

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

CITIZEN VERSUS CITIZEN “A WAR OF INCHES AND SECONDS”

by

Colonel Dennis J. Adams
United States Army National Guard

Colonel Dallas Hack
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 30 MAR 2007		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2006 to 00-00-2007	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Citizen Versus Citizen 'A War of Inches and Seconds'				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Dennis Adams				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 22	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Dennis J. Adams
TITLE: Citizen Versus Citizen "A War of Inches and Seconds"
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 23 March 2007 WORD COUNT: 6,586 PAGES: 22
KEY TERMS: Counterinsurgency
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Since the attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 the National Guard has mobilized and deployed all of its enhanced Combat Brigades. The Brigades have reorganized into special tables of organizations especially for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Why and how do the National Guard Brigade Combat Teams excel in these operations? What does the citizen Soldier have to offer in counterinsurgency operations, because of additional civilian acquired skill sets the guard Soldiers bring to the fight along with their military occupation? In Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations the key component is separating the insurgents from the populace. The guardsmen and guardswomen use their civilian skills everyday at home in the U.S. to interact with employers and other citizens. Can they interact with the Iraqi citizens on the same level to achieve the important goal of Iraqi self-governance and putting Iraqi infrastructure back in operation?

CITIZEN VERSUS CITIZEN “A WAR OF INCHES AND SECONDS”

Since the attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 the National Guard has mobilized and deployed all of its enhanced Combat Brigades and Regiment. The Brigades and Regiment have reorganized into special tables of organizations especially for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. They have adapted and changed the normal way of doing business to prepare for this fight. The National Guard Brigades and Regiment have excelled in these counterinsurgency operations, because of additional civilian acquired skills skill sets the guard Soldiers bring to the fight along with their military occupation.

This paper will be shaped by research and fashioned by my personal experience fighting the counterinsurgency in Iraq as the commander of the 278th Regimental Combat Team, an Armored Cavalry Regiment reorganized for the counterinsurgency, still fighting a cavalry fight with cavalry troopers. David Galula wisely notes, “to confine soldiers to purely military functions while urgent and vital tasks have to be done, and nobody else is available to undertake them, would be senseless. The soldier must then be prepared to become...a social worker, a civil engineer, a school teacher, a nurse, a boy scout. But, only for as long as he cannot be replaced, for it is better to entrust civilian tasks to civilians.”¹ Thus, the best soldiers to fight the counterinsurgency fight, are the National Guard. These soldiers have the additional skills to conduct basic community improvements, infrastructure, and have the capability to conduct full spectrum operations when the situation warrants.

The first time the National Guard was involved in counterinsurgency operations and had to reorganize for this kind of warfare was November 11, 1620 at Plymouth Colony. There the militia formed to fight Native Americans; CPT Miles Standish became the military advisor and organized the militia into four squadrons. He established watches, alarms and raids to destroy the capability of the enemy.² The first major action of the Revolutionary War, an insurgency fight with Americans as the insurgency, was the battle of Concord. There an insurgency militia regiment attacked three regular companies of British Infantry guarding a bridge on the Concord River, where the skirmish lasted the entire day. While the British companies retreated to Boston, the insurgency grew to greater than 4000 farmers, turned minutemen, firing at the British from behind trees and rocks. This was a new tactic in warfare and the British were unprepared to counter. The embattled Britons were saved from sure annihilation by an emergency relief column of over 1000 men. The shot that was heard around the world was fired here. For American this became the first in a series of information operations activities to gain support from other countries, and a very good example of information operations, still used today.³

Another good illustration of this organized insurgency's new tactics came when members of the New England Militia surprised the British at Fort Ticonderoga. This unchallenged attack came in the middle of the night and the unsuspecting British guards did not follow protocol to defend these tactics. Leading this attack was Vermont's COL Ethan Allen and his Green Mountain Boys with COL Benedict Arnold commanding the other militia. First time use of these unconventional tactics were so successful the Fort Ticonderoga garrison surrendered his command in his night shirt. As a result, the heavy guns were sent to Boston for use in the upcoming siege.⁴

In 1782, a year before the end of the American Revolution, French scholar Abbe de Mably wrote to patriot leader John Adams. He sought Adams thoughts on the writing of a comprehensive history of the war where the Americans were the insurgency. The future President of the United States replied, "any study of the Revolution requires an understanding of the key institutions that created American greatness and serve as the basis of success during the recent war." Adams believed there were four critical institutions in American society: towns, religious congregations, schools, and the militia. Adams told the French scholar, "The militia comprehends the whole people...so that the whole country is ready to march for its own defense upon the first signal of alarm."⁵ This thought process parallels our current fight in Iraq. The insurgents of Operation Iraqi Freedom III use information operations while we are countering with conventional means. Clerical influence is critical to our success in Iraq because citizens in Iraqi Arab culture obtain their information, news and political views at the mosque.

The last full insurrection utilizing the National Guard was the Philippines. Religion was a key factor then, as it is today, in both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Guard units from several states including Pennsylvania, Tennessee and North Carolina were formed under the command of General John J. Pershing. General Pershing understood the importance of knowing the people and their situation, both politically and religiously. He was known for his country tours, gathering facts before he committed resources. After a massacre in one of the constabulary units manned by natives, he felt the best way to conduct operations was to enlist as many Philippine men as possible into small police units. Without knowing the full danger to come, a police unit from Dapitan, a small platoon of eighteen Philippine Police, approached Boburan. The Subanos were peaceful, yet their oppressors were hostile, and too few for war. The platoon was ambushed by a group of oppressed Subanos who had been "whipped to frenzy" by panditas calling on Allah to bless these followers against the infidels and to whisk his fallen to paradise.⁶ This clearly shows how an insurgency operates within information operations and why we must consider all factors.

A lesson to be learned was General Pershing wanting to strike hard at the heart of the massacre. However, due to administrative duties in other parts of the country, he had to send Major John P. Finley from the 28th Division, to lead the Philippine natives and his own forces to quell the uprising in that area. General Pershing wanted to restore America's resolve in the counterinsurgency fight by showing some success and maintaining congressional support.

Major Finley had orders to restore order, free the Subanos, and kill or apprehend the renegade leaders. Major Finley's maturity level was evident, as he was known as a young 55 year old. At that time in the Army, it was common to be an older force.⁷ He became a legend fighting the counterinsurgency fight. Standing at well over six feet tall, weighing two hundred fifty pounds, his courage took him unarmed into seething villages to talk to the leaders and to learn their grievances and plight.⁸ My experience, of having older Army National Guard troops in Iraq is evidence this type advantage remains. A custom practiced by Iraqi village elders we must be aware of, assumes the older person has more wisdom and is in authority.

Additionally, Major Finley conducted a very long, deliberate operation with the Second Company of Philippine Scouts, a splendid, native auxiliary to the regular Army, and a rejuvenated constabulary unit. Together, they captured the insurgent leaders experiencing very few casualties. Thirty five natives, of twenty thousand involved, perished, losing no scouts or policemen. General Pershing was concerned about his slow pace, but realized the successes were in reach and allowed him to continue.⁹ Countless units in Iraq have commanders doing this same thing. They are making headway while exposing them selves and connecting with the people. Daily, the 278th squadron and battalion commanders did this with the same great results.

Looking back at history is a good example, demonstrating that common sense and maturity will help us in the battle we now face. Technology has changed; however, human nature has remained the same. Human expectations for quality of life have risen and we must remember that while dealing with native people in their own communities and states.

In Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations the key component is separating the insurgents from the populace. The Army National Guard is specially equipped to accomplish this. The citizen soldier brings additional skills and maturity to the fight. The guardsmen and guardswomen have used their civilian skills to interact with the Iraqi citizens along the logical lines of operation of governance and putting Iraqi infrastructure back in operation. This has allowed the very important nation building task to have a chance.

War-fighting has two important dimensions; winning the war and winning the peace. The United States excels in the first, but without an equal commitment to stability and reconstruction,

in time, combat victories can be lost. The military's bravery, dedication, and skill are unsurpassed both in the active duty and National Guard, but it must have the institutional and resource support from the United States government to succeed in securing the peace.¹⁰ Units must be responsive and have the ability to shift from combat operations to peacekeeping and destroying the enemy to helping the populace. The immediate post-combat phase of war requires a shift in rules of engagement, doctrines, skills, techniques, and perspective appropriate to the mission.¹¹

As I discuss the capabilities of the National Guard combating insurgents in the counterinsurgent fight, I must discuss that which makes up the basics for the insurgency, the best description of insurgencies and what the fight is about. Clausewitz said, in On War, "The ultimate outcome of war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date. It is obvious how this, too, can slacken tension and reduce the vigor of the effort."¹² Fighting the insurgency in a country that has been defeated is very problematic; the population sees you as occupiers and refuses to commit themselves to the new government. All actions must focus on winning the popular support a village at a time. Many pieces that make up the puzzle must be applied in a very structured, effects based operation. The following paragraphs best describe what a counterinsurgency fight looks like, and how the numerous new ways of fighting along new axis must be observed.

Counterinsurgency operations are the most demanding and complex forms of warfare for United States military forces. Counterinsurgency draws heavily on the broad range of capabilities of the joint force. Military forces must be prepared to conduct a different mix of offensive, defensive and stability operations from that expected in major combat operations. Air, land, and maritime elements all contribute to successful operations and to the vital effort to cut off and isolate insurgents from the populations they seek to control. Nonetheless, the Army and Marine Corps usually furnish the principal United States military contributions to counterinsurgency.¹³

Counterinsurgency is a violent, political struggle waged with military means. The political issues at stake for the contestants defy nonviolent solutions because they are often rooted in culture, ideology, societal tensions, and injustice. Military forces can compel and secure but alone cannot achieve the necessary political compromise among the protagonists. A successful counterinsurgency force that includes civilian agencies, U.S. military forces, and multinational forces, purposefully attacks the insurgency rather than just its fighters and it addresses the host

nation's core problems in a comprehensive fashion. The host nation leaders must be purposefully engaged in this comprehensive approach.¹⁴

Counterinsurgency operations nested with Stability Operations for long term success in winning the support of the population are the contributions land forces can make by conducting stability operations. A stability operation is an operation to establish, preserve, and exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources (FM 3-0); Forces engaged in stability operations establish, safeguard, or restore basic civil services. They act directly and in support of governmental agencies. Success in stability operations enables the local population and government agencies of the host nation to resume or develop the capabilities needed to conduct counterinsurgency operations and create the conditions that will permit U.S. military forces to disengage.¹⁵

As we conduct these stability operations, we must ensure that actions are well planned. This perception of our operations is an example: An American unit conducted a raid in the Sunni Triangle. "They carried out the raid here because we're Sunni," said Ibrahim Ali Hussein, a sixty-year-old farmer wearing a blue dishdasha with a white scarf tied loosely over his head, told interviewer Anthony Shadid. "After this operation, we think a hundred Saddam's are better than the Americans."¹⁶ This statement clearly shows how all options must be weighed before conducting any operations other than clear self defense of your soldiers.

The insurgent has a distinct advantage over the counterinsurgency forces. The insurgent plays upon the discontent of the people and can infiltrate into the civilian population only emerging at his opportunity. Counterinsurgency is "war amongst the people." Combat operations must therefore be executed with an appropriate level of restraint on the use of force to minimize or avoid killing or injuring innocent people who are not involved with the conflict. To combat this we must organize our units for this type of conflict with the ability to provide security and protect the force.¹⁷

Not just in insurgencies, but historically, continental struggles have been lost because governments either failed to control, or actually encouraged, the bad behavior of their armies. Consider how all Europe, even sincere, one time supporters, eventually turned against Napoleon, in large part, because he allowed wide ranging armies to "live off the land," a quaint circumlocution for looting civilians. Also, one can make a good case the Nazis' savage treatment of the population of Ukraine and western Russia cost them victory in World War II.¹⁸

Insurgency operations are limited during their organizational stage and it's difficult to get situational awareness. As in any other operation, effective problem solving is dependant on a detailed understanding of the environment. This is particularly important in counterinsurgency.

Although members of the force never achieve perfect situational understanding, their understanding should be a continuous learning affair. The counterinsurgency environment is more complex and uncertain than that associated with conventional military operations, due to the preeminence of a difficult and tangled web of complicated societal issues. Identification of the problem is one of the most challenging aspects of counterinsurgency operations, because that task demands an appreciation of how social, cultural, political, economic, and physical conditions have supported or even fomented discontent among the population.¹⁹

The Iraqis have a very distinct tribal network that was suppressed by Saddam's regime and there was a resurgence right after the fall of Iraq. These tribes filled the vacuum in a very lawless time after the government ceased to exist and the Iraqis felt they needed to protect themselves. For example, the new U.S. trained Iraqi police were considered American collaborators and lackeys. They stood at the intersection of all the things going wrong after the war. The anger at the occupation, the resentment of the U.S. troops and the riverbed of religion channeled those currents into armed opposition, which has grown with each passing month after the fall of Iraq.²⁰

Sabah, an Iraqi informer, nicknamed "the masked man" by his tribal members is an excellent example of tribal justice. He was accused of aiding the Americans in the killing a 15 year old boy and two older men, of the Aani tribe, during a cordon and search operation. A tribal council was convened, and his fate was determined by the elder of the tribe. He was to be killed by his family for his actions, or the entire family of the Jabbouri tribe, would be killed. Sabah's father and a younger son executed his oldest son with AK47s to close this chapter of tribal justice and to protect his family.²¹ As leaders of military units conducting operations to change conditions for success we must understand these customs.

Logical lines of operations emerged to address situations when a positional reference to enemy or adversary forces has little relevance. Using information operations is an appropriate technique for synchronizing operations against an enemy that hides among the population. A plan based on insurgents unifies the efforts of joint, interagency, multinational, and host nation forces toward a common purpose. Each line of operation represents a conceptual category along which the host nation government and commander of the counter insurgency force intend to attack the insurgent strategy and establish government legitimacy.²²

We must avoid, at all costs, the following example of poor judgment by our soldiers. On August 13, 2003 an explosion drew several religious clerics from noon prayers to observe a U.S. Blackhawk helicopter hovering over an electrical transmission tower that had a black flag attached to the top. A crewman in the Blackhawk tried to kick the flag down off the tower. The

flag was inscribed with the Mahdi and was considered a religious icon for Islam.²³ The information lines of operations are closely related and depend upon closely coordinated action among all elements of the counterinsurgency force to include all facets of United States government.²⁴

An example of bad communication, within the state department and the military, was the announcement made by Mr. Jay Garner stating the establishment of the Iraqi government by May 15, 2003. This communication caused L. Paul Bremer, III to work hard and quickly, as he said, “to disabuse both the Iraqi and American proponents of this reckless fantasy (some in the administration were calling this “early transfer of power”) animated in part by their aversion to nation building.” This was brought on by the military campaign to bring down the Iraqi government as a cakewalk, encouraged by overly positive predictions especially by the Iraqi exiles.²⁵ To maintain a focused positive counterinsurgency plan we must maintain talking points for the press and ensure that all announcements are made under the context of a plan. False hopes and broken promises will enable the insurgency to expand its manning base.

The Information Operations in the Logical Lines of Operations are critical and decisive in that they assist in setting conditions for success of all other operations. By publicizing government policies, the actual situation, and counterinsurgent accomplishments, information operations can neutralize insurgent propaganda and false claims. The major task categories follow:

- Identify all the audiences (local, regional, and international), the various news cycles, and how to reach them with the host nation government’s message.
- Manage local population expectations regarding what counterinsurgency operations forces can achieve.
- Develop common, multiechelon themes based on, and consistent with, host nation government policies and operations’ objectives, and sustain unity of the message.
- Coordinate and provide a comprehensive information preparation of the operational environment using all communications means and incorporating the activities of all other logical lines of operations.
- Remember actions always speak louder than words; every Soldier and Marine is an integral part of information operation communications. Information operations are executed every day through the action of firm, fair, professional, and alert soldiers and marines on the streets with the people.²⁶

Legitimacy of the government and security of the people are the basic essentials for successful counterinsurgency operations. The population in the area of operations must be

protected from the insurgents in order to make any progress in building support for the host nation government. If the people are not secure, or they perceive they are not, then counterinsurgency operations will be greatly hindered. The host nation must provide security and good governance to gain legitimacy to the people. Necessary activities include the following:

- Security activities (military and police) isolating the insurgency as part of public safety.
- Establishing and enforcing the rule of law.
- Public administration.
- Justice (Judiciary system, prosecutor/defense representation, and corrections).
- Property records and control.
- Civil information.
- Public finance.
- Historical, cultural, and recreational services.
- Electoral process for representative government.
- Disaster preparedness and response.²⁷

When the United States National Guard goes to war, America goes to war. This helps fulfill part of the paradoxical trinity by Carl Von Clausewitz. Operation Iraqi Freedom must maintain the support of the people. If an uninformed relationship exists between the United States populace and the military, the government support will wane and the insurgents need do nothing but maintain “status quo” to maintain their momentum.²⁸ If that occurs, one must consider the following factors when considering the price of war: passion of the people, policy objectiveness and the ability to affect the outcome desired in limited or total war.

Vietnam is a good example of a limited war that developed into total war. Our hazy political goals and limited strategy of escalation was faulty and pulled the United States into total war.²⁹ To neglect strategy, in defense planning or the conduct of war, would compare to playing chess without kings on the board; there would be no point. Strategy can fail because of policy that does not reflect the former.³⁰ As leaders it is important for soldier’s morale to be persuaded that victory matters. The United States military performance in Vietnam, especially after spring of 1968, is testimony to just how soldiers will fight for themselves and their immediate group, even when they have been all but abandoned by strategy and policy.³¹

When we justify a war, we must ensure that we have the morale right at home, and in the world to make war. Perceived unjust wars are hard to maintain and take more energy from the government trying to find ways to justify the conflict. A perceived unjust war continues to drain the resources of the country conducting it. It gives the enemy another source to use against the

government that is the will of the people. In today's global, communicating environment, world ideals and information is passed rapidly and can have a very negative political impact on the government conducting an unjust war.

The national news media headlines naturally focus on violence and broadcasts this to the public. As commander of a National Guard Regiment, I understood the importance of communicating our successes and actions to the soldiers. For modern communications such as email, instant messaging, internet, blogs, and phones to be an asset rather than a liability I developed one page flyers known as Hoofbeats. These flyers focused on the soldiers daily successes and served as a visual aid of the regiment's positive works. The M1A1 Abrams tank driver sees the world through his vision blocks. His world is narrow and he sees a very small portion of the battlefield. These flyers allowed opportunity for the tank drivers, as well as soldiers across all areas of operations, to share in each other's successes. Modern communications were provided at all forward operation bases in Iraq for soldiers to communicate frequently and continually with their friends and families to insure community support. The Hoofbeats measure of success was the outstanding support we continued to get from the home town papers, local television and radio broadcasts.

278RCT HOOFBEAT 28 MAY 2005

Joint Raid Captures AIF Cell Leader

LOO: Security
TIME: 15 Days Ago
WHO: Troop L 3/278RCT; 3rd BN / 2nd BDE / 5th DIV (IA); Jalula Police
WHAT: AIF Cell Leader Captured
WHEN: 13 May 2005
WHERE: Jalula, Iraq
WHY: Attacks against newly elected Iraqi officials and Coalition Forces
MEDIA STATUS: N/A
BULLETIZED: Troop L conducted a joint raid with Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police to detain a Kurdish AIF cell leader in the Jalula area. This cell leader was potentially linked to several IED attacks within the Jalula area. The success of this raid helped make the area safer for the local populace and improved the cooperation between the Iraqi Security Forces and Regiment.

UNCLASSIFIED

FIGURE 1: CAPTURE OF CELL LEADER

These Hoofbeats allowed the Soldier to justify what they were doing because what they were accomplishing was not being broadcast in the media at home. To maintain the important momentum of support from American citizens for the long war we must make sure all know the good works we do.

Hoofbeats were posted on our website and in common areas such as the dining facility and in the internet and phone centers. As our the deployment continued it was very rewarding to hear all the Soldier's interviews back home in the United States with the press as they were doing their mid tour leave. You could hear them describe verbally all the positive things the 278th Regimental Combat Team were doing for the Iraqi people, something absent from the national evening news. With this deployment, it was important that we practiced rectitude and the general morale of our fighting force is related to political awareness. Officers and key non-commissioned officers need to be able to provide convincing answers to questions their troops ask them about why and against whom they are fighting.³² The Hoofbeats also gave them the information they needed. Middle-aged guardsmen, with the facts, generally practice restraint much better than young men, even during dangerous combat missions. Our crews always had a mature soldier with our young soldiers which provided impressive results.

To make sure the prevailing perceptions in America's vital interest are understood, we are doing everything possible to ensure the public understands our interests in that area of the world. We must promote successes that are true and maintain issues in our foreign affairs that are thought to affect the survival of security of the nation, meaning specifically security against military attack. This language naturally applies to a nation not bent on expansion.³³ This ideal or thought must be well understood in all military formations from top to bottom. To believe is to do, and to maintain our political will at home, our soldiers must be involved.

Continued problems in Iraq could lead to greater polarization within the United States. Sixty-six percent of Americans disapprove of the government's handling of the war, and more than sixty percent feel there is no clear plan for moving forward. The November 2006 elections in the United States were largely viewed as a referendum on the progress in Iraq. United States foreign policy cannot be successfully sustained without the broad support of the American people.³⁴

When discussing operations, I contend and agree with our new doctrine that Information Operations is critical to our success in the counterinsurgency fight in Iraq. As I saw the momentum develop with the Hoofbeats, we started another program called Drumbeats. These centered on the Iraqis and were published in Arabic. The same format was used to publicize the good works and local successes of the Iraqi Security Forces, both police and army, and the Iraqi government in our area of operations. The example below was published in Arabic and distributed to the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Border Police and local police. This allowed the Iraqi population to see how the three cultures were working together for a better, safe and secure Iraq. We also started an open source media center that collected news from Iraqi local

television, newspapers, radio stations and international, Arab satellite TV. We collected flyers, banners and other posted media to give us a method of evaluation for our activities. The media center workers were local Iraqi interpreters. They were able to give us their input on what was happening.

278th RCT HOOFBEAT 26 Feb 05

Force Protection Increase at White Castle Checkpoint

LOO: SECURITY
TIME: 12 days ago
WHO: HSC/3BN/15BDE (IA), HHB/1/278 RCT, 386 ENG
WHAT: Improve Force Protection
WHEN: 14 February 2005
WHERE: vic Kirkush, Iraq
MEDIA: None.
BULLETIZED: Joint mission with Iraqi Army and 278RCT troopers improved force protection and security at a local Iraqi Army traffic control checkpoint called the "white castle". Engineers built a berm along the side of the checkpoint and around the building. Jersey barriers and concertina wire were added at the checkpoint. This improved force protection at an important checkpoint and improved area security.

Berm Site Before

Berm Site After

Checkpoint After

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 2: Hoofbeat Good News Story

278RCT Drumbeat 18 August 2005

Unification of Iraqi Security Forces

LOO: Security
WHO: Saber 6, Raider 6, Warrior 6 3d BDE IA CDR, DBE CDR.
WHAT: Initial Meeting of 3d BDE IA Commander and DBE Commander
WHEN: 20 August 2005, 1200 hours
WHERE: 278th RCT Command Building, AO Volunteer
WHY: Develop communications and teamwork between Iraqi Security Forces.
MEDIA STATUS: None
BULLETIZED: Saber 6 invited BG Essa, 3rd BDE IA Commander, and BG Nazim, DBE Commander to a luncheon in order to develop open lines of communication to facilitate future sharing of assets and intelligence. This will increase the Iraqi Security Forces' effectiveness in AO Volunteer and Eastern Diyala. The meeting served to create a foundation of cooperation between both forces for future operations and defeating the insurgent threat

UNCLASSIFIED

This Drum Beat was published in Arabic. It showed the local Iraqi people that American, Kurds, Arabs and both Shia and Sunnis could work together for a common security goal. Products such as these were distributed to all local media outlets and posted for all the Iraqi Security Forces to see.

FIGURE 3: DRUMBEAT OF SECURITY FORCES

We must remember, as we improve the quality of the indigenous security forces, they cannot convey legitimacy upon a government that does not enjoy the support of its own people. If anything, they will be viewed as accomplices to the illegitimate government and become targets themselves. In El Salvador, we had that very problem when training the Salvadoran Army because of the corrupt government that did not support the needs and desires of the people.³⁵

As we develop tactics and plan for operations in the counterinsurgency fight, we must prepare leaders for the long battle. The advantage with the 278th National Guard Regiment was it's the leaders had been together many years creating excellent unity of command. This stability in leadership enabled the commander's intent to be understood at all levels. Our successes were directly tied to our ability to react to the enemy and to develop a common operating picture throughout our area of responsibility. Just as the British did during the Malaya insurrections in 1950, we gathered all the information we could about Iraq, its people (tribes) and the area where we were to be deployed. We also developed a primer Area of Operations Volunteer for Dummies for our troops like the British book called the ATOM, was officially known as the "The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya. It was sized to fit the pockets of a soldier's jungle greens and was also called the soldiers bible. It covered all aspects of lessons learned at the soldier's level.³⁶

To be successful in attacking the insurgency in Iraq, units must stay on the offensive at all levels of operations. Total engagement is paramount to ensure that we separate the insurgents out of the population. Kinetics is not always the answer. I compare this fight to a cancer patient. You want to assure the cure does not kill the patient. The insurgency will burrow itself into the population and every bad act of faith or action on our part causes the cancer to grow. As Sun Tzu said, "to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."³⁷

It must also be noted that Britain's most successful counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya was 1945 to 1960, a period of 15 years! This occurred under highly favorable circumstances, and that probably will never be repeated. The United States does not have the patience, as I see it, to fight for 15 years. However, the British deployed an extraordinary degree of control over local populations and could promulgate draconian tactics with little domestic or international scrutiny.³⁸ In today's information age insurgents bring new dimension to the fight. The British did not have to contend with this type of exposure as on today's scale.

I believe the problems we face and the growth of the insurgency were caused by our deliberate use of the tactic to divide the country along ethnic lines for the initial attack. This tactic

was successful and we received help. Iraq presents a stark illustration of ethnic and religious cleavages put to use by the ruling party. The Baathist Party, a secular and state socialist movement, ruled Iraq as a police state for decades by relying on the Sunni population (20 percent of Iraq's population), to suppress the Shiite majority (60 percent of Iraq's population), the Kurds (less than 20 percent of Iraq's population), and other smaller segments of the populace. President Saddam Hussein wielded the purse and dagger like a Mafia don to buy patronage or to eliminate opposition. His power plays left him vulnerable among excluded communities when the United States led multinational coalition invaded. We converted the Kurdish opponents to an American asset during the invasion phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom.³⁹ Our tactics here while helping to achieve regime change have created additional difficulties now as we are trying to put the country back together. I can attest, first hand, on the deep divide between the three major ethnic groups.

This division, created along the lines of ethnicity, allowed terrorists in Al-Qaeda of Iraq to establish their foot holds. "Terrorism could grow as fast as a franchise in Iraq, like McDonalds's has grown around" one Iraqi official told the Iraqi study group during their recent interviews.⁴⁰ They brought with them hope to the uneducated Iraqis reaching for a new life during this transition interlude. To combat this in the future, leaders and troops must beware and be aware of doing more harm than good when planning to foment or benefit from infighting within enemy ranks. Exacerbating the Sunni-Shia divisions, for instance, would contravene strategic aims in Iraq and stated policy of Iraqi political leaders. As with other weapons, clear rules of engagement should have been used and preparations to unify the diverse ethnic groups should have been applied as soon as the regime fell.⁴¹

The operational strategy of the insurgency in Iraq is difficult to perceive, except for the obvious actions taken to make the country ungovernable by continuous violence and terrorism. Many factions were committing numerous uncoordinated acts, and it took time to understand chaos. It was doubtful that a regime such as Hussein's, that had suppressed the Shiites and the Kurds as it did, could execute an overall Iraqi operational insurgency strategy.⁴²

As stated before, the maturity level of National Guard soldiers is an asset in the fight of an insurgency in the Arab world. As units conducted a relief in place between Operation Iraqi Freedom II through Operation Iraqi Freedom III, the attitude perceived from troops quoted from an Army Captain was, "most of the people here want us dead. They hate us and everything we stand for, and will take any opportunity to cause us harm." In the broadest sense, America had forgotten the humiliation and anger that come from foreign occupation after 225 years of independence from England.⁴³ The frustration, with most Iraqis, is they want to govern

themselves. While thanks is in order for destroying Saddam Hussein's regime, "its time for you to now go home".⁴⁴

Our National Guard soldiers, as a whole, are older, have established families, additional job skills, and careers. The Arab culture respects this. I could see a difference in how Iraqis' treated our older non-commissioned officers compared to the younger officers. The Iraqi Security Forces hold the key to the victory we all want in Iraq. The ground forces of a country such as Iraq, threatened by an insurgency, hold the solution to combating the threat. The outcome of insurgent conflicts often depends on the political reliability, behavior, and capabilities of the defending government's ground forces.⁴⁵

As a regimental commander in Iraq, I discovered phase four operations were difficult to implement. We understood what our higher headquarters at all levels had published, but to make strides in time is complex. Americans' we tend to grasp for results quickly until we realize that quick results are never going to be tangible, as our culture is so different from the Iraqis. Changing the Iraqi Security Forces pre-regime culture and training began to be successful after we came to this realization. It was important the Iraqi people and the security forces knew they were there to protect the Iraqi people not control them. We gleaned on our experiences as United States National Guard Citizen Soldiers. We were involved in interacting with communities and showing respect to the Iraqi citizens and Iraqi security forces. This was a war of inches and seconds, years and months. A paradoxical term in itself, our combat actions dealt with inches and seconds depending on one's location. Fighting the battle of improvised explosive devices can miss or hit you by a margin of inches and seconds. While, training the Iraqi Security Force and securing our lines of communications can take months and years.

As in the Philippines, the success Major Finley had, and the British model in Malaya, we began infiltrating ourselves into the lives of the Iraqis as politely as possible. We established Joint Communication Centers in the villages with platoon outposts. We were involved in health care, education and the quality of life for "our Iraqis." We made certain our Iraqi security forces began to lead all operations within their capabilities.

As we started this, communities from home sent us thousands of school supplies, toys, children's clothes, and shoes, all of which became combat multipliers on the insurgency fight. As our excellent Information Operations were ongoing and telling the good news stories of the difficult Iraqi plight, home towns all across the home guard states supported us. This is an operation only a home town National Guard unit can do at the grassroots level. In return we received tremendous cooperation from most Iraqi citizens.

Our intelligence was refined to the point showing our actions were genuine, and we ceased the dragnet type of operations that rarely netted insurgents we were trying to capture. Using all available national intelligence resources, coupled with hard work, we started very surgical operations with vetted information and intelligence. We also made sure all damages were repaired, and our Iraqi Soldiers explained all operations we conducted. In counterinsurgency warfare, tactics are politics, or they should be. Hence, first and foremost, we should make every effort to abstain from tactics that harm or antagonize civilians.⁴⁶ As our influence grew, one could drive through a village and know by the occupant's actions and attitudes if insurgents were hiding there. On several occasions, children and parents of our villages would warn our soldiers of impending danger.

The second greatest resource of a National Guard unit is the dual skills most soldiers possess. We had the capability to resource advisors to schools to aid in education of Iraqi children. Our units consist of professional educators who hold doctorates of education, and are supervisors of large school systems to small elementary and high school teachers. We had police officers from all agencies to establish a local police academy to teach survival skills and ethics along with the rule of law. Our civilian lawyers, which were JAG officers, assisted and brought experience in all facets of law consisting of criminal to domestic contracts. The guard possesses industrial leaders in manufacturing, civil engineers, agriculture, banking, energy production, emergency response services and health care professionals, transportation, electrical, city managers, chamber of commerce and other various types of government officials. As a counterinsurgency commander I was able to continually utilize these numerous resources aided by the commander's emergency relief funds and the attached civil affairs company.

Having these resources available to use everyday gave me an advantage many commanders were seeking throughout the Army and the federal government. Jay Garner, director of office of reconstruction and humanitarian assistance (ORHA), during the planning stage of Operation Iraqi Freedom, asked Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld "do you have department of defense personnel qualified in agriculture, education and banking available, to name a few?"⁴⁷

Communications with your subordinate units is another key factor in fighting the insurgents. The area we covered was expansive, but through cavalry tradition of communications diligence, we established a SINGARS FM command network that reached all areas, and included remote regions. This allowed junior leaders to take the necessary risks associated with combat operations knowing help was a radio call away. As we have discussed, good governance, timely intelligence and air transport serve as counterinsurgent force

multipliers. Road construction and communications serve as well. The Romans held their empire together with a system of excellent roads, some still used today. The timely reaction and ability to move rapidly shows evidence that the government is there to stay.⁴⁸

We also placed the Iraqi Security Forces up front, in the realm of communications, by assuring their Joint Communication Centers functioned correctly and were resourced. All Iraqi Security Force organizations in our area of operations were equipped with FM band semi-secure, hand held radios and base stations. Each passing week this unique resource wrought Iraqi citizens calling in phone tips and emergencies.

The aim of true counterinsurgency is to reestablish peace. Real peace means reintegrating into society its disaffected elements. The rate, even the possibility, of such reintegration depends in great part on how the counterinsurgency is conducted.⁴⁹ Our tour in Iraq was United States national treasure well spent. The National Guard soldiers each brought their communities and civilian professions into the fight as a weapon system. The 278th Regimental Combat Team was known as the peaceful, supportive tribe by the good Iraqi people. Our three star patches symbolized the three stars of death by the insurgents and criminals. This was truly, a war of inches and seconds that will and can be fought and won by the citizen soldier. When the National Guard goes to war, America goes to war.

Endnotes

¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24, (Washington D.C.; U.S. Department of the Army June 2006,Final Draft)2-34.

² Michael D. Doubler and John W. Listman Jr., *The National Guard, An Illustrated History of Americas Citizen-Soldiers*,(Washington D.C.; Brassey's, Inc, 2003),3.

³ Ibid., 9.

⁴ Michael D. Doubler, *Civilian in Peace Soldier in War, the Army National Guard*, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003),43.

⁵ Ibid., 46.

⁶ Frank E. Vandiver, *Black Jack, The life and times of John J. Pershing*, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press 1977),470.

⁷ Ibid., 471.

⁸ Ibid., 472.

⁹ Ibid., 472-473.

¹⁰ Samuel R. Berger, Brent Scowcroft, William Nash, and Mona K. Sutphen, *In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-conflict Capabilities*, (New York, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc, 2005),13,

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*,(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 80.

¹³ FM 3-24, 2-15,2-16

¹⁴ Ibid., 5-1.

¹⁵ Ibid.,5-1.

¹⁶ Anthony Shadid, *Night Draws Near*,(New York: Henry Holt, 2006), 266.

¹⁷ FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, Headquarters Department of the Army, Page 5-35, June 2006 (Final Draft)

¹⁸ Anthony James Joes, *Resisting Rebellion The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency* The University Press of Kentucky, Page 158, 2004

¹⁹ FM 3-24, 5-35

²⁰ Shadid, 282.

²¹ Ibid.,288-289.

²² FM 3-24,5-7,5-8

²³ Shadid, 314

²⁴ FM 3-24,5-7,5-8

²⁵ Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III, *My Year in Iraq*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006),12

²⁶ FM 3-24,5-12

²⁷ FM 3-24,5-46,5-47

²⁸ Von Clausewitz, 89.

²⁹ Von Clausewitz, 606.

³⁰ Collins Gray, *Modern Strategy*, (New York: Oxford Press,1999), 44.

³¹ Ibid.,45.

³² Joes, 163.

- ³³ Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics*,(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), 344.
- ³⁴ James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, *The Iraq Study Group Report*,(New York: Vintage Books Random House, Page 35, December,2006),35.
- ³⁵ Thomas R. Mockaitis, *The Iraq War; Learning From the Past, Adapting to the Present, and Planning for the Future*,(Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2007), 9.
- ³⁶ John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*,(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 97.
- ³⁷ Sun Tzu, *Art of War*,(New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.
- ³⁸ Mockaitis, 12-13.
- ³⁹ Thomas H. Henriksen, *Dividing Our Enemies*, (Hurlburt Field: The JSOU Press,2005),7
- ⁴⁰ Baker and Hamilton, 34
- ⁴¹ Henriksen, 12
- ⁴² M. Hough, G.P.H. Kruys, and A du Plessis, *Contemporary Terrorism and Insurgency: Selected Case Studies and Responses*,(Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria South Africa, November 2005),39.
- ⁴³ Steven Metz, *Learning From Iraq: Counterinsurgency In American Strategy*, (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute January 2007),30.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid.
- ⁴⁵ Stephen T. Hosmer, *The Army's Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency*, (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, November 1990),9.
- ⁴⁶ Joes, 243.
- ⁴⁷ Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City*, (New York: Borzoi Books Random House, September 2006),33.
- ⁴⁸ Joes, 235.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., 246.