PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION FOR THE “PENTATHLETE” OF THE FUTURE

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA  17013
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<td>Professional Military Education for the &quot;Pentathlete&quot; of the Future</td>
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<td>U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050</td>
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
The strategic environment, like the world around us is changing at an exponential rate, and thus the challenges of leadership are also changing at an ever faster rate. As such, our leaders of tomorrow must master tactical, operational and strategic competencies to address a much larger scope of contingencies at a much earlier point in their military careers to include a greater focus on non-kinetic issues such as culture, socio-economics and politics. However, our current formal system of Professional Military Education (PME) continues to try and meet these growing requirements within a framework whose scope has changed little in the past twenty years. In order to prepare our future officers to become “pentathletes” in the future strategic environment, there are significant modifications that need to be considered for the existing PME continuum. These “pentathlete” competencies that teach officers “how to think” vice “what to think” need to be introduced early during the pre-commissioning process and then reinforced through a Continuing Officer Education System (COES) that supports leadership development at formalized schools within the institutional domain and while serving in unit assignments within the operational and self development domains throughout an officer’s career, thus enabling life long learning.
On 3 April 2003, the 2/327th Infantry Battalion was charged with the mission of securing the key city of Najaf during the combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In command was Lieutenant Chris Hughes, an extremely professional warfighter. I knew Chris during our time together at the pre-command course in Leavenworth in 2001. During the tactical exercises, Chris was the most effective commander of our group as he consistently prevailed time after time during the JANUS tactical exercises. I knew he would be a successful commander in combat. However, it was not LTC Hughes' tactical skills that defined his success during OIF.

Prior to and during the advance through the deserts of Iraq, Chris had studied the Koran and had read several books on Mohammed the prophet and understood the concept of Jihad and used this knowledge during the campaign. After routing Sadaam’s forces in Najaf, the Grand Ayatollah Sistani wanted do speak to the American Commander to arrange for protection. LTC Hughes had studied the Ayatollah's teachings and sent a note to the Ayatollah with carefully selected words. The Ayatollah was impressed and invited the American to meet with him. To get to the Ayatollah’s location, LTC Hughes would have to traverse the heart of the city and go near the holiest Shi’a location in the country. He knew the visit would be a sensitive issue and so he organized a force of 130 soldiers, not to large but sufficient enough for self protection. Upon nearing the Mosque, insurgents began spreading the word that the Americans were there to harm the Ayatollah and the crowd began to become hostile. LTC Hughes could have easily suppressed the crowd with force, but instead he used his own critical reasoning and determined it was a misunderstanding and made the decision to withdrawal or as he stated it “they defused the confused.” He told his troops to smile, take a knee and point their weapons down at the dirt. He instructed his soldiers to take digital photos of those in the crowd who were not smiling and then told his troops to withdraw. Upon departing he “demonstratively swung his right arm and placed his hand flat against his heart in the traditional Islamic gesture, Peace be with you.” He added, “Have a nice day” then he walked off. Later that evening he sent a force back into town and took out the problem makers that had stirred up the crowd earlier in the day. He later met with Ayatollah Sistani who issued a fatwa ordering all Shi’as not to interfere with his force. His leadership was the decisive factor for successfully accomplishing the mission and protecting his force.

“Leadership is influencing people by providing purpose, direction and motivation while
Like previous successful leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Chris Hughes is a master in combat leadership. However, it is his skills that he developed above and beyond his warfighting expertise that made him an effective leader in Iraq. LTC Hughes epitomizes the traits needed for the current strategic environment. The Army calls such leaders “pentathletes” - leaders who are not only warriors but are culturally aware, skilled in governance, and able to operate across the full spectrum of conflict in the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment of today. The current Professional Military Education (PME) system is not optimally structured to prepare the Army’s leaders for the 21st century environment.

Leadership in the New Strategic Environment

The strategic environment of today is significantly different from the strategic landscape of just a few years ago. The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols phase 1 report emphasizes this point:

At the time of Goldwater-Nichols, the United States was engaged in a very dangerous, but somewhat predictable, competition with the Soviet Union. Today, the United States, albeit the world’s sole superpower, is waging a global war on terrorism and must cope with pervasive uncertainty. A Defense Department designed for a massive, industrial-era opponent is clearly not suited for combating covert, non-state actors in the Information Age.

So what is the best approach for enabling the Army to operate within the complexities associated in this new environment and win decisively? Many in the Army leadership have been seduced into believing that the answer lies in technology. There is no doubt that technological advancements are important enablers. However, there are two key reasons why the Army should reject the belief that technology is the primary solution. First, as technology changes and becomes cheaper over time, adversaries will continue to have easier access to low cost technology to asymmetrically attack even the most robust of new systems. Secondly, assuming the U.S. can stay ahead of potential adversary technology, those adversaries will gravitate to asymmetric threats that are not directed against these robust warfighting capabilities. Technology plays a vital role in ensuring our soldiers have the most effective systems available. However, the Soviet experience in Afghanistan and the U.S. experiences in Viet Nam and Somalia make the case that a technological advantage does not equal success on the battlefield, especially non-traditional battlefields.

Leadership is the most dynamic element of combat power. Confident, audacious, and competent leadership focuses the other elements of combat power and serves as the catalyst
that creates conditions for success. From Alexander the Great in the battle of Issus, to LTC Chris Hughes at Najaf, effective leadership has always been crucial in determining the difference between victory and defeat. The impact of leadership on the capability of the force is best illustrated by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker’s equation:

\[ F = (D + O + M + F) \cdot S \cdot L \cdot TEE \]

Where:
- \( F \) = Capability of the Force,
- \( D \) = Doctrine,
- \( O \) = Organization,
- \( M \) = Materiel,
- \( F \) = Facilities,
- \( S \) = Soldiers,
- \( L \) = Leadership,
- \( TEE \) = Leader Development (\( T \) = Training, \( E \) = Education & \( E \) = Experience)

The equation makes clear the importance of the human dimension of warfighting through the multiplicative effect of soldiers and leaders. But more importantly it highlights the exponential effect gained by experienced leaders who are well trained and educated.

Leadership Competencies for the 21st Century

As an institution, the Army is universally recognized for its ability to produce exceptional leaders. The issue however, is whether the current education system is structured properly to keep pace with the new strategic environment. “Both current and past senior civilian defense officials reportedly have grown increasingly frustrated with the conventional mindset of many strategic-level military officers.\(^6\)” In their view, too many senior leaders are too cautious, lacking the “fresh thinking, creativity, and ingenuity” to engage in the “out-of-the-box” thinking required to fully understand the asymmetric threats posed by new strategic environment. The current education system is very effective in training officers “what to think” but is not nearly as effective in educating officers “how to think.”

To improve the officer education system, developing leadership competencies that address “how to think” must be part of the solution. General Shelton stated “our military leaders must be schooled in matters both military and political - they must also be masters of the geopolitical realm.” He added “these stringent requirements for our future military leaders mean we must educate them on a wide range of subjects over a period of years throughout their careers.”\(^7\) Aware that junior officers must develop strategic thinking skills earlier in their careers, FM 22-100 lays out several competencies for strategic leaders. These include communication, dialogue, negotiation, consensus building, envisioning, strategic art, motivation, and skillful execution.\(^8\) LTC Paul Reayo expanded this list to include a compression of tactical operational and strategic expertise; articulate communication skills; abstract knowledge, political and cultural awareness; critical thinking; the capacity to be adaptive and intuitive; knowledge of
peace operations, stability operations, homeland defense, regional geography and economics. In recent years the traits of self awareness and adaptability have risen to the top of the list of desirable competencies. The 2001 Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLD) officer study report specifically challenged the education system to educate officers on the increasing importance of self-aware and adaptive leaders in full spectrum operations. That same year, Lieutenant General Steele, the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center stated that officers must be self aware and adaptive and be involved in lifelong learning, and the 2005 Army posture statement says the Army needs adaptive leadership. The Strategic Studies Institute recognized the list of requirements was becoming unmanageable and consolidated these traits into six general metacompentencies.

The “Pentathlete”

The Department of the Army chartered the Secretary of the Army Transition Team (SATT) in December 2004 to assist the Secretary of the Army outline a vision, goals, objectives and performance metrics for his term in office. The SATT briefed the Army’s senior leadership in early April 2005 using the chart at figure 1 below. The slide refers to building pentathletes, leaders that are innovative and adaptive, culturally astute professionals that demonstrate character and integrity. They are experts in the art and science of the profession of arms and can lead change and build teams in the new strategic environment.

![Figure 1. The “Pentathlete”](image)

The SATT further defined the pentathlete as a leader that is well versed in a range of...
areas and not just one discipline - leaders who have mastered their military or core career field
tasks and have developed skills in the broader, more complex, politico-military arena. The
report recommended a basic proficiency in a foreign language, and general awareness of
various cultures, including social mores and religious beliefs. Pentathletes need a regional
orientation based on a deep understanding of social, economic, and geographic factors.17

Figure 1 lists the requisite skills and attributes. To develop these pentathletes, the current
leadership development model and officer education system must change.

Leadership Development

The Army leader development model, sometimes called the Army education model, is
composed of three pillars or domains; the operational experience domain, the self development
domain and the institutional training domain. The model is designed to support the concept of
life long learning.18

The operational domain is where officers develop skills on how to operate in the “real”
Army. However, not all officers receive the same operational experiences and the other
domains must compensate for these inequities. In addition to actual downrange experience,
unit commanders are responsible for developing leadership development programs that include
a mix of individual and collective training, officer professional development classes and
individual counseling. The standards for these unit developmental programs are varied and
mostly defined by battalion and company commanders based on what they think is right for their
unit. While commanders must have flexibility, there are significant inequities between junior
officers assigned to units with very good programs and those where the program is virtually non
existent. There is little guidance on what skills or subjects should be addressed that ties
operational experience to skills learned previously or skills needed in future assignments.

The self development pillar is probably the weakest domain. Like operational
experience, there is no specific guidance, nor are there any concrete requirements placed on
the officer to encourage self development other than what may be command directed as part of
a unit program. The self development domain is dependent on the motivation of the individual
officer. Officers who pursue or do not pursue self development are neither rewarded nor
penalized for their efforts. The self development pillar must fill in the gaps not covered by the
other two pillars in order to achieve life long learning. Under the current construct, the self
development domain may be the only place an officer develops non traditional or non
warfighting competencies. Thus, if the officer is not properly motivated, and the educational
gaps are not addressed, the leadership model is fractured and the system of lifelong learning is
Of the three pillars, the institutional domain is the most developed. It is this domain that is embodied in the formal Officer Education System (OES) and provides the core of Professional Military Education (PME). Within the education system, the Army uses the terms training and education almost interchangeably. This causes confusion as the terms are quite different. The Army posture statement gets it right when it states that training prepares soldiers and leaders to operate in relatively certain conditions and focuses them on “what to think.” Education on the other hand prepares soldiers and leaders to operate in uncertain conditions, focusing more on “how to think.”

There is a natural symbiotic relationship between training and education. Early in an officer’s career, the focus is on training in the science of warfighting. As the officer develops and rises in rank, the focus then shifts towards an educational foundation. The Army War College is designed to produce officers that can operate in an environment of complexity, ambiguity, and rapid change; and can adapt and solve problems creatively. The Army, like the joint world, focuses on the educational end of the spectrum for its senior officers, and training for its junior officers. McCousland and Martin developed a graphic showing how training requirements should decrease over time, while education requirements increase (fig. 2). They argue that to successfully develop strategic leaders, the Army cannot wait until the 20-year point in an officer’s career to educate him or her in security studies.

Figure 2. Theoretical Leadership Scale
In reality, the linear relationship between training and education is somewhat off the mark. The Army’s current OES does not address topics related to “how to think” until the captains career course and really not with any substance until the officer attends Intermediate Level Training (ILE) at the field grade level. The actual relationship is more accurately portrayed by figure 3. In the new strategic environment, there is a mismatch in training versus the education of our officers. In OIF some officers felt unprepared for stability and support operations because it was not part of the training program prior to deployment. Officers like LTC Chris Hughes were prepared to handle these missions, based on their ability to adapt and think on their feet - they knew “how to think”.

Therefore the relationship should be modified per figure 4 to focus a little less on “what to think” and significantly more on educating our officers earlier in their careers on “how to
think.” With the challenges of the new operational environment, junior leaders must not only be able to think through solutions, but also must understand the strategic implications of their actions. Focusing PME more on education earlier in an officer’s career provides two positive secondary effects. First, strategic thinkers are developed through a life long learning process instead of waiting until the 18th-20th year of service. Secondly, improving the educational base directly contributes to the professionalism of the officer corps. The primary foundation of a profession is the application of abstract knowledge to a special situation that is unique to that profession’s jurisdiction. The profession of arms, just as any other profession, requires continuing education. In the new strategic environment, the expanded Army jurisdiction (peacekeeping and nation building) may have very well outrun its educational system. The environment has changed and the leadership development model developed for the “Cold War” no longer applies.

Current Professional Military Education Shortcomings

The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) officer study report accurately sums up OES shortfalls:

Over the past ten years the Army’s institutional training and education system has attempted to remain relevant to the Operational Environment. But the basic structure and methods within the OES have not appreciably changed. OES must adapt to meet the emerging requirements of full spectrum operations and the transforming Army. In addition to not adequately addressing the competencies needed for full spectrum operations; the current system is locked in a cold war mentality focusing officers on the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war independently from one another and in a sequential pattern.

In addition to the institutional domain not being able to keep pace with the requirements of the current strategic reality, the other two domains have serious flaws as well. Both the operational experience and self development domains suffer from inconsistent application and lack clear guidance to tie them to the institutional domain. Under the current education system, continuing professional self development is highly encouraged, however very little incentive or resources back up this encouragement. There is no overarching continuing education policy that ties the institutional education with operational experience and personal professional development. Thus, the leadership development model and officer education system is structurally flawed, and not up to the task of developing pentathletes.
Professional Military Education Recommendations

The current Officer Education System (OES) must evolve to develop pentathletes for the changing environment. It is not only a matter of adding new competencies, it also requires a re-examination of when and where these new competencies should be mastered in an officer’s career. As recent experience has shown, pentathletes with a level of strategic thinking skills are needed down at the company grade level.

To develop pentathletes, I propose four general recommendations. First, the new educational system must address the expanded pentathlete competencies without degrading core warfighting competencies. Second, the institutional pillar of the educational model must be protected from further degradation and better synchronized with the operational Army. Third, the educational system must be better integrated within the framework of a continuing educational model, similar to civilian professionals. Finally, officer education within the operational domain of the Army must be better defined, more regimented, and synchronized within an over arching continuing education system – leveraging the new Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) model.

Integrate Pentathlete Competencies

It is essential that pentathlete competencies are integrated without diminishing the strengths of the current Officer Education System. The Army education system must educate and train leaders who are well-founded in doctrinal principles in traditional as well as irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive environments and who have a high degree of tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. Much of this new program of instruction must be addressed in the operational Army; outside the institutional school system which is already time constrained to meet current requirements. Many of the new competencies such as creative and critical thinking must be addressed within the institutional domain during the Captains Career Course (CCC) through small group instruction and then reinforced during Intermediate Level Education (ILE) and by operational experience. Hard decisions on moving portions of the existing traditional POI, such as battalion staff processes, to a distance learning forum within the operational domain must be made to accommodate time to some critical pentathlete competencies. Other pentathlete competencies such as governance, statesmanship, diplomacy, cultural awareness and adaptive thinking can be taught through alternative forums outside of institutional education. For most of these new competencies, they will need to be continually reinforced as it will take years before leaders reach the level of competence desired.
Preserve Institutional Education

The anchor of the officer development model is the institutional domain. Educational institutions provide time for reflection and rejuvenation - an important aspect of developing intellectual capacity. The civilian professional world has known this for years and has programs for sending their people on sabbaticals to reflect, improve family relationships, and recharge. This rejuvenation process is instrumental to retaining high quality talent and infusing intellectual thought into the organization. Despite acknowledgement of its importance, there is continuing pressure to compress institutional time. For many, reducing time away from the operational Army is a valid means to save costs. However, as Colonel Rowan points out, we must not transition to a system where our career schools become “academic ranger schools,” which risks even greater junior-officer retention problems in the name of efficiency and cost effectiveness. Time spent at these institutions is akin to sabbatical time in the civilian professional world. The Army must, at a minimum, protect the institutional education time of the current system and find innovative ways to develop expanded pentathlete competencies.

One approach within the institutional domain is to encourage officers to complete a graduate degree in a field that benefits the Army and enhances pentathlete development. Civilian universities provide superb intellectual environments for developing many pentathlete competencies such as cultural awareness and governance. McCousland and Martin proposed that the Army consider offering a leave of absence at partial pay in order for officers to pursue an advanced degree. At the end of the leave of absence the officer returns to the Army, but joins a later year group. Another recommendation would be to increase the pay back time to the Army to discourage civilian corporations from recruiting these officers after the Army educates them. Another model being used by the Engineer Regiment is to allow officers to obtain a masters degree in conjunction with the career course in cooperation with the University of Missouri at Rolla. Under this program, officers remain for an additional 15 weeks beyond the normal career course. To support the development of pentathletes, the Army needs to prescribe that a portion of the curriculum be dedicated to pentathlete competencies. Increasing these opportunities may also encourage officer retention. Even with graduate degree opportunities, the institutional domain cannot address all pentathlete competencies. The solution lies in the development of a synergistic continuing educational model that leverages both the institutional domain and the officer’s time in the operational domain.
Adopt a Continuing Education Model

While the institutional domain has structured programs of instruction, the operational and self development domains are neither well developed nor synchronized with the institutional domain. The education officers receive outside the institutions is left to unit commanders and the individual. With the expanded pentathlete requirements, the Army can no longer afford such a disjointed system and must leverage operational assignments to meet officer professional growth requirements. Under the present system many officers have neither the time nor the motivation to pursue a self development program outside the institutional domain. A regulated continuing education model is needed that is directive in nature and integrates the institutional, operational, and self development domains together to reinforce lifelong learning.

The medical, legal and engineering professions have successfully used continuing education programs for years. These civilian professions recognize that the education their professionals receive at formal institutions is not sufficient to ensure their members maintain the expertise needed to remain competitive in a rapidly changing environment. The success of these programs is based on a system of incentives and penalties. If the professional fails to maintain the appropriate number of continuing education credits, they lose their professional registration and can no longer practice their profession until they gain the credits necessary. Many of these same organizations also provide bonuses if the professional maintains their professional registration status. The Army should initiate an overarching Continuing Officer Education System (COES) that prescribes requirements from pre-commissioning throughout the officer’s career that includes both institutional and operational educational opportunities that are designed to develop and grow the pentathlete competencies. Under the proposed COES, education is initiated in the institutional domain then continues during operational assignments. The continuing education model must be prescriptive and require the officer to achieve certain requirements at certain points in his or her career. Incentives and penalties for not meeting certain educational gates should be considered to motivate and ensure officers stay on track. For example, if an officer does not obtain the necessary continuing education credits, they would not become eligible for promotion to the next grade. Concepts such as bonuses and or greater assignment opportunities could also be considered.

Transitioning to a COES like model was not feasible previously because the appropriate tools and time within the operational domain were not available. A key component to COES is the availability now of online distance learning tools for routine classes like battalion staff operations or an introduction to joint operations that can be used to tailor officer education while
For COES to work in the operational domain, officers should not have to sacrifice off-duty time to meet educational requirements. Most officers have limited free time and this would be counterproductive to retention. Therefore, time must be made available during duty hours. The OPTEMPO of operational units is at an all time high and most junior leaders complain that they don’t even have enough time to adequately train on required small unit collective tasks. So where is the time going to come from? A potential solution rests with the emerging ARFORGEN model shown in figure 5. It is while the unit is in the reset/train pool that educational opportunities exist for officer education. During the initial phases of manning and equipping the force, direct supervision is primarily in the realm of the NCO corps. While it is still important to manage the multitude of administrative requirements, it is reasonable to expect that two to three times a week, the officers could attend classes supporting officer educational requirements. These classes could be conducted either within a unit environment or at post centers, or a combination of both. For instance, classes focusing on unit related requirements such as regional awareness for an upcoming deployment might be best taught in small groups formed at the battalion level and facilitated by trained personnel from the post education center.

This method would maximize the benefits of small group instruction as well as improving unit team building. The classes could be tailored around projected unit deployments to enhance the cultural awareness or particular national strategy issues associated with the deployment location. Other classes might be best taken at the individual level to address the particular needs of the officer based on their grade and where they are in meeting the educational
Figure 5. Proposed ARFORGEN Readiness Strategy - Heavy Brigade Combat Team

requirements as spelled out in the COES. Many of the individual classes could be delivered via
distance learning which would also enable officers to continue their education beyond the initial
reset year and can be tailored to support individual needs. To support COES, the Army must
develop education support centers on each installation. This proposition is made more feasible
by the latest rounds of BRAC and overseas basing initiatives that are consolidating more
officers at fewer installations. These education centers could either be Army developed or
contracted through civilian universities. Many civilian universities are already operating on
military posts and their operations could be expanded to support the new Army requirements.

Operational education opportunities complimented by unit professional development
classes and distance learning opportunities all tied to a master program of educational
requirements round out the means for executing continuing officer education within the
operational domain. The costs associated with standing up and operating the installation
education centers is significant and must be justified. However, given the Army’s objective to
develop pentathletes, the alternative travel costs and loss of operational troop time to accomplish this education within the institutional domain should make the initiative cost effective.

Proposed Continuing Officer Education System (COES) Framework

A continuing education program must start at pre-commissioning and continue through an officer’s career, integrating the institutional, operational and self development domains to support a system of life long learning. Figure 6 shows a proposed COES framework in very general terms, showing the relationships and types of coursework that supports pentathlete development. The focus of military education at the pre-commissioning (cadet) level must introduce the candidates to the service missions, national military capabilities and organizations and a very limited foundation in joint warfare. With the exception of the Military Academy, the Army does not prescribe much of the educational program of instruction outside of the minimum
military science classes. Except for a few scholarship opportunities, fields of study are left to the cadet’s choosing as long as the cadet graduates with a degree and the completion of military science classes. Even at West Point, there are opportunities to be more prescriptive on the types of courses required prior to commissioning. The Army is missing an opportunity to educate cadets on key pentathlete competencies that are available at West Point and civilian universities. Curriculums for academy cadets and ROTC scholarship recipients should be very rigid as students are effectively being paid to attend school. In addition to their degree requirements, these students should be required to focus on regional studies, language requirements, economics, sociology, cultural awareness, geography, communicative arts, and history. Non-scholarship ROTC cadets should have more flexible requirements depending on the region and resources available at the institution. For colleges that do not offer instruction that is prescribed, supplemental online courses could be offered as an alternative and in some cases waivers might need to be considered. In the case of non-scholarship students, some compensation should be considered for classes required that are above and beyond the scope of their degree requirements. This compensation would support recruiting and retention concerns associated with the added new requirements.

At the primary level (O-1 to O-3), focus should remain at the tactical level. Lieutenants selected to fill captain staff positions should received distance learning courses to prepare them for staff work. The concepts of full spectrum and joint operations should be integrated into both the institutional (BOLC) and operational domains. Additional exposure to cultural awareness, regional studies, language, and communicative arts should be integrated into the operational domain in conjunction with the ARFORGEN model. At the captain’s career course, the concepts of critical thinking and initial exposure to strategic concepts (NSS, NDS, and NMS) should be introduced. Finally, a formal leadership assessment needs to be completed at the career course to begin an officer’s self awareness process. Consider expanding graduate level degree opportunities in fields designated by the Army and in conjunction with the career course.

At the intermediate level (senior captains and majors), continue the focus on warfighting but within the context of operational art emphasizing systems thinking. Reinforce critical thinking skills and open dialogue during small group instruction during Intermediate Level Education (ILE). Increase distance learning opportunities to gain JPME 1 credit, as needed, prior to assignment to a JTF if the officer has not yet attended ILE. At ILE, the curriculum should be expanded to address interagency operations as well as an introduction to governance. Another 360 degree leadership assessment should be conducted at ILE to continue an officer’s self awareness. At this level, continue to develop cultural awareness skills,
enhance regional awareness, improve communications skills and pursue advanced language training outside the institutional training domain during operational education opportunities. Officers that have completed JPME I prior to ILE, should be given the opportunity to gain JPME II credit at ILE.

At the senior level (O-5 to O-6), focus on strategic leadership, national military strategy and theater strategy as well as national security strategy. Increase the understanding of the joint, interagency and multinational aspects of full spectrum operations. Improve understanding of all elements of national power with emphasis on governance, information and economics. Continue to develop cultural awareness skills, enhance regional awareness, improve communications skills and pursue advanced language training during operational education opportunities. Continue the current curriculum at the Army War College, however encourage more participation for those not selected to attend the resident course to complete the distance learning course. Finally at the general or flag officer level (O-7-O-9) education should be focused at the joint, interagency and multinational operations and the effective use of the elements of national power to support national strategy objectives. These skills should be supplemented by courses offered through distance learning on current business management practices in the private sector.

The recommended COES does not come without challenges. Acquiring qualified instructors to teach many of the new competencies within the captains’ career course and ILE is a significant hurdle. For many courses such as critical thinking, very experienced faculty members are required for the instruction to be beneficial. Additionally, there are significant challenges to meet all of the COES pre-commissioning requirements as all universities may not offer all the courses needed. These considerations will need to be considered in the process of modifying the existing pre-commissioning POI within ROTC and the military academy. Another concern will be the changes to the programs of instruction. There should be great concern that critical warfighting skills will be diminished by the addition of new non-warfighting competencies. Careful attention to this issue will require significant effort with constant re-evaluation of all PME programs of instruction to guard against this very potential. Finally, without the proper incentives, new additional online continuing educational requirements could be viewed very negatively by the junior officer corps.

Many leaders question the need for institutional PME during wartime, let alone any modification of the educational system. With many headquarters and units short qualified officers in the field, it seems counterproductive to many to sacrifice needed manpower to attend schooling while trying to prosecute a war. Lessons from the interwar period of the 1920s and
The 1930s as well as the aftermath of World War II illustrate the importance of continuing PME during wartime. The intellectual investment to PME during the interwar period created a cohort of strategic leaders who were extremely well equipped to prosecute a global war. However, during that very same war, the majors and lieutenant colonels who fought the war did not receive education at the general staff or war college level that would have greatly assisted in preparing them for strategic senior leadership positions. Those same leaders faced very different conditions during the Viet Nam war when they were the senior strategic leaders in charge and, from my perspective, could have greatly benefited from the strategic tools they would have otherwise received from a good PME program. Therefore, it is not only wise to maintain a vigorous PME during both peacetime and wartime, it is essential that our best leaders receive this critical education.

The COES model will produce the pentathletes desired by the Army leadership. However, there are costs associated with producing these pentathletes as outlined in this paper. The majority of these costs are associated with the operational domain. First, TRADOC will need funding to develop and manage the operational COES modules to support installation and on-line education that currently does not exist. Additionally, TRADOC will need to synchronize this training with institutional domain. Finally, installation education centers will need to be funded to manage and execute those operational COES modules taught on the installations.

Conclusion

The strategic environment has dramatically changed, however leadership remains the most dynamic element of combat power. Army leaders must remain masters of warfighting but must also expand that expertise to address the full spectrum of operations within an environment that compresses and blurs the lines between the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Leaders of tomorrow must become pentathletes, mastering strategic concepts at a much earlier point in their careers to include a greater focus on the broader, more complex, politico-military arena.

The current professional military education system and leadership development model is not adequately structured to develop Army pentathlete leaders and the officer education system must be modified. The answer is not to significantly expand institutional training but rather better leverage the operational and self development domains of the leader development model. By the same token, institutional education must be protected from further degradation and be better synchronized to include introducing the pentathlete competencies early during the pre-commissioning process and then reinforcing them through a Continuing Officer Education
System (COES), thus enabling life long learning. Institutional education must be synchronized with well defined officer education within the operational domain by leveraging the new ARFORGEN model.

Such a Continuing Officer Education System will go a long way to creating the "pentathletes we need to meet the demands of the new strategic environment we now find ourselves in. Renovating our officer education system is critical to the effectiveness of the future force. Former Chairman of the Joint Staff, General Hugh Shelton sums it up well:

To put it simply, we must provide our future leaders with the best possible education in the military art, and other related fields, to make certain America retains its pre-eminence on tomorrow's battlefields. This investment in educating our people and building future leaders (read pentathletes) is crucial to meeting our future security requirements. It is an investment we must not fail to make.28

End Notes


4 U.S. Department of The Army, FM 3-0 Operations (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2001), 4-4 to 4-11.

5 Ronald Johnson, “Leadership,” lecture, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 19 October, 2005, cited with permission of MG Johnson. During Class briefing relayed the equation as that presented to the Army staff by Chief of Staff of the Army.


8 U.S. Department of the Army, Army Leadership, 7-2.

"At the individual level, it is difficult to assess one's leadership ability when the lists suggest that a strategic leader must be, know, and do just about everything. Looking across the existing literature on strategic leadership, the current lists of Army strategic leader competencies, and the environment of the future force, six metacompetencies can be derived: identity, mental agility, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior, and professional astuteness. Identity is the same as self-awareness – the ability to gather self-feedback to form accurate self-perceptions and to change one's self-concept as appropriate; Mental agility includes adaptability and the ability to scan and adjust learning based on the environment. Cultural cross-savvy includes the ability to understand cultures beyond one's organizational, economic, religious, societal, geographical, and political boundaries. Interpersonal maturity includes empowerment, persuasiveness, consensus building, ability of officers to analyze, challenge, and change an organization's culture. World class warrior discusses where strategic leaders move beyond tactical and operational competence in the employment of the future force in full spectrum operations. Strategic leaders who are professionally astute understand they are no longer members of a profession, but leaders in the profession; they develop the future leaders of the profession and communicate this responsibility to future leaders of the profession.” Quoted in George Reed, “Appendix A Strategic Leadership Competencies,” in Strategic Leadership Primer, ed. Colonel Stephen A. Shambach, 2nd ed. (Department of Command, Leadership, and Management United States Army War College, 2004), 61-63.

21 Ibid., 26-28.


23 McCousland and Martin, 32.

24 U.S. Department of the Army, Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Report to the Army, OS-11


26 McCousland, and Martin, 29.

27 U.S. Department of the Army, Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Report to the Army, OS-10.

28 Shelton, 6.