POST-CONFLICT IRAQ: IF YOU DON’T KNOW WHERE YOU’RE GOING ...

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
**Report Documentation Page**

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Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Recent experiences in Iraq have demonstrated the United States preparations for post-conflict operations were inadequate. Traditionally, post-conflict operations have been seen as separate to major combat operations and pre-conflict preparations by both the military and interagency organizations have been deficient. For post-conflict operations to be effective, they need to be integrated into all aspects of the government’s strategic planning. The United States needs to institutionalize post-conflict operations as a core mission and develop an integrated process to properly organize, educate, train, and equip the United States Government interagency apparatus to effectively execute this mission.

This paper will research and analyze the post-conflict activities in Iraq and make recommendations on how to properly organize, educate, train, and equip the United States Government to develop an appropriate post-conflict organization for the next war. Would a military-interagency "Goldwater-Nichols-type" initiative enhance integration of all United States Government elements of power? What would such a program or process look like?
Warfare, especially its unpredictability and unexpected consequences, demands we learn the lessons from history and apply them to our future endeavors. Recent experiences in post-conflict Iraq have demonstrated the United States Governments’ preparations for post-conflict operations were inadequate. Traditionally, the military has viewed post-conflict operations as separate to major combat operations and the interagency has essentially ignored them. In recent history, pre-conflict planning and preparations for post-conflict operations by the political leadership, the military and interagency organizations have been deficient.

If we have learned anything from our experiences in Iraq, we must recognize that post-conflict planning is just as critical to our long-term success as pre-war combat planning. Additionally, for post-conflict operations to be effective, they need to be integrated into all aspects of our governments’ strategic planning. The United States Government needs to institutionalize post-conflict operations as a core mission and develop an integrated process to properly organize, educate, train, and equip our forces and agencies to effectively execute this mission. Otherwise we will continue to risk winning the “war” and ultimately losing the “peace.”

This work examines the United States Governments’ experience with post-conflict activities in Iraq and will make recommendations on how to properly organize, educate, train, and equip the military and interagency to develop an appropriate post-conflict capability for the next war. The fundamental issue confronts the following question: Would a military-interagency "Goldwater-Nichols" type initiatives enhance the integration of all United States Government elements of power in post-conflict operations? What would such a program or process look like?

The material for this study comes from a variety of sources. The primary material includes newspapers, speeches, and documents produced by government agencies. These materials will be supplemented by a variety of secondary books, research papers, and articles. Essentially, there is sufficient material available to form the basis of a sound analysis.

For objective analysis, this study will review the United States Governments’ experiences in post-conflict Iraq from January 2003 to present. The study will briefly review what actions the current administration took prior to and after major combat operations in Iraq as they relate to the task of post-conflict activities. Although limited in scope, this paper will assess how the government is organized, educated, trained, and equipped to accomplish the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction mission. The study will then make ten
recommendations the United States Government could initiate to better prepare for future post-conflict activities.¹

In the conclusion, the study offers some thoughts concerning the implications of the findings on the government’s interagency organization. More significantly, it attempts to provide a model for understanding the importance of interagency coordination at the top levels of government. The study concludes with the realization that any significant change in how the United States Government is organized, educated, trained, and equipped, to conduct post-conflict operations will ultimately come in the form of a mandate from the American people through the United States Congress.

Post-Conflict Operations in Iraq

In March 2003, the United States military led a coalition force into Iraq with the explicit goal of toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein. The rationale for this invasion was that removing Saddam Hussein from power provided the only sure means of disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, the President argued that a stable and democratic Iraq would promote reform and stability in the Middle East and was vital to the national security interests of the United States.² Military victory in Iraq has given rise to an equally important challenge: rebuilding the country of Iraq after years of totalitarian rule and delivering on President Bush’s promise of a free and democratic future for the Iraqi people.³

In Iraq, the United States Government was faced with the most challenging and ambitious nation-building mission since the occupation of Germany and Japan after World War II: the military occupation and complete political transformation of a significantly large Middle Eastern country.⁴ Unlike its post World War II experience, the United States did not have millions of men and women in uniform, a strong coalition partnership, or the political stamina for success. As the United States continues to struggle with post-conflict operations in Iraq, the nation is grappling with the stark realization that Iraq is far more challenging than anyone anticipated.

Nation building in Iraq is confronted with a significant number of challenges. In addition to the size of Iraq’s population, the country has a history of long-running ethnic and religious hostility among the dominant ethnic groups, the Sunnis, Shiites, and the Kurds.⁵ Reconstruction efforts in Iraq are significantly more challenging because the United States has to deal with several unsympathetic neighboring countries—Iran, Syria, and Turkey.⁶ These countries all have a significant interest in influencing and shaping the post-conflict Iraqi landscape. In the international arena, the United States spilt with the United Nations (UN) Security Council leading
up to the war in Iraq, which has made it more difficult to seek burden-sharing for post-conflict reconstruction efforts.7 The United States Governments’ coordination at home was no better.

The United States Government, including the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, and other interagency organizations did not initiate any substantial pre-war coordination or preparations to deal with a post-conflict Iraq. Within the U.S. Government, there was a false assumption that a post-Saddam Iraqi Government would somehow rise from the ashes of U.S. military might. Therefore, there was little pre-war interagency planning effort or prior coordination with UN humanitarian relief organizations or other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) relating to post-conflict operations.8 As if almost an afterthought, within weeks of initiating combat operations, the President appointed a retired general officer to the task of post-conflict operations.

Only weeks before the United States invasion and subsequent military occupation of Iraq, Lieutenant General (retired) Jay Garner was selected to lead the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). This organization was created by President Bush in January 2003 in anticipation of the war in Iraq and was meant to be the primary post-war planning office within the Department of Defense.9 ORHA was charged with developing detailed plans for all aspects of the administration of post-war Iraq. They were tasked with coordinating the post-war activities and participation of the UN agencies, all non-governmental organizations, and the other branches within the United States Government. There should have been no illusion that this effort was too little, too late for the mission they were about to embark on in Iraq. Politicians and bureaucrats knew too well the inability of the interagency to deal with operational matters. In the prior administration, President Clinton had issued a Presidential Directive that attempted to create a mechanism for better interagency coordination.

In 1997, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 ordering the Pentagon, State Department, CIA and other agencies to create a cohesive program for educating and training personnel for reconstruction missions, but the Bush administration did not carry this program forward.10 For a variety of reasons, George Bush entered the office of presidency determined to avoid peace-keeping and nation building endeavors and thus jettisoned the Clinton policy. With Iraq looming, the Bush team suddenly realized the possibility of a significant void in their Iraq war plans. ORHA was the Bush administration’s attempt at filling this void in Iraq post-conflict reconstruction operations. ORHA’s responsibilities in post-war Iraq included reconstruction efforts, civil administration, and coordinating humanitarian assistance. It was tasked with coordinating the participation of other United States agencies operating in Iraq including the State Department, the Treasury Department and the Department
of Justice. The Department of Defense’s extensive control over the post-conflict activities caused tension with the other government agencies, particularly the Department of State.\textsuperscript{11} The ad-hoc and rushed creation of ORHA did not end up accomplishing any substantial progress with post-conflict operations prior to President Bush’s appointment of a new civil administrator for Iraq.

In May 2003, the President announced that with the end of major combat operations in Iraq, Paul Bremer, a career civil diplomat, would serve as the new civil administrator in Iraq.\textsuperscript{12} This new office attempted to fill the pre-war need of a coordinating mechanism of interagency activities in the United States Government. This organization, which eventually became known as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), was thoroughly unprepared for the complete collapse of governance at every level in Iraq, including basic security and policing functions.\textsuperscript{13} One of the basic assumptions by the United States prior to the war was the U.S. military would be greeted in Iraq as liberators. Although there was some thought by the State Department prior to the war on what a post-Saddam Iraq would look like, it ultimately proved to be of little practical value.\textsuperscript{14} It would be a fair assessment that a divided and poorly coordinated United States Government was unprepared for virtually every aspect of post-conflict reconstruction activity when Saddam Hussein’s regime disintegrated on April 19, 2003.

The United States’ plan for a post-Saddam transition to a democratic form of government has evolved and shifted since the beginning of the war, when little was known about how Iraq would be governed.\textsuperscript{15} The pickup game mentality by the United States Government to post-conflict operations in Iraq was exacerbated by the complete collapse of every Iraqi Government institution after the fall of Baghdad. Traditionally, non-U.S. Government actors involved in post-conflict activities include the U.N., international financial institutions, NGOs, and regional ad-hoc security alliances.\textsuperscript{16} In Iraq, during the unintended strategic pause between combat operations and post-conflict reconstruction activities, the void was filled with ethnic, sectarian, and foreign influenced corruption and violence. That this proved to be the case should have come as no surprise. History has shown that three variables significantly influence the success or failure of post-conflict activities.

Historically, the success or failure of post-war reconstruction activities depends on three critical variables: the nation’s internal characteristics, a convergence of the geopolitical interests, and a commitment to economic development.\textsuperscript{17} From the finish the United States failed to achieve a positive trend in any of the three variables in Iraq. First, the internal characteristics of Iraq are represented by three distinct religious groups with a long history of opposing views and sectarian violence and oppression. Second, the country is divided along geopolitical lines both
internally in Iraq and regionally with its neighboring countries of Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Third, with Iraq’s post-war economy in shambles and utterly incapable of regeneration without outside support, there appears to be a lack of commitment from the American public, the United States Congress, and the international community to sustain the long-term economic and financial commitment required to rebuild Iraq. Although having a robust post-conflict, post-Saddam plan in place prior to the invasion would not have eliminated the challenges mentioned above, it would have made the transition from combat to stability and reconstruction efforts better.

Time will mostly certainly reveal that in the months leading up to the war in Iraq, the United States Government interagency coordination process broke down.\textsuperscript{18} There are several reasons for the breakdown, including the lack of effective leadership from the National Security Council, the lack of prior coordination and planning within the Defense Department, the State Department, and other interagency organizations. The post-conflict challenges in Iraq including security, humanitarian assistance, creating a civil government, political transition, and economic reform have proven to be too difficult for the current United States Government interagency apparatus. At last, politicians and bureaucrats from across the political spectrum have acknowledged problems with the interagency process and recognized the need to do something to fix the interagency.

Recently, President Bush has conceded that the current government interagency process is ineffective and will require drastic changes to meet the demands of the Twenty-First century and the Global War on Terrorism.\textsuperscript{19} The obvious question now is whether or not the government will make the necessary changes required to improve the interagency process. The complexity of the United States Government coupled with institutional biases, bureaucratic barriers, and Congressional friction will not make change an easy task. The good news is there appears to be a consensus building in Washington D.C. that something has to be done with the interagency process. The bad news is there doesn’t appear to be any consensus on what road will lead us there.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{The Road Less Traveled}

History suggests that there is no quick path to post-conflict reconstruction. After reviewing our experiences in post-war Iraq, there are lessons to be gleaned that can help us in our efforts to organize, educate, train, and equip our government for future operations. Although the initial military phase of operations in Iraq went extremely well, the United States Government was overwhelmed with the task of building a new democratic, economically vibrant
Iraqi nation. Over past decades, the United States Government has made major investments in the combat power of its military forces. The return on that investment has been evident judging from the results of recent combat operations from Desert Storm to Iraqi Freedom. Conversely, the United States Government has not made a comparable investment in the Department of State, or in the capacity of other governmental agencies’ possessive abilities to conduct post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction activities.\textsuperscript{21} In short, the United States lacks any credible capacity within the interagency to execute the post-conflict mission.

Post-conflict reconstruction activities have been a controversial topic within the Department of Defense and Department of State over the past few decades. This friction has undoubtedly had an affect on both the United States Government’s investment and inherent institutional biases against nation building. Neither department regarded post-conflict nation building as one of their core missions.\textsuperscript{22} However, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been involved in major nation building operations, on the average, every two years.\textsuperscript{23}

In October 2001, Senator Joseph Biden, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, claimed that United States led nation building in the Central and South Asia was the “long-term solution to the terrorism problem.”\textsuperscript{24} Unfortunately, the United States Congress made no financial investment in creating a capacity within the government to accomplish that mission, and the administration didn’t publish its strategy for success in Iraq until late 2005.

In November 2005, President Bush’s National Security Council issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, clarifying the governments’ strategy for achieving security, political, and economic objectives in Iraq. The document clearly identified U.S. involvement in Iraq as a “vital national interest and the central front on the war on terror.”\textsuperscript{25} Although a dramatic improvement over any pre-war planning, the document failed to identify clearly which agency within the government was responsible for implementing the overlapping activities listed in the Iraq strategy.\textsuperscript{26} In December 2005, however, President Bush issued a new directive to empower the Secretary of State to improve the United States Governments’ capacity to conduct post-conflict reconstruction activities.\textsuperscript{27}

On December 7, 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 that established the Secretary of State as lead to coordinate and integrate the United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. departments and agencies, in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction activities.\textsuperscript{28} This directive also established a State Department Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. NSPD-44 directed the Secretary of Defense and State to integrate stabilization and reconstruction planning efforts with the Defense Departments’ contingency plans. Additionally, the Department of Defense issued a new
instruction, Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction* (SSTR), which for the first time established stability operations as a core military mission for the Department of Defense.\(^{29}\)

The Department of Defense’s new directive on SSTR made clear that future military operations will regularly include post-conflict stability operations. This unprecedented action by both the Department of State and Department of Defense acknowledged that post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts were vital to the national security of the United States and could no longer be ignored. While the United States’ experience in post-war Iraq brought new emphasis to SSTR operations as a core strategic capability, the U.S. Government must identify the most appropriate way to organize, educate, train, and equip to develop and maintain these capabilities.\(^{30}\) With the promulgation of the SSTR directive, the Department of Defense ended decades of denial in regards to the validity of post-conflict operations as a military mission.

With the realization that post-conflict operations are not optional operations, the United States Government has the moral obligation to develop a competent system within the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and other agencies to ensure they are organized, educated, trained, and equipped to execute this mission. The administration, the United States Congress, and the American people must demand a change to the status quo. It is unimaginable that the United States Government or the United States Congress would ever make the level of sacrifice in American blood to win a war and not dedicate the required resources to win the peace. Implementing any change in the United States Government, however, will not be easy, but the alternative to change is failure. The events of 2001 were the catalyst for significant change in our government, but the American appetite for the long war is waning.

Although the attacks of September 11, 2001 devastated the United States, they had a unifying affect on the United States Government, the United States Congress, and the American people. The United States faced unprecedented national security issues that helped form the tight bond of national unity. That national unity resulted in the accomplishment of several great initiatives in the months and years following 9-11: creation of the Office of Homeland Security, consolidation of the national intelligence agencies, creation of the Homeland Security Council, improvements in our national transportation security systems, nuclear security systems, as well as a host of other Defense Department initiatives (e.g. U.S.A. Patriot Act)\(^{31}\) to improve the nations homeland security.\(^{32}\) In recent months, we have witnessed a decaying of that national unity as the nation struggles with the realities of a post-conflict Iraq. There may no longer be
the unity in our nation required to make the necessary changes in how our government approaches post-conflict operations.

The cost of winning the peace in post-conflict operations will require the United States Government to make significant changes. To build an effective and credible capability within the government will require adjustments to department and agency missions, education, organization, budgets, and strategic culture. Post-conflict operations require the support of several branches of the United States Government and will require thinking very differently about how our nation engages in warfare to ultimately win the peace. Regardless of the outcome of the war in Iraq, in the future the United States will more than likely be called upon to conduct combat operations and the inevitable post-conflict activities that follow. The United States Government must take action now to be prepared to meet the challenges of the Twenty-First century. Although the need for interagency focus is both obvious and urgent, any change in our government will take time and inevitably create friction.

Driving change in the United States Government will be neither easy nor quick. Nearly 56 years after the National Security Act of 194733 and 20 years after the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 198634, the United States military has genuinely developed the ability to execute joint, integrated military operations. Although the Goldwater-Nichols legislation created friction and frustration within the services, ultimately the military realized the change was worth it. The effectiveness and combat capability of a joint team are far greater than those of a single service. There is no reason a similar forcing function on the interagency will not have a similar affect.

The United States Government must fundamentally reshape its interagency organization, as well as various interagency processes, if we are to realize the same level of effectiveness in post-conflict operations as we currently see in combat operations. Past efforts at reforming the interagency have failed for a host of reasons making it abundantly clear that congressional legislation is the only sure way to provide for, or force, needed changes in how the United States Government conducts post-conflict interagency operations. The exact form will be left to the United States Congress, but the proposed roadmap as to what is needed is presented in the following ten recommendations.

The Road Ahead

Ideas abound in both the Department of Defense and in a host of Washington D.C. think tanks about how to reform the interagency process.35 Although a grand design to fix all of the United States Governments’ interagency problems is beyond the scope of this paper, a modest
list of recommendations that are both plausible and attainable within the next ten to twenty years comes easily to mind.

First, increase the number of interagency allocations at service intermediate and senior service schools, civilian university fellowships, and U.S. industry fellowships. The professional military education system exposes a select number of military officers to the art and science of warfare, history, theory, service and joint doctrine, strategic cultures, and fosters critical thinking and analysis. The numbers of interagency professionals who attend professional education opportunities are often limited by the parent organizations ability to release its members. The need for advanced education is even greater today as we develop our governments’ capability to meet the challenges of the Twenty-First century. The professional military education system has proven critical to the effectiveness of our nation’s senior military leaders. Now is the time for our nation to invest in developing professional educational opportunities for the interagency.

Second, the United States Congress must authorize end-strength personnel floats within the interagency similar to the ten percent float allowed in the Department of Defense to facilitate the first recommendation. The interagency organizations must have the ability to send a select number of their people to career broadening professional educational opportunities and not cripple the organizations ability to function. As with every increase in authorized personnel end strength, there will be an associated increase in annual expenses. Compared to the cost of executing post-conflict operations in Iraq with a ill prepared and untrained professional cadre from the interagency, this investment would be seem both wise and prudent.

Third, increase the number of two-year military officer and senior enlisted exchange tours at interagency organizations. The Department of Defense is the largest department in the government and has the preponderance of both personnel and resources. If the United States Government is to develop a robust and effective capability to conduct post-conflict operations, the Defense Department must step up to the task of developing a more ‘joint’ interagency. One of the first steps is to increase the number of joint positions within the interagency arena. Having more officer and senior enlisted military professionals detailed to interagency departments, congress, and industry will help develop an understanding and appreciation how different organizations operate and function. The long-term benefits for our nation will most certainly outweigh the short-term costs.

Fourth, the United States Congress should amend current legislation to allow the military members detailed to the interagency to receive “joint credit” for assignments to the interagency. An officer assigned or detailed to permanent duty in the interagency for a tour of duty no less than two years, but no more than four years, with the approval of the Secretary of
Defense is given the equivalent credit for the purposes of qualifying as a Joint Staff Officer. Unless the government creates a mechanism for military professionals to get the required joint credit with interagency assignments, we will continue to have barriers to recruiting the best military officers to serve in the interagency postings.

Fifth, develop a Department of Defense and interagency publication that sets forth standard military and agency terminology that encompasses the activities of interagency operations similar to Joint Publication 1-02. The purpose of this publication would be to develop a common vocabulary for use among departments and agencies that captures the essence of interagency actions required for both combat and post-conflict activities. The Department of Defense recognized the requirement to develop common vocabulary among the services. The next logical step would be to develop a body of common interagency, military, and associated terms, with their definitions, that constitute the approved United States Government terminology for general use by the interagency and the Department of Defense.

Sixth, create an online training program to help facilitate operational awareness and education on integrating the interagency capabilities within the United States Government. This education system is not meant to replace the current resident education system, but augment the educational opportunities provided within the current professional education system while taking advantage of the access provided to every member of the interagency through the internet. This concept is along the lines of the Center for Strategic and International Studies recommendation for the creation of a “Joint Virtual University” to facilitate distinct learning professional military education courses. This online training program would concentrate on operational issues associated with integrating the interagency during conflict and post-conflict operations.

Seventh, organize the Department of Defense to better meet the demands of post-conflict operations. Although NSPD-44 directed better civilian and military coordination in regards to stabilization and reconstruction activities, the Defense Department is not currently organized or funded to effectively execute that mission. Based on its size and budget, the Department of Defense is in a good position to create the organizational change required to meet the demands of post-conflict operations. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 is a step in the right direction is building the appropriate force structure for post-conflict operations. However, its value will be marginalized if it is not accompanied by the appropriate changes in doctrine, organization, training, education, equipment, and planning.

Eighth, fund the Department of State to execute the mission it was tasked to accomplish under NSPD-44 and modify its charter to include post-conflict activities as a core mission. The
political reality is that the direction contained in NSPD-44 likely will not survive the presidential elections of 2008. For the mandates in NSPD-44 to have any enduring value, both the United States Congress and the Department of State will have to embrace this mission both culturally and fiscally. The Congress will have to increase funding to the State Department to meet the recruiting, training, equipping, and organizational requirements inherent in developing a credible capability to execute post-conflict operations. The current direction in NSPD-44 is a hollow mandate when it is not accompanied by the required funding to execute that mission.48

Ninth, the United States Congress must institutionalize a mechanism for national strategic planning and execution oversight.49 The current Presidential National Security Council system leaves too much to chance and does not support long-term national strategic planning that incorporates all the elements of national power. The nature of our form of government coupled with the presidential election cycle, the political appointment process, the dynamics of interagency strategic culture, and the human dimensions of leadership is not conducive to harmonized and integrated operations. The complex nature of the international security environment demands we have a system in place to plan and integrate across interagency boundaries. Post-conflict activities are difficult to execute under the best of circumstances, and they are even harder to execute without an integrated interagency plan and unity of effort.

Tenth, the United States Government must establish an organizational leadership structure to support unity of command when executing post-conflict operations.50 Having command organizations, one military and one civilian, when executing post-conflict operations is cumbersome, inefficient, and ineffective. By its nature, post-conflict operations are difficult enough without the added friction involved with dual changes of command. Having a civilian provisional authority and a military command structure in Iraq complicated the already difficult task of stability and reconstruction. Having the unity of command, as witnessed in our World War II experience, will enable both civilian and military organizations to learn from their mistakes and adapt to the dynamic international environment we face in the Twenty-First century.

These recommendations are neither the answers to all of our government’s interagency failings, nor are they meant to diminish or degrade the vast number of dedicated, devoted, and patriotic professionals who work very hard everyday to make a difference in our government and to make our nation more secure. The reality is, however, that we must improve how our government operates, specifically in the realm of interagency integration in combat and post-conflict operations. Otherwise, the investment our country makes in our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guard for combat operations will be lost in post-conflict operations. By its very nature, change creates friction, confusion, frustration, and requires a significant
investment of the nation’s financial resources. The merits of all these recommendations notwithstanding, one must acknowledge that there are natural obstacles to success that exist in our form of government that will make change even that more difficult to accomplish.

**Obstacles to Success**

Unfortunately, there are many obstacles to developing our governments’ capacity to integrate interagency efforts in future nation-building endeavors. There is no quick fix for making the United States Government interagency apparatus more effective at conducting post-conflict operations. Incremental changes within the institutional, bureaucratic, strategic cultures of the various department and agencies will more than likely take decades to accomplish, if ever. Additionally, the nature of our two-party political system will make changes to the interagency organization, interagency budgets, or personnel end strengths difficult at best.

The United States’ level of effort, as measured in terms of personnel, money, and time, required for successful post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction is significant, and maintaining that level of commitment will not be easy. Not until a national consensus recognizes how important post-conflict operations are in creating a stable international environment, and thereby increasing our national security, will it be possible to make any significant changes. Only then may we witness again the unity among our interagency departments, the United States Congress, and the American people as we did on September 11, 2001.

**Summary**

On average, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been involved in post-conflict operations every two years. The United States experience in post-conflict Iraq has proven to be difficult at best. The United States Government failed to properly plan for and execute a cohesive, integrated post-Saddam, post-conflict strategy in Iraq. The current organization structure of the United States Government interagency is inadequate to meet the demands of the Twenty-First century international arena. The stakes of failure in Iraq are great, and the United States must succeed. Implementing changes in how the United States Government interagency is organized, educated, trained, and equipped to accomplish post-conflict operations is critical to our current and future national security. Integrating all the elements of national power in implementing stabilization and reconstruction activities will in the long run save American lives and build a more stable and secure future for the United States.
Endnotes

1 For the purposes of this paper, post-conflict activities, nation building, stabilization and reconstruction, and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction, all fall under the same collective meaning of post-conflict activities.


4 Dobbins, 168.


6 Dobbins, 169.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., 170.

9 Open Society Institute, 8.


11 Open Society Institute, 9.

12 Ibid., 8.


14 Open Society Institute, 9.

15 Ibid., 28.

16 Ibid., 10.

17 Minxin Pei, and Sara Kaspar, 4.

18 Len Fullenkamp, Professor, United States Army War College, January 2007.

19 Cordesman, 12.
20 Author recently traveled to Washington D.C. on an interagency staff ride with the Advanced Strategic Arts Program (ASAP) from the U.S. Army War College. The trip included visits to: Washington D.C. based think tanks, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Joint Staff, House Armed Service Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and the U.S. Army Staff.


22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., xxix.


26 Ibid., 9.


28 Ibid.


31 USA Patriot Act available from http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.html.

32 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9-11 Commission) report available from http://www.9-11commission.gov/.


Recommendation formed after discussions with Professor Len Fullenkamp, United States Army War College faculty and Michele A. Flourney, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, during ASAP interagency staff ride to Washington D.C. in January 2007.

Ibid.

Total costs of the war in Iraq are now estimated to exceed $2 Trillion. Additionally, recent reports indicate millions of dollars of reconstruction money was wasted with an ineffective post-conflict distribution system.


Ibid., United States Code, Title 10, Chapter 38, Section 664, Joint Duty Credit.


A common vocabulary is the first step to effective communications within the interagency.

Clark A. Murdock, and Michele A. Flourney, 118-120.

Office of the Secretary of Defense is currently working with the Joint Staff on developing a National Security University (NSU) that creates a National Security Officer Corps to address current and future challenges relating to employing all the elements of national power.


FY08 President’s Budget available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/.


Clark A. Murdock, and Michele A. Flourney, 27.
