Deception, Surprise and Attack:
Operational Art for Air Superiority

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Deception, Surprise, Air Operations, Operation Barbarossa, 1956 Suez Crisis, and 1967 6-Day War

U.S. doctrine calls for deception to be part of every tactical, operational and strategic plan. Unfortunately, this deception plan is often included as little more than an afterthought rather than an integrated part of whole planning process. Further, the deception plan frequently only focuses on operational security (OPSEC) of one’s own plan. Despite U.S. operational commanders’ dependence on air superiority, their only guidance is often only the vague “gain” or “achieve” air superiority received as tasking in an operational order. A comprehensive and integrated deception plan, leading to a surprise attack of an enemy’s air force on the ground is one historically successful method to achieve air superiority. With lessons from several historically successful air attacks and expanding practical deception methods beyond just OPSEC, operational art can provide the air superiority the commander requires.
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by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

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Abstract

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INTRODUCTION

The use of deception in warfare has thousands of years of history and hundreds of examples of both successful and unsuccessful deception campaigns. While the history of aircraft in combat has not yet reached a hundred years, deception has still played a role in air operations. In fact, a successful deception campaign concurrent with air operations can often have decisive results across the tactical, operational and even strategic levels of war. Air operations and specifically air superiority are cornerstones of U.S. operational doctrine and U.S. combat operations have been conducted under cover of air superiority since mid-WW2. Future U.S. operations often assume U.S. air superiority will exist at the onset or shortly after the commencing of combat operations. Deception as a means of achieving or magnifying air operations and superiority are frequently an afterthought during a major operation or campaign’s planning process despite U.S. doctrine which calls for deception to part of the planning process. For an air operations plan, the deception, surprise and air attack need to be linked. Despite airpower’s short history, case studies can be found which show how deception, surprise and airbase attack can lead to air superiority.
BACKGROUND

Throughout history deception has played a part in military operations. Whether it was the Trojan Horse in Troy or the elaborate deception plans masking the Allied invasion of France in World War II, military commanders have used deception to help achieve surprise. Deception is defined for the U.S. military as “Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy’s interests.”¹ A separate definition for military deception follows as “Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.”² Five categories of military deception are included for strategic, operational, tactical, service and operational security (OPSEC).³ Unfortunately, OPSEC is often the major or only part of U.S. deception plans. No one doubts the importance of hiding friendly capabilities and intentions from the enemy with OPSEC. However, besides not utilizing the full potential of deception, the problem with an OPSEC only

² Ibib 331.
³ Ibib.
deception plan is if the enemy penetrates your OPSEC your entire plan is compromised.

Expanding the planner’s use of deception beyond just OPSEC requires more information on the types of deception at all levels. Broadly, deception can first be thought of as either passive or active. With passive deception, an effort is made to hide something real. Whether it is equipment, capability or intentions, passive deception seeks to hide them from the enemy. Conversely, with active deception, one’s goal is to show the enemy equipment, capabilities and intentions that do not really exist. Camouflage is often associated with active and passive deception. Hiding aircraft from detection with netting or in wooded areas would be passive camouflage. Decoy or fake airfields and dummy aircraft would be active camouflage. While this type of effort is most often viewed as tactical deception, at a large enough scale or as part of a large deception plan they can have operational deceptive effects.

Deception by fabrication occurs when false information is created and presented as true. Fake units, fictitious orders, and dummy weapon systems are examples of fabrications. A lie in a public statement would also be considered a fabrication.

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Manipulation is more subtle and involves true information. Deception with manipulation occurs when information is presented out of context, pieces of information are left out, or by combining and relating true information so a false conclusion is reached. Manipulation can be thought of as partial truths.\(^5\) Within deception, cover is closely related to manipulation.

With cover, an attack is prepared for and started under the guise of non-threatening activities. An attack launched by forces involved in a training exercise is an example of deceptive cover. An attack occurring at the end of a training exercise perceived as routine is an example of conditioning. Conditioning deception occurs by repeating routine activity from which an attack could be launched, then launching the attack after the enemy has settled into a routine with a false sense of security. Routine patrols by air and ground forces along an attack route, viewed as non-threatening by the enemy, would be an example of conditioning. Cover and conditioning are often used in tandem in deception operations.\(^6\)

Another closely related deceptive technique is that of the diversion. With diversion, an enemy’s attention is purposely drawn somewhere other than the point of attack or

\(^5\) Ibid., 2.
\(^6\) Ibid., 9.
real target. Diversions can be divided into two types. The first, the feint, involves friendly forces attacking in one location to draw enemy attention away from main effort. In the demonstration, no combat occurs but friendly forces are deployed to distract the enemy.7

The idea of an “A-type” and “M-type” deception plan developed by Daniel Donald and Katherine Herbig is yet another technique the deception planner can use. The A-type or “ambiguity-increasing” deception plan is designed to confuse the enemy by providing conflicting and confusing information leaving them unsure what to believe. Presented with a range of possible and credible threats, the enemy is unable to focus on anyone in particular. While an enemy may have insight on friendly intentions, the “noise” created by A-type deception causes the friendly intentions to be treated as just one more possibility.8

Where as the A-type deception plan shows the enemy a variety of possibilities, the M-type or “misleading-type” deception plan attempts to focus the enemy’s efforts on one “false” friendly plan. The M-type plan requires more resources, more time, and is considered more difficult because it requires a collection of related deception plans designed

7 Ibib., 8.
to keep the enemy’s efforts focused on and reinforce the validity of the “false” plan.\textsuperscript{9}

Another interesting aspect of any deception operation is what the enemy will do if they discover or suspect deception is occurring. Barton Whaley presented four difficult choices facing the enemy:

1) He can choose to act as if no deception is being used, taking the conscious risk that he has correctly second-guessed his opponent....

2) He can yield rationally to uncertainty and give equal weight to all perceived solutions, striving to cover all possibilities. This luxurious strategy, violating as it does the “principle” of economy of force, is warranted only when two conditions are simultaneously met: he must be as many times more powerful than his antagonist as the number of options the latter offers and the issue must be one of survival itself.

3) He can yield rationally to uncertainty, and engage in random behavior, risking success or failure on blind guesswork. This type of solution is warranted only when either the stakes are low (i.e., the consequences of a wrong guess would be trivial) or when the trade-off between risk and the long-shot gain is deemed work the gamble. In words, the victim simply makes a raw calculation of the probabilities.

4) He can yield irrationally to uncertainty, i.e., panic. This is a paradoxical situation in that it offers quite as good a long-shot chance of success as the rational course 3) above. Panic is, behaviorally, simply a random (mindless) search for a solution to a problem for which neither the intellect nor conditioned response provides an answer. In other words, panic behavior has very real survival value. However, the beneficial effects are usually only of a short-term nature, as protracted panic will prevent him from recognizing any opportunities that might suddenly emerge during the melee.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid 7.
Whaley’s responses show the real power of a deception plan that extends beyond just OPSEC of the actual plan. With deception, a series of alternative and plausible options are presented to the enemy. Then even if the actual plan’s OPSEC is compromised, the actual plan will appear as only one more plausible option in the “noise” of plausible options. Regardless of the response the enemy commander chooses, his overall effort is weakened.

Ultimately, effective deception plans have overlapping types and combine layers of deception. At the operational level, for deception to be effective and allow surprise to be achieved, the deception must influence the enemy commanders and decision makers thought and decision-making process while making the enemy’s position weaker. Further, deception is used to achieve surprise and seize the initiative in the attack.

**DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS**

“I have always maintained that the essential purpose of an Air Force is to conquer the command of the air by first wiping out the enemy’s air forces.”

- General Giulio Douhet

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While Douhet’s term “command of the air” has been replaced with modern air superiority and air supremacy, the importance of destroying or neutralizing the enemy’s air force has not. With the commander’s desire and expectation of air superiority in mind, deception provides a method for achieving it. In the time since Douhet’s writing, air operation’s focus on simple battlefield reconnaissance and limited air-to-air attacks has grown to a wider range of ground attack, air defense, naval attack and defense, and strategic bombing all under the umbrella of joint operations. While the range of air operations has increased, the importance of having a plan to achieve friendly air superiority while denying the enemy air superiority has not diminished. Thus, to prevent the enemy from achieving air superiority, the friendly commander’s choice comes down to destroying the enemy’s air force either in the air, on the ground, or some combination of the two. When airborne, aircraft flights tend to be short and operating in small groups. However, on the ground aircraft are frequently massed at a limited number of known airfields. It would follow that to destroy a large number of enemy aircraft

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12 JCS PUB 1-02, 28-29. Air superiority- That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. Air supremacy- That degree of air superiority where in the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference

13 Blustone and Peak, 1.
would be more effective when they are massed at airfields rather than dispersed airborne.¹⁴

Deception to hide the impending surprise attack is clearly one method to keep the enemy’s air force on the ground, where it can be destroyed. The technological parity of the aircraft used in the attack has not been as important as pilot training, morale, and planning.¹⁵ History shows that this attack requires training and careful planning. History also shows that the plan for and elements of successful deception in air operations with a surprise attack have elements that have been used again and again. Barbarossa, the German invasion of Russia, the 1956 Suez Crisis, and a jet-age example in Operation Moked during the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War all used deception operationally, and each were remarkably successful.

**Barbarossa: “The Greatest Deception Operation in Military History”¹⁶**

The elaborate deception operation for Barbarossa successfully allowed 129 German Army divisions with 2,270 aircraft to deploy across a 950 mile front to achieve strategic, operational and tactical surprise.¹⁷ While the attack began at dawn on 22 June 1941, the deception plan for

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¹⁴ Ibib., 3.
¹⁵ Ibib., 9.
¹⁷ Ibib.
Barbarossa started a year earlier in July 1940. German planners recognized that deception and surprise would be required by the numerical inferior German forces. Concealing the presence of the large number troops on the Eastern Front would be impossible, so German deception plans utilized a cover story for their buildup. Sealion, the cancelled invasion plan for England, was used as M-type deception covering the German buildup on the Eastern Front. While rehearsals for the fake invasion of England and Scotland continued, arriving German troops on the Eastern Front were told to prepare for operations in Gibraltar, North Africa and England. German deception efforts also utilized the diplomatic and press corps, including a fake “accidental” leaking of a newspaper article which discussed how the successful airborne invasion of Crete could be used as a model for an invasion of other islands. The article was reported worldwide by foreign press agencies and British news broadcasts claimed German military maneuvers in the East were really training for an invasion of England. Furthermore, German allies were informed that German units in the East deployed against a possible Soviet invasion, building defensive positions along likely Soviet axis of advance to counter a Russian attack. The Soviet leader Joseph Stalin

18 Ibid., 694.
believed that Germany would never attack without first issuing an ultimatum as Hitler had done during prior invasions.\textsuperscript{19} German diplomatic, economic, and military relationships continued right until Barbarossa was executed. Within Germany, rumors where spread by civilian and military agents that created a flood of conflicting A-type deception. Stalin’s intelligence gave dates for of an impending invasion of Russia starting as far back as April 1941. As each invasion date passed, and with no German attack or ultimatum, Stalin’s belief that Germany was focused on England and would not attack was as reinforced.\textsuperscript{20}

While the \textit{Luftwaffe} was confident that it possessed training and technological advantages over the Soviet Air Force, German intelligence estimated the Soviets possessed a significant numeric advantage with 7,300 aircraft deployed to 66 airfields. With only 2,270 \textit{Luftwaffe} aircraft available, The Head of the \textit{Luftwaffe} Goring was convinced the only way to overcome this numeric disadvantage was to destroy the Soviet aircraft on the ground through a surprise attack.\textsuperscript{21} Although airfield and logistical efforts started in January 1941 under great secrecy, the aircraft weren’t moved until the first

\textsuperscript{19} Ibib., 698. \\
\textsuperscript{20} Ibib., 699. \\
\textsuperscript{21} Ibib., 693.
three weeks of June. 22 The diversion against England continued with fake radio calls by Luftwaffe aircraft not involved in the opening phases of Barbarossa. Also, the Luftwaffe continued low-risk air operations against English targets giving the appearance of normal operations against England. Following maintenance periods at their home bases in Germany, the aircraft were camouflaged at staging bases along the Eastern front by noon on the 21 June. Barbarossa’s last deception operation was passive with the attack aircraft flying to forward operating bases in complete radio silence.23

The Soviet Air Force was caught completely by surprise. Few aircraft were armed or had fuel, some were actually tied to the ground, and most were lined up in parade formation at the airfields. By noon, the Germans had destroyed over 800 aircraft on the ground and another 400 in the air. With 2,800 Soviet aircraft destroyed by the end of the second day of the offensive, air superiority was achieved and Luftwaffe units began flying close air support and interdiction missions.24 By June 29th over 4,000 Soviet aircraft had been destroyed with only 150 German losses. The Luftwaffe had air supremacy.25 By July 15th the Luftwaffe had destroyed over 7,500 Soviet aircraft.

24 Read, 793. Was a common Soviet practice to prevent pilots from defecting with them or attacking Soviet regime.
25 Brookes, 33.
aircraft which exceeded their pre-war estimates. However, with just 1045 operating planes and exhausted pilots and aircraft maintenance shortfalls the Luftwaffe was showing the strain of the effort.\textsuperscript{26}

Directive No. 21, Hitler’s operational order for Barbarossa, contained specific tasks for the Luftwaffe including “It will be the Luftwaffe’s duty to paralyze and eliminate the effectiveness of the Russian Air Force.”\textsuperscript{27} A multi-layered and multi-faceted deception campaign had allowed the Luftwaffe to launch a surprise attack and destroy a vastly numerically superior foe largely on the ground. The Luftwaffe would enjoy control of the air for rest of 1941.\textsuperscript{28} With the success of the German deception methods and air attack style, the lessons from Barbarossa will be used again.

\textbf{1956 Suez Crisis: Operations Musketeer and Kadesh}

Following Egyptian President Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Channel in July 1956, both Britain and France had planned operation Musketeer in an effort to regain influence over the Suez Channel from Egypt. Lacking a trigger for their planned intervention, an agreement with Israel was signed in September. Israel, using operation Kadesh, would attack

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\text{\textsuperscript{26} Read, 715.}
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\text{\textsuperscript{27} Brookes, 17; quoted in D.M. Glantz and J. House, When Titans Clashed (University Press of Kansas, 1995), 31.}
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\text{\textsuperscript{28} Mark Partridge, Avoiding Operational Surprise: Lessons from World War II (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, April 1987), 12.}
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toward the Suez Channel through the Sinai. British and French forces would invade the Channel zone and act as a buffer between the warring Egyptian and Israeli forces. The Israeli airborne drop into the Sinai followed by ground force reinforcement was a complete surprise. With no knowledge of the secret British-French-Israeli agreement, the Egyptians were unprepared for the surprise British and French air attacks on their air force several days later.²⁹ Launched at dawn with runways cratered by bombers and fighters strafing the pinned-down Egyptian Air Force (EAF) planes, 260 planes were destroyed on the ground.³⁰ Over the next three days, 400 of the 500 EAF’s planes were destroyed. The destruction guaranteed the British and French air supremacy for their invasion of the northern Suez Channel.³¹

The British and French deception plan for Musketeer was aimed at convincing the Egyptians that the threat of a British and French invasion was a military bluff. While not initially believed, the creditability of the deception plan grew as the British and French troops loitered in Cyprus and Malta for over two months without being used. The Egyptians were slowly being conditioned to the presence of the British and French

²⁹ Whaley, 2: A 547-548.  
³⁰ Ibid., 2:A 550.  
³¹ Blustone and Peak, 111.
forces.\textsuperscript{32} Israel’s deception plan was more elaborate. It used a series of on-going border conflicts with Jordan as cover for mobilization. Deception for the airborne drop in the Sinai used manipulation and demonstration to misled Egypt and Jordan into thinking that Israel’s entire airborne brigade was deployed against Jordan, when in fact one battalion of paratroopers had been left hidden at the airfield in preparation for the surprise drop.\textsuperscript{33} Deception and surprise again allowed a successful dawn attack to destroy an enemy air force on the ground. Eleven years later Israel would combine prior deception methods, surprise, and air operations into an air strike with even more devastating results.

\textbf{Operation Moked}

Surrounded by hostile Arab nations, Israel needed an air operation that could defeat the enemy air forces quickly and decisively. Having witnessed the successful destruction of the EAF on the ground during the 1956 Suez campaign, the Israel Air Force (IAF) developed and trained for a similar attack.\textsuperscript{34} “Israel’s Operation Moked was devised upon a model similar to that of Operation Barbarossa ... eradication of the Soviet air force before it could even take off.”\textsuperscript{35}

Numerically inferior with only 196 combat aircraft and four

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} Whaley, 2:A 549.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Whaley, 2:A 538-539.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Jeremy Bowen, \textit{Six Days} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, February 2005), 98.
\end{itemize}
airfields, the IAF faced a combined Syrian, Jordanian, and Egyptian air force with 654 combat aircraft and 35 airfields. As the primary threat, the EAF alone had 500 combat aircraft operating from 23 airfields. Clearly, for the IAF to succeed in achieving air superiority as the British and French had done in the Suez Crisis, Moked needed to be a surprise pre-emptive attack on Arab airfields destroying the aircraft on the ground. Given that this strike occurred after weeks of military deployments, mobilizations and re-deployments, as well as inflammatory political rhetoric by both the Arabs and Israelis, deception would play a key role in ensuring that the EAF aircraft were on deck for the attack. Major crisis’s leading to the conflict included withdrawal of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces, Egyptian blockade of an international strait leading to an Israeli port, large Egyptian troop deployments into the Sinai, mobilizations on both sides, and a last minute Arab military alliance adding Jordan to the anti-Israeli coalition. With tensions high on both sides, Israeli deception was required to assure surprise, gain the initiative, and allow Moked to succeed.

Israel’s deception plan combined most of the methods described above into an interwoven deception plan at

36 Blustone and Peak, 122-124. There is some variation in the exact numbers but they are in this range.
37 Ibid., 144.
38 Whaley, 2:A 573.
strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The newly appointed Israeli Defense Minister, who was considered a “hawk,” in a complete fabrication gave press statements that the crisis was too far developed for “spontaneous military action” and diplomacy needed a chance to work. His statements, a complete fabrication, were given days after the decision to start the war had been made. An M-type deception was also used when the Defense Minister sent thousands of Israeli soldiers home on leave over the weekend before the attack. The Ministers statements urging patience and diplomacy were featured next to photographs of Israeli soldiers resting on the beach in papers worldwide. However, that these same soldiers were back to their mobilization sites the next day, which was not reported.39

Both the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) and IAF arrived home at normal times the night before the attack. The Defense Minister also gave a relaxed interview from his home to a foreign journalist the weekend before the attack. Deception by cover was the aim of these actions by giving the appearance that the next day was just normal day.40

IAF used a diversion with a demonstration to draw Egyptian attention towards the blockaded Israeli port. EAF

39 Ibid., 2:A 574-575.
40 Bowen, 88.
fighters where redeployed to bases in southern Egypt to cover the new IAF activity, thus reducing the number of EAF aircraft that might oppose the surprise attack. The IAF had also conditioned the Egyptians by flying morning training flights over Israel and the Mediterranean using the same starting routes that Moked strikes would follow.  

Past pre-emptive air attacks had occurred at dawn. This was the generally accepted time for a surprise attack with the attackers hidden in the rising sun. The Israeli’s recognized this and moved their attack later by several hours. The attacks on the Egyptian airfields were timed so that the morning Egyptian fog had cleared and the EAF’s “dawn patrol” flights were on deck with crews eating breakfast before resuming flight operations. Passive deception methods were not the only ones the IAF used.

Active measures were also used on the morning of the attack with training aircraft flying the IAF’s morning patrol flights utilizing fighter radio traffic. On the days prior to the attack this deception had also been used with propeller aircraft flying in place of jets to allow the jets a maintenance period to ensure maximum readiness. These

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41 Blustone and Peak, 130.
42 Blustone and Peak, 142.
43 Bowen, 103.
44 Bowen, 99.
45 Blustone and Peak, 130.
methods are very similar to German deception air operations in the period leading up to Barbarossa.

The deception operations were completely effective and Moked was carried out with complete surprise and stunning results. On the first day, 410 Arab aircraft were destroyed with 390 on the ground. The IAF had achieved complete air superiority. By the end of the conflict, 444 Arab aircraft had been destroyed, 393 of them still on the ground. IAF losses were light with 40 IAF aircraft lost, and only 30 were from combat operations.46

Also similar to Barbarossa, the Israeli deception continued after attack by claiming Egypt had started the war.47 Israel also delayed announcing military victories, like how far units had advanced into the Sinai. At the same time, they were not denying Arab leaders claims that Arab forces were advancing into Israel.48 These mixed reports caused Arab commanders a great deal of confusion since their poor command and control forced them to use news reports for intelligence.49 This deception was so successful that the Arabs leaders would not accept the UN ceasefire proposals because they thought they where winning.50

46 Ibib., 137-139. Each source has slightly different totals of and causes for the losses but are overall consistent.
47 Whaley, 2:A 580.
48 Bowen, 127.
49 Whaley, 2:A 591-597.
50 Bowen, 131.
CONCLUSIONS

When looking at deception and air operations in the three case studies above, some patterns emerge. Deception plans are interwoven at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. While they can exist independently of each other, when they are mutually supporting and built on one another, the deception is magnified. Deception methods and techniques can be used repeatedly. Each of the three case studies involved a pre-emptive, surprise attack against an enemy air force on the ground. Each used similar attack methods and deception methods to ensure success. A clear relationship between deception, initiative and surprise can be seen. All commanders desire to gain and hold the initiative and surprise the enemy. Deception allows both.

Air operations at the operational level involve many missions such as close air support, airborne and air assault operations, strategic bombing, and interdiction. All of these missions need air superiority to be the most effective. An effective method to achieve air superiority can be found in attacking massed aircraft when they are vulnerable on the ground at airfields. Deception can be used to keep the enemy’s air forces on the ground for the surprise attack. While deception and surprise magnify the attack they are no
substitute for thorough planning and training for the operation.

LESSONS LEARNED

While Joint Doctrine for Military Deception (JCS PUB 3-58) provides some guidelines on and requirements for including deception as part of planning, it doesn’t really provide much insight on what those plans might entail. The types and methods of deception presented give the planner a better idea how to translate the requirements and desires of deception into a real air operations plan to achieve air superiority.

Will the deception plan be active or passive? Will this deception be strengthened by fabrication or manipulation? How can conditioning and cover be used in a commander’s planning for deception? Will a feint or a demonstration cause the diversion deception to occur? Will deception attempt to increase the “noise” and ambiguity the enemy sees as in a type-A deception, or will the deception plan attempt to focus enemy efforts against one false plan as in a type-M deception? By asking and answering these questions during the operational planning process, the air operations and deception campaign can be developed.

OPSEC is only one aspect of a deception plan. The fact that OPSEC is rarely a complete success gives even more
importance to ensuring the enemy is provided with multiple plausible friendly plans on which to base their reaction. That way, even if friendly OPSEC efforts are not completely effective, the enemy is presented with the difficult task of reacting to the information. Whaley’s four enemy responses to deception were provided and each of them still creates a goal of deception by weakening the enemy’s position.

U.S. doctrine calls for integrating and including deception in all planning efforts. U.S. commanders assume that friendly air superiority will exist during operations. A pre-emptive air attack on enemy air forces that destroys them on the ground is one method to achieve air superiority while minimizing friendly losses. The conditions for surprise and initiative desired during the air attack can all be created by deception. The historical deception methods to create deception and the deceptions themselves can be used successfully and repeatedly to achieve air superiority.
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