EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AND HOMELAND DEFENSE FORCE:
CAN THE NATIONAL GUARD DO BOTH?

by

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Homeland Defense (HLD) became the highest national security priority following 9/11. Accordingly, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau declared, “Homeland Defense is job number one.” The Guard has undertaken several initiatives, including specialized teams, as the first steps toward HLD. However, the Guard is not planning for additional or dedicated HLD force structure, but rather enhanced capabilities to the current force structure. The National Guard (NG) is planning to undertake the new HLD mission as it continues under its current level of overseas deployments. This analysis will evaluate if the NG is on the correct path for HLD by first defining the HLD environment, including HLD strategies and NG HLD initiatives, then transitions to examine and discuss alternatives, and concludes with a recommended course of action for the NG to consider in development of a new HLD policy.
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AND HOMELAND DEFENSE FORCE:
CAN THE NATIONAL GUARD DO BOTH?

Homeland Defense (HLD) became the highest national security priority following 9/11, when the United States came under direct attack. "With the imminent terrorist threat to the homeland and the increasing likelihood that US civilians may be targeted at home, the homeland is now a theater of war." Accordingly, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) declared, "Homeland Defense is job number one – we ‘Guard’ the nation." Given this direction and in response to requirements in the new Department of Defense (DoD) Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, the National Guard (NG) must add several new missions to its already full plate. As the “primary” military responder for HLD, NG missions will “require a rapid response, often measured in hours, not days," along with new training specific to HLD.

The NG is an essential component in the nation’s total force; its role has increased considerably over the past decade during the downsizing of the Active Component (AC). The NG’s alignment under the Total Force Policy essentially mandated the Guard’s integration with the AC to make up one fighting force in the 1970’s. This integration resulted in call-ups of NG units to join AC forces for peacekeeping missions in such places as Bosnia and the Sinai. It further led to the large number of NG Soldiers currently serving in combat and combat support roles in Iraq and Afghanistan. The NG’s augmentation of the AC for wartime missions is authorized under Title 32, United State Code, Section 102, General Policy:

In accordance with the traditional military policy of the United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the Army National Guard and Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line of defense of the United States be maintained and assured at all times. Whenever the Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular components of the ground and air forces, the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard of the United States … shall be ordered to Federal duty and retained as long as needed.4

"HLD requirements do not demand a dedicated HLD force structure – rather, they require enhanced capabilities to the existing war fight force structure." Accordingly, the NG is planning on undertaking new HLD missions with no change to its current organization. But, as NGB Chief LTG Blum added, "the Guard must remain capable of being a full participant in joint and expeditionary warfare overseas."6 Clearly then, the NG is going to undertake both missions.

But can the NG presently carry out both HLD and expeditionary missions? To answer this critical question this analysis first reviews current strategy for the defense of the homeland, examines the current military strategies of the United States and the initiatives taken by the NG,
then assesses several options for strengthening the NG, and concludes with recommendations for the NG to consider in development of a HLD policy.

The Homeland Defense Environment


The homeland is defined as the physical region including the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, US territories and possessions, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace. The National Strategy for Homeland Security defines homeland security as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and to minimize the damage and recover from such attacks that do occur.” The Department of Homeland Security is the lead agency for homeland security.

Defense of the homeland is carried out as a dual mission for the Armed Forces. The first is our forward presence, which is designed to defeat our adversaries quickly at a safe distance away from the homeland. The second is our defense of the homeland within the US homeland.

Within the homeland, the Armed Forces are charged with two distinct missions – Homeland Defense (HLD) and Civil Support (CS). HLD provides for “the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threat or aggression, or other threat as directed by the President.” The DoD is primarily responsible for HLD; other government agencies support DoD as necessary. HLD is designed to protect against and mitigate the effects of an attack on the homeland. DoD’s CS mission provides support to civil authorities in emergencies – including Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA), and Military Support for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS). In its conduct of CS missions, the DoD serves in support of another federal agency.

The Strategies

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) specify the nation’s strategic objectives. The first objective of both strategies is to “Secure the United States from Direct Attack” and “Protect the United States against external attacks.” These objectives are implemented through an active, layered defense system that includes prevention - the most critical component - and the actual physical defense of the US. The guiding concept for defending the homeland is the active layered defense plan that ensures forces are prepared to seize the initiative from our enemies. Defense of the homeland missions that protect United States sovereignty include offensive operations designed to defeat threats early and as far
forward as possible – that is, identifying and defeating threats abroad before an attack occurs is the “sine qua non of our nation’s security.” The United States is currently executing this portion of our strategy: The successful attack against Afghanistan routed the Taliban defeating the terrorist threat as far forward as possible. Additionally, active defensive operations in the United States are designed to destroy deployed or en route threats. DoD actions within the United States include Force Protection (FP); Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP); Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) preparedness; Defense Crisis Management operations; assistance in CS operations; and appropriate air, land, and maritime missions. The DoD will also partner with other federal agencies, specifically the Department of Homeland Security and law enforcement agencies, to enhance their forces when the situation exceeds their capabilities.

Both the NDS and NMS clearly stipulate that physical defense of the homeland is the highest priority. Our current force design under the “1-4-2-1” strategy directs a force to defend the US homeland, to operate in and from four forward regions, and to swiftly defeat adversaries in two campaigns, with one decisive and enduring result. In accord with this strategy, the majority of our efforts are directed toward conventional wars away from United States soil, but these efforts also provide the foundation for a successful physical defense of the United States. Current strategic deliberation is contemplating a “1-1-1” strategy; it would give equal emphasis to HLD, the Global War on Terror, and conventional war scenarios. No matter what strategic configuration is selected, defense of the US homeland remains a high priority.

The new DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support builds upon the concept of an active layered defense as outlined in the NDS, NMS, and National Strategy for Homeland Security with its focus on the US homeland. Although recognized as Total Force requirements, HLD and CS missions are identified within the new strategy as particularly well-suited for the NG since the Guard is forward-deployed in 3,200 communities, is easily accessible for state active duty, is experienced in responding to natural disasters, and is interconnected with local first responders. The NG is specifically identified for carrying out the following HLD missions:

- Air and Missile Defense – Including surveillance and manning of ground-based defense systems.
- Land Defense – Including Rapid Reaction Forces.
- CBRNE Response – Including detection, extraction, decontamination, and medical care.
- Critical Infrastructure Protection – Including assessments of, security of and uses of reaction forces.
National Guard Duty Status

With its unique dual Constitutional authority, the NG is the only military force that can respond to both State and Federal missions by leveraging State Active Duty (SAD), Full Time National Guard Duty (Title 32), or Active Duty (Title 10). This allows employment of the NG in three distinct ways.

- **State Active Duty (SAD):** Governors of the states can call the NG to SAD for emergencies; NG forces then serve under state control and expense. This allows governors, as commanders-in-chief, and executed by the Adjutant General (AG), full access to the Guard’s personnel and equipment. Under this authority, NG forces can respond to floods, earthquakes, wild fires, and other natural or man-made disasters; and to riots, civil unrest, and terrorist attacks. NG Soldiers serving under SAD remain under the command and control of the governor, so the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) does not apply.

- **Title 32 Full-Time National Guard Duty:** Title 32 allows governors, with the approval of the President, to place Guard Soldiers on full-time duty under the command and control of the states, but supported with federal funds. Guard Soldiers attend military schools, weekend drill periods, and annual training under Title 32. Additionally, Guard Soldiers can perform operational missions, including HLD, under 32 USC 502(f), 32 USC 901, and 32 USC 902, again supported by federal funds, for a wide variety of missions such as airport security, disaster relief, and CIP. Again, the PCA does not apply to Guard Soldiers serving under Title 32 status since they remain under the command and control of the state governors.

- **Title 10 Active Duty:** Title 10 authorizes the federal government to mobilize and deploy NG units and personnel for missions in the United States and throughout the world. NG forces are thus “federalized” and placed under the exclusive control of the President and the federal government. So both active duty military and the NG serving under Title 10 are subject to the PCA, which precludes their use for HLD missions that require direct law enforcement actions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State Active Duty</th>
<th>Title 32</th>
<th>Title 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Command and Control</strong></td>
<td>State Governor</td>
<td>State Governor</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pay</strong></td>
<td>State Pay</td>
<td>Federal Pay</td>
<td>Federal Pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duty Location</strong></td>
<td>CONUS IAW state law</td>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Worldwide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PCA</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF NG DUTY STATUS
National Guard Actions - Defense of the Homeland

Since 9/11 over 210,000 NG Soldiers and Airmen have mobilized under Title 10 in support of overseas missions.\textsuperscript{35} Recently, 50,087 NG Soldiers and Airmen provided a CS response to Hurricane Katrina.\textsuperscript{36} In all likelihood, these large deployments of Guard personnel will continue into the foreseeable future.

\textit{Campaigns}: The NG continues a full partnership with the AC as an expeditionary force. NG soldiers currently serve in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantánamo Bay. Over 73,000 Soldiers are currently serving; 167,322 since 9/11/01.\textsuperscript{37} These deployments will continue into the foreseeable future, perhaps in accord with a predictable six-year rotation schedule.\textsuperscript{38}

\textit{Forward Presence}: The NG is also forward-deployed in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai, with 3,765 Guardsman currently serving; 26,247 since 9/11/01.\textsuperscript{39} These deployments started in the late 1990’s and are expected to continue – also subject to the proposed six-year rotation schedule.

Additionally, the NG continues its twelfth year in the State Partnership Program (SPP). This program is an outgrowth of the 1993 National Security Strategy; it partners NG states with foreign units to promote democracy, foster prosperity, and enhance security.\textsuperscript{40} The program is designed to improve host nations’ relations with the United States by promoting regional stability and civil-military relations in support of US policy objectives.\textsuperscript{41} The NG was selected for this mission as it can introduce host nations to the political and cultural environments of the states, a specific cultural access not available in an AC partnership.

\textit{Homeland Defense}: Governors and the public expect the NG to place the first military units on site within hours of an event. They are expected to respond with the right capabilities, to the right location, and at the right time.\textsuperscript{42} Currently, the Guard is providing 4,364 soldiers within the United States to protect key assets, to provide security at military installations, and to backfill deployed AC units. A further 17,628 Guard Soldiers are still responding to Hurricane Katrina. Overall, 133,863 have served in HLD missions since 9/11/01.\textsuperscript{43}

National Guard Homeland Defense Initiatives

The NG’s training and preparation for overseas conventional war fighting and SAD missions have provided the majority of the Guard’s preparation for HLD. The Guard leadership sees no need to dedicate units solely for HLD missions.

But why is the Guard opposed to dedicated force structure? The NG is structured and trains as part of the Total Force to augment the AC for its overseas missions. Both the structure and training are focused almost exclusively on offensive operations to serve as the reserve to
According to Major General Randy Mosley, the Adjutant General for Montana, there is concern that the Guard will take a step backwards to again become an under-funded reserve force. It has taken the Guard years to build its force to the current level of quality and training. By having units that are now in essence hands off for deployments, it is felt that resources as a whole for the Guard could decrease or those resources might divert to support dedicated HLD units.

Instead, the NG has developed enhanced capabilities to meet potential HLD missions. The NG emphasizes prevention, pre-event deterrence, and responding within 96 hours of an incident. With these priorities in mind, the NG has identified four roles to fulfill: CIP, CBRNE response, prompt coordinated federal response, and HLD training. To enhance the NG’s capabilities to perform these four roles, the NG has developed several initiatives identified in the NG HLD White Paper:

- Establish State Joint Forces Headquarters, each staffed with a Joint Operations Center (JOC) and fielded with the Joint CONUS Communications Support Environment (JCCSE).
- Select and train specialized NG teams consisting of 55 Civil Support Teams (CST) with 22 Active Guard Reserve (AGR) personnel, 12 CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package Teams, and six “pilot” Full Spectrum Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (FSIVA) Teams with 14 NG personnel.
- Establish National Guard Reaction Forces (NGRF) that can respond with 75 to 125 personnel within 4 - 8 hours, which can be expanded by 375 additional personnel within 24 - 36 hours.
- Transform NG Army Aviation to facilitate use of their capabilities in a dual role to support both HLD and normal aviation operations.

Alternatives

Several organizations have proposed a variety of alternative uses for the NG in HLD. These think tanks and analysts have offered recommendations which the NG should review and consider when developing future force plans. All of these organizations consistently recommend that the NG be “in charge” of HLD along with having specialized HLD teams. A brief summary of such recommendations follows.

Defense Science Board

The Defense Science Board (DSB) in their 2003 study on DoD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security acknowledged homeland security as an important NG mission, but not the
sole or primary mission of the Guard. They did recognize the need for the specialized teams, such as CSTs, but felt homeland security could be effectively accomplished as a dual mission of the NG by drawing on its strengths from responding to domestic emergencies and its combat, combat support, and combat service support experiences in overseas missions.

The DSB also recommended the expansion of ten state CSTs to provide regional coverage by joining their capabilities with those of the Marine Corps Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF). This joint effort could result in the strategic positioning of additional CBIRF teams while promoting joint operations between the Marines and NG. The DSB also encouraged the Guard to explore enhancing engineering, medical, and security police units to perform search-and-rescue missions as well as mass medical and tactical site security.

Although the study did recommend the continued dual role of the NG, it recognized that the Guard could become overextended as it adds the new “Homeland Defense-Homeland Security/Military Assistance to Civil Authorities missions” and that the Guard must also receive the proper resources to ensure its capability to execute the new missions.

Heritage Foundation

The Heritage Foundation’s (HF) Homeland Security task force made several recommendations in the Heritage Foundation Backgrounder (April 2002) in, “The Role of the National Guard in Homeland Security.” The study recognized that the NG is part of the Total Force and noted that the NG’s dependence on Citizen-Soldiers will continue. This study clearly recommended that the NG continue to support active duty forces to carry out the nation’s security as part of the joint overseas force, but urged military planners to prepare for future wars on both the home front and abroad. “The military force structure must prepare for HLD without compromising the ability of the armed forces to carry out their missions abroad.”

The primary recommendation from the HF study was to “refocus the NG on homeland security” by designating NG units to focus first on homeland security, with a secondary mission of deploying overseas. To accomplish this, they recommended the AC add personnel to replace any shortfalls in NG units that focus primarily on “defending against attacks at home.” They further recommended that domestic military service be accorded the same prestige and entitlement benefits as NG Soldiers deployed in a Title 10 status. Finally, the study stressed the importance of providing adequate funding for the NG units focused on homeland security, for expansion of forces in the AC to replace NG units and for Soldiers assigned to HLD missions.
Center for Strategic Leadership

The Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) hosted a workshop in December 2003 to examine issues related to RC structure and roles in homeland security. The CSL specifically addressed whether the NG should be structured for full-spectrum operations or designed for less than full-spectrum operations. They recommended a study to examine the concept of a “domestically focused element” in the RC trained for CS missions and the development of specialized CBRNE capabilities with the Department of Homeland Security, not DoD, since DoD CBRNE teams are part of the expeditionary forces. The CSL additionally reviewed the RC roles in HLD. Here, they recommended identifying missions that require specially structured units that are dedicated only to HLD missions and to make CIP a primary mission of the NG.

The CSL also held a forum in August 2005 to assist in the development of plans for use of the NG in CIP. Given the NG’s current mission set, the forum clearly recognized the need for the NG to balance potential domestic and overseas missions. The CSL forum recommended that NG responsibility for private CIP should start at the private sector fence line by providing a buffer of protection. The NG would accomplish this by establishing a standing rapid-reaction force, capable of responding within 12 hours. The forum concluded that CIP plans should call for a balancing of NG force structure between “defense of the homeland in the homeland” and overseas missions. The forum also identified that the Guard could play a key role in vulnerability assessments in support of the DoD, and state and local governments by working toward establishing “baseline standards.” The forum discussed expanding the FSIVA teams beyond the ten programmed and concluded that the capability exists within the teams to accomplish the task but that detailed assessments would require augmentation of additional personnel.

US Commission on National Security/21st Century

In their document entitled “Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change,” the US Commission on National Security/21st Century concluded that the nation is faced with new challenges, particularly in homeland security, and that we must immediately address these issues. The Commission specifically recommended that “The Secretary of Defense, at the direction of the President, should make homeland security a primary mission of the NG, and should be organized, properly trained, and adequately equipped to undertake that mission.” The Commission further recommended the NG redistribute resources from overseas missions to support CS missions responding to disasters and weapons of mass destruction incidents.
The CST’s were identified as filling part of this niche, but the Commission noted that more effort was required.69 Interestingly, though, the Commission also encouraged the “DoD to devote its highest priority to improving and further developing its expeditionary capabilities.”70 This would obviously require DoD to radically alter its war plans if the Guard is assigned a smaller role in the expeditionary force mission.

State Defense Force and Homeland Security

In a Parameters article (Winter 2003/2004), Tulak, Kraft, and Silbaugh proposed using State Defense Forces (SDFs) for homeland security – “forces created, funded, and controlled by individual states.”71 Twenty-three states and the territory of Puerto Rico currently have SDFs that fall under the command and control of the states Adjutants General; these SDFs are paid only when they are called to state active duty. Tulak et al. pointed out that since NG forces may not always be available and since their training focuses on combat missions, the SDF provide an additional force dedicated to homeland security. SDF’s can provide a pool of specially trained militia to assist in operations, command and control, and bridging military forces to local first-responders.72

The Rand Corporation Monograph

The Rand Corporation analysis, "Army Forces for Homeland Security", proposes a hedging strategy for the Army’s role in homeland security. The study looked into ways the Army could prepare for homeland security by addressing possibilities based on assumptions about the nature of terrorist threats, capabilities of civilian response, and the Army’s overseas commitments.73 The Rand hedging strategy cascades homeland security directly to the NG.74

1. Legislation is needed for the DoD to fund homeland security and for the NG to share resources across state boundaries.
2. With many units currently unavailable due to deployments, the Army should dedicate trained forces to homeland security.
3. These units should be a mix of forces (AC, RC) with some units specializing in law enforcement.
4. The dedicated units should come from the NG by creating ten multi-state Civil Support Battalions (CSBs) from within the existing NG force structure.
**TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Defense Science Board</strong></th>
<th><strong>Primary Mission of HLD for the NG</strong></th>
<th><strong>Expeditionary Mission</strong></th>
<th><strong>Specialized Teams for the NG</strong></th>
<th><strong>Additional/New Force Structure</strong></th>
<th><strong>Resources Recommended</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dual with expeditionary mission</td>
<td>Dual with HLD mission</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Heritage Foundation</strong></td>
<td>Refocus on HLD; maintain overseas mission</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td>Implied; but not specifically recommended</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Center for Strategic Leadership</strong></td>
<td>For specific units only, but maintain overseas mission</td>
<td>Balance with HLD mission</td>
<td>Only one discussed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not discussed</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>US Commission</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Improve its capabilities</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Defense Force</strong></td>
<td>Not discussed</td>
<td>Implied they will continue</td>
<td>Within the SDF</td>
<td>Use the SDF</td>
<td>Not discussed</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rand Corporation</strong></td>
<td>Dedicated force structure</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

**Mission:** Along with the NG, all of the above alternatives recognize the need for the Guard to maintain its overseas missions and now add the new HLD mission. The DSB’s consideration that the Guard accomplish both missions simultaneously closely reflects the NG’s current policy. The US Commission on National Security suggests that the Guard be given the primary mission of HLD, but it also recommended the Guard improve its capabilities for overseas missions. Conversely, the CSL and Rand Corporation advise that specific units in the NG should have the primary mission of HLD while the Guard maintains its overseas commitments.

Although NGB may find it relatively easy to say the Guard can take on HLD missions, the states are left with having to implement the new missions. MG Mosley currently has the Montana National Guard staff developing a plan to cover all the new responsibilities to ensure that the Montana Guard is “always prepared to support the citizens of Montana.” The most challenging question his staff faces are the exact expectations in developing these new missions. Additionally, MG Mosley identified the need to develop regional HLD and CS missions to cover large incidents such as Hurricane Katrina. This concept is echoed by the Rand Corporation’s recommendation to establish 10 regional CSBs that are available for immediate deployment.

**Resources:** Thomas Hall, assistant secretary for reserve affairs, indicates that it will cost $21 billion by 2012 to equip the reserve forces for domestic missions. He further added that, “If we’re going to use the Guard like never before, we need to equip them.” This thought is
echoed by the DSB, HF, US Commission on National Security, and the Rand Corporation that clearly identified resources as critical to the success of adding HLD missions to the Guard. Both the HF and the Rand Corporation stressed funding as the focal point for the new missions although neither offered specific plans for use of this funding. The US Commission on National Security advised that resources should be redistributed from the Guard's overseas missions for HLD. This is interesting since they also advised the NG to devote its highest priority to expeditionary capabilities.

Although NG units have been historically under resourced, that trend is changing rapidly as the Guard converts from the Cold War strategic reserve to immediate employment as part of the full spectrum force. These new resources, specifically equipment, were fully available to the states to support all types of CS and HLD missions prior to the Guard's large scale deployments beginning in 2002. Guard units deployed overseas under Title 10 were fully equipped to their Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) standards prior to departing. However, this now stripped the states of Guard equipment for missions within the state. This problem is further compounded by the fact that many Guard units are leaving their equipment in Iraq when they re-deploy. Many units responding to Hurricane Katrina did not have adequate numbers of tactical radios or High Mobility Multi Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) since this equipment was in Iraq. The Montana Army National Guard's 1-163rd Infantry Battalion just returned from Iraq but had to leave all 29 deployed HMMWVs in theater for follow-on forces, which greatly reduces the Guard's ability to deploy within the state. LTG Blum also indicates that while the Guard is well equipped for Iraq, that isn't the case for domestic missions; the Guard specifically needs better communication equipment that is easily deployable and is able to work within large cities. The Army National Guard also lacks the equipment necessary to react to a CBRNE incident; specifically personal protective equipment, non-lethal systems, and communications equipment that can interface with civilian responders.

**Force Structure:** "Mutually supporting capabilities in one environment must extend to support the other – that is the requirement for a full spectrum force and the essence of Homeland Defense and security." While the Guard has identified the need for new force structure such as CST's, CBRNE teams, and FSIVA teams, it firmly believes that no force structure should be dedicated solely to HLD. This assessment is echoed by the DSB when they recognized that the Guard can respond to domestic emergencies by using the strengths developed during combat operations overseas. The DSB did take into account though that the Guard could become overextended with large deployments and new HLD missions. The CSL, Rand Corporation, and Tulak et.al. argue for having dedicated force structure that is always
available during a domestic emergency and not subject to overseas deployments. The CSL did not go so far as to recommend dedicated units for reaction forces instead they called for a balancing of forces between HLD and overseas missions. The HF went one step further, calling for the AC to add new personnel to replace any Guard units refocused on HLD. The SDF concept in essence provides a dedicated militia without dipping into the authorized NG force structure. Resources, especially equipment, might be a limiting factor though for an effective SDF since the state is responsible for equipping this force. A final point in which all of the recommendations concur are for specialized teams within the NG force structure. The CSL though, did not concur that Guard CBRNE teams should be in DoD, but rather located in the Department of Homeland Security.

Recommendation

“Homeland defense is job number one”  NGB Chief LTG H. Steven Blum’s priority prompted NG actions to ensure it was prepared not only for CS missions but now also HLD. However, even LTG Blum contends that the Guard must expand its capabilities at home and improve its capability to prevent attacks, detect potential enemies, respond to threats and adverse events, and support recovery from such events. He further recognizes that current irregular and asymmetric threats require further changes in policy, organization, and forces to prepare a successful HLD.

LTG Blum is exactly correct. He leaves little doubt that HLD is the Guard’s new mission. However, a brief review of the actions taken by the NG show that HLD, although listed as first priority, continues to take a back seat. To date the Guard has only developed 55 CST’s (one per state/territory), 14 CBRNE teams, and 6 pilot FSIVA teams that are truly focused on HLD. The other actions listed, Joint Forces Headquarters, transformation of Army Aviation, and NG reaction forces are all inherent missions within the Guard. So is the NG really preparing for the new HLD mission? What is the Guard’s next step to ensure HLD? The Guard needs to build upon the actions already completed and combine them with the recommendations from the analysts discussed previously to produce the best course of action for HLD. One possible recommendation follows.

The NG, as discussed by the CSL, must undertake a detailed HLD vulnerability assessment. The Guard should establish a “baseline” for CIP from which HLD planning can begin. By completing a vulnerability assessment, the Guard can develop an accurate picture of the requirements for HLD that will support the nation and individual states along with providing a direction for NG units. The Guard must complete this assessment in a timely manner. As such,
the Guard should implement the recommendation proposed by the CSL to augment the ten FSIVA teams with additional personnel. The Guard should also consider temporarily expanding the number of FSIVA teams to complete this first assessment.

The NG is fully capable of completing the new HLD mission as concluded by the DSB by drawing upon its inherent strengths from experiences in responding to domestic CS and overseas missions. The Guard has successfully responded to thousands of events such as natural disasters and civil disturbances with existing force structure. However, states must immediately identify and task units with the HLD mission. Use of these units is for HLD within the state and also for establishing the ten CSB’s proposed by the Rand Corporation to support catastrophic events in the region. To identify units for HLD, the Guard should implement the proposed six-year rotational schedule for selected units by actively placing units in the cycle (see Figure 1). For example, the 1-163rd INF BN that just returned from Iraq should receive the mission of “Homeland Defense” for the next three years in Montana. After completion of that mission, they would continue in the cycle for the next two years in intensive training preparing to deploy followed by a one year mobilization. The battalion would also become part of the regional CSB task force and part of the reaction force proposed by the CSL for CIP. This three year HLD mission would also meet the intent of the HF, US Commission on

Full Spectrum Availability
Army Guard Model & Goals

- Approximately 50% of the National Guard force will remain available to the Governor for State missions and Homeland Defense/ Security missions
- Approximately 25% is in intensive training preparing to deploy
- 25% (+/-) of force is currently deployed and not available

The model’s goal is 1 Army Guard Rotation Every Six Years

FIGURE 1
National Security, and CSL to provide dedicated units for HLD – they would simply serve on a rotational schedule as the dedicated force. The CSB concept though, needs expansion to regional Brigade-sized units to support large scale events.

In conjunction with the regional CSB concept, the Guard must also take full advantage of existing interstate agreements for the sharing of personnel and equipment. With limited resources, especially with Guard personnel and equipment deployed, states must support each other. Conducting joint training exercises with other regional states, especially at the senior leadership level, must also occur at a minimum on an annual basis. The focus of this training is to ensure that units tasked with HLD are prepared to depart on short notice, develop working relations with local law enforcement, conduct joint CS response missions, assess the threat in the state, and develop CIP plans. Incorporating lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina in the training and preparation is also highly recommended.

The NG also needs to continue with the direction of specialized team development as concurred by all of the think tanks and individual analysts. The CST’s were noted as the most significant action that the NG has taken toward HLD. As such, the Guard should consider expanding the number of CBRNE teams to 55, thus ensuring this capability is available in every state and territory.

Risk Areas for Continued Study

As the Guard continues along the current path of no dedicated force structure for HLD, it must complete periodic risk assessments to ensure its overall health. There are three main areas that require continual risk assessment:

- Recruiting. Continual deployments have led to recruiting shortfalls resulting in decreased NG strength thus further compounding the ability to undertake both missions.
- Training Preparation. Training for both missions may result in decreased skills for both overseas war fighting and HLD.
- Over-commitment. Guard Soldiers deployed in a Title 10 status are not available for HLD or for Governors to perform SAD. Additionally, many Guard Soldiers are civilian first-responders and would also not be available.

Conclusion

Homeland Defense is the “the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and our critical infrastructure against external threat or aggression, or other threat as directed by the President.” With the DoD identified as primarily responsible for HLD and now more
specifically with the Guard identified for missions in the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, the NG is expected to be ready for HLD; reaction to a crisis must come immediately.

The Guard sees no need for dedicated force structure, instead is undertaking the new HLD mission with enhanced capabilities. It is planning to conduct both HLD and overseas deployments as a dual mission. The Guard has added specialized teams, specifically CST’s and CBRNE teams, as part of their first steps toward HLD.

To undertake this critical responsibility, the Guard must complete a vulnerability assessment to establish a baseline from which to develop HLD plans. From there, the Guard must identify and task units with the HLD mission and place them in the six-year rotational deployment schedule. These units would also become part of the ten regional CS brigades to support large scale disasters. Use of interstate agreements is critical in HLD with limited resources available and the need to support all states with additional forces and equipment during catastrophic events. Finally, training and preparation, specifically for the reaction forces, must begin immediately.

The use of the NG for HLD is in line with its traditional role of defending the homeland as an integral part of the first line of defense of the United States. “Everybody clearly sees the National Guard as the first military responders when it comes to homeland defense.”

Use of the NG’s core competencies combined with its unique dual status ability and 3,200 locations make it the best military organization to defend the homeland of the United States.

Endnotes


4 United States Code, Title 32 –National Guard, Chapter 1 – Organization, Section 102, Section 102, General Policy.

5 Blum, 8.

Military Support to Civil Authorities generally consists of support during natural disasters, special security events and man-made incidents that have evoked a presidential or state emergency declaration.

Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies consists of support provided to a lead federal agency for activities such as counterterrorism and counterdrug operations and may include provisions of equipment, training, or expert advice.

Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances occurs when the President employs the armed forces to suppress insurrections, riots, or to assist the states in maintaining law and order. In these situations, the lead federal agency supported by DoD is the Department of Justice.

28 Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385), along with other related laws and provisions prohibits the use of the military to execute civilian laws unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 states: “Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not for more than two years, or both.”


30 32 USC 502(f). “This statute allows members of the National Guard to be ordered to full-time National Guard duty to perform operational activities.” (as cited in the National Guard Homeland Defense White Paper: *September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina and Beyond*, 12.)

31 32 USC 901. “National Guard units or its members may be employed for a ‘Homeland Defense activity,’ meaning an activity undertaken for the military protection of the territory or domestic population of the United States, or of the infrastructure or other assets of the United States determined by the Secretary of Defense as being critical to national security, from a threat or aggression against the United States.” (as cited in the National Guard Homeland Defense White Paper: *September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina, and Beyond*, 13)

32 32 USC 902. “Homeland Defense activities: Funds. (a) The Secretary of Defense may provide funds to a Governor to employ National Guard units or members to conduct homeland defense activities that the Secretary determines to be necessary and appropriate for participation by National Guard units or its members.” (as cited in the National Guard Homeland Defense White Paper: *September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina, and Beyond*, 13)

33 Lowenburg, 2.

34 Ibid., 3.

35 Blum, 15.

36 Ibid.

37 ARNG Horse Blanket Power Point Presentation dated 19 Oct 05. Operational commitments include OIF-Iraq, OEF-Afghanistan, OEF-Guantanamo Bay, and OEF-Support.

38 The 6 year rotational schedule for NG soldiers plans for 25% of the force deployed for 9 to 24 months, 25% of the force in training for deployments for 3 to 24 months, and 50% of the force available for HLD for 48 to 60 months. See Building Capabilities and Transforming: The Way Ahead powerpoint briefing by LTG H. Steven Blum, Chief, NGB., 8 September 2004.

39 ARNG Horse Blanket Power Point Presentation dated 19 Oct 05.


42 Blum, 9.

43 ARNG Horse Blanket Power Point Presentation dated 19 Oct 05. Does not include soldiers on State Active Duty for hurricane Katrina.


45 Randy Mosley, MG, The Adjutant General, Montana National Guard, interview by author, 1 Dec 2005, Carlisle, PA.

46 Blum, 8.

47 Ibid., 8.

48 Ibid., 8.

49 Ibid., 8-11.

50 CST’s are not deployable outside of the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or US territories.


52 Defense Science Board, 114.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid., 110-111.


57 Ibid., 5.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid., 4.


61 Ibid.

Ibid., 3.

Ibid., 4.

Ibid., 4.

Ibid., 3-4.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 78.


Ibid, 133.


Ibid., 49-52.

Mosley, 1 Dec 2005.

Ibid.


Loren Oelkers, COL, J8 for the Montana National Guard, Email correspondence, 16 Dec 2005.


Blum, 16.

Ibid., 17.
83 Blum, 2.

84 Ibid., 16-17.

85 Ibid.


87 England, 5.

88 Matthews, 43.