

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE IMPORTANCE OF CROSS-CULTURAL AWARENESS FOR TODAY'S
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

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ABSTRACT

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As the nation has grappled with the challenges inherent in a long war against a determined and committed enemy, one consistent weakness has surfaced: the importance of understanding how others throughout the international community perceive the United States and its policies. Without this understanding, the United States cannot develop and sustain effective multinational organizations nor can it devise and execute effective strategies to win the Global War on Terrorism. The United States springs into action without much thought to how it will "win the hearts and minds" of those it is trying to help. Because of its increased likelihood of serving with coalitions and its transformation to an expeditionary Army, America's military and political leaders must realize how important understanding an opponent's culture is to operating in today's global environment. In this paper I will show how the lack of cross-cultural awareness has decreased military effectiveness, and explain what must be done to address these shortcomings.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CROSS-CULTURAL AWARENESS FOR TODAY'S OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

And when people are entering upon a war they do things the wrong way around. Action comes first, and it is only when they have already suffered that they begin to think.

—Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War.

Introduction

As the nation has grappled with the challenges inherent in a long war against a determined and committed enemy, one consistent weakness has surfaced: the importance of understanding how others throughout the international community perceive the United States and its policies. Without this understanding, the United States cannot develop and sustain effective multinational organizations nor can it devise and execute effective strategies to win the Global War on Terrorism.¹

The United States springs into action without much thought to how it will “win the hearts and minds” of those it is trying to help. Because of its increased likelihood of serving with coalitions and its transformation to an expeditionary Army, America’s military and political leaders must realize how important understanding an opponent’s culture is to operating in today’s global environment. In this paper I will show how the lack of cross-cultural awareness has decreased military effectiveness, and explain what must be done to address these shortcomings.

Being cross culturally aware is a more complex issue today than ever before. During the Cold War, siding with either the East or the West was necessary in a bipolar world in which the major powers’ ideologies competed through aligned or nonaligned states. Nations sought security by aligning with the Big Brother of their choice. This changed at the end of the Cold War. States, individuals, and societies felt free to reconnect with their own cultural and social norms. Where once U.S. and Western economic and cultural values overshadowed traditional and religious based societies, many regions of the world are now beginning to retreat from Western values as they have become a source of friction.²

During the past decade the military has increasingly engaged in lengthy overseas deployments where mission performance involved significant interface with local populations. This interaction and how it affects military operations has become so important that mission success is often significantly affected by a soldier’s ability to interact with local individuals and communities.

Learning to interact with local populaces presents a major challenge for soldiers, leaders, and civilians. For most long-distance operations, the Army attempts to instill soldiers with an awareness of societal and cultural norms for the regions in which they operate. While these programs are useful, they fall short of providing an adequate understanding of today's complex settings, of divergent values and norms. Working with diverse cultures in their home element is more a matter of finesse, diplomacy, and communication than the direct application of coercive power. Success demands an understanding of individual, community, and societal normative patterns as they relate to the tasks soldiers perform and the environment in which they are performed. Cultural education is now necessary as part of soldier and leader development programs.³

Culture Defined

Culture consists of origins, values, roles, and material items associated with a particular group of people. It includes evaluative standards and norms and rules or models defining what entities and actors exist in a system and how they operate and interrelate.⁴ Culture, which is learned and shared by members of a group, is presented to children as their social heritage. Cultural norms are the standard, model, or pattern a specific cultural race, ethnic, religious, or social group regards as typical. It includes thoughts, behaviors, and patterns of communication, customs, beliefs, values, and institutions.⁵

The Importance of Cross Cultural Awareness

The requirement to operate effectively in the international environment demands an international perspective and an understanding of the various political, economic and cultural factors that influence decision-making in other countries. Multinational operations are commonplace today. The current influence of radical religious groups, transnational threats and non-state actors further complicates the ability to form strategic alliances. As such, strategic leaders must know their potential enemies, who may share common interests in addressing an international threat, what alliances and relationships exist among and between involved factions, and what the political and diplomatic dynamics of the situation may be internationally and domestically. Strategic leaders must be aware that successful multinational operations require a particular sensitivity to the impact the deployment of United States forces may have on the laws, traditions and customs of a host country.⁶

Cross cultural awareness accepts and creates an environment which allows each culture to contribute its values, perspectives, and behaviors in constructive ways to enrich the outcome. With the increase in multinational efforts, cultural competence is a critical leadership

requirement. Stability and support operations demand adept leaders who can work with community, international, and private organizations whose members come from widely divergent cultural backgrounds.⁷

It is imperative that leaders understand culture at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Misunderstanding culture at the strategic level can produce policies that exacerbate an insurgency; a lack of cultural knowledge at an operational level can lead to negative public opinion; and ignorance of the culture at a tactical level endangers both civilians and troops.⁸

Recent conflicts, such as Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, have forced leaders to develop their skills in managing local populations. These skills were developed out of the necessity of dealing with the local culture. The culture of our adversaries matters. Cultural knowledge benefits leaders when integrated into planning, especially when the desired outcome is to win the hearts and minds of the local population.⁹

Future operations likely will involve the same kind of policing action with a large amount of interaction between US military forces and indigenous people. There is less likelihood of a worldwide conventional war, like World War II, compared to protracted conflicts geared toward a non-state actor, an organization, or a country. Given this, there rarely will be a need for total destruction. The military goals will be identified as destroying or diffusing the bad elements with an eye toward future rebuilding. Integrating cultural knowledge in operational planning will increase in importance, and it will be a continuing theme central to actual and perceived US success. "Wars are won as much by creating alliances, leveraging nonmilitary advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions, and managing perceptions--all these tasks demand an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivation."¹⁰

Cross Cultural Awareness as it Relates to Multinational Operations

The United States military is prepared to wage war, to maintain peace and stability and to provide support to other nations in times of disaster. Increasingly, these activities are being carried out through multinational operations with forces from many other nations. Given the complexity of multinational operations and the numerous obstacles to success, senior military professionals must hone their cultural skills and develop competencies that work well during multinational operations. They must not assume that leadership techniques that have worked in national tactical applications will be effective with foreign militaries. Given the likelihood of US participation in multinational operations and the importance of these operations to American interests, military leaders must carefully prepare now for the associated professional

challenges¹¹ because there are few scenarios in which it can respond effectively to these challenges without the sustained support of allies and partners.¹²

The critical ingredients to building successful alliances are the shared recognition of common threats and a pledge to take action to counter them.¹³ Building them actually begins long before they are needed. Last-minute courting of previously neglected nation-states can breed suspicion, resentment, and ultimately, refusal of support if intended partners perceive they are being treated disrespectfully. A senior official recently suggested that if you treat other recognized sovereign entities with dignity and respect day to day, they will feel more like bona fide stakeholders in a common cause and thus be more amenable to cooperating when their collaboration is needed. In this setting, states which participate in multinational operations will truly be a coalition of the *willing*, not a coalition of the *compelled*.¹⁴

Nadja West suggests that by being more culturally attuned to its friends, the United States might build better multinational coalitions by remembering the three “A”s of *acknowledge*, *appreciate*, and *accept*. They must *acknowledge* that other prospective members of a coalition may not enjoy America’s hyperpower status, but they still have pride, history, intelligence, and the potential to contribute. America must *appreciate* that possible participants may have laws, conflicting interests, or differing opinions that may not allow them to become affiliated with the gathering coalition. They may have other agreements or relationships on which they depend that would be compromised if they committed to the suggested partnership. Most importantly, America must graciously *accept* that the offer to align with the forming multinational organization may be declined – a choice that democracy may require. According to West, the “play my way or I will take my marbles and go home” mentality is irritating on the playground; when demonstrated by a great power, it is unbecoming indeed.¹⁵

How Our History Has Shaped The American Experience

America’s ability to remain in a world leadership role has never before depended so much on being able to influence foreign populations. Yet in the years since the end of the Cold War, the world has witnessed a sharp rise in anti-Americanism: “Anti-Americanism is now like a religion around the world.”¹⁶ Such hostility and resentment comes largely as a result of trying to transplant, too directly, American culture to the rest of the world. It is intuitive for most Americans to feel that modernity and the pursuit of individual liberties are the only viable way for humanity to progress. Yet Americans might well be blind to what the rest of the world thinks and are ignorant about alternatives. Such lack of comprehension in a world where the U.S. population is a distinct minority risks America’s future. America today is confronted with several

competing non-Western ideologies that Americans seem culturally blind to acknowledging.¹⁷ Cross cultural awareness demands successfully operating in a world that is increasingly hostile.

American culture is a Western Hemisphere “New World Paradigm” that historically has had the challenge of assimilating immigrants from nearly every culture in the world. In such an environment, any foreign culture is seen as a problem to overcome. U.S. success has come from blurring cultural differences and finding common ground among disparate peoples to produce a “new” American identity. U.S. history is one of breaking down foreign cultures, the opposite of being cross culturally aware, which is the ability to understand and work within other cultures. Some argue that no matter how much cultural education Americans receive, the legacy of immigrant and multicultural assimilation resists understanding foreign cultures.¹⁸

The Western Hemisphere New World Paradigm is founded on “American exceptionalism,” which promotes the successful integration of immigrants by creating a new common identity. American exceptionalism is an extremely nationalistic style of culture that arose from the success of the U.S. national experience. The United States forged a new and vibrant nation with a unique model grounded in several concepts such as upward social and economic mobility, new concepts of social justice, individual liberties under the rule of law, separation of church and state, and successful integration of foreign immigration. As the first “universal nation,” one that had to accommodate many diverse immigrants, the United States does not include, to the same degree, the elements of hierarchy, community, tradition, and custom so evident in other cultures.¹⁹ “The U.S. fundamental belief in exceptionalism is its righteousness and moral superiority over other nations.”²⁰

Americans must be sensitive to being perceived as chauvinistic towards more traditional cultures. “Chauvinism—Americans think America is the biggest and the best, the newest and the richest, and all others are a bit slow, old-fashioned, rather poor, and somewhat on the small side.”²¹ Under this logic, it is argued that everything with the “Old World” is flawed, and everything with the “New World” is superior. By understanding American exceptionalism, the United States can better understand its deep-rooted inclinations and keep from applying “one shoe fits all” solutions. In a sense, the “manifest destiny,” which led Americans to conquer the North American continent, has been rekindled, and seeks to reshape the world under American principles of social and economic success. Exceptionalism lies at the heart of America’s cultural uniqueness, but other historical experience also shapes its culture.²²

American national purpose and the worldview it acts toward continue to build the globalized world emerging today. It promises an even brighter future for humanity, if American leadership can convince the rest of the world to continue following the American model and resist competing ideologies. But American ineptness in reconciling competing foreign ideas with U.S. goals could yet derail progress. Experience shows U.S. policy to be somewhat blind to

other views and sending conflicting signals, often making it look like a threat to traditional societies. Essentially, U.S. policymakers, strategists, and other national security professionals lack competency in cross cultural awareness.²³

Learning from History

“Knowing your enemy” is not an historical U.S. strength. Americans generally do not appreciate other societies and cultures, much less “know” them well enough to facilitate accurate predictive analysis. A study of American history shows a pattern of not recognizing subtle clues that foretold radical shifts in history, much of it hidden in a cultural context. For example, the United States was surprised by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 because it failed to anticipate the Japanese military response to the U.S. prewar trade embargo against Japan. Nor did the United States and its allies fully appreciate the consequences of the rise of Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler; perhaps swayed by the appearance of a German democratic process. The United States did not see the rise of Communism as an enemy of democracy during World War II and, subsequently, failed to foresee the Cold War. The United States failed to foresee the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, and did not appreciate the significance of the start of the Islamic “jihad” there, expediently focusing on al-Qa’ida’s shared goal with the United States at the time—the defeat of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United States failed to anticipate the downfalls of both the Shah of Iran and the Soviet Union, not recognizing when their populations would react and how to support it. Even today, we can see traces of Neville Chamberlain’s “peace in our time” through appeasement in how we dealt with the rise of Islamic radicals in the 1990s.²⁴ Consequently, rampant multilateralism and Islamic fundamentalism continue to hinder the achievement of the U.S. worldview. Each of these events had an ideological component rooted in their peoples’ culture.²⁵

Making enemies is easy. It is harder to make friends. The wrong approach to allied or occupied countries can quickly create enemies. In Iraq, however, a cultural divide brought to the fore issues three generations of soldiers have considered only peripherally. Operating in a foreign land can be a minefield. Few members of the Armed Forces are familiar with cultural traditions of the countries in which they operate. Yet violation of local norms and beliefs can turn a welcoming population into a hostile mob. Iraqis arrested by U.S. troops have had their heads forced to the ground -- a position forbidden by Islam except during prayers. This action offends detainees as well as bystanders. In Bosnia, American soldiers angered Serbs by greeting them with the two-fingered peace sign, a gesture commonly used by their Croat enemies. And the circled-finger “A–OK” signal was a gross insult to Somalis. The military has

enough to worry about without alienating the local population. It is clear that the Armed Forces lack sophisticated knowledge of foreign countries. That does not dishonor their performance; cultural awareness has not been a mission-essential task—but it should be. Winning a conflict means more than subduing an enemy. While the U.S. military ran into trouble in the past, it was not because it lacked combat skills, personal courage, or the necessary resources. As operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated, the process of restructuring the political order, economy, and social well being of an entire country is as critical as defeating organized resistance. But it is cultural awareness that is important to sustaining long-term American military presence—and may determine the outcome of the mission.²⁶

In today's operating environment successful counterinsurgency depends on attaining a holistic, total understanding of local culture. This cultural understanding must be thorough and deep if it is to have any practical benefit at all. This fact is not lost on the Army. In the language of FM 3-24 (Counterinsurgency): "Successful conduct of counterinsurgency operations depends on thoroughly understanding the society and culture within which they are being conducted."²⁷ Therefore, understanding the local society and gaining its support is critical to success. For U.S. forces to operate effectively among a local population and gain and maintain their support, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and its culture, including its history, tribal/family/social structure, values, religions, customs, and needs."²⁸

To defeat the insurgency in Iraq, U.S. and coalition forces must recognize and exploit the underlying tribal structure of the country, the power wielded by traditional authority figures, the use of Islam as a political ideology, the competing interests of the Shia, the Sunni, and the Kurds, the psychological effects of totalitarianism, and the divide between urban and rural, among other things. Understanding and working within the social fabric of a local area is initially the most influential factor in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. This is often the factor most neglected by U.S. forces.²⁹

What We're Doing Wrong Today

Operation Iraqi Freedom is the text-book "missed opportunity" when it comes to knowing your enemy or demonstrating cross cultural awareness. The United States was not ready to seize the peace through a combination of two strategic missteps: lack of "Phase IV" post-hostilities planning; and the "firing" of the Iraqi Army, civil service, and police forces.³⁰ Sun Tzu wrote, "Generally, in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this."³¹

World War II strategists would have recognized the need to plan for the postwar (Phase IV) time frame early with the specific intent of including as many former regime elements as

possible in the postwar reconstruction. In World War II, the United States used Japanese and German institutions and personnel fairly effectively. It is likely that the United States confused the local cultural intricacies of being “Ba’thist” with being “pro-Saddam,” leading to no government functioning after the “firings.” In the same manner, the United States confused anti-Saddamism for pro-U.S. sentiment. What was underappreciated were the long-term implications of being “freed” by “infidels” on the culturally proud Muslims when U.S. forces had to occupy the nation.³² As Eliot Cohen, an observer of American strategy, often states, Iraq “requires the rarest of American qualities: patience.”³³

At a strategic level, policymakers misunderstood the tribal nature of Iraqi culture and society. They assumed that the civilian apparatus of the government would remain intact after the regime was decapitated. In fact, when the United States cut off the hydra’s Ba’thist head, power reverted to its most basic and stable form--the tribe. As a tribal leader observed, “We follow the central government.... But of course if communications are cut between us and the center, all authority will revert to our sheik.” Tribes are the basic organizing social fact of life in Iraq. Once the Sunni Ba’thists lost their prestigious jobs, were humiliated, and got frozen out through de-Ba’thification, the tribal network became the backbone of the insurgency.³⁴ The tribal insurgency is a direct result of our misunderstanding Iraqi culture.³⁵

At the operational level, the military misunderstood the system of information transmission in Iraqi society and consequently lost opportunities to influence public opinion. One Marine back from Iraq noted, “We were focused on broadcast media and metrics. But this had no impact because Iraqis spread information through rumor. Instead of tapping into their networks, we should have visited their coffee shops.” Unfortunately, the emphasis on force protection prevented soldiers from visiting coffee shops and buying items on the economy. Soldiers and Marines were unable to establish one-to-one relationships with Iraqis, which are key to both intelligence collection and winning hearts and minds. A related issue was the military’s squelching of Iraqi freedom of speech. Many members of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Combined Joint Task Force 7 felt that anti-coalition and anti-American rhetoric was a threat to security and sought to stop its spread.³⁶ Closing Muqtada al Sadr’s Al Hawza newspaper contributed to an Iraqi perception that Americans do not really support freedom of speech despite their claims to the contrary, reinforcing their view of Americans as hypocrites.³⁷

These points demonstrate how necessary it is that a cultural subject matter expert be required to at least explain the players and organizations and their motivations behind the actions. It definitely highlights how much is not known and how much is glossed over in briefings and smart cards.³⁸

Over-Reliance on Conventional Operations

The most straightforward reason why the Army struggled in OIF Phase IV to achieve the effectiveness demonstrated in the preceding combat phase was that it was, by design, relatively ill prepared for it. Phase IV is the rebuilding and security phase that relies on cultural knowledge and the human element to help win over support and unite the country under the new democratic government.³⁹ Even though Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) operations occupied the majority of the Army's operational time since the Cold War, these roles have not been considered core Army activities. The Army's focus has been conventional warfighting, and its branches into COIN and S&R have been regarded as a diversion, to be undertaken reluctantly, and preferably by Special Operations Forces and other specialists, many of whom are in the Army reserves. So deeply ingrained is the Army's focus on conventional warfighting that even when HQ 3 Corps was preparing to deploy to Iraq in early 2004 to conduct COIN and S&R operations, its pre-deployment training still focused on conventional operations.⁴⁰

Nor does COIN have a strong conceptual foundation for training in the U.S. Army. As LTC Scott M. Eagen noted: "To make matters worse, nowhere in the DOD's Joint Professional Military Education system is there a course that is solely dedicated to the specific study of counter-insurgency."⁴¹ Written doctrine has also been neglected. The U.S. Army published an interim field manual on COIN only recently, in response to events in Iraq, but too late to assist those who needed to adapt so swiftly in 2003.⁴²

The U.S. military has focused on the destruction of the enemy's forces, rather than a more finely tuned harnessing of military effect to serve political intent. This becomes highly significant when an army attuned to conventional warfare suddenly needs to adapt to the more subtle political framework of a COIN campaign. In short, the U.S. Army developed over time a singular focus on conventional warfare, of a particularly swift and violent style, which left it ill-suited to the kind of operation it encountered as soon as conventional warfighting ceased to be the primary focus in OIF. Success thereafter therefore depended on its capacity to adapt, to S&R in the first place, and then to COIN as the insurgency gathered strength during 2003.⁴³

Over-Reliance on Overwhelming Force

Winning on the battlefield is irrelevant against an insurgent adversary because the struggle for power and legitimacy among competing factions has no purely military solution. Often, the application of overwhelming force has the negative, unintended effect of strengthening the insurgency by creating martyrs, increasing recruitment, and demonstrating the

“brutality” of state forces. The alternative approach to fighting insurgency, such as the British eventually adopted through trial and error in Northern Ireland, involves the following: A comprehensive plan to alleviate the political conditions behind the insurgency; civil-military cooperation; the application of minimum force; deep intelligence; and an acceptance of the protracted nature of the conflict. Deep cultural knowledge of the adversary is inherent to the British approach.⁴⁴

Although cultural knowledge of the adversary matters in counterinsurgency, it has little importance in major combat operations. Because the Powell-Weinberger doctrine of overwhelming force meant conventional, large-scale war was the only acceptable type of conflict, no discernable present or future need existed to develop doctrine and expertise in unconventional war, including counterinsurgency. Thus, there was no need to incorporate cultural knowledge into doctrine, training, or warfighting.⁴⁵

Over-Reliance on Technology

Since the Israeli War of Independence, Islamic armies are 0 and 7 when fighting Western style and 5-0-1 when fighting unconventionally against Israel, the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite this statistic, the United States remains infatuated with technology and transformation via technology. Americans believe success in war is best achieved by overwhelming technological advantage. Transformation has been interpreted exclusively as a technological challenge. So far, the United States has spent billions to gain a few additional meters of precision, knots of speed, or bits of bandwidth. Former Commandant of the United States Army War College, MG (ret) Robert H. Scales, believes this is money that might be better spent to improve how our military thinks and become more culturally aware of the adversary we are facing.”⁴⁶

Consensus seems to be building that this conflict was fought brilliantly at the technological level but inadequately at the human level. The human element seems to underlie virtually all the functional shortcomings chronicled in official reports and media stories. Technological failures are easy to identify and fix. Human failures are not. The U.S. military is not accustomed to finding collective solutions to address human failures. MG (ret) Scales insists that this war has shown that such an approach is essential and long overdue.

It is quite logical in a force with unparalleled access to high technology, to seek to use technological solutions to compensate for shortages in manpower. That logic is further encouraged when the deployed force is supported by a massive industrial base, with vested business interests in the wider employment of technological solutions and a powerful

Congressional lobby culture. However, the lure of technology can be misleading. In an environment where, above all else, it is imperative that the occupying force be seen as a force for the good, it is counter-productive when technological solutions are employed that promote separation from the population. Furthermore, a predilection with technology arguably encourages the search for the quick, convenient solution, often at the expense of the less obvious, but ultimately more enduring one.⁴⁷

Ralph Peters wrote in *Fighting for the Future*, "We need to struggle against our American tendency to focus on hardware and bean counting to attack the more difficult and subtle problems posed by human behavior and regional history."⁴⁸ In the dozen years between operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. military made tremendous technological strides in its efforts to increase all aspects of its joint warfighting capability, specifically the overall lethality of the force, joint information management and situational awareness driven by enhanced collection capabilities. But it is clear that the joint force did not place the same premium on gaining an adequate understanding of the Iraqi people and their culture.⁴⁹

The Problem with Intelligence

Once the kinetic phase of the fighting in Iraq ended, soldiers and Marines found themselves immersed in an alien culture unable to differentiate friend from foe or to identify those within the population they could trust to provide useful and timely tactical intelligence. The military relied on intelligence-gathering tools and methods left over from the Cold War. A technical intelligence specialist sitting in Maryland could exploit data collected from overhead sensors to count vehicles, spot convoy movement, or report on the level of telephone traffic halfway around the globe. But in spite of good intentions, he could not begin to divine how the enemy intended to fight. Today, the enemy's motives often remain a mystery, and the cost in casualties of this inability to understand the enemy and predict his actions has been too great.⁵⁰

The military possessed the technological means in Iraq to conduct net-centric warfare with unparalleled proficiency. But it lacked the intellectual acumen, cultural awareness, and knowledge of the art of war to conduct culture-centric warfare. When the enemy adapts and finds ways to overcome the advantages of net-centric warfare, a focus on the art rather than the science of war becomes necessary to secure success. Sensors, computer power, and bandwidth count for little against a dispersed enemy who communicates by word of mouth and back-alley messengers and fights using simple weapons that do not require networks or sophisticated technological integration to be effective. The lessons are clear. Computers and aerial drones are no substitute for human eyes and brains.⁵¹

This over-reliance on technical intelligence and technology is no more evident than in the story by the returning commander from 3d Infantry Division who observed: "I had perfect situational awareness. What I lacked was cultural awareness. I knew where every enemy tank was dug in, only problem was, my soldiers had to fight fanatics charging on foot or in pickups and firing AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades. Great technical intelligence...wrong enemy." As this commander's observation indicates, understanding one's enemy requires more than a satellite photo of an arms dump. Rather, it requires an understanding of their interests, habits, intentions, beliefs, social organizations, and political symbols--in other words, their culture.⁵²

The Way Ahead

The Department of Defense, the services and the federal government realize the importance culture plays in today's operational environment and are taking action to address their shortcomings. While the United States currently lacks the dedicated programs, systems, models, personnel, and organizations to instill cross-cultural awareness across the entire national security structure, the on-going efforts described below will help to correct past inadequacies in cultural awareness as they begin to incorporate cultural knowledge of our adversaries into doctrine, training, leadership, education, planning, intelligence, and operations.

Key Cultural Targets and Competencies

In the future, the key powers in a regional or global context will most likely be the United States, the European Union, China, Japan, and Russia. Future alliances, coalitions, and partnerships will most likely be tied to these nations. Key regional powers, whose activities or issues have the greatest possibility for creating global consequences, are most likely to be Indonesia, India, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, South Africa, Brazil, Algeria, and Mexico. In addition, natural resources in the Caspian Basin, off the coast of east-central Africa and in Venezuela will certainly increase those regions' importance.

Unfortunately, history demonstrates the uncertainty of predicting where, when, and with whom our military might be required to operate. Adopting an approach, at least initially, oriented toward some foundational cultural norms with broader application across a wider range of settings might prove more prudent. However these nations might offer a good starting point for a program of study of other cultures.⁵³

The difficulty for the operational commander is determining what information is relevant to his mission and where to find that information. Bledsoe provides the following cultural aspects that provide critical information for cross-culturally competent leaders. Those points include: a basic understanding of the major cultural differences between tribes, groups, factions and

organizations, understanding public opinion, knowing what the tension points are and knowing the centers of power. Additionally, cultural competency includes understanding local religions and basic belief systems, sources of pride and sources of shame and what aspect of the culture must be influenced in order to initiate change.⁵⁴

Anthropology's Contribution to Cross Cultural Awareness

Countering the insurgency in Iraq requires cultural and social knowledge of the adversary. Yet, none of the elements of U.S. national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, or economic—explicitly take adversaries' culture into account in the formation or execution of policy. This cultural knowledge gap has a simple cause—the almost total absence of anthropology within the national-security establishment.⁵⁵ The aim in anthropological studies is to develop cultural patterns and find the inherent reasons for their practices and traditions. An anthropological cultural analysis can provide a staff the information it requires to complete mission analysis, planning and execution.

At the strategic level there is a clear need to infuse the national security structure with anthropologists and culturally aware policy makers. The field of anthropology was largely developed to support military operations of the British Empire and later the American experience. U.S. national security and military policy makers were able to draw from the resources of the federal government during the Indian Wars and World War II. During Vietnam U.S. planners recognized that familiarity with indigenous, non-western cultures was vital to waging counter-insurgency operations.⁵⁶

Cultural knowledge and understanding can benefit a combatant commander's mission when integrated into an operational level course of action especially when the desired outcome is to win and utilize the popular support of the indigenous population. A special staff position on a joint task force level staff could provide the commander and staff all the necessary information during the planning and execution phases of the operation. Bledsoe recommends creating a position on the commander's staff for an anthropologist. This special staff person, a cultural consultant, would have training in the study of culture, as well as military operational knowledge, and would not only be the resident expert but also would have access to other experts in the academic and professional arena.⁵⁷

Improving Cultural Intelligence

The current intelligence system is also not up to the task of providing the required level of cultural intelligence. Retired Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, USN, Director of the Office of Force Transformation, noted that "the value of military intelligence is exceeded by that of social and

cultural intelligence. We need the ability to look, understand, and operate deeply into the fault lines of societies where, increasingly, we find the frontiers of national security."⁵⁸ But we must also provide the commanders on the ground with detailed information regarding local customs, ethnicity, biographic data, military geography, and infectious diseases." Producing intelligence on these factors can be challenging. After the U.S. battle in Somalia, Lieutenant General James R. Clapper Jr., Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, noted, "We provided detailed analysis on more than 40 clans and subclans operating in Somalia--far more difficult than counting tanks and planes."⁵⁹

William Flavin argues that intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) should address political, economic, linguistic, religious, demographic, ethnic, psychological, and legal factors. The intelligence operation needs to determine the necessary and sufficient conditions that must exist for the conflict to terminate and for post-conflict efforts to succeed.⁶⁰ The U.S. Joint Forces Command, tasked with the lead for transformation within the Department of Defense, has taken a first step in placing more emphasis on cultural intelligence and the imperative to understand a country's or region's dynamics well beyond fielded forces or other potential combatants. The draft "Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept" focuses on the vital period within a campaign that follows large-scale combat operations. Pervasive knowledge in security, transition, and reconstruction operations requires thorough familiarity with all of the dynamics at work within the joint area of operations: political, economic, social, cultural, religious. The joint force commander must have an understanding of who will oppose transition efforts and what motivates them to do so.⁶¹

Improving Professional Military Education and Training

Cultural knowledge and warfare are bound together. Knowledge of one's adversary as a means to improve military prowess has been sought since Herodotus studied his opponents' conduct during the Persian Wars (490-479 BC).⁶² Cultural understanding is not derived from demographic information like that usually provided to the military in country briefs just prior to deployment. Cultural understanding and cross-cultural awareness is gained from studying and understanding the people, religion, history, customs, and their social and political structures.⁶³

Within the military, the keys to properly understanding centers of gravity and getting at the vulnerabilities with supporting concepts of military operations are cultural education and training and foreign language training, all of which serve to provide the grounds for working better with allies in a more mutually symbiotic way. True reform in the way Americans deal with foreign cultures is best served through long-term and sustained education, preferably learned through

foreign contact before entering the military. This is a long-term strategic imperative for the nation, but the military must confront the challenge today.

Educating for Cross Cultural Awareness

“Cross-cultural awareness” as a leadership competency is addressed several times in Army Field Manual 6-22, *Leadership*. It describes the attributes of a leader as one who prepares himself by developing core leader competencies characterized by maintaining relevant cultural awareness and geopolitical awareness. These skills are developed by learning the adversary’s language, values, customs, behavior, ideas, beliefs, and patterns of thinking. A strategic leader knows when culture plays a role in mission success. He learns about relevant societies outside the United States experiencing unrest. He recognizes Army influences on other countries, allies, and enemies and understands the factors influencing conflict and peacekeeping, peace enforcing and peacemaking missions.⁶⁴

According to Colonel (ret) Leonard Wong, a research professor at the United States Army War College, strategic leaders must take it upon themselves individually and as professionals to bear the responsibility for understanding the role culture plays in operations. Wong states,

The Army’s future leaders clearly need to be well versed in interacting with cultures outside American borders. The term “cross-cultural savvy” refers to more than just the ability to work with non-U.S. militaries. This “metacompetency” includes the ability to understand cultures beyond one’s organizational, economic, religious, societal, geographical, and political boundaries. A strategic leader with cross-cultural savvy is comfortable interacting with and leading joint, international, interagency, or inter-organizational entities. Future strategic leaders must work with diverse groups of people and organizations ranging from 24-year old congressional staffers, to Northern Alliance warlords, to representatives from non-governmental organizations.⁶⁵

Cross-cultural awareness can be developed in future strategic leaders as early as pre-commissioning with courses in foreign languages, international relations, and regional studies. Time spent abroad or interning with various organizations can also help broaden the horizons of officers. In the institutional school setting, joint and interagency issues can be taught as well as electives focused on specific regions. Developing cross-cultural awareness in the institutional arena should move the officer from a general understanding and appreciation of other cultures as acquired early in the career to a gradual focus later in the career on particular cultures, organizations or regions.⁶⁶

The Army’s Review of Education, Training and Assignments for Leaders (RETAL) Study completed in November, 2006, identified the need for its officers to become “pentathletes.” The

pentathlete Army officer is a multi-skilled leader who is grounded in the warrior ethos and aspires to become a multi-talented expert possessing mental agility, cultural awareness, business acumen and governance skills. A pentathlete officer personifies the warrior ethos in all aspects, from war fighting to statesmanship to business management. The Army RETAL study concluded that officer leader development requires additional emphasis leading to a broader identity in the areas of mental agility, cross-cultural awareness, governance and enterprise management.⁶⁷

When comparing the desired pentathlete attributes with the current leader development system, additional emphasis was required for the development of senior pentathlete officers. To enhance this process, the Army RETAL study recommended the creation of an ROTC Foreign Immersion experience. This recommendation will increase the officer corps' foreign cultural awareness capability by developing and encouraging cultural awareness in ROTC cadets. This initiative provides the best ROTC cadets an opportunity to broaden their horizons by immersing them in a foreign culture for a short period of time to indicate to pre-commissioned officers that the Army values cross-cultural savvy.⁶⁸

Continuing along the leader's professional timeline from pre-commissioning through a lifelong learning process of cultural awareness the operational environment also plays a role in developing cultural awareness in leaders. Officers should have multiple tours outside the Army's mainstream units. Deployments offer a particularly good opportunity to understand and work with different cultures and different organizations outside the military.⁶⁹ On-the-ground lessons will be vital to ensuring academic studies are keeping up with the reality of the battlefield.

The Army is now offering post-graduate study opportunities to its officers through the "Expanded Graduate School" opportunities program for junior officers. The Army's Human Resources Command has been authorized to offer additional graduate school opportunities to outstanding junior officers to enhance development of the broader intellectual capital required in a Joint and Expeditionary Army. This opportunity provides officers the ability to earn a high-quality graduate degree and return to the field for a follow-on key developmental utilization assignment. This program has two reinforcing objectives: development of critical skills and long term retention of quality junior officers. Officers are authorized to attend an accredited U.S. graduate school while required to study in an approved discipline that enhances the competencies required in an expeditionary Army -- emphasizing cultural awareness, regional knowledge, foreign language, governance, diplomacy, national security or social sciences that reinforce operational skills.⁷⁰

Training for Cultural Awareness

The Army can expand on the educational base by ensuring tactical and operational training programs address cultural factors. At the national training centers, opposing-force role players should be skilled in emulating key cultural norms that might affect military actions and activities. All leaders should be exposed to these factors and receive appropriate feedback on how well they manage differences and accomplish tasks. The Army should also consider introducing cultural-awareness training into Battle Command Training Programs and combat training centers where, with allies and partners, command and staffs would be combined to foster development of cultural competency skills. Models and simulations in support of training should begin to include cultural factors which will increase the number of variables and complicate environments so they more closely approximate reality. This program is already being worked by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).⁷¹

Army and Marine units deploying to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa receive unit-level cultural awareness training in preparation for deployments, much like they have in the past. Soldiers deploying to Iraq where they face suicide bombings, skirmishes, riots, and cultural clashes are learning to react to such things as if they are second nature after weeks of war gaming at the National Training Center, at Fort Irwin, California, the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany. These training centers are focusing on cultural challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan to make soldiers more confident in confronting the cross-cultural challenges they face on the battlefield.⁷²

Predeployment training focuses on the current military situation for all the obvious reasons. But cultural awareness training must be accomplished on a regular basis and well in advance. Thus that knowledge must already be in place before it is time to go.⁷³ Integrating cultural knowledge into operational planning will not only help with the decisive phases of the operation but will help tailor the operation that will include a functional "Phase IV" with early coordination from the appropriate government organizations. Early integration could also help tailor predeployment training, so that soldiers going into the conflict will have a better understanding of the culture of that particular region.⁷⁴ With a deeper understanding of the region or host nation being supported, the commander is better prepared to deal with the design of his campaign or supporting efforts including civil dimension of operations and post-conflict activities.⁷⁵

The latest distance learning technology permits military students to learn in groups, in virtual seminars and even while on the job in some distant theater. The task of learning

therefore should maximize sharing and distribution. Our officers and noncommissioned officers understand this phenomenon; the remarkable success of web sites such as companycommander.com and platoonleader.com testify to the need young leaders have to learn by sharing. Soldiers should become members of a web-based community of learners from the moment they join the service.⁷⁶

In the past, responsibility for learning has been relegated to military learning institutions. If we are to create a body of leaders capable of fighting future asymmetric wars, responsibility for learning must be shifted to those most responsible for success—unit commanders. Unit-based learning and leader development must be perceived as a condition for unit readiness. More stable home basing and a cycled rotation system now under development in the Army and extant in other services will allow enough scheduled down time for commanders to establish and actively superintend a disciplined study program for junior officers and noncommissioned officers.⁷⁷

The Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Awareness Center offers The 2007 Professional Military Education Cultural Awareness Training Support Package which contains four levels of training spanning from initial military training to courses designed for company commanders. It offers lessons in defining culture, discussions of American and personal culture to determine areas of conflict and biases, the cultures of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the impact of culture on military operations through multiple practical exercises and situational training exercises.⁷⁸ TRADOC also recently established the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to provide the training, and practical experience foundation to enable a force-wide red teaming capability.⁷⁹

Service Approaches to Cultural Training and Education

An example of how one of the services is developing and growing cross culturally aware servicemen and women is the United States Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL). The CAOCL was established at Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM), Quantico, Virginia in May 2005. According to the Marine Corps Commandant's vision, CAOCL is to develop an operationally focused "...understanding of the people we are trying to help and the people we are fighting: their culture, what they think is unimportant, what they think is important," through focused training for the operating forces, individual training and Professional Military Education (PME), Distance Learning, and Professional Reading.

CAOCL promotes a grasp of culture and language as regular, mainstream components of the operating environment—the human terrain—throughout the full spectrum of military operations. It is the Corps’ “one-stop” clearing house for operational culture and language training. CAOCL ensures Marines are equipped with operationally relevant regional, culture, and language knowledge to allow them to plan and operate successfully in the joint and combined expeditionary environment: in any region of the world in current and potential operating conditions. CAOCL executes operationally focused training and education in individual training, PME, and pre-deployment phases, reflecting current and likely contingencies and functions, to ensure Marines and leaders deploy a grasp of culture and indigenous dynamics for use as a force multiplier.⁸⁰

The U.S. Air Force also recognizes the need for its Airmen to be culturally in tune with today’s operating environment. The Air Force University Culture and Language Center supports the Expeditionary Air Force by providing Airmen at all ranks with the best available understanding of foreign cultures and the competencies to communicate and collaborate effectively with members of foreign societies. The Culture and Language Center’s mission is to serve as a premier Department of Defense institution for the definition of cross-cultural competencies, for the development of conceptual tools to facilitate analysis of culturally distinct behavior, and for the sponsorship and application of cutting-edge research into cross-cultural communications.

The Culture and Language Center was established at the Air University in 2006. The Center focuses on education, research, and publications that support cultural studies, cross-cultural communication, and cultural awareness programs. The primary focus of the Center is the enhancement of cross-cultural competencies within the US Air Force. The Center conducts and sponsors research into the development of cross-cultural competencies by USAF personnel, as well as research addressing the requirement for specific skills needed by individuals in particular assignments and roles.⁸¹

Changes to the Foreign Area Officer Program

Even though all services now have a foreign area officer (FAO) program, the military still lacks advisers who can provide local knowledge to commanders on the ground. FAOs are officers trained and proficient as regional experts, with the requisite language skills, cultural and regional knowledge, and diplomatic training to operate in any part of the world.⁸² They are the closest thing to cultural experts the military has, however, they are more regional generalists vice possessing formal cultural education and training of a specific people and culture. The fact

they learn the language and must spend time in their region of expertise remains a benefit to the commander. The issue is that there are just not enough FAOs to provide the commanders and staff with the necessary expertise. Most FAOs work at the embassies and are not on operational level staffs.⁸³

Other staff members, such as the information operations officer, the S/G-5, and the intelligence officer, become the de facto cultural consultant out of necessity when FAOs are not available. This is especially true for Operation Iraqi Freedom. As cultural analysis in this form is not their normal job, these staff members don't have the adequate cultural studies training to provide the commander with the relevant, required information. Their mind-sets are to develop possible enemy thought processes and actions, not a cultural analysis.⁸⁴

The post-cold war environment has shown time and again that DOD needs culture-centric expertise for the planning and execution of various military operations. FAOs provide the regional and linguistic skills to support those operations. A revamped FAO program must be part of that process. Reconstituting the FAO program will create regional experts who can improve operational planning, intelligence, and strategic communications. It will also provide the human capital and a long-term strategy for the services to better deal with the threats we are sure to face in the future.⁸⁵

DOD and Federal Initiatives and Programs for Cultural Awareness

The Department of Defense also recognizes the importance cultural education, training and language proficiency play in warfare and in October 2004, then Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld released a memo stating "foreign language skill and regional and cultural expertise are essential enabling capabilities for DOD activities in the transition to and from hostilities."⁸⁶ Additionally, DOD recently released the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (DLTR) which highlighted these same issues. The DLTR outlines an important series of steps for the Department of Defense to ensure that foreign language and regional expertise capabilities are developed and maintained for employment as strategic assets in the War on Terrorism and in all future military operations.

The roadmap directs the Joint Staff to promulgate guidance, policy, process, and procedures to integrate foreign language and regional expertise capabilities into all planning activities in support of joint operations. Language skills and regional expertise are critical "warfighting skills" that are integral to joint operations. Lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) prove that this force-multiplying

capability can save lives and ensure mission accomplishment throughout confrontation, conflict, and stabilization operations.⁸⁷

Joint doctrine is also reflecting the need for leaders to plan for and prioritize their foreign language and regional expertise requirements to ensure that combat forces deploy with the essential ability to understand and effectively communicate with native populations, local and government officials, and coalition partners when in theater. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3126-01 requires Combatant Commanders (COCOM) and supporting commanders to ensure foreign language and regional expertise capability requirements are integrated into all crisis, contingency and security cooperation plans, and day-to-day manning needs in support of military operations. COCOMs and force providers must consider all possible sourcing solutions from available DOD resources to include Active, Reserve, National Guard, contractor services, multi-language tools, allied/coalition partners, government civilians, and military retirees in order to meet the warfighter needs.⁸⁸

The February 6, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) found that developing broader linguistic capability and cultural understanding is critical to prevail in the long war and to meet 21st century challenges. Further, the QDR states that DOD must dramatically increase the number of personnel proficient in key languages such as Arabic, Farsi and Chinese and make these languages available at all levels of action and decision – from the strategic to the tactical. The Department must foster a level of understanding and cultural intelligence about the Middle East and Asia comparable to that developed about the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

To further language and cultural goals, DOD will increase funding for the Army's pilot linguist program to recruit and train native and heritage speakers to serve as translators in the Active and Reserve Components. Other recommendations include requiring language training for Service Academy and Reserve Officer Training Corps scholarship students and expanding immersion programs, semester abroad study opportunities and inter-academy foreign exchanges. Increase military special pay for foreign language proficiency. Increase National Security Education Program (NSEP) grants to American elementary, secondary and post-secondary education programs to expand non-European language instruction. Further recommendations call for the establishment of a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps, composed of approximately 1,000 people, as an on-call cadre of high-proficiency, civilian language professionals to support DOD and developing country and language familiarization packages and operationally- focused language instruction modules for deploying forces.⁸⁹

One final DOD assessment which recognized the importance language and culture play in operations is the Iraq Study Group Report which recommended that the Secretary of State, the

Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence should accord the highest possible priority to professional language proficiency and cultural training, in general and specifically for U.S. officers and personnel about to be assigned to Iraq.⁹⁰

While much of this knowledge is available inside and outside the government, there is no systematic way to access or coordinate information from these sources. We can mitigate this gap quickly and effectively by developing a specialized organization within the Department of Defense to produce, collect, and centralize cultural knowledge, which will have utility for policy development and military operations.

The Defense Science Board (DSB) suggests the creation of a National Center for Contingency Support, to be organized as a federally funded research and development corporation, which would have country and functional expertise to support contingency planning and joint interagency task forces. These proposed federal offices would maintain close working relations with DOD, country teams, regional centers, U.S. and foreign academia, think tanks, and so on.⁹¹ This organization should act as a clearinghouse for cultural knowledge, conduct on-the-ground ethnographic field research, provide reachback to combatant commanders, design and conduct cultural training and disseminate knowledge to the field in a useable form.

Among other things, this federal organization should be responsible for providing on-the-ground ethnographic research in all areas of strategic importance (such as Eastern Europe, the Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia) to support development of training, education, wargames, Red Teams, planning, and concepts.

Second, it should develop and conduct predeployment and advanced cultural training on specific countries, help develop Professional Military Education curriculum as needed, develop and produce computer-based training on society and culture and design and produce training that units can give at in-house training facilities.

Third, the organization should provide cultural advisers for planning and operations to commanders, implement experimental sociocultural programs, such as the cultural preparation of the environment and respond to demands from within DOD for sociocultural studies on areas of interest such as North Korean culture and society, Iranian military culture, and so on.

Establishing an office for operational cultural knowledge would solve many of the problems surrounding the effective, expedient use of adversary cultural knowledge. But, building an organization to capture operational cultural knowledge will require visionary leadership and tremendous persistence from someone inside the system who will not take no for an answer.⁹²

Conclusion

The changing nature of warfare requires a deeper understanding of adversary culture. The more unconventional the adversary, and the further from Western cultural norms, the more we need to understand the society and underlying cultural dynamics. To defeat non-Western opponents who are transnational in scope, nonhierarchical in structure, clandestine in approach, and who operate outside the context of nation-states, the capacity to improve the understanding of foreign cultures must be improved.⁹³ Unfortunately, the United States will have sufficient time to apply cultural lessons-learned and adapt to the enemy because this war is likely to go on for many years. The requirement for a more culturally aware force is more evident now than ever as General John Abizaid remarked while testifying before Congress March 5, 2004:

What will win the global war on terrorism will be people that can cross the cultural divide. It's an idea often overlooked by "people [who] want to build a new firebase or a new national training center for tanks. The war against terrorism is a war largely of intelligence and perceptions. As a result, it is important to tailor and temper our combat activities to cultural sensitivities and cultural concerns of the moderates as we pursue the terrorists."⁹⁴

Five years into the Global War on Terrorism the United States is struggling to adapt to a complex and constantly evolving enemy. The capacity to adapt to a different kind of warfare has been and will continue to be the key to success. The challenge is to adapt without compromising conventional warfighting ability. The U.S. must keep the temptation of technology in perspective and realize that the human dimension – cultural awareness -- is the key to adaptability⁹⁵ Doctrine must change and the accompanying support and training must follow for the change to take root. Cultural awareness must become a competency for soldier and leader alike.

Cultural knowledge of adversaries should be considered a national security priority and the entire defense establishment should comply with the recommendations from the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the 2006 Defense Science Board Task Force on Force Protection, the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, the Iraq Study Group and the Army's Review of Education, Training and Assignments for Leaders report and adopt measures to improve cultural awareness through education, training and proficiency in foreign languages. Additionally, the military must dedicate appropriate resources to create a world-class Foreign Area Officer program in parallel with infusing the combatant commanders' staffs with cultural anthropologists in order to maximize planning, intelligence and operations.

The military services realize the importance adversary culture plays in operations and are taking steps in the right direction to create centers for cultural knowledge and training. Many

initiatives have been undertaken already to include cultural courses in service school curricula as well as cultural factors in training scenarios. Additional study in the fields of customs, military history, philosophy, religion, government and literature of target cultures is also relevant and the pace of operations must not become so frantic just when the value of this education and training has never been more important.

A process of cognitive and cultural transformation cannot be accomplished in uncoordinated bits and pieces as it is today. Achieving such a transformation might well demand change as sweeping and revolutionary as the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The end state of this effort will be nothing less than a learning revolution throughout the Department of Defense. This much is clear from past efforts however, reform of this magnitude is essential, long overdue, and depends on the commitment of the entire military intellectual community.⁹⁶

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⁶¹ U.S. Joint Forces Command, draft working paper, "Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations: Joint Operating Concept," version 1.06. dated June 8, 2004 available from http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/draftstab_joc.doc; Internet; accessed March 10, 2007, 34.

⁶² McFate, "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," 42.

⁶³ Bledsoe, 4.

⁶⁴ U.S. Army Field Manual 6-22, *Army Leadership*, (Washington DC, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 12 October 2006), 6-7 to 6-9.

⁶⁵ Leonard Wong and Don M. Snider, "Strategic Leadership of the Army Profession," *The Future of the Army Profession*, project directors Don M. Snider and ed. Lloyd J. Matthews, (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 614.

⁶⁶ Wong and Snider, 615. At West Point, most members of the class of 2007 now have a requirement for one additional "culture" elective (foreign language, regional politics, geography, or history courses). Further, Academy and Army leaders are endeavoring to give as many cadets as possible an immersion experience in a foreign culture prior to commissioning. Michael J. Meese and Sean M. Morgan "New Requirements for Army Expert Knowledge: Afghanistan and Iraq" in *The Future of the Army Profession*, project directors Don M. Snider and ed. Lloyd J. Matthews, (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 363.

⁶⁷ Army's Review of Education, Training and Assignments for Leaders (RETAL), conducted during September through June of 2006. Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7, Washington, DC, November 22, 2006. On 6 July 2005, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) established the RETAL Task Force to answer the central question, "How should the Army develop its military and civilian leaders, who will serve in both operational and institutional capacities, to become pentathletes needed to operate and win in this new environment [21st Century national security environment]?"

⁶⁸ Review of Education, Training, and Assignments for Leaders (RETAL) Task Force Officer Team Report 16 June 2006. The RETAL Task Force consisted of three teams: Officer, Noncommissioned Officer and Civilian chartered to review the education, training and assignments of leaders for the 21st century. The Commandant, United States Army War College (USAWC), Carlisle, Pennsylvania was the Officer Team Lead. The Officer team consisted of three War College faculty members and three War College students from the class of Academic Year 2006.

⁶⁹ Wong and Snider, 615.

⁷⁰ U.S. Army Military Personnel (MILPER) Message 06-335, issued by the United States Army Human Resources Command, a Field Operating Agency of the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, available from <http://PERSCOMND04.ARMY.MIL/MILPERmsgsf/ALL+Documents/06-335?OpenDocument>; Internet; accessed 12 January 2007.

⁷¹ McFarland, 69.

⁷² Army News Service, "Training to Deploy," September 12, 2005, available from <http://usmilitary.about.com/od/armytrng/a/deploytraining.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 January 2007.

⁷³ Skelton and Cooper, 16.

⁷⁴ Bledsoe, 6.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Scales, 3.

⁷⁸ Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Awareness Center provides cultural awareness training, foreign language training and resources for MI, DOD, and Homeland Security personnel to enhance cultural awareness and maintain foreign language proficiency. Available from <http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/main.asp>; Internet; accessed 12 January 2007.

⁷⁹ Defense Science Board Task Force on Force Protection in Urban and Unconventional Environments, Washington, DC, March 2006 p 34. The Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD [AT&L]), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director, Defense Research and Engineering requested the Defense Science Board (DSB) to form a task force to evaluate force protection in the context of post- major combat operations that have been conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. The task force has assumed that such operations include stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR); counterinsurgency; and related operations that can occur in situations other than post-major combat. Available from http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2006-03-Force_Protection_Final.pdf; Internet; accessed 12 January 2007.

⁸⁰ U.S. Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), available from <http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/caocl>; Internet; accessed 12 January 2007.

⁸¹ The Air Force University Culture and Language Center, available from <http://www.au.af.mil/culture/about.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 January 2007.

⁸² Functional Area (FA) 48 Proponent website. The Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program available from <http://www.fao.army.mil/>; Internet; accessed 12 October 2006.

⁸³ Bledsoe, 28.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Lieutenant Commander Steven C. Boraz, U.S. Navy, "Behind the Curve in Culture-Centric Skills," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, April, 2005, 2.

⁸⁶ Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, memo titled, "Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities," October 8, 2004, available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050330roadmap.pdf>; Internet; accessed 12 January 2007.

⁸⁷ Department of Defense "Defense Language Transformation Roadmap," January 2005, 3. Post 9/11 military operations reinforce the reality that the Department of Defense needs a significantly improved organic capability in emerging languages and dialects, a greater competence and regional area skills in those languages and dialects, and a surge capability to rapidly expand its language capabilities on short notice. The Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) for FY 2006-2011 directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)) to develop and provide to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef), a comprehensive roadmap for achieving the full range of language capabilities necessary to support the 2004 Defense Strategy. The Defense Language Transformation Roadmap outlines an important series of steps for the Department of Defense to ensure that foreign language and

regional expertise capabilities are developed and maintained for employment as strategic assets in the War on Terrorism and in all future military operations. The roadmap directs the Joint Staff to promulgate guidance, policy, process, and procedures to integrate foreign language and regional expertise capabilities into all planning activities in support of joint operations.

⁸⁸ Department of Defense "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3126-01," January 23, 2006, A-1.

⁸⁹ Department of Defense "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," February 6, 2006, 78-79. The Department of Defense must transform the force to grow foreign language and regional expertise capabilities to adequately and efficiently support the warfighters. This instruction applies to the Joint Staff, Services, COCOMs, and Defense agencies responsive to the Chairman for joint operation planning and execution and provides comprehensive guidance and procedures to COCOMs for identifying foreign language and regional expertise requirements during COCOMs' operational and security cooperation planning efforts, and planning for day-to-day manning needs in support of operations. The goals of this instruction are to: a. Familiarize the Joint Planning and Execution (JPEC) community with foreign language and regional expertise capabilities. b. Identify and integrate foreign language and regional expertise capabilities in all force planning activities in support of joint military operations. c. Obtain warfighter requirements for foreign language and regional expertise capabilities to support language transformation.

⁹⁰ James A Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, "The Iraq Study Group Report," December 6, 2006, 61. In this report, the Co-Chairs make a number of recommendations for actions to be taken in Iraq, the United States, and the region. The most important recommendations call for new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. They believe that these two recommendations are equally important and reinforce one another. If they are effectively implemented, and if the Iraqi government moves forward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an opportunity for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow, stability will be enhanced in an important part of the world, and America's credibility, interests, and values will be protected.

⁹¹ Department of Defense "Defense Language Transformation Roadmap," January 2005.

⁹² Montgomery McFate, "An Organizational Solution for DOD's Cultural Knowledge Needs," *Military Review*, July-August 2005, 20.

⁹³ McFate, "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," 48.

⁹⁴ General John Abizaid, U.S. Army, March 5 2004, congressional testimony, article by Ann Scott Tyson, *Christian Science Monitor*, available from <http://peacecorpsonline.org/messages/messages/2629/2022255.html>; Internet; accessed 12 January 2007.

⁹⁵ Aylwin-Foster, 15.

⁹⁶ Scales, 5.