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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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16 May 2006
ABSTRACT

Nation Building: How US Forces were Effective in Bosnia between 1995 and 2000

Although the deadline for US forces returning stateside kept expanding and NATO’s Implementation Forces and Stabilization Forces mission objectives under the Dayton Peace Accord evolved toward providing more military support to the civilian aspects of nation building than anticipated, the US forces remained focused in achieving the desired end state of a peaceful, coexistence of multi-ethnic groups in Bosnia. Exercising ingenuity and flexibility, while adapting to new technologies and working closely with 30 coalition partners and numerous non-governmental organizations, presented tremendous challenges in avoiding mission creep and human casualties. US force involvement in this peace enforcing operation, when closely examined, provides excellent lessons learned for future US force participation in future peace enforcing operations conducted in the twenty-first century and beyond. This paper outlines Bosnia’s history and the events that preceded US troops in Bosnia, it identifies lessons learned from US force participation in arresting war criminals, psychological operations, civil affairs, public affairs as well as the challenges related to force protection, communications interoperability, intelligence exchanges, and training. Finally, the paper makes some recommendations and draws some conclusions regarding US force participation in peace operations.
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INTRODUCTION

Today Bosnia is an amalgamated nation state. However, to best understand the challenges US forces, under NATO’s Implementation Forces (IFOR) and Stabilization Forces (SFOR), faced while conducting peace enforcement instead of peacekeeping operations under the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA) from 1995 through 2000, it is necessary to understand Bosnia’s history and the events that preceded US troop involvement in Bosnia. Prior to US force deployment in Bosnia, the time involved in conducting peace operations and nation building had been not been accurately assessed by US leaders. DPA objectives reflected what needed to be done to achieve the desired end state in Bosnia, but the individual leaders each held separate reasons for signing the Accord. Subsequently, no one readily admitted to the unforeseen obstacles involved in turning a former Communist, war-ravaged nation, still ripe with residual ethnic tensions, into a peaceful democratic society geographically straddled between the two opposing and influential nations of Croatia and Serbia.

HISTORY

In the centuries leading up to the Bosnian War, Bosnia found itself geographically sandwiched between the Roman and Byzantine Empires, invaded by Serb and Croat tribes, and influenced by Roman Catholicism and Greek Orthodoxy. Lasting 400 years, Ottoman rule converted the vast majority of Slavs to Islam. Although Habsburg rule in the nineteenth century tethered Bosnia to Central European political culture and Christian rule, Bosnia’s Slavic culture and language remained. From this point forward, however, faith in Bosnia became a more private matter. Catholics regarded themselves as Croats, orthodox as Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims embraced a political party separate from those of the Croats and the Serbs.¹
The end of WWI resulted in a Serb dominance until the eruption of WWII, with the Axis Powers winning in 1941. Resistance movements opposing the Axis Powers resulted in over a million Yugoslavs killing other Yugoslavs. Jozef Tito successfully united the warring communities, and then pitted them against the Axis Powers, before ruling Yugoslavia from 1945 to 1992. Despite Belgrade’s unrelenting pressure on Bosnian political leadership to choose between Serb and Croat politics, most Bosniaks refused to abandon their Muslim identity. After Tito’s death, most Bosnians, especially the Muslim community, supported the maintenance of the Yugoslav state. However, even before the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic plotted to divide Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia. The two presidents’ inability to come to terms under peaceful negotiation resulted in the conflict’s spillover from Croatia into Bosnia as of April 1992.

**BOSNIAN WAR (1992-1995)**

During the war, Bosnian communities and their ethnic leaders jockeyed for position and power. In 1991, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnian government and the head of the Muslim-dominated Party for Democratic Action, applied to the European Community (EC) in December for Bosnia independence. The EC recognized Bosnia as an independent state on 6 April 1992, and the US concurred the next day. EC recognition of Bosnia’s independence demanded withdrawal of the Serbian-led Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) from Bosnia. The JNA withdrew 20,000 troops, but left 80,000 in place. Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic quickly took command of the remaining JNA troops and formed the Army of Republika Srpska. As of April 1992, the military balance in Bosnia was heavily weighted on the Serb side. The Milosevic government and leaders of the Republika Srpska Army focused on uniting
all Bosnian Serbs into one state. Their goal was to create homogenous areas within Bosnia through mass exodus, using intimidation, massacres, and propaganda.\textsuperscript{6}

Despite Bosnia’s EC- and US-recognized independence, civil war ensued with Bosnians killing Bosnians. No one community was guilt-free—each of the three warring factions practiced ethnic cleansing to varying degrees. In the end, the Serbs gained the most territory, created the most refugees, and bore the most responsibility for the majority of ethnic cleansing. Although Tudjman and Milosevic shared responsibility for the Bosnian War, the US press portrayed the Muslims as the victims, and the Serbs as the guilty party.\textsuperscript{7}

\textbf{PRELUDE TO THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORD}

In the early 1990s as war and ethnic cleansing ravaged Yugoslavia, the EC and US were reluctant to get involved. The US believed the Yugoslav situation was “Europe’s problem,” and the Europeans were in disagreement on how to resolve the problem. Finally, after forming an Allied Rapid Reaction Corps in May 1995, British, French and Dutch troops deployed to suppress the Serb shelling of Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{8} Meanwhile, US intolerance of the Serbian advantage over the Croats and Muslims prompted two US retired generals to use their private corporation, Military Profession Resources Incorporated (MPRI), to “train and equip” the Croatian officer corps.\textsuperscript{9} This initiative escalated armed conflict. In July 1995, Tudjman and Izetbegovic successfully launched a combined, military operation against the Serbs. Toward the end of 1995, when circumstances became more favorable for the Croats, Milosevic began regarding the Bosnian Serbs as a liability. His higher priority became getting the United Nations (UN) embargo on Yugoslavia lifted. Tudjman, on the other hand, was willing to negotiate on Bosnia if he could gain Croatian ownership of Eastern Slavonia.\textsuperscript{10}
On 14 December, leaders of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia officially signed the DPA in Paris. DPA’s major five objectives focused on facilitating fair and free local and national elections; the return of an estimated 2.2 million refugees and displaced persons to their original homes; the free movement of people throughout Bosnia; arrest and prosecution of war criminals; human rights; and a $1.8 billion civilian rebuilding program. DPA’s General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) established Bosnia with two autonomous Entities, a Bosniak-Croat Federation controlling 51 percent of the land and the Bosnian-Serb Republika Srpska controlling 49 percent; and three presidents, one Croat, Muslim and Serb. It also established three structures for implementation: an Implementation Force for the military aspects, a High Representative to coordinate civil tasks, and Donors Conferences to stimulate reconstruction. From a US perspective, one of the most important outcomes of DPA was the commitment of US troops in Bosnia. US participation in Bosnia was officially based on the impact on US and Alliance credibility; damage to the prestige of UN, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and other institutions expected to form the core of the post-Cold War security order; and the danger of spillover. US troops under NATO control were responsible for implementing and enforcing military provisions including force separation, arms control, redeployments, and prisoner exchanges.

DAYTON PEACE ACCORD OBJECTIVES

Compared to its UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) predecessor, IFOR’s rules of engagement (ROE) were more clearly defined, and US forces’ military objectives clear, measurable, and achievable. Under the ROE, IFOR was allowed to employ force as necessary to protect itself and ensure compliance with DPA. Since NATO took over where UNPROFOR and other peacekeeping agencies left off, there were some built-in time, space
and force uncertainties. Initial deployment took place in the depth of winter and in an area of
difficult terrain. Despite the ongoing peace initiative, the likelihood of provocations was high.
For NATO forces, this was its first “Out of Area” operation as well as its first major
operation.\textsuperscript{15} IFOR’s instructions were to separate the belligerents and establish a four
kilometer-wide zone of separation (ZOS) along the front lines of the Bosnian Muslims and the
Bosnian Serbs. Since IFOR had three divisions (one US, one French, and one British), Bosnia
was divided into three regions, with US headquarters in Tuzla, the French in Sarajevo, and the
British near GornDi Vakut. From the beginning, IFOR made it very clear to the former
warring factions (FWF) its intent to adhere to DPA. In February 1996, the IFOR Commander
held a meeting of the Joint Military Commission on board the \textit{USS George Washington} aircraft
carrier. The meeting’s location sent a clear message to FWF leaders as to the firepower the US
was willing to use to enforce DPA. By early May 1996, IFOR had facilitated greater freedom
of movement for civilians and commercial traffic by tearing down illicit check points and
bunkers; repairing roads, bridges, and railways; and moving soldiers and thousands of heavy
weapons into cantonment areas and barracks.\textsuperscript{16} On December 20, 1996, the IFOR mission
concluded. According to Defense Intelligence Agency LTG Patrick Hughes, IFOR had met its
objectives through the withdrawal of Bosnian Federation and Bosnian Serb forces along the
ZOS, and the demobilization of forces to nearly half their wartime strength, as well as, the shut
down of all FWF air defense radars, the release of most prisoners of war, and the movement of
forces and heavy weapons into designated cantonment areas.\textsuperscript{17}

However, peace enforcement efforts in Bosnia did not cease. Instead, 1997 ushered in
a new phase of operations called SFOR\textsuperscript{18} with 8,500 US troops scheduled to remain in Bosnia
for another 18 months to rebuild Bosnia’s economic and political infrastructure. Prior to
SFOR’s mission conclusion, three benchmarks were set: the creation of an independent judiciary; political leaders’ relinquishment of media control; and the establishment of self-sustaining multi-ethnic political institutions. On June 20, 1998, SFOR transitioned to a smaller follow-on force, with the US providing 6,900 troops. To instill confidence in the Bosnian public that SFOR’s strength reduction did not represent a slackening of resolve or military weakness, NATO staged a strategic reserve deployment exercise with air, land, and sea power demonstrating NATO’s powerful commitment to continue its nation building and stabilization efforts. Despite the planners who tried hard to contain SFOR tasks, SFOR mission requirements shifted gradually over the next few years from conventional military tasks to supporting the civil annexes of GFAP. Not all elements of SFOR could effect this transition comfortably. For example, intelligence priorities were slow to adjust from normal military targets to support for the information mission that by 2000 constituted the focal point of SFOR activity.

LESSONS LEARNED

Although the deadline for US forces returning stateside kept expanding and SFOR mission objectives turned more toward providing military support to the civilian aspects of nation building, such as arresting war criminals and working law enforcement issues, US forces remained focused in achieving the desired end state of a peaceful, coexistence of multi-ethnic groups in Bosnia. Exercising ingenuity and flexibility, while adapting to new technologies and working closely with 30 coalition partners and numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs), presented tremendous communication challenges. Avoiding human casualties and mission creep remained top on the list. US force involvement in a modern, multi-ethnic country with a history of turmoil and strife provides
excellent lessons learned for US force participation in future peace operations conducted in the twenty-first century and beyond.

**Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons**

Many refugees had no interest in returning to their former homes now controlled by other ethnic groups; meeting the DPA objective of returning 2.2 million refugees and displaced persons to their original homes in one year’s time was an unrealistic goal. In the end, displaced persons crossing the Inter-entity boundary lines were minimal. However, for those who returned, US forces under NATO protected their freedom of movement by conducting de-mining operations to clear main routes of movement, patrolling neighborhoods as returnees inspected or repaired their former homes, and providing armed backup for local authorities and UN International Police Task Force monitors, who conducted their duties unarmed.

On 1 May 1997, the International Crisis Group (ICG) reprimanded SFOR for relying on local authorities, many of them former ethnic cleansers, to provide security for returnees. The ICG asked SFOR “to interpret its Peace Accord mandate in a more robust manner” and accused its lack of action as being based on “mission creep phobia” and “an aversion to casualties.” On 1 May 1997, the International Crisis Group (ICG) reprimanded SFOR for relying on local authorities, many of them former ethnic cleansers, to provide security for returnees. The ICG asked SFOR “to interpret its Peace Accord mandate in a more robust manner” and accused its lack of action as being based on “mission creep phobia” and “an aversion to casualties.”

SFOR returned volley by explaining that the DPA mandate did not extend to community policing and that SFOR lacked the trained personnel and resources to undertake such a mission.

One example of an SFOR success story occurred in the US brigade sector near one of the checkpoints when a US colonel observed that the locals were attempting to establish an informal trade area. Although this effort was opposed by hard-line separatists who viewed an ethnically mixed marketplace with disdain, the colonel was successful in giving the market
official sanction. The effect was remarkable. On this small patch of earth, members of Bosnia’s ethnic groups interacted and exchanged goods as in pre-war days.\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{Arrest and Prosecution of War Criminals}

The IFOR and SFOR mandate regarding war criminals was ambiguous. According to GFAP, they were not supposed to operate as a police or detective agency nor seek opportunities to apprehend war criminals.\textsuperscript{28} US forces could only arrest individuals if encountered on patrols. During 1996 and half of 1997, IFOR and SFOR failed to detain any indicted war criminals. Then, from 10 July 1997 to 2 October 1998, SFOR captured nine.\textsuperscript{29} The apprehension of suspected war criminals sometimes conflicted with other IFOR objectives. For example, in mid-summer 1996, Serbian tanks were in an unauthorized area. While adhering to their disarmament tasks, US forces under IFOR made moves to conduct a weapons inspection at the Serbian-controlled site, but were refused access. This was viewed as a Serbian rebuff to DPA and became a contest of wills between the Bosnian Serbs and IFOR. Because known war criminal Mladic resided at this site, the Bosnian Serbs believed the weapons inspection was an IFOR ploy to capture Mladic. The Serbs did not know that US forces wanted little to do with apprehending war criminals and were not required by DPA to do so. After repeated attempts and the eventual involvement of Bosnian government officials, US forces successfully conducted a weapons inspection at the site. No arrests were made. IFOR demonstrated to the Bosnian Serbs its authority to follow through on what it believed to be the DPA higher priority task.\textsuperscript{30} However, had this situation occurred a few years later, international opinion may have caused the weapons inspection team to readjust their priorities.
**Force Protection**

Threats in Bosnia were many and both force and space related. In terms of space, all three FWF held the home court advantage to include language and terrain familiarity. Additionally, there were land mines and snipers everywhere. In terms of force, each FWF possessed extensive combat power and robust intelligence capabilities complete with internal security services. The Bosnian Serbs had an active information campaign against NATO members, especially US forces.

Force protection competed with the other DPA objectives. A successful mission in Bosnia meant no casualties. This made commanders reluctant to take risks. In the US sector, force protection measures were severe and strictly enforced. US troops wore “full battle rattle”—including Kevlar helmets and jackets—and traveled in four vehicle convoys off campus. Many non-US IFOR participants believed that US force protection measures were more politically driven than based on a realistic threat assessment. However, US sector Commander Nash defended force protection measures taken by claiming that American soldiers today are more of a target than soldiers of other countries and they deserve all the protection they can be given. The transition from IFOR to SFOR resulted in reduced force protection measures. No hostile acts were taken against US forces from 1995 to 2000.

Force protection in the British and French sectors was less severe. In the UK-led sector and around Sarajevo, single IFOR vehicles were permitted. Other coalition soldiers sported blue “soft’ caps instead of helmets and no battle rattle. This lack of protection was well received by the locals. Facilities outside the US sector employed limited traditional protection such as heavily armed guards, tanks, barriers, sandbagged bunkers, and obstacle courses in access areas.


**Communication Challenges**

Throughout the peace enforcing operation, information security remained an operational challenge. Initially, there was a lack of discipline and standard operating procedures on how to maintain operation security. Only minimal guidance was given on how to incorporate non-NATO and Partnership-for-Peace (PfP) nations’ communication systems into a real-world operation, including the Russian’s. The integration of the PfP and other non-NATO nations under NATO was reasonably successful for two reasons. First, NATO had experience with PfP nations through its PfP Program and related exercises. Second, there was a strong international political will to make it happen.

Because NATO air strikes had destroyed most of the Bosnian telecommunications infrastructure, NATO had no place to deploy its strategic command, control, communications, computers and intelligence capabilities. Consequently, it relied heavily on the national tactical assets of the US, UK, and to a lesser degree the French. Commercial data network products, communications leases, and deployable SATCOM services were employed to extend NATO’s strategic information network connectivity into the Bosnia area to provide information services to the sector headquarters and forces. Both IFOR and SFOR produced an enormous amount of classified and unclassified material. Although extra care was taken when dealing with mixed classifications of information and the coalition partners with whom it was shared, an inadequate supply of secure telephones, safes and shredders hampered the situation. Although NATO’s communications and information systems operated SECRET system-high, other coalition-approved communications and information system protection capabilities were either lacking or not secure, resulting in diskettes being shared between classified and unclassified systems. The frequently used UN VSAT network, INMARSAT, cell phones,
commercial Post Telegraph Telephone systems, and Internet were not protected. Additionally, configuration management and information network protect measures, such as virus protection and intrusion detection, lagged in operational tempo.\textsuperscript{38}

**Operation Security**

Since no clearly defined Operation Security (OPSEC) proponent existed for IFOR, daily maintenance of OPSEC was challenging. With the operational environment reasonably stable in Bosnia, the lack of an obvious threat created a relaxed and complacent security posture. The primary OPSEC risks that had to be managed concerned the relentless questioning of soldiers by television and print journalists, and the continuous monitoring of hundreds of local national workers who entered and worked in IFOR/SFOR areas of operation.\textsuperscript{39}

**Psychological Operations**

Without any declared enemies, ROE were fairly restrictive. In Bosnia, the PSYOP\textsuperscript{40} campaign was based on truth and factual information and always identified IFOR/SFOR as the source. ROE forbade the use of disinformation and deception, and the campaign could not take actions that took sides, undermined the factions, or directly refuted FWF disinformation activities. Inconsistencies among national doctrine arose. For example, US doctrine requires maximum truth and transparency when it comes to the public’s right to information regarding governmental activity. However, British doctrine differs. When a Republika Srpska policeman beat a reporter in the British sector, the British refused immediate release of photographic evidence.\textsuperscript{41}
Conducting a PSYOP campaign in Bosnia’s media-rich environment challenged US forces. Although no physical attacks were made on IFOR or SFOR’s control and command (C2) systems, the FWF engaged in disinformation regarding IFOR/SFOR’s existence in Bosnia. Since the FWF needed to command and control their forces in order to comply with DPA, jamming, electronic deception, and physical destruction against the FWF C2 and information systems were disallowed. Although there were some incompatibility and unfamiliarity issues between US production equipment and Bosnia’s media environment, IFOR/SFOR was successful in directing PSYOP operations at the FWF leaders and populace using radio, television, and print products. US law prevented US forces from using the Internet as a PSYOP tool, since US audiences should not be able to access US-generated PSYOP messages.

The PSYOP campaign on landmine awareness was an immense success. Targeting a youthful audience, the US Government and the UN joined with DC Comics in 1996 and produced a special superman comic book entitled “Superman – Deadly Legacy.” Designed to aid landmine awareness among children in the Former Yugoslavia, the books were printed in both Cyrillic and Roman alphabets. Half a million Superman books were distributed.

**Public Affairs**

The purpose of Public Affairs (PA) was to establish IFOR/SFOR credibility with the international media. From the start, PA had two factors to contend with. First, due to the significant presence of media throughout Bosnia when IFOR arrived, media reports of incidents frequently reached the home country and or higher headquarters before the US commander on the ground learned of the situation. This was furthered by US force’s use of
embedded journalists. Second, Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks relied almost exclusively on media sources closely aligned with their parties or those strongly influenced by regional authorities. Consequently, the Internet became a primary communication tool for PA. Its primary uses included surfing for updated information on Bosnia, translating foreign news articles, and establishing “home pages” designed to inform the general public on IFOR/SFOR operations. While PA proved successful over time in establishing credibility with local, ethnic, national, and international media, an overall worldwide interest in Bosnia waned as the year 2000 neared, with other area events drawing more international interest.

**Intelligence**

In Bosnia, it was not always clear who the enemy was. Therefore, force protection drove the US intelligence architecture, and a lot of faith was placed in Information Dominance. Early on, IFOR made it clear to the FWF that it could monitor them at anytime. In the words of US sector Commander William Nash, “We don’t have arguments. We hand them pictures, and they move their tanks.” In addition to monitoring the FWF and all potential “hot spots” such as equipment storage areas, the ZOS, and mass gravesites, IFOR/SFOR had to monitor a wide spectrum of threats that included criminal activities, extremists, civil disturbances, and terrorism. To do so, the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the application of many other sensors and non-traditional sources were adjusted to address the unusual circumstances in Bosnia.

Traditional analytical efforts were also challenged. Prior to deployment to Bosnia, most US military analysts were trained in “hard targeting-based analysis” and were ill-prepared to analyze “softer” issues such as civil unrest, election support, refugee movements, and
faction and population intentions. Releasability and dissemination issues were also prevalent in Bosnia. In order to support a 30-nation coalition peace operation demanding a “common view of the situation,” traditional and non-traditional databases had to be developed and flexible enough to quickly respond to a vast assortment of requirements from the commanders as well as the wide range of other consumers.

**Training Challenges**

One of the most contentious issues during IFOR was the “train and equip” program sponsored by the US but not NATO. The intent was to build up the Army of Bosnia to achieve parity with the armies of Croatia and Serbia and serve as a deterrent to future aggression. This solution was supported by Americans and many journalists who believed that expansionism by Serbia and Croatia had been the root cause of war. However, skeptical NATO participants feared that the solution would encourage Bosnian Muslims to use their military might in ways not conducive to peace. As a result, it was difficult for IFOR to speak with a single voice.

Although local police were responsible for the investigations and arrests of war criminals and persons committing acts of violence against returnees, they often were unable or unwilling to perform such tasks. Only in the event of large-scale public disorders were SFOR units prepared to lend support. The EU had assumed the task of training local police departments but through 1997 provided an insufficient number of experts to do the job. However, due to some unique liaison relationships, SFOR was able to both monitor and train the Serbian Special Police Brigade in the Bijeljina area. Although no tactical training was provided, the training they did receive kept individual policemen employed, out of mischief, and in cooperation with DPA.
RECOMMENDATIONS

In peace operations involving many participating nations, interoperability will always be an impediment. Peacekeeping in Bosnia heightened the value and complexity of classified and unclassified communications systems—to include the Internet—used to collect and disseminate information. And, although data basing issues will never fully resolve themselves, operations in Bosnia introduced a wide array of previously unanticipated categories of information (checkpoints, storage sites, license plates, mass gravesites, personalities, ethnicity) that now need to be collected and concatenated into existing databases. The challenge will be to not only collect and data mine volumes of information now available through an assortment of collection systems, but to develop database filters that can be flexed to fit future scenarios with yet undetermined participants from a hodgepodge of nations.

Peace operations take place in environments less well-defined than war, and understanding political and cultural dimensions are critical to success. President Clinton erred and created unrealistic expectations when he placed a finite deadline on the initial deployment of US forces under the DPA. Changing the name from IFOR to SFOR was just a political ruse to save face in the eyes of the American public. DPA’s objectives and tasks and the participants remained the same, only the timeline expanded. When agreeing to participate in peace operations, it is essential that all involved—leadership, the military, and the public—expect, from the beginning that operations of this ilk typically require a significant investment in time and resources and that established objectives will most probably be altered over time.

One of the biggest obstacles IFOR and SFOR had was achieving a unified presence. With President Clinton having mandated US force protection as a high priority issue and making “no casualties” the measure of success, US forces stood out from the crowd by acting,
dressing and operating differently from their coalition counterparts, even long after the threat assessment had been reduced. Having its own US sector further exacerbated the differences in philosophies between the US and its European allies.\textsuperscript{54} If peace operations are supposed to win hearts and minds, then US forces must be allowed to do the following: adopt and adapt to local culture by learning the language, taking calculated risks with regard to safety, and respecting cultural habits by imbibing when necessary while conducting informal information gathering and meeting local leaders; learn about the NGOs operating in country \textit{before} deploying and work more closely with them upon arrival; and when possible, work under other national command authorities to avoid a distinct and separate US presence.

With regard to the civil tasks of nation building addressed in DPA to include training law enforcers, creating an independent judiciary and establishing self-sustaining multi-ethnic political institutions, the military should not become involved. Although peace operations in various regions may last years, it is imperative that the scope of military responsibilities remain focused on what the military does best, i.e., preparing the groundwork for reconstruction, for example, by confronting insurgents, enforcing curfews, demobilizing militias, de-mining, and providing security for elections.\textsuperscript{55} Since private US corporations such as MPRI are available to train and equip foreign armies, other private corporations should be both encouraged and incentivized to develop programs and train nations on the civil tasks specified above.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

On 3 May 2000, the High Representative to the Secretary General of the UN reported that the implementation of DPA was progressing at a slow and painful pace.\textsuperscript{56} After five years of peace operations, ethnic hatred in Bosnia still persisted. IFOR’s one-year role in Bosnia’s peace operations can be deemed a success because no American casualties occurred. Also,
IFOR was successful in separating the belligerents, establishing a four kilometer-wide ZOS and releasing prisoners of war. However, when examining IFOR’s and SFOR’s combined effectiveness in meeting the objectives outlined in DPA through the year 2000, the results are mixed. Refugee and minority returns are occurring, but at a slower rate than imagined, and to only safe areas, not minority areas. Fair and free elections have occurred, although the nationalist parties remain strong. Some war criminals have been arrested, but the high profile ones remain at large. Parliamentary actions in the Federation continue at a slow pace regarding important legislation, such as the procrastination of judicial reform.\textsuperscript{57}

But one has to look at why the US elected to participate in the first place. When evaluating those criteria, separately from the objectives set forth in DPA, success looms large. US troops under NATO were responsible for implementing and enforcing military provisions including force separation, arms control, redeployments, and prisoner exchanges, of which all tasks were completed. As a peace enforcer, the US military and its arsenal effectively deterred belligerents and provided NATO with the necessary extra clout and credibility to accomplish what UNPROFOR failed to achieve. Although ethnic tensions still exist, US forces can be partially credited with the fact that ethnic cleansing among the FWF has ceased, and no spillovers occurred into Croatia, Serbia or Montenegro. In the end, nation building is an art with Bosnia as the canvas, the ethnic-religious communities its colors, the DPA objectives its brushes, and coalition forces its easel. Human will paints the picture, and as Bosnian history has clearly demonstrated, the finished product is still a work in progress.
ENDNOTES


3 Bauman. 22.


5 Ibid. 24-27.

6 Ibid. 25-27.

7 Ibid. 27.

8 Ibid. 28.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid. 28-29.

11 Ibid. 31-32.


15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.


The International Crisis Group is an independent organization composed of experts from the international community.


Although tallies are imprecise for the exact period of 1995-2000, as of 2001, SFOR had captured 20 war criminals, nine local police, and 12 individuals surrendered. The remaining 38 war criminals are still at large. To date, local Bosnian Serb police have not arrested a single war criminal, despite reports and sightings of both Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic,

This hesitancy to take risks was in part due to the scar Vietnam had left on the military psyche, as well as, the lesson learned from Somalia that nation building leads to mission creep and expansion of a military’s role into civilian affairs has harmful effects.

The four vehicle convoy ensured a “buddy system.” If one vehicle broke down, two could go for help while on remained with the disabled vehicle.
40 Ibid. Although PSYOP is a term officially used by NATO, some North Atlantic Council members were sensitive to the term and did not want to be associated with a PSYOP campaign in Bosnia due to misperceptions of the relationship between PSYOP and intelligence. As a result, IFOR planners replaced the term “PSYOP” with the phrase “IFOR Information Campaign.” Within this paper, the term “PSYOP” will be used instead of “IFOR Information Campaign” when referencing PSYOP operations.

41 Bauman. 102.

42 Wentz.


44 Bauman. 176.


46 Wentz.

47 Ibid.

48 Hughes.

49 Wentz.

50 Ibid.

51 Bauman. 103-104.

52 Ibid. 78.

53 Ibid. 207.

54 Ibid. 138-139. Although escorted excursions to Tuzla and Sarajevo were made available to American soldiers, the contracting firm of Brown & Root made life on the US sector’s base so self-sufficient that not many soldiers spent their leisure time off base.


57 Ibid.
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