Due to the African continent’s strategic importance, the United States will be engaged in Africa for years to come. In an era of competing global demands in which assets and resources are at a premium, it is imperative to leverage existing opportunities in achieving strategic objectives in Africa; thus, creative multilateral cooperation is fundamental in successful theater security cooperation. France, because of its significant presence, security relationships, cultural ties, and historical relations in Africa, is critical to successful U.S. theater security cooperation and crisis response in Africa, and will be for the foreseeable future. Regional Combatant Commanders must work with the French in Africa in order to achieve successful theater security cooperation and U.S. strategic objectives.
IL FAUT LE FAIRE ENSEMBLE (WE MUST WORK TOGETHER) –
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR WORKING WITH THE FRENCH IN
AFRICA

by

Philippe D. Rogers
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the
requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________________

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Due to the African continent’s strategic importance, the United States will be engaged in Africa for years to come. In an era of competing global demands in which assets and resources are at a premium, it is imperative to leverage existing opportunities in achieving strategic objectives in Africa; thus, creative multilateral cooperation is fundamental in successful theater security cooperation. France, because of its significant presence, security relationships, cultural ties, and historical relations in Africa, is critical to successful U.S. theater security cooperation and crisis response in Africa, and will be for the foreseeable future. Regional Combatant Commanders must work with the French in Africa in order to achieve successful theater security cooperation and U.S. strategic objectives. Although the French need to be engaged across the full spectrum of national powers, this paper will be limited to primarily military means at the Regional Combatant Commanders’ disposal; specifically: 1) The leveraging of French operational reach, presence, access, and basing; 2) Intelligence cooperation and information sharing; 3) Coordinating existing security cooperation initiatives; and 4) Information operations.
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“Our success depends on maintaining relevant, focused, and complementary security cooperation, tailored to the political, social, economic, military realities in Africa.”

- General James L. Jones  

Introduction and Thesis

Due to the African continent’s strategic importance, the United States will be engaged in Africa for years to come. In an era of competing global demands in which assets and resources are at a premium, it is imperative to leverage existing opportunities in achieving strategic objectives in Africa; thus, creative multilateral cooperation is fundamental in successful theater security cooperation (TSC). France, because of its significant presence, security relationships, cultural ties, and historical relations in Africa, is critical to successful U.S. TSC and crisis response in Africa. Regional Combatant Commanders (RCC) must work with the French in Africa in order to achieve successful TSC and U.S. strategic objectives.

The Need for Cooperation with Allies in Africa

The U.S. is currently engaged in a global war on terrorism (GWOT) with Afghanistan and Iraq being the main effort, and, accordingly, drawing the majority of U.S. assets and resources. Commander, U.S. European Command (CDRUSEUCOM) and other RCC’s, however, have identified transnational terrorism in other locations within their areas of responsibility (AOR) where extremists establish the pre-conditions for the growth of future battlegrounds in places such as Africa. General Jones, CDRUSEUCOM, stated, “There is evidence terrorist efforts may eventually shift from Iraq and Afghanistan to North Africa and Western Europe as experienced fighters shift from the Middle East…the time to prepare for them is now.”

2
Leveraging allied capabilities is the most effective way to equip RCC’s with additional resources in the GWOT. Specifically, leveraging European allies who have long standing historical ties to Africa is an example of how RCC’s may increase the efficacy of engagement programs.

There are several European countries that have well developed ties with African countries, namely Belgium, France, Germany, Portugal and the United Kingdom (U.K.). The U.S. should remain actively engaged with these European allies who have similar objectives in Africa, but a focused African security cooperation relationship with the French should be the RCC’s main effort. The reasons for a closer partnering with the French over other allies are many, and there are distinct advantages in doing so.

The French wield influence on the international stage, holding a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seat, as well as playing a founding role in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The French also hold sway in other influential intergovernmental organizations (IGO) such as the Group of Eight, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and similar organizations. Additionally, due to France’s dedicated regional engagement in Africa, it has an important status with organizations like the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-Governmental Agreement for Development, the South African Defense Community, and the Economic Community of Central African States. France, too, is the unofficial leader of Francophone countries worldwide, serving as a defender of the maternal language and common culture. This political influence is important to the U.S., especially when it needs international support for its strategic objectives, multilateral initiatives, and crises response.
France maintains key military bases around the world, including several important locations in pivotal countries of Africa. There are currently over 34,000 French military personnel deployed worldwide, nearly a third of which are in Africa, and France maintains the means to support, supply, and reinforce these forces with an operational reach trailing only that of the U.S. and the U.K. Along with establishing a large number of bases, personnel, and assets in Africa, the French have negotiated important bilateral agreements and security arrangements that can be leveraged in the GWOT.

Ultimately, France shares many of the same terrorism concerns and threats the U.S. does, and it shares a similar vision for the development of peace and stability around the world to include Africa. France is dealing with extremist problems at home and abroad, with both becoming inextricably linked. It has a burgeoning domestic extremist problem due to a dispossessed, alienated North African Muslim population constituting 10-15% of the population. Its former colonies in Africa are facing growing extremist threats as well. For instance, Al Qaeda recently announced its official ties to the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, an organization vowing to attack both U.S. and French interests. Suicide bombers and terrorist plots are being discovered in former French West and North African possessions such as Morocco and Mauritania.

With respect to Africa, France had the largest historical colonial control of the continent, and until recently continued to administer many African countries. This history stretches over 200 years, giving French leadership a deeper cultural understanding of local African customs, history, and government. The French colonial system inculcated its subjects with French education, commerce, and governance, and most importantly, imparted a maternal lingua franca that still spans a majority of the continent.
The long French presence in Africa has a concomitant benefit realized in an extensive human intelligence and information network that makes for an unrivalled understanding of local culture. The French have also established one of the preeminent security cooperation programs in Africa, the Réinforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paie (RECAMP, or the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities).

A Brief History of France in Africa

French involvement in Africa spans centuries, but it did not become significant until the late 19th Century. The real scramble for Africa by pre-World War I colonial powers began shortly after the Berlin Conference of 1884.9 France subsequently took over African territory with an appetite that dwarfed its most ambitious competitors. Vast swaths of North, West, and Central Africa fell under French influence, known collectively as French West Africa, or more colloquially French Black Africa. At one time, France possessed colonies from Morocco to Madagascar with a total combined territory of more than 4,767,000 square miles (see Map 1).10

France maintained these possessions through both World Wars and well into the 1950’s under French President Charles DeGaulle’s strong leadership. It was not until the 1960’s that most French colonies became independent (see Appendix 1: Independence dates of former French colonies).11

The colonial ethos that all French colonies were to be treated as French territory - no different than that of mother France – left deeply engrained and profound vestigial ties to modern-day France. Whereas the British and other colonial powers developed more independent political systems, the French kept everything from decision-making to
functioning government truly beholden to French rule – a domineering parental-filial, centralized relationship. French education, government, commerce, culture, language, and history were forced upon indigents. The French controlled national airlines, information technology (IT) systems, communication and intelligence infrastructure, currency, and import and export commerce. As a result of this forced dependency on the motherland, former French colonial countries have a difficult time integrating into the modern world, and French culture, language, mentality, trade and, in some cases, security matters, have remained preeminent. Twenty-four African countries still claim French as one of their first languages (see Appendix 2: African Francophone countries). Additionally, there exist large French expatriate communities in the majority of these countries, keeping France closely interested in their welfare.

**French Security Cooperation in Africa**

France’s long established African ties have kept it closely intertwined in its affairs. Africa accounts for 59% of France’s foreign aid budget. Currently France has over 10,950 personnel deployed to Africa, to include over 5,000 permanently stationed at bases in Chad, Djibouti, Senegal, Gabon, and the Central African Republic (CAR) (see Map 2). The French have eight military bilateral agreements (called Defense Accords) and 23 Military Technical Agreements with African countries.

These military relationships and deployed forces in Africa have proven very important to both U.S. and French interests. The French have been able to rapidly deploy forces to Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC), and other near failing states when needed in the past decade. The French have conducted noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO)
using these and other forces in Côte d'Ivoire, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in Liberia, to include evacuating over 100 U.S. citizens from Monrovia in June 2003.18

The French have taken a great interest in the development of African peacekeeping capacities and the training of African forces to take care of their own security matters. This training involves IT support, professional military education, operational staff training, battalion and below unit training, and, of course, France’s most successful training venue, the RECAMP initiative.19

Current U.S. and French Cooperation in Africa

The model for French and U.S. security cooperation in Africa is Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF HOA). The U.S. leveraged the French in 2002 for basing at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, to support CJTF-HOA. The U.S. wisely took advantage of existing French infrastructure, basing, and access since they already possessed a base on the Red Sea Coast in a strategic region important to the GWOT.20

The U.S. has also leveraged French aid and infrastructure in other parts of Africa, but these tentative, nascent attempts have proven small in scale and scope when room for a much more robust security cooperation partnership exists. Ironically, while U. S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) has taken advantage of France in order to meet its objectives for CJTF HOA, USEUCOM (whose primary responsibility includes France and most of Africa) has not done so to the same degree. The French-U.S. security cooperation record in Africa to date has been one of missed opportunities, counter-productivity, competition, and misunderstanding rather than one of complementary and coordinated security cooperation.
Some of this is directly attributable to the U.S.’s reduction of ties to France in the aftermath of French efforts to undermine international support for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The U.S. additionally has not sufficiently leveraged French security cooperation activities and access to Africa. Some of the blame may lie with France due to its perception that the ‘sudden’ U.S. interest in Africa may threaten its carefully developed foreign policy in its ‘backyard’, Africa.21

These misperceptions, misunderstandings, and missed opportunities need to be smoothed out in order to effectively leverage each other’s strengths, especially in the common goals shared in the GWOT.

**Operational Considerations for Working with the French in Africa**

Although the French need to be engaged across the full spectrum of national powers (e.g. diplomatic, information, military, and economic), I will limit my discussion to primarily military means at the RCC’s disposal.

To successfully leverage the French in the attainment of U.S. objectives in Africa the RCC needs to primarily focus on the following aspects of French-U.S. security cooperation: 1) The leveraging of French operational reach, presence, access, and basing; 2) Intelligence cooperation and information sharing; 3) Coordinating existing security cooperation initiatives; and 4) Information operations.

**Operational Reach, Presence, Access, and Basing**

The key to attaining U.S. strategic objectives in Africa is a robust continued and persistent presence coupled with access capacity enabling further increased presence for exercises,
training, and real world contingencies. This presence must be accomplished through basing, over flight/overland, and staging (BOS) access which needs to be developed with individual partner nations over time. Even well established bilateral relationships formulated over time, however, do not equate to automatic BOS access as witnessed in 2003, when even long-standing agreements between the U.S. and its allies were not honored for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The development of BOS rights with any nation is normally a protracted process involving Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSA), Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), and other types of agreements.

The USEUCOM Strategic Transformation Plan calls for an increased expeditionary capability throughout its AOR in the form of main operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations (CSL). Many of these will likely be in former French colonies. These expeditionary bases are part of what CDRUSEUCOM calls the en route infrastructure (ERI), a set of strategically located enduring assets with infrastructure that provides the ability to rapidly expand, project, and sustain military power during times of crises and contingencies, and serving as anchor points for throughput, training, engagement, and U.S. commitment. CDRUSEUCOM’s vision for expanding this ERI system in Sub-Saharan Africa involves using these strategic “lily pads” to refuel aircraft and stockpile needed supplies for future operations. The U.S. is currently looking at CSL’s in Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Gabon, Uganda, Sao Tome and Principe, and Zambia, with future considerations in Mali, Namibia, and Tunisia, though none of the above have been robustly developed to date (see Map 3).

Cooperation with the French in leveraging already existing BOS access holds huge promise for immediately increasing U.S. presence and access across Africa. As previously
mentioned, the French have over 5,000 deployed personnel in pivotal countries throughout Africa. RCC’s should leverage the French connections as much as possible like CJTF HOA was able to do with Camp Lemonier, while continuing to pursue U.S.-partner nation, bilateral arrangements. This tandem approach would allow ongoing BOS access to proceed with designated partner nations for the long term, while ensuring a short- and mid-term capability to rapidly deploy and operate in regions in which the U.S. does not currently have access. These French bases in conjunction with the proposed U.S. ones, take advantage of French access while giving the U.S. flexibility to act on its own.

The French-U.S. co-basing concept in a third party nation is not farfetched since the U.S. has TSC activities with most of the countries of interest such as Chad, Gabon and Senegal. Thus, the sensitivities of operating from French-host nation bases would not be extraordinarily novel or unusual. The level of site cooperation would not have to be high-profile. Cooperation as simple as a few permanently or temporarily stationed military personnel or contractors storing and maintaining materials, supplies, equipment, and infrastructure, and acting as a liaison would suffice. A minimal presence in times of low tempo operations could keep the profile and overhead cost low, while ensuring enabling capability for a rapid, robust deployment for exercises or in extremis operations.

Additionally, the value of piggybacking on existing French arrangements allows for other advantages. Their prior colonial history in Africa gives the French a considerable advantage in cultural, economic, governmental, and information aspects of the host nation, thus facilitating the ability to negotiate, procure, and enable operations. Should a contingency arise that links strategic and operational U.S. and French objectives, the existing French forces and assets based at these locations provide a ready and willing force multiplier; while
adding a French/allied/multinational face to the mission – giving it an added legitimacy in the international community. French NATO commonality also ensures interoperability and familiarity with assets, transport, refueling, and contractual obligations through ASCA’s.25

The efforts to secure basing arrangements would have to be closely coordinated at the strategic and operational levels. At the RCC level, this would have to be pursued at French Chief of Defense (CHOD)-RCC staff talks, with further developments being pursued at Joint Staff, interagency, and political levels. The quid pro quo for the French would be the ability to piggyback at similar U.S. bases in Africa where feasible to do so. The economic and prestige incentives would be obvious to the host nation if the arrangements are made public, the former more than the latter if U.S. participation is not publicly known. The larger message is a French-U.S. cooperative stance with regards to helping African nations.

Although it would not be prudent to count only on French bases for access, the added capacity of BOS capabilities leveraging French existing capacities would give the U.S. more freedom of action and a larger range of operational possibilities should a contingency in Africa arise.

**Intelligence Cooperation/Information Sharing**

Leveraging French intelligence and information sharing in Africa is an absolute must for the RCC. The French have developed a profound and rich institutional knowledge of their post-colonial possessions and partner nations while developing wide-ranging, mature intelligence and information networks.

Primarily, the French are the unequivocal leaders when it comes to human intelligence and information in their former possessions. As previously mentioned, this is primarily due
to the very strong language bond France shares with these countries, many of which still use French as the common link between various tribes, peoples, and ethnicities.\textsuperscript{26}

Additionally, the French were single handedly responsible for helping its post-colonial African countries establish intelligence agencies after achieving independence. These were linked to France through *Postes de liaison et de renseignements* (Overseas Intelligence and Liaison Centers), and they permitted them to weave French solutions to post-colonial African countries’ affairs. These French operations mainly began in the 1960’s with a few agents, but later developed into one of France’s most active agencies in overseas operations. The vestiges of these influential intelligence networks, though no longer existing in their original form, still are part of the overall intelligence/information mosaic France relies on today.\textsuperscript{27}

The French have also developed key intelligence networks through their embassy and attaché system which is much more developed than the U.S.’s in Francophone countries. Another often overlooked informational asset is that garnered from United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKO) through military observers and peacekeeping forces. The French are very active PKO participants with over 13,000 peacekeepers deployed worldwide.\textsuperscript{28} The French have over 237 UN military observers in the Western Sahara, Eritrea, DROC, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire.\textsuperscript{29} Although the peacekeeper’s role is normally that of an impartial party, it does not stop the French from actively collecting information on the local country, mission, and fellow peacekeepers - all of which the French gather for future use.\textsuperscript{30}

This well-developed, robust, boots-on-the-ground knowledge of Africa is another key to successfully attaining U.S. objectives. It would literally take decades for the U.S. to attain a similar intelligence and information infrastructure in Africa.
RCC’s should aggressively pursue vibrant intelligence cooperation and information sharing bilateral agreements with the French military throughout Africa. The current USEUCOM-French and other RCC intelligence agreements are valid starts, but true co-opting and benefiting from the French involves a much deeper commitment. The U.S. must learn the local intelligence and information networks through hand-in-hand involvement with the French.

Lastly, a clearly undervalued, underused operational information asset neglected by the U.S. is the French Liaison Officer (LNO) to USEUCOM. Given little to no daily access to privileged or classified information, this asset has withered on the vine. France hand-picks a French Army colonel who is an English-fluent, front runner with Africa experience for this position; three of the last four LNO’s have been promoted to brigadier general. However, due to classification releasing issues, he has little access to intelligence or information within USEUCOM headquarters. Daily access to materials relevant to Africa would allow him to advise the RCC on French-African issues, whether for in extremis operations like NEO’s that arise unpredictably or on day-to-day French TSC activities in Africa. Conversely, the U.S. military representative to the French Joint Staff is granted wide access to ongoing operations and developments, and is thus better able to advise U.S. Embassy, Paris, and RCC’s. A fuller and fairer reciprocal relationship approaching those enjoyed in USCENTCOM (in HOA, Afghanistan, and the Coalition Village at USCENTCOM Headquarters) would mutually benefit all.

Coordinating Existing Security Cooperation Initiatives

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and 11 September, there has been no shortage of initiatives started by the U.S. and its allies to readdress the strategic importance of Africa.
These efforts are mostly constructive and coordinated, but some have lead to duplicity, mixed messages, and occasional counter-productivity. The African nation beneficiaries of this largesse find themselves subject to almost too many programs to choose from, and have even sometimes taken advantage of the situation, soliciting multiple nations for identical supplies and funding.  

The U.S. is not immune to starting well-intentioned initiatives without coordination with its allies, to include the French. A good example of this is the Trans-Sahel Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI, formerly the Pan–Sahel Initiative) started by USEUCOM in 2003. The initiative was rightly formed to collectively address the shortcomings of nine military nations that make up or border the Trans-Sahel and the control of this vast ungoverned space, a vacuum actively exploited by criminal and terrorist agents. The CHOD’s of each of these nations met at USEUCOM in 2004 to formalize a working security relationship (see Map 4). The conference was a success; however, the French had no idea it was taking place until the conference was mid-stream – an operational surprise and embarrassment for the French Joint Staff officers who have, in many instances, educated these African officers and cultivated long-term relationships with them. Whether intentional or not (for the record it was not), the French perceived it as a slight and bemoaned the lack of transparency.

This is exactly the type of initiative the French should be collectively consulted or invited to co-sponsor. Their long-term involvement in the Trans-Sahel region, their knowledge of key figures and issues, and their aforementioned intelligence networks need to be leveraged to the utmost. With limited assets, resources, time, and experience, RCC’s need to cooperate on transnational initiatives with U.S. allies, especially the French.
For this reason, USEUCOM-backed venues like the Africa Clearing House (ACH) initiative must remain paramount. Started by USEUCOM in May 2004, the ACH initiative is open to all NATO and EU members. As its name implies, the ACH initiative is a single-venue clearinghouse to share and exchange ideas on better military cooperation and towards a collective approach to Africa. The meeting of ACH participants rotates through host nations and features a different theme at each gathering.37

Other U.S. interagency or military initiatives involving Africa should be openly vetted in cooperation with the French in ACH or other similar venues such as the Principal Three (P3) meetings between France, U.K. and U.S. Very successful U.S.-started initiatives like the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Peacekeeping Operation Initiative (GPOI) should have tacit French support if possible. This lends more credence to U.S. initiatives in Francophone African nations who are sometimes overcome by the potpourri of engagement choices and wary of ostracizing themselves should they not participate in one initiative over another.

RCC’s, therefore, need to keep French Joint Staff counterparts advised of developing initiatives. The French, apprised of U.S. intentions, will be more likely to support U.S. initiatives and link them to initiatives of their own while de-conflicting duplicitous efforts.

**ACOTA and RECAMP: The Need for Coordination of Two Complementary TSC Initiatives Competing for the Same Resources**

Nowhere is the duplication of effort between the U.S. and France in Africa more evident than in two complementary TSC initiatives competing for the same resources, the U.S. Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) and the French RECAMP.
ACOTA, which was originally named the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), is a Department of State (DOS)-funded training program executed by the U.S. military. Its mission is to improve African ability to respond quickly to crises. The U.S. has trained 15,000 African military personnel under ACRI, and over 27 African nation battalions totaling over 6,800 peacekeepers under ACOTA since 2002. Participating ACOTA countries include Benin, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, and Zambia.

RECAMP’s objective is the training of African forces to conduct peacekeeping missions primarily in Africa. RECAMP, started in 1998, has grown larger and more complex each iteration; RECAMP V (Operation Sawa 2006) will take place in 2006 and will include 28 nations to include the U.S. Over time, the exercise’s mission has matured from simple tactical lessons to operational problem solving and combined staff work. RECAMP’s proof of concept has been the successful employment and utilization of graduates and units in real world PKO missions such as Liberia and the Cote D’Ivoire.

There is practical value in having multiple peacekeeping training initiatives like ACOTA and RECAMP, but they must be closely coordinated. There are only so many eligible military personnel from target nations that can be realistically trained; many of these African nations have small officer cadres and only so many battalions – so, in effect, the U.S. and France are competing for a low-density asset from a small target audience. The African nations targeted for training are sometimes conflicted about sending the wrong message by choosing participation in one over the other. There is also a very real issue of deconflicting the timing of and the preparation for the operations that are preparation and schedule intensive. This problem is magnified by the cost/time-distance operational factors to travel
from Africa to Europe, or to another nation in Africa through Europe since many African
national airlines having had intra-continental flights no longer exist.\textsuperscript{40}

RCC’s should insist on carefully coordinating RECAMP and ACOTA with the French
Joint Staff, making sure target African partner nations are most efficiently scheduled for this
valuable training. Efforts should be geared towards training the maximum forces capable
while ensuring this training is complementary and reinforcing.

\textbf{Information Operations}

Information operations with the French should weave a commonly threaded message
through all mutual security cooperation activities. Target countries should not perceive their
erstwhile benefactors as elbowing each other out of the way, but instead should understand
the synergistic benefits of receiving both U.S. and French aid. The French, through their
long term relationships in Africa, are better postured to target local audiences with the correct
message through accurately nuanced language. The U.S. needs to co-opt this capability.

USEUCOM efforts for a combined information operations campaign for Africa have
already started as a subset of the ACH initiative, with initial USEUCOM-led meetings with
the French and other allies in order to coordinate IO in Africa. Operation Assured Voice is
the overarching IO program resulting from this cooperation.\textsuperscript{41}

USEUCOM has some very powerful IO tools it has successfully used in other areas. A
USEUCOM African web-based initiative called \textit{Magharebia}, run in concert with DOS and
U.S. Embassies, offers American and African leaders a place to post balanced news, articles
and opinion pieces about key players, events, and issues. Involving the French can help the
website carry the right IO message without turning off the target audience due to ignorant or
untenable messages. Currently \textit{Magharebia} targets the North African nations of Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia in three languages averaging over 5 million hits per month, but similar websites should be sponsored in other parts of Africa with mutual French-U.S. interests.42 Another IO program with great appeal and used very successfully in the Balkans is a rewards program for information leading to the capture of nefarious characters or the disruption of illegal activities. A $5 million dollar rewards program has been set up by the DOS for criminals, terrorists, and persons of interest wanted in Central Africa, and numerous suspects have already been netted.43 This program should be expanded to other parts of Africa, and French help should be enlisted in carefully crafting messages to targeted audiences with help on whom to target.

Other information operation considerations include IT aspects and communication exercises using African information networks. The French set up the majority of their colonies’ post-independence IT networks, since they were usually the sole providers for these countries.44 Thus, the French better understand the current IT networks as they exist today and where key infrastructure and nodes are. Understandably, the U.S. should work hand-in-hand with the French as much as possible to introduce common or interoperable IT when setting up military/dual use IT networks, or when conducting training using African information networks. Yearly large-scale USEUCOM-led communication/information systems exercises such as Africa Endeavor should include close French-U.S. cooperation with respect to African countries.45

Counterarguments

There are challenges to cooperation with the French in general, and specifically in Africa. For instance, there is an anti-American sentiment in France based upon its dislike of U.S. hegemony and world preeminence.46 The French use of the word *hyper-puissance* (hyper-
power)\textsuperscript{47} to describe the U.S. is considered pejorative.\textsuperscript{48} Regrettably, this anti-Americanism has been institutionally engrained in the French mindset.\textsuperscript{49}

France is a long-time U.S. ally and an important democratic partner in pursuing common foreign policy objectives such as global stability, economic growth, and greater democracy throughout the world. At the same time, France, as a member of the UNSC, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE, is frequently a vocal and influential critic of some aspects of U.S. policy abroad. Overall, both have an enormous stake in a healthy trans-Atlantic relationship, but different approaches by France, in its chosen role as an “independent” global player, will remain a challenge to bilateral and U.S.–European relations.\textsuperscript{50}

Internally, France has intractable problems, making it difficult to focus extensively on foreign policy issues. It suffers 10% unemployment; a welfare government that will potentially bankrupt its future; a massive dispossessed, non-integrated Muslim community that is fomenting unrest; and the inability to solve long-standing domestic issues. French popular literature reflects this malaise with such bestsellers as \textit{La France qui Tombe} (France’s Free Fall). This malaise translates into an international one, where France has lost valuable momentum and credibility on the European stage.\textsuperscript{51}

Lastly, there is a latent backlash and discontent among former French colonial countries who no longer wish to be tied so closely to France, but who in the past felt had no other option because of France’s closely engineered partnerships. Now, with many engagement choices from countries like the U.S., some of these old colonies are distancing themselves from the French with their security cooperation decisions.\textsuperscript{52}

Despite these challenges, RCC’s can still provide additional leverage and value to security cooperation initiatives by working with the French in Africa. There is a strong anti-anti-
American movement gaining steam in France, and there is a political push to replace lame duck President Jacques Chirac with a pro-American candidate named Nicholas Sarkozy. While senior French military leaders have acknowledged the ebb and flow of political strain in French–U.S. relations, they have refrained from criticism, instead seeking to stress examples of positive cooperation and the importance of a strong military-to-military relationship. In the international arena, the U.S. must actively engage French support for its initiatives – the French are potent allies when in agreement. Though encumbered by domestic issues, France will not turn its back on African engagement due to the importance of Africa to its national interests. French-U.S. cooperation in Africa will help France with its internal challenges by easing foreign policy resource and funding burdens. Finally, by working closely with the French and African partner nations in tandem, the U.S. can gain a thorough understanding of all aspects of this post-colonial tug of war while offering additional security cooperation alternatives.

**Conclusion**

In spite of the main focus of effort being elsewhere in the GWOT, the U.S. ignores Africa at its own peril. It is absolutely critical the U.S. address problems in Africa with an aggressive security cooperation plan. In order to successfully do this, the U.S. must coordinate and leverage existing opportunities presented by allies. France, due to its significant presence, security relationships, cultural ties, and historical relations in Africa, is a critical key to successful U.S. theater security cooperation and crisis response in Africa. The examples presented above represent only a few of the many possibilities available to cooperate with the French in Africa. RCC’s need to explore the full range of opportunities
cooperation with France offers in order to successfully achieve U.S. strategic objectives in Africa.
Map 1: French Colonial Possessions in Africa circa 1902

Algeria
Tunisia
Morocco
French West Africa
  Mauritania
  Senegal
  French Sudan (now Mali)
  Guinea
  Côte d'Ivoire
  Niger
  Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso)
  Dahomey (now Benin).
French Equatorial Africa
  Gabon
  Middle Congo (now the Republic of the Congo)
  Oubangi-Chari (now the Central African Republic)
Chad
French Somaliland (now Djibouti)
Madagascar
Comoros

(Source: Wikipedia [see endnote 10])
Map 2: French Forces Deployed to Africa
(Source: U.S. Embassy, Paris, France [see endnote 15])

French Forces in Africa
Total = 15,486 personnel*

*On the African continent – 10,946

Joint Force Headquarters

W. SAHARA (MINURSO) 20
SENEGAL 1163
LIBERIA (UNMIL) 1
COTE d’IVOIRE (LICORNE/UNOCI) 3416 / 231
GULF of GUINEA (CORYMBE) 231
TOGO (LICORNE AIR DET) 105
CAMEROON 49
CAR (BOALI/FOMUC) 213
DROC/MONUC Gendarme DET 28
DROC (EUFOR RD Congo) 1020
BURUNDI (MONUC) 1
GABON 750
DARFUR DORCA 10
CHAD 1071
INDIAN OCEAN 253
REUNION-MAYOTTE 3796
*French Overseas Territory

As of September 2006
USEUCOM is looking at establishing CSL’s in Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Gabon, Uganda, Sao Tome and Principe, and Zambia, with future considerations in Mali, Namibia, and Tunisia. Morocco, Senegal, Gabon, Mali, and Tunisia are former French colonies.

(Source: USEUCOM Command Brief [see endnote 23])
Map 4: Trans-Sahel Counter Terrorism Initiative Countries and Area of Operations

TSCTI countries: Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.

Trans-Sahel Area of Operations

(Source: Wikipedia Map of Trans-Sahel)
Appendix 1: Independence Dates of Former French Colonies

Algeria: 5 July 1962
Benin (formerly Dahomey): 1 August 1960
Burkina-Faso (formerly Upper Volta): 5 August 1960
Cameroon: 1 January 1960
Central African Republic (formerly Oubangi-Chari): 13 August 1960
Chad: 11 August 1960
Comoros: 6 July 1975
Cote D’Ivoire: 7 August 1960
Djibouti (formerly French Somaliland): 27 June 1977
Gabon: 17 August 1960
Guinea: 2 October 1958
Madagascar: 26 June 1960
Mali (formerly French Sudan): 22 September 1960
Mauritania: 28 November 1960
Morocco: 2 March 1956
Niger: 3 August 1960
Republic of Congo (formerly Middle Congo): 15 August 1960
Senegal: 4 April 1960
Togo: 27 April 1960
Tunisia: 20 March 1956

(Source of independence dates: CIA World Fact Book)
Appendix 2: African Francophone Countries

Countries with French as first language
Benin
Burkina-Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Côte d’Ivoire
Democratic Republic of Congo
Djibouti
Equatorial-Guinea
Gabon
Guinea
Madagascar
Mali
Republic of Congo
Rwanda
Senegal
Seychelles
Togo

Countries with French as second language or universally spoken
Algeria
Morocco
Mauritania
Tunisia

(Source: Organization Internationale de Francophonie)
Notes

11. Andereggen, France’s Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa, 50.
15. LTC Jeffrey D. Kulmayer, USA, ‘French Forces in Africa’ image sent by e-mail message to author, 18 October 2006. Note: French troops in CAR are technically not permanently based, but in support of an open-ended mission to train CAR troops for the Bozize government, starting in 2003. The French permanent base in CAR was closed in 1997.
20. Lieutenant Colonel Robert F. Premo, USMC (Country Coordination Element Officer in Charge for Ethiopia/CJTF-HOA Action Officer), interview by the author, 10 October 2006.
25. A pre-existing cooperative US-French arrangement would have been extremely beneficial in 2003 when the Chadian government cornered terrorist elements the U.S. had been tracking across the Sahara. Unfortunately, the Chadians lacked the logistical means to fully prosecute their quarry. The French aviation unit permanently based at D’Jama, Chad, supported the operation but lacked forward refueling capability for a sustained continued operation over such distances. Overnight arrangements were made for U.S. assets to provide for this requirement and the operation was successful, but the lack of pre-existing arrangements or infrastructure made for a case-study in how the lack of pre-coordination could lead to failure. (Lisa Burgess, “Stripes’ Q&A on DOD’s Pan Sahel Initiative,” Stars and Stripes, http://www.estripes.com/article.asp. (accessed 10 October 2006). Note: Since 2003, an ACSA enabling support at the French Air Base in Abeche, Chad, has been signed between the U.S. and France. The French are currently refueling U.S. transport aircraft as they ferry peacekeeping troops to Sudan. France is providing the fuel and on-call search and rescue assets if needed. (LTC Jeff Kuhlmeier USA, (U.S. Embassy, France, Africa Desk Officer), interview by author, 13 October 2006.)
31. LTC Therese Raymond, USA (USEUCOM J-5 French Desk Officer), interview by the author, 13 October 2006.
32. Raymond, interview.
33. LTC Jeff Kuhlmeier USA (U.S. Embassy, France, Africa Desk Officer), interview by author, 13 October 2006.
34. A perfect example for the need of a robust intelligence cooperation occurred in 2003 when it was discovered EUCOM and French Joint Staffs had each been following a notorious terrorist for months in the Trans-Sahel using similar means. It was only upon his near capture in Chad that both staffs realized their duplicitous efforts just as the situation came to a head. Shortly afterwards EUCOM-French Joint Staff talks led to the first bi-lateral
intelligence sharing agreement between the two. (Source: Author’s personal experience, and Robert D. Kaplan, “America’s African Rifles,” *Atlantic Monthly* 295, no. 3 (April 2005): 91.)

35. Author’s experience as the USECUOM J-5 Africa Clearing House Action Officer in 2004. As an example, in 2004 it was discovered that a Gulf of Guinea nation was actively seeking patrol craft donations from three different partnered countries: the U.S., France, and the U.K. Each nation was prepared to donate patrol boats to this nation without knowing the others’ intent to do the same. The duplication of effort was eventually deconflicted.

36. Colonel Jean-Paul Fournage, French Army (USEUCOM French Liaison Officer), in discussion with the author in 2004. Note: Cooperation with France on TSCTI has considerably improved since this event through high level talks and information sharing. (Source of note: Kuhlmeyer, interview.)


41. General Charles F. Wald, USAF “New Thinking at USEUCOM: The Phase Zero Campaign,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 43, (4th Quarter 2006): 74. Note: Operation Assured Voice is the theater IO plan designed to harness and orient a range of theater information and influence activities to reinforce regional security and establish an environment unfavorable to extremist ideas, recruiting, and support.

42. Ibid., 75.


49. Ibid., 143.


54. Kulmayer, interview.
56. General Carlton Fulford, USMC “The Importance of Africa” (lecture, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 30 May 2006).
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