Operational Function to Achieve Synergy Between Special And Precision Strike

William M. Huff
Paper Advisor (if Any): Professor Hime

Joint Military Operations Department
Naval War College
686 Cushing Road
Newport, RI 02841-1207

This research identifies and analyzes the requirements for combatant commanders to effectively combine the capabilities of special operation and precision fires in context of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This examination describes the operational functions required from the appointed operational commander and his staff to achieve synergism through the combination of special operations and precision strike. Offensive Counterterrorism (OCT) is a critical part of the United States national strategy for counterterrorism and is implicit for operational leaders. Each combatant commander must ensure organizational systems and methods maximize information technology and achieve rapid decision making capability, leverage all-source intelligence that is analyzed efficiently and networked joint fires assets that provide effects timely and precisely without unnecessary collateral damage. Neither special operations nor precision fires alone will achieve desired results, but their cumulative effect in a balanced combination offers combatant commanders increasingly viable and effective options.
Operational Functions to Achieve Synergy Between Special Operations and Precision Strike

By

William M. Huff
MAJ US Army

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _________________________

14 February 2005

Professor Hime
Faculty Advisor
Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

This research identifies and analyzes the requirements for combatant commanders to effectively combine the capabilities of special operation and precision fires in context of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This examination describes the operational functions required from the appointed operational commander and his staff to achieve synergism through the combination of special operations and precision strike. Offensive Counterterrorism (OCT) is a critical part of the United States national strategy for counterterrorism and is implicit for operational leaders. Each combatant commander must ensure organizational systems and methods maximize information technology and achieve rapid decision making capability, leverage all-source intelligence that is analyzed efficiently and networked joint fires assets that provide effects timely and precisely without unnecessary collateral damage. Neither special operations nor precision fires alone will achieve desired results, but their cumulative effect in a balanced combination offers combatant commanders increasingly viable and effective options.
INTRODUCTION

“From the clouds of smoke at Ground Zero in Manhattan and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001 (9/11), a blueprint emerged for a new, intense, determined struggle against international terrorism.” ¹ Just nine days after the infamous event, President George W. Bush described the coming war before a prime time media audience and a joint session of Congress,

Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes visible on TV and covert operations secret even in success. ²

The new emphasis on offensive capabilities against global terrorists signified the post-9/11 American strategy. Congressional Joint Resolution 23 passed on 14 September 2001 granted the President the authority to "use all necessary and appropriate force" against those who were involved in the terrorists attacks that occurred against U.S. targets on 9/11. ³ Complementing this authority, President Bush signed a Memorandum of Notification ordering the CIA to "use all necessary means" to destroy bin Laden and Al Qaeda. ⁴ The President, with Congressional support, provided both the military and the CIA with the required authorities for offensive counterterrorism.

The initial “campaign,” in what has become commonly known as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), is the on-going Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. Beginning only weeks after 9/11, initial military operations consisted of ad hoc elements of CIA paramilitary (PM), Special Operation Forces (SOF)
and Northern Alliance Forces (NAF) supported by U.S. Navy, Marine and Air Force expeditionary air assets. The predominance of ordnance used in support of the ground forces were precision guided munitions (PGMs). This combination of multinational and interagency combat power quickly toppled the Taliban and forced Al Qaeda to disperse to remote areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The defeat of global terrorism will require coordination among all instruments of national power, but the military in particular will play a significant role in conducting offensive counterterrorism. Bruce Nardulli, of RAND, coined the new term:

The new policy for waging the war on terrorism envisions taking the war to the terrorists wherever they may be. This offensive orientation, and the strong emphasis on relentless pressure in this regard, is markedly different from past counterterrorism efforts. Therefore we have defined this new policy as Offensive Counterterrorism (OCT) to distinguish it from more traditional doctrinal counterterrorism.

To meet the challenges of OCT, new combinations of joint and interagency capabilities are required. Frequently, the operations will include some form of collaboration with foreign nations. The openness of coalition or foreign nation support will depend on multiple factors to include political stability. The combination of special operations and precision strike provides an OCT capability with comprehensive reach. The symbiotic relationship between special operations and precision strike is critical for preemption and surgical strikes against high-value targets (HVTs) of the “international terrorism network.” Although there is no panacea for the application of combat power in the GWOT, the cumulative effects from combining special operations and precision strike provides operational level commanders with expanded options to achieve their required objectives. This research examines the current and future requirements to
achieve synergy between special operations and precision strike at the operational level of war. The intention is not to determine when to use this option nor the legal, philosophical, moral and political aspects pertaining to strategic decision makers. The intent is to provide operational decision makers and planners with the critical operational functions based on current capabilities.11 Debates on major organizational restructuring and requirements for new doctrine to complement evolving capabilities in information technology, special operations and precision strike are topics for additional research.

DEFINITIONS

As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated, "We really almost are going to have to fashion a new vocabulary and different constructs for thinking about what it is we're doing." 12 The U.S. transformation to meet the requirements of the GWOT requires additional and new definitions in the development of organizations, structures, doctrine, technology and their interactions. Unless otherwise noted, definitions in this research are taken from Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. In addition to OCT, precision strike, and operational functions, the definition for special operations is not from JP 1-02. The statement of meaning for “special operations” for this paper is from Drs. Maurice Tugwell and David Charters given during their presentation in March 1983 at a symposium sponsored by National Defense University entitled, "The Role of Special Operations in U.S. Strategy for the 1980s." The author feels this definition, despite being written in 1983, remains particularly salient:

Small-scale, clandestine, cover or overt operations of an unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature, undertaken to achieve significant political or military objectives in support of foreign policy. Special operations are characterized by either simplicity or complexity, by subtlety and imagination, by the discriminate use of violence, and by
oversight at the highest levels.\textsuperscript{13}

Special operations will include both CIA paramilitary (PM) and forces from U.S. Special Operation Command (SOCOM) or other elements conducting U.S. supported OCT interchangeably. The 9/11 Commission's recommendation that CIA PM clandestine and covert operations should become the responsibility of SOCOM is a topic of great debate for both CIA and Department of Defense. For the sake of brevity and clarity, Recommendation 32 of the 9/11 Commission report will not be further discussed.\textsuperscript{14}

Relevant to this paper is that special operations and precision strike must be in concert with the combatant commander's campaign plan to maximize effects against terrorist organizations. The level of war for this paper is operational. As defined in CJCSM 3500.04C, \textit{Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) dated 1 July 2002},:

A theater of operations commander (e.g. combatant commander, sub unified commander or CJTF), however, operates more often at the operational level of war, applying military power in the designated theater of operations toward the strategic military objectives assigned by the geographic combatant commander or national command authorities.\textsuperscript{15}

The author will use Joint Task Force (JTF) as the synonym for command that "operates more often at the operational level of war." One distinguishing aspect of modern special operations is its leveraging of contemporary communication and information technology.

For the purpose of this research, the term “Network Centric Warfare” (NCW) will be used to describe the networking or linking of special operators, decision makers and precision strike assets to provide or achieve shared awareness and a common and more complete picture of the battle space.\textsuperscript{16} In this particular context, NCW will be used as merely an enabler and will not be considered a method of war or as a way to achieve objectives.
BACKGROUND

While the initial construct of OCT was focused in Afghanistan, OCT is the primary approach for the military's systematic, long-term campaign against terror. Portions of OCT will target terrorist leaders deemed as high value targets (HVTs) by the JTF or higher headquarters to include multinational elements. In the pre-9/11 work by RAND’s Stephen T. Hosmer, *Operations Against Enemy Leaders*, the challenge of successfully attacking the highly mobile HVTs is described:

... will depend importantly on availability of accurate, near-real-time or predictive intelligence about the leader's location and movements. Since U.S. forces must be capable of striking the target within the window provided by this intelligence, predictive intelligence will be essential if significant time is needed to mount an attack.

Two years into the military's GWOT, Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Rumsfeld wrote a memo to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Richard Myers, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Vice CJCS General Peter Pace. In this memo, SecDef questioned the Department of Defense (DOD)'s ability to change fast enough to successfully fight the GWOT and his question, "Does DoD need to think through new ways to organize, train, equip and focus to deal with the global war on terror? " In the narrow application of this rhetorical question pertaining to special operations and precision strike, the answer is ambivalent. Certainly, we have current organization, training and equipment. Unfortunately, we do not have the focus. This examination attempts to clearly describe the operational functions required at the operational level to conduct OCT with special operations and precision strike. The operational paradigm required to achieve decisive effects from interdependent special operations and precision strike at the operational level is feasible today. Operational art in concert with currently
defined operational functions and within existing joint doctrine will allow JTF commanders to conduct OCT and achieve the desired end-state. In simplest terms, we do not need to "invent the wheel."

"National decision makers will insist on having the capability to attack high-value but fleeting targets in far-flung places with high confidence of success." Secretary Rumsfeld has repeatedly emphasized about terrorism since 9/11, "There is no way to defend everywhere at every time against every technique. Therefore you simply have to go after them." The focus at the operational level of war against terrorist HVTs is to establish complementary relations among interagency planning, command and control, maneuver, intelligence and fires. To provide the required simultaneity and depth to the GWOT, combatant commanders through their designated JTF commanders, must use various combinations of combat power to achieve the required results. The operational functions most pertinent to the JTF command conducting OCT against terrorist HVTs are command and control (C2), intelligence, maneuver and fires. The Joint Staff's Universal Join Task List (UJTL) is used to define operational functional tasks for a joint task force (JTF) commander and staff. For purpose of this research, the JTF can be subordinate to USSOCOM or another combatant command. The four operational functions to be discussed later in greater detail are: conduct operational movement and maneuver; provide operational intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); employ operational firepower; and provide operational command and control (C2).

**ANALYSIS- NESTING**

The initial operational planning consideration is the “nesting” and “linking” of operations with larger campaign or strategy. David Thaler, in his work titled *Strategies*...
to Tasks: A Framework for Linking Means and Ends, defines the process of linking in great detail to achieve what he calls the "audit trail" for strategic and operational planners. In the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003, specific objectives are identified to focus the elements of national power. Pertinent to military planners are the objectives identified in “Goal: Defeat Terrorists and Their Organizations: identify terrorists and terrorist’s organizations, locate terrorists and their organizations, and destroy terrorists and their organizations.” The final element to the Defeat goal is an aggressive, offensive strategy to eliminate capabilities that allow terrorists to exist and operate-- attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control and communications; material support; and finances.” Linking the national security strategy with the national military strategy is the National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow (NMS-2004). The Chairman's intent to meet the challenge of GWOT consists of three priorities: “Winning the War on Terrorism, enhancing joint warfighting and transforming for the future.” The attributes specified in the NMS-2004 relevant to interdependent special operations and precision strike: fully integrated, expeditionary, networked, decentralized, adaptable, lethal and possessing superior decision making capability. Additionally, USSOCOM, in its Posture Statement- 2003-2004, identified several attributes common with this topic: precision strike and effects, tailored and integrated operations, ubiquitous access and C4ISR dominance. Without getting into regional or theater specifics, the "nesting" and “linking” of operational tasks to strategic objectives in the GWOT is recognizable to operational planners. The challenge is developing the process to facilitate the JTF to receive the tasking from higher headquarters and translate into operational functions,
operational tasks and overall structure.

ANALYSIS- CURRENT PARADIGNS

While the combination of special operations and precision strike to destroy terrorist HVTs is relatively new to American war fighting, the concept has been one of the pillars of Israeli counterterrorism (CT) for nearly two decades. Termed “selective targeting” or “targeted killing”, it has been the focus of Israeli CT since 2000. Although the details of the Israeli commando 'sensor-to-shooter' operations remain classified, there is enough open source information available to identify key elements:

In the past four years a unique partnership has been created between the [Israeli Defense Forces]IDF and the [General Security Service]GSS. A visit to a GSS command and control centre during an operation reveals a level of co-operation that would have been inconceivable just a few years ago. GSS human intelligence (HUMINT) operators share the room with IDF imaging intelligence (IMINT) officers, while Israeli Air Force (IAF) and IDF Special Forces commanders all share information from different intelligence sensors and jointly co-ordinate the operation to achieve one goal: shortening the sensor-to-shooter cycle.33 The Israeli combination of HUMINT with technical intelligence, maneuver with covert and clandestine elements to achieve “eyes-on” target, and an established network linking the tactical reconnaissance with decision makers and various precision strike assets have been essential in their “selective targeting” operation.34 The Israelis apply lessons learned and continually evolve their tactics, techniques and procedures.35

Although the majority of U.S. SOF units are currently operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF- HOA) is involved in training with selected regional armed forces in counterterror and counterinsurgency tactics as well as assisting in the apprehension of terrorists operating in the region. 36

"The CJTF-Horn of Africa is an excellent model of exactly this type of arrangement,
including not only Special Forces but a diverse mix of joint capabilities covering a range of missions. CJTF-HOA is actively pursuing HVTs using special operation ground elements. Complementing this 'maneuver' element are various precision strike assets, while all are linked together with command and control (C2) elements using modern communication and information technology. General John Abizaid, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander, has said that CJTF-HOA is the model for a joint task force. CJTF-HOA is multinational and interagency and serves, “As a catalyst to preempt and eliminated terrorist safe havens in the region by creating a coalition among the nations.”

**ANAYYSIS- NOT WITHOUT FRICTION**

Israeli’s campaign of “selective targeting” has many internal and external doubters regarding its effectiveness. The second and third order effects of Israeli strikes against HVTs is a topic of great debate within Israel. One assessment written in 1998, concluded that Israel has experienced limited success in its attempt "... to frighten and deter terrorists and disrupt their plans for future violence." Although the Mossad and other covert and clandestine units supported by a network of intelligence and precision strike assets have eliminated many "master terrorists," it was asserted that this had not ended the threat. "Those who were assassinated were soon replaced and terrorism resumed, sometimes more ferociously than before." In contrast to this pessimistic assessments, in the summer of 2004, *Washington Post* columnist Charles Krauthammer declared Israel victorious and the Palestinian Intifata over. He credited the victory partly to Israel’s targeting terrorist leaders:

Attacks so hypocritically denounced by Westerners who, at the same time, cheer
the hunt for, and demand the head of, Osama bin Laden. The top echelon of Hamas and other terrorist groups has been either arrested, killed or driven underground. The others are now so afraid of Israeli precision and intelligence – the last Hamas operative to be killed by missile was riding a motorcycle – that they are forced to devote much of their time and energy to self-protection and concealment.43

Related to the operational function of C2 is the proscribed networking and characteristics of NCW to support special operations and precision strike. Professor Milan Vego, of the Naval War College, has described NCW process as "... unnecessarily complicated, [and] cumbersome," and adds, "... target selection and approval is becoming increasingly complex and time-consuming."44 Professor Vego identifies the technological advances in communications and information sharing, tenents of NCW, as primary factors in over centralization of command and control.45 In contrast this research, similar to Clay Wilson’s Network Centric Warfare: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, emphasizes operational art applied by the JTF commander will not centralize the process but will allow for self-synchronization of forces resulting from increased collaboration and mutual understanding of commander's intent.46

"Empowered by knowledge derived from a shared awareness of the battlespace and a shared understanding of commander's intent, our forces will be able to self-synchronize, operate with a small footprint, and be more effective when operating autonomously.47

RECOMMENDATION- JTF FUNCTIONS

"Special operation elements typically function on the operational and strategic levels but in reality are tactical assets with a strategic impact."48 Similar characteristics exist for precision strike assets. It is in their combination that the JTF can achieve synergy during OCT operations. While all the operational functions have a role in successful OCT, four critical functions will be further analyzed; Operational Command
and Control (C2), Operational Movement and Maneuver, Operational Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Operational Firepower.

Provide Operational Command and Control (C2). In 1985, Martin van Crevald described effective command and control, "By making possible a faster, clearer reading of the situation and a more effective distribution of resources, a superior command system may serve as a force multiplier and compensate for weaknesses in other fields. . . ." The information age technologies could potentially be the key to dissipate the old dictums about fog and friction of war by fundamentally changing a military commander's ability to ‘see,’ to ‘tell’ and to ‘act.’ Special operation communication and computer networks are compatible with precision strike and the supporting intelligence services. The JTF commander is responsible for the structuring of C2 and defining the communication requirements for his decision making. His guidance must clearly identify the C2 structure, and, in particular, the level at which approval authority lies for mission execution. In order to be effective, the C2 structure must delegate approval authority to the lowest possible level. Networked elements with required C2 are vital. The success during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq was not simply the ability of special operators to locate and identify targets but the communication network that provided timely information to the supporting strike platform with the engagement authority delegated to the “man-in-the-loop.”

Conduct Operational Movement and Maneuver. Precise maneuver by special operation elements will be tailored according to each specific situation but will have some common themes. The signature will be small and the forces will not need to physically mass to produce combat power. Whether the ground force is a unilateral,
multinational or simply surrogate forces employed under U.S. control, the aim is positioning of the "man-in-the-loop" with execution authority to provide the final target confirmation to the striking asset. As current Army Chief of Staff and former commander of USSOCOM, General Peter J. Schoomaker stated in 1998, "... SOF as ‘global scouts’ can quickly transition to combat operations and spearhead decisive victory." Conducting operational preparation of the battlespace throughout the theaters designated as potential areas of potential conflict will facilitate timely OCT. Special operation maneuver may be facilitated by indigenous groups supported or unsupported by host nation government. The initiative, creativity and capabilities of special operators allow them to "tailor to task" and to train indigenous forces, provide advisory and liaison capabilities and leverage joint and interagency unique qualities in order to enhance the capabilities of the entire force. This equates to a variety of force structure options for the special operation element. The force may consist of indigenous special operation forces with negligible U.S. signature operating in the clandestine role or purely forces infiltrated unknowingly by host nation, operating in covert manner. The various combinations are too numerous to describe, but are only limited by the imagination and will of the JTF commander. The operational function must facilitate initial movement of the force and ensure tactical maneuver is not restricted.

**Provide Operational Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.** As clearly stated in the 9/11 commission report,

The U.S government must find a way of pooling intelligence and using it to guide the planning and assignment of responsibilities for joint operations involving organizations as disparate as the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, the military, and the agencies involved in homeland security. The report further emphasizes combining joint intelligence and joint action, "A ‘smart’
government would integrate all sources of information to see the enemy as a whole."

With ISR assets in high demand for nearly every component, proper allocation by the Combatant Commander to the JTF for HVT prosecution is vital. The JTF commander then must set guidance on the use and appropriation of ISR assets. One non-doctrinal term descriptive of the required capability is “saturation reconnaissance.” Term was defined by Joint Force Quarterly authors Hooper and McDaniel while describing ISR requirements in support of operational fires: "This [saturation reconnaissance capabilities] implies reconnaissance systems with a genuine saturation capability. Continuous support is critical." While the best sources of intelligence are likely to be the layers of people among whom the terrorist hide, signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT) and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) provide valuable complementing information for all-source fusion for analysis, planning and execution. Information technology is also providing links from ISR assets to the precision strike assets, special operation elements and the identified C2 for repaid decision making. The increased situational awareness from the all-source ISR has potential to provide saturation reconnaissance of HVT areas. Analysis to support the increased levels of information from the ISR is important and enormous levels of information from various sources could lead to paralysis rather then decisive action. It is imperative on the JTF commander to clearly identify his information needs and practice the art of command. "The ability of leaders to assimilate real-time combat data and sort out vital information will be critical to success."

**Employ Operational Firepower.** "Air and space power can be used in concert with covert action, diplomacy, economic instruments and joint military operations."
The notion of "parallel warfare" described by in RAND research titled, *Countering The New Terrorism*, does not capture the essence of the synergism required between special operations and precision strike. The source of the precision strike is of little concern for the special operations force. Platform or type of asset providing the precise effect is immaterial to the special operation element provided these assets are inclusive in the network. The critical factors are precision and timeliness for HVT targeting cycle.  

Similar to the concept of “saturation reconnaissance,” the operational planners must ensure “continuous precision strike” capability. Although predictive intelligence support and specific HVT analysis will allow operational planners to focus the surging of precision strike assets, the agility gained through proper basing of redundant assets is critical to achieve “continuous precision strike” capability in time sensitive HVT operations.

**RECOMMENDATION- POWER OF COMBINATIONS**

The operational art of combining and complementing to achieve interdependent relationships is paramount to successful implementation. The desired result for the JTF commander is what Glenn, Steeb and Matsumura of RAND, have termed as “selective dominance.”

"Through the synchronization of high-resolution intelligence, separation of noncombatants from the combat zone, isolation of the adversary, and application of precision munitions, the commander will often be able to dominate selected parts of an urban area without physically occupying them..." The network will consist of the multi-spectral ISR assets required for saturation reconnaissance, continuous precision strike capability, and decentralized C2. The essence of success will "...certainly be to make everything you want to happen in a very short period of time." Precision maneuver from the special operations force
complimented by ISR saturation reconnaissance, and responsive precision strike will allow a very small element to achieve effects of what large massed armies and thousands of non-precision munitions were unlikely to achieve in the past. Additionally, the low level of visibility of U.S involvement and low collateral damage provide greater options to combatant commanders.

CONCLUSION

Military power is only one component of the portfolio of instruments that the nation must employ in the fight against terrorists groups. Military operations and their effects play a unique and crucial role in the overall campaign, mainly to find, identify, and apprehend or destroy terrorist HVTs. Operational functions play an unmistakable and essential role in conducting OCT in support of the GWOT. The operational functions will require continued modification, innovation and evolution of our current organizations and capabilities. We must not become victims of the tendency in human nature to stay with old ways of doing business when the external world has made old ways obsolete or even dangerous. The essential tenents, processes and capabilities demonstrated to date in the GWOT, clearly illustrate the tools required are available to the combatant commander to prosecute terrorist HVTs throughout the globe. While no simple solution should be desired, the template for combining special operations and precision strike exists. The time is now for the continued evolutionary interdependence of these two attributes available to operational elements. As stated in SOCOM's SOF Posture Statement 2003-2004, "Future missions might include operations for psychological effect, low-visibility strike operations, advanced unconventional warfare,
special forms of reconnaissance, human and technical collection operations. . . ." The statement goes on to state "... because the future is uncertain, SOF will peruse new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations to create a force capable of conducting full spectrum engagements in a joint environment, anytime, anywhere, against any adversary." Although many past, current and future operations remain cloaked in secrecy, one operation combining special operations and precision strike publicly acknowledged is the Predator strike on Abu Ali in Yemen in fall of 2003. Following the strike, Newsweek asked Senator Robert Graham (D-Fla.) if the operation was a precursor of more to come. He answered, "I hope so."
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


"Industry, Government Precision Strike Officials Look to Networked Future." Defense


Ochmanek, David. Military Operations Against Terrorist Groups Abroad: Implications


Internet; accessed 19 December 2004.


Schwamb, Tim. "Preempting Terrorism on the Horn of Africa." Intercom (September 2004). Available from
Internet; accessed 4 February 2005.


Strindberg, Anders. "Khalil Assassination Sours Relations with Jordan." Jane's Intelligence Review. 01 November 2004; available from

Thomas, Evan, and Mark Hosenball. "The Opening Shot." Newsweek 140, No. 21 (18 November), 48-49.


NOTES


3 United States Congress, Senate Joint Resolution 23: Authorization for Use of United States Armed Forces, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 2001, 2. Sec. 2. (a) In General- “That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”


5 Rebecca Grant, “An Air War like No Other”, Air Force Magazine (November 2002), 3, [database online]; available from http://www.aem.org; Internet; accessed 29 December 2005. Initial U.S. air support was provided by five carriers and 18 combined B-1s and B-52s. Additional precision fires provided from 8 combined AC-130Us and AC-130Hs.


7 Bruce Nardelli, The Global War on Terrorism: An Early Look at Implications for the Army, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), viii.


9 precision strike: Author’s working definition is the delivery of precision effects from air, sea or ground systems. Weapons may include family of precision guided munitions to include global position (GPS) aided munitions, laser guided bombs (LGBs) or simply highly precise fires from platforms such as USSOCOM’s AC-130 and AH-6. Effects achieve point target accuracy without unnecessary collateral damage. Additional information on precision strike available from Joint Precision Strike Demonstration Project Office, https://peoiewswcloinfo.monmouth.army.mil/JPSD/JPSD/overview.html. Similar terms related to precision strike are “precision fires,” “precision firepower,” “precision engagement,” “precision bombing,” and “joint fires.” For more information on topic see Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Fire Power: A RAND Research Study, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000) and Jeffrey A. Jackson, “Global Attack and Precision Strike,” in Air and Space Power in the New Millennium (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1997).

10 Determination of specific target category is determined in “joint targeting process.” In this research, the term high-value target (HVT) will be used. In actual application, the target may be defined as high-payoff target (HPT) or time-sensitive target (TST). For additional target categories see Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, 17 January 2002; Term “international terrorism” defined; Department of State, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism:1998, introduction, (April 1999); available from http://www.usemb.se/terror/rpt1998/intro.html; Internet; accessed 29 January 2005.

11 operational functions: Author’s term to define activity by the operational element. The major functions performed by joint forces at operational level of war to successfully execute major operations in a area of operations. Working definition is a modification to operational function definition used by Milan Vego in Operational Warfare, (Newport, RI: Naval War College 1004, 2000), 185. Author includes operational movement and maneuver from the Joint Staff, CJCSM 3500.04C: Universal Joint Task List (UJTFL).
26

(Washington, 2002), C-5 and C-6, section covers the “operational functional task.” Author’s definition similar to terms: “operational operating systems,” “operational procedures,” “operational factors,” and “operational tasks.” Further definitions available from http://www.fas.org/news/ references/lexicon/mildef.htm

12 Anna Simons and David Tucker. “United States Special Operation Forces and the War on Terrorism.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 14, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 77.

13 Frank Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz., Special Operations in U.S. Strategy. (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1984), 9. Current U.S. joint doctrine defines special operations in Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, DC: 2001, amended through November 2004), 495: “Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.”

14 Richard A. Best, and Andrew Feicket, “U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Order Code RS21048, (Library of Congress, 28 September 2004), CRS-5. Recommendation 32 of the 9/11 Commission report: “Lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department. There it should be consolidated with the capabilities for training, direction, and execution of such operations already being developed in the Special Operations Command. This recommendation does not call for the disbanding the supposedly 150 person strong CIA Special Activities Division, which reportedly consists largely of both former and retired U.S. SOF personnel.”


16 Author’s working term for NCW is as a subset of C2 and provides the common means for linking ISR, maneuver elements and fires. Computers and communication networks link all elements to achieve interoperability, collaboration, information sharing and enable rapid decision making. Additional key attribute in the special operations-precision strike paradigm is “knowledge network”: a set of concepts related to providing critical information to the warfighter. It enables the most effective use of the information in a collaborative manner to conduct multi-level planning, execution, assessment of military operations. In includes the Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP), Joint Interactive Planning (JIP), and Adaptive Joint Command and Control (AJC2) concepts. Definitions available from http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm.


20 Term interdependent special operations and precision strike is linked to term used by Antulio J. Echevarria, “Interdependent Maneuver for the 21st Century,” Joint Force Quarterly 34, (Spring 2003) X; available from http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOKNN/is_34/ai_113052686/pg_3; Internet; accessed 03 February 2005. Echevarria attempts to bring a unifying concept he believes is lacking in both Joint Vision 2020 and Joint Publication 3.0 Doctrine for Joint Operations: “The technical revolution of the 21st century which is currently underway might finally combine fire and movement in genuinely effective manner. Interdependent maneuver calls for a fully joint approach from the outset, generating synergy with the interaction of fire and maneuver rather than placing the burden of success on one dimension, others absent or only in support. In terms of application, it brings synergy of fire and movement to the realms of operations and strategy, levels on which these components have never been applied in tandem.”
Critical elements of operational art as defined in Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: 2001), xi: “Attain operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles.”

Nardelli, page 17.


Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Opening Testimony General Bryan D. Brown, Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command before the United States house of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, 107th Cong., 4th sess., 3 March 2004. Database on-line; available from http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementandpressrelease/108thcongress/04-03-11brown.html; Internet; accessed 3 February 2005: General Brown stated, “Secretary Rumsfeld expanded USSOCOM’s role to include leading DOD’s military global war on terrorism (GWOT) planning effort, and commanding select GWOT operations. We are standing side-by-side with out interagency, conventional and coalition partners fighting the GWOT. SOF, in support of the geographic combatant commanders, have taken the offensive against the enemy, to strike him where he lives, to bring the battle to him, and to bring him to justice.”

nesting: The most definitive reference available for nested concepts is General William E. DuPay’s article in Army, August 1988, page 31, “Cascading concepts carry the top commander’s intentions to the lowest levels, and the nesting of those concepts traces the critical path of concentration and priorities. This is a phenomenon the Germans called schwerpunkt. The concepts are nested like mixing bowls in the kitchen. It is the only method by which the talent and initiative of commanders and troops at every level can be engaged and exploited.” Available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_00-9_shields.htm; Internet; accessed 2 February 2005.

David E. Thaler, Strategies to Tasks: A Framework for Linking Means and Ends, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1993), ix. Thaler defines the process, “Strategies to tasks is designed to provide an audit trail from the broadest national objectives down to operational activities at the tactical engagement level. It explicitly disaggregates these activities into key functional elements encompassing the tactics, organizations, and systems that enable the successful execution of missions; it also gives high visibility of the interrelationships among these elements.”


Ibid, 17.


Ibid, 14. Extracted from block titled “Joint Force Attributes (Characteristics Describing the Joint Forces).”


Gal Luft, “The Logic of Israel’s Targeting Killing,” The Middle East Quarterly 10, no. 1 (Winter 2003) [Database on-line]; available from http://www.meforum.org/article/515; Internet; accessed 20 January 2005. Luft defines Israeli destruction against known and suspected terrorists as “selective targeting.” Other terms used are “targeted killing” and “assassination.”; BBC News [On-line addition], (1 August 2001); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1258187.stm; Internet; accessed 2 February 2005, Israeli Minister Ephraim Sneh, in attempt to define “selective targeting” or “targeting killing “, “I can tell you unequivocally what the policy is. If anyone has committed or is planning to carry out terror attacks, he has to be hit. It is effective, precise and just.”

Alon Ben-David, “Israel’s Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine- Inner conflict,” Jane’s Defense Weekly (1 September 2004), 3; Available from http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jitic/doc_view.jsp?K2Dockeys人居contentl/janesdata/eags, Internet; accessed 6 December 2004. Senior GSS source further added to Ben-David, “We have managed to shrink the sensor-to-shooter cycle to a few minutes between the time a target appears, is positively identified and destroyed.”

Various precision strike assets include missiles from attack helicopters, precision guided munitions from F-16s, armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ground based systems like SPIKE-ER.
For detailed listing of Israeli “hits” on terrorists see Jewish Virtual Library, available from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/hits.html; Internet; accessed 18 December 2005. Illustrative example of Israeli evolution and innovation is the targeting of terrorist master mind Sheikh Ahmed Ismail Yassin. On 6 September 2003, Israeli Air Force (IDF) F-16 dropped a laser guided bomb on a building occupied by Yassin. He survived the attack. Eighteen months later, while he was in the open with his body guards, Israeli helicopter gunships destroyed the target with hellfire missiles. Ariel Cohen of Maariv International, describes the targeting of terrorist leaders, “Such operations take months of meticulous intelligence preparation and coordination between high tech assets, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and Israeli Air Force helicopters,” Available from http://www.iact.ca/views.php?name=Cohen, Internet; accessed 4 February 2005.


Ibid, 4.


Ibid, 1.


Ibid.


Air Land Sea Application Center, Multi-Service Procedures for Targeting of Time-Sensitive Targets (Final Coordination Draft), (Ft. Monroe, VA: November 2003), III-1.


precision maneuver: Author’s term for the movement and maneuver of special operation elements in battlespace with full situational understanding of environment. Maneuvering element leverages increased real-time and near-real-time common relevant operational picture (CROP) to include adjacent elements, enemy, terrain, and civilians to make contact only when desired. Relevant for unilateral maneuver or indigenous forces are incorporated.


Ibid, page 5.


Ibid, 401.


Simons and Tucker, 80.

61 Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, Countering The New Terrorism, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 144.
63 Continuous precision strike: Author’s term for joint lethal and non-lethal fires to achieve desired effect within time constraints of specific target environment. Due to the time sensitivity of targeting cycle, multiple sources and/or dedicated assets will be allocated to meet the constraints.
64 Echevarria, 5. Echevarria continuously emphasis the need for, “A unifying operational concept to combine the advantages of rapid movement with the benefits of precision strike. It also must unite the tactical and operational applicability of dominant maneuver with the strategic reach of precision engagement.”
65 Russell W. Glenn, Randall Steeb, and John Matsumura, Corralling the Trojan Horse: A Proposal for Improving U.S Urban Operations Preparedness in the Period 2000-2025, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 17; Joint Vision 2020, 6; Related to term “selective dominance” is definition of “full spectrum dominance”, “The ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations.”
69 Ibid, 72.