers. Although the U.S. is accepting some risk in these provinces, reducing U.S. influence will allow the Shi'a political parties to sort out their differences with respect to secularism and Iranian influence. This would help the U.S. understand the government with respect to the dominant regional issues – Iranian influence and Israeli coexistence.⁴³

The key to this strategy is employing enough force to establish zone 1 control. The available units must be assigned clearly delineated and manageable areas of operation (AO). In urban centers, a general rule could be three U.S. and three ISF battalions per five hundred thousand people. Once assigned, these units should stay in place in order to facilitate building relationships with the local communities. U.S. or ISF unit commanders that fail to build these relationships must be removed. Therefore, an operational reserve must be maintained to rotate units and replace their leadership if necessary.

Controlling the Population

Effective population control results from a skillful combination of physical and psychological control measures. Words matter for Iraqis (and Arabs in general). Toward this end, living amongst the population allows U.S. forces to gain an intimate understanding of how people think and would support political leadership.⁴⁴ Additionally, clearly conveying the rules for security and then enforcing them is a sign of strength that Iraqis respect. CF operations that employ violence selectively will denote strength and command the peoples' respect; especially when enforcing security measures. Thus, all CF operations must be guided by the principles listed in Table 2, Unit Operating Principles.

- Find and protect moderate (anti-extremist) leaders with vision.
- Find collaborators and reward support.
- Selectively capture or kill opposition without alienating the community.
- Actively communicate *who* is targeted and *why* (relative to established security rules) to the community.

Table 2: Unit Operating Principles

When judging those captured, the CF must account for local motivations as well as the motivations ascribed to the 'insurgent' or 'enemy.' For those who are motivated by private purposes, efforts must be made to turn them to the friendly side.

Here the CF is employing violence (providing harm) to ensure the safety and security of the people. Initially, CF violence results in collaboration from *coercion* and *shielding*. CF commanders then work to win the support of the people through the remaining five causal paths to collaboration.⁴⁵ CF leaders must work to integrate the control force into the communities and adapt society to the control measures. That is, to provide a safe and secure environment and win support (through collaboration). By dominating the AO and providing *coercion* and *shielding*, CF leaders will begin establishing the *credibility of rule* in Iraqi minds. To complete this causal path, the Iraqis need leadership.

Selecting Leaders

As T. E. Lawrence pointed out when providing guidelines for working with Arabs, "Arabs believe in persons, not institutions."⁴⁶ Concerted efforts must be made to politically unify the Sunnis at the community levels by finding strong leaders. Democracy may not be a priority at the local level; Sunnis need leaders rather than elected representation. In this endeavor, the

threat of U.S. withdrawal in the next two years can be used to diffuse the resistance effort in Iraq and widen the search for leadership.⁴⁷ All CF efforts must be focused to find strong, local leaders with moderate positions; keep them alive; and help them establish influence (facilitate their control of the security forces).

Ideally, the top priority must be finding a charismatic leader whose interests are a better Iraq and who can control or appeal to a majority of clan and tribal leaders. But in the initial stage, alliances must be built with Sunni leaders based upon their willingness to set aside sectarian divisions and the size of their family, clan, and tribe. Once a local leader is recruited (or a coalition of leaders – council of sheiks), then he and his trusted tribal members are armed and incorporated into the CF as local police.⁴⁸ Accorded the credibility of force, the leader(s) and the ISF commander become the de facto law for the population center. This allows completion of the *credibility of rule* causal path as well as the basis for *mechanical ascription*.⁴⁹ For the people, this leader (or group of leaders) represents the Sunni future.

In coordination with local leaders, the CF's primary duties are maintaining zone 1 control and re-building Iraqi communities. The CF battalion, brigade, and division staffs must maintain political and military unity of effort as well as to fairly manage a reward and punishment system for communities. While the *provision of harm* can be an effective method of punishment at the local level, communities that are supportive – those that actively suppress extremism – can be rewarded with reconstruction aid (*provision of benefits*).⁵⁰ Hence, the leader's influence is reinforced by solving local infrastructure problems. This, in turn, increases support along the causal paths of *monitoring* and *self-reinforcing by-products*. Those communities that are unsupportive must be punished with tighter movement restrictions and control measures. The important point is that units are stationary so that they may be able to understand problems in the local context of the community and then build relationships with local leaders to resolve them.

Once the *credibility of rule* is established at community levels, political unity at the provincial level can be built. Thus unified at the grass-roots levels, the Sunni provinces will be ready to negotiate a power sharing settlement with the Shi'a government. Successful negotiated settlements require established leaders and respected institutions.⁵¹ While the U.S. could sponsor the negotiation, ideally the Iraqi Army or an Islamic religious institution could be agreed upon.⁵² This would allow the Iraqi government to gain credibility by distancing itself from U.S. influence. Whoever the third party is, they must leverage the expectation of civil war that is so prominent in the Sunni mindset. At the same time, Sunni expectations to win a civil war must be reduced.⁵³ The provision of information toward this end, via relationships with local leaders

and Iraqi and Arab media, must be the primary focus of the CF information operations campaign.⁵⁴

Why should Iraqis suddenly collaborate with the U.S. in these occupied areas? The short answer is that they may not, but they should be given the chance to decide. By massing force on the Sunnis, the U.S. has a better chance of finding credible, moderate leaders and convincing the people that civil war is not desirable. As Toft and others found, the key to making this strategy work is the *provision of harm* associated with civil war. Until departure, the U.S. will need to act as the honest broker as well as the enforcer of equal sharing. How resistant Iraqis are will be dependent upon three factors. First and foremost is the strength and optimism of the community leadership. Second is the community's previous experience with U.S. forces (since March 2003).⁵⁵ And third is how desperate they are for peace. If this strategy fails, then the U.S. will have to *give war a chance*.

Outside and Beyond Iraq

Regional Strategy

The *Give War a Chance* scenario can be used to leverage regional support. A Sunni-Shi'a civil war that spills over national borders threatens regional stability. Extremist violence, refugees, and Sunni-Shi'a power balance are the main concerns for Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Iran. Turkey is concerned with preventing the revival of the Kurdish independence movement within their own population. While no state may officially sanction the financing and recruiting of extremists to fight in Iraq, they are hesitant to crack down on support organizations within their own countries. None want the possible instability caused by these extremists within their own states. Meanwhile, people continue to flee the violence in Iraq. The United Nation High Commission for Refugees estimates that approximately two million Iraqi refugees now reside in Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon.⁵⁶

Regional Sunni and Shi'a powers see Iraq as a potential ally against the other. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt have all expressed public concern for the creation of a "Shi'a crescent of power" stretching from Iran, through Iraq and Syria, to Lebanon.⁵⁷ On the other side, Iran fears an anti-Iranian government prone to support subversion in their country or even repeat the Iran-Iraq war. This leads to the question: can the U.S. influence the regional states to not support their extremist proxies? Ultimately, the answer depends on each regional actor's perception of the cost of an unrestrained Iraqi civil war and likelihood of victory (for their proxy). In the next two years, the preeminent priority for U.S. diplomats is to shape those perceptions.

Thus, counterbalancing potential Shi'a power and Iran should offer the common ground for U.S. diplomats to gather support for efforts in Iraq. The aim would be to build a coalition of Sunni Arab states that would influence Iraqi Sunnis not to fight (or support extremists trying to spark civil war). The primary obstacle to regional support of Iraq from Sunni states is the deep-seated distrust of Iran and the Shi'a in general.⁵⁸ This support (for the Iraqi government) will only come after Sunni states have been assured that Iraq's government is not complicit with Iran. Obviously, the best option for the U.S. is to build consensus for peace amongst both Sunni and Shi'a.

Global Implications

Regional states are uncomfortable with the U.S.'s stated policy "to seek and support" democracy in the Middle East which can be construed as a direct threat to many of these governments and monarchies.⁵⁹ On the international level, it is understood that the U.S. represents democracy, but the policy in the National Security Strategy is too direct. In the near term, the U.S. will have to look past the democratic nature of the regional governments to build active support for peace in Iraq.

The U.S. can expect Al Qaeda to redouble their efforts in Iraq as local control of Sunni communities is contested. If CF efforts are successful, then support for the terrorists will dwindle. On the other hand, U.S. withdrawal and Iraqi civil war will be a significant boost to Al Qaeda and other extremist groups. Portraying themselves as righteously fighting and dying to evict the western super power from Muslim lands, their theory of victory is founded on the belief that the U.S. is too weak to accept casualties and will give up.⁶⁰ Al Qaeda and other Islamists will gain credibility and influence by fulfilling their theory of victory as predicted.

Conclusion

The strategy set forth considers sectarian enmity as a consequence of civil strife. It is a convenient, but not always accurate, label for outsiders to differentiate belligerents at the local level. The strategy assumes that the U.S. will withdraw from Iraq in two years without increasing force levels in the meantime.⁶¹ The U.S. military must take the lead and bear the burden of solving the Iraqi problem inside-out *and* from the ground up. With the available forces, this strategy focuses effort to resolve Iraqi civil conflict at the local level. U.S. diplomats must marshal support in the region by leveraging the Sunni-Shi'a fears and the threat of widespread civil war. This threat is made credible by U.S. debates over withdrawal and the idea that war can resolve conflict and produce a stable environment – "peace takes hold only when war is truly over."⁶²

Democratic nations must be built from the ground up. As history has repeatedly shown, the redistribution of power and wealth is far more likely to be a violent struggle instead of a peaceful agreement. If U.S. politicians are serious about withdrawal, then the next two years may be the only chance to shape Iraq's immediate future. Half-step COIN methods must be focused into a politically unifying effort at the community level. The U.S. military effort must focus on the Sunni population to broaden their perspectives and secure them from their own violent sectarian prejudices. The local trust and confidence that the U.S. military builds while securing Sunni population centers may significantly impact the future. Decisions made now will affect the character of the Iraqi regime placing it somewhere between moderate *and* extremist Islam and tolerant secularism *and* violent sectarianism.

Now is time for the U.S. to stop ignoring and resisting the sectarian riptide and begin leveraging the civil war. This threat may awaken conciliatory action in Iraqi leaders as well as regional state actors if they see the cost of civil war as too expensive. If not, then the pending Sunni-Shi'a conflagration must be brought to a head sooner rather than later; before proliferation of weapons of mass destruction escalates in the region. The U.S. must *give war a chance*, if that is what the Iraqi people choose, and be prepared to capitalize on its outcome. After all, as Kalyvas observes, "*civil wars are state-building processes.*"⁶³

Endnotes

¹ Catherine Soanes, Maurice Waite, and Sara Hawker, eds., *The Oxford Dictionary, Thesaurus, and Wordpower Guide* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). The legendary knot tied by Gordius, King of Gordium, and cut through by Alexander the Great in response to the prophecy that whoever untied it would rule Asia.

² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed., trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 88.

³ The mosaic nature of conflict alluded to in U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, 15 December 2006), 1-37, 1-39, 2-13, 3-5, 3-123, 4-20, and 4-23. Hereafter, this reference is referred to as FM 3-24. For a detailed, open-source review of U.S. progress in Iraq, see Anthony H. Cordesman, *Iraq's Sectarian and Ethnic Violence and the Evolving Insurgency: Development through mid-December 2006* (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 14 December 2006); cited hereafter as Cordesman, *Iraq's Sectarian and Ethnic Violence*. Official overviews are provided by the series of Department of Defense (DOD) reports to Congress. The latest is U.S. Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress, 2 March 2007, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/iraq_measures.html; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

⁴ Monica Duffy Toft is Associate Professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; and Stathis N. Kalyvas is the Arnold Wolfers Professor of Political Science at Yale where he directs the Program on Order, Conflict, and Violence.

⁵ The author commanded an infantry battalion task force with Army, Marine, Air Force, and Navy attachments deployed to Ar Ramadi, Iraq from August 2004 to July 2005. Ar Ramadi is a city of 480,000 and the capital of Al Anbar province. The author's battalion and a Marine battalion shared responsibility for the city.

⁶ Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," *Foreign Affairs* 78 (July/August, 1999): 36. The original thesis was proposed by Robert H. Wagner, "The Causes of Peace," in *Stopping the Killing*, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993). While Licklider and, most recently, Toft have argued variations or parts of this thesis, Luttwak's title is most often quoted to denote the body of supporting literature. Wagner's logic is that if social groups fail to organize politically and militarily, they are destined to minority status or extermination. Military organization keeps them in the fight long enough to exhaust the other side and political organization (solidarity) determines how long they fight for victory, concessions, or total destruction. Wagner concluded that "[w]ars will end when the combatants have convergent expectations about the outcome of further fighting, regardless of the goals that led them into war in the first place. Moreover, because war conveys information about the consequences of using force, war itself can be a potent cause of peace, and civil war can therefore make a subsequent civil war less likely." (Wagner, p. 258)

⁷ This is known as "Wagner's Hypothesis;" named after Robert H. Wagner who first proposed the thesis in 1993. Monica Duffy Toft, "Peace through Security: Making Negotiated Settlements Stick," paper for draft book manuscript, *Peace through Victory: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars* (TBP), 5.

⁸ Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars 1945-1993," *The American Political Science Review* 89 (September 1995): 681-690. Licklider provides empirical analysis to support this idea. Licklider found that 79% of identity-based civil wars ending in military victory remained stable while only 33% ended by negotiated settlement remained stable. The downside of this method is that genocide is possible.

⁹ Toft, with a more up-to-date data base of 134 conflicts from 1942 to 2001, found that 88% of civil wars ended by military victory remained stable, 70% of negotiated settlements remained stable, and 66% of ceasefires remained stable. See Toft, "Peace through Security."

¹⁰ Toft, "Peace through Security," 39.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 36-37.

¹² Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 391. Kalyvas accounts for the dark side of human nature with his theory of violence. By "endogenous" he means that violence originates internally instead of as a consequence of anarchy or polarization around national (or international) level issues such as religion, ethnicity, and nationalism. The connections between national causes and local enmity are usually not present. (p. 82)

¹³ Ibid., 389. Populations frequently use denunciation as the primary means to settle local scores. Using either factual or fabricated information, they denounce their rival/enemy to an armed faction that then directly kills or coerces the victim(s). It will be no surprise to OIF and OEF veterans that these denunciations occur frequently. What is surprising is that it is common to such a wide range of conditions (insurgencies, revolutionary war, civil war, and occupations) and seems to be the populaces' primary method of improving their lot in life or just surviving.

¹⁴ Ibid., 364-365. Kalyvas found that "individuals and local communities involved in the war tend to take advantage of the prevailing situation to settle private and local conflicts whose relation to the grand causes of the war or the goals of the belligerents is often tenuous."

¹⁵ Ibid., 391.

¹⁶ Ibid., p.389-390. There is strong support for the phenomenon of community adaptation in the field of sociology. See Roger Petersen's work: *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), and "A Community-Based Theory of Rebellion," *European Journal of Sociology* 34 (1993): 41-78.

¹⁷ Ibid., 388. Kalyvas summarizes the types of violence and their interaction as follows: "indiscriminate violence is an informational shortcut that may backfire on those who use it; selective violence is jointly produced by political actors seeking information and individual civilians trying to avoid the worst – but also grabbing what opportunities their predicament affords them."

¹⁸ Ibid., 211-212. In zones 1 and 5, the controlling force has destroyed most or all of the opposition's clandestine cells and is able to prevent their effective operation. In zones 2 and 4, opposition clandestine cells are still in operation and support sporadic attacks. Zone 3 is a contested area in which both sides exercise equal control.

¹⁹ Ibid., 124-132.

²⁰ Ibid., 124. Kalyvas cites Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States* (London: Blackwell, 1992), 70, "coercion works; those who apply substantial force to their fellows get compliance." The author's experience from establishing military control of populations in vicinity of the Fallujah Peninsula and then east Ramadi also confirms these causal paths to collaboration.

²¹ Provision of benefits and credibility of rule are sequential and linked. As Sir Robert Thompson emphasized, the benefit and cost of support must be clearly laid out for the people. "It is important to get across that the benefits are a reward and a consequence of security, not a bribe." Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 143.

²² Kalyvas, 126-127. Perception management is a significant factor affecting how the people view one side or another and then choose. Through actions and words, the population must be convinced. As Thompson points out "What the peasant wants to know is: Does the government mean to win the war? Because if not, he will have to support the insurgent. The government must show it is determined to win." (Thompson, 146)

²³ FM 3-24, p. Annotated Bibliography-1 through 4. Of the nineteen references cited as “classics” in FM 3-24: one is Mao Tse-tung’s, *On Guerrilla Warfare*; twelve were written as a direct result of French experience in Algeria (1952-1962), French and U.S. experience in Vietnam (1954-1975) or both; and six do not address Mao, Algeria, nor Vietnam. These six are: Charles Calwell’s *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, Eric Hoffer’s *True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*, T.E. Lawrence’s *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* and *The 27 Articles*, Brian M. Linn’s *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, and the U.S. Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual*. U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine was neglected and never updated after Vietnam (see FM 90-8, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, 1986).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 1-15. A critical aspect of counterinsurgency is that the “counterinsurgents must understand the environment.” (p. 1-22) Cultural understanding is also emphasized in chapters 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7. It is fundamental for insurgency analysis (p. 1-15 to 1-16), intelligence efforts (p. 3-6 to 3-9), Host Nation (HN) government legitimacy and governance (p. 1-21 and 2-8), developing HN security forces (p. 6-2 to 6-3), and preparing U.S. leaders for ethical dilemmas and leadership challenges (p. 7-1 to 7-2).

²⁵ A HN government (with a security force) is assumed in the definition from Joint Publication 1-02: *insurgency* – “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.” U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 August 2006).

²⁶ FM 3-24, 1-20, see Figure 1-2.

²⁷ Kalyvas, 390.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 389. Civil war is a “transformative phenomenon...Collective and individual preferences, strategies, values, and identities are continuously shaped and reshaped in the course of a war. Popular loyalty, disloyalty, and support cannot be assumed as exogenous and fixed.”

²⁹ Even in a stable and prosperous nation-state, deep seated mindsets require generations to change. For example, racism in the U.S. still exists 40 years after the Civil Rights Act (albeit to a lesser degree).

³⁰ FM 3-24, 1-21, emphasizes the importance of understanding the people (culture and values) amongst whom the U.S. must operate. In the author’s experience, few units operate in this manner. What is required is decentralized Human Intelligence (HUMINT) -based operations which, in turn, allow local commanders to adapt efforts against the threat with respect to local politics, customs, laws, and mindsets of the people. As a senior British Army officer (assigned to the Office of Security Transition in the Coalition Office for Training and Organizing Iraq’s Armed Forces) observed, U.S. officers and units: were inconsistent in their approach (some targeted insurgents while others worked to gain the popular support of the people); misunderstood the importance of and how to influence a population; allowed emotions and/or a strong sense of moral authority to distort judgment when responding to insurgent activity; were not culturally attuned but instead continually looked for technical solutions to problems. He uses these conclusions to show how: the U.S. Army has not adapted to COIN conditions, command environments suppress critical thinking, and a conventional warfighting focus is nurtured and

reinforced by the organizational culture. See Nigel R. F. Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," *Military Review* 85 (November/December 2005): 2-15.

³¹ For a valid and critical analysis of the U.S.'s share of reasons for security sector reform (SSR) failure, see Christoph Wilcke, "A Hard Place: The United States and the Creation of a new Security Apparatus in Iraq," *Civil Wars* 8 (June 2006): 124-142. Wilcke concludes that the creation of an indigenous security force failed because the U.S. understood Iraqis too little, there was too little commitment to the effort, and U.S. adjustments were too late. The author found his critique valid. The term *ISF* is used to denote both Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces excluding local police. The Iraqi Army is organized under MOD and the National Police under MOI. Local police forces are recruited and controlled locally, but are paid by the MOI. Thus, local police are specified separately in this paper.

³² Prior to the January 2005 National Elections in Ramadi, the author's battalion paired with an Iraqi Special Police Commando Battalion of 600 men. After five months of operations, the battalion strength was 95; 41 had been killed or wounded and 464 were absent without leave or did not return from leave.

³³ Saddam's security apparatus did not rely on local police. He did not trust them. Since the 1970s, Saddam had steadily worked to gain personal control over "an elaborate network of institutions watching over one another and intertwined with all state institutions." These organizations overlapped in intelligence gathering areas, but maintained compartmentalized reporting procedures and secret operations. Collectively, the intelligence units watched the army, the people, and each other. For a detailed description of Saddam's security apparatus in the 1990s, see Anthony H. Cordesman and Achmed S. Hashim, *Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 44-49, and its effect on the military and politics, p. 49-58. Good summaries are also provided in Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), 150-151, and Sandra Mackey, *The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2002). Neither Marr nor Mackey mention the local police as a tool of security and control for Saddam.

³⁴ Community members told the author that from 1995 until the CF invasion local police in Ar Ramadi were coerced by Saddam's secret police as a method of controlling the city. This was a fairly common method of control throughout the country during this time. If the police were not manhandled by Saddam's security apparatus, they were pushed aside by tribal militias empowered by Saddam. Also, see Amatzia Baram, "Re-Inventing Nationalism in Ba'thi Iraq 1968-1994: Supra-Territorial and Territorial Identities and What Lies Below," in *Challenges to Democracy in the Middle East*, ed. William Harris (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997), 43-45; and Cordesman and Hashim, *Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond*, 19-21, for civil control of unrest across the country.

³⁵ Indeed, this is a valid perception. See T. David Mason and Patrick J. Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40 (December, 1996): 546-568. By analyzing fifty-seven civil wars since 1945, the authors show that the larger the government army is, the less likely the conflict will result in negotiated settlement. They also found that the longer a civil war lasted, the more likely a negotiated settlement was possible (civil wars that lasted four years or more were highly likely to end in negotiated settlement, p. 560).

³⁶ In the last two years, the U.S. has consolidated more units on fewer FOBs in Iraq, moving from 110 to 39. (DOD, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, 63) This means that units now must travel farther to and from their AOR and reduces the time for interacting with and securing the people.

³⁷ Over the last 34 months in Ramadi, the longest duration an Army battalion worked in the city was 11 months. Other Army battalion durations were: 7, 10, and currently 6 months. Marine battalions on the west side of the city rotated every 5-6 months. The unit that the author's battalion relieved in place had moved AOs seven times in a year. Surge operations in response to enemy activity also pull battalions and brigades away from their assigned AOs. For example, units were moved for operations in Fallujah (Nov 04), National Elections (Jan 05), Talafar (Sep 05), and Baghdad (Jun 06 and Jan 07). From the Iraqi peoples' perspective, the U.S. security effort was inconsistent and ineffective. (Author's observation)

³⁸ From August 2004 to August 2005, Al Anbar had five Governors: one was killed, two were coerced to quit (family members kidnapped or killed), one was detained by U.S. forces, and the last has proven adept at survival. Despite several assassination attempts and the kidnapping of his son, Mamoun Sami Rashid al-Alwani is slowly building consensus amongst the tribes and families of Al Anbar.

³⁹ FM 3-24 alludes to the mosaic nature of conflict in the first four chapters (see paragraphs: 1-37, 1-39, 2-13, 3-5, 3-123, 4-20, and 4-23). However, other than urging commanders and units to "continually develop and enhance their understanding of the mosaic peculiar to their AO," it does not discuss how the shifting mosaic affects operational design (Chapter 4) or execution (Chapter 5). The quote above is from page 4-6.

⁴⁰ Iraqi-Iraqi violence also occurs as a result of the need to avenge insults to personal and family honor and sectarian revenge. Raphael Patai, *The Arab Mind* (New York: Hatherleigh Press, 2002), provides an insightful discussion of how Arab values (courage, honour, and self-respect) interrelate and play out in Islamic society. Honorable behavior is defined as "that which is conducive to group cohesion and group survival, that which strengthens the group and serves its interests; while shameful behavior is that which tends to disrupt, endanger, impair, or weaken the social aggregate." (p. 95-96)

⁴¹ These forces must be under U.S. control to ensure sectarian enmity and distrust can be mitigated. The U.S. commanders must have the power and authority to relieve ISF commanders and soldiers for indiscipline and/or abuse of the people. The majority of violence occurs in Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, and Salladdin Provinces. Approximately 40% of the population lives in these areas. Cordesman, *Iraq's Sectarian and Ethnic Violence*, 21. Wade Markel makes a convincing argument for this strategy of population control in "Draining the Swamp: The British Strategy of Population Control," *Parameters* 36 (Spring 2006): 35 – 48. Chaim Kaufmann and Alexander Downes are conflict management theorists that advocate partition as a solution to civil war. See Chaim D. Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century," *International Security* 23 (Autumn, 1998): 120-156, and Alexander B. Downes, "The Holy Land Divided: Defending Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Wars," *Security Studies* 10 (Summer 2001): 58-116.

⁴² The U.S. battalions must gain a deeper appreciation for their assigned AOs. As Kalyvas notes (p. 382) by quoting Roger Howell, Jr.: "What one needs to know is the manner in which the local issues, local perceptions, and local problems shaped and informed the national

perspective...and conversely how that sense of generality, which is so integral a part of the national perspective, was transferred and perhaps translated back into the framework and language of local politics.” See Roger Howell, Jr., “Newcastle and the Nation: The Seventeenth-Century Experience,” in *The English Civil Wars: Local Aspects*, ed. R. C. Richardson (Phoenix Mill, UK: Sutton, 1997), 309.

⁴³ It will become apparent if the Iraqi government begins to court or fall under the influence of Iran. Currently, the government in Baghdad perceives Sunni extremism (gaining popular support) as a bigger threat than Iranian influence. For current discussions of the Shia perceptions, see Vali Nasr, *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), and Sherifa D. Zuhur, *Iran, Iraq, and the United States: The New Triangle’s Impact on Sectarianism and the Nuclear Threat* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2006). For the historical events and ideas that formed these perceptions, see Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, and Mackey, *The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein*.

⁴⁴ Kalyvas, 11. Kalyvas observes that “[u]nderstanding the behavior of individuals vis-à-vis political actors requires knowledge of the dynamics within and among small groups – a fact well understood by political actors, some of whom have even called on anthropologists to provide them with such knowledge.” He cites studies done by Camille Lacoste-Dujardin, *Operation “Oiseau bleu:” Des Kabyles, des ethnologues et la guerre en Algérie* (Paris: Decouverte, 1997) and Eric Wakin, *Anthropology Goes to War: Professional Ethics and Counterinsurgency in Thailand* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1992). This also facilitates effective communication between the U.S., ISF, and community.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 124-132. These are mechanical ascription, credibility of rule, the provision of benefits, monitoring, and self-reinforcing by-products.

⁴⁶ T. E. Lawrence, “The Twenty Seven Articles of T. E. Lawrence,” *The Arab Bulletin* (20 August 1917). This is a common point of cultural misunderstanding between Americans and Iraqis. While the U.S. offers the idea of government as a democratic institution (irrespective of any leader) as the solution, the Iraqis focus on the leader himself. In the similar vein, Richard Lewis provides the same caution for negotiating with Arabs: “Westerners believe “in organizations and institutions; Arabs believe in people (guided by God).” Richard D. Lewis, *When Cultures Collide: Leading Across Cultures* (Boston: Nicholas Brealey International, 2006), 401.

⁴⁷ Portions of every Iraqi community are resistance fighters. These are loosely organized groups that resist for the simple reason that the U.S. is a foreign army of occupation. Also, depending on local conditions and leaders, these groups alternately work with or fight against extremist groups. By promising to leave (setting a withdrawal timetable at the local level), some of the resistance fighters can be persuaded to stand down.

⁴⁸ CF controlling the community will have to sort through the local politics as the empowered tribe seeks to eliminate opposition and position itself for gain. This is the best chance for the U.S. to influence and position moderate leaders in control of the local security forces and population. This also avoids the problems of recruiting men from multiple tribes and families who have loyalties to as many leaders. These men, recruited through the sheiks, become the local police. Recently, this method has had some success in Anbar. (Cordesman, *Iraq’s Sectarian and Ethnic Violence*, 31) The most significant obstacle is the turn-over of U.S.

units and their lack of continuity in methods. Without immediate results or if relations with the primary sheiks are not maintained, U.S. commanders are likely to try a different way.

⁴⁹ As tribes take on the police and security missions, they accord their family and tribal honor to the effort. Within that family and tribe, ascription to the ISF becomes a natural occurrence.

⁵⁰ In conflict management terminology, the *provision of harm* is essentially coercing one or more belligerent actors. Wagner and Kalyvas both provide the logic and evidence for past success. Also Toft, "Peace through Security," provides empirical evidence for the value of both benefit and harm (carrot and stick).

⁵¹ Power sharing conflict resolution requires "established elites" and acknowledged institutional structures (respected within the society). See Ulrich Schneckener, "Making Power-Sharing Work: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation," *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (March, 2002): 203-228.

⁵² Iraqis today still respect the army as an institution. There is historical precedent for this respect. Before Saddam neutralized it, the Iraqi Army enjoyed widespread popularity and respect as the "guardians of Iraqi nationalism." Quoted from William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 197. Also see Marr, 141-146. The U.S. interests are a secular Iraq led by a moderate leader. However, as long as the leadership is anti-extremist (Sunni and Shi'a) and anti-Iranian, the U.S. should accept the arrangement.

⁵³ Carter Malkasian, "The Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western Iraq, 2004-05," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 17 (September, 2006): 367-394. Malkasian found that the peoples' perceptions of the future play a significant role in the decisions they make.

⁵⁴ See Ralph O. Baker, "The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's Perspective on Information Operations," *Military Review* (May-June 2006), for ways and insights on how to engage and work with Iraqi and Arab media. When speaking with the people, the author found that unless a relationship was already built, the Iraqi would always believe what he heard and saw via Arab media first (and foremost).

⁵⁵ Some communities have had very poor experiences with U.S. occupation forces. The clans and tribes will undoubtedly be influenced more by the negative experiences than others.

⁵⁶ "UN Welcomes US Iraq Refugee Plan," *BBC News*, 15 February 2007, [online news report]; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6362289.stm; Internet; accessed 4 March 2007. DOD confirms the news reports and estimates that approximately 9,000 Iraqis flee the country each month. (DOD, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, 4). The estimate for Iraqi refugees in Iran is unavailable.

⁵⁷ Zuhur, 3.

⁵⁸ Nasr, 231-232 and 241-244, and Zuhur, 6-7.

⁵⁹ George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 2006), 1.

⁶⁰ For details of Al Qaeda's strategy and their designation of Iraq as the priority battleground see Thomas Hegghammer, "Global Jihadism after the Iraq War," *Middle East Journal* 60 (Winter 2006): 11-32, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, "Ayman al-Zawahiri's letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," available from <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/203gpuul.asp>; Internet; accessed on 12 January 2007.

⁶¹ This period is the time available before the U.S. Presidential elections to be held in 2008. It is widely assumed that the next administration will withdraw the military effort from Iraq.

⁶² Luttwak, 36.

⁶³ Kalyvas, 389.