USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

MAKING THE FUTURE TOTAL FORCE WORK

by

Lieutenant Colonel Gerald A. Buckman, Sr.
United States Air Force Reserve

Professor Dallas Owens
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>15 MAR 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. REPORT TYPE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. DATES COVERED</td>
<td>00-00-2005 to 00-00-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</td>
<td>Making the Future Total Force Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b. GRANT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5e. TASK NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. AUTHOR(S)</td>
<td>Gerald Buckman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</td>
<td>U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</td>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. ABSTRACT</td>
<td>See attached.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. SUBJECT TERMS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. REPORT</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ABSTRACT</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. THIS PAGE</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
The Air Force is implementing Future Total Force (FTF) as one method of transformation. Through FTF, the Air Force will better meet the challenges of a shrinking budget, aging aircraft fleet, and emerging missions by integrating (or associating) different combinations of Active Duty, Reserve, and/or Air National Guard personnel and equipment into single units. FTF implementation has produced many of the intended benefits but is also producing strain from high operations tempo and cultural differences. These strains have contributed to negative consequences to FTF unit members that threaten the strategic vision.

This project describes how FTF evolved to be a vital strategy in Air Force mission accomplishment. Both Active and Reserve components are described from their technical and cultural perspectives. These perspectives are used to analyze different FTF unit combinations now in place along with six ongoing constructs designed to test the FTF concept. The study explores strengths and weaknesses and recommends actions to ensure the FTF vision remains on track.
MAKING THE FUTURE TOTAL FORCE WORK

The United States Air Force instituted an interesting solution to cope with its shrinking budget, aging aircraft fleet, and high operations tempo. Dubbed the Future Total Force (FTF), this force management concept combines various Active and Air Reserve component entities into single units. The intent is to increase combat capability by capitalizing on the strengths inherent in each component. The term Air Reserve component (ARC) as used in this paper describes both the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command.

FTF was conceived by senior Air Force leaders at the end of Quadrennial Defense Review 1997. The concept had admirable goals: maximize strengths, keep everyone relevant, demonstrate teamwork, save money. These attributes were enough to set the first FTF units in motion.

As 2006 begins, senior leadership is rightly praising FTF’s proven successes. The program gained substantial advocacy from senior leaders and members of Congress. It is being incorporated into Base Realignment and Closure as well as Quadrennial Defense Review decisions. As a result, new, forward leaning organizational constructs are in their infancy stages of testing with hopes of rising to fruition. The casual observer could certainly conclude FTF is a huge hit as FTF units steadily accomplished their missions and consequently received public praise.

However, there exists a side to FTF that few outside of the participating units are aware of. Despite the sanctioned success stories, the problematic growing pains of this large transformational effort are underemphasized. For instance, the more controversial active associate and integrated constructs (to be discussed later) produced intense cultural clashes that needed unusual workarounds to produce the noted success stories. FTF unit commanders felt pressure to make the new construct work, and often passed their accomplishments up the chain of command for recognition while choosing to work the harsh realities of forced integration internally, if choosing to work on them at all. Therefore, the barriers to effective implementation were being under-reported, which took away the means to address those barriers. The result is a far different and dissenting view of FTF progress by the unit subordinates—those people who were living the vision.

The pressures of perceived forced integration with the other component plus the continuing unusually high operational tempo are adversely affecting morale and cohesion. The troops largely heard “Make it work!” while any accompanying rationale or additional guidance was not provided. Unit members, by and large, perceive that senior leadership does not fully understand the realities accompanying FTF implementation.
FTF is a long term transformational effort that has the service and DoD leadership support that is necessary for the program to develop. Its potential merits and vital contribution to the strategic vision of the U.S. Air Force means FTF is here to stay. The good news is that there are realistic methods to ease the pain of implementing the program. This study explores strengths and weaknesses of the program and recommends actions to ensure the FTF vision remains on track.

**Why Future Total Force?**

Transformation. The word often results in hand-wringing and cynicism among today’s military members. This is because transformation really means change—and change historically has not always proved to be for the better. Add the complexities of waging a war, shrinking budgets, and emerging missions, and transformation can be perceived as nearly overwhelming.

But this combination of complexities is precisely why Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld outlined his approach to transform the Department of Defense in April 2003. In the Department of Defense (DoD) Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG), Secretary Rumsfeld stated the war on terrorism is a transformation event that cries out for us to rethink our activities, and to put that new thinking into action.\(^2\) The TPG went on to direct all DoD agencies to build individual transformation roadmaps. And so the journey of transformation received new emphasis.

The United States Air Force published its “Transformation Flight Plan” in 2004. It defines transformation as:

> A process by which the military achieves and maintains advantage through changes in operational concepts, organization, and/or technologies that significantly improve its warfighting capabilities or ability to meet the demands of a changing security environment.\(^3\)

One of the key tools described in the flight plan to transform Air Force organization and culture is the Future Total Force (FTF). The flight plan correctly recognizes the Air Reserve component (ARC) as a critical partner in air and space operations, and identifies four benefits of merging, or integrating, them with active duty counterparts. First, FTF allows the ARC to be included in operating, fielding, or owning new weapons systems and emerging missions, thus remaining relevant as ARC legacy systems are retired. Second, including the ARC in operating, fielding, or owning these new weapons systems would substantially increase crew ratios and allow for maximum output. Third, integration would relieve stress on active duty members and provide a cost effective force multiplier. Finally, FTF would use the extensive experience of
ARC personnel and provide an incentive for retaining Airman who leave active duty. Using this rationale, the flight plan specifically states:

The Air Force will develop options to leverage all capabilities and expand Associate Unit programs and “Blended Wing” initiatives.

What this pioneering flight plan does not plainly point out, however, is that the Air Reserve component became a “must have” in order for the Air Force to accomplish its mission. The Active component is simply undermanned and under-equipped to carry out the foreseeable high operations tempo.

Presently, Headquarters United States Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Directorate of Future Total Force (AF/A8F) is leading the charge to conceive and implement FTF initiatives. Its mission is to integrate the Total Force to ensure air and space dominance for the future. Specifically, AF/A8F is responsible to identify integration opportunities, develop concepts of operation, implement validated initiatives, and advocate those initiatives at all levels internally and externally to produce needed capabilities.

**Air Force FTF Components and Culture**

To understand the FTF concept, it is critical to understand the defining characteristics that make up both the Active and Reserve components. It is regularly demonstrated that member’s knowledge of how the other component operates is generally weak. Learning about the other component—what makes that component “tick”—will give insight into the potential strengths and weaknesses of mixing portions of each component.

**Active Component**

The authorized end strength of the active duty Air Force is 359,300. Active duty personnel are committed to serve full time. They usually do not have a choice in their assignments or deployment schedule. They can be “tasked without being asked,” and this may be considered the component’s greatest strength. Active members tend to stay in jobs for a lesser amount of time then their RC counterparts, resulting in a lower overall experience level. Lower level experience may be considered the AC’s greatest weakness, and is one of the major factors to be overcome by FTF.

Most active duty personnel have not been significantly exposed to RC members. When close working relations do happen, many active personnel are surprised at how the RC functions. Active duty partners often find the RC traits of volunteerism, part time duty, and “asking before tasking” very foreign and not compatible with the AC way of doing things. Additionally, there are still some older active personnel that hold a lingering prejudice against
the RC. These few senior people still hold the belief that the RC operates like a “flying club”, is overall unprofessional, and is a sanctuary to escape from hazardous consequences, such as the draft. This belief was brought to the open during President Bush’s reelection campaign in 2004 where he was criticized for evading Vietnam by joining the Taxe Air National Guard. Fortunately, these beliefs and bias are eroding as the RC increases its visibility on the forefront of the mission, the draft becomes a distant memory, and the senior offenders retire.

Air Reserve Component

The Air Reserve component includes the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and the Air National Guard (ANG). Authorized end strength for the ANG is 106,678 and 74,000 for the AFRC. The key concept of the RC is “citizen airman.” By and large, duty in the RC is voluntary and co-exists with a civilian career. This principle of volunteerism means the member has a choice to participate. This may be the greatest weakness since volunteerism can only be estimated and not definitively scheduled. Members of the ARC typically have been in the same unit and often the same job for years. This often pays off with an unmatched experience level, which is also the components greatest strength.

Close association over long periods tends to produce a level of familiarity within ARC units that some active members find offensive. Many ARC members are former active personnel. For various personal reasons, they chose to leave active duty to pursue other interests while still serving the country from a system more to their liking.

Unlike active members who all serve in one status, members serving in either the Reserve or Guard participate in one of the following four statuses:

- Traditional Reserve (TR-Reserve) or Drilling Status Guardsman (DSG-Guard)
  These “citizen airmen” are members of the selected reserve and popularly known as “weekend warriors.” They function as the heart of the ARC. Although these volunteers are only committed to one weekend a month and two weeks a year, the global commitments since the end of the Cold War add pressure to participate much more. TR/DSGs must struggle to balance their time between civilian career, family, and military affiliation. This juggling of commitments is becoming more stressful as pressure to participate in the military remains intense. Civilian employers, especially small companies, tend to lose out when their workers are unavailable due to military duty. Although sympathetic to the cause at first, many civilian employers are now finding TR/DSG employees a burden.
- Air Reserve Technician (ART)
Air reserve technicians, commonly referred to as ARTs, are a nucleus of managers, planners, and trainers who manage the day-to-day operations of an ARC unit. They provide management continuity, equipment maintenance, and training support to help keep their units combat ready.

ARTs carry dual status, working as full-time civil service employees for the Air Force and as TR/DSG military members. They serve as TR members at the same units where they work as civilians and perform the same job. As civilians, ARTs provide full-time support throughout the month for their units. As military members, ARTs participate with other reservists on weekends and annual active-duty tours and are mobilized with the unit.11

- **Active Guard Reserve (AGR)**

  AGR members are similar to regular active duty personnel. They are on duty “24/7”, earn the same pay, and accrue the same benefits. The only major difference is that they are administratively and operationally assigned to either the Guard or Reserve, as their affiliation mandates. AGRs serve on limited tours of active duty, usually at headquarters staff level or in other special assignments. Their job is to bring Reserve or Guard expertise to the planning and decision-making processes at senior levels within the Air Force and other services.12

- **Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA)**

  IMAs are Reservists who are assigned to active-duty units to do jobs that are essential in wartime but do not require full-time manning during times of peace. They report for duty a minimum of one day a month and 12 additional annual training days a year.13

The ARC is subject to additional considerations that must be analyzed for their effects on potential FTF units:

- **Volunteerism**

  A bedrock principle of FTF is to use the ARC as a daily partner in today’s stressing operations tempo. The problem with this is that the ARC was designed and structured to be a Cold War backup force and is manned accordingly. Gone are the days of “one weekend a month, two weeks a year.” Today’s TR/DSG force is being “asked” to give more and more of their time to military duty. Time given to the military takes away from time expected by their civilian employers and family. Ways to increase volunteerism are being explored but may not be achievable. Despite this quandary, volunteerism is the preferred way to fulfill requirements for the Global War on Terrorism.14

  What all of this means is the ARC is being relied upon by the combatant commander, but TR/DSG members have the choice to participate. Danger lurks here, and the important aspect
of volunteerism must be strongly considered when building FTF units with high operations tempo.

- Mobilization
  Filling missions with volunteers is important so that involuntary service through mobilization can be avoided. If the ARC mission cannot be completed with volunteers, the President can mobilize the force to active duty status. This tool is used sparingly, as the repercussions are enormous. Civilian employers face hardship while their employees are not available to work. Mobilized personnel often experience pay cuts and other hardships not typical of part-time participation. On a positive note, even after mobilization authority is available, volunteers may be used to decrease the number of airman mobilized.

- Recruiting and Retention
  Recruiting and retention are now presenting challenges to the ARC. The pool of active duty separatees continues to shrink due to force reductions over the last decade, and the competition for these members has become even keener. The active duty is intensifying its efforts in retention, and the Air National Guard and Reserves are competing for these assets as well. Additionally, the current high operations tempo and a perceived likelihood of mobilization and deployment are being routinely cited as significant reasons why separating members are declining to choose continuing military service in the ARC. These issues further contribute to the civilian sector’s ability to attract these members away from military service. One consequence of the reduced success in attracting separating members from active duty is the need to make up this difference through attracting non-prior service (NPS) members. Increasing NPS members, however, erodes the high experience base the ARC is known for.

To conclude, the ARC is organized to be effective in a different era—the Cold War. Volunteerism is meeting the combatant commander’s requirements, but this may be difficult to maintain. Until significant ARC restructuring occurs, FTF strategy and decision makers should weigh these three considerations carefully.

FTF Constructs

The Air Force Directorate of Total Force Integration (AF/A8F) serves as the lead agency to build organizational constructs that will improve combat capability by better serving Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve people and systems. Five FTF organizational constructs are now available for consideration (only four are now in use). The following describes and analyzes strengths and weaknesses of each.
Classic Associate

Also called a “Reserve Associate,” this integration model charges the active component with principle responsibility for weapon system or systems, which it shares with one or more ARC units. Both AC and ARC retain separate organizational structures and chains of command.\(^{16}\)

Several airlift units have enjoyed this type of association since 1968. The success rate has been high because active duty retains ownership of the mission, with the ARC taking up the slack when capable. Additionally, both active and air reserve components are best able to sustain their cultural identities under the classic associate construct. Classic associate units are the best FTF constructs to consider under the current ARC structure and emphasis on volunteerism.

Active Associate

Lt Gen Stephen G. Wood, the U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs recently proclaimed the benefits of dramatically increasing the number of active associate units.

By doing this we can leverage the tremendous experience levels we have in the Guard and Reserve, as well as provide the ability to utilize the active duty airmen to sustain increasing levels of deployment necessitated by our expeditionary role.\(^{17}\)

This model is the opposite of the classic associate. This means that the active duty will move to Guard and Reserve locations, not just the other way around. In this construct, the ARC has responsibility for weapon system or systems, which it shares with one or more AC units. Both components retain separate organizational structures and chains of command.\(^{18}\) In addition to exposing AC personnel to higher experienced ARC members, the AC also has better “access to iron.” The AC can fly ARC airplanes (increase utilization rate) when ARC members are unavailable.

The 919th Special Operations at Duke Field, Florida flies the MC-130E Combat Talon I aircraft under an active associate arrangement. Experience here has shown the quote above to be overly optimistic. The MC-130E is a low density high demand asset (LDHD) and “tip of the spear” asset in the Global War on Terror. This is precisely the type of FTF situation to avoid.

Recall the three ARC characteristics discussed earlier. Immediately after 9/11 the unit was mobilized for two years. Many ARC units were mobilized during the initial post 9/11 thrust. Mobilization happened because the likelihood of meeting those initial requirements through volunteerism was negligible. The problems continued after the mobilization period ended and
the reservists went back to their civilian careers and volunteerism waned for a while. Since the Talon I mission did not decrease at all, despite the ended mobilization, the active piece of this association was forced to continue performing the mission it did not technically own. This caused resentment between both components at the unit level.

The Talon I is scheduled for retirement in 2010. As the Reserves look for a follow-on mission, the Air Force Special Operations Command has shown no desire to enter another active associate agreement in any of its LDHD platforms.

Active associations are useful for newer active troops to learn from their more experienced ARC brethren. However, potential FTF LDHD active associate constructs should generate red flags and wailing sirens to the strategist.

**Air Reserve Component (ARC) Associate**

The ARC associate unit is the combination of both AFRC and ANG units with one designated with the responsibility for the weapon system or systems, which is shared by all. Each unit retains separate organizational structures and chains of command.\(^{19}\)

No ARC associate units exist at this time. Although Reserve and Guard units share similar culture, this construct presents command and control challenges because of the different rules governing each entity. Significant legislative changes allowing for absolute command and control must occur before the Reserve and Guard should operate together in a single unit. Memorandums of agreements and handshakes cannot replace the authority of a lawful commander.

**Fully Integrated (Blended)**

If you said let's try to make this as hard as possible, I think this is a pretty good recipe.\(^{20}\)

Fully integrated units blend members from both components into a single organization and single chain of command.\(^{21}\) This was attempted within the 116th Air Control Wing at Robins AFB, Georgia. The intent in 2001 was to merge active duty and Guard into a single RC-135 Joint Stars unit. The insurmountable differences in governing law and command and control statutes made the fully integrated construct unworkable. The situation was similar to the ARC associate scenario above, in that no signed agreement or handshake can substitute for a lawful commander. The unit therefore evolved into an Integrated Associate construct (to be discussed next). Controversial constitutional amendments must become law before the Guard (as organized today) can fully integrate, as defined by this construct, with anyone.
Integrated Associate

This model is similar to the classic associate however all members belong to a single unit and administrative support and control is provided by the respective component through detachments.\textsuperscript{22} The 116 ACW found the integrated approach to be militarily unworkable. It needed a definitive command and control structure for each of its components to properly function as a military unit. The unit partially solved this issue by retaining respective administrative control. More contentious issues of rotating commanders between Guard and active, along with ensuring each is legally able to command the other, are being worked.

Forced integration into difficult organizational constructs generally brings a negative reaction from members. FTF strategists must consider minimizing growing pains to unit members--even if this means sacrificing potential FTF gains.

FTF Test Initiatives\textsuperscript{23}

FTF is venturing into unknown territory by testing innovative organizational constructs to synergize the strengths of active duty and citizen airmen. These extensive initiatives demonstrate top leadership support to long term FTF. The more prominent of these initiatives are described below.

- In Virginia, the 192d Fighter Wing (192 FW) from the Virginia Air National Guard will become a Classic Associate unit partner with the active duty 1\textsuperscript{st} Fighter Wing (1 FW) as it transitions to the F/A-22 at Langley AFB, VA. This association will functionally integrate both partners resulting in increased combat capability in the F/A-22.
- In Vermont, the USAF commenced a test of the Community Basing concept in summer 2005 by stationing 12 AD personnel for two years with the 158\textsuperscript{th} Fighter Wing (158 FW), an ANG F-16 unit at Burlington, VT. The goal of this active associate unit is twofold: 1) assess the feasibility of assigning AD personnel at ARC units and living in a community where no traditional base support is available, and 2) take advantage of the high levels of ANG experience to train and season junior AD maintainers functionally integrated with the 158FW.
- In Colorado and Wyoming, active duty C-130 aircrew and maintainers will fly and train as Active Associate units with the Reserve’s 302d Air Wing, Peterson AFB, CO and the ANG’s 153d Air Wing, Cheyenne, WY.
- In Nevada, The United States Air Force Warfare Center (USAFWC), Nellis AFB, NV, will integrate Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve members into advanced pilot training,
Predator UAV operations, many of the Air Force's test and evaluation requirements. AFRC will also classically associate maintainers with the USAF Thunderbirds.

- In Utah, a classic associate unit relationship was initiated between the 419 Fighter Wing (AFRC) and the 388 Fighter Wing (Active Duty). Both units are located at Hill AFB, Utah, and fly the F-16.
- In Hawaii and Alaska, the Air Force is moving forward to create classic associate wings with both the ANG and Air Force Reserve, respectively. They will share flying duties when the Air Force’s newest C-17 Globemasters arrive at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, and Elmendorf AFB, Alaska.

Making FTF Work - Recommendations

With both active and reserve components shrinking in size yet expanding in commitment, the focus should be on building a force that is “on the hook” to go. The pitfalls of volunteerism and mobilization have become clearer since the Cold War ended. The ideal solution, then, is to radically restructure the ARC to conform to the present and projected environment. This means less part time and more full time people all working under the same statutory guidance. This would be a move toward creating an efficient, single Air Force. The constitutional hurdles to implement this solution, however, make it just a dream.

The rationale for FTF is compelling enough for senior Air Force leadership to stamp the program as key to providing combat capability requested by combatant commanders. Some forms of FTF have proved to be logical, forward thinking concepts that have already demonstrated substantial success. It is clear that FTF will not fall into the “fad” category but will evolve through trial and error.

The good news is that the professionals at AF/A8F are evolving and working hard to manage the initiative. As is the case with all things, the responsibility for success falls with leadership. The following FTF-bolstering strategies will better enable leadership to make sure the “right unit” is being created at the “right place.”

Understand the ARC

Both active and air reserve components have significant strengths and weaknesses that must be better understood by FTF strategists. Some well-intended FTF constructs that are in place now have proven to be too culturally radical—too upsetting to the members—to realize intended efficiencies. It is time to include the ARC in all levels of developmental education. Since the ARC is an essential mission accomplishment tool, it is essential for leaders at all levels to be familiar with this tool before using it! This recommendation goes beyond just the Air
Force, as the operating environment today is undeniably joint in nature. The active personnel in all services need to understand more about their reserve components than what they bring to the fight. They also need to know what makes the reserve components culturally different.

Education will then enable the strategic leader to examine the puzzle pieces as outlined in this paper and figure out the best ways to make them fit together. First, a definition of the word Reserve:

1. To keep back, as for future use or for a special purpose.
2. To set or cause to be set apart for a particular person or use.25

Our current ARC was originally conceptualized with these two definitions in mind. Many of its members today still hold on to that paradigm. Members choose to serve in either component for personal reasons. Those reasons usually include not wanting to be a member of the other one! Therefore, being forced to work with the other on a routine basis may result in resentment that detracts from the overall vision. Today’s expectation to partner different components can entail more commitment and effort than the member intends to give.

FTF strategists must be educated on the concept of “citizen airman” before deciding on constructs. The elements of volunteerism, mobilization, and recruiting and retention must be consciously and clearly understood. Strategists must also understand the importance of cultural identity on potential associations. Maintaining cultural identity should be a paramount consideration when constructing a FTF unit.

The single most important attribute of the reserve component is volunteerism. Unlike active duty members who are “on call, 24/7,” citizen airmen have a choice to participate. In times other than mobilization or when members have already been mobilized to the maximum extent that law or policy allows, they can say “No thanks.” This is precisely why missions involving Low Density High Demand (LDHD) assets should not be primarily assigned to the ARC. In fact, a case can be made to keep the ARC out of LDHD missions altogether, as the combatant commander should never have to rely on volunteers to take on priority, time intensive missions. To stay true to the intent of FTF, however, the ARC should stay involved in LDHD but in a Reserve Associate role only, and considering force shaping guidance discussed next.

Increase AGR, Decrease TR/DSG

The ARC today is no longer that force kept in reserve until needed. The ARC is instead partnered with the AC and required to respond at any time at any level of need. This presents considerable risk to the combatant commander, who in actuality, is relying on individual
volunteers to ensure a mission is accomplished. Unless mobilized, ARC members must consent to military service and cannot be ordered to participate— they can say “No!” Therefore, ARC personnel structure changes must happen if it is to be a reliable partner in today’s missions. The mix of AGR, ART, and TR/DSG members was designed to be useful during a much different era. Today’s operations tempo requires a reliable force not subjected to the negative side of volunteerism.

Assuming the ARC remains involved in LDHD and other demanding missions, the best way to minimize the potential negative consequences of volunteerism on mission accomplishment is to increase the number of “full time” ARC members at the unit level. AGRs would be the best solution, as they operate under the same conditions as active duty and can be “tasked, not asked.” One way to increase the number of AGRs without adversely affecting end strength is to reduce the number of corresponding TRs. A general rule of thumb is that it takes three TRs to produce the workload of one AGR. More ARTs would also help, as they are technically full timers although they operate under two different statuses to be classified as such. The right mix at the unit level should be approximately 25% full time and 75% TR/DSG. However, the goal should be to always lessen the number of TRs or DSGs in LDHD and/or other high operations tempo units. The downside is cost, as AGRs are expensive. But relying on volunteers for critical missions could prove far more costly to the combatant commander and the nation.

Advocacy: Managing the Meaning

Any new idea must have buy-in from those who must use or live under it in order for it to be a success. If people at any level do not see the merits of a proposal, they may undermine the effort in a variety of ways. There has been a perception among unit members that senior leadership in some cases simply mandated success of FTF—something that is impossible to do. Take the case of the 116 ACW integrated wing initiative:

The two wings joined with essentially no direction other than, “Make it happen and don’t fail.”

That is not a flattering assessment of how the implementation proceeded. The wing generated a lot of great press for getting the job done. Much of this was attributed to the integration, but many wing members have a different take about what earned the hearty praise. It came down to pride—the unit members would not let the mission fail despite the ongoing organizational experimentation. “Pushing a wheelbarrow upside down” will get the job done but not by the best means.
Managing the meaning simply means leadership stays involved in the transformational process and reports honest feedback. It is leadership’s job to continually translate strategic goals to subordinates in a manner the subordinates understand. This involves explaining “why” things are happening. The days of blind followers are gone in today’s Air Force. Our professional and highly skilled cadre must understand why. If they do, the chances are better that they will support the cause. Conversely, leadership must transmit subordinate feedback back up to the senior level so appropriate adjustments can be made. Sometimes there is bad news! The only way to fix something major is to let people know there is something wrong. Transformational leadership involves continual mediation and marketing so both superior and subordinate understand the dynamics of what is trying to happen.27

Conclusion

FTF is a critical tool to Air Force transformational efforts. FTF is not just a passing fad but an absolutely necessary initiative as the Air Force simply cannot perform its mission without the contributions of its Air Reserve component. This will become increasingly apparent as budgets and personnel end strengths continue to shrink. However, FTF is under scrutiny as high operations tempo proves to strain personnel of both components and their cultural identities. Leadership education of ARC values is the key to alleviating this strain. It is important to maintain the heritage and culture of contributing FTF units while maximizing their output. This can be done by thoughtful force structure constructs, increasing full time presence in ARC units, and quality leadership continually mediating FTF intent and progress down and up the chain.

Endnotes

1 The term “Reserve Component” is often used to refer collectively to the seven individual reserve components of the armed forces: the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. CRS Report for Congress, Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers, Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, 18 January, 2006, 1.


4 Ibid., 34.

5 Ibid.


8 Ibid.


10 Volunteerism in this context applies to the ARC only. Both AC and ARC volunteer to become members of either component. However, after this occurs, the AC member can be involuntary moved to another assignment or tasked to perform a certain duty. The ARC member ordinarily cannot be involuntary moved or tasked. Only through Presidential mobilization can an ARC member be forced to serve. Mobilization is an extreme measure that can bring consequences to an ARC member's civilian status, and should be avoided when possible. The tool to avoid mobilization is volunteerism--see how much of the mission can be supported through volunteers before involuntary mobilizing people.


13 Ibid.


15 Ibid., 2.


21 Ibid.


24 Wood, 2.


