LESSONS LEARNED FROM DENAZIFICATION AND DE-BA'ATHIFICATION

by

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ABSTRACT

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What lessons can be learned from comparing U.S. experiences in the post-World War II era during Denazification with de-Ba'athification in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom? This SRP will 1) compare and contrast Denazification and de-Ba'athification; 2) discuss lessons learned from these experiences; 3) identify some of the related challenges during post-conflict reconstruction; and 4) analyze implications for planning, implementation, and execution of similar events in the future.

This SRP will be based primarily on a review of the available literature, focusing on primary sources as much as possible. Because there are fewer primary sources available regarding de-Ba'athification, correspondence with select individuals having first-hand knowledge of the described events will be used to round out available information.

This research reveals significant commonality between de-Ba’athification and Denazification. However, I also found a divergence in how each was implemented. That is, challenges and lessons learned from Denazification were not adequately applied against the contemporary experience.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM DENAZIFICATION AND DE-BA'ATHIFICATION

…more than half the German people were Nazis and we would be in a hell of a fix if we removed all Nazi party members from office.

—Gen George S. Patton

What lessons can be learned from U.S. experiences in the post-World War II era during Denazification and during de-Ba'athification in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)?

This SRP will 1) compare and contrast Denazification and de-Ba'athification; 2) identify lessons learned from these experiences; 3) identify some of the related challenges during post-conflict reconstruction; and 4) analyze implications for planning, implementation, and execution of similar events in the future. Although this SRP focuses on Denazification and de-Ba'athification, it briefly highlights certain aspects of demilitarization and blacklisting in Japan at the end of World War II that relate to U.S. experiences with de-Ba’athification.

After examining Denazification in Germany and de-Ba’athification in Iraq, this paper identifies four key lessons learned: 1) The mass purges of Denazification created significant amounts of resentment from the German populace and complicated efforts to effectively rebuild Germany; 2) while the general concept of de-Ba’athification may have been the right policy, it was poorly implemented; 3) there was insufficient planning for post-war de-Ba’athification; and 4) the scope of the de-Ba’athification program seems to have gone too deeply and quickly into the party membership.

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer served as the Presidential Envoy to Iraq and Administrator of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) from May 2003 to June 2004. During a series of interviews for a documentary on Public Broadcast Service’s Frontline, Bremer discussed how CPA Order No. 1, De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society, evolved. He claimed Saddam Hussein modeled the Ba’ath Party on Germany’s Nazi Party, so the Coalition then modeled de-Ba’athification on Allied Denazification decrees in the aftermath of World War II. Before discussing how de-Ba’athification was conceived and carried out in Iraq, then, it is necessary to understand the Denazification program in post-World War II Germany.

Denazification in Germany

Why de-Nazify Germany in the aftermath of World War II? The Office of Military Government for Germany recognized that one of the “foremost objectives defined in the Potsdam Agreement and one of the primary justifications for the occupation is the denazification and demilitarization of Germany and its people.” But Denazification would be a challenge, too.
The Allies quickly realized that nearly everyone in public positions of authority in Germany had been, at least to some extent, politically compromised. Denazification proceeded quickly. General Patton, as military governor in Bavaria, “…was ordered to remove men ‘with Nazi affiliations’ from ‘the running of waterworks, power stations, medical laboratories, subway systems, even hospitals.’” Patton wrote to General Eisenhower requesting a slow-down of Denazification, urging him to “go more slowly…because too many trained people were being removed and too many inexperienced or inefficient ones brought in.” Earl Ziemke reports Patton’s assertion that “It is no more possible for a man to be a civil servant in Germany and not have paid lip service to Nazism than it is for a man to be a postmaster in America and not have paid lip service to the Democratic Party or Republican Party when it is in power.”

However, the Allies were committed to Denazification so that “Germany should never again be permitted to threaten the peace and that to accomplish this.” To accomplish this, the Allies sought to create a “stable democratic Germany, uncontrolled by Nazi or militaristic elements.” Denazification was designed to “assist in transferring authority from those who usurped and abused it.”

Guenther Roth offers a valid analysis of the “crucial reasons for the failure of the quickly changing U.S. Denazification policies.” Roth clarifies the difference between a political purge and judicial punishment. A purge should be based on strategic political considerations with an eye towards reconstruction. Yet Roth points out that after Denazification began and hundreds of thousands of German citizens holding various administrative, professional, and business positions lost their jobs, “huge procedural and administrative problems arose.”

Denazification was certainly not a simple policy. Rather, it was “a plethora of directives and practices for the political purge, punishment, stabilization and democratization of Germany.” The program of Denazification was carried out somewhat differently in each of the three occupation zones, but German reactions in each of the zones was essentially the same, resulting in a Denazification program that was relatively even across the three zones.

In the late summer of 1944, President Roosevelt appointed a committee of the secretaries of State, War, and Treasury to develop a program of postwar policy towards Germany. Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, developed a doctrine in the last several months of the war that defined how to purge Nazis from German society. This doctrine essentially posited that “In order to eliminate Nazism at its roots, and to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a danger to peace, the structure of German society must be changed, and a comprehensive political purge and decisive economic measures had to be instituted.” This was a more hard-line approach than that preferred by the Departments of State and War.
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 1067 of April 1945 provided a compromise plan which included provisions to arrest Nazi regime advocates and other Germans responsible for committing crimes under Nazi authority.23

The Potsdam Conference took place from 17 July – 2 August 1945.24 Three key agreements and pronouncements related directly to the Denazification program. First, the three heads of government agreed to “destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.”25 Second, the leaders agreed that they needed to bring war criminals to justice, and also needed to arrest and inter Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and Nazi high officials.26 The final key agreement related to Denazification declared that “All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings.”27

On the face of it, Denazification appears relatively simple and straightforward. The Nazi party was to be outlawed, senior Nazis were to be arrested and imprisoned, and regular members of the party were to be removed from public office. As a statement of policy, these three goals appear easy to execute. However, actual implementation varied from location to location. Roth noted that many U.S. Military Government officers did not consider Denazification to be their key task when “confronted with the problems that had arisen from the breakdown of food supply and distribution and of public services.”28 Eisenhower replied to Patton’s request for a slow-down by explaining why the U.S. wanted Denazification implemented evenly and as planned: “I know certain field commanders have felt modifications to this policy [Denazification] could be made. That question had long since been decided. We will not compromise with Nazism in any way.”29 Roth sums up the result of the worsening situation, observing that “from then on, Denazification began to get lost in its own wholesale operations.”30 Roth observes that the differences between “small” and “big” Nazis were blurred, resulting in undesirable consequences.31

De-militarization in Japan

There appears to have been little, if any, serious debate on whether or not the successful U.S. occupation of Japan after World War II is a realistic model for a constructive American role in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. John Dower examined this question, however, and answered with a strong negative.32 This is because General MacArthur and his staff had from 1945 to

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1947 to concentrate on promoting democratization, while “policymakers in Washington were preoccupied with developments in Europe.”33 As the Cold War heated up and countries like China became increasingly hostile to U.S. plans, Japan’s geographic isolation insulated it from external threats. Iraq, on the other hand, shares borders with “apprehensive and potentially intrusive neighbors.”34 Unlike Iraq, Japan had few natural resources and other nations had little economic interest in it. So, the U.S. was able to conduct reconstruction efforts free from international interference. Conrad Crane says that Dower, a renowned historian of the occupation of Japan, has an important caveat to his answer that post-war Japan does not serve as a model for Iraq: “Even under circumstances that turned out to be favorable, demilitarization and democratization were awesome challenges.”35

The Bush administration initially deliberated whether or not the U.S. occupation of Japan could serve as a model for democratization and demilitarization in Iraq. But it quickly determined that post-war Japan was not a valid model because of several significant differences between the two.36 First, the U.S. defeated Japan militarily; second, Japan surrendered unconditionally; third, the entire world acknowledged the legality of and need for an Allied occupation; and fourth, Japan suffered massive infrastructure and economic damage, and loss of life.37 Japan also lacked the ethnic, tribal, and religious division that has become a major problem in Iraq. Thus, post-war Japan, while providing some insights, does not serve overall as a sufficient model for post-war Iraq.

De-Ba’athification in Iraq

De-Ba’athification Planning

Thomas Ricks has judged the U.S. war and post-war plan for Iraq as, “The worst war plan in American history.”38 But was it? In October 2001, the Department of State (DoS) began planning the post-Saddam Hussein transition in Iraq.39 DoS’s Future of Iraq Project brought together over 200 exiled Iraqi engineers, lawyers, businesspeople, doctors, and other experts into 17 working groups to strategize on topics important in post-war Iraq.40 The working groups focused on topics such as: public health and humanitarian needs, transparency and anti-corruption, oil and energy, defense policy and institutions, transitional justice, democratic principles and procedures, local government, civil society capacity building, education, free media, water, agriculture and environment, and economy and infrastructure. Farrah Hassen summarized the de-Ba’athification recommendations of the Democratic Principles and Procedures Working Group (DPWG):
The Democratic Principles working group overwhelmingly endorsed de-Ba’athification "of all facets of Iraqi life," with the caveat that such a program "would not consist of the total abolition of the current administration, since, in addition to its role of social control, that structure does provide a framework for social order."41

Hassen also noted that "those former Ba’athists who are not reintegrated into society, most notably members of the Iraqi army, the group foreshadowed, "may…present a destabilizing element, especially if they are left without work or the ability to get work."42

The DPWG’s non-Iraqi members recognized that the Iraqi Opposition wanted most to remove Saddam Hussein from power, so they did not focus extensively on any need to uproot the Ba’ath Party structure.43 However, when the Ba’ath party problem was discussed, there were three general opinions about the appropriate extent of de-Ba’athification.

The first general opinion was to “basically absolve the party and its institutions from any culpability in the crimes of the regime.”44 This group viewed the party and its members as “innocent bystanders to the crimes of the regime.”45 It stressed that the “party itself has been corrupted and co-opted by the regime and that it would be foolish to alienate the 2 million or so members of the party who can prove to be an important prop to any new government.”46 This group believed that de-Ba’athification would focus on President Hussein and probably not more than about 50 people in his inner circle.47 Significantly, this group advised that, “The party itself…be allowed to continue to function as a party in any future post-Saddam order in Iraq.”48 The group was concerned that “broadening of the definition of who is blameworthy would open the gates of uncontrolled revenge killings that would blight the future of the country, and that it would be best to forgive and move on.”49

The second general opinion is similar to the first, but held that a greater number of regime leaders should be held culpable, but the remainder of the party’s members would not be held culpable.50 This expanded group would include, “…prominent Ministers, Governors, Military and security personnel, and similar such luminaries.”51 This group advocated provisions for some sort of public hearings, perhaps modeled on the way South Africa conducted reconciliation after the end of apartheid.52 The group focused on a “pragmatic approach of cooperation…stressing the practical needs of administration and continuity.”53

The third general opinion held that the “entire Baathist experience in Iraq has been…an unmitigated disaster and the party is directly responsible for providing the ways and means by which the regime has inflicted its catastrophes on the Iraqi people, its neighbours and the world community.”54 Further, this group believed that “democratization is simply not possible unless and until the entire apparatus of control and authority is uprooted.”55
The DPWG designated the objective of de-Ba’athification as re-education of “a people who have been subjected to a 30-year barrage of hate, invective, bigotry, chauvinism, racism, militarism and vainglory, and to ensure that such a disaster could not befall Iraq again.”56 The report also recognized the importance of implementing the plan:

If the machinery of de-Baathification is seen to be fair, just and expeditious then de-Baathification would be seen as a great boon to the rooting of democracy in Iraq. If it is administered chaotically, unfairly or expeditiously, then it would serve the opposite purpose and the whole process would become flawed and eventually discredited.57

The final recommendations of the working group appear to have attempted to balance the views of the three general opinions held by the Iraqi Opposition regarding de-Ba’athification. However, the working group clearly stated that “De-Ba’athification cannot mean dismissing from their jobs all two million Iraqis who belong to the Ba’ath party, or conducting witch hunts based on rumors and allegations.”58 The report advises that de-Ba’athification should be viewed as a “composite series of actions involving dissolutions of some institutions, segmentation of others, and the de-ideologization of the Ba’athist legacy from the whole of Iraqi society.”59 The report also stresses the difficulty in determining the role and status of the majority of party members: “Seniority in the Ba’ath Party does not always translate into a position of power in government, and conversely, not all officials who are guilty of collusion in crimes are high in the Ba’ath Party hierarchy.”60

At the same time that the DoS was working on the Future of Iraq Project, the Department of Defense (DoD) was doing its own planning. However, George Packer writes that the DoD, while conducting some post-war scenarios, did not coordinate its efforts with the Department of State.61 Packer reports that the post-war planning was directed primarily by Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense of Policy, who “pointedly excluded Pentagon officials with experience in postwar reconstructions. The fear…was that such people would offer pessimistic scenarios, which would challenge Secretary Rumsfeld’s aversion to using troops as peacekeepers.”62 Packer quotes former Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White: “You got the impression in this exercise that we didn’t harness the best and brightest minds in a concerted effort.”63 The majority of DoD post-war planning discussions was “not the strategy or the philosophy of occupying a post-Saddam Iraq, but the numbers of troops it would take.”64 Packer cites Barham Salih, the Prime Minister of the Iraqi Kurdish administration: “There was a mistaken notion in certain circles in Washington that the Iraqi civil service would remain intact.”65 Salih described the Bush administration’s view on law and order in post-war Iraq. “They were expecting the police to work after liberation.”66
On 20 January 2003, about seven months after the Future of Iraq Project had begun meeting, Bush signed National Security Directive No. 24, thereby designating the DoD to control post-war Iraq. Then, seven weeks before OIF began, the DoD selected Jay Garner, a retired Army Lieutenant General, to head the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which would be responsible to administer post-war Iraq. Garner’s planning priorities included preparations for humanitarian disaster, displaced civilians, starvation, disease outbreaks, enemy prisoners of war, and chemical weapons attacks, all of which ORHA conducted extensive planning for. However, ORHA did little research and planning on how to run Iraq’s various ministry departments.

During a telephone conversation in late April 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told Garner that Bush had selected Bremer to be his Presidential Envoy, and that Bremer would arrive in Baghdad within about a week. It was common knowledge within the Coalition that Garner’s appointment was temporary, and that the focus of his mission was responding to the expected humanitarian crisis. Bremer brought to Iraq a skill set more aligned to the new political environment.

De-Ba’athification Order and Implementation

On 16 May 2003, just four days after arriving in Baghdad, Bremer signed CPA Order No. 1, De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society. This order effectively outlawed the Ba’ath Party of Iraq and removed the top four levels, or the senior party members, from their positions, banning them from future employment in the public sector. Before implementing the Order, Bremer estimated that roughly 20,000 Iraqis – about one percent of the Ba’ath Party membership – would be affected. Packer, however, claims the de-Ba’athification order “put at least thirty-five thousand civil servants – engineers, professors, managers – out of work.”

Conventional wisdom holds that de-Ba’athification failed. Thomas Ricks, author of Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, surely pronounces de-Ba’athification as one of many U.S. errors. Ricks recently discussed his book at Dickinson College. Referring to de-Ba’athification and disbanding the Iraqi army, Ricks indicated that neither was well-planned or briefed to Bush. Ricks pointed out that Bremer implemented them, triggering a “disaster.” Bremer disagrees. He clarified the overall impact of the de-Ba’athification program when questioned about banning nearly all Ba’ath party members from the Iraqi government. “I did not ban the majority of Ba’athists. I banned one percent of the Ba’ath Party. The Ba’ath Party had two million members. The ban that I put into effect, affected 25,000 of them. And they were only banned from public service, in the public sector.” Fareed Zakaria, however, put the
number at twice that: “During those crucial first months, Washington…fired 50,000 bureaucrats.” General Tommy Franks wrote that the Ba’ath Party had spread throughout the entire government to the extent that “with the collapse of the regime, the country’s organizational skeleton was broken. Tens of thousands of policemen had disappeared from the country’s cities and towns, fearful of citizens’ vengeance.”

Bremer claimed that he had to remain cognizant of the broad strategic view about de-Ba’athification. Specifically, because America had used its military element of national power to remove Iraq’s regime, which the Iraqi people hated, then the Iraqi people had a promise of a better life and a better government. In Bremer’s view, the de-Ba’athification plan was the right way to counter possible negative Iraqi public reaction against the “broader goals and what we were trying to accomplish in Iraq.” Bremer compared it to Denazification, on which it was modeled, though in a much more restrained way. Although Future of Iraq Project report did not propose a sweeping policy of de-Ba’athification, Bremer emphasized that it clearly advocated that “De-Ba’athification absolutely had to happen; the senior members of the Ba’ath Party had to be got rid of, and the Ba’ath ideology should be got rid of.”

While de-Ba’athification was not Bremer’s plan, it was up to him to implement it. Bremer believed the policy to be an important step for Iraq. An internal CPA coordination memo on de-Ba’athification affirms, in part, that the “policy has been set in Washington and agreed to by Ambassador Bremer. This memo is not concerned with the actual substance of the policy, but its implementation.” However, this memo was staffed within CPA just days before Bremer signed the de-Ba’athification order and implementation memorandum, which did not leave much time to consider secondary and tertiary effects of the program. This is not to say that the CPA staff did not work hard to ensure the implementation plan was sufficient and comprehensive. But clearly the staff had little time to develop a detailed implementation plan. CPA did, however, have a major advantage in that they were able to refer to Denazification plans and policies, reducing the time needed to create the implementation plan.

Garner spoke of his concerns about CPA’s de-Ba’athification order: “[What] I thought was going to happen was you wouldn’t be able to bring back the government in a functional capability, because all the talent was in those first three or four levels of the Ba’ath Party.” Using the city of Boston as an example, he said, “You take out the first three or four levels of government in Boston, see how well your electricity runs and how well the traffic lights work, and everything else goes.”

Bremer signed CPA Memorandum No. 1, Implementation of De-Ba’athification Order No. 1, on 16 May 2003. This memorandum outlined a two-step process. First, the Commander of
Coalition Forces would establish Accreditation Review Committees to conduct initial investigations to establish the facts of individual Ba’ath Party membership status. Second, as the de-Ba’athification program progressed and more senior former Iraqi government officials came under scrutiny, Bremer planned to have the Iraqi De-Ba’athification Council, under Ahmad Chalabi’s leadership, assume increasing levels of responsibility for the process, until it ultimately had full responsibility.

Zakaria summarizes the overall de-Ba’athification program by writing that the U.S. had “dismantled the Iraqi state, leaving a deep security vacuum, administrative chaos and soaring unemployment….We summarily deposed not just Saddam Hussein but a centuries-old ruling elite and then were stunned that they reacted poorly.”

Comparisons
The implementation and scope of the purges in Germany and Iraq are similar. Implementation varied throughout Germany; not all occupation authorities considered Denazification or de-Ba’athification their priority task. There were also difficulties in both scenarios in determining the differences between the various levels of party membership.

Denazification, Japan’s demilitarization, and de-Ba’athification were all extremely complex. Political, cultural, and social forces created constant kaleidoscopic alterations in the execution of the programs. This compounded Allied and Coalition efforts to effectively and quickly carry out the programs. Both the Japanese and Iraqi cultures are vastly different from U.S. culture, so the occupied citizens were understandably confused about the new social and political constructs that they were encountering. Germany and the U.S. shared a much more similar cultural background. While social and political differences were still challenges, their relatively common culture perhaps reduced some of the tension that could have built during Denazification.

The major difference between post-World War II Germany and Japan and post-Saddam Iraq is that the Allied forces militarily defeated the German and Japanese armies, and both countries surrendered unconditionally. OIF, however, ended with the Iraqi army virtually melting away before it could be militarily defeated or soldiers rounded up and confined to their barracks.

When World War II ended, the entire world acknowledged the need for and legality of an Allied occupation of both Germany and Japan. A similar situation did not exist in Iraq, despite the United States pulling together an OIF coalition of some 30 nations. A final difference is that Iraq did not suffer anything near the massive infrastructure and economic damage or loss of life that Germany and Japan had suffered.
Lessons Learned

This review of Denazification and de-Ba’athification, and to some degree Operation Blacklist in Japan, provides four key lessons: First, the mass purges of Denazification created significant amounts of resentment from the German populace and complicated efforts to effectively rebuild Germany. Second, while the general concept of de-Ba’athification may have been the right policy, it was poorly implemented. Third, there was insufficient planning for post-war de-Ba’athification. Fourth, the scope of the de-Ba’athification program seems to have gone too deeply and quickly into the party membership.

Lesson 1: Denazification Purge

Denazification was extremely complicated. And, according to Roth, the mass purge was the great mistake. This mistake, he argues, “was based on erroneous assumptions and on neglect of available information.” Although most of the Denazification measures served in one way or another to promote democracy, the mass purge created resentment. Some key German administrators and technicians, along with some security forces, were permitted to remain at their posts to help with reconstruction. Initially, however, the governmental administration collapsed because too few Germans were permitted to occupy those positions. Key community positions could have been filled by new employees because very few people “were thinking of obstructing Allied efforts and policies, not only for fear of losing their jobs but because of a genuine readiness for loyal cooperation.”

Lesson 2: De-Ba’athification Implementation

Although the general concept of removing senior Ba’athists from public and political life may have been the right policy, implementing it has proven much more controversial. De-Ba’athification was a complex policy with an even more complex implementation plan. Bremer defends the overall de-Ba’athification program, but then acknowledges that implementation should not have been left to Iraqi politicians, who broadened the program. Bremer concludes that the Coalition would not be able to discern the fine line between true party believers and people who joined the party in order to hold civil service jobs. As a result, he turned de-Ba’athification over to the Iraqi Governing Council:

The mistake I made was turning it over to the Governing Council. I should have turned it over instead to a judicial body of some kind. The Governing Council, in turn, turned it over to Chalabi. I did not turn it over to Chalabi. It is true that once the Governing Council took it over, they started interpreting the policy, implementing the policy much more broadly.
After the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the Iraqi army and police and implemented de-Ba’athification, Lee Kuan Yew, Minister Mentor of Singapore, became nervous, fearing a coming vacuum. Minister Yew described his anxiety thusly:

I recalled how when the Japanese captured Singapore in February 1942 and took 90,000 British, Indian, and Australian troops prisoner, they left the police and the civil administration intact and functioning – under the control of Japanese military officers but with British personnel still in charge of the essential services, such as gas and electricity….Had the Japanese disbanded the police and the civil administration when they interned the British forces, there would have been chaos.

Lesson 3: De-Ba’athification Planning

Bremer concluded his oral remarks before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee with two lessons learned from the CPA’s experiences, the first of which is applicable to this study: “There is no substitute for good planning.” Planning for post-conflict situations must, in many ways, be even more extensive than planning for the initial combat operations. Chris Wallace asked Bremer about de-Ba’athification, remarking: “General George Marshall began planning for the post-was occupation of Germany two years before D-Day. The Bush administration was still planning for a post-war Iraq when you invaded….Was there a failure of planning for this occupation?” Bremer responded that he hadn’t had much time to examine the pre-war planning.

Planning for the post-war occupation of Japan began in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, and the “general objectives of demilitarization and democratization of the vanquished foe were spelled out in the Potsdam Proclamation of July 1945, weeks before the Japanese government finally capitulated.” Two factors, perhaps, led to the successful institutionalizing of democracy in Japan: strong pre-existing democratic traditions and the survival and cooperation of the existing bureaucracy. Dower reports that the “administrative structure remained essentially intact from the central ministries and agencies down to the level of town and village governments, and administrators at all levels often proved genuinely receptive to the vision of a new and better society.” He goes on to allow that even though post-war Japan is not a model for post-war Iraq, it does provide a clear warning: “Even under circumstances that turned out to be favorable, demilitarization and democratization were awesome challenges. To rush to war without seriously imagining all its consequences, including its aftermath, is not realism but a terrible hubris.”

In a nod to Carl von Clausewitz, Thomas McNaugher discusses how the purpose of war is to achieve a positive political outcome to some sort of conflict between nations. McNaugher
characterizes war as having a narrow focus, which, in his opinion, was “evident and tragic…in
the Bush administration’s failure to plan adequately for postcombat operations in Afghanistan or
Iraq, or even to understand that the combat phase would inevitably affect the political
circumstances after it.” If, as Crane says, “The primary problem at the core of U.S.
deficiencies in postconflict capabilities, resources, and commitment is a national aversion to
technology,” then the Army must take extra care to plan effectively for post-conflict
operations. McNaugher quotes Frederick Kagan on this issue: “Military operations of any
scale must be planned from back to front.” Taken together, these observations contend that
the primary focus for planning should be on post-conflict phases, perhaps, rather than on the
combat phase itself.

Lesson 4: Scope of de-Ba’athification Program

Much like Denazification, the de-Ba’athification program seems to have gone too deeply
and too quickly into the membership. General George Casey, when recently asked whether or
not the de-Ba’athification process had gone too far, replied, “Yes, it did. It still is.”
Anecdotally, de-Ba’athification was implemented unevenly across the country, which confused
both Coalition forces and Iraqis about the true scope and intent of the program. Lawrence
Anthony, a South African civilian working to save the animals in the Baghdad Zoo, formerly one
of the best zoos in the Middle East, described one of his experiences, commenting on how de-
Ba’athification has led to the removal of relatively low-level party members. De-Ba’athification
caused a negative impact on the Zoo by removing “one of the key directors and veterinarians
when he was needed most….He was a low ranking Party official…who claimed that in order to
hold any position of authority in Iraq one had to hold a party position.” Anthony concluded
that “the Coalition did not or could not make this differentiation in the de Ba’athification
process.”

Perhaps the Coalition should not have been driving the de-Ba’athification process.
Kenneth Pollack thinks that South Africa offers a lesson for this type of situation:

…every nation must create a process of reconciliation that suits its unique
history, cultural traditions, and political needs. In that sense, the United States
should not attempt to impose any such process on Iraq and should do no more
than help the Iraqis to find the process that will fit their own history, culture, and
political needs.

Crane observed that, “Most commentators agree that the most critical mistake made
during the initial occupation of Iraq was the total disbanding of the Iraqi Army and the extensive
purging of Ba’athists without attempting discriminatory screening.” Crane aptly points out that
the purging reached too deeply into the party. There were, however, attempts to discriminate between various types of party members. Shortly before the Implementation memorandum was signed, Ambassador Robin Raphel coordinated with other CPA officials and staff on implementation procedures. The coordination memo discussed “options and recommendations in three key areas: ascertaining who is a senior Ba’ath party official, weeding out ba’athists from ministry management, and formulating exceptions where needed.” Thus, CPA clearly intended, even before the de-Ba’athification order was signed, to provide formal mechanisms to ensure that the program was not blindly implemented and to provide a reasonable amount of flexibility.

Related Post-Conflict Challenges

Two additional related post-conflict issues facing the Coalition were the formal disbanding of the Iraqi army and a lack of unity of command between Coalition forces and the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Disbanding the Iraqi Army

An immediate concern for planners was what to do with the Iraqi army. Initial planning in Washington had acknowledged that demobilizing 300,000 Iraqi soldiers in the immediate aftermath of combat operations would be reckless, so it would be better to screen the army to identify Saddam loyalists. However, CPA’s Order No. 2, The Dissolution of Entities, formally abolished the military services and the Defense Ministry, and released all conscripts from the service. The need to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR) soldiers back into civil society was not unique to Iraq. According to James Dobbins:

In any nation-building, post-conflict situation, you always have the problem [of] dealing with former combatants. If there’s been a civil war or an international war, you’ve got more soldiers than you need. You always need to demobilize at least a large portion of them, and you need to retrain and professionalize those that are left. This is absolutely standard.

Dobbins then cites several basic steps that could have been undertaken in the Iraq DDR scenario. First, register all of the soldiers (name, address, resume, etc.). Second, provide a paycheck so their means of livelihood was not immediately reduced, then inform the soldiers that the Coalition did not know exactly what would be done with them, but that they should come back in, for example, a month. Third, divide the soldiers into three categories – those staying in the army, those transferring to the police force, and those retraining into a civilian job. Taking these three steps might have helped to keep a large number of trained military and disaffected youth off the streets and out of the influence of insurgent leaders.
Additionally, the Coalition could have made use of Iraqi soldiers to benefit the Iraqi populace through various public works programs – again keeping them too busy and too well paid to be interested in joining the insurgency. Garner indicated that such a program would have been useful in Iraq, saying: “Take a page out of FDR’s book and do the WPA [Works Progress Administration] thing. Infusing money into the economy – we’ve done that throughout the history of our relation. Make the resources of the nation owned by the people of the nation.”

Unity of Command

A major high-level challenge in OIF was the unity of command and the command and control relationships between U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and both the ORHA and the CPA. ORHA was responsible for administering Iraq – for providing humanitarian aid and rebuilding damaged infrastructure. ORHA was under the operational control of CENTCOM. However, when CPA replaced ORHA, Bremer was Bush’s personal envoy, as well as the Administrator of the CPA. This arrangement seemed to unify command. However, it also created a situation where it was unclear to many ORHA and CPA staff members, as well as Coalition military forces, who was actually in charge. Ricks also thinks that unity of command was a problem in Iraq. Referring to Galula, he believes that the one chief should have been a civilian, to whom military commanders should report.

However, CENTCOM’s forces greatly outnumbered CPA’s staff; CENTCOM had significantly more resources available to accomplish not only the military mission, but also to carry out many reconstruction-related missions. As a result, CENTCOM controlled the ground, but lacked much of the needed authority, while CPA’s control was more theoretical than actual. This situation was not unique to Iraqi Freedom. Nadia Schadlow notes that “these are precisely the kinds of problems and constraints that hampered civil agencies in past wars and led to the decision by U.S. leaders to cede control over governance to the Army.” Schadlow writes about one of the key differences in post-World War II Germany between General Lucius Clay, the theater commander, and John McCloy, the High Commissioner:

It was General Clay, serving as theater commander and military governor, who oversaw the toughest political and economic reconstruction tasks, including intensive Denazification and demilitarization efforts as well as banking and monetary reform. The civilian leader, John McCloy, arrived in 1949, well after stability had been achieved.

Schadlow concludes that in Iraq today, as in post-war Germany, the Army is the only organization capable, with the appropriate political direction, of reaching all areas of Iraq in
order to effectively make reconstruction take “root and evolve.”

From her perspective, CENTCOM could have established military governance, supported by various other U.S. government agencies, until the situation in Iraq was ready to be transitioned to civilian lead. Admittedly, the absence of related military doctrine or established procedures would have greatly hampered CENTCOM’s ability to establish this sort of military governance.

Conclusion and Implications for the Future

Ricks also considers analogies between post-war Germany and post-war Iraq. He questions how applicable Germany is as a model for Iraq: “How do we arrive at the idea that the postwar model is Germany in 1945? It’s really more than anything else I think an excuse. They didn’t really study, as best I can tell, the occupation of Germany and the lessons of it.”

Ricks notes that while the U.S. military began its preparation for post-war Germany several years prior to the end of the war, planning for post-war Iraq was short, hasty, and disorganized, beginning just months prior to the beginning of OIF.

Finally, Ricks claims that “de-Baathification didn’t really pay attention to the lessons of de-Nazification.”

It has been said that history repeats itself. In an interview with PBS, Garner claimed, “Nobody read U.S. History 101.” The purpose of collecting lessons learned is to avoid making similar mistakes in the future. This is often easier said than done. Both post-World War II Germany and Japan taught us that policies such as de-Ba‘athification are complex at best – and are executed in a constantly changing environment. Studies completed after World War II indicated that post-war planning, while difficult and not something the United States is particularly interested in, are extremely important. Some of these same studies identified the challenges of too quickly and too deeply purging a former ruling party from all power once the armed conflict is over.

Planning for post-war Iraq was done in slightly more than one year, which was a short time frame to ensure that these prior lessons were recalled. Denazification policies and laws clearly informed the de-Ba‘athification policies, which enabled the DoD and CPA to quickly publish the de-Ba‘athification order and began implementing it. However, there was not sufficient time, given all the other post-conflict contingencies being planned for, to adequately examine the difficulties and challenges experienced in Germany and Japan.

Describing the immediate aftermath of the fall of Baghdad, Thomas Mockaitis reported that, “The collapse of Saddam’s regime produced not the expected rush of enthusiastic Iraqis willing to accept responsibility for self-government but an enormous power vacuum.”

Given the ethnic and sectarian divides, this was to be expected. Had planners had more time to delve
into lessons learned from post-war Germany and Japan, they could have developed a more robust de-Ba’athification implementation plan in order to avoid some of the confusion and difficulties the Coalition has experienced. World War II provides more evidence that post-conflict governance is critical when planning military operations. Shortly after the fall of Algiers during the North African campaign, Major General Mark Clark threatened the French that he would declare martial law in North Africa. Robert Murphy, the top American diplomat in Algiers, “could hardly imagine administering railroads, mail, water supply, and other civil functions across a million square miles with nearly 20 million people, few of whom shared a language with any American.”

In the future, the U.S. may persist in its aversion to nation-building. However, since the end of World War II, we have participated in many post-conflict reconstruction efforts, although not all on the scale of Germany, Japan, or Iraq. Each time we embark on such an operation, we may be faced with the need to work with the local political and governmental structure. If changes need to be made, we need to fully understand that that country’s political, social, and cultural ways of life, acknowledging that these factors are complex and interrelated. We may not do another de-Ba’athification, but we should avoid relearning the lessons we’ve learned in World War II’s Denazification and in OIF’s de-Ba’athification.

Endnotes


Patton writes in his diary: “General Eisenhower said he felt that no matter how much immediate removal of all Nazis from office adversely affected the administration of Bavaria, they should be removed because it was his experience that there was always some subordinate to take over the job of a superior.” Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers: 1940–1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974), 784-786.

2 Throughout this Strategy Research Project, the reader will find the terms “Denazification” and “de-Ba’athification”. The author chose these spellings based on two official documents:
Denazification in the Four Zones, Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.); and Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1, De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society.

3 This paper focuses on de-Ba’athification’s links to Denazification because both the Departments of State and Defense used Denazification as a model. However, there are some questions as to whether, beyond modeling de-Ba’athification on Denazification, post-World War II Germany and Japan are appropriate models for U.S. and Coalition involvement in Iraq. Some have suggested that U.S. planners could better have modeled Operation Iraqi Freedom on U.S. interventions in Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, or other similar operations.


6 Ibid.


9 Ibid.


11 Ibid. Ziemke quotes Patton’s comment regarding Nazism: “It is no more possible for a man to be a civil servant in Germany and not have paid lip service to Nazism than it is for a man to be a postmaster in America and not have paid lip service to the Democratic Party or Republican Party when it is in power.”

12 John G. Kormann, *U.S. Denazification Policy in Germany, 1944-1950*. Historical Division, Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1952, 44. In a letter to his wife, Patton wrote, “I had never heard that we fought to de-natzify Germany – live and learn. What we are doing is to utterly destroy the only semi-modern state in Europe so that Russia can swallow the whole.” Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers: 1940 – 1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974), 784-786.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid. Kormann also wrote in this section that “In order to achieve this, political and economic authority must be shifted from those who dominated German society under the Nazis to others who would establish a free and peaceful society.”

15 Guenther Roth, e-mail message to author, 31 December 2007. Dr. Roth was commenting on his 1954 study, *The American Denazification of Germany*.
16 Ibid.


18 Guenther Roth and Kurt H. Wolff, Studies in German-American Postwar Problems (SGAPP) No. 1: The American Denazification of Germany, A Historical Survey and an Appraisal, Department of Sociology & Anthropology, (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University, 1954), 1. Dr. Roth granted permission for the work to be cited in this SRP in an e-mail message to the author dated 31 December 2007.

19 Ibid., 1-2.

20 Ibid., 6.

21 Ibid., 7.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., 8.


25 Agreements of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, Section IIA, Paragraph 3(b)(iii), July 17-August 2, 1945; available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/truman/psources/ps_potsdam.html; Internet, accessed 18 January 2007. Paragraph 5 provides that “war criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.”

26 Agreements of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, Section IIA, Paragraph 5, July 17-August 2, 1945; available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/truman/psources/ps_potsdam.html; Internet; accessed 18 January 2007. The full text of Paragraph 6: “All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.”
28 Roth, *Studies in German-American Postwar Problems*, 10. Dr. Roth also noted the complications that the repatriation of Displaced Persons added to the influx of millions of Germans from the East.

29 Ziemke, 385.

30 Roth, *Studies in German-American Postwar Problems*, 11. Roth writes: From then on, Denazification began to get lost in its own wholesale operations. More than 100,000 were interned by the end of ’45. They had been automatically arrested, but there was no law for trying them. By next May, in the American Zone about 300,000 persons had lost their jobs. The differences between “small” and “big” Nazis were blurred, which was bound to have undesirable consequences. While SHAEF Denazification planners had been warned against this as early as the Fall of ’44, the mistake could never be properly corrected; the mass purge acted as mass punishment.

31 Ibid.


33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Conrad C. Crane, “Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won,” *Military Review*, May-June 2005 [journal on-line]; available from http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MayJun05/MayJun05/crane.pdf; Internet; accessed 24 January 2007. Although interdepartmental deliberations about occupying Japan had begun in Washington, D.C., since the attack on Pearl Harbor, the actual planning in the Pacific for Operation Blacklist did not begin until May 1945. Dr. Crane writes: “Within two years of the end of the war, most Japanese soldiers were disarmed and repatriated (except those from Soviet-controlled areas); a purge list of persons restricted from political activity was completed; basic services were restored; police reform programs were implemented; the economy was restarted; land reform had begun; and the nation had adopted a new democratic constitution renouncing war as an instrument of national policy.”

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.


Ibid. After a series of 33 meetings between July 2002 and April 2003, the Future of Iraq Project published a 1,200-page, 13-volume report.

Ibid. “The Democratic Principles working group overwhelmingly endorsed de-Ba’athification “of all facets of Iraqi life,” with the caveat that such a program “would not consist of the total abolition of the current administration, since, in addition to its role of social control, that structure does provide a framework for social order.” Those former Ba’athists who are not reintegrated into society, most notably members of the Iraqi army, the group foreshadowed, “may…present a destabilizing element, especially if they are left without work or the ability to get work.” (4.3.1, Democratic Principles working group) Ultimately, CPA Order 1, issued by Administrator L. Paul Bremer on May 16, 2003, eliminated in its entirety the Ba’ath Party’s structures and removed former members from positions of authority in the “new” Iraq. This decision has since faced intensive scrutiny and considerable criticism from outside observers.”

Ibid.

"While many of the top officials are easily identified, the exact role and status of the majority are less easy to discern. Seniority in the Ba'ath Party does not always translate into a position of power in government, and conversely, not all officials who are guilty of collusion in crimes are high in the Ba'ath Party hierarchy. The Transitional Government should carefully determine the layer of senior officials that need to be replaced…In general, the Transitional Government must try to preserve as much as possible of the rank and file and “middle management” classes of government officials for the sake of continuity and efficiency while providing stages of oversight and avenues of appeal for abuses."


Packer.


Bremer, “The Lost Year in Iraq.”

Ibid. Packer also writes: “The firings were based on rank, not conduct, and, inevitably, qualified Iraqis lost their jobs just when their expertise was needed most. American soldiers told me that the deputy director of the Baghdad Zoo, a Baathist, had been the hardest worker on the staff.”

Thomas Ricks, public lecture, Dickinson College, Carlisle, PA, 26 February 2007.


Ibid.


Franks, 525.

Bremer, “The Lost Year in Iraq.”

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Bremer, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope, 39.


Garner.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.
96 Zakaria, 25. A more complete quote: “In effect, the Untied States dismantled the Iraqi state, leaving a deep security vacuum, administrative chaos and soaring unemployment....Baathism equaled fascism, so every school teacher who joined the Baath Party to get a job was seen as a closet Nazi; state-owned enterprises were bad, the new Iraq needed a flat tax, etc....We summarily deposed not just Saddam Hussein but a centuries-old ruling elite and then were stunned that they reacted poorly.”


98 Ibid.

99 Crane.

100 Roth, *Studies in German-American Postwar Problems*, 33.

101 William Lacy Clay, quoted in Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Democrats, Bremer Spar Over Iraq Spending,” *Washington Post*, 7 February 2007, available from http://ebird.afis/mil/cgi-bin/ebird/displaydata.pl?Requested=/ebfiles/e20070207487064.html; Internet; accessed 7 February 2007. Representative William Lacy Clay (D-Mo.), during the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee on 6 February 2007, questioned Bremer about whether or not “your de-Ba’athification program helped to set the stage for the takeover of Iraqi politics by Shiite politicians with close ties to Iran. During his testimony, Bremer said that de-Ba’athification was “the right policy, but poorly implemented.”

102 Bremer, “The Lost Year in Iraq.” Bremer said, “I knew that we, the foreigners – whether it was Americans or British or Australians or Romanians or Poles – we were going to have a hard time making the kind of fine distinctions that de-Ba’athification policy required. Did [a person] join the party because he was a real believer, or did he join it because he wanted to be a teacher, and to be a teacher you had to join the party? I said: ‘We’re not going to be able to make those distinctions. I need to turn it over to Iraqis.’

103 Ibid. While Bremer’s de-Ba’athification policy had targeted only the top 1% of the party’s members, the Iraqi De-Ba’athification Council greatly broadened the program, effectively removing thousands of teachers, among others (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, 297).


105 Ibid.


107 Bremer, “FOX News Sunday.”

108 Ibid.
109 Dower.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Crane. Dr. Crane writes in his endnotes that Steven Metz, AWC SSI, developed this depiction, which first appeared in Conrad Crane, Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in Smaller-Scale Contingencies during the 1990s (Carlisle, PA: AWC SSI, January 2001), 34.
116 Frederick W. Kagan, quoted in McNaugher, 146.
117 GEN George W. Casey, CSA Confirmation Hearing, Senate Armed Services Committee, heard on C-SPAN, 1 February 2007. This question was posed by Senator Levin.
118 Lawrence Anthony, e-mail message to author, 20 December 2006. “...de Ba’athification impacted negatively on the Zoo through the removal of one of the key directors and veterinarians when he was needed most, how I managed to get him reinstated and how he was removed again. He was a low ranking Party official but a dedicated veterinarian who claimed that in order to hold any position of authority in Iraq one had to hold a party position. In other words there were two types of Ba’athists who held Government positions. Those that were Ba’athists first, and got given jobs because of their party affiliation. Secondly there were people who had to join the party to get or hold jobs. The Coalition did not or could not make this differentiation in the de Ba’athification process.”
119 Ibid.
121 Crane.

126 Ibid.

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid.

129 Garner.


131 Ibid.

132 Ricks, public lecture.

133 Schadlow, 89.

134 Ibid., 90.

135 Ibid.

136 Ricks, “The Lost Year in Iraq.” A more complete quotation from Ricks’ interview: “The United States military began preparing for the occupation of Germany several years before the end of World War II, not with a hasty couple of months of planning that was really disorganized, as was the case with Iraq. Even de-Baathification didn’t really pay attention to the lessons of de-Nazification. The Army War College actually had studied this in the fall of ’02 and made the point in a study that de-Nazification was very carefully done from the very bottom up. They went into each village, and they talked to anti-Nazi people about who the Nazis had been, and they compiled information at the village level. Bremer did the opposite. He comes in at the very top and issues a sweeping rule that really doesn’t even have information about who are Baathists, why they were Baathists, and who wasn’t a Baathist. It’s really just almost a casual imposition on the society that’s not particularly informed about the nature of Iraqi society. I think the occupation of Germany was much more an excuse than real analogy.”

137 Ibid.

138 Ibid.

139 Garner, “The Lost Year in Iraq.”

