PREPARING MILITARY LEADERS FOR SECURITY, STABILITY, TRANSITION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

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An historical review of U.S. involvement in armed conflict consistently reveals that post-hostility activities, to include peacekeeping/enforcement, nation assistance, reconstruction, and stability operations, are the most vital yet difficult steps in bringing war to an acceptable conclusion. Given this, it would seem that mastery of this phase of any conflict would be a priority requirement. Remarkably, our military is reluctant and even neglectful in planning and executing these challenging operations; operations that are clearly essential to achieving our political objectives and securing our national interests. This paper explores the impact of Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05, which directs DoD to embrace Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) as a core competency. The paper also provides the historical context and rationale for prioritizing related SSTRO equivalent to traditional and conventional combat operations. Additionally, it examines existing cultural impediments to institutionalizing proficiency in SSTRO and highlights the need for managing cultural change in order to embrace these operations. Finally, the paper presents recommendations for future training and leader professional development that inculcates in our future leaders a warrior ethos that includes the planning and execution of post-hostility SSTRO.
PREPARING MILITARY LEADERS FOR SECURITY, STABILITY, TRANSITION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

Nation-building doesn’t have a brilliant record across the globe. It’s a very hard thing to do…

—Donald Rumsfeld

INTRODUCTION

An historical review of U.S. involvement in armed conflict consistently reveals that post-hostilities activities, to include: peace-keeping/enforcement, nation assistance, reconstruction, and stability operations (referred to as Phase IV operations within a military campaign) are usually the most vital yet problematic steps in bringing any conflict to an acceptable conclusion.

Labeling political and economic reconstruction as a postwar problem muddles the fact that central to strategic victory in all wars fought by the United States has been the creation of a favorable political order…

Given this, it would seem that professional mastery of this phase, especially at the operational and strategic levels of leadership, is an absolute requirement for victory and should be a priority mission area. Notwithstanding, our military tends to be very reluctant and somewhat neglectful in planning and executing these most challenging operations; operations that are essential for achieving our political objectives, securing our national interests, and consolidating victory. This paper, 1) provides background and a conceptual framework for examining SSTR requirements and explores the historical precedence and contemporary challenges for accomplishing post-hostility missions; 2) examines the current U.S. military culture as a major impediment to successful execution of these operations and proposes a means for overcoming the institutional cultural barriers in order to embrace this mission; and finally, 3) makes recommendations for future training and leader professional development in order to increase our capability to successfully execute these operations. These recommendations focus on developing and inculcating a warrior ethos that places execution of post-hostility SSTR equivalent with traditional and conventional combat operations.

BACKGROUND

The US military’s joint doctrine for the conduct of campaigns, Joint Publication 3-0 (Operations), outlines a phasing model that provides the Joint Force Commander (JFC) a standard yet flexible construct in which to focus the force toward related but distinct phased activities. A brief description of the six phases follows:

- **Phase 0 – Shape** – Operations designed to assure success by creating perceptions and influencing the behavior of adversaries and allies, developing military
capabilities, information and intelligence sharing, and providing peacetime and contingency access.

- **Phase I – Deter** – Intent is to deter undesirable adversary action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force.
- **Phase II – Seize Initiative** – Executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time in order to set conditions for decisive operations.
- **Phase III – Dominate** – Overmatching joint force capability at the critical time and place in order to break the enemy’s will for organized resistance and gain control of the operational environment.
- **Phase IV – Stabilize** – Required when there is little or no functioning legitimate civil government to perform local governance. It involves integrating multinational efforts, Other Government Agencies (OGA), International Governing Agencies (IGA), and/or Non-Governmental Agencies (NGO) until legitimate local entities are functioning.
- **Phase V – Enable Civil Authority** – Joint force support to legitimate civil authority with the goal of enabling the viability of the civil authority and its provision of essential services to a majority of the populace in the region.³

Within this campaign conceptual construct, the military performs specific missions defined by a unique but related set of tasks and operational environmental conditions. For specified missions related to post-hostility activities, this paper will treat SSTR as including the doctrinal missions of: Peacekeeping,⁴ Peace Enforcement,⁵ Nation Assistance,⁶ Stability Operations,⁷ and Security Operations.⁸ It is largely in the performance of these missions that responsibilities and authorities become convoluted among US, foreign, and non-governmental participants; especially so between the Department of State (DoS) and the Department of Defense (DoD).

Historically, there has been a confusing debate as to which Department (DoD vice the DoS) should have the lead in SSTRO. In November 1942, President Roosevelt assigned the responsibility of post-war occupation duties to the DoS. This was in direct contradiction of Army doctrine that specified the theater commander would act as the military governor for post-hostility occupation activities. In response to Roosevelt’s guidance, the DoS established the Office of Foreign Territories; however, it accomplished little and was soon disbanded because, when applied to North Africa, it proved completely dependent on the military for execution. Following the campaign in North Africa, Roosevelt once again attempted to use civilians for post-hostility governance and created the Foreign Economic Administration in the Office of Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President. This effort also proved confusing and eventually failed. After two failures in one year, in November 1943, Roosevelt assigned the primary role to the War Department and its doctrinal text was the 1943 revision of FM 27-5, *Military Government*.⁹

Interestingly, over 60 years and several conflicts later, the confusion still exists. During the planning to oust the Saddam Hussein regime from Iraq, General Tommy Franks,
commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), directed his commanders in August 2002 that the State Department and others in the Government would take the lead in planning the post-hostility governance of Iraq that would follow the “dominate” maneuver phase. Franks appointed a tiny cell to plan humanitarian assistance operations for potential post-conflict crises but the main focus was on meeting possible humanitarian assistance challenges resulting from Phases 0-III. 10 Franks’ planning direction was contrary to the wise counsel found in B.H. Liddell Hart’s book entitled, Strategy.

If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.11

Confirming this oversight in CENTCOM’s planning effort, Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor observed in their comprehensive examination of the war in Iraq that, “A lot of energy focused on the tactical piece but there was not a lot of intellectual energy focused on Phase IV.”12

While CENTCOM was largely ignoring post-conflict planning requirements, in the fall of 2002 the Joint Chiefs recognized (much like Roosevelt did in 1943) that postwar Iraq was a bigger issue than DoS or CENTCOM. Historically, every time U.S. forces were sent to a trouble spot they seemed to stay longer than policymakers anticipated and there was a dire lack of military planning for this imminent possibility. Perhaps recognizing, but not fully comprehending the magnitude of this task, the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, decreed that the DoD would take the lead in postwar efforts and all references to the DoS were subsequently dropped from the pre-war organizational chart. Even though the DoS had led relatively recent post-war efforts in the Balkans and Afghanistan, it was decided that the DoD would assume direct authority for the administration and rebuilding of an occupied country for the first time since WWII.13

From that ominous decision to even now, the responsibility for post-hostilities operations continues to be volleyed back and forth between the Departments - usually ending up in DoD’s court for actual execution. Likewise, the March 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) document again volleys the responsibility back into the DoS functional side of the “court” by assigning responsibility for Stability and Reconstruction to the DoS. The NSS states:

…success often depends on early establishment of strong local institutions such as effective police forces, and a functioning justice and penal system. The governance capacity is critical to establishing the rule of law and a free market economy, which provide long-term stability and prosperity. To develop these capabilities, the Administration established a new office in the Department of State, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, to plan and execute civilian stabilization and reconstruction efforts.14
Additionally, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) supports the NSS on this concept:

The U.S. Government created the Office of the Coordinator for the Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department to bolster the capabilities of U.S. civilian agencies...to contribute to the resolution of complex crises overseas. The Defense Department is cooperating with this new office to increase the capacity of interagency and international partners to perform non-military stabilization and reconstruction tasks that might otherwise often become military responsibilities by default.15

Both documents are quite clear and most current senior Army officers, based on their 20+ years of training, military education, and operational experience, believe that the DoD should only provide an umbrella of security under which successful post-hostility governance and nation assistance can occur under the direction of the appropriate DoS oversight authority. Notwithstanding, the US is currently locked in a conflict wherein DoD tenuously straddles Phases III and IV and its security efforts are hindered or diluted by the requirement to provide major governmental services necessary for stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq...services more appropriately provided by the DoS and/or other interagency partners.

Given the NSS and NDS direction, there is a logical and direct (although resource intensive) solution. Simply stated, the DoS, in a leading interagency role, should have a sufficiently large, standing, deployable, and expeditionary constabulary force trained and ready to conduct reconstruction tasks associated with post-hostility governance. These tasks include, but are not limited to: supervising elections, maintenance of civil infrastructure (electricity, water, sewage, etc.), police/fire services training, etc. However, the DoS simply does not possess the necessary resources (budget and manpower), expertise, capacity, or institutional processes and experience to stand-up, train, equip, deploy, synchronize, and/or manage the efforts of such a force now or in the foreseeable future. Figures from a Human Resources Fact Sheet at the DoS reveal that there are only 19,685 Foreign and Civil Service employees (not counting an additional 37,092 Foreign Service Nationals) stationed in the U.S. or overseas.16 Additionally, the DoS has an operating budget of merely $7.1 billion, and combined with USAID and other foreign affairs agencies still only totals a relatively small $36.2 billion.17 Moreover, all these personnel and resources are already committed to performing existing agency missions; missions that would have to be abandoned or not performed if the resources were diverted to a contingency requirement such as Iraq. Essentially, DoS (and other governmental agencies) have limited to “no” surge capacity. By comparison, the DoD has roughly 2.23 million active and reserve in uniform18 with and operating budget of $491.3 billion for Fiscal Year (FY) 2007.19 By its nature this capability, although heretofore primarily designed, manned, trained and equipped for conventional combat operations, is postured for contingency deployment and employment.
Within certain on-going mission constraints, the entire operational force is essentially “surge capable.” As a result, DoD is the only U.S. government department capable of quickly deploying and sustaining sufficient assets to conduct these operations. It is, consistent with our history, the only viable or practical alternative.

Unfortunately, the dichotomy continues: the DoS has the assigned responsibility but no resources; the DoD has the resources but not the responsibility and, by default, eventually muddles into SSTR execution with forces poorly prepared to do these kinds of operations. Correspondingly, the Secretary of Defense (recognizing DoS’ historic inability to effectively execute these operations) issued a directive that placed the missions associated with SSTRO squarely on the shoulders of the Service Secretaries and Geographical Combatant Commanders. The impact of this document is potentially profound. DoD Directive 3000.05, Subject: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, dated 28 November 2005, directs the following:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organization, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.20

The U.S. military has made several adjustments over the last decade to enable troops to perform peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. However, actions in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforce criticisms that the military remains largely ineffectual in performing post-hostility missions; especially compared with its ability to conduct traditional combat operations. The above directive should provide both the impetus and management attention to improve associated military force structure and the defense planning and execution of SSTRO. But however clear the DoD directive, execution will be problematic. This change requires a dramatic shift in the military culture and is further undermined by the illusionary central role of the DoS. As a consequence, DoD is currently unsure of the steps it will take to implement SSTRO. Surely, it will use the directive to request changes in legislation, regulations, authority and, of course, request additional funding.21 But those steps are for the DoD civilian leadership to pursue. Tangible methods of implementing this directive through the re-design of existing military force structure, individual and collective training, and professional leader development programs will necessarily be the charter of senior uniformed leaders.
CHANGING THE MILITARY CULTURE

The institutional and cultural impediments to preparing for or adopting SSTRO as core competencies are a result of a confluence of diverse factors. Foremost, is the inherent cultural bias emanating from the constitutionally-based separation of the military from the governance role. Additionally, there is the continued institutional focus on conventional combat operations generated by the military’s Cold War focus on fighting and winning a high-intensity war against the Soviet threat. This focus was reinforced by almost 45 years of training and volumes of associated doctrinal literature.

Within the military, doctrine in and of itself reflects the organizational culture and disposition. Not too long ago, U.S. war fighting doctrine was almost completely devoted to total victory, relegating peace operations to only an unpopular topic separate rather than closely connected to decisive combat operations. The 2000 version of FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, which had been used fairly extensively in the 50s and 60s, “dropped reference to military government, except for two pages on civil administration in occupied territories.” And, even more contemporary doctrine, Joint Publication 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, dated 8 February 2001, contains only one paragraph on civil administration in hostile or occupied territories. Add to this, the purging from our doctrine of many of the related counter-insurgency and peacekeeping lessons following the Vietnam War by an army intent on avoiding associated nation assistance tasks. The result is an existing body of doctrinal literature almost devoid of SSTRO guiding an acculturated military postured and prepared to concentrate mass and firepower to destroy the enemy…and not prepared to conduct SSTRO.

The American Army, at the tactical level, can be self-critical and quickly learn from its mistakes. This, however, does not mean it is an institution that changes its culture quickly. The Army’s identity is still focused on its core competency of defeating conventional enemy forces despite the fact that most of our 13 conflicts since the 1800s were limited wars fought for limited objectives.

Recent experiences of ground commanders and soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate this conundrum. By and large, ground combat forces were well trained to tactically employ fires and maneuver in order to destroy a varied array of enemy forces. In Iraq, U.S. forces quickly defeated unconventional, yet organized fanatic Saddam Fedayeen forces. Moreover, Coalition Forces literally annihilated Iraqi Special Republican Guard and general purpose conventional units, and when Coalition forces encountered radical Islamic insurgents in several provinces, they similarly crushed them. However, U.S. Army officer professional military education (Officer Basic Course, Captain’s Career Course, and Command & General Staff College) did
not adequately prepare officers to conduct simultaneous nation assistance operations or face
the myriad challenges of SSTRO, to include: appointing and supervising local government
leaders, re-starting and securing public services (electrical power plants, oil refineries, water
and sewage treatment plants, trash collection, etc.), supervising contractors on the battlefield,
and establishing police and fire fighting service. Fortunately, many educational shortfalls were
mitigated by common sense and well-developed problem-solving skills possessed by
innovative, dedicated, and tenacious leaders at all levels. Nevertheless, ground commanders
routinely avoided assuming a proactive governance role and failed to exercise internationally-
recognized legal measures available to occupying powers. Thus, the assumption of the
governance role was uniformly slow, inconsistently applied and achieved spotted
effectiveness.

Unfortunately, the cultural impediments for internalizing SSTR competencies are also
strengthened by the personal experience and professional upbringing of Army senior
leadership. Senior Army leaders, primarily trained during the Cold War, are habitually trained
for success at the high-intensity end of the combat spectrum essentially becoming “major
combat operations focused” vice “full spectrum capable.” The basic logic for this focus was
that resources limited the ability to prepare for all levels of potential contingency operations, so if
the Army was trained for the most violent and high risk contingencies, it was logically capable of
adapting to lower risk or less violent operations. “A common assumption was that if the military
trained for major combat operations, it would be able to easily handle less violent operations like
peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. But that assumption proved to be wrong…”

We have since learned that in many ways SSTR is significantly more intellectually
challenging. Army leaders, consciously or sub-consciously, are reluctant to focus training on
non-kinetic solutions or disciplines (ex: negotiation competency or aptitude for civil
administration) because these were not professional skills essential for operations against the
USSR during the Cold War, nor were they necessary to defeat the notional enemy played by
opposing U.S. forces at the training centers during the 1990s.

Additionally, our current doctrinal terminology may contribute to this strategic and
operational oversight by characterizing these activities as occurring “postwar” when in actuality
they are performed concurrently and also as a continuation of conflict. The most haunting and
recent evidence of this conspicuous strategic and operational blind spot has come to light in
post-Saddam Iraq. “The War in Iraq situation is the most recent example of the reluctance of
civilian and military leaders to consider the establishment of political and economic order as part
of the war itself."\textsuperscript{37} This is a clear manifestation of the difficulty in overcoming existing cultural impediments.

Notwithstanding the confusion over SSTR mission responsibilities prior to invading Iraq to oust the Saddam Hussein regime, several of our most senior leaders (Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, USAF General Meyers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and USA General Franks, Commander, CENTCOM) utterly failed to plan and adequately resource the most difficult and problematic phase of the operation - Phase IV. Based upon his acceptance of what proved to be a long list of overly optimistic assumptions, and likely influenced by the relatively rapid and resource limited ground campaign in Afghanistan, Secretary Rumsfeld rejected the recommendations for more troops for anticipated post-conflict occupation duty and he directed another resource-limited course of action. While this miscalculation did not constitute criminal neglect, its cost in time, blood, and treasure was and continues to be great. He was eventually held accountable and dismissed. On the other hand, in Meyers’ and Franks’ case, their oversight is indicative of gross institutional and cultural ignorance of the potential scope and magnitude of the problem - they simply did not know any better.\textsuperscript{38} Meyers and Franks reflect an existing military cultural blind spot. The solution to this problem is more difficult and takes much longer to remedy because it requires a major overhaul and dramatic retooling of our leader professional development program and a deliberate strategy to change the existing culture.\textsuperscript{39}

Despite the fact that cultural change in the Army is extremely difficult, adopting force-wide SSTR capabilities and embedding those professional competencies within the force is not only imperative but also feasible.

Changing organizational culture is difficult but not impossible. In fact, cultural change is imperative if an organization is to grow, develop, and adapt to the changing environment within which it exists.\textsuperscript{40} Strategic leaders proactively manage change through the processes associated with embedding their vision within the organization and shaping organizational culture to support the vision.\textsuperscript{41}

To effect the required cultural changes, military strategic leaders must take a leading role in transitioning from our current focus on conventional combat operations and develop it into a profession wherein SSTR tasks are of equal importance. Complying with DoD Directive 3000.05 and embracing SSTRO as a core U.S. military competency requires a major cultural azimuth change. Fortunately, there exist conceptual frameworks to help guide this transition.

There is a rich theoretical and conceptual body of literature developed for managing cultural change in the private sector that is applicable to the military. John Kotter, one of the world’s foremost experts on business leadership, published a relevant framework for managing change in his book, \textit{Leading Change}. The author clearly understands that the military is not a
commercial business; nevertheless, Kotter’s book provides a detailed road map for transforming large organizations with an eight-stage process that is general enough to allow application to military organizations.  

Similarly, Edgar H. Schein outlines in his book, Organizational Culture and Leadership, embedding and reinforcing mechanisms for implementing cultural changes. These embedding mechanisms closely support the military’s leadership ethos and, if used by our strategic leaders, will most expeditiously effect the necessary cultural change required to embrace SSTRO as core competencies. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed strategy for embedding cultural change, six of Schien’s embedding measures are clearly applicable:

- **What leaders pay attention to, measure, and control on a regular basis** communicates in much stronger terms than mere written policy what they think is important. Consequently, senior leaders must establish definitive doctrine and tangible measures of effectiveness for the attainment of training standards in order to gauge SSTR competency within the force.

- **How leaders react to critical incidents and organizational crises** within the force is critical to establishing the credibility of a leader and his commitment to achieving the vision. Adjusting the culture and training methodology to create SSTR competency must anticipate the angst created by the dilution (to some degree) of the force’s conventional combat capability; so, the leader’s actions to mitigate the risk to mission and personnel will play a pivotal role in the successful embedding of SSTR competency in the force.

- **Deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching** are all necessary embedding mechanisms. Commanders have long understood that in order to realize their vision, they must use every opportunity to communicate its meaning and applicability to subordinates. Commanders must assume the SSTR mantra and maintain a constant drumbeat in their teaching and mentoring of subordinates in preparing for or executing SSTR supporting tasks.

- **Observed criteria by which leaders allocate resources**, or in other words, which projects receive an organization’s time, talent, and money most effectively communicates and focuses organizational energy. As directed by DoD Directive 3000.05, SSTR capability must garner its requisite portion of an organization’s resources or it simply will not be internalized.

- **Criteria by which leaders allocate rewards and status** can be a leader’s most powerful agent for change. Leaders who are creative thinkers can foster healthy, internal competition and recognition that offers huge incentive to those organizations that successfully master SSTRO.

- **Criteria by which leaders recruit, select, promote, and punish organizational members** may be the leader’s most powerful mechanism to embed cultural change. Senior leaders should establish selection and promotion criteria based on demonstrated SSTR mastery comparable to conventional combat skills proficiency.

Clearly Schein’s embedding and reinforcing mechanisms provide an excellent guide for senior leaders navigating the services through the cultural change necessary to develop core competencies in SSTR comparable to conventional combat operational missions. Both Schein’s measures and Kotter’s systematic 8-step program for managing change provide an effective methodology for transitioning the military’s culture within its officer and non-
commissioned officer corps. Similarly, the military must also undertake a deliberate training and education approach to develop that capability within its leaders and units.

LEADER DEVELOPMENT, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION

While the Army, as an institution, does not rapidly change, it does routinely respond to identified weaknesses and then quickly devises effective solutions to correct deficiencies. The Army trains well because one of its core competencies and Title 10 mandates is to man, equip, maintain, and train land forces. It achieves readiness by developing combat-like experiences through tough, imaginative, realistic, multi-echeloned, and fully integrated training that individually and collectively develops the combat capability of the force. Leader development and education is an integral part of a training strategy and consists of three interacting core domains: self-development, operational, and institutional.44

Self-development is extremely important but is the least tangible of the three core domains of leader development. Briefly stated, it is a continual, career-long process of life-long learning that occurs during institutional training and during operational assignments. Self-study, professional reading, and most importantly, leader feedback constitute the main source of self-awareness – these in turn provide a basic knowledge of personal strengths and weaknesses to assist in learning required skills.45

Leader development in the operational core domain occurs through mentorship at every level of command in units/organizations, through individual and collective training at home station, during major training exercises, Combat Training Center (CTC) rotational deployments, and while conducting the full spectrum of real-world operations.46

Because units have limited resources and a finite amount of time in which to prepare for deployment, leaders must prioritize which missions they will prepare their units to perform. Home station training will usually focus on the core conventional combat operations and/or support missions for which the units were doctrinally designed. However, under the previously mentioned SSTR DoD directive, that is simply not enough. They must be trained to execute their tasks under conditions found throughout the broad spectrum of operations that include exercising the “soft” skills required for constabulary duties and SSTRO usually associated with Phases IV and V. Additionally, leaders must train their units in scenarios that include joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) participants. Herein is the conundrum and resultant overarching challenge. The U.S. military must (with little additional time or money) continue to produce units led by competent warrior leaders who are without peer in their conventional shoot, move, and communicate skills AND that are also masters of SSTRO...yet
not become a “peace-corps with guns.” It is well beyond the scope of this paper to outline all common tactical skills associated with the range of SSTR operational missions, but in order to meet this requirement, the Army must develop doctrine and related tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and train SSTR tasks that align with similar conventional tactical and operational tasks already being trained within its institutions.

Our Joint and National Combat Training Centers (CTC) can also contribute to SSTR mastery. For over 20 years, the training centers have become world-class combat simulation laboratories. They provide realistic scenarios against professional opposing forces on diverse terrain, during a limited but demanding period of time in a carefully observed force-on-force exercise. Combined arms units periodically rotate through these training centers and perform the planning, preparation, and execution of directed missions and then receive candid evaluations of their performance by professional, doctrinally-sound, and expert observer/controllers. This collective training regimen has produced arguably the finest trained military units in the history of warfare, “having played a key role in the U.S. Army’s success in Operation Desert Shield/Storm…and in the initial phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom.”

The challenge is to build upon the training center concept and increase the scope of the training to address SSTRO; however, the current training center construct has certain limitations. SSTRO usually requires a complex operational and strategic environment consisting of large numbers of civilians residing within various types of urban terrain with associated public administrative, law and order, and infrastructure support challenges. These conditions are dramatically different than those faced by a maneuver force fighting conventional operations at the CTCs against an opposing force of similar capability all operating within relatively sparsely occupied terrain. Moreover, SSTR problems and corresponding responses take a very long time to develop and implement – usually much longer than units can reasonably spend during a CTC rotation. Nevertheless, the Army and joint community should exploit developing technology to provide the context and training support required to develop proficiencies in SSTRO.

Live-Virtual-Constructive-Integrated-Architecture (LVC-IA) is a critical component of the Army’s training transformation. It is a network-centric linkage that collects and assimilates information between live and simulation instrumentation. This capability can be integrated and linked to our joint capabilities enabling commanders of all services to apply lessons learned from training and operational experience seamlessly between training institutions, home station, CTCs, and real-world deployed locations. It also provides the capability to generate an overarching scenario (referred to as a synthetic training environment (STE)) that incorporates
associated modeling and simulation technology to virtually portray a wide range of participants and complex conditions that can be used dynamically to conduct command post exercises or augment collective training events.48

The LVC-IA training capability can portray within the STE the JIIM environment and enable concurrent multi-echelon training in virtual and/or constructive modes while also integrating actual live training operations conducted at home station or at the CTCs. This also enables “the Army to execute combined arms and joint training, mission planning and rehearsals at home station, en route, and at deployed locations.”49 Here is a brief example of a potential application to training at a CTC. First, preparation for and the conduct of training will be informed by collaboration with other similar units, accessing information available from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) or other similar sources that capture recent and relevant lessons. Concurrently, the STE virtually portrays numerous participants and scenario-related conditions, links directly with other live participants (possibly with members of the JIIM with whom the organizations would develop habitual training or deployment relationships), and captures the live actions of the organization through the network during the conduct of actual training operations. In other words, rotational units would not only be coached and evaluated on the standard CTC rotational 10-14 day period of time, interaction and training would continue both pre- and post-rotation. The CTC rotation would consist of a continuation of a Synthetic Training Environment (Live-portion) rather than the start or end of one. Not only could the unit be evaluated on its conventional combat mission capability, but also on the corresponding challenges and responses performed within a Live-Virtual-Constructive training context begun before and extending after the rotation. Additionally, success could also be measured by both the unit’s performance in live operations during the rotation and also by the conditions it established for a successful follow-on rotational unit. Understandably, there are limitations to this construct but this example demonstrates one way in which we could leverage current and emerging technology with the proven success of the training centers to master SSTRO in accordance with the DoD’s directive. In this way, limited resources are optimized through the integration of existing JIIM participants and activities (networked from their current offices and home stations) and exploited with simulation and modeling technology to virtually portray the diverse and complex operational and strategic environments.

Leader training and development in the institutional core domain may be the most important. Most commanders or senior leaders agree that one of their highest priorities is subordinate leader development.50 Correspondingly, senior leaders have the most influence in the manner in which our institutions train and develop future leaders.
To inculcate heretofore ignored SSTR competencies, senior leaders must begin at the junior leader level by identifying and formally evaluating potential and developing the corresponding strategic meta-competencies – identity, mental agility, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior, and professional astuteness. These attributes and skills are consistent with a future leader likened to a well-rounded athlete – a “pentathlete” – possessing a multitude of talents to operate in the volatile, uncertain, and asymmetric future of the 21st century. In short, our current leaders must develop future leaders that are intellectually flexible, open-minded, adaptive, and equally adroit at performing near-simultaneous conventional combat operations along with SSTRO. This range of disciplines requires advanced intuitive decision-making skills traditionally acquired over time and through operational experience. Nevertheless, based on our operational and tactical constructs, the senior leaders who have gained the necessary experience and education are often far removed from the SSTR environment requiring the wisdom necessary for effective decision making. The solution is to prepare our junior leaders for these challenges as early as during their pre-commissioning education and then reinforce the need for continued lifelong learning and development of associated SSTR competencies.

For instance, our premier commissioning source, the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, offers approximately 35 degrees that include languages, multiple social sciences, hard sciences, and engineering disciplines. However, regardless of major, all USMA degrees awarded are Bachelors of Science (BS) as opposed to a Bachelor of Arts (BA) traditionally associated with social science disciplines. This is because all graduates are required to take an engineering-heavy course load and a host of other technical courses as part of the core curriculum. Clearly, mathematics, physics, and chemistry are important but their relevance may be overemphasized given the current and future operational and strategic environments. Even the most technical military science skills (artillery gunnery or tactical bridge emplacement) required of company-grade officers seldom require more than basic mathematical and engineering skills. On the other hand, skills required for SSTR mastery are more appropriately aligned with interpersonal-relation disciplines, listed as pentathlete attributes, such as cross-cultural savvy and interpersonal maturity. These are cultivated in the sociology, psychology, political science, foreign language, civil/public administration, history, and criminal justice educational disciplines.

The Army’s Review of Education, Training and Assignments for Leaders (RETAL) Task Force made many similar recommendations to adjust leader education. Illustrative of the wide
range of associated study proposals is the following recommendation advocating cross-cultural savvy education earlier (rather than later) in an officer’s career:

Increase the officer corps’ foreign cultural awareness capability by developing the skill in ROTC cadets. Provide the best ROTC cadets an opportunity to broaden their horizons by immersing in a foreign culture for a short period of time to send a clear message to all pre-commissioned officers that the Army values cross-cultural savvy.\(^{54}\)

To implement these training initiatives, Training and Doctrine Command must embrace this philosophy and adjust service school curricula to cultivate SSTR skills as a core competency. Likewise, a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report indicates that the military should “...ensure that military schools and training centers incorporate stability operations curricula in joint and individual service education and training programs at all levels.”\(^{55}\) Additionally, the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) and officer basic and career branch courses offer other opportunities to identify and develop those who demonstrate pentathlete potential. Curricula in these courses should gradually increase (commensurate with their rank) exposure of officers to military governance tasks associated with SSTRO in the JIIM environment and then certify proficiency in related constabulary tasks. Similarly, the Army’s Intermediate Level Education (ILE) and the other service Command and Staff Colleges should develop leaders by educating the respective SSTR metacompetencies and then require demonstrated proficiency in SSTR tasks during exercises or as temporary augmenters to deployed staffs. In most cases, the Senior Service Colleges (SSC) cover this complex topic adequately. However, as the battlefield becomes more complex and SSTR decisions are pushed increasingly to lower levels, this education at the SSCs occurs much too late in the officers’ career. The need for timely decisions based upon first hand knowledge of the environmental context mandates lower level decision-making by the appropriately trained and educated junior leaders.

Officer career development is another area that must adjust to ensure SSTR competency across the force. There have been several DoD reforms in the last 60 years, but none as revolutionary as the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Based on several embarrassing events from 1979-1983 (the failed Iran-Hostage rescue attempt, 1980; the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon, 1983; and weaknesses in the execution of Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, 1983), Congress enacted and DoD was compelled to comply with the statutes of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA). Essentially, it empowered the geographical combatant commanders and Chairman of the JCS, but more pertinent to this paper, the Act legislated joint service duty as a required part of an officer’s career. It did much to break down parochial
barriers and force the services to operate jointly by conducting joint operational planning, exercises, and operations while capitalizing on core service competencies and joint interdependence.\textsuperscript{56} Most officers serving today agree that the Goldwater-Nichols Act was a positive “forcing function” to create joint readiness and our combat record since then testifies to its value.

On the other hand, our interagency cooperation continues to suffer from many of the maladies that afflicted the joint force prior to GNA.

For years, the United States has underinvested in the civilian capabilities needed to partner with its military forces to achieve success in complex operations...post-conflict operations are an intrinsic rather than optional part of winning a war – suggest that it is high time the United States develop and institutionalize the civilian and military capabilities it needs to be successful in such complex operations.\textsuperscript{57}

SSTR requires not only joint competency, but coordinated and integrated interagency activity as well. Therefore, a reform act similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, that inspired joint war fighting competence in the military, is recommended in order to prompt interagency competence. Legislation for this Act should mandate sufficient authorities and resources necessary to support the rapid deployment of a trained and ready core of interagency civilian team members prepared to conduct unified SSTR. Additionally, “Congress should create a new Training Center for Interagency and Coalition Operations.”\textsuperscript{58} In order to be effective, Congress should ensure that legislation directs interagency service by military officers and offers incentives to the services and non-military federal agencies that tie service interagency service to promotions and key assignments. Correspondingly, the RETAL Task Force recommends that the “Officers most likely to be successful in the operations career field would be sent to joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational or similar internships...”\textsuperscript{59}

Training and leader education programs are essential for the development of SSTR leader competencies, collective operational proficiency within the services, and the integration of joint and interagency operations. The modification of traditional training and education programs together with the implementation of innovative Live-Virtual-Constructive-Integrated-Architecture (LVC-IA) enabled by a transformed training system can provide the means for achieving DoD’s objective for SSTR capability. However, true military-civilian interagency competency, possibly achieved through a similar GNA-like legislative initiative, will likely be required to attain overall interagency proficiency in SSTR.
CONCLUSION

The US is again faced with the profound challenges of effectively executing SSTRO. Not surprisingly, the military has again found itself executing a mission set for which it is ill-prepared. Recognizing this deficiency, and as a long term remedy, DoD directed that the military prepare to plan and execute SSTRO with the same priority that it conducts conventional combat operations. How well the military will be able to comply depends on both the recognition of the dramatic challenges in overcoming existing institutional and cultural impediments and the comprehensive integration of current and future operational and institutional leader development and training programs. To effectively develop SSTRO competency, our senior strategic leadership must lead decisively, implement enabling reforms, and employ reinforcing and embedding mechanisms to overcome significant cultural impediments. Additionally, we must improve and modernize our self-development, operational, and institutional core domains of leader development, training, and education to effect the necessary transformation to meet these challenges now and in the future. This will require significant investment of time, talent, and resources. Nevertheless, the alternative consequences are severe. Using our most recent experience as a touchstone, failure in SSTR-dependent phases of conflict (IV and V) will be measured in terms of the lives of our Nation’s sons and daughters, our national treasure, and overall strategic success.

Endnotes


4 Joint Publication 3-0, GL-26, Peacekeeping – Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

5 Joint Publication 3-0, GL-26, Peace Enforcement - Application of military force, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

6 Joint Publication 1-02, 288, Nation Assistance - Civil and/or military assistance rendered by foreign forces within a nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements between nations.
Joint Publication 3-0, GL-29, Stability Operations - Military missions/tasks conducted outside of CONUS, in coordination with other instruments of national power, to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services (infrastructure and emergency), and humanitarian relief.

Joint Publication 1-02, 381, Security - Measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to impair its effectiveness.


Ibid, 141.


U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Opening Remarks by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice Washington, D.C., 8 February 2007.


Ibid.


The U.S. Constitution is designed to ensure absolute civilian control over the military. The Constitution grants certain powers to both the Executive and Legislative Branches. See...
U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2; art. 1, sec. 8. Consequently, the principle of absolute civilian governance (vice any semblance of military influence or role) permeates the consciousness of every U.S. citizen. So strong is this aversion, it extends through related policy decisions to military operations conducted outside our country’s borders. The US military does not exercise governance over its citizens. To do so in our own country is explicitly forbidden by law; to do so in a foreign country is antithetical to our culture…and is done so only in the direst of circumstances. Consequently, civil leadership has rarely pre-planned to cede control of governance to the Army in past conflicts, but has eventually done so out of necessity. See Schadlow, 88.

23 Moreover, throughout the 1980s, the early 90s, and the passing of the Cold War, the U.S. military clung to its focus on kinetic combat operations and the doctrine of overwhelming firepower and decisive maneuver. The operational approach was sampled in Grenada, tested in Panama, and validated in Desert Storm. See F.G. Hoffman, *Decisive force: The New American Way of War* (Westport: Praeger, 1966), 99-101. Operation Just Cause foreshadowed obstacles the Army would encounter after major hostilities in future conflicts, such as: supervising humanitarian assistance, restoring order, and re-building damaged infrastructure. “In fact, post conflict headaches…would last considerably longer and would require a great deal more effort than generals ever imagined.” BG Robert H. Scales, “Forging a New Army” in *Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War*, (Brassey’s: Washington D.C., 1997), 35.


26 Walters, 27.


30 Schadlow, 87.

31 Gordon, 500. See also, Karl Zinsmeister, “The Reconstruction Business” in *Dawn Over Baghdad: How the U.S. Military Is Using Bullets and Ballots to Remake Iraq*, (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2004). This chapter’s theme communicates that the U.S. paratroopers are skilled warriors fighting a counterinsurgency but are also required to perform many other civil administration duties in which they have no formal training. Karl Zinsmeister was an embedded reporter working with this paper’s author during his command of 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division.

32 Clark, 6.

34 MG David Huntoon, “Army Leaders for the 21st Century (RETAL Task Force): Officer “Pentathlete” Leader Development Action Plan”, briefing slides with scripted commentary, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 16 October 2006, slide #2. The briefing points out how the Army, in the 21st century, must grow multi-skilled leaders with attributes that “personify the Warrior Ethos in all aspects, from war fighting to statesmanship to business management…as a way of life.”


36 BG Robert H. Scales, “Forging a New Army” in Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War, (Brassey’s: Washington D.C., 1997), 21-22. The training centers are excellent force-on-force laboratories that helped rebuild the U.S. Army throughout the 80s and 90s; however, they focused almost solely on tactical force-on-force engagement evaluation with no attention to the aftermath.

37 Schadlow, 85.


39 The U.S. military’s reluctance to governance is not universal among all militaries. In fact, the U.S. military’s apolitical ethos, in comparison to other militaries, is rare. Interestingly, the British Army, probably due to its long history of service in colonial wars, is much more comfortable with colonial policing and administration and seems to relish its constabulary role. Its experience in Malaysia demonstrated that the British Army had little problem realizing that, “political rather than purely military solutions were well within the purview of the British Army.” John A. Nagl, “Organizational Culture and Learning Institutions,” in Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam, (University of Chicago Press – Books, 2005), 216.


41 Ibid., 50.

Edgar H. Schein, “How Founders and Leaders Embed and Transmit Culture” in *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (New York: John Wiley & sons, Inc. 1992), 231. Primary Culture-Embedding Mechanisms: 1) What leaders pay attention to, measure, and control on a regular basis, 2) How leaders react to critical incidents and organizational crises, 3) Observed criteria by which leaders allocate scarce resources, 4) Deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching, 5) Observed criteria by which leaders allocate rewards and status, 6) Observed criteria by which leaders recruit, select, promote, retire, and excommunicate organizational members.


Ibid., C-16

Ibid., C-6.


Ibid., C-3 and C-24.

Ibid., C-27.


Shambach, 58.

Ibid., 55. “On December 21, 2001, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) tasked the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) to identify the strategic leader skill sets for officers required in the post-September 11th environment.”

Total Army Personnel Data Base (TAPDB), U.S. Army Human Resources Command, U.S. Army G-1 extract, June 2006. Regardless of declared major, USMA awards a BS because of its demanding curriculum of hard sciences and engineering that includes: four semesters of mathematics, two semesters of physics, two semesters of chemistry, and two semesters of computer science. Of the 824 graduates of the USMA class of 2006, 359 (or 44%) were awarded a BS in hard sciences and various engineering disciplines.

Hunton briefing slide #4.

Serafino, 8.


Ibid., 67.
58 Ibid., 65.

59 Huntoon briefing slide #8.