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**INFORMATION OPERATIONS
DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY**

by

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June 2006

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INFORMATION OPERATIONS DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY

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ABSTRACT

Today, Information Operations (IO) is an area of emerging importance in military science. IO however is not new. Many of the elements of IO have existed for hundreds, and in the case of specific elements like military deception (MILDEC), for thousands of years. IO becomes more important in dealing with the conflicts we face today, particularly as modern wars transition away from the large force on force encounters of the past. This thesis focuses on the specific British IO lessons learned during the Malayan Emergency. The thesis will also examine the IO implications of British organizational and cultural adaptation to counter the insurgents. Finally, it will also examine the most recent list of relevant Joint Doctrine, which drives how the individual services train, equip and resource forces for counter insurgency.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO)	1
A.	WHY IO?	1
B.	ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN THE PAST	1
C.	TODAY'S INFORMATION OPERATIONS	4
II.	THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY	9
A.	WHY MALAYA	9
B.	THE INSURGENT BUILDUP	10
C.	OPEN INSURGENCY AND THE INITIAL BRITISH STEPS (1948-1950)	12
1.	Overview of Events between 1948 and 1950	12
2.	Electronic Warfare (EW) and Military Deception (MILDEC)	15
3.	Operational Security (OPSEC)	16
4.	Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) and Public Affairs (PA)	17
5.	Civil Military Operations (CMO)	20
6.	Public Affairs	23
D.	THE BRIGGS PLAN (1950-1952)	24
1.	Overview of Events between 1950-1952	24
2.	Organizational Changes	27
3.	MILDEC and OPSEC	28
4.	Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Public Affairs	29
5.	Civil Military Operations	36
E.	TURNING THE TIDE (1952-1954)	37
1.	Overview of Events between 1952-1954	37
2.	Organizational Changes	39
3.	Electronic Warfare and MILDEC	40
4.	OPSEC	40
5.	Psychological Operations	41
6.	Civil Military Operations	43
7.	Public Affairs (PA)	44
F.	MOPPING UP (1954-1960)	46
1.	Overview of Events from 1954-1960	46
2.	Psychological Operations	47
3.	Civil Military Operations	48
4.	Public Affairs	48
G.	SUMMARY (1948-1960)	49
H.	LESSONS FROM MALAYA	51
1.	Insurgency	51
2.	Message	51
3.	Public Affairs	52
4.	Decentralized Planning	52

5.	Technology.....	53
III.	JOINT IO DOCTRINE VIEWED THROUGH MALAYAN EXPERIENCE	55
A.	US JOINT DOCTRINE FOCUS	56
B.	INSURGENCY.....	56
C.	MESSAGE.....	59
D.	DECENTRALIZED PLANNING	62
E.	TECHNOLOGY	67
IV.	RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION.....	71
A.	INSURGENCY DOCTRINE.....	71
B.	MESSAGE	71
C.	DECENTRALIZED PLANNING	72
D.	TECHNOLOGY	72
E.	CONCLUSION	73
	BIBLIOGRAPHY AND LIST OF REFERENCES:	75
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	79

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	New Path Newspaper from 1955 (Taken from Derry p. A-15)	19
Figure 2.	Briggs Plan Organization (taken from Riley Sutherland, <i>Organizing Counterinsurgency in Malaya</i> , p. 34)	25
Figure 3.	Surrendered Insurgents One Month After Capture (From Derry, p. B-1)	42
Figure 4.	Range of Military Operations (From JP 3.0 p. 20 and JP 3-13.1 p. I-5).....	58
Figure 5.	Model for Coordination Between Military and Nonmilitary Organizations – Foreign Operations (Taken from JP 3-8 V1, p. III-7).....	64
Figure 6.	Psychological Operations Plan and Program Approval Authorities (From JP 3-53 p. V-2).....	66

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Scale of Rewards for Defection or Capture in Malaya (in Dollars) (From Komer p. 73).	33
Table 2.	Casualties, Incidents and Contacts during 1948-1955 (From Short p. 507)....	39
Table 3.	Casualties, Incidents and Contacts during 1956-1960 (From Short p. 508)...	47

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I. INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO)

A. WHY IO?

American military operations after World War II featured several large conventional operations like Korea, Desert Storm, and Iraqi Freedom. However, there was Vietnam, as well as limited American involvement in the Philippines and Greece to help counter those three insurgencies. Martin Van Creveld, in his book *The Transformation of War*, argues that the frequency of insurgencies continues to increase. The attraction of insurgency is simple; it works against superior forces, as in Vietnam over forty years ago or Iraq today. Unlike the American experience in Vietnam, however, Britain has had success in counter insurgency operations. In that regard, British operations in Malaya from 1948-1960, showed that IO was a crucial to countering an insurgency. Therefore, this paper will use the Malayan case to determine if American IO doctrine, in support of counter insurgency operations, has the necessary elements to succeed.

B. ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN THE PAST

Information Operations (IO) are defined “in the Department of Defense (DOD) IO policy as the ‘integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC) in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own’”¹. While some of the current literature could lead a reader to believe that IO is a recent development, certain pillars such as MILDEC, PYSOP and OPSEC have existed for thousands of years. Past experts in IO include Sun Tzu, who wrote about these three elements in his classic work on military strategy, and the Carthaginian general Hannibal, who also employed elements of IO to win the battle of Cannae. In this specific battle, Hannibal applied MILDEC through his use of the crescent formation combined with a slowly retreating center, which

¹ "Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Information Operations (JP 3-13)," (Department of Defense, 9 Oct 1998), I-1.

convinced the Roman Consuls that the Carthaginian center was collapsing. At the same time, the use of OPSEC hid Hannibal's true intent as the battle developed, until it was time to execute the final movement, resulting in the Carthaginians lopsided victory.

History is full of examples of the effective use of IO. However, the most significant recent event in the development of IO occurred in the 20th Century. America's involvement in World War II began with the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on Dec 7, 1941. "The operation began with Vice Admiral Nagumo Chuichi and his task force of 6 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers and 11 destroyers leaving Tokyo Harbor on November 23, 1941."² Sixteen days later, after crossing the Pacific Ocean, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. This operation was a classic use of OPSEC in denying the adversary information to achieve surprise.

Another significant IO operation occurred during World War II. Codenamed Operation Bodyguard, its purpose was to provide the allies with an extra edge that could mean the difference between failure and success of the Normandy Invasion.³ Winston Churchill proclaimed, "If we pull this off, it will be the greatest hoax in history."⁴ The design of Operation Bodyguard incorporated the dissemination of tens of thousands of splinters of information, "that when reassembled by the Third Reich would create a highly plausible, but false picture of allied intentions."⁵ There were five primary elements of Operation Bodyguard.

- a. Deception (MILDEC)
- b. Security (OPSEC) and counterintelligence
- c. Offensive Intelligence
- d. Political Warfare (a combination of Public Affairs and PSYOPS)
- e. Brutal unadulterated mayhem.

² Encyclopedia Britannica Vol 9, p. 227

³ William B. Breuer, *Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), 13.

⁴ Breuer, *Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception*, 13.

⁵ Breuer, *Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception*, 13.

The primary emphasis of Operation Bodyguard was to deceive German decision makers as to the intended exact invasion location. As the date for the invasion approached, the deception plan expanded to include new and emerging technologies like radar. The radar countermeasures developed for D-Day and other mission areas became the basis of what we now call Electronic Warfare (EW). In many respects the newer elements of IO, such as EW, were born during WWII. The buildup prior to Normandy used thousands of people, radio signals, newspaper stories, celebrities, actors, and the Germans themselves to build the illusion that the invasion was going to take place somewhere other than Normandy.

Hiding the movement of the invasion fleet toward the beaches required new capabilities that today form the basis of modern EW. Prior to Normandy, the primary uses of EW, by both sides, were limited to confusing bombers (via mismatched direction finders), radars, and communications denial. In 1942, Joan Curran developed two new capabilities to fool German radars, codenamed *Window* and *Moonshine*.⁶ *Moonshine* was a powerful jammer that took the German Wurzburg radar pulse, amplified it and sent the modified pulse back to the Wurzburg radar. This resulted in a large return similar in size to what an invasion fleet would look like. The second major development, *Window*, is the modern equivalent of the chaff dispensed by onboard protective systems of modern ships and planes.⁷ To confuse German radar operators, RAF formations mixed bombers carrying Mandrel noise jammers with the aircraft-dispensing *Window*. Aircraft orbit patterns created small gaps in the jamming, allowing German radar operators to see through the electronic noise. In this gap, the operators could see a false fleet created by the *Window* and *Moonshine* transmitters. A later development called *Filbert* enhanced the illusion of an impending invasion fleet. *Filbert* was a small launch towed by a real ship which broadcast the prerecorded sounds of a landing force debarking, using tapes made during the allied invasion of Salerno, Italy in 1943.⁸ During the actual invasion, the allies positioned the false fleet off the coast of Calais. This movement was in

⁶ Breuer, *Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception*, 176.

⁷ *Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems*, ed. M. Streetly (London: Biddles Ltd., 2002), 464.

⁸ Breuer, *Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception*, 177.

conjunction with the deliberate dropping of rubber dummies in the Calais area reinforcing the notion of an allied invasion in progress at Calais.⁹

Operation Bodyguard targeted Adolph Hitler as the key German decision maker. The result of the Bodyguard deception leading up to D-day was the deliberate German positioning of their mobile reserves to attack “allied beachheads” at Calais, just as the allies intended. Furthermore, it caused Hitler to deny permission for those mobile forces to move to Normandy, even as the German commander, Field Marshall Rommel, demanded they be committed against the allied beachhead there. Hitler continued to believe that Normandy was a feint by the allies and the real invasion would come at Calais. The allies established a secure beachhead by the time German High Command realized Normandy was not a feint. Integrated and synchronized IO capabilities created strategic paralysis in the German High Command, keeping Germany’s mobile forces away from Normandy. The integration, coordination, and cooperation among the various IO capabilities were crucial to the success of Operation Bodyguard.

C. TODAY’S INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Similarly, the British efforts in Malaya in 1948-1960, showed the importance of Information Operations in successfully countering an insurgent threat. As stated by Lt Gen Briggs, Malaya was primarily a political conflict in which the war of ideas was the critical fulcrum by which the population would choose one side or the other.¹⁰

Today, the American Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) official viewpoint on IO is in the latest draft of JP 3-13, dated 2005. Prepared under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), JP 3-13, combined with supporting doctrine for specific capabilities like MILDEC, OPSEC, PSYOP, CNO, and EW, provides the ultimate guidance for IO. Specifically the purpose of JP 3-13;

... sets forth the doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for United States military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of

⁹ Breuer, *Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception*, 178.

¹⁰ Anthony Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975), 115.

authority by combatant commanders and other joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine for other joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication {JP 3-13} to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.¹¹

Like Operation Bodyguard, the “ultimate strategic objective of IO is to affect the adversary or potential decision makers to the degree that will cause them to modify personal actions, or direct their subordinates to modify or cease actions, that threaten the United States national security interests”.¹² As recognized by DOD planners, IO has physical and informational properties, in addition to the human properties highlighted in Operation Bodyguard. The information dimension is ever changing, increasingly complex, and omnipresent which complicates planning further. JP 3-13 also recognizes that movements within the information domain are more complex than the physical dimension.

One of the major developments from the past is the concept of information superiority, which is defined in JP 3-13 as the “capability to collect, process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s’ capability to do the same.”¹³ In addition to the functions of CNO, EW, MILDEC, PSYOP and OPSEC, JP 3-13 defines several supporting and related capabilities. The additional areas are Information Assurance (IA), Physical Security, Physical Attack, Counterintelligence, Public Affairs (PA), Civil Military Operations (CMO), Public Diplomacy (PD) and Information Management...¹⁴

For the purpose of this paper, the major British IO lessons from the Malayan Emergency will become the lens through which the author examines American joint doctrine. This lens will provide insight into how the American military prioritizes IO resources and training. Unfortunately, the time and environment of the Malayan

¹¹ "Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Information Operations (JP 3-13)," i.

¹² "Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Information Operations (JP 3-13)," I-12.

¹³ "Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Information Operations (JP 3-13)," i.

¹⁴ "Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Information Operations (JP 3-13)," I-9.

Emergency will limit the IO areas covered in this thesis. Those IO areas not covered are Physical Attack, Physical Security, Counter-Intelligence, Information Assurance, and Computer Network operations. Some areas like Physical Attack, Physical Security, and Counterintelligence are timeless, but outside the scope of this thesis. Finally, modern information systems were not available during the Malayan Emergency. Information Assurance, which applies to the quality, reliability, and availability of modern information systems, is not relevant for this reason. Computer Network Operations will not be considered, as there were no modern information systems in use by either side during the Malayan Emergency.

The first chapter serves as an introduction to Information Operations past and present. The second chapter will utilize the framework developed by R.W. Komer for analyzing the IO dimensions of the Malayan Emergency (ME). Komer's framework divides the ME into five time phases, with the first phase being the insurgent build up ending in 1948. The second phase covers the initial British steps and missteps (1948-1950) and the third is based upon the Briggs plan of 1950-1952. The two final phases are from 1952-1954, when the British successfully turned the tide, and then from 1954-1960 when they finished dealing with the last elements of the insurgency.¹⁵ Each phase will be examined in terms of the application of individual elements of IO, defined as Military Deception (MILDEC), Psychological Operations (PSYOPs), Operational Security (OPSEC) and Electronic Warfare (EW). This thesis will also assess the effectiveness of the related capabilities of PA, CMO, and PD, for each of the five phases in Komer's framework and identify certain key lessons. These lessons become the basis of the evaluation of American doctrine in the next chapter.

The third chapter will analyze current U.S. joint doctrine through the lens of lessons learned from British Malaya. In this chapter, an examination of current US doctrine through the Malayan lenses will determine what similarities, differences, and shortfalls exist. Chapter 4 will conclude with recommendations based upon the analysis of the differences.

¹⁵R. W. Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort* (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand, 1972).

Finally, there are two limitations to this thesis. The limitation is the use of a single case on which to base the analysis. To draw broad implications about IO from a single case can be problematic, particularly as this thesis examines Information Operations, counter-insurgency, and Joint Publications. The second limitation is one of scope. To cover the gamut of Information Operations, counter-insurgency, and Joint Publications would take this thesis far beyond its scope. Thus, examination of context will be limited to those documents that in the opinion of the author most directly bear on Information Operations and Joint Doctrine.

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II. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY

A. WHY MALAYA

It may be argued that the origins of the insurrection in Malaya should be sought in the economic and social conditions of the time, in political disturbances, in the repressive acts of government and in the experiences of the Malay and the Chinese communities during and after the war. These arguments have their place; and while it cannot be denied that upheavals of some kind would have occurred in its absence, the presence of the Malayan Communist Party—its membership, its experience, and its objectives—ensured that when it began, formally in June 1948, it took on the shape of a Communist insurrection; it is to this party and its organization that we turn first.¹⁶

Malaya is an example of a resource-limited (money, manpower, equipment) government that defeats a well-equipped, experienced, and organized insurgent force. In the case of Malaya, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and its successor, the Government of Malaya (GOM), successfully countered a large-scale insurgency and achieved independence, “all while spending less than 800 million dollars” during the 12 years of the emergency.¹⁷ Malaya offers much in showing how a multifaceted civil, military and information program provides an optimum counterinsurgency response.¹⁸ These combined programs did not happen overnight, but rather, were an evolution of the U.K. and GOM learning and adapting to the situation based upon their successes and failures. Through trial and error, the counter-insurgency efforts of the U.K. (later GOM) evolved from an initial campaign based on retribution into one that focused on breaking the relationship between the insurgents and the population base.¹⁹

To achieve this “hearts and minds approach” to counterinsurgency, Britain employed a campaign that blended control, information, political, economic, and social measures. The counter insurgency (C-I) was managed on a daily basis by a unified civil-

¹⁶ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 1.

¹⁷ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, vii.

¹⁸ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 1.

¹⁹ Anthony Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension* (Latimer, UK: Psychological Operations Section, Joint Warfare Wing, National Defence College, 1982), 4-1.

military command structure.²⁰ At the upper most level, the British employed their “Committee” system, with war executive committees extending from the top down to the district level. While headed by civilians, military officers in dual roles occupied many key positions. Effective administration using local civil and police forces were crucial in minimizing the cost of the Emergency. Malaya’s own tin and rubber export revenues paid the eventual 800 million dollar cost of the Emergency.²¹ The ability to succeed at a low cost, using an information campaign and civil measures to achieve popular support is the reason for choosing the Malayan Emergency.

B. THE INSURGENT BUILDUP

The insurgency in Malaya did not occur overnight, in fact, it had been festering since April of 1930. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), based upon the remains of the former South Seas Communist Party, was in existence less than 3 years before the British Authority arrested its two primary leaders and many of the organization.²² The MCP was also composed primarily of ethnic Chinese.²³ Several years passed and the MCP adopted a different organizational tact before it rose to prominence again. In 1937, the Malayan General Labor Union (MGLU), a front organization for the MCP, led a successful strike at the Batu Arang Coal mine. During the strike, the MCP, under the guise of the MGLU, attempted to establish a Soviet-style government of workers. The British Authority quickly put down the MGLU government.²⁴ However, a resurgent Germany in Europe and militant Japan in the East tempered the British response.

The MCP realized that Germany and Japan changed the world political situation; yet, they did not see this as a sufficient inducement to cooperate with British

²⁰ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, VI.

²¹ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, VII.

²² Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 1.

²³ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 2.

²⁴ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 1.

administrators.²⁵ The MCP position did not change until 1940, when the MCP publicly supported British policies.²⁶ In return, the British governor legalized and legitimized MCP status. To prove good faith, the British governor also released multiple MCP political prisoners that had been in prison in an effort to help shore up the MCP for the anticipated fight with the Japanese.²⁷ However, internal memos and post-insurgency interviews indicate that the MCP leadership actually saw the coming conflict as an opportunity to improve their position.²⁸ These documents and interviews reaffirmed that the MCP's primary objective was expulsion of the British from Malaya. In 1941, the Japanese invaded Malaya, further transforming the MCP's prospects. Shortly after this, the MCP renamed itself the Malayan Peoples Anti Japanese Army (MPAJA).

The first wartime policy of the MPAJA was to issue a basic policy ensuring civil liberties and vernacular education. The basic policy ended with a call for all native Malays (all ethnicities) to join with the Soviet Union and China in their struggle. Nowhere in this policy was the restoration of British sovereignty mentioned.²⁹ Simultaneously, the MPAJA was lobbying the British for support in their fight against the Japanese. British support did not begin until the arrival of the Liberator bombers in 1944, which greatly increased Britain's capability to transport supplies to the Malayan resistance fighters.³⁰ By the end of the war, British supply drops inserted over 500 personnel and 1.5 million pounds of equipment.³¹ Though allies, the British were still distrustful of the MPAJA/MCP, and limited the number of machine-guns and radios that were delivered. In mid-1945, the war ended with the Japanese surrendering in place.

²⁵ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 1.

²⁶ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 2.

²⁷ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 2.

²⁸ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 26.

²⁹ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 3.

³⁰ L. Thompson, *Dirty Wars: A History of Guerilla Warfare* (Somerset, Great Britain: David & Charles Military Books, 1990), 84.

³¹ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 3.

When the British returned, they found Malaya in “somewhat of a shambles”, with the MPAJA in de facto control of many areas of Malaya.³²

Instead of attacking the MPAJA, the British impressed them into service, placing them under military command and putting the MPAJA on the British payroll.³³ As the British solidified their position, they opened negotiations with the MPAJA. The initial British objective was the return of as many weapons as possible from the supply drops during World War II. The negotiations resulted in the newly renamed Malayan Communist Party (formerly the Malayan Peoples Anti Japanese Army) receiving legal status and recognition for the party’s wartime role.³⁴ The British were somewhat shocked to have more weapons turned in than they dropped (in some areas), and yet to also witness the large number of automatic weapons and semi automatic pistols that were not returned. Explosives, detonators, and automatic weapons were not returned, in spite of the tons of munitions delivered in the closing days of the war.³⁵ With the conclusion of negotiations and the MCP well armed, the stage was set for the coming insurgency. The MCP continuing to follow their original policy drafted in 1943 and moved towards active intimidation of the populace. Between Oct 1945 and Dec 1947, the MCP murdered and abducted 191 people in its play for power³⁶.

C. OPEN INSURGENCY AND THE INITIAL BRITISH STEPS (1948-1950)

1. Overview of Events between 1948 and 1950

The campaign of intimidation reached a crescendo in 1948 with 109 murders committed in the first 6 months of 1948.³⁷ While no one can pinpoint the exact date that

³² Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 4.

³³ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 4.

³⁴ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 34.

³⁵ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 5.

³⁶ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*.

³⁷ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*.

the insurgency began, all will agree on the single event which captured the British administrations attention. On June 16, 1948, the MCP ambushed and killed three prominent planters.³⁸ Previously on May 21, these same planters had been involved in discussions with the British High Commissioner, Sir Edward Gent, as to the state of the current Malayan affairs. The planters had asked that Gent declare Malaya to be in a state of emergency.³⁹ With the three planters' deaths, the Malayan administration declared a state of emergency on June 19. Initial British estimates indicated that the emergency would only last six weeks.⁴⁰ However, Britain was not in a position to fight a long war at a remote outpost, since she was trying to recover financially from WWII, which had bankrupted the British Economy.⁴¹ The climate in Malaya in June of 1948 favored an insurgency: the government and the economy had not recovered from the Japanese occupation. At the same time the administrative structure and security forces were weak and under strength, while crime and banditry were rife.⁴²

The MCP, in conjunction with the attack on the three planters, began the insurgency by publishing their initial objectives. Exact objectives are below:

- a. Increase the rice ration and reduce its official price [Malaya required imports of rice to supplement internal production, which left many Chinese families on the edge of survival]
- b. Oppose removal of families [unassimilated Chinese referred to as squatters]
- c. Freedom for tilling of the land [untended land illegally occupied by Chinese squatters]
- d. Abolish high taxation
- e. Less rent and less interest⁴³

³⁸ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, 24.

³⁹ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 65.

⁴⁰ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, 247.

⁴¹ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 72.

⁴² Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 6.

⁴³ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 108-09.

As the insurgency, progressed, initial MCP estimates of a supportive popular uprising did not occur and they eventually retreated to the jungle at the end of 1949. While, the Chinese represented a significant portion (thirty-eight percent) of the population, they were not a majority.⁴⁴ Consequently, during their retreat to the jungle, the MCP eventually shifted their strategy to a classic Maoist campaign.

Initial British evaluations of what they faced were both accurate and wrong. The British correctly assessed that the key industrial targets were the tin mines and rubber plantations of Malaya.⁴⁵ At the same time, they correctly identified the unassimilated Chinese civilian population as the base from which the insurgents hoped to draw support.⁴⁶ They realized that, in addition to recruits, the critical link would be the food and supplies that friendly Chinese (referred to as Min Yuen) would supply to the insurgents.⁴⁷ Initial estimates of the size of the insurgent force ranged from Britain's estimate of 2,000 up to the estimate of 10,000 supplied by the former Soviet Union, both of which were wrong.⁴⁸ Post insurgency interviews and records found the actual number to be in excess of 12,000.⁴⁹ This was coupled with an initial British effort that was characterized by the future British Commander, Lt Gen Briggs, as "inadequate, undermanned and under managed," partly due to a lack of trained Chinese linguists.⁵⁰ The British government replaced the High Commissioner, police chief, attorney general, and the Financial Secretary for their inept handling of the initial emergency. The military commander escaped removal only by having assumed command on July 1, one day prior to the British Government's decision to replace the civilian administration.⁵¹ The

⁴⁴ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 6.

⁴⁵ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 6.

⁴⁶ R. Thompson, *Guerilla: The Lessons of Malaysia and Vietnam* (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1966), 85.

⁴⁷ Thompson, *Guerilla: The Lessons of Malaysia and Vietnam*.

⁴⁸ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 8.

⁴⁹ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 8.

⁵⁰ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, VI.

⁵¹ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 130.

Malayan people's faith in the government was not helped by the decision to completely change the civil and military administration of Malaya. MCP propaganda portrayed the change in administration as an indication of the success of the insurgency, and began generating questions amongst the local populace about the administration's chances of winning. This loss of faith in the British Administration hampered early calls to the Chinese Community for support. The new High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, arrived in August 1948.⁵² For the next few months, the scale of violence increased while the British administration studied the problem. The most conclusive item resulting from the study was the British realization that to win, Malaya had to become independent. The United Kingdom's Foreign Ministry codified this conclusion on April 13, 1949.⁵³

2. Electronic Warfare (EW) and Military Deception (MILDEC)

Hoping to take advantage of technology, initial British attempts to locate and gather information on insurgent operations relied heavily upon communications intelligence (COMINT). This capability had really only come to the forefront during WWII, roughly five years earlier. During this conflict, the British had developed sophisticated means of communications intelligence (COMINT). However, enforcement of strict import controls on radios prior to the Malayan insurgency limited the MCP's radio capability.⁵⁴ This action, when coupled with the lack of radios dropped during WWII to the MPAJA, resulted in the MCP having to rely on couriers as their primary means of communication.⁵⁵ Because of these two actions, two-way radios were limited to MCP elite. Units at the platoon, and company level did not have radios. There were some receiver type radios available for listening to Radio Peking,⁵⁶ but this lack of radios was to limit the overall value that COMINT would play in the Malayan Emergency.

The British initially did not use radios in early operations due to their overly restrictive weight and bulk. Instead, they relied on a combination of timed patrols and

⁵² Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*.

⁵³ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 327.

⁵⁴ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 75.

⁵⁵ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 8.

⁵⁶ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, 4-1.

couriers when combating the insurgents.⁵⁷ Even when British COMINT was able to determine where the party elite were located, the rebel force seemed to melt away as British units advanced upon it. Thus for the majority of the war, EW did not play a significant role.

The only other possible role for EW was the active jamming of Radio Peking. Hugh Carlton-Greene, the director of Emergency Information, overturned the decision to jam Radio Peking in 1949. Simply put, Greene reasoned that jamming Radio Peking supported MCP propaganda, which claimed that the British Administration was hiding something from the Malayan People.⁵⁸ This same reasoning eventually led to Greene forbidding the use of black propaganda at a strategic level. Military Deception and propaganda were also limited, as administrators saw MILDEC and propaganda as possibly compromising the theme of an open and honest administration. The British and the MCP were fighting over the Malayan population and Greene reasoned that a strategic deception could have serious consequences on British credibility. Consequently, the Malayan Emergency did not see the use of strategic deception.⁵⁹

3. Operational Security (OPSEC)

During this phase, there were no significant improvements in OPSEC. The insurgents had the advantage of knowing when and where the British patrols inserted into the jungle. From that point on, the British had limited success in making contact with the insurgents.⁶⁰ Initially, the British limited military formations to large sweeps, which were hard to hide. By mid 1949, the military had shifted to aggressive small unit patrols using random routes.⁶¹ The major problem that the British had to contend with in OPSEC was that the insurgents seemed to know British plans from the moment British forces departed their barracks. “Intimate friendly relations with the civilian population allow guerillas to obtain near perfect intelligence concerning the militaries [sic]” strength

⁵⁷ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 133.

⁵⁸ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, I-4.

⁵⁹ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*.

⁶⁰ Thompson, *Dirty Wars: A History of Guerilla Warfare*, 85.

⁶¹ Thompson, *Dirty Wars: A History of Guerilla Warfare*, 89.

and movements,”⁶² for this reason, the insurgents knew what British movements were. Chalmers Johnson, in his book *Revolutionary Change*, further highlights how the civilian population can serve as an intelligence system for the insurgents. In Malaya, this was certainly the case, particularly during the early years. As Johnson points out, finding a new means to conceal British movements became crucial, as circumventing the entire Malayan population was not possible.

4. Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) and Public Affairs (PA)

The new British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney arrived in August of 1948. Gurney increased the emphasis on PSYOPS, just as the PSYWAR division became operational in September of 1948. The original configuration of the PSYWAR Department was primarily military, with most of the personnel’s experience gained during World War II. Malaya was a fundamentally different type of confrontation.⁶³

Relying on past experience, the PSYWAR division approached the Malayan Emergency from a rather traditional perspective, and guidance from the High Commissioner further diluted the effectiveness of PSYWAR. Responding to criticism from the commercial planters, following the killing of three planters by the insurgents, the primary PSYOPs theme became revenge.⁶⁴ This resulted in a PSYOPS campaign, which threatened not only the insurgents but also the local populace who helped them, even if such help was against the locals’ will.⁶⁵ The British discussed seven but settled on two means of disseminating messages. The two means were leaflets and the vernacular press (See fig 1) for reaching the population and the insurgents.⁶⁶

During this period, the new newspaper sponsored by the PSYWAR division attempted to win over the population supporting the insurgents through several means. Named SIN LU PAO (*New Path News*), the new PSYOP sponsored paper’s first distribution in September 1948 was to the urban areas, new villages, and the jungle

⁶² Chalmers A. Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, 2nd ed. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982), 149.

⁶³ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, 2-1.

⁶⁴ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, 2-2.

⁶⁵ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, I-3.

⁶⁶ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, IV-2.

fringe. The paper carried a combination of messages (based on truth) and news.⁶⁷ While its initial reception was not overly enthusiastic, it eventually became a major force for conveying facts and information to the people.⁶⁸

During its first months, the pages of the New Path News reflected several collisions between policy, PSYOPS and Public Affairs. For example, the New Path News, while mocking the MCP, simultaneously reported several policy decisions that caused more damage than good. First, High Commissioner Gent approved Directive 17C in July 1948, which allowed the High Commissioner to deport anyone who was not a federal citizen or born in Malaya, which turned out to be the majority of the Chinese squatter population. Regulation 17D, approved in Jan 1949, gave the High Commissioner the right to detain anyone suspected of collaborating with the insurgents and confining them for up to 90 days without trial.⁶⁹ .

⁶⁷ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, I-3.

⁶⁸ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*.

⁶⁹ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 188.




Figure 1. New Path Newspaper from 1955 (Taken from Derry p. A-15)

The 17E and 17F regulations followed 17D in May 1949, which gave the High Commissioner the authority to relocate families without appeal or to banish them to mainland China.⁷⁰ The regulations had an inherent flaw in that they did not discriminate between those who willingly helped and those forced to aid the insurgents. The

⁷⁰ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 194.

combination of rapid implementation and lack of discrimination of these new regulations quickly created distrust and suspicion between the civilian population and the government. Within a year, “71 people had been executed” under the new regulations.⁷¹ British leaflets reinforced this message with graphic depictions of the consequences for both the insurgents and the Chinese population.

New Path News accurately reported events and administration decisions which highlighted another decision by the PSYWAR division to avoid counter propaganda. At this point in the emergency, most MCP propaganda simply emphasized the decisions made by the current administration, while the government did not attempt to explain their rationale for those decisions. Major mistakes during operations appeared in the New Path News, such as the Batang Kali incident where a British patrol executed 25-suspected Chinese collaborators in their own village.⁷² Conversely, on 29 May, MCP killer squads executed a popular teacher and educator, Pho Tee Lai, and his family, yet their killings were not reported in the New Path News.⁷³ The problem lay in the reporting. Both the teacher execution and the Batang Kali incident offered similar ramifications to the offending side, yet the government failed to publicize the execution of the schoolteacher, while the MCP used the government paper as evidence of administration wrongdoing. In many respects, this is indicative of the entire early threat based PSYWAR campaign.⁷⁴ The early British PSYWAR campaign achieved an effect, which was the opposite of what it desired, effectively emphasizing the MCP message while forcing the Chinese population away from the government.

5. Civil Military Operations (CMO)

CMO took a different tack from the PSYOPS campaign by taking a measured approach to their new responsibilities. After the initial outbreak of hostilities, one of the first items identified by both the military and the police was inadequate knowledge of the civilian population they were attempting to influence and defend.⁷⁵ Up to this point, few

⁷¹ "Malayan Hanged by British," *New York Times*, 4 May 1949.

⁷² Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 167.

⁷³ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 106.

⁷⁴ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, I-3.

⁷⁵ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 34.

ethnic Chinese had accepted identity cards, even though everyone in Malaya had the opportunity. State procedures posed additional complications for ID card acceptance as each of the nine states of Malaya had unique forms and processes.⁷⁶ Police and military both believed that the registration process would allow them to separate the law abiding from the lawbreakers.⁷⁷ Another reason was basic knowledge, as significant changes in the population demographics, location and infrastructure had occurred during the Japanese occupation. Simply put, the British government was missing key information about the Malayan population, its makeup, and location that the registration process could provide. The key points included the following:

- a) Accurate numbers of the population and their ethnicities.
- b) Location and distribution of the population.
- c) Location of Chinese squatters and contested land.
- d) Food and water sources surveyed
- e) Update maps to reflect camps, roads, trails and paths from pre-war maps
- f) Update infrastructure knowledge. What services (electricity, water, medical, schools, etc.) were available, where and to whom?

As the British registration process began, the MCP realized that the registration would ease the identification of insurgents. It would also create two additional negative effects for the insurgency. First, for the Malayan people, this was the first time many of the people had ever seen government representatives. The registration became the first step in establishing a government presence and started to dispel the perception of a distant and uncaring administration.⁷⁸ Second, the registration served an intelligence function by determining population, food, and resource distribution throughout Malaya while also facilitating the creating or updating of administration maps.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*.

⁷⁷ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 142.

⁷⁸ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 148.

⁷⁹ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 142.

The MCP realized the implications and attempted to counter the registration. Shortly after the registration began in Sept 1948, the insurgents began to tell the villagers not to register for ID cards. The government countered by making the IDs cards an access requirement for local medical care.⁸⁰ The next insurgent plan was to attack the registration teams. The British then provided the teams with armed guards. The final insurgent plan saw them target and begin to assassinate the photographers.⁸¹ The government countered by providing military photographers who traveled with the registration teams an armed escort to each village. By Dec 1949, the initial registration process provided the British administration with an accurate picture of the population, its various ethnicities and their distribution. At the same time, the availability of food, water, electricity and medical services were itemized.⁸²

The registration was the first step in re-establishing British presence in many remote parts of Malaya. While not permanent, the registration teams were the first government presence that many of the rural Malay villages had ever seen. The administration determined what it was facing as information from the registration began to arrive. First, numerous, aggressive Royal Navy patrols were not intercepting any food shipments for Malaya.⁸³ From this, the British administration determined that the MCP was obtaining its food outside Malaya. Second, the Chinese squatters were consuming more food per person in high conflict areas than in areas of lower conflict.⁸⁴ From these two facts, the British determined that the MCP was dependent upon the Min Yuen (Chinese squatters) for logistics and resupply. Postwar records later confirmed that the Min Yuen provided the MCP's food supplies. This conclusion provided the impetus for the village relocation program as a means of cutting insurgent supply lines and emphasized the importance of the ongoing registration.

The registration revealed another key fact to the British administration. By 1949, High Commissioner Gurney announced that the squatters constituted a "state within a

⁸⁰ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 71.

⁸¹ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 142.

⁸² Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 144.

⁸³ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 196.

⁸⁴ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 177.

state”. This was partly due to the Japanese occupation when the ethnic Chinese squatters occupied and cleared plots of jungle land simply to survive. In some areas, the pre-war British and wartime Japanese administration had simply failed to stop their advance.⁸⁵ When the British re-assumed control in 1945, the MCP (then the MPAJA) retained control of the rural areas and constituted the local government.

To counter MCP control, the British administration decided to relocate the Chinese to new villages. While the registration was ongoing, in Sept 1948, the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney presented a basic plan to relocate the Chinese squatters to secure, protected villages.⁸⁶ At this point in relocation planning, the British administration did not know the exact number and location of the squatters as the registration was still in its initial phase. The final relocation program design was to accomplish four things. First, it would allow the British to remove two key tenets from the MCP’s platform, freedom to till the land and lowering rent. Information gathered during the registration process indicated that if the plan did not include transferring-deeded land to the former squatters, the probability of success would be virtually zero. Second, the registration process drove home to the British administration the fact that most of the Chinese squatters were illegally occupying their land. Third, it would reestablish British control over the outlying areas and undermine the unofficial MCP government. Finally, successful relocation would allow the British administration to sever the insurgents and their supply lines. Two unforeseen effects of the registration were valuable insight into the popular points of the MCP platform and a better understanding of the area of operations and its geographic constraints.

6. Public Affairs

Public Affairs (PA) addressed two major issues through public awareness programs, the registration process, and the proposed relocation program. The first major problem encountered was the problem of registering the populace. The government waited five months before providing official reasoning for the registration to the local populace.⁸⁷ This delay only created more tension between the Malayan people and the

⁸⁵ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 177.

⁸⁶ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 174.

⁸⁷ Thompson, *Guerilla: The Lessons of Malaysia and Vietnam*, 86.

British administration. This tension was due to the wartime Japanese registration. The wartime registration resulted in young Malayan (native Malay, and ethnic Chinese) men and women forced to travel to Burma and work on construction of the Burma railroad. The exact number of Malaysians lost to this project remains unknown to this day. However, this loss of untold men and women was still fresh in the local populace's mind when the British registration began.⁸⁸ The second problem facing British PA was the relocation of Chinese squatters. The key element in future operations, relocation, also had to overcome prior Japanese behavior. Again, after registration, the Japanese forced relocation of Malaysians during the war.

Unfortunately, PA was noticeably absent in these two key areas during the initial British response to the Malayan Emergency. Yet at the same time, British PA and the PSYWAR division needed to be educating the Malayan population on the tangible benefits of the current government, in spite of its recent policies and directives. A campaign explaining the current directives, registration process and relocation plans to the population would have alleviated many Malay fears as to how British policies and directives would affect them. Instead, these policies created unneeded friction as the Malays fell back on both their past experiences with the Japanese experience and the current MCP propaganda.

D. THE BRIGGS PLAN (1950-1952)

1. Overview of Events between 1950-1952

The period between 1950 and 1952 saw the insurgency reach its high water mark. However, incorporation of the first lessons from data gathered over the two previous years occurred during this period. April of 1950 was a momentous month for the British Government. The senior war council saw the first appointments of native Malays to its numbers. Retired Lt Gen Harold Briggs arrived to fill the newly created position of Director of Operations, with the ability to coordinate the military, police, and civil side of the counter-insurgency effort. As noted, Briggs was a civilian, emphasizing that the military was subordinate to the civilian administration. The key problem not highlighted

⁸⁸ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 301.

in Figure 2 below, was Briggs' lack of formal authority over the civil and police functions. Coinciding with Briggs' arrival, the insurgents, not seeing a popular uprising within the cities, retreated from the urban environment and into the jungle.⁸⁹

In May 1950, Briggs presented his plan, which was a series of smaller programs with the following aims:

- a) Separate the insurgents from the people
- b) Formalize and strengthen the counter-insurgent management
- c) Deploy the Security Forces on a territorial basis
- d) Strengthen Intelligence as a key to anti-insurgent ops⁹⁰




Figure 2. Briggs Plan Organization (taken from Riley Sutherland, *Organizing Counterinsurgency in Malaya*, p. 34)

In order for the Briggs plan to work, Lt Gen Briggs had to revamp the civil structure running the war. Detailed changes are discussed below in the Organizational

⁸⁹ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 63.

⁹⁰ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 19.

Changes section. The most intense insurgent operations of the entire war interrupted Brigg's implementation and civil restructuring. Reform implementation was slowed further by government-scheduled elections in September 1950. The elections were the first held at the town and municipal level as part of the plan to transition control from Great Britain to Malaya.⁹¹

In late September 1950, the British had a notable success in the defection of Lam Swee, a member of the MCP Central Committee, who had defected earlier in July. Lam Swee was the highest-ranking defector of the entire war.⁹² In addition, by the end of 1950, the British had killed 650 guerillas,⁹³ and by 1951, the Briggs plan was gaining momentum, while the fighting was reaching a fever pitch. Briggs' plan was beginning to stress the MCP and cracks in the MCP leadership began to appear in May, when Siew Lau, the committee chair for the states of Jahore and Malacca, was executed for disagreeing with MCP Central committee on the conduct of the war.⁹⁴ Almost simultaneously, young Chinese students affiliated with the MCP killed their high school Headmaster, who was pro-administration, at the Chung Ling High School in Penang.⁹⁵ To the local populace, these two events emphasized that an MCP victory would not come as easily as believed in early 1948.

Following the two MCP reverses, the British unwittingly assisted the MCP cause between October and December 1951. The first mistake occurred in late October. High Commissioner Gurney was on his way to the Fraser's hill resort when his car sped away from his military escort and stumbled into an MCP roadside ambush. Gurney died, and the MCP claimed credit for his assassination. Sir Oliver Lyttleton replaced Gurney in Nov 1951. Shortly afterwards in December 1951, Sir Harold Briggs retired, and an inter-administration squabble broke out. The squabble resulted in Police Commissioner Gray chief of intelligence, Sir Harold Jenkins, to tender his resignation. In turn, Oliver Lyttleton, the British Colonial Secretary, forcibly removed Commissioner Gray for his

⁹¹ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 65.

⁹² Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, I-11.

⁹³ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 295.

⁹⁴ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 303.

⁹⁵ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 431.

poor performance during the insurgency.⁹⁶ While the Briggs plan began to stress the MCP, the insurgents used the British administration squabble to convince the local populace that the insurgency was creating similar cracks in the administration.

2. Organizational Changes

The appointment of Sir Harold Briggs marked the beginning of a significant change in the way that Britain prosecuted the Malayan Emergency. Briggs was the first person to fill the new Director of Operations role.⁹⁷ Briggs' new position made him responsible for coordinating civil, police, military, naval and air forces.⁹⁸ For the first time, these capabilities were under the control of a single person. Any service questioning a Briggs' decision could appeal to the current High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney.⁹⁹ Upon unifying the military and civilian police under his authority, Briggs next remodeled the War Executive Committees. At the top, he created the Federal War Council, responsible for formulating overall policy and allocating resources. Initially Briggs presided over the committee. However, Lyttleton later replaced him at Briggs' request. Briggs felt that the having the High Commissioner as the chair added further credence to the perception of civilian oversight.¹⁰⁰

At the state level, Briggs created a State War Executive Committee (SWEC), which included the senior civil servant (as chairperson), senior police officer, senior military officer in addition to the Special Branch (Intelligence), and Home Guard Chief. Briggs then created the District War Executive Committee (DWEC), with similar representation at the district level (roughly equivalent to an American county).¹⁰¹ A year later, in September 1951, Briggs also added the settlement level war executive committee. Authority from these committees flowed from Federal to State to District and

⁹⁶ John Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954*, Westview Studies in Regional Security (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 111.

⁹⁷ Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954*, 81.

⁹⁸ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 27.

⁹⁹ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*.

¹⁰⁰ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 28.

¹⁰¹ Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954*, 85.

finally to the Settlement level. Policy review occurred at a local level and results then flowed from the settlement level to the federal (via the DWEC and SWEC). These committees met weekly and melded civil, police and military actions into a cohesive whole across horizontal governmental levels while coordinating national policy vertically from the federal down to the settlement level. Another critical aspect is that each committee had discretionary powers limited to its level. For example, a district committee could review and release a leaflet, if within federally determined parameters, across the district. The Committee structure allowed tailoring of national policy, actions, and messages for delivery across state, district and settlement lines. The tailoring resulted in messages aimed at groups, ethnicities, and small settlements so that individuals could easily discern their place and role in the overall policy. The Committees also allowed the government to act in a “coordinated, integrated, focused, and methodical manner across the whole of Malaya.”¹⁰² Briggs referred to this as his “framework” and became the basis of his new counter-insurgency organization

3. MILDEC and OPSEC

During 1950, the British learned that maintaining operational security was difficult. New methods were needed to insert teams covertly. Early experiments in 1949 had shown that using paratroops allowed a high degree of mobility, but that the insurgents were now watching the few clearings in the jungle where the paratroops could land.¹⁰³ Thus, the insurgents were still able to get advance warning of paratroop arrival into their particular region of the jungle. MILDEC changed this in 1950. First, the British SAS developed a unique tree jumping harness that allowed paratroopers to insert through the jungle canopy.¹⁰⁴ This usage permitted the paratroops to remain suspended in the canopy until after dark, when they would lower themselves to the ground.¹⁰⁵ During the initial phase of this operation, parachute insertion using the special harness and normal parachute missions into clearings started to produce results.

¹⁰² Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954*, 86.

¹⁰³ Thompson, *Guerilla: The Lessons of Malaysia and Vietnam*, 66.

¹⁰⁴ Thompson, *Guerilla: The Lessons of Malaysia and Vietnam*, 92.

¹⁰⁵ Thompson, *Guerilla: The Lessons of Malaysia and Vietnam*.

The long-range patrols used a second military deception strategy. After designing a preliminary deception campaign, the New Path News published that the typical patrol lasted roughly two weeks.¹⁰⁶ In reality, the patrols lasted a minimum of 100 days. In some cases, to support the two-week perception, some paratroops would link up with the patrols and the same number of troops that began the patrol would return within two weeks. To aid this perception, the paratroops used the same uniforms worn by the regular soldiers. In the meantime, the remaining personnel from the patrol and paratroops would continue deeper into the jungle to complete the 100-day mission. This deception resulted in the MCP consistently underestimating the number of patrols actively operating in the jungle at any one time.

The final deception was an evolution of British parachute insertion tactics. After several months, and desperate to counter British tactics, the insurgents realized that the number of paratroops could be determined by monitoring the troop transports. The British countered this in late 1951 by putting the paratroops on the loudspeaker aircraft performing PSYOP message delivery. To enhance insurgent confusion, the Royal Air Force began to schedule aircraft whose sole purpose was to drop dummy paratroops into the jungle.¹⁰⁷ After a while, the RAF began to mix live and fake paratroopers. Thus, the insurgents found that monitoring the troop transports was an unreliable means and stopped monitoring the transports all together. By the end of 1951, the insurgents were not sure either how or how many British forces were inserted, but had to expend additional resources on heightened security.¹⁰⁸

4. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Public Affairs

The first major PSYOP campaign of 1950 was named anti-bandit month, partially to counter waning Malayan support of the government in the face of increasing insurgent attacks.¹⁰⁹ Planned for February of 1950, it backfired on the PSYWAR division. During anti-bandit month insurgent kills increased from 92 in Jan to 123 in February. However, the New Path News (the British government's own paper) reported that the government

¹⁰⁶ Thompson, *Guerilla: The Lessons of Malaysia and Vietnam*, 94.

¹⁰⁷ Thompson, *Guerilla: The Lessons of Malaysia and Vietnam*, 93.

¹⁰⁸ Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954*, 161.

¹⁰⁹ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 213.

lost 103 police and military personnel. This number was a significant increase from the 51 lost during the previous month.¹¹⁰ At the same time, the New Path News reported, “these numbers do not reflect civilian casualties or those caught in the crossfire”¹¹¹. The New Path News highlighted the failure of “anti-bandit month” in another report, which reported “that overall guerilla recruiting [was] up by over 500%.”¹¹² This lack of coordination between PA and PSYOPS severely undermined the overall PSYOP campaign.

Further damage to the Government’s credibility by the New Path News occurred with the trial of Jeffrey Watts-Carter. Watts-Carter was the manager of one of the largest rubber plantations in Penang (located in one of the worst states, districts and locales for insurgent activity), yet Watts-Carter was able to drive around in an unarmored car. His estate was the only one bordering contested jungle that maintained full production.¹¹³ The British administration accused Watts-Carter of collaborating with the insurgents. During the trial, it was determined that the reasons Watts-Carter was able to move freely and safely through the district was first, a payoff to the insurgents, as the government insinuated, and second, an exceptional relationship with his workers.¹¹⁴ The jury acquitted Watts-Carter “when his defense proved that seven percent of the European planters had been killed and that the government was not able to protect them.”¹¹⁵ To make matters worse, the New Path News reported that the police had tortured beaten and imprisoned people for over 4 months while trying to convict Watts-Carter. ¹¹⁶.

The disastrous trial and problems with anti bandit month reported in New Path News led High Commissioner Gurney to appoint Hugh Carlton-Greene director of the

¹¹⁰ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 217.

¹¹¹ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*.

¹¹² Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 213.

¹¹³ Nicholas J. White, "Capitalism and Counter-Insurgency? Business and Government in the Malayan Emergency, 1948-57," *Cambridge Journals* 32 (1998): 168.

¹¹⁴ White, "Capitalism and Counter-Insurgency? Business and Government in the Malayan Emergency, 1948-57," 167.

¹¹⁵ White, "Capitalism and Counter-Insurgency? Business and Government in the Malayan Emergency, 1948-57," 169.

¹¹⁶ White, "Capitalism and Counter-Insurgency? Business and Government in the Malayan Emergency, 1948-57," 177.

newly created Emergency Information Services in September 1950.¹¹⁷ The Emergency Information Services primary purpose was to oversee information released to the Malayan public, and, in that regard, to serve a function similar to US military Public Affairs. By the end of September, Carleton-Greene determined that PSYWAR division functionality and organization needed review. After his one-day tour at the end of September, Greene told the PSYWAR division “a major change in organization of the propaganda machine and the nature of its output is necessary.”¹¹⁸

At the end of September 1950, Hugh Carlton-Greene approached Lt Gen Briggs and received permission to reorganize the PSYWAR and Emergency Information Services, as well as institute a radical new information campaign. In his studies of Malaya, Carlton-Greene concluded that the current policies offered little incentive to the Chinese squatters to defect or collaborate and, conversely, served as an incentive for the insurgents to fight to the death. Instead, Carlton-Greene proposed rewards for surrender policy.¹¹⁹ This offered the first substantive shift in Malayan PSYWAR policy from the previous revenge theme underlying the previous PSYOPs campaign.¹²⁰ Bitterly opposed by the police and military, Briggs overrode their objections after local Malay leaders convinced him of the potential of the rewards for surrender program. Prior to his proposal to Briggs, Carleton-Greene began to involve local Malay political figures in planning. Tenky Abdul Raman was a leading figure in the Malayan Independence movement and publicly supported Great Britain. Raman’s support of Carleton-Greene’s program was key in convincing Briggs.¹²¹

To take advantage of this change in policy and to make the marriage of PYSWAR and PA more effective, Carlton-Greene changed the objectives of the PSYWAR section. Working closely with local political leaders and captured insurgents, they developed a new set of objectives to replace the previous revenge theme. The new objectives were:

¹¹⁷ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, I-3.

¹¹⁸ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, A-3.

¹¹⁹ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, I-3.

¹²⁰ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, 4-1.

¹²¹ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, I-3.

- a. Create distrust and suspicion between leaders and led by stressing gulf between the advantages and benefits enjoyed by the MCP elite as compared with the latter.
- b. Create doubt in ultimate victory by quoting from captured documents in which senior party members expressed uncertainty.
- c. Counter enemy propaganda that those who ‘self-renewed’ [surrendered] would be ill-treated or killed when their usefulness to the security forces had ended
- d. Promote dissension within units by stressing differences of treatment accorded to various ethnic, religious, or racial classes
- e. Encourage desertion by emphasizing the rewards payable to the “public” for assisting surrenders and providing information.¹²²

¹²² Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, IV-4.

SCALE OF REWARDS FOR DEFECTION OR CAPTURE IN MALAYA*
(U.S. Dollars)

<u>Group</u>	<u>Approximate Political or Military Rank</u>	<u>Malaya Bring in Alive, 100%</u>
A	Chairman Central Committee	\$28,000
B	Presidium Member	\$22,700
C	Central Committee Member	\$18,200
D	Province Secretary Regimental CO	\$16,000
E	Province Current Affairs Member Front Chairman Battalion CO	\$ 8,750
F	Province Committee Member District Secretary	\$ 6,300
G	District Assistant Secretary Company CO	\$ 4,550
H	District Committee Member Assistant Company CO	\$ 2,800
I	Platoon Leader	\$ 2,300
J	Cell, Squad Leader	\$ 1,600
K	Ordinary Party Member Soldier or Class A Laborer	\$.875

Table 1. Scale of Rewards for Defection or Capture in Malaya (in Dollars) (From Komer p. 73).

This change in objectives also required a major shift in organizational structure as well. Realizing that the small staff at the top level (never more than 30) could not prepare sufficient material, Carlton-Greene shifted the bulk of the propaganda to the state and the district level for production.¹²³ The objectives also required another shift towards personnel who understood the insurgents, their motivations and organization. This translated into a change, which eventually became permanent, for each PSYWAR

¹²³ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, II-3.

section. Each section was “composed of 80% Chinese, 10% Malay, 5% Indian, and 5% European, with around 90% of that number being civilian, preferably former insurgents.”¹²⁴ By shifting the bulk of the work to the district and state level, propaganda could be prepared faster and tailored to the local region. Each level had rules to which propaganda had to conform. These new rules allowed each level to move faster than previously.¹²⁵ At the same time, PSYWAR/Emergency Services section hired the surrendered MCP Central committee member Lam Swee to work with them. Briggs then directed Carlton-Greene to coordinate the release of all public information and propaganda. At the same time, Carleton-Greene became an invited member of the Federal Wartime Emergency Council, so that he could see the development of policy and advise the council of possible public ramifications.¹²⁶ The settlement warfare executive committee’s (SWEC) and district warfare executive committee’s (DWEC) structures implemented this relationship.

To further open communications with rebels and the Chinese squatters, Carlton-Greene increased the number of channels available for distributing information, adding ground loudspeakers, plays and personal appearances by surrendered enemy personnel (SEP).¹²⁷ However, surrendered personnel indicated that the leaflet remained the best means to communicate with rebels. In fact, the MCP declared that possession of a British leaflet (by an MCP member) as reasonable justification for execution toward the end of 1951.¹²⁸ At about the same time, Carlton-Greene started to exploit MCP policies as a PSYOP theme against the insurgents, particularly the policy of executing those who disagreed with MCP leadership. Together, these new policies and messages increased instability within the MCP ranks.

In another development, Briggs approved Carlton-Greene’s suggestion to use SEPs in message development and further directed that the PSYWAR section have immediate access to surrendered personnel as part of their initial interview process.

¹²⁴ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, IV-1.

¹²⁵ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, III-1.

¹²⁶ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, III-4.

¹²⁷ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, I-2.

¹²⁸ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, III-4.

Further, he agreed with Carlton-Greene to declassify the interview transcripts as much as possible so that the PSYWAR section could take immediate advantage of the propaganda value of SEPs' defections in their area of operation.¹²⁹

As October 1950 ended, Carleton-Greene introduced a full broadcast schedule in Malay, Tamil, and four dialects of Chinese, replacing the English and Malay only broadcasts.¹³⁰ The new programming combined the vernacular press and translated broadcasts to become the principal means of communicating with the uncommitted people of the country.¹³¹ Working closely with Carlton-Greene, the PSYWAR and Emergency Information services, Radio Malaya focused upon explaining three specific themes, the importance of registration, how the resettlement would occur, and countering the growing perception by Malays that the Chinese were shown favoritism in infrastructure construction. PA worked with Civil Military Operations and PSYWAR to ensure that the following five objectives in policy and actions matched. Those objectives were:

- a. Resettling squatters into compact groups
- b. Strengthening of the local administration
- c. Establishing police posts in these areas
- d. Provision of roads and communication in these areas
- e. Exploiting these measures with good propaganda, both constructive and destructive.¹³²

This ensured synchronization of message, policy, and actions across the settlement, district, state, and federal levels of Malaya. To further this message, Carleton Green had 500 radios distributed by December 1951, many of which were the first radios ever seen

¹²⁹ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, I-5.

¹³⁰ Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960* (New York; New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 181.

¹³¹ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, IV-1.

¹³² Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 237.

by the villagers. In fact, once installed these radios became the only source of communications for the villages.¹³³ What is interesting is that these radios could also receive Radio Peking.

The capability to hear both stations was part of the larger PSYOP designed to appeal to the materialistic urge of the rural Chinese. The British radios created two PSYOP problems for the MCP. First, only senior MCP officials possessed radios. Second, MCP radios could only receive Radio Peking. At the same time, the radios led to increasing village suspicion about the true MCP agenda.¹³⁴ The rural Chinese knew that the MCP had radios only for the party elite, and yet, ordinary people had access to radios under the British government.¹³⁵

5. Civil Military Operations

Upon reviewing the data accumulated as part of the registration and resettlement efforts, Briggs laid out a sweeping plan for food and drug control, aimed at breaking the logistic links between the jungle-based insurgents and their Min Yuen support in populated areas. Administered by the SWEC and DWEC, the system enforced black areas (those with heavy insurgent activity) strict rationing, curfews, and village gate checks. Mobile food-check teams enforced strict accounting of all stocks and sales of specified items in stores. Identification cards were mandatory for purchasing food, and records were maintained on all sales.¹³⁶

The key to making the food and drug denial work was the resettlement plan begun in 1948. Briggs revitalized the relocation plan, and by the end of 1950, “82 villages with 117,000 people had been moved. The relocation number increased to 429 villages and 395,000 people by the end of 1951”¹³⁷. The reason for this renewed emphasis was that the preliminary data revealed that recruitment from the Chinese villages had increased

¹³³ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 420.

¹³⁴ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 139.

¹³⁵ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 420.

¹³⁶ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 58.

¹³⁷ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 55.

from “less than 5% in 1948 to between 10 and 30% of the insurgent’s total force.”¹³⁸ The government also suspected that casualties were trailing recruitment in all states.¹³⁹

To ensure the success of the program, High Commissioner Gurney received approval to implement Emergency Regulation 17FA, which gave state and settlement authorities the power to declare areas as controlled areas. The main purpose was to concentrate the population of such an area at night in specific areas, in part, to provide a means of protecting the population from the insurgents while simultaneously cutting communications and support to the insurgents.¹⁴⁰ To entice the Chinese to relocate to the new villages, villagers received a stipend while they waited for their first crop, one sixth of an acre for a home, and a minimum amount of deeded land for planting. The villager received additional deeded land if the minimum land was less than what the villager had in the old village.¹⁴¹ By combining land ownership and security with access to medical facilities, water, electricity, and schooling in each village, the CMO effectively removed several of the key points underpinning the MCP justification for the insurgency.

E. TURNING THE TIDE (1952-1954)

1. Overview of Events between 1952-1954

Unlike Briggs, his replacement Gerald Templar, prior to accepting the Malayan posting asked for complete authority. Winston Churchill combined the Director of Operations and High Commissioner positions and offered Templar the revamped High Commissioner job.¹⁴² In early February 1952, Lt Gen Gerald Templar replaced Briggs. After reviewing the situation in Malaya and talking with Briggs, Templar concluded, much as Briggs did, that this was primarily a political campaign.¹⁴³ Additionally, with the movement towards independence gaining momentum, Templar developed an

¹³⁸ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 213.

¹³⁹ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*.

¹⁴⁰ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 249.

¹⁴¹ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 54.

¹⁴² "Smiling Tiger," *Time*, Dec 15, 1952 1952.

¹⁴³ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 339.

information campaign to educate native Malays about sharing power in the government, if it was to succeed. At the same time, Templar had to start transitioning Malayan civil service from a predominantly European operation to one run by the Malays. By the end of 1956, Templar initiated reforms that reduced European representation to only 1800 in a service of over 160,000.¹⁴⁴ In May 1952, Templar proposed legislation implementing the election of councils in the new villages created by the resettlement policy. In September 1952, he created a new policy that offered citizenship to over half the ethnic Indians and Chinese.¹⁴⁵ Templar then followed this success with new legislation proposing an electoral process for state legislative councils elected from the newly established village councils. Seen as enhancements, Templar's actions did not effectively change Briggs' plan.

Templar took command after the heaviest period of insurgent activity had ended in December 1951. However, the insurgents had retreated deeper into the jungle to regroup and this placed tremendous pressure on the aborigine groups whom the MCP was forcing not only to work, but also to provide food and security to their camps. In a departure from the previous policy of relocation, beginning in August 1952, Templar established deep jungle forts to protect the aborigines.¹⁴⁶ Templar did not relocate the aborigines, as it was easier to protect than to relocate them.

The MCP began 1952 with over 7,000 insurgents; however, the Briggs plan was beginning to have an effect. During 1952, total contacts with the MCP declined from 450-500 per month at the beginning of 1952 to less than 100 per month by the end of 1952.¹⁴⁷ At the same time, the deep jungle forts established to protect the aborigines were beginning to take their toll on the MCP forces. By the end of 1953, the total insurgent force fell to less than 2,000.¹⁴⁸ At the same time, civilian and security force

¹⁴⁴ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 59.

¹⁴⁵ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 355.

¹⁴⁶ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 63.

¹⁴⁷ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 10.

¹⁴⁸ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*.

casualties declined dramatically (see Table 1) while maintaining a high MCP casualty rate. Table 1 demonstrates that during 1951, 1.74 insurgents were killed for every single security force officer lost. At the same time, roughly one civilian was lost for every two insurgents. By the close of 1953, those ratios had improved to 8.11 insurgents per officer, while only one civilian was lost for every 11.85 insurgents killed. This is a remarkable improvement in only two years.

CASUALTIES, INCIDENTS, CONTACTS								
	Total 1948	Total 1949	Total 1950	Total 1951	Total 1952	Total 1953	Total 1954	Total 1955
TERRORISTS KILLED	374	619	648	1078	1155	959	723	420
TERRORISTS CAPTURED	263	337	147	121	123	73	51	54
TERRORISTS SURRENDERED	56	251	147	201	257	372	211	249
TOTAL ELIMINATIONS	693	1207	942	1400	1535	1404	985	723
TERRORISTS WOUNDED				649	596	291	212	161
TOTAL TERRORIST CASUALTIES	693	1207	942	2049	2131	1695	1197	884
REGULAR POLICE KILLED	45	104	148	116	65	10	6	8
REGULAR POLICE WOUNDED	73	93	161	191	113	9	21	17
SPECIAL CONSTABLES KILLED*	37	51	134	192	106	19	19	21
SPECIAL CONSTABLES WOUNDED	42	72	138	217	134	34	52	32
AUXILIARY POLICE WOUNDED	4	5	22	46	31	10	16	11
AUXILIARY POLICE KILLED	7	9	32	72	36	29	28	18
MILITARY FORCES KILLED	60	65	79	124	56	34	34	30
MILITARY FORCES WOUNDED	92	77	175	237	123	64	65	43
TOTAL SECURITY FORCES KILLED	149	229	393	504	263	92	87	79
TOTAL SECURITY FORCES WOUNDED	211	247	496	691	401	117	154	103
TOTAL SECURITY FORCES CASUALTIES	360	476	889	1195	664	209	241	182
CIVILIANS KILLED	315	334	646	533	343	85	97	62
CIVILIANS WOUNDED	149	200	409	356	158	15	31	24
CIVILIANS MISSING	90	160	106	135	131	43	57	57
TOTAL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES	554	694	1161	1024	632	143	185	143
INCIDENTS								
{ MAJOR			1744	2333	1389	258	293	206
{ MINOR			2995	3749	2338	912	784	575
TOTAL INCIDENTS			4739	6082	3727	1170	1077	781
CONTACTS	1274	1442	983	1911	1868	1407	993	563

Table 2. Casualties, Incidents and Contacts during 1948-1955 (From Short p. 507).

2. Organizational Changes

There were really only two significant changes in the organizational structure. First, Templar was a military officer serving as the High Commissioner (Senior Civilian post) further unifying the military and civilian functions. This unification of authority resolved one of Lt Gen Briggs' greatest problems, by eliminating the previous appeal option that Briggs had to contend with under Gurney.¹⁴⁹ Templar's second major innovation was to create a single director of intelligence who oversaw the civilian, military and police intelligence functions. What made this new position unique was that the director of intelligence was primarily responsible for analysis and had little to do with actual collection. Templar created this division of responsibility specifically to let the

¹⁴⁹ "Smiling Tiger," 1.

collectors focus on collection with all questions and requests for analysis routed to the new Director of Intelligence. The analysts were now responsible for analyzing data and producing estimates etc. “This let the military and police focus on gathering intelligence versus answering questions from on high”¹⁵⁰

3. Electronic Warfare and MILDEC

During 1953, the MCP introduced a new type of radio for communications amongst senior MCP officials. However, the new radio allowed a much more accurate triangulation than was possible before.¹⁵¹ In fact, the triangulation was accurate enough that it could successfully guide RAF heavy bombers. To prevent civilian casualties, the Special Police would verify that the MCP camp was not holding captive civilians and would smuggle homing beacons into the camps.¹⁵² When the bombers approached, if the radio signal and the beacon were present, approval to strike the camp was automatic. The result was that several hundred insurgents were killed using this technique.¹⁵³

The British took this new EW technique one-step further. They activated a MILDEC plan focused on the MCP leadership. The objective was to convince the MCP leadership that the British were getting their information from high-level members of the MCP. Through information obtained from surrendered enemy personnel, the British leaked that certain high-ranking members of the MCP had left the camps just prior to the RAF strikes. In the end, the MCP did not figure out the EW methodology being used and instead executed 11 mid level officials for leaking information to the British.¹⁵⁴

4. OPSEC

MCP food production produced the only significant change in OPSEC. The insurgents were driven deeper into the jungle as food denial operations began to have an effect, and neatly cultivated plots of land began to appear in the deep jungle. This style of farming was typical of ethnic Chinese and not the aborigines. Once known, patrols

¹⁵⁰ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 361.

¹⁵¹ L.T. Dunnett, "Royal Air Force: The Malayan Emergency," ed. Defence Council (Ministry of Defence, June 1970), 105.

¹⁵² Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 370.

¹⁵³ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*.

¹⁵⁴ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*.

destroyed the plots of land and crops. At the suggestion of the PSYOP section, large plots were destroyed just short (no more than two weeks) of maturity to further intensify the damage to MCP morale.¹⁵⁵

Due to a lack of proper operations security, the greatest loss of personnel on both sides in a single action occurred during this period. On the government side, a patrol leader chose the same trail to and from the jungle three times. The MCP ambushed the patrol leader, and his patrol lost over thirty personnel.¹⁵⁶ On the MCP side, two different patrols repeated their route in returning to their camp. In both cases, government forces ambushed the MCP patrols, with one MCP patrol losing over 60 personnel.¹⁵⁷ Each side remembered this lesson, and patrol patterns avoided predictability for the rest of the Emergency.

5. Psychological Operations

As mentioned earlier, civilian casualties decreased during the 1952-1954 period. The establishment of any new village incorporated a perimeter fence and a rigid curfew was enforced. Guards checked workers at the gate prior to exit, to prevent food from leaving the village. The PSYOPs section took advantage of this when they created a new campaign targeting the residents of the new villages. Encouraging the villagers to take advantage of the checkpoint and the fence, the PSYOP section provided a means for the villagers to deny food to the insurgents while placing blame for it on the government, thus reducing the risk to the villagers.¹⁵⁸ At the same time, the transfer of deeded land for homes and farming to the villagers mitigated two key portions of the MCP PSYOP campaign.

¹⁵⁵ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 58.

¹⁵⁶ Thompson, *Guerilla: The Lessons of Malaysia and Vietnam*, 93.

¹⁵⁷ Thompson, *Guerilla: The Lessons of Malaysia and Vietnam*.

¹⁵⁸ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 392.




Figure 3. Surrendered Insurgents One Month After Capture (From Derry, p. B-1)

PSYOPS began to emphasize the decline of the MCP with government films featuring a combination of well-known surrendered insurgents and those from the local area of the village. Another PSYOP program rotated the better-known insurgents through the contested areas to prove to the people that they were alive and well, in keeping with the government promise. Subtle points to the photos and visits included clothing, obvious weight gain, the simple fact they were alive, and doing well under the British.¹⁵⁹ An example is shown in Figure 3.

The PSYOPS campaign was also working on the MCP, and as mentioned above, the combination of air strikes and MILDEC allowed for the creation of further dissension within the MCP ranks. At the same time, the PSYOPS section began to capitalize further upon the rewards-for-surrender program. Starting in late 1952, the MCP began executing MCP personnel for possessing their surrender leaflets.¹⁶⁰ Jeeps with large speakers drove near the jungle fringe to transmit the British surrender message.¹⁶¹ Jeep access was limited to roads, roads that did not exist in the deep jungle where the MCP bases were

¹⁵⁹ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, B-2.

¹⁶⁰ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 10.

¹⁶¹ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, V-1.

located. Instead, voice aircraft replaced the jeeps, flying over the deep jungle broadcasting the same surrender message. The surrender message also provided a catch phrase for the insurgent to provide on his/her surrender.¹⁶²

Another refinement was in the PSYOP messages. At this point, according to Derry, there were five primary messages in usage

- “a. Where did the money go?
- b. Why work against the interests of the masses?
- c. It is dangerous to carry a pistol or a carbine.
- d. One of your comrades has been killed in this area?
- e. Do you need medical assistance?”¹⁶³

Theme d. was quite interesting in that, not only would the PSYOP section announce who had been killed by the government during operations, but would also include who had been executed for possessing, reading or doing something the MCP found offensive.¹⁶⁴ As these were standardized procedures, as Briggs envisioned them, these tailored leaflets differed across districts. This particular theme was the single most effective leaflet in the inventory of messages designed to induce the surrender of individual insurgents.¹⁶⁵

6. Civil Military Operations

In a refinement of the Briggs plan on food denial, Templar decided that the security forces should focus their efforts on the guerilla supply parties operating near the jungle fringe to force the insurgents to commit resources to defending their supply organizations. A secondary effect was to force the MCP to divert additional resources to producing the necessary food.¹⁶⁶ Che The, the MCP senior official countered with an

¹⁶² Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, V-2.

¹⁶³ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 422.

¹⁶⁴ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*.

¹⁶⁵ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, V-2.

¹⁶⁶ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 56.

aphorism “the guerillas moves among the people like a fish swims through the ocean.”¹⁶⁷ Templar pointed out that food denial and civil programs “would create shallows where the fish could be found easily.”¹⁶⁸

Standardized ID forms (for receiving an ID card) for all of Malaya denied the insurgents any ability to move among the population. This change eliminated insurgent exploitation of the last seam in the system.¹⁶⁹ By January 1953, 535 new villages had been created, relocating 563,000 people, and by the end of 1953, another 84 villages would be created.¹⁷⁰ The relocation proved highly effective in separating the villagers from the insurgents.

The next phase was the creation of white areas and black areas. By 1953, in some areas designated as white areas, insurgent activity had practically ceased. In a white area, residents were not subject to emergency restrictions or regulations. In comparison, black areas continued to enforce all the regulations and restrictions. In fact, the definition of what constituted a white area closely agrees with what Mao would define as a base area.¹⁷¹ The establishment of white areas delivered yet another blow to the insurgent campaign, which had yet to establish a secure base area. Contrast this insurgent failure with the government which actively advertised its success in doing exactly what the insurgents had been attempting to do for the last 4 years.

7. Public Affairs (PA)

Public affairs had a challenging role of keeping the population informed of what was going on and why the selected measures were necessary. The food denial programs and the resultant restrictions were extremely unpopular. A key PA message was that the

¹⁶⁷ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 378.

¹⁶⁸ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*.

¹⁶⁹ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 34.

¹⁷⁰ Komer p. 55

¹⁷¹ Mao p. 168

programs provided a legitimate means for villagers to refuse food to the insurgents.¹⁷² PA also disseminated the village requirements for designation as a white area to the local populace.¹⁷³

Carlton-Greene ordered another 700 radios for installation in new and old villages speed the dissemination of word-of-mouth messages.¹⁷⁴ Radio Malaya programming was still restricted primarily to news, to increase credibility, but the installed radios still provided access to the Radio Peking. This distribution widened the chasm between the Min Yuen and the MCP insurgents, as radios within the MCP were still limited to large formations and could only receive Radio Peking. The message conveyed as part of the larger information campaign was “why work against the masses.”¹⁷⁵ By this point, over 1200 villages had received radios and had daily access to news programs from both sides. From an insurgent viewpoint, it also heightened the sense that the MCP had something to hide due to the limited access given MCP members. The MCP reinforced this perception by implementing harsh penalties in June 1952 for possessing leaflets or listening to Radio Malaya broadcasts.¹⁷⁶

The distribution of radios and openness shown by the British government created two developments that PA had to counter. The first created a new tactic for the MCP. In June of 1952, the MCP shifted their tactics from the adults in the villages to the Chinese students in the middle schools. The MCP began to infiltrate the ethnic Chinese schools. The ramifications of this shift in policy did not become apparent until 1954 when the students began to attack pro-government educators. The second development was the government plan to begin educating the populace that a unified government which represented all was better than one based upon a single dominant ethnicity.¹⁷⁷ Templar forced alliances between the various Malay factions to further the single unified government. At the same time, debate and discussions featuring panels of respected local

¹⁷² Komer p. 60

¹⁷³ Short p. 381

¹⁷⁴ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 420.

¹⁷⁵ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 422.

¹⁷⁶ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*.

¹⁷⁷ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 345.

academics debated the issues using the radio as a means for the entire nation to participate. This second development was critical in Templar's mind for establishing a successful and stable government, versus one beset with various tensions or civil wars.

At the insistence of the PSYWAR division, the British Emergency Information Services (PA) initiated another campaign to broadcast visits of the best-known insurgents to relocated villages. This sent four messages: first that the government cared and was in control. Second, the government had kept their word and insurgents from 1948 were still alive and well, which further implied that the government could provide effective security. Third, it also made the MCP look incapable of stopping the government. Finally, in the case of Lam Swee, the most famous of the surrendered insurgents, it dramatically reduced insurgent recruiting and support from the relocated villages.¹⁷⁸

F. MOPPING UP (1954-1960)

1. Overview of Events from 1954-1960

In 1954, General Sir Geoffrey Bourne replaced Templar and remained the senior British official until Malaya became independent on August 31, 1957.¹⁷⁹ The first of Templar's proposed state elections occurred in 1954 under Bourne. The last state election (of nine states) was in 1955. In Nov of 1955, the federal election selected a representative body at the top level. This election replaced all European officials with Malayan throughout the civil administration. By 1958, the 200 man Aborigine Strike Force killed more insurgents than all the other forces combined.¹⁸⁰ Table 3 shows the reduction in civilian casualties from the earlier table. Table 3 also shows the number of major and minor incidents continued to decrease until the Malayan Emergency ended in July of 1960.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ Short p. 381

¹⁷⁹ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 66.

¹⁸⁰ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*.

¹⁸¹ Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, 10.

The final military push from the MCP came on an unexpected front, in the schools of Malaya. The execution of several senior administrators of Chinese High Schools in 1954 alerted the British Administration to the new MCP front. During 1954, 1955 and 1956, the British administration discovered several large MCP cells in different, large, mostly Chinese high schools across Malaya. To counter this, Bourne and his Malayan successors, used a variety of programs to combat the MCP incursion into the high Schools.

	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
TERRORISTS KILLED	307	240	153	21	
TERRORISTS CAPTURED	52	32	22	8	13
TERRORISTS SURRENDERED	134	209	502	86	6
TOTAL ELIMINATIONS	493	481	677	115	29
TERRORISTS WOUNDED	115	59	33	4	48
TOTAL TERRORISTS CASUALTIES	608	540	710	119	48
REGULAR POLICE KILLED	5	2	1	1	
REGULAR POLICE WOUNDED	9	2	4	8	
SPECIAL CONSTABLES KILLED	12		2		
SPECIAL CONSTABLES WOUNDED	17	6	2		
AUXILIARY POLICE KILLED	8	3	1		
AUXILIARY POLICE WOUNDED	6	3			
MILITARY FORCES KILLED	22	6	7		
MILITARY FORCES WOUNDED	47	22	13	1	
TOTAL SECURITY FORCES KILLED	47	11	10	1	
TOTAL SECURITY FORCES WOUNDED	79	33	19	9	
TOTAL SECURITY FORCES CASUALTIES	126	44	29	10	
CIVILIANS KILLED	30	22	3	3	
CIVILIANS WOUNDED	36	7			
CIVILIANS MISSING	26	2		3	
TOTAL CIVILIANS CASUALTIES	92	31	3	6	
INCIDENTS					
{ MAJOR	102	40	13	4	
{ MINOR	333	150	77	8	5
TOTAL INCIDENTS	435	190	90	12	5
CONTACTS	486	303	186	27	21

Table 3. Casualties, Incidents and Contacts during 1956-1960 (From Short p. 508)

2. Psychological Operations

Templar's administration developed the concept of a peace offensive. However, it remained for Lt Gen Bourne to implement the peace offensive during his tenure. "The new PSYOPs campaign used a general amnesty which would be offered to all the insurgents. It used a combination of well-known and respected figures making radio and newspaper appeals. Communiqués from states were issued showing enthusiastic response to the proposal and stressing the political and economic advantages of a return to normality hoping to induce popular acceptance of the offer."¹⁸² The peace offensive

¹⁸² Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, IX-1.

became the new overall theme behind the PSYOPS program. As the insurgent numbers decreased, the focus of the PSYOP program shifted from groups to individuals. Increased emphasis on group photos further emphasized surrendered insurgents peaceful coexistence with the government years after laying down their arms.¹⁸³

For the insurgents who did not cooperate, the government resorted to other means. First, the government would surround an insurgent area. Then, the government offered insurgents the opportunity to surrender. Message delivery was through assorted means such as radio, voice, speaker aircraft, leaflet, and contact with villagers. The troops would withdraw for a period of three days. At the end of three days, the troops moved back into the area and killed all remaining insurgents. If captured, insurgents went to prison on extended sentences.¹⁸⁴ In 1956, the Peace offensive began under Bourne; it was completed by the Government of Malaya in 1960.¹⁸⁵

3. Civil Military Operations

By 1954, the relocation program approached completion. Over thirty percent of the villages provided their own protection. In some areas, village guards were down to standby status as the size of white areas increased.¹⁸⁶ The increase in white areas allowed Bourne to begin another step, which was the establishment of a common educational system across Malaya. Bourne created school management committees using locally elected parents and school administrators to enforce common standards. This was the final unifying step taken by the British for the sole purpose of breaking down the ethnic barriers.¹⁸⁷

4. Public Affairs

In 1955, to counter the MCP push into the Chinese High Schools, Bourne used a combination of measures to counter the violent MCP students. To begin with, an assortment of new channels to the high school and pre-high school populations was established. Specifically, the government began sponsoring sports competitions, essay

¹⁸³ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 423.

¹⁸⁴ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*.

¹⁸⁵ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 460.

¹⁸⁶ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 466.

¹⁸⁷ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 437.

contests, debating societies, supervised moonlight parties and excursions for teenagers.¹⁸⁸ After several months of investigation, the government identified several MCP support groups. Once identified, the government was able to take the students into custody without violence. At the same time, the school management committees began identifying those teachers known to have MCP ties. As simply being communist was not a crime in Malaya; the local populace revoked teachers' credentials instead.¹⁸⁹

The school problem was initially identified as a predominantly Chinese issue. Later investigation confirmed no other ethnicities had suffered this problem. However, the British used the school issue as the reason for pushing a common educational system. While publicly using the reasons mentioned, the real purpose was to break up the large specialized Chinese schools and integrate the entire population at an early age. At the same time, well-known community and public figures became involved and assisted the integration campaign. These community figures managed to convince other Chinese business leaders to abandon their fence sitting attitudes to the emergency.¹⁹⁰

G. SUMMARY (1948-1960)

By ignoring the warning signs prior to 1948, the British administration of Malaya was unprepared when the actual Emergency began. For the next two years, British policy and actions were more reactionary than indicative of considered planning. In fact, the British theme of revenge characterized the first two years of the Malayan Emergency. During this period, the MCP's only strategic failure was expecting an uprising in the urban areas in support of the insurgency. This failure allowed the British to gain time to begin implementing policies that would eventually become the foundation of a successful counterinsurgency. The key British action was to begin a registration of the Malayan population. The registration gave the British administration the ability to build a picture of the Malayan battle space.

¹⁸⁸ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 433.

¹⁸⁹ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 435.

¹⁹⁰ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, IX-1.

The arrival of Lt Gen Harold Briggs (ret.) in 1950 signaled a significant change in the Malayan Emergency. Briggs realized that the Emergency was a politically motivated conflict. He also realized, based upon initial data from the registration begun in 1948, that the key to winning was to separate the insurgents from their supporters within the Malayan populace. Briggs personnel planned an IO campaign as the means to create such a wedge

Briggs also realized that the British Malayan Administration was not capable of separating the insurgents from the population base. This colonial administration did have good knowledge of the local customs and languages, and the lack of coordination between the civil, political, police and military branches provided a seam that the MCP insurgents were successfully exploiting. Prior to his arrival, British administrators decided to create a new position, the Director of Operations. Briggs was able to begin integrating civil, military, political, and police actions to provide a cohesive message of policy and actions. Unfortunately, the new position also allowed each branch to appeal to the high commissioner as the ranking civilian authority in Malaya. This appeal process slowed Briggs' response to insurgent actions. On the positive side, Briggs was able to replace civilian, police and political appointees.

Building upon the registration begun in 1948; Briggs also began the planning and implementation of the relocation plan which was critical to the eventual success of Britain in Malaya. At the same time, Briggs replaced key personnel in the PSYWAR division and revamped the civil, military, political and police administration. Previously, the lack of coordination amongst the elements of the administration had provided a seam that the insurgents were able to exploit. During Briggs' watch, the insurgent campaign reached a high water mark with the increasing number of attacks and the assassination of the High Commissioner Hugh Gurney.

In 1952, Lt Gen Gerald Templar, Briggs' replacement refined Briggs basic plan and furthered its implementation. During his tenure, Templar saw insurgent numbers fall, attacks decrease and the insurgents driven deeper into the jungle. Templar also oversaw the beginning of the transition from British control to Malay control. Continued integration of former insurgents into the British PSYWAR campaign increased the

effectiveness of PSYWAR. Templar continued to improve civil military integration and to tune the IO campaign for maximum effect. While cracks in the MCP had appeared under Briggs, they became chasms under Templar.

General Sir Geoffrey Bourne, who replaced Templar, was the final British officer to serve in Malaya and oversaw the transition from British to Malay control. At the same time, he completed the relocation program begun under Briggs. Bourne changed the emphasis of the IO campaign from separating the insurgents and their support base to one of peace. He also oversaw the final campaign against the insurgents and their deep jungle bases. In 1960, the new Malayan government declared the emergency at an end.

H. LESSONS FROM MALAYA

1. Insurgency

Sir Harold Briggs recognized that the insurgency he was facing in Malaya differed significantly from recent conflicts like World War II. WWII and the Malayan Emergency both centered on clashing belief systems. However, the means to success were diametrically opposite. In the case of WWII, defeating the axis governments resulted in the defeat of the nation. This is markedly different from the Malayan Emergency where two parties were fighting to become the Malayan population's choice for governance. This conceptual difference was the underlying reason for Briggs' earlier comment that the Malayan Emergency was primarily a political campaign.

2. Message

The Malayan Emergency demonstrated that the ability of a ruling government to deliver a coherent message, seamlessly coordinated through words and policy, is critical to a successful counter-insurgency. The message that the British delivered to the Malayan populace was simply, "the government is your friend."¹⁹¹ This ability to connect with the Malayan people was the result of vertical and horizontal coordination across the Malayan government structures. The ability to meld civil, military and police

¹⁹¹ Hafizah Kamaruddin, "Learn from the Malayan Emergency Experience to Fight Terror," *Malaysia General News*, 1 June 2005 2005, 1.

policies and actions transmitted a message heard loud and clear by the Malayan population. The MCPs inability to offer a better or at least equal message resulted in their eventual downfall.

3. Public Affairs

PA was a key message channel during the Malayan Emergency. PA's role was critical and evolved as the conflict progressed. In the initial phase, it explained government reasoning behind the registration and relocation of the populace. PA was able to explain why both government programs were beneficial to the local population. Later, PA, in conjunction with Radio Malaya, conveyed accurate news about important local issues to the Malayan population. In that regard, providing access to news and a simple radio served as a means of driving another wedge between the insurgents and their supporting population base.¹⁹² Carleton-Greene let the radios receive Radio Malaya and Radio Peking. This deliberate action allowed the population to listen to both sides of the argument and make an educated choice about which side to support. PA provided a peaceful means that allowed villagers to deny support to the MCP insurgents.

4. Decentralized Planning

One of the primary lessons of the Malayan Emergency was the value of decentralized planning. One of the problems the British administrations faced was synchronizing the message across nine states which had populations composed of Chinese, Malay, and Indian, along with a religious mix of Christianity, Buddhism and Islam. Timeliness and relevance were important considerations as well. The ability to tailor a message for a region down to a settlement level was critical in the overall success. Early in the conflict, Hugh Carleton-Greene realized that centralizing this process would create unacceptable delays, negating any advantage that PSYOPs could create. Fortunately, Lt Gen Briggs recognized this same issue. This was one reason for the creation of the district warfare executive and settlement warfare executive committees for coordinating government policies and actions vertically (from federal down to settlement) and horizontally (across police, civil and military). Working closely together, Briggs and Carleton-Greene created guidelines that allowed the lower levels to create and distribute PSYOP leaflets faster than the MCP. By the end of the conflict, MCP insurgents

¹⁹² Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, IV-1.

discovered that the government had better knowledge of their losses than their own leadership. By the end of the emergency, this decentralized planning was key in being able to focus PSYWAR efforts on individuals versus a movement. In the end, this decentralization allowed the government to react faster than the MCP, creating the perception of a force that would eventually win out over the insurgents.

5. Technology

The Malayan Emergency provides lessons in the use of technology as well. Initially, the British deployed sophisticated equipment to monitor MCP radio traffic, only to find little MCP activity. As the war progressed, EW found applications as the MCP fielded slightly more sophisticated radio equipment. However, for the most part, sophisticated direction finding, signals intelligence and EW capabilities were not applicable. The lesson is that the British possessed a technological capability, which did not confer any significant advantage to them. This was not for a lack of capability on Britain's part, but rather a lack of technological sophistication on the part of the MCP.

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III. JOINT IO DOCTRINE VIEWED THROUGH MALAYAN EXPERIENCE

Generally, doctrine is historically derived, in that it is the synthetic product of actual experience in previous conflicts”¹⁹³

Doctrine provides the guidance on how the United States military determines resource allocation, preferred techniques, and means by which combatant commanders are responsible for implementing the best practices that US military forces have learned collectively in past wars. This chapter will examine the American doctrine in support of counterinsurgency operations through the lens of the Malayan lessons identified in Chapter two.

When examining our doctrine for Information Operations and Insurgency, the following doctrinal documents applied to this thesis. They are:

JP 1-0 Joint Warfare for the Armed Forces of the United States

JP 3.0 - Doctrine for Joint Operations, JP3-07 – Military Operations other than war

JP 3-07.1 Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense, JP 3-08 Vol. 1 and 2 Procedures for Interagency Coordination

JP 3-13 Information Operations (two versions, the current one dated 9 Oct 1998 and the draft used for this thesis)

JP 3-13.1 Command and Control Warfare

JP 3-16 Multinational Operations

JP 3-51 Electronic Warfare

JP3-53 Psychological Operations

JP 3-54 Operations Security

JP 3-57 Civil Military Operations

¹⁹³ Larry E. Cable, *Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War* (New York: New York University Press, 1986), vii.

JP 3-57.1 Civil Affairs, JP 3-58 Military Deception

JP 3-61 Public Affairs in Joint Operations.

A. US JOINT DOCTRINE FOCUS

When reviewing the majority of Joint Doctrine, it became clear that “the services self-concepts determine not only how they prepare for war, but how flexible they will be in responding to unexpected situations when that war occurs.”¹⁹⁴ The basis of the majority of Joint Doctrine is large-scale conflict. Thus, the focus of how the United States Armed Forces are organized is based upon large-scale conflicts. This can be seen in the types and variety of documents that relate directly to large-scale conflict, including fire support, forcible entry, space, air mobility, laser designation, amphibious assault, amphibious embarkation (separate document on how to load the ships for the assault) and suppression of enemy air defenses. Yet only two of the newest documents, Foreign Internal Defense (JP 3-07.1 in 2004) and Urban Operations (JP 3-06 in 2002), relate directly to insurgency.

B. INSURGENCY

Low Intensity Conflict has been more common throughout the history of warfare than has conflict between nations represented by armies on a “conventional” field of battle.¹⁹⁵

Insurgency as we know it today is neither a new phenomenon nor a recent one. Once classified as rebellions or revolutions, insurgencies have long existed in the past. During the twentieth century, the United States has been involved in multiple counterinsurgency efforts. The Hukbalahap rebellion in the Philippines, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq show recent US involvements in counterinsurgencies. The British, based on lessons from the Malayan emergency, treat insurgency as a different form of

¹⁹⁴ John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, Paperback ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 218.

¹⁹⁵ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, 15.

war. Counterinsurgency techniques and methodology are fundamentally different from conventional conflict.¹⁹⁶ Based simply upon frequent US involvement, one could expect that US doctrine would address counter-insurgency. This section will review the relevant joint doctrine, IO doctrine, and identify the problems associated with the IO and insurgency documents as whole.

In reviewing the joint publications, insurgency and counterinsurgency are both mentioned, primarily in our doctrine for Joint Operations (JP 3.0), Military Operations other than war (JP 3-07) and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (JP 3-07.1). Of all the joint doctrine for operations, the one for Foreign Internal Defense mentions “insurgency” 82 times. If all the insurgency references in the doctrine documents examined by this thesis are combined, the three JP’s (JP 3.0, 3-07 and 3-07.1) count for 82.6% of the references. This means that for the remaining nine documents, “insurgency” is mentioned roughly once every 90 pages (23 refs over 1998 pages). Granted this in and of itself is not critical if the context in which the word is used is relevant.

The Malayan Emergency demonstrated the importance of a tightly integrated and clearly defined IO campaign within a counterinsurgency. However, the current IO doctrine creates the opposite effect, particularly in how IO is organized. There are currently three doctrinal templates in existence for the services to use. The first and oldest is JP 3-13.1 on Command and Control Warfare, the second is JP 3-13 Joint Doctrine for Information Operations dated 8 October 1998. The final template is the draft replacement for JP 3-13. If the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs signed the draft document, his signature would eliminate two of these three documents. However, it has been in final coordination for roughly two years. Most service organizations closely resemble that of the draft JP 3-13, though it is not official guidance yet.

The IO documents are particularly relevant in terms of their role within counter-insurgency. As a key means of influencing a target population, these documents as a group do not distinguish between major conflict and insurgency. In some cases, their guidance is simply wrong. For example, Figure 4 is common to JP 3.0 Doctrine for Joint

¹⁹⁶ John Keegan, *The Iraq War*, 1st American ed. (New York: A.A. Knopf, 2004), 182.

Operations, JP 3-13.1 Command and Control Warfare, and JP 3-57 Civil Military Operations.¹⁹⁷ What is interesting is that Figure 3 lists counterinsurgency as a non-combat mission. Current losses of US troops in Iraq highlight the falsity of this perception.

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS		
Military Operations	General US Goal	Examples
COMBAT	War	Large-scale Combat Operations: Attack / Defend / Blockades
	NONCOMBAT Military Operations Other Than War	Deter War & Resolve Conflict
Promote Peace & Support US Civil Authorities		Antiterrorism / Disaster Relief Peacebuilding Nation Assistance Domestic Support Counterdrug / NEO

Figure 4. Range of Military Operations (From JP 3.0 p. 20 and JP 3-13.1 p. I-5)

Using the Iraq example again, JP 3-0 later states that the US military does not usually engage in counter-insurgency. This assertion flies in direct contrast to the US military's experience in Vietnam, and the ongoing situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. All three primary publications also specify that the military will support insurgencies or support counter-insurgency as directed by our government.¹⁹⁸ In that regard, some of the newer documents such as JP 3-58 (2001) and JP 3-07.1 (2004) are starting to show improvement in this area.

Improvements aside, however, the IO and insurgency doctrine documents as a whole suffer from two problems. First, there is no service lead established for the insurgency mission, which means that there is no advocate to fight for funding and resources to support this area. It is interesting to note that we have a service lead for

¹⁹⁷ "Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Information Operations (JP 3-13)," I-5.

¹⁹⁸ "Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (JP 3-07.1)," (Department of Defense, 30 April 2004), I-6.

specialized operations such as embarking troops for an amphibious assault, yet counter-insurgency is lumped with unconventional warfare under Army. Second, lack of guidance lets the services determine internal resources for this mission: for example, the Marine Corps formalized counter-insurgency in MCWP 33.5.¹⁹⁹ Third, the Army has not clearly established its role as the lead service. The Marine Corps also produces and distributes to Marine officers an updated version of the 1940 Small Wars Manual based on Marine Corps counter-insurgency experiences in 1930's Nicaragua. In contrast, the army is drafting new counterinsurgency guidance, while the USAF and the Navy do not have doctrine for counterinsurgency at all.

However, considering the frequency of US involvement in insurgency or counter-insurgency, it makes sense, that someone should be in charge of coordinating COIN resources. One service should be in charge and define the other services' supporting responsibilities defined. Once defined, services could focus upon specific training requirements and resources in support of counterinsurgency. Joint doctrine provides a means to coordinate the focus of multiple services and would produce an integrated effort better able to support a Joint Force Commander during a counter-insurgency.

C. MESSAGE

The most important lesson from the Emergency that remains relevant today is the importance of being 'propaganda minded' with all personnel involved in the campaign, from the government officials, police to soldiers, especially at the grassroots level, emanating the same message to ordinary Malaysians, that the government was their friend²⁰⁰

The quote from Kumar Ramakrishna, the head of Singapore's Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies highlights the success that Britain had in transmitting a single cohesive message to the Malayan People. As such, US ability to transmit a similar message is critical. The prerequisites to do this do not exist in US doctrine for three reasons: artificial constraints, local involvement and decentralized planning. Decentralized planning will be discussed in section E of this paper.

¹⁹⁹ "Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations (JP 3-53)," (Department of Defense, 5 Sept 2003), C-5.

²⁰⁰ Kamaruddin, "Learn from the Malayan Emergency Experience to Fight Terror," 1.

The British concept of PSYWAR is markedly different from the US version of PYSOP. After several incidents in early 1950, the British brought in a Military Deception specialist named Hugh Carleton-Greene.²⁰¹ Originally, Carleton-Greene was to run the British emergency information services providing PA support to the British in Malaya. Shortly after his arrival, Carleton-Greene assumed overall command of the British PSYWAR operation for PSYOPS and PA. Carleton-Greene effectively became the coordinator for the message developed and disseminated through PA and PSYOP methodologies.²⁰² One of the products that Carleton-Greene inherited was the *New Path News*, a paper distributed throughout Malaya. An example of this paper is in Figure 1. What is interesting is that the paper had articles from both PA and the PSYOP section.²⁰³ Another available medium was Radio Malaya, discussed earlier in this paper. Together, the integration of all capabilities allowed the British to create and disseminate a cohesive message in a timely manner.

US doctrine states that PA and PSYOP will coordinate to make sure those messages will not conflict.²⁰⁴ The artificial constraints begin with JP 3-61 stating that PA personnel will not be involved in PSYOP activities and PSYOP personnel cannot talk to media unless it is concerning a PSYOP program. Additionally, in Malaya, PSYOP messages were disseminated using radio, newspapers, and leaflets. However, US doctrine prohibits contact with traditional media (newspaper, radio etc) by PSYOP personnel.²⁰⁵ An interesting note is that Hugh Carleton-Greene published an article in the New York Times on May 4, 1952 titled *In Malaya the Front is Everywhere*.²⁰⁶ The article states that he is the former head of the Information services, when at the time of the article; he was the chief of the PSYWAR division. If Malaya had been a US operation and Carleton-Greene a US citizen, he would not have had access to any press. Under current US doctrine, Carleton-Greene would not have press access, as he was a member of the PSYWAR division and a practicing expert on PSYOPS.

²⁰¹ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, I-3.

²⁰² Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 273.

²⁰³ Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension*, IV-1.

²⁰⁴ "Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs (JP 3-61)," ed. Department of Defense (14 May 1997).

²⁰⁵ "Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs (JP 3-61)," III-18.

²⁰⁶ Hugh Carleton Greene, "In Malaya the Front Is Everywhere," *New York Times*, May 4 1952, 1.

Another artificial constraint is the decision process that removes authority for PSYOP and concentrates it in Washington DC (See Section E below) further complicating the situation. A second key point is that British media access focuses upon supporting the commander; yet JP 3-53 specifically states that the primary purpose is to “expedite the flow of accurate and timely information about the activities of US joint forces to the public and internal audience.”²⁰⁷ Unfortunately, these distinctions place an artificial constraint upon US operations in developing and disseminating a message in a synchronized manner. A recent example of this was the uproar after the US placed positive news articles in the Iraqi press. American media claimed that this was an example of the US compromising free press in Iraq.

The involvement of local personnel was critical in the eventual success of the Malayan Emergency. Local involvement ranged from designing programs and leaflets to garnering political support for the embattled administration. This is particularly problematic in terms of PSYOP, which relies upon US planners designing and creating appropriate messages. Unlike the British, US methodologies are somewhat more limited. Recent articles in the Washington Post, NY Times and on CNN reported on the Department of Defense’s unwillingness to use local personnel due to security clearance issues.²⁰⁸ This is in direct contradiction to the methodologies employed by the British in Malaya.

The final concern for US PA is found in its ability to convey selected themes. Under current US doctrine, that ability is traditionally found in Public Diplomacy and PSYOP, which are limited to foreign audiences.²⁰⁹ Much of the authority to convey these messages rests within the State Department and not the Department of Defense.²¹⁰ However, this also reveals a dichotomy that is addressed in JP 3-61. First, PA is separate from and should only coordinate messages with PSYOP and MILDEC according to JP 3-

²⁰⁷ "Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs (JP 3-61)," I-1.

²⁰⁸ Jan Schakowsky, *Schakowsky: Bush Administration Misstatement of the Day - Private Military Contractors in Iraq* (View From the Hill Online, 2004 [cited March 26 2006]); available from http://www.house.gov/schakowsky/press2004a/pr5_07_2004mist.html.

²⁰⁹ "Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs (Jp3-61)," ed. Department of Defense (14 May 1997), A-N-1.

²¹⁰ "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I," ed. Department of Defense (United States Government, 9 Oct 1996).

61.²¹¹ JP 3-61 also establishes clear boundaries between PA and PSYOP that did not exist in Malaya. This approach differs significantly from the role British PA played in Malaya, where PA did not propagandize, but did provide information on current programs.

D. DECENTRALIZED PLANNING

Decentralized planning was a key innovation in being able to counter the MCP within Malaya. Initially the British government outside Malaya coordinated all actions through the High Commissioner. Authority flowed from the high commissioner through civil, military and police sections (for example). However, the appointment of Sir Harold Briggs marked a significant change in how this structure worked and, in turn, a new beginning for the counter-insurgency effort. In a newly created position directly below the High Commissioner, Briggs became responsible for all functions. At the same time, he began to establish state and district war committees to coordinate efforts below the federal level. These two changes resulted in the ability to integrate the counterinsurgency horizontally across all government functions. At the same time, these functions allowed vertical coordination to happen quickly from the federal thru the local district level. The British decision to create a single position for coordination and the second decision to decentralize will be used to examine American Policy, basic organization and the PSYOP coordination process.

To begin with, American policy does not adequately capture the lesson of a single person responsible for civil and military integration. Today, a state department official can be responsible for civil and military matters. However, when a Joint Force Commander (JFC) is responsible, this same relation does not exist. In fact, JP 3-08 which rightly advocates the use of different executive branches like state, treasury, etc in the performance of the job also states that the military “must build consensus²¹²” and further states “that the goals of an institution may conflict with the private, usually short-

²¹¹ "Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs (Jp3-61)," III-18.

²¹² "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I," I-16.

term, agendas of its members”²¹³. It then goes on to state that “the key to success in interagency cooperation is to achieve consensus in the Department of Defense before entering the interagency process.”²¹⁴ Again, the Malayan Emergency was managed from within theater, not from a London. The US process does not reflect this lesson. .

In essence, American policy creates unnecessary delays in time. During the Malayan Emergency, the civil, military and police chiefs could appeal Briggs’ decisions directly to the high commissioner. This appeal process resulted in lost time. However, Templar learning from Briggs, eliminated this process prior to accepting the position of high commissioner. In comparison, current American policy creates the problem of having another staff build consensus outside the theater of operations without a senior decision maker. There are two problems with consensus seeking, analysis and time. The first problem in most group dynamics is that decisions can be over analyzed or diluted. Theoretically, the theater experts are not located in Washington D.C., home of the interagency process, but rather in theater. This does not discount some experts that work in various agencies, but the majority of such experts with contemporary knowledge reside in-theater. The second major problem is time. Building consensus takes time that a JFC might not have to spare. By transferring the decision to another combination of staffs, the only guarantee is that the process of consensus wastes valuable time. In many respects, this negates the advantage of the country teams that are supposed to serve that function. The official role of the country team “is to facilitate interagency coordination,”²¹⁵ provide area specific expertise and representatives from all US government agencies. This does not include decision authority that allows the representatives to speak for their respective agencies.²¹⁶ This policy centralizes the process and delays decisions made for the theater.

²¹³ "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I," I-7.

²¹⁴ "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I," I-8.

²¹⁵ "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I," II-15.

²¹⁶ "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I," I-6.




Figure 5. Model for Coordination Between Military and Nonmilitary Organizations – Foreign Operations (Taken from JP 3-8 V1, p. III-7)

The second major problem is that of organization. The British were able to combine all civil and military functions under a single senior administrator. The US does not possess a similar ability. Current doctrine cannot provide an answer for this problem. The actual problem is external to the DOD. JP 3-08 VI states

The concept of a designated lead agency has not carried with it the operational authority to enjoin cooperation. So, then, how will interagency efforts be drawn together to achieve synergism? Exacerbating

the problems surrounding issues of authority and resourcing is the lack of an agreed interagency planning process that might synchronize interagency effort. The executive and legislative branches have not routinely provided interagency leadership with direct control over the resources necessary for interagency operations.²¹⁷

The above quote and Figure 5 highlight a major lesson from Malaya not incorporated into our current doctrine. A key point of Figure 5 is that military and civilian departments maintain separate chains of command that do not merge until they reach the president. It also highlights the lack of a senior decision maker below the President. Briggs' reorganization was a means to alleviate this specific problem. Unfortunately, this problem is larger than the US military and must be resolved external to it. In the meantime, this organizational design compromises the ability to push decisions down to theater level. This design also compromises the ability to provide a timely response. Briggs was able to decentralize planning, and American policy does not capture the first step in that process, that of a single decision maker in theater.

The final example concerns the development of PSYOP themes and messages. By 1952, four years into the emergency, PSYWAR officers at the district and settlement level had five themes available for execution. So long as the settlement PSYWAR officers stayed within the approved PSYWAR template, federal approval was not required prior to production and dissemination.²¹⁸ This allowed quick implementation of messages against the MCP insurgents. One of the templates was for the loss of MCP insurgents to combat or simply surrendering to the British authorities.²¹⁹ This leaflet let the local settlement committee place an insurgent's name and photo into a leaflet and get it into dissemination by the end of the day, greatly increasing the effect the information would have on the MCP insurgents. This framework also allowed the rapid implementation of messages and themes at both the two highest levels, federal and state, without interfering with the local campaign.

This contrasts with US doctrine on Information Operations, where each document has a section dedicated to command and control. As John Nagl points out, "central

²¹⁷ "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I," I-3.

²¹⁸ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 422.

²¹⁹ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*.

management is the preferred choice of the US armed service.”²²⁰ The new JP 3-07.1 has added a section, which calls for working with the local authorities and representatives, but does not provide the same degree of leeway that the British used to achieve success in Malaya. While the document actually mentions local sixty-two times, it still requires most actions to be coordinated for approval through the senior staff and provides very little guidance for simplifying the chain of command. The result is that while the document recommends tailoring the mission to meet local needs, central management of all coordination is mandatory. US doctrinal guidance does not capture this lesson from Malaya.




Figure 6. Psychological Operations Plan and Program Approval Authorities (From JP 3-53 p. V-2)

Unfortunately, the DOD places tighter controls on the development of PSYOP messages than it does on kinetic capabilities in theater. Figure six shows that the Secretary of Defense must approve objectives and themes. In fact, JP 3-53 specifically states, “The Secretary of Defense normally delegates PSYOP product approval to the supported combatant commander. This does not mean that the supported combatant commander also has been delegated approval for PSYOP product dissemination.”²²¹

²²⁰ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, 51.

²²¹ "Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations (JP 3-53)," V-1.

This is an important distinction, which means that Joint Force Commander cannot distribute leaflets in his/her theater of operations. In fact, based on this doctrine, the highly successful British campaign would never have worked, as only the Joint Force Commander can approve products (when delegated).²²² However, the joint force commander cannot approve themes, objectives, or dissemination of the product in his own theater.²²³ This becomes particularly troublesome as the ability to decide what will work in theater becomes resident not with the staff working in theater, but rather in the Secretary of Defense's staff in Washington, D.C. Contrasting this with process applied in Malaya, theater staff made all PSYOP decisions with downward delegation to locales for material production and dissemination. The American policy of centralizing guidance also increases the time necessary to create, produce and disseminate a PSYOP message. This is in direct contrast to principle six of the PSYOP methodology, which states that timeliness is critical.²²⁴ In fact, the current system guarantees that production and dissemination will take several days, as the only two people with any ability to approve any stage of the process are the Joint force commander or the Secretary of Defense in Washington. Official guidance also prevents any creation of a similar system where local level officers can create and disseminate tailored PSYOP products for their locality.

E. TECHNOLOGY

Technology is an advantage that the American military deploys in support of its operations. One of the key lessons of the Malayan Emergency was that technology advantages were almost superfluous. In almost every category, the British and government of Malaya had technological superiority over the insurgents. In fact, the MCP's dependence upon a courier system rendered Britain's sophisticated COMINT technology not relevant.²²⁵ At the same time, the jungle limited access to both aircraft and vehicles. Used for strategic, operational and tactical mobility, aircraft and motor vehicles could not achieve their designed impact. Instead, Britain relied on patrols,

²²² "Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations (JP 3-53)," V-2.

²²³ "Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations (JP 3-53)."

²²⁴ "Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations (JP 3-53)," I-6.

²²⁵ Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 75.

which essentially negated advanced technologies in a leveling effect between the insurgents and British forces. The key lesson here is that technology is only a means, and it might or might not work dependent upon the specific opponent in question. As Chalmers-Johnson stated “intimate friendly relations with the civilian population allow guerillas to obtain near perfect intelligence concerning military strength and movements”²²⁶. Technology cannot counter informal social networks. Unfortunately, as John Nagl points out, a “basic tenet of American military doctrine is the concept of massive firepower/technology”²²⁷.

Current doctrine places a heavy emphasis on technology. Placed in context, Malayan lessons would indicate a connection between the lack of British success in using advanced technology and insurgency. Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan are showing that insurgents are able to adapt commercially available technology to their needs. Much of the commercial technology being adapted in modern conflicts was not available in 1948-1960. Still, US technological advantage is neutralized against the threat in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, advanced firepower has negative impact on the population due to its inherent lethality.

Modern US doctrine emphasizes technology and adaptation to current circumstances. JP 3-51 on Electronic Warfare discusses the need to find adversary use of the electronic spectrum while securing friendly spectrum use of it.²²⁸ Broad in overall concept, JP 3-51 offers basic guidance but is lacking in identifying specific needs for counter-insurgency. In Iraq today, computers, key chains, garage door openers and cell phones represent several examples of non-traditional technologies being adapted for insurgent uses. Yet there is no JP that provides any direction on how to counter the integration of technology in a counter-insurgency. JP 3-51 needs to identify requirements, such as education, training, culture and decentralization, which will result in an ability to innovate faster than the insurgents. Considerations of how technology is

²²⁶ Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, 149.

²²⁷ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, 51.

²²⁸ "Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare (JP 3-51)," ed. Department of Defense (United States Government, 7 April 2000), III-1.

used in insurgencies versus conventional conflict do not exist at the joint level. Worse, the basic lesson that American technology might be ineffective is lost.

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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

A. INSURGENCY DOCTRINE

First, our doctrine must recognize insurgency as a combat operation. The problem with insurgency is that our current doctrine ignores the lessons learned from Malaya and now Iraq. The DOD is currently drafting a new document for insurgency. This document should not be part of the JP 3-07 series on major operations other than war, as it is a form of war. The document should be a stand-alone document that designates a single service as the lead for the insurgency mission. The US Air Force and Navy have a role but are not appropriate for developing counter-insurgency doctrine. The Army, according to John Nagl, has systematically dismissed insurgency when not engaged in an active insurgent conflict. As the United States Marine Corps has shown interest in counter-insurgency, one recommendation would be to designate the USMC as the lead service in the counter-insurgency mission. This would include making the USMC the service lead for organizing and equipping forces for insurgencies.

B. MESSAGE

This message problem is partially within the scope of DOD doctrine to change. A well-crafted plan would remove most of the artificial constraints. Current US law prohibits the use of PSYOP messages upon the American populace. However, the concept of using traditional media to convey either PSYOP or deception messages would create a firestorm within the US media community. This is in spite of the fact that the deception for D-Day made extensive use of conventional media like radio and newspapers for distribution of both deception and PSYOP messages. The D-Day methodology used the media as unwitting participants, in that they reported what they are given. The issue centers around whether PA will pass information to the media that is misleading. JP 3-61 makes it impossible, given current language, for PA to be an unwitting participant to achieve COIN objectives. Unfortunately, JP 3-61 seems to imply that some type of agreement needs to be in place with civilian media before

removing any artificial constraints. This becomes important as modern communications technology continues reduce the traditional difference between theater and domestic audiences. Without resolution to the question of access to foreign media for counterinsurgency messages, American PSYOP will remain effectively shackled and incapable of creating the effects Britain did in Malaya.

C. DECENTRALIZED PLANNING

In terms of decentralized planning, and specifically in terms of PSYOP, this paper recommends that the theater commander have the ability both to develop themes in advance, for approval, and to disseminate these themes through the appropriate mediums in theater. This authority would also include the ability to push pre-approved themes and products to lower levels for faster implementation than our current models.

Similarly, the purpose of a country team, when working with the US ambassador, is to provide contact with and decision-making authority in country to respond to the crisis du jour. Peace and conflict, not war, are the situations where country teams normally exist. Based upon the Malayan Emergency, the US military needs that similar capabilities and authorities for counter-insurgency. However, if a country team is in place when the US declares war or places a JFC in charge, those teams lose their decision authority. Decision authority reverts to Washington versus theater. Instead, this paper recommends that a country team provide the same capabilities to the Joint Force Commander or an Ambassador. Appropriate policy decisions would remain in Washington, but execution should remain under the direction of either the JFC or ambassador, supported by appropriate staffs. A common country team would also simplify transition to a more peaceful situation managed by an ambassador. It would eliminate many duplicative staff actions attempting to achieve consensus on issues on the opposite sides of the world and accelerate the decision process.

D. TECHNOLOGY

There are two lessons to take from Malaya in terms of technology. First, that technological superiority does not confer an automatic advantage. Second, that Malaya is

not a good case to examine insurgent use of technology. US doctrine, particularly, JP 3-51 on EW needs to identify the requirements needed to anticipate technological adaptations by modern insurgents and any planning considerations that differ from current constructs.

E. CONCLUSION

When I began writing this thesis, the purpose was to see if American military forces have incorporated those lessons learned by the British Government and the Government of Malaya during the Malayan Emergency into our doctrinal guidance. At most, the American armed forces have learned the lessons that they wanted to learn. Critical terms like insurgency and downward delegation are in the doctrine, but the organizations retain a highly centralized management style, which diametrically opposes the lessons of Malaya. While Insurgency is not a distinct form of war according to US doctrine, the same doctrine shows that it does not involve combat. The evening news from Iraq (or in the past, Vietnam) highlights the inadequacy of our current definition for insurgency.

Critical capabilities like Public Affairs and PSYOP are shackled by bureaucratic restraint and artificial limitations. In the battle of minds, the US has organized to fail by limiting its ability to integrate civilian and military capabilities effectively. Currently, PA and PSYOP organizations are designed for major force on force conflict, not counterinsurgency. Organizational limitations hamper US efforts in winning any conflict that sheer force of arms cannot handle. At a minimum, looking to Washington DC for every PSYOP and PA decision will so increase our decision cycle timeline as to make it completely ineffective, regardless of the decision rendered. Furthermore, the knowledge necessary for effective and efficient decisions is located in theater.

Finally, this has been an enlightening study in terms that, as an officer, one should truly understand the positive and negative aspects of his/her guidance. In the case of insurgency, the guidance is so inadequate as to be of questionable use in most situations. The fact that doctrine defines insurgency as a non-combat operation shows how little

experience our guidance actually captures. This should be doubly frightening given the accelerating pace of insurgencies in the world today.

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