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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Direct Attack Doctrine for Asymmetric Airpower Against an Army

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James LaBombard

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12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
See attached.

14. ABSTRACT
See attached.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel James D. LaBombard

TITLE: Direct Attack: Doctrine for Asymmetric Airpower Against an Army

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 04 Mar 2006 WORD COUNT: 6,014 PAGES: 25

KEY TERMS: Air Interdiction, Close Air Support, Counterland

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Direct Attack is “air attacks against enemy ground forces in which friendly land forces either support the attacks or are absent altogether.” USAF counterland doctrine does not formally classify Direct Attack as an operational and apportioned mission. Lack of formal doctrine for Direct Attack results in numerous operational and tactical level ad hoc arrangements and degrades airpower’s overwhelming effectiveness against an army. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. airpower has directly engaged enemy land forces outside the AO of our own land-power in four separate conflicts, but USAF counterland doctrine remains little changed from the Cold War.

Technological advances give airpower an incredible capability against enemy ground forces. The collective effect of these advances have improved the speed, flexibility, and effectiveness with which airpower can halt or destroy an army, regardless of proximity to our own ground forces. These capabilities are best leveraged when airpower is used synergistically in coordination with land-power; however, it is not always timely, feasible, suitable, nor acceptable to deploy land forces.
DIRECT ATTACK: DOCTRINE FOR ASYMMETRIC AIRPOWER AGAINST AN ARMY

How the joint community conducts war has changed, but U.S. Air Force counterland doctrine has changed comparatively little since the end of the Cold War. U.S airpower has demonstrated overwhelming capabilities against an enemy army, but USAF counterland doctrine does not fully exploit this emerging strategic advantage. Current USAF Counterland doctrine (Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3) describes two missions; Close Air Support (CAS), and Air Interdiction (AI). Each mission is a critical element of joint warfare intent on gaining land-superiority, and each represents a sacred bond between Airmen and the land warriors. USAF doctrine describes both CAS and AI as missions conducted mostly within the area of operations (AO) of friendly land forces with intent of support to the land component scheme of maneuver. However, since the end of the Cold War, U.S airpower has directly engaged enemy land forces outside the AO of our own land-power in four separate conflicts; but USAF counterland doctrine does not explicitly describe a "Direct Attack" operational mission. Lack of formal doctrine results in numerous ad hoc intelligence and command and control (C2) arrangements, which degrade airpower’s overwhelming effectiveness against an army. The USAF should formally bridge this doctrinal gap and add Direct Attack (DA) as third operational mission to counterland doctrine; the thesis of this article.

Background

The RAND Corporation defines Direct Attack as, “air attacks against enemy ground forces in which friendly land forces either support the attacks or are absent altogether.” The USAF does not formally define DA, but does mention a DA like role as a subset of AI. The RAND Corporation distinguishes DA from AI in that, “the planned air operations are the principle determinate of where and how to (or even whether) land forces will be used, instead of the other way around.” Stated another way, DA is an operational mission where airpower becomes the supported or sole operation against a land force. The USAF routinely conducts DA missions, but formerly labels these missions as AI or CAS.

Since the U.S. led NATO air war over Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, the USAF has twice considered but decided not to add DA as a third operational counterland mission. The reasons are elusive and somewhat vague, but research shows the DA issue seems to be an on-again off-again internally debated matter. Two themes against codifying DA emerge. The first is, “DA is just subset form AI or CAS and is already covered in counterland doctrine.” “It is still airpower against an army.” Secondly, without careful scrutiny, DA sounds anti-joint; “there goes the USAF claiming sole decisiveness again!” This article does not make that claim.
Conversely this article strongly maintains the best way to gain land superiority is through joint air-land operations. An enemy land commander confronted solely by airpower can disperse and conceal thereby reducing airpower’s effect, e.g. the air war over Kosovo/Serbia. Confronted by solely by land power, an enemy land commander may maintain defensive or maneuver formations and inflict unacceptable causalities. The most effective way to gain land superiority is to crush an enemy land force between an airpower “hammer” a land-power “anvil.”

The dilemma is the conduct of war has changed. U.S. deployment/employment of decisively sized land forces may not align ends, ways, and means with a congruent national military strategy in a new global security environment. This article does not claim airpower’s decisiveness over land-power in a counterland role, but does advocate, in certain and frequently experienced scenarios, DA best fits national military strategy.

A New Conduct of War

The way the U.S. conducts war is changing. The Cold War bi-polar balance of power came down with the Berlin Wall in 1989-90, and brought about an era marked by redistribution of power between states, increased intrastate conflict, and comparatively smaller scale but more restrained armed conflicts. Globalization, terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction further shifted threats to U.S. national security from “powerful states” to “relatively weak states and ungoverned areas.” Cold War concepts of total and unlimited war with a predestined foe shifted to more uncertain but limited and politically restrained regional armed conflicts. In addition to shifting balances of power, other globalizing and domestic trends further drove political restraints on warfare. World and domestic opinion, alliances and coalitions, inter-government and non-government organizations, economic and financial relationships, and even presidential and congressional style all influence the U.S. national security strategy formulation, and tend to limit and shape military operations. War is an extension of politics by other means, and since the geopolitical landscape has changed, so too has the conduct of war; with three implications. First, the U.S. armed forces are redeploying from a heavy Cold War forward-based posture to a “transformed” smaller but lighter, modular, and more capable expeditionary force. Second, the relative importance of enemy land forces with offensive capability is a growing threat to regional stability and U.S. national interests. Third, the speed, range, flexibility, and lethality of airpower, “provides the U.S. a unique capability to project national influence anywhere in the world on a very short notice.” In sum, the new conduct of war is one in which political issues tend to focus U.S. military power on enemy land forces, and airpower gives the U.S. capabilities for quick access and lethal direct attack.
The U.S. military is in the process of transforming itself to a capabilities-based force to better meet the new global security threat. One such essential and asymmetric capability is the direct attack of an opponent’s land forces with airpower, either before friendly land forces deploy, or as an alternative to land-power. The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (NDS), is designed to, “provide the President a broad range of options....to deny an opponent the strategic initiative or preempt a devastating attack; combat operations against a capable and organized military, paramilitary, or insurgent adversary....” The supporting National Military Strategy of the United States of America (NMS) is to protect, prevent, and prevail against traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive threats. Under these circumstances the NMS directs transformation to a force, “sized to defend the homeland, deter forward and in four regions, and conduct two overlapping "swift defeat" campaigns.” This “1-4-2-1” force sizing construct anticipates some crises may quickly escalate and require rapid action with the capacity to “surge” follow on forces.

The NMS reflects the new conduct of warfare by planning for comparatively more but smaller scale conflicts. “Swift defeat” and “rapid action” are driving the services to leaner, lighter, and more lethal forces, and DA is emerging as a key asymmetric airpower advantage. The United States Army is transforming to a brigade combat team (BCT) concept with the intent to shorten traditionally long deployment times normally measured in months to quicker deployments. While the USA is making great strides in reducing response times, a recent RAND study gauges the worldwide response time at 18 days. A distinctive capability of airpower is rapid and persistent global attack, where airpower’s response time is measured in hours. Airpower is well suited to translate a “rapid action” and/or “swift defeat” NMS into joint campaign operations.

One NDS implementation guideline is, “continuous transformation.” Part of transformation is how we think about challenges and opportunities. The traditional idea that “it takes an army to defeat an army” should be challenged as we transform how we think about the new conduct of war.

The new global security environment, the new conduct of warfare, and transforming military forces put the focus on enemy land forces as a comparatively more strategic threat. Whether enemy land forces are massed in traditional formations like the Iraqi Republican Guards or dispersed and concealed like the Serbian Vojske Jugoslavije, enemy land forces are a significant adversarial power projection capability and frequent threat to regional stability and U.S. national interests. Enemy land forces were central to U.S National objectives in four post Cold War conflicts; Operation Desert Storm (ODS) in 1991, Operation Allied Force (OAF) in
1999, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2001, and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003. National Security Directive 45, issued prior to ODS, called for "the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait". Marking the start of the U.S. led air war in Kosovo, President Clinton in an address to the nation said, "...today our armed forces joined our NATO allies in airstrikes against Serbian forces responsible for the brutality in Kosovo." President G.W. Bush in an address to the nation prior to OEF said, "...the United States military has begun strikes against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan." The day the U.S. began OIF, President G.W. Bush said, "...at this hour, American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq...." In these four conflicts, enemy land forces were our adversary’s source of power and threatened U.S. National Security objectives. These four presidential addresses focused national resolve on enemy land forces.

One characteristic of the new security environment is conflicts are smaller than previously anticipated during the Cold War. Small scale conflicts normally stem from relatively less intense national interests. Less intense national interests increase casualty and collateral damage aversion, legal, ethical, and public opinion restraints on warfare, which tend to limit acceptable targets to military forces. In the absence of a credible air or naval threat characteristic of less powerful nations, targets are more focused specifically on land forces.

Airpower has an amazing capability against an army. Innovations in stealth, all weather stand-off precision strike, unmanned sensors/strikers, information technologies, and surveillance and reconnaissance give the U.S. the ability to "maneuver over, around, and through" enemy defenses and mass strategic effects. Specifically, innovations in stealth, precision attack, and battlefield situational awareness (ISR) make enemy land forces particularly vulnerable to DA. Stealth gives airpower relatively quick strategic global access. Precision gives airpower massed effects without the need to employ massed formations. Airpower’s effectiveness is no longer measured in sorties per target, but rather targets per sortie. Battlefield situational awareness initiates and facilitates the find-fix-track-target-engage-assess kill chain. These distinctive innovations along with the airpower’s unique characteristics of speed, range, and flexibility make DA against an enemy land force an extremely attractive course of action (COA), especially when the U.S. needs to quickly counter a threat when it is not timely, feasible, suitable, or acceptable to deploy land forces.
Counterland: A Lesser Emphasized Airpower Doctrine

USAF doctrine describes what airpower can do strategically for the nation and our allies, and operationally for the combatant commander in terms six capabilities. Air and space superiority, information superiority, global attack, precision engagement, rapid global mobility, and agile combat support are distinctive capabilities the USAF provides the nation, before, during, and after a conflict. The USAF achieves these six distinctive capabilities through the coordinated implementation of 17 operational airpower functions. Traditionally, strategic attack and counterair are the most familiar and widely studied airpower functions. Counterland is lesser studied and sometimes divisive airpower function, which remains a source of friction between the U.S. Army and the USAF as each service competes for control over battlefield air operations due to their differing perspectives of the battlespace.

The land commander traditionally wants air “support” within or near enough to his AO to influence his scheme of maneuver. The effects are immediate but mostly localized and tactical. To avoid fratricide these types of close-in operations require a high degree of command and control. The Airman traditionally wants to bypass an enemy’s fielded forces, strike deep, and cause strategic and operational effects across the whole theater. The effects are relatively slower to actualize but cumulatively decisive and more directly support the overall joint campaign versus one land commander’s fight. These types of operations require less command and control and are viewed as a more effective use of available airpower by airmen. Current USAF counterland doctrine is revealing; “… attack of fielded forces, one vehicle or artillery battery at a time, is possible but tends to be a less effective use of aerospace power.” This article does not dispute, make excuses, nor apologize for this perspective, but does make the point that Airmen, “typically do not speak or write a great deal about counterland air attack,” due in part to their instinctive aversion to ground control of airpower, and perspective that counterland operations typically yield less strategic effect.

The traditional Airman’s perspective of counterland operations is manifested in the USAF’s relative neglect of counterland doctrine development. In fact, during ODS, then current counterland doctrine AFM 2-1, Tactical Air Operations-Counter Air, Close Air Support, and Air Interdiction was published 22 years earlier in 1969. Current USAF counterland doctrine was published in 1999; six years and 2 air wars prior to the composition of this article. Codification of counterland lessons learned is slow. USAF doctrine is reviewed every two years, but current counterland doctrine is only superficially changed and remains designed for the Cold War, according to a study published by the RAND Corporation and commissioned by the USAF.
Even while the conduct of war was changing, USAF counterland doctrine has changed little since the end of the Cold War. The USAF’s organizational culture helps explain this phenomenon. Early airpower advocates thought the most effective use of airpower was to bypass an enemy’s fielded forces and attack his capability and will to wage war. The predominate thinking was, it is more effective and efficient to destroy key war industries/enablers, say ball-bearings used in tank production, versus find and destroy scores of mobile or concealed and dispersed tanks. These Airmen held a strategic perspective of warfare and sought independence as a separate service to conduct centrally controlled/coordinated and decentrally executed air operations across the entire theater of operations, versus tether airpower to a supporting role boxed into a land commander’s specific AO.

Gaining independence as a separate service in 1947, USAF leaders and theorists emphasized strategic bombing and air superiority missions over counterland operations. Since, airpower operations against an enemy army require a larger degree of coordination and control by surface forces; Airmen traditionally held an innate aversion to subjugating control of airpower to a ground commander and have thus not typically emphasized counterland doctrine development.

In this cultural context, the USAF continued to underestimate the need to fully develop counterland doctrine. Beginning in 1973 and culminating in 1982 with AirLand Battle Doctrine, Tactical Air Command (TAC) and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) jointly developed Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI). BAI was not an entirely new counterland mission but merely a subset of AI, with differences being mostly in the increased level of coordination and control, a sticking point for many Airmen. Reluctant to adopt a new mission that subjugated airpower to more control of the land component, the doctrine was not accepted across the larger Air Force and wholly ignored by CENTAF in Desert Storm. CAS, AI, and a short-lived BAI have been the only operational counterland missions formerly codified in USAF doctrine since 1947. Counterland doctrine has not kept pace with the changing conduct of war.

Counterland Doctrine Deficiencies

All USAF doctrine is based on Foundational Doctrine Statements; basic principles and beliefs which guide doctrine development. USAF Foundational Doctrine Statements affirm that doctrine guides the actions of military forces in support of national objectives and shape the way the USAF organizes, trains, equips, and sustains its forces. Doctrine guides the entire air effort from developing Airmen, to technology-to-warfighting, to integrating operations; the USAF core competencies. Because of the magnitude of what is at stake, it is important to
understand and speak in precise doctrinal terms, so counterland, the lesser emphasized airpower doctrine warrants a closer look.

Counterland is one of 17 airpower functions employed by the USAF with the main objective “to dominate the surface environment and prevent the enemy from doing the same;” in other words, land superiority. The desired effect of each airpower function is pursued through operational missions. For example, the airpower function of counterair has the intended effect of air superiority which is achieved through two operational missions; offensive counter air and defensive counterair. Likewise; the airpower function of counterland has the intended effect of land superiority which is achieved through two operational missions; CAS and AI. This article proposes a third operational mission, DA; so it is important to understand commonality and differences between CAS, AI, and DA.

The commonality of counterland operational missions is in purpose; “the objectives of Counterland operations are to dominate the surface environment and prevent the opponent from doing the same.” CAS and AI provide the Joint Force Commander (JFC) two options to engage enemy land forces, but both imply support to the land component. CAS directly supports land maneuver with more immediate effects, while AI supports land maneuver in a less direct but more effective way from a theater perspective. The differences are mainly where the missions are conducted relative in proximity to friendly ground forces, and their associated command and control relationships. A review of formal definitions provides a starting point to evaluate the distinguishing characteristics.

Close Air Support is, Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.

Air Interdiction is, Air operations conducted to delay, divert, disrupt, or destroy the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.

Direct Attack is, Air operations conducted to halt, delay, divert, disrupt, or destroy the enemy’s military ground force potential, in which friendly land forces either support the attacks or are absent altogether. (Proposed)

A separate volume of USAF doctrine, AFDD 2-1 Air Warfare says, “The ultimate expression of this (counterland) doctrine is the “decisive halt” in which the enemy is both stopped short of reaching their objective…and destroyed or disrupted to such a degree that continued fighting is no longer possible.” DA is strongly associated with the classic “halt” phase of a counterland air operation, for example in Desert Storm when coalition airpower was
and used to halt an Iraqi invasion into Saudi Arabia towards Kafji. The formal definitions of CAS and AI, a review of expanded doctrine in AFDD 2-1.3 Counterland, and an analysis of the proposed DA definition show that CAS, AI, and DA are distinctly different missions. These differences are summarized in Table 1.

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<td>Relative Time to Realize Effect</td>
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<td>Delayed</td>
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<td>Direct</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>None or indirect if friendly forces deploy in a subsequent phase.</td>
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<td>Proximity to Friendly Ground Forces</td>
<td>Extreme proximity</td>
<td>Vicinity of A/O or close enough to A/O to effect ground scheme of maneuver</td>
<td>Ground forces not present or in supporting role</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level of Coordination with Ground Forces</td>
<td>Highly detailed with terminal control</td>
<td>Coordinated</td>
<td>General degree or none</td>
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<td>Targets</td>
<td>Narrow. Air attack of ground forces</td>
<td>Limited. Air attack of ground forces and support</td>
<td>Wide. Air attack of ground forces and all enablers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Example Targets</td>
<td>Ground forces in close proximity or engaged with friendly ground forces</td>
<td>Bridges, convoys, ground forces enroute to engage friendly ground forces</td>
<td>Ground forces; dispersed, concealed, operating, supporting C4ISR</td>
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TABLE 1: DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF CAS, AI, AND DA

While DA is not formally defined in USAF doctrine, DA missions are briefly described as a subset of AI. Here AFDD 2-1.3 Counterland expands the description of AI to include the proposed realm of DA; however, later goes on to say such operations are “unusual.”

AI has the flexibility to operate either in support of surface operations or as the main effort against enemy ground force. In some cases AI can provide the sole effort against enemy ground forces for example, when a joint operation has no friendly land component involved in combat operations. 63

In those unusual circumstances in which aerospace forces conduct AI in the absence of friendly surface forces….
This is one of the two themes against codifying DA, “it is just another form of AI.” The other argument against adding formal DA doctrine is the potential perception of “anti-jointness” which will be covered later. In keeping with the tradition of a lack of emphasis of counterland doctrine development, current counterland doctrine is at the very least confusing, and dismissive of a critical operational mission, DA. Failure to codify DA as an operational counterland mission represents a major doctrinal deficiency in the context of the new conduct of war. This doctrinal deficiency manifests itself in inefficient intelligence and C2 arrangements with large implications for the joint force commander, and also degrades airpower’s potential to achieve strategic effect by direct attack of enemy ground forces.

**Implications**

DA is not an “unusual circumstance,” but rather a well-tested, commonly employed operational mission. The USAF employed direct attack in Kuwait and Iraq in 1991 (ODS), in Kosovo in 1999 (OAF), in Afghanistan in 2001 (OEF), and in Iraq in 2003 (OIF). However, counterland doctrine has only superficially changed and remains mostly designed for the Cold War. The main dilemma is USAF doctrine classifies DA as a subset of AI, which forces the joint planners and warfighters into ad hoc organizational arrangements.65 “If you have to organize differently to execute a mission, then it is a different mission.”66 DA is a very different mission. During these conflicts, two problems emerged. The first problem deals with ineffective intelligence arrangements. The second problem stems from unclear C2 relationships.

Successful counterland operations enormously depend on high-quality intelligence and the capability to detect and identify enemy ground forces.67 Joint doctrine does not use the term *counterland*; however, when describing effective intelligence support to *interdiction* operations joint doctrine lists: enemy capabilities, centers of gravity, force dispositions, relationships, intentions, operations, vulnerabilities, defenses, enemy war fighting sustainability, passive defense measures, and environmental factors as key to maintaining situational awareness over the ground order of battle.68 Doctrinally, most airpower operational missions depend on the air operations center (AOC), the air component’s planning and execution headquarters,69 for targeting intelligence. Intelligence is funneled from its collection sources through the AOC to analysts, planners and eventually warfighters.

Counterland operations have a different intelligence arrangement. AI planning sources targeting intelligence from the AOC; however, since targets are coordinated with the land component via a joint targeting process, AOC intel is correlated with ground-sourced intel. This arrangement accurately portrays overlap in the air and land components’ respective AOs; that is
to say, the area just outside the fire support coordination line (FSCL) for airpower, but close enough to affect the land component’s scheme of maneuver. CAS intelligence comes predominately from land component sources and is funneled through the air support operation center (ASOC). The ASOC coordinates and directs airpower support for land forces at Corps level. Ground-war is the realm of the ASOC, which has very distinctive capabilities to collect, analyze, and exploit intelligence specific to the ground order of battle.

The ASOC is directly subordinate to the AOC, but it has distinctly different functions, expertise, and the best capability to provide Airmen a critical ground perspective. Due to advances in sensor technology, Airpower gives planners and warfighters the capability to get an excellent perspective of the land order of battle. However; this capability is problematic when enemy ground forces are concealed or intermixed with civilians as the Unutrasnjih Poslova and the Vojske Jugoslavije did in Kosovo during OAF, or widely dispersed as the Taliban did in Afghanistan during OEF. Passive tactics like dispersal, concealment, decoys, and intermixing with civilians require close-in time sensitive situational awareness of the ground order of battle. Close-in time sensitive situational awareness requires intelligence down to micro-details. The intelligence required here is extremely high-fidelity and timely. The concern is not just that vehicles are on the move, but who is in each vehicle. Special Forces (SF) are well suited to provide close-in high-fidelity and timely intelligence. Combined teams of U.S. Army SF and USAF Special Operations Terminal Attack Controllers (SOTAC) as used in Afghanistan in OEF link intelligence to airpower and are trained and accustomed to work through the ASOC or an extension thereof.

This is the ASOC’s area of expertise. Elements within the ASOC, like intelligence specialists with a particular ground expertise and a credible degree of airmanship collect, analyze, exploit, and translate data from human, imagery, signals, open-source, and measurement and signatures intelligence sources into targets for nomination to the joint targeting process, or in time sensitive cases, pass the targeting data to the most appropriate C2 channel. The functions and air-ground expertise of the ASOC gives planners and war fighters an eyes-on-the-ground perspective the AOC alone could not.

It is noteworthy then; no ASOC was deployed during OAF and initially during OEF. Both campaigns were unquestionably counterland operations waged against enemy ground forces with no friendly or supported ground forces, our proposed definition of DA. During OAF, USAF planners requested ASOC intelligence elements but were turned down, most likely to avoid any perception of a ground war, a major political constraint on the operation. During OEF, the start of the air war preceded deployment of an ASOC like unit, until “significant” ground forces arrived.
in theater later; not a seamless fit as the AOC was left out of the planning for Operation Anaconda with negative consequences for CAS support. The absence of an ASOC or specifically the intelligence elements of the ASOC denied Airmen a critical theater-wide ground perspective. The effect was a slowed cumulative strategic effect airpower gains from tactical wins; that is to say airpower was still effective, but not efficient.

Doctrinally, both CAS and AI support the U.S. Army. Doctrinally, both also require an ASOC or as a minimum the intelligence elements of an ASOC for an eyes-on-the-ground perspective. Logically, any counterland operation requires a high degree of ground perspective from the ASOC. Historically, ASOCs deploy to link airpower to support of the land component. USAF doctrine has yet to decouple counterland operations from anything other than a supporting role to friendly ground forces, and as such does not have the doctrinal foundation to require an ASOC or ASOC-like support. USAF codification of DA and its associated operational and tactical requirements is a start. One such requirement is a supporting ASOC or ASOC-like capable unit. DA is a mission the USAF is already doing, but in an ad-hoc manner with respect to intelligence support. The gap between formal doctrine and real world operations is routinely bridged by innovative Airmen, but the gap still leads to ad-hoc and confused intelligence arrangements. The doctrinal gap also leads to inefficient and unclear C2 arrangements.

The gap between formal doctrine and real world operations, specifically the employment of DA missions unsupported in formal doctrine, forces ad hoc confused and inefficient C2 arrangements. Effective C2 drives synchronization, unity of effort, deconfliction, and focused effects across the theater of operations. Doctrinally, most airpower operational missions depend on the air operations center (AOC) for C2. The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) is an extension of the AOC and extends the AOC’s C2 into the battlespace. Doctrinally, counterland missions depend on the ASOC for C2. Before its retirement shortly after OAF, the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC), was an extension of the ASOC’s C2 into the battlespace. The C2 function of the ABCCC has since migrated to the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and AWACS. Without an ASOC as a source of C2, neither the AWACS nor the JSTARS can effectively control the counterland function across the battlespace.

This was evident during OEF before an ASOC was established. Each SF-SOTAC team was in effect its own intelligence source and C2 extension to airpower. The C2 function was fragmented across the theater and limited to each team’s local area, setting up a system of many smaller dispersed ASOC-like elements. The problem: there was no centralized coordination between the teams let alone a mechanism for centralized planning and
prioritization. There was no centralizing C2 across the theater. The result was decentralized planning and decentralized execution, in other words, many small uncoordinated and non prioritized air operations. Aircraft would orbit and wait for emerging targets called up by uncoordinated SF-SOTAC teams on first come, first served basis. Airpower proved decisive, but again, the counterland campaign was inefficient.

The ASOC is an USAF unit, but it lives and trains with the U.S. Army. Doctrinally, Air Force ASOCs “do not deploy independently, and moreover rely on their associated ground forces for much of their logistics support.” The Joint Force Commander (JFC) ultimately makes the decision to deploy an ASOC, doctrinally to support the U.S. Army, normally at the Corps level, but there is no doctrinal convention or precedent to deploy an ASOC in support of an airpower only operation. This reflects the attitude in the joint community that airpower still supports the land component versus the land component supporting airpower in counterland operations. The omission of DA from USAF doctrine compounds the problem.

The conduct of both OAF and OEF can best be described as airpower campaigns directed against enemy ground forces in which friendly land forces either supported the attacks or were absent altogether. Specifically, these air campaigns were functionally counterland campaigns and the operational mission of choice was DA. However, the joint community, including Airmen resist acknowledging a DA mission and still label all counterland missions as either CAS or AI. Joint doctrine is clear and counter to this line of thinking, “Many of today’s joint operations preclude conventional force-on-force operations. The JFC must ensure that forces are adequate and flexible enough to recognize the impact of emerging asymmetric threats and quickly integrate appropriate responses to those threats.” Airpower against a land force is an asymmetric advantage. Doctrinal recognition of DA as a legitimate and credible airpower capability against a ground force, doctrinally distinct from CAS and AI, would alleviate the need for ad hoc intel and C2 arrangements.

Conclusion
Advances in sensors, munitions, and information technology give airpower incredible capabilities against heavy enemy ground forces. The collective effect of these advances have sped the FIND-FIX-TRACK-TARGET-ENGAGE-ASSESS kill chain, and have improved the speed, flexibility, and effectiveness with which airpower can halt or destroy an army. These capabilities are best leveraged when airpower is used synergistically in coordination with land-power; however, it is not always timely, feasible, suitable, nor acceptable to deploy land forces.
Current USAF doctrine confines employment of these advanced capabilities to air interdiction support or close air support roles, little changed from Cold War doctrine. Within a USAF culture that traditionally underemphasizes counterland doctrine, a gap between counterland operations and counterland doctrine has developed. The position that air strikes against ground forces, regardless of stated purpose or desired effect play a supporting role, and that it takes an army to defeat an army, prevail. As such, DA has twice been considered at counterland doctrine conferences, but never codified. Nonetheless, the USAF is routinely employing DA, but without any supporting doctrine. Lack of supporting doctrine results in intelligence and C2 organizational deficiencies. Innovative Airmen work around these problems, which result in ad-hoc and less efficient arrangements. The USAF should formally bridge this doctrinal gap and add Direct Attack as third operational mission to counterland doctrine; the thesis of this article.

Two themes emerge from interviews with Airmen close to counterland operations and doctrine development, and help to explain why DA has not been formalized. The first argument against formalizing DA into USAF doctrine is, “DA is no different than CAS or AI.” Air operations in OEF used ground controllers to control aircraft and provide terminal guidance, a distinguishing component of CAS. Officially, the USAF then and now still consider these as CAS missions. Since doctrine already mentions an “unusual” role for AI in the absence of friendly ground forces, why develop a third counterland mission? This position mis-categorizes DA missions into the Cold War construct of CAS or AI. Review Table 1 for the distinguishing characteristics of CAS, AI, and DA. Each mission has a distinct purpose and effect. The bottom-line is, “If you have to reorganize to accomplish a mission, then it is a different mission.” 81 DA is a different mission.

A second argument against formalizing DA into USAF doctrine is, if not properly understood by Airmen and correctly articulated to the joint community, DA sounds very “anti-joint,” in other words, “airpower can solely win wars and land power is now somehow diminished.” Again this article strongly advocates the best way to gain land superiority is through joint air-land operations under the umbrella of air and space superiority. The trouble is it is not always timely, feasible, suitable, or acceptable to deploy land forces.

An Air Force Doctrine Center (AFDC) white paper laid out the DA concept and in part brought the issue forward in two counterland doctrine conferences. The paper lists 6 mutually supporting guiding principles, statements, and COA selection criteria from joint doctrine which support the issue of DA. 82
First, “...the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners.” The asymmetric use of airpower against enemy ground forces was an appropriate and effective strategy during ODS, first as a defense against a ground invasion and then as a precursor to a ground war. The concept evolved under various names but was still effectively but inefficiently employed during OAF, OEF, and OIF. Casualties were comparatively low in each campaign and most national objectives were met. The concept was eventually termed “Direct Attack” by MGen Deptula (USAF), Col Gary Crowder (USAF), and Maj George Stamper (USAF) in an Air & Space Power Journal article.

Second, “It (joint operations doctrine) seeks to provide JFCs with a broad range of options to defeat an adversary in war....” Doctrinally supported DA would give the joint force commander a swift, doctrinally sound third air option to engage and defeat land forces, where the desired effect might be a defensive halt action as the first phase of an overall campaign, or as a precursor to deployment/employment of friendly ground forces. Codified in doctrine, intelligence and C2 organizations could be formalized by the joint community.

Third, “The fundamental principle for employment of US joint forces is to commit decisive force to ensure achievement of the objectives established by the National Command Authorities (NCA) while concluding operations in the shortest time possible and on terms favorable to the United States.” Technological advances give airpower an incredible capability against ground forces, and provide the JFC a decisive COA. The collective effect of these advances have improved the speed, flexibility, and effectiveness with which airpower can halt or destroy an army, regardless of proximity to our own ground forces when it may not be timely, feasible, suitable, or acceptable to deploy land forces.

Fourth, “The goal is to increase the total effectiveness of the joint force, not necessarily to involve all forces or to involve all forces equally.” Force selection is based on the type and scale of land effects the JFC desires. The JFC must consider what is the best joint force composition (and strategy) to achieve this effect. In some cases the best joint force composition and strategy might be an asymmetric use of airpower against enemy ground forces without land power leverage.

Fifth, “JFCs seek decisive advantage through the use of all available elements of combat power to seize and maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve his objectives, and generate in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat.” Airpower has a proven capability against ground forces, and doctrine should leverage this potential for the JFC.
Sixth, “During a major operation, one component or major category of operations might be the main effort, with others in support. When conditions change, the main effort might shift to another component or function.” This joint statement speaks to the utility of DA to support an overall phased joint campaign, either as a possible phase 1 defensive “halt,” or a phase 2 “preparation of the battle space” specific to the ground order of battle,” or a phase 3 offensive “counter attack.”

As these 6 joint doctrine statements express, DA provides the JFC with an almost immediate decisive counterland force and should have a prominent role in USAF doctrine. The joint community, including Airmen must change the way they think about airpower’s role against an army. Joint doctrine states, “Campaign planning is as much a way of thinking about warfare as it is a type of planning.” It does no longer takes an army to defeat an army. Airpower has proven asymmetric capabilities against ground forces. The USAF should focus its efforts to fully develop counterland doctrine from a Cold War construct to leverage airpower’s incredible potential strategic effect. Considering all, if properly understood and articulated, DA is no more anti-joint than it is CAS or AI.

Endnotes


“AI has the flexibility to operate either in support of surface operations or as the main effort against the enemy ground force. In some cases AI can provide the sole effort against the enemy ground forces, for example, when a joint operation has no friendly land component involved in combat operations,”

5 Bruce R. Pirnie, Alan Vick, Adam Grissom, Karl P. Mueller, and David T. Orletsky, Beyond Close Air Support: Forging a New Air-Ground Partnership (Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, Pa: The RAND Corporation, 2005) 18.


Lt Col Bowers was Air Force Doctrine Center, Deputy Director Doctrine Development Directorate and action officer for Counterland from May 2002 to Apr 2004.
7 Alan Vick et al., *Aerospace Operations Against Elusive Ground Targets*, (Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, Pa: The RAND Corporation, 2001) 3-5.

8 Alan Vick et al., *Aerospace Operations Against Elusive Ground Targets*, (Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, Pa: The RAND Corporation, 2001) 3-5.


23 Alan Vick et al., *Aerospace Operations Against Elusive Ground Targets*, (Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, Pa: The RAND Corporation, 2001) 8.


27 In 1984, Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1 Basic Doctrine Chapter 1 stated, “The basic objective of aerospace forces is to win the aerospace battle—to gain and or maintain control of the aerospace environment…. ” Also, “The basic objective of land forces is to win the land battle…..” These two doctrinal statements highlight late Cold War thought in the Air Force. Airpower and land-power have their well defined and separate lanes; in other words, it takes an army to defeat an army, and it takes airpower to win the air war. This perspective prevails in institutional Air Force thinking.


Col Gary Crowder was HQ Air Combat Command, Chief of Strategy Concepts and Doctrine Directorate of Plans and Programs from Apr 2002 to Feb 2004. He also hosted two Counterland Doctrine conferences in 2002 and 2003. While deployed to OEF, he served as Chief of Combat Operations. During OIF, he was part of the “Red Team” for the air plan.


38 For the complete list and description of the 6 distinctive capabilities and the 17 airpower functions see Air Force Doctrine Document 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, 17 Nov 2003. 38-58 and 78-82.


47 Counterland operations conducted within a land component’s AO, or conducted outside a land component’s AO but having the potential to affect the ground scheme of maneuver require at least surface-air coordination and at most surface control depending on the proximity of air operations to land forces.


The Unutrašnji Poslova is the Serbian Interior Police. The Vojske Jugoslavije is the Yugoslavian “Serbian” Army.

The support/supported relationship is debatable in the joint community regarding OEF, but Special Forces Operational Detachment-A, or A-Teams, deployed with specific mission objectives, one of which was to support air operations. One of the JFACC objectives was to attack Taliban forces. Combinations of A-Teams and USAF SOTACs facilitated those attacks in hunter-killer fashion. Due to the requirement for terminal control, these missions resembled traditional CAS, but ground forces objectives were to find and fix enemy targets for airpower versus airpower providing “close proximity support” for engaged ground forces. Tradition CAS missions were also conducted, Robert’s Ridge for example.


Bruce R. Pirnie, Alan Vick, Adam Grissom, Karl P. Mueller, and David T. Orletsky, Beyond Close Air Support: Forging a New Air-Ground Partnership (Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, Pa: The RAND Corporation, 2005), 11.


Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 Sept 2001, ix.


