

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE AIR FORCE AND THE WAR ON TERROR

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ABSTRACT

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This SRP identifies shortfalls in the current Air Force mission and the employment of Airmen in the prosecution of GWOT and counterinsurgency. As relevant background, it examines the roots of terrorism, showing that the insurgency is global in character, and that terrorist organizations are employing insurgency strategies, specifically those of Mao Tse-Tung. Because global terrorism is an insurgency, U.S. leaders have adapted national strategies focused on counterinsurgency. Based on the assumption that this strategic approach is viable, this SRP will identify key warfighting requirements for the Air Force and use them as the baseline for identifying readiness shortfalls. Finally, this paper will offer some general recommendations for improving the Air Force's readiness to fight terrorism and insurgency.

THE AIR FORCE AND THE WAR ON TERROR

Future strategic leaders of the U.S. Military must prepare for the volatile and uncertain world they will face. With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the United States as the dominant world power, it is time to move toward a national strategy to address smaller scale wars and terrorism. Terrorism will continue to be the most prevalent threat to national security. According to DOD data, over 550 guerrilla and terrorist groups are active throughout the world. These groups see terrorism as an effective means of achieving various goals, many of which threaten global order and U.S. interests.¹ The National War College Student Task Force defined terrorism as a *pansurgency*, or globalized war of ideas seeking change of thought processes and values, rather than attempting to overtake a specific state.² To counter these terrorists/insurgents, the U.S. must develop an overall strategy to fight them. Knowing and understanding each particular enemy is essential to the success of this fight. U.S. military forces, including the Air Force, must adapt to fight terrorists and insurgents while maintaining the capability to fight total war if called upon.

This SRP identifies shortfalls in the current U.S. Air Force mission and employment of Airmen in the prosecution of GWOT and counterinsurgency. It then provides recommendations to address each shortfall. This SRP begins by detailing the background of both the global terrorism strategy and U.S. national strategies to combat terrorism. To show how terrorist groups use insurgency strategy, this SRP will analyze terrorist movements in the context of known insurgency strategy. It then argues that the U.S. must fight terrorism as an insurgency. Following this analysis of the problem and associated strategy, the SRP will describe relevant airpower resources. Although the U.S. and the Air Force have adapted well to defeat insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, they must still develop ways to ensure Airmen have the competencies to fight this war. Next, this SRP examines current airpower doctrine applicable to a counterinsurgency strategy, identifying strengths, weaknesses and areas for improvement. It will then describe Air Force adaptations to carry out its Iraq missions, showing the need to update in its doctrine to ensure these adapted missions become core competencies.

This SRP focuses primarily on Airmen. The Air Force must prepare and train every Airman to meet the requirements of his deployed mission. It describes what, when and how we must train Airmen to meet these needs. While Airmen are not infantry Soldiers, they must be prepared to face enemy fire and to endure casualties and stress associated with this environment. These Airmen must also be culturally aware, with some capability in the host

nation language. They must be able to engage effectively with indigenous populations to gain their support and enable them to defend their country.

Background of Insurgency and Terrorism

An effective national strategy requires an understanding of the underlying nature and strategy of the global terrorist movement. Many view Mao Tse-Tung as the father of insurgency warfare and there is evidence that current terrorists are using Maoist strategies to achieve their goals. While Mao intended his strategy for use in Communist insurgencies to overthrow non-communist governments, it directly serves as a strategy for the worldwide terrorist movement. Specifically, the overall goal of Al Qaeda, set forth in *The Al Qaeda Training Manual*, is, "The overthrow of the godless regimes and their replacement with an Islamic regime."³

Mao describes three stages of insurgency: 1) "Strategic Defensive; 2) Strategic Stalemate; and 3) Strategic Counteroffensive."⁴ Regarding strategic defensive, Mao believed that the insurgents should move into the hills and establish base areas for protection, training, and preparation. Strikes during the strategic defensive should be strictly limited to fast attacks against enemy weak points. As the insurgent power base builds and strengthens, the strikes will intensify, but still concentrate on enemy weaknesses. As the power base has grown stronger, insurgents should maintain a defensive posture as the war moves into the strategic stalemate stage - wait out the enemy, but continue to harass. Here we see a direct correlation between Mao's tactic and that of global terrorist organizations. Terrorists are now hiding within "safe havens" or countries that will harbor them and carrying out attacks against weak points. Following these attacks, they melt back into the population for safety. In the current insurgency in Iraq, the Air Force has adapted to this elusive enemy by concentrating on surveillance of insurgent movement and subsequent rapid destruction of specific targets.

The key to any successful insurgency is to ensure that the public supports both the purpose of the insurgency and the insurgents themselves. Ian F. W. Beckett maintains that, according to Mao's strategy, "the careful political preparation of this first phase was designed to convince peasantry that their lives could be improved only by supporting the communists, and it was essential if the guerrillas were to survive, for 'the guerrilla must be in the population as little fishes in the ocean.'⁵ The U.S. military must pursue Mao's direction to protect and defend the public of the country in which it is fighting and to pay specific attention to their cultural norms.

While current insurgents and terrorists are neither communists nor strict believers in Mao, their strategies and tactics seem very similar. Current terrorist organizations stress ideological or political issues and attempt to promulgate them. They attack weaknesses in an

effort to terrorize the western public and gain worldwide publicity for their ideas. Further, they are lodging a tremendous public relations /propaganda campaign through the Arab world to foster support and gain safe areas to continue their campaign. As the terrorist organizations gain further publicity, they gain additional support by showing the masses that their way is better than the western way. Again, there is a direct correlation between Maoist and *Al Qaeda Training Manual* strategies as shown in Al Qaeda's mission five: "Spreading rumors and writing statements that instigate people against the enemy."⁶

The U.S. fought this type enemy in Vietnam, attempting to employ airpower as used in World War II. Leaders fully believed that that by destroying the industrial base of North Vietnam through strategic bombing, they would eliminate the North's ability to conduct a war in the South. However, the U.S. Army encountered an adaptive insurgent enemy in the South, easily living off the local population, as U.S. leadership continued the war of annihilation. The U.S. also failed to win the war of ideas and to provide the South Vietnamese military the capability to continue the fight after U.S forces departed. The insurgency in the south, combined with increasing support from the North Vietnamese regular forces, eventually prevailed. Therefore, as the U.S. misused airpower and lost the war of ideas, it eventually lost the war. U.S. military personnel must engage with the local populace both to gain their support and to deny their support to the enemy. Military personnel must also train indigenous people to defend their country against the aggressor. In Vietnam, U.S. forces departed without providing the south with airpower equipment or training, a tremendous strategic failure.

The bottom line is that the U.S. must develop effective capabilities to counter the strengths of enemy strategies. As we have seen, worldwide terrorists depend heavily upon the masses to provide support, personnel, and safe havens. Further, they depend upon public appeal and popularity to strengthen their support base and develop additional safe havens. Now, consider the U.S. strategies to combat terrorism and the ways the U.S. Military is supporting the national strategy.

National Strategy

The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* closely incorporates counterinsurgency doctrine for applying the elements of power to counter the global terrorist insurgency. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. and its coalition partners are combating insurgencies at the operational and tactical levels. While these efforts are a small part of battling the global terrorist insurgency, our leaders must not concentrate solely upon these battles. National strategy must attack global terrorism from a higher level, combining the efforts of multiple U.S. Government

elements of power. While the current operations are part of the larger effort in the war on terror, the overall strategy must address terrorism as a worldwide insurgency or “pansurgency”.

The September 2002 National Security Strategy identified terrorism as the single greatest threat to U.S. national security. “We will not rest until terrorist groups of global reach have been found, have been stopped, and have been defeated.”⁷ The President clearly states his intent up front, detailing his overall goal of eliminating the terrorist threat to the United States and the world. Our strategy must deny the conditions that allow terrorism and its leadership structure to flourish and operate freely. However, many of the freedoms and capabilities U.S. citizens enjoy are the ones the terrorist organizations use against us.⁸

President Bush elaborated upon his strategic intent on June 1, 2002: “We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.”⁹ The overall intent of this strategy is to stop attacks against the United States and its friends and allies abroad. The strategy specifies four major ways to defeat the terrorists: “Defeat terrorist organizations by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control and communications; material support; and finances. Deny further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by ensuring other states accept their responsibilities to take action against these international threats within their sovereign territory. Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on the areas most at risk. Defend the United States, our citizens, and our interests at home and abroad by both proactively protecting our homeland and extending our defenses.”¹⁰ This is a very well defined intent; it directly specified the ends and ways of the strategy.

U.S. strategy then breaks down each goal into more specific objectives: Goal 1, defeating terrorists depends heavily on intelligence capabilities to find and understand the enemy, as well as on diplomatic capabilities to gain support from allies and allow access to terrorist safe havens.¹¹ Thus, the primary means to support goal 1 is information and intelligence. The U.S. Military plays a large part in this goal: It provides the full range of intelligence gathering capabilities and deploys to many countries around the world.

Goal 2, denying sponsorship, such as support and sanctuary for terrorists, depends mainly on diplomatic means to eliminate state sponsorship and hold those accountable who continue to sponsor terrorists. The U.S. will strengthen international support by working with those who are willing and able, enabling weak states, persuading reluctant states, and compelling unwilling states. Also, the U.S. must eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and safe havens,

again using diplomatic means to persuade those unwilling.¹² Diplomatic capability is heavily dependent on the current credibility of the United States and its representatives. To achieve this goal, we must strengthen states, allowing them to protect themselves through their indigenous military. Many states need much assistance to enable their military to operate effectively. The U.S. military must be capable of training these forces. This capability requires extensive linguistic and cultural training, but it will definitely pay large dividends by enabling those indigenous forces to protect their countries. The U.S. military currently executes this mission through training and engagement in support of the geographic combatant commanders and USSOCOM. Specifically, one of the primary missions of special operations forces is foreign internal defense (FID), training indigenous forces to defend themselves.

Goal 3, possibly the most important goal and the one that will take the longest to fulfill is to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit. The U.S. will do this through partnerships throughout the international community to strengthen weak states and thereby eliminate some of the roots of terrorism. The U.S. will achieve this goal through both diplomatic means of strengthening governments and the financial means by assisting impoverished populations. The U.S. must also win the war of ideas. The enemy relies on time and patience while building support and safe havens, as described in Mao Tse Tung's strategy. Therefore, the U.S. public must also be patient.¹³

Goal 4 is to defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad. To accomplish this, the U.S. must implement the National Strategy for Homeland Security and maintain awareness of activities, events, and trends that threaten the safety and security of its people. The U.S. must also enhance measures to ensure the protection and reliability of physical transportation capabilities as well as information based infrastructures at home and abroad. Since 9/11, the Air Force, including the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve has maintained a constant air patrol of the United States, directly fulfilling this mission. While most of the protection of citizens takes place at home, the government must also provide for protection of U.S. citizens traveling abroad. Finally, in the event of an actual terrorist act, U.S. government agencies must be prepared to respond and work together to mitigate the effects of the attack.¹⁴ The primary means of supporting Goal 4 are the military and civilian domestic disaster relief organizations, as well as law enforcement. As evidenced after the hurricanes of 2005, the military played a large role in consequence management after local governments failed. The Air Force and Air National Guard performed extremely well during the disaster relief operations.

The Pentagon published a new "Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism". Although the document has not been made public, *U.S News & World Report* summarized it in

Linda Robinson's article, "Plan of Attack".¹⁵ This article outlines the new strategy and assesses its capabilities. The Pentagon strategy fully defines engagement and tasks theatre combatant commanders to assess and engage countries within each theatre. It also gives the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) primary responsibility for the overall campaign plan for fighting global terrorism. The strategy calls for heavy engagement in each regional theater, not simply the hot spots of the Middle East. The strategy does not rely solely upon use of military force.¹⁶ While this strategy does not solve every individual problem in the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, it does provide a viable framework for success. Again, the Air Force must play a large role in this engagement strategy. Not only must it be prepared to train other countries' air forces, it must have the ability to perform global strike missions and provide global mobility for itself and other U.S. forces.

In summary, the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* offers a complete strategic framework for attacking terrorism as an insurgency. With the addition of the new military strategy, the U.S. now has a detailed strategy for success.

AF Doctrine in a Strategic Context

U.S. airpower theory and doctrine have undergone many transformations throughout the years. Through the interwar years and into World War II, most believed, like Douhet, that destruction of the enemy's industrial infrastructure would weaken the will of the enemy's people and would lead to certain victory. During that time, this total destruction was acceptable and practicable. Today, the U.S. public pays much more attention to collateral damage and to the force protection of its military personnel. Further, as the U.S. fights the war on terror, leaders must consider the "will of the people" in whose country they are fighting. John Nagl describes two approaches to revolutionary warfare: the direct and indirect methods. The direct method seeks to annihilate the enemy's military forces. However, such annihilation is difficult to accomplish because insurgents and terrorists live with the people in the daytime and carry out their attacks while blending in with the population.¹⁷ The U.S. failed in this approach during the Vietnam War, when leaders believed they could destroy the war-making capability of North Vietnam and eliminate the insurgents' capability to wage war in South Vietnam. The U.S. also failed to identify the insurgents in South Vietnam and could not separate them from the general population. Nagl's indirect approach addresses this problem through a tactic of separating the terrorists or insurgents from the people, and then destroying them.¹⁸ The indirect approach requires much more time and a completely different and more innovative use of airpower. To operate indirectly, Airmen must have additional skill sets.

So the Air Force must concentrate on both the direct and indirect approach to fighting in the current environment. The U.S. military learned some valuable lessons in Kosovo concerning the coercive use of airpower alone to win wars. Although the overall campaign was a success, there were problems. Scott Cooper analyzed these misleading lessons : “First, air power saves the lives of U.S. soldiers on the ground. Second, the advanced technology of precision-guided munitions reduces collateral damage, thus making war less bloody and more morally acceptable. Third, fear of this sophisticated technology coerces an enemy to do our will. In sum, advocates of air power claim that it is a silver bullet—an infallible, invulnerable instrument with universal application.”¹⁹ While airpower appeared to assure victory in Kosovo, it still did not control the refugee flow, and many second- and third-order effects caused the Kosovo public to question the NATO cause. These unintended effects indicate a need for greater interdependency among the air and ground services , which means Soldiers and Airmen must share more competencies .

Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine lists and defines the tenets of Air and Space Power, the Roles and Mission of Air and Space Power and six distinctive airpower capabilities.²⁰ The USAF then published its Transformation Strategy in 2005. This document specifies the tenets for Air Force transformation, and details the key missions and tasks of the Air Force. The document lists six capabilities for the future Air Force: global mobility; global persistent attack; global strike; nuclear response; agile combat support; homeland security; and space and command, control, communications and computer systems intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR).²¹ These capabilities are entirely consistent with basic doctrine and directly support the national strategies for the war on terror . However, Airmen must possess a range of skills to support the advertised capabilities.

While most studies focus on the equipment and wartime capabilities of the Air Force, mission success at any time, and specifically in the war on terror , depends heavily or totally upon the Airmen. General “Hap” Arnold declared that, “Air Power is not made up of airplanes alone. Air power is a composite of airplanes, air crews, maintenance crews, air bases, air supply, and sufficient replacements in both planes and crews to maintain a constant fighting strength...”²² Chapter 6 of *Air Force Basic Doctrine, Core Competencies*, appropriately lists the first core competency as Developing Airmen. The document defines the core competencies not as doctrine, but as enablers of doctrine.²³ Indeed, Airmen are the key to effective airpower. The Air Force regards this issue as sufficiently important to address it directly in its primary doctrine document.

The former Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) spoke of transforming organizations within the Air Force, to include transforming the way we train “battlefield Airmen”.²⁴ He described these “battlefield Airmen” in the Air Force Posture Statement of 2005 as the combat controllers and truly forward warfighting Airmen.²⁵ In previous wars, only pilots and aircrew came in direct contact with the enemy in carrying out their missions. Meanwhile, the support Airmen were normally at the airfield in a rear area, far away from direct exposure to the enemy. In today’s fights, Airmen are at the front, dealing with daily attacks by small arms or indirect fire. They are also performing traditional Army missions such as high-threat convoys and combat patrols. Airmen now must be war fighters .

The transformation document also cites the importance of building relationships and partnerships, possibly the most important factors in waging the war against terror. It states the Air Force will train indigenous air force personnel to allow them to protect their territory, contributing to a more stable environment and eliminating safe havens for terrorists. As the U.S. Air Force fosters these relationships, it will also acquire basing rights, giving U.S. access to sites for launching future combat operations, if needed. It also warns that as the Air Force transforms, it must ensure its partners maintain compatibility with U.S. Air Force systems and people.²⁶ Relationships and partnerships are indeed integral to the success in the current fight.

Analysis of Air Force Capabilities

In the future, the Air Force will fight the Global War on Terror on two fronts. The first fight is at the worldwide level. Therefore, the Air Force must remain ready at all times to go wherever needed at zero notice. Second, the Air Force must fight the “small wars” such as Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the overall global war on terror. First, then, the Air Force must be constantly ready to go anywhere in the world from home stations to complete their mission. Second, once deployed for long fights, Airmen must have the training and knowledge to survive and operate in non-traditional conditions.

Global mobility and global strike are the primary means to attack and destroy enemy vulnerabilities, when force is necessary. To carry out the worldwide taskings in the global war on terror, the Air Force is charting new ground. The Air Force Posture Statement identifies the requirement for global mobility, both to move itself and assist sister services when necessary. It also requires that the Air Force maintain a global strike capability.²⁷ Using this global strike capability, the Air Force can attack targets anywhere in the world without deploying forward. Air Force cruise missiles and long-range bombers can surgically strike terrorist targets, thereby destroying key infrastructure or terrorist centers of gravity. However, the Air force cannot

achieve desired end effects or effectively identify enemy centers of gravity without effective intelligence.

The Air Force provides many capabilities to the National Command Authority for C4ISR. Through the United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), the Air Force provides satellite control and serves as the primary service responsible for space. These satellite capabilities provide detailed imagery and targeting information at any time, regardless of the situation on the ground. However, in selecting targets, decision-makers require more timely and detailed intelligence, provided by manned and unmanned aircraft platforms. Providing such detailed intelligence is the largest current weakness in equipment and personnel in the Air Force. As reported on the Air Force Personnel Center website, the personnel tempo of linguists and ISR aircrews is the highest in the Air Force, leading directly to poor retention and morale.²⁸ The CSAF cites this as a key issue for the Air Force, constantly stressing its importance.²⁹ The Air Force must address this shortage and provide additional trained personnel to support these missions.

The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* states engagement is a critical way of fighting the global war on terrorism. The *National Military Strategy for Combating Terrorism* tasks the regional combatant commanders with theatre engagement.³⁰ Through this engagement, the military can assist in eliminating the roots of terrorism and strengthen indigenous militaries to provide internal security; further eliminating roots of terrorism and, more importantly, eliminating safe havens. In order to be effective in this environment, Airmen must know and appreciate the culture of the people they are assisting. Numerous recent articles attest to the importance of both Airmen and Soldier abilities to engage indigenous personnel. Metz and Millen stress this issue in their counterinsurgency paper; they believe cultural awareness is vastly important for success.³¹ But, while Air Force personnel are involved during peacetime operations supporting regional combatant commanders, they are also involved in wartime operations, fighting terrorism's "small wars".

In almost every published work on counterinsurgency, two themes emerge; win the hearts and minds of the people and eliminate safe areas. In the proceedings from the Royal Australian Air Force conference on Air Power and Wars of National Liberation, two themes surface in every airpower summary; close air support/ground attack and humanitarian assistance through airlift.³² John Pustay heavily stresses the importance of relief support throughout his book.³³ Airpower will indeed play a major role in both ground attack and airlift.

The Air Force is currently performing exceedingly well in Iraq and Afghanistan as it locates and prosecutes key terrorist/insurgent targets in both countries. Effective use of armed

predators has provided additional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) coverage with the ability to destroy targets rapidly, ensuring positive publicity for the system and continued procurement.³⁴ Further, precision weapons provide surgical strike capability to destroy targets and greatly diminish collateral damage. So it seems these capabilities are outstanding and the Air Force needs no further systems. However, in Iraq and Afghanistan (as well as Kosovo and DESERT STORM), coalition air forces enjoyed complete air supremacy, both from air-to-air threats and ground-to-air threats. However, this supremacy may not be complete in future battles, so the U.S. Air Force must continue to develop and acquire advanced aircraft with stealth or low observable capabilities to ensure it maintains the edge in both insurgency/terrorism warfare and conventional war against a peer competitor. The current CSAF constantly stresses this in the press and to Congress to ensure the Air Force retains its dominance in this realm.³⁵

Every writer on counterinsurgency documents the critical importance of the battle for the hearts and minds of the people. Winning this psychological battle is the key for both the global war and for each of the Iraq type battles in the larger war. Airmen are now and will continue to be an integral part of this battle. Cultural awareness is the key to this engagement. The U.S. Air Force must train each Airman from basic training through retirement on cultural awareness. Each day, news services publish articles about Airmen engaging Iraqi personnel for both training and social reasons.³⁶ Each Airman must understand the culture of the country to avoid offending the indigenous people and to provide a better training environment. Language training is also integral to this capability. In order to reduce the current personnel tempo of linguists and to produce a more culturally aware force, the Air Force must make language-training part of its organizational culture.

As discussed above, airlift also plays an important role in winning the hearts and minds. The Air Force is currently moving assistance supplies all over Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. While this is a true core competency of the Air Force, the airlift fleet is aging and heavily overused. Air Mobility Command is now publicizing the need to replace its current tanker fleet with dual-use tankers/airlifters. Airlift is a vital strategic tool. The Air Force needs a dual-use aircraft to replace two aging aircraft fleets. However, if the Air Force pursues this dual-use tanker, it may have to eliminate production and purchase of additional C-17s.³⁷ Air Force leadership knows they have an issue with equipment, but fully understands and supports the importance of both global mobility and intra-theatre airlift needs.

The Air Force must develop a culture that values Airmen first and foremost. Deployed Airmen are now performing duties well outside their normal capabilities and will continue to

perform these in the future.³⁸ Because of these non-traditional duties and the demands of a highly deployable force, the Air Force must change its culture to a culture of Airmen. This means that Airmen must be Airmen first, trained in their tasks, but prepared to do anything at any time. It also means additional combat-type training to inculcate the proper attitude and to learn key battlefield skills. Many units are currently performing this type training, but most personnel still deploy without “work up” training with their units. Combat Communications units have performed this training as a team for many years.³⁹ These schools not only teach combat skills, but also stress the value of teamwork and trusting the person next to you. They also teach critical decision-making skills while under extreme stress. These values will save the lives of Airmen in the field performing wartime tasks. Along with this important training, the Air Force must indoctrinate Airmen with a “can do” attitude, starting with Basic Training and initial officer training and continuing throughout their careers. Airmen must be prepared to do any task required at any time and never demonstrate a this-is-not-my-job attitude.

Summary

This SRP described terrorism as a worldwide insurgency and viewed the U.S. fight against global terrorism as a counterinsurgency campaign. As background, it described the roots of insurgency to provide a basis of understanding for the war on terror. The paper then analyzed the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, identifying its links to other national strategies and to military strategies. It showed how the CSAF’s posture statement about the future of Airpower defined the Air Force role in the war on terror.

The SRP then identified the most important components of airpower for combating insurgency and terrorism. While it cited some equipment issues and shortfalls, it asserted that the most important Airpower resource in this battle are the Airmen. Finally, the SRP described relevant training issues associated with foreign cultures and languages as well as the overall Airman culture of Air Force personnel. These personnel findings are the basis for the following recommendations.

Recommendations

Airmen are the key to the future of the Air Force. Accordingly, the Air Force must train Airmen in both foreign cultures and the new Airman culture. Air Force leadership knows this and is already providing this combat training at Basic Training and other locations.⁴⁰ General Jumper also directed this vital training in the Air Force Posture Statement of 2005.⁴¹ The two primary recommendations address Airmen cultures.

Recommendation 1 concerns cultural training for every Airman: This training must begin with initial training of both officer and enlisted personnel and it must continue through their careers. Such training should not concentrate only on current issues with Arab culture, but should concentrate on each Airman's specific career path. This training must include language acquisition. The Department of Defense is currently stressing language as very important to career military personnel and has begun to develop strategies to address this issue. The Air Force should take the lead. In order to train indigenous forces effectively, personnel must know their language and culture. In addition to providing this cultural knowledge and compatibility, language training will greatly reduce the current linguists' high personnel tempo.

Recommendation 2 requires a complete cultural change within the Air Force. The entire organization must develop a cultural awareness that each is an Airman first, prepared to complete any mission. As described above, Airmen are performing many non-traditional tasks in both peacetime and combat environments. Therefore, it is the Air Force leadership's responsibility to properly train each Airman before deployment and instill the proper attitude for success. Air Force training must instill this Airman-first culture, beginning at initial training for both officers and enlisted, just as with the training in foreign cultures. This training should include combat skills, self-aid and buddy care and general survival skills. It must also stress teamwork, positive attitude and succeeding in spite of adversity. Again, just as with the foreign culture training, this Airman culture training must continue this through Airman, NCO, Senior NCO and all officer professional military education. Perhaps the most important aspect of this preparedness training is the workup prior to deployment. Airmen must train with their specific teams prior to each deployment. This training will provide skills needed to succeed in the field. Most importantly, the deploying team will learn to work together and trust each other through a rigorous pre-deployment test. These tests will identify the strengths and weaknesses of the teams; success will come only when the team demonstrates its overall effectiveness.

Airmen are the most important players in the Air Force future and in the fight against global terrorism. Over the last 15 years, the Air Force transformed from a U.S.-based force to an Expeditionary Air Force. Now, every Airman expects to deploy. To complete this transition to prosecute the war on terror, The U.S. Air Force must now complete this transformation into an "Airman" force.

Endnotes

¹ Ian F. W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies*, (New York: Routledge, 2001), VIII

² National War College Student Task Force on Combating Terrorism, *Combating Terrorism in a Globalized World*, (Washington D.C.: National War College, 2002), 10

³ Unknown, *Military Strategies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants: The Al-Qaeda Training Manual*, Ed. Jerrold Post, (Alabama: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2004), 23

⁴ Mao Tse-Tung, *Mao Tse-Tung on Revolution and War*, Ed. M Rejai, (New York: Doubleday & Company INC, 1969), 180.

⁵ Beckett, 74.

⁶ Unknown, 23.

⁷ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington D.C.: The White House, February 2003), 1.

⁸ Ibid, 6-10. This paragraph is a synopsis of the information included in the primary document.

⁹ Ibid, 11.

¹⁰ Ibid, 11-12.

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¹² Ibid, 17-22.

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