TRAINING THE FORCE

by

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The horrific events of September 11, 2001 resulted in change in the United States Military Doctrine and the execution of modern warfare. Smaller formations of technologically superior conventional forces quickly defeated a larger conventional enemy force in Iraq. In early May 2003, the President of the United States publicly proclaimed an end to the war in Iraq. Over two years later in Iraq, the United States Military, primarily the United States Army, continues in a quagmire of conflict with no clear termination conditions and an unclear vision of troop withdrawal conditions. Amidst a major realignment of forces and transformation of almost half of the Army’s major formations, the United States Army consciously altered individual and collective training in order to execute a mission to ‘win’ in Iraq. Did the Army make the right decision? Alternatively, is there a need for change in the training paradigm in order to better prepare Soldiers and leaders? This project will first examine current Army training doctrine. The study will then examine current Army training initiatives and discuss the potential of these initiatives as they apply to the future of warfare. Finally, the project will discuss recommended changes to current training trends in three specific areas: creation of exportable training teams, alignment of institutional training, and creation of a centralized 18 month training model for Army forces.
TRAINING THE FORCE

The United States Army continues to accomplish its primary missions of protecting the Nation and winning the Nation’s wars. Over the last 230 years, Americans have grown accustomed to an Army capable of fulfilling all ‘calls to duty.’ Today, however, the Army finds itself concurrently challenged with an effort to transform its formations and doctrine while fully engaged with an ill-defined enemy best described as, “Adversaries capable of threatening the United States, its allies, and its interests range from states to non-state organizations to individuals.” Given this ambiguous enemy, the Army remains challenged by a wider variety of operations than ever before in its history. How does the Army look to the future while engaged in transformation and fully engaged in a war with an unconventional enemy with no apparent defeat mechanism? More specifically, is the Army too engaged in reacting to the current conflict, thus losing the ability to train and prepare for future missions? Is there a need to begin reforming the training paradigm of the United States Army? The analysis that follows presents a single opinion and suggests that the Army can improve efforts to train the force for future missions while completing transformation, investing in the Soldier and Army leadership, and incorporating lessons learned from the current conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq. This article proposes that the Army must realign certain areas of traditional training methods by embracing a more centralized and expeditionary training model. As a subset of expeditionary training, the Army must also revitalize and reorganize the education system for Soldiers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Officers.

History

The author confesses an existing bias when analyzing current fielding, research and development trends, and their impacts on deployed forces, Soldier, and unit training. The reader should understand that the author was commissioned in Armor, and served in Armor assignments at division and below for 16 of 20 plus years of service. My perspective on the Army and its role in providing a trained and ready force derives from assignments ranging from tank platoon leader to G3. I served as platoon leader, scout platoon leader, and company commander, in Cold War and peacetime operations in the United States and Germany. I have attended training (rotations) at two of the three Army Combat Training Centers and I served as Opposing Force Tank Battalion Commander and Company Team Observer Controller at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany when the United States committed to Bosnia. Additionally, I served as a tank battalion commander in combat operations in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom I and II and most recently as G3, Operations and Training
Officer for the 1st Armored Division. I believe these assignments provide a solid base for analyzing effective training methods at individual and collective levels, but I also realize I lean toward favoring the employment of heavy forces over light forces in most operations.

A lighter more lethal force will become reality someday, but for the next twenty years the Abrams Main Battle Tank variants (M1A1, M1A2) and its ally the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) will remain the preeminent Army fighting vehicle sources for all conflict resolution, and in other cases applied for lesser missions across the globe. Lieutenant General (LTG) William Wallace clearly laid out this premise in a memorandum dated 30 September 2005 saying, “1. The purpose of this memorandum is to re-emphasize TRADOC and future Center (FC) support for the Army strategy to improve and maintain the Abrams and Bradley as key elements of the combat capability through the next two decades, and beyond.” This means the focus on any revolution in training method must incorporate what the Army inventory possesses, not what the Army might develop next decade. Additionally, the paper assumes that the eventual incorporation of new technologies will only serve to enhance proposed changes to current training methods. This principle of train with what you have and incorporate technological changes within an existing system, rather than change the system, supersedes any thought that a revolution in technology acts as a panacea for ineffective training or lack of ‘field’ time. Until another nation seriously challenges the United States in superior arms and/or technology, the United States remains the preeminent world military power and will continue to engage in myriad missions with ‘legacy’ equipment. As LTG Wallace further states in his memorandum to the Commanders of the Armor Center and Infantry Center, “2. …the Abrams and Bradley will continue to provide the necessary combat overmatch to modular forces for the foreseeable future.” Therefore, the training of forces, whether heavy, medium, or light, must consistently address two factors; the security environment and the potential of the force to achieve the assigned mission.

Background

The current strategic security environment poses a number of challenges for the United States Department of Defense and its State department contemporaries. Joint Publication 1 describes the operating environment as, “The superpower conflict is over, but many complex and dangerous challenges remain. The enemy we face today is instability and unpredictability. It is virulent drug trade and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. And it is terrorism, the weapon of cowards and malcontents.” Joint Publication 1 further describes the strategic security environment as “dynamic and uncertain, with recurring disputes, crises, and conflicts in
many regions as well as endemic conflicts in regions of particular importance to the United States...These adversaries may be states or groups of states as well as non-state actors." The Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff acknowledge the uncertain and unpredictable environment in the Army’s 2005 Posture Statement. They also provide guidance and a vision for the future of the Army saying, "The Army exists to serve the American people, to protect enduring national interests, and to fulfill national military responsibilities." Based on the current environment and the increasing external complexities of the future environment and threat, the Army’s focus must be on maintaining proficiency across the full spectrum of operations. As described in Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, "Full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. Missions in any environment require Army forces prepared to conduct any combination of these operations: Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating the enemy...Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack...Stability operations promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment...Support operations employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering."

Applying Doctrine

Having described the current operating environment, a discussion on applicable Army and Joint doctrine is necessary. FM 3.0 clearly provides the doctrinal framework for training for full spectrum operations and the Army must realize that full spectrum operations accounts for the current conflict in Iraq. The Army must also understand the risks associated with leveraging training and resources in a single spectrum, without regard to the other three. Developing all Soldiers as warriors makes for a good bumper sticker, but an over-reaction to this particular vision would result in detrimental effects on the training institution for many years to come. In order to address the current conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California completely revised the structure of training and assessment for rotational units. There were clearly a number of reasons the NTC moved to the current training model, but the question now becomes how rapidly the Army, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the NTC can reverse the effects of deploying the opposing force units, contracting civilians to simulate battlefield effects, and removing force on force and live fire training. General Peter Pace recently reiterated this concern in guidance to the Joint Staff when he stated, "Our proper emphasis is on the War on Terrorism but we must remain prepared to conduct the full range of military operations. We will remain a force capable of defeating any
If the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs tells the Service Chiefs that the Armed Forces must remain capable of defeating any enemy, how then does the Army translate this information in the training base?

The answer to the above question is two-fold. First, the Army must train within the framework provided in FM 3-0 using every available resource, and, second, training must remain focused on enabling the warfighter. The Soldier remains the tool from which the nation and the Army execute missions. As previously mentioned, technological revelations only augment the Soldier’s ability. An unmanned aerial vehicle still requires a ‘pilot’ and if used as a weapons delivery platform still requires a commander’s authority to engage the enemy. Future combat systems will still require technically and tactically proficient Soldiers.

Within the model of full spectrum operations, the Army maintains the mission to defeat irregular forces across the global battlefield. Traditionally, Special Operations Command led all efforts in combating irregular forces, however, the current Global War on Terrorism highlights the increasing need for conventional forces to engage in the defeat of irregular forces. Need, however, does not mean the Army should necessarily adjust, change, or otherwise alter training methods or current doctrine. When the Army’s National Training Center changed from high intensity conflict training (or major combat operations) in 2003, what costs were associated with the changes in the training model that could not be replicated at home-station, at another training center, or through existing simulations? The first degradation in training was the loss of brigade level operations in the northern live fire area, followed by the loss of brigade level force on force operations. Third, and probably the most significant when considering the effect on the training institution, was the dismantling of the professional opposing force (OPFOR). The professional OPFOR created a realistic training environment that truly challenged rotational units in major combat operations.

Integration of Lessons Learned

Army Field Manual 7-0, *Training the Force*, begins by stating, “We train the way we fight because our historical experiences show direct correlation between realistic training and success on the battlefield. Today’s leaders must apply the lessons of history in planning training for tomorrows battles.” If this statement holds true, then the Army should continue to incorporate lessons from the current fight in Afghanistan and Iraq into all echelons of training. The Army must also look at the other potential missions and their effects on the force and the forces’ ability to train proactively and not reactively. In the training inventory, the Army possesses a plethora of resources. These resources range from the drill sergeant to the engagement skills trainer; a training simulator that allows Soldiers to train on a variety of
weapon systems before moving to the live fire ranges. The Army also developed premier professional military educational schools focused on continued development of Army Soldiers and leaders. Additionally, the Army boasts unmatched live fire and maneuver training areas at nearly every installation in the continental United States, Germany, Kuwait, and Korea, and possesses the potential to expand these capabilities when needed. An example of expanded live fire capability was the construction of Butler Range south of Baghdad, Iraq. In less than six months, the Army, through United States Central Command, built a live fire range capable of supporting platoon level live fire exercises, aerial gunnery for rotary winged aircraft, and artillery and engineer live fire operations. With all these resources and capabilities, the Army continues to adapt to changes in the operating environment.

The Army must continue to address training shortfalls and take immediate but appropriate actions to correct deficiencies before the operational army fully commits to training along a single path of the full spectrum of operations. As the Army transforms to the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) as its primary combat unit, the Army must also adapt traditional training methods while remaining focused on current doctrine. With the reality that a BCT (Stryker, Heavy or otherwise) could deploy into combat without its parent headquarters, the institutional army must be dismantled and reassembled. The Army must also accept a more decentralized training institution that permanently exports training resources to BCTs and higher staffs across the Army. The decentralization of training resources will require some relocation of institutional organizations that support training and development.

Alignment of Resources and Changing Institutions

In order to resolve further resourcing deficiencies in training, manning, and budgeting, a discussion about infrastructure changes is required. First, each installation, or major command, should possess the ability to conduct professional development courses. In order to accomplish this, the Army would assign instructors and leverage resources and staffs at installations such as Fort Hood. The installation commander would oversee these newly formed schools allowing the tactical commander to control attendance. The institutional army must also recreate and relocate training center resources giving the capability of training full spectrum operations at BCT and lower echelons to local installations. Training teams would also be assigned to the division and exportable when the unit deploys to the actual Training and Readiness Center. The Training Center would be fully manned by professional opposing forces capable of replicating the threat across the full spectrum of operations. The following paragraphs explain in more detail the required initiatives. Realistically, some of these ideas cost more than the Army
can afford in the immediate future, but a total commitment to achieve these stated goals in conjunction with the completion of the rebasing initiative and Army transformation ensures the Army remains relevant in the future. Army leadership must truly embrace joint operations. This requires support by the Department of Defense (DOD) and sister services, but the true value of manning and executing missions on a daily basis as a joint headquarters results in saved lives of Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, and Seamen. This also means that units like the 18th Airborne Corps, a Joint Task Force (JTF) capable headquarters, must daily execute integrated training, manning, and budgeting. Much discussion at the higher echelons of the Army and DOD would lead one to believe this can happen, however, until certain ‘rice bowls’ are broken the Army will continue to man Corps headquarters with the responsibility of providing JTF Headquarters.

A New Training Paradigm

The Army must commit to an evolution in its training paradigm. One of the most prominent failures in training revolves around staff proficiencies. Staffs become consumed by everyday business. Rarely does the Executive Officer, Chief of Staff, or Deputy Commanding General identify and allocate sufficient time to prepare and train the staff along the full spectrum of conflict. Based on my experience, if self-induced training does occur, the training normally focuses on the primary staff neglecting the deputies and planners who continue to accomplish daily missions. Additionally, current deployment cycles exacerbate training inefficiencies. If a higher-level staff does conduct scheduled training and evaluation, the training and evaluation comes at a cost and is facilitated by an outside agency like the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). The resulting lessons learned more often than not become long forgotten as the staff reestablishes a daily battle rhythm, recovers from deployment, incurs personnel turnover, or prepares for deployment.

In order to better prepare staffs, the Army should re-look the composition and location of assets like BCTP. Institutionally, the Army should invest in organizations that retain the mission of BCTP and assist JTF and division commanders in training staffs. Each division should have an assigned training and support team composed of a former chief of staff and former primary staff officers. The training team becomes the training and support staff or G3Training and Support (G3TS). The G3TS also assist in assessing readiness, and planning and executing subordinate staff training events. The team deploys with the headquarters and staff when executing training or real world deployments. This provides the unit commander with a look at internal functions and efficiencies; like having a scout team watch the battalion vice watching the enemy (see yourself)! The direct benefit of establishing permanent teams allows the
commander to establish a training program that can be monitored and enforced by the G3 through the G3TS. The G3TS would be fully integrated into G3 operations and would attend Chief of Staff Primary meetings, reporting on the staff training readiness. The division commander would also possess the ability to mobilize the team to assist in training subordinate staffs when the training cycle of the division staff was not the primary focus.

Similar to the G3TS teams, the Army must invest in experienced, exportable Readiness Training Teams (RTTs). These teams are assigned to the regional training centers, like the National Training Center, are under Operational Control (OPCON) of the division they are currently evaluating, report directly to the division commander with a second line of communication back to the parent training center, and focus on evaluating and providing feedback on home-station training within the BCTs. Unlike the range control workers, the Readiness Teams enhance the training experience. Another required change is each major installation, or more specifically, each installation that headquarters a division with accompanying BCTS, requires a sufficient training area to maneuver a BCT, conduct battalion level force on force missions, conduct a company level live fire exercise, and possess adequate simulations to train Soldiers and staff.

**Additional Training Requirements and Professional Military Education**

In addition to the major muscle movements required of the Army to reform its training base and institution, there exists a requirement for specialized training. Specialized requirements refer to training such as Air Assault, Airborne, Path Finder, and like courses. As motivating as many of these schools might be, specialized training schools exist specifically to produce a Soldier qualified in a skill set required to accomplish his or her assigned mission. For example, a tank battalion does not have a need for airborne qualified Soldiers, but does have a need for Soldiers expertly trained in fire control systems on the Abrams tank. Therefore, only Soldiers and leaders involved with or assigned to airborne units attend airborne school. Similarly, only Soldiers and leaders assigned to Air Assault units require Air Assault training. In an effort to minimize duty away from home station, these specialty schools must be consolidated and relocated, where necessary, to accommodate the required training base and in order to support the commander of those particular specialty forces. A Soldier or leader would attend the school only after reporting to the command. This reduces travel time, temporary duty in route to new duty locations, and provides Soldiers more available for training.

Shifting the doctrinal training paradigm also encompasses a shift in professional military education (PME). In order to continue to produce quality Soldiers and leaders, the institutional
The Army must adjust some aspects of the current professional military education system. Career oriented schools, through the rank of Major and E-7 must be dismantled and moved to local installations. Recent experience with units returning from deployment clearly highlights the inability of Human Resources Command to efficiently manage the thousands of Non-Commissioned Officers and Officers requiring the next level of professional military education. Additionally, the Army G8 would benefit as local commands would incur no cost for temporary duty of Soldiers. By consolidating entry level at all major commands vice a centralized branch or MOS specific site, the Army allows for decentralization of order of merit lists, and thus, allows commanders to retain attendance decision making authority. With current changes being made to the local Primary Leader Development Courses or Warrior Leader Course (WLC), Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC), and Intermediate Level Education (ILE) there are positive signs improvement is being made to the PME system. Beyond the specifics of those changes, fundamentally the Army needs to restructure by consolidating professional military education along four lines of operation. These lines of operation include Entry-Level, Mid-Career, Senior, and General Officer professional education. For purposes of this paper, Entry-Level recommendations will be discussed in some detail with discussion about the other lines of operation touching on how to teach not what to teach.

The educational system should address one question, at each echelon, and then shape the learning experience to achieve that particular effort. Army Commands must become more involved in the continuing education of Soldiers and officers and should directly input whether that Soldier progresses to the next level. Although not a detailed discussion of educational training, the following offers some suggestions for the Army educational system along the recommended four lines of operation. Key to all education is the continued requirement to complete education and training through distance learning programs. Additionally, in line with the battle-buddy concept, upon arrival at the unit every Soldier and officer will be assigned a mentor. The mentor becomes responsible for guiding his or her charge through completion of the entry-level training program reporting progress to the commander quarterly. The education system must also be viewed as long term vice a peaks and valley model where Soldiers and officers conduct Temporary Duty away from home-station for short durations, then return to their assigned unit upon completion. The initial-entry model below probably raises the hair on the necks of first sergeants and company commanders, but the model allows more flexibility and direct input from the command.
Entry Level Training and 350-1 Requirements

Entry-Level includes all new Soldiers from Private, E-1, to Lieutenant, O-1, and continues until a Soldier reaches the rank of E-6, or an officer is ready to progress from the rank of Captain to Major. This is a significant change from current methods and implies that the gaining commands assume responsibility for completing Entry-Level training and then recommending the Soldier/Officer for continued Mid-Level training and promotion. The individual assumes responsibility for continuing education by accepting a distance learning profile upon graduation from initial entry training. A current initiative by the Army to increase Soldier education in cultural and language training is the Rosetta Stone Program. This program allows certain Soldiers to access language training programs online. This does not presume that an entry level Soldier, many of whom do not even possess a high school diploma, can master a language. However, programs like Rosetta Stone show that the Army understands the complexities of a Soldier's awareness and training remaining relevant for future conflicts.

Initial Entry-Level education operations must focus on providing the gaining command a technically proficient Soldier or leader. What does this mean? The Army should centralize what is now known as Basic Training to produce a disciplined Soldier that is physically fit and an expert on two weapons—the current rifle and pistol. In addition, the initial entry course should begin indoctrinating the Soldier in Army values, drill and ceremony, and what will be termed as the ‘350-1’ training matrix i.e. subjects like Equal Opportunity, Consideration of Others, and Suicide Prevention training. After initial entry, the Soldier moves to his military occupation specialty (MOS) course or advanced initial entry and continues to train 350-1, language, and weapons training as well as knowledge based proficiency in the specific MOS. Thus, a command receives a Soldier with skill sets necessary to execute mission from day one. Officers undergo similar structure but the 350-1 and language training must begin prior to actual entry, meaning college level programs or BOLC I, and military academies begin to take on the shared responsibility of ensuring that officers enter BOLC II at the same level a Soldier enters advanced individual training.

Once arrived and integrated into a unit, the Soldier and officer continue their education through a series of directed training in addition to the unit’s training. The individual maintains an electronic ‘job book’ assigned at graduation from initial entry or BOLC II that guides the Soldier and Officer through additional language and cultural training and bears the burden for all 350-1 familiarization training. The leadership reviews the progress of the electronic ‘job book’ during quarterly counseling sessions. The command also retains full responsibility of the glide path for movement to the mid-level education based on training events, deployments, and leave.
opportunities. Monthly the mentor and Soldier/Officer review progress and report official results through an information technologies system.

The education system also incorporates what is currently titled Primary Leadership Development (PLDC) or Warrior Leader Course (WLC) and the Basic Non-Commissioned Officer (BNCOC) Course into a unit level training requirement under Entry-Level training. Parts of the required education for both schools becomes mandatory distance learning, while the remaining training is accomplished at home station based on a unit’s training and deployment cycle. Similarly, officers up to the rank of captain must meet certain requirements through distance learning before attending a local captains training course, which encompasses the centralized learning objectives of what used to be Combined Arms Services and Staff School and the current Captains Career Course. For officers, completion of the resident-local captains training course qualifies for attendance at the branch proponent update course. Where distance learning and the captains training course focus on warfighting and skills required of staff officers, the branch course instructs officers in specific proponent updates.

Impacts of a Shifting Paradigm

The impacts of moving to an education system as outlined above resound with issues, but these obstacles can be overcome with commitment and proper resources. First, basic training sites must be limited and consolidated within major commands. Current organizations that support Entry-Level education must become exportable. The ultimate goal being permanent facilities and qualified instructors at each Major Command in CONUS, with the facilities and instructors assigned to and responsible for by the senior tactical commander on each particular installation. This allows the commander to adjust an individual’s military education to fit required field training and deployments. There are a number of other impediments to this system centering around the priority between continued education and what I label as required commitments that must be done in order to keep a Soldier healthy, like dental and medical appointments, and family commitments. The mentor and commander determine the priority by being proactive with recorded monthly reviews of the education program.

Mid-Level and senior education models would also need to continue to incorporate Rosetta Stone, distance learning in 350-1, language and cultural skills training. As with Entry-Level training and education, the non-commissioned officer and officer receive mentors to help guide them and to enable learning. The Army would need to reconsider what distance learning objectives would be required before advancement, but the object would be to educate leaders at the mid-level between 10 and 18 years of service, allowing for senior education between 18-25
years of service. At the more advanced levels of training and education, the educator must possess the appropriate life skills and experiences requisite to the position. Former commanders at the brigade, battalion, and company must be hand selected to instruct at applicable educational levels. These officers and non-commissioned officers should be taught how to teach creative and critical thinking, and should assigned as instructors for a minimum of two years on site of the respective school. A much more specific requirement exists when selecting instructors for senior level education and it appears the institution has the selection criteria about right.

In addition, an officer or non-commissioned officer attends mid-level educational training after meeting all prerequisites, to include a commitment of service through the 20-year point. Too often, the Army invests in education and training of leaders only to have those leaders depart the service, thus denying the Army full benefits of the past education. It becomes vital that the Army ensure ILE instructors possess the necessary skills to enable creative thinking. For example, former battalion level commanders must be assigned as instructors for ILE. The course material should remain focused on joint and expeditionary models, and continue to develop the officer in skills required of division and corps level staffs. Continued emphasis on a second language skill and cultural training should also remain consistent during ILE.

Unit Training Readiness

The final training tier that requires discussion is unit readiness training. With current deployment cycles and the recommended changes above, a new training model must be incorporated into unit readiness training. Current models often depend on the major command, or leadership, of a particular Army echelon instead of a standardized model. The most immediate effects of these multiple unit training models across the Army is a Soldier’s inability to easily integrate into the training cycle of newly assigned units. Therefore, the Army must standardize, according to doctrine, a model that enables predictability and efficiency for all units. Adapting to a new model allows for predictability, assists in clearly outlining responsibility for training subordinates units and staffs, assists in regeneration after deployment, and synchronizes current deployment life cycles.

The proposed model extends over an eighteen-month period and remains flexible enough at BCT level to allow commanders to integrate incoming Soldiers up to the twelfth month in the cycle. The proposed cycle begins upon redeployment from a theater of war, completion of transformation, or completion of movement due to rebasing (see figure 1).
Adhering to the start of this cycle allows for total synchronization across the Army by 2012, when the final unit scheduled for transformation is complete. The final advantage of implementing a standardized model reflects a commander’s, and Soldier’s, ability to predict future deployments. If all units incorporate a single Army model, a Soldier moving from Unit A to Unit B can determine where in the model he stands, and the commander receiving the Soldier better understands the level of proficiency, or where in the training model the Soldier is, allowing both the command and the Soldier to adapt.

The first two months of the model focus on individual proficiency in weapons, equipment, and basic staff functions. During the first two months exportable training teams and G3TS teams arrive on location and begin integration with new units. Higher level staffs recover systems and integrate new arrivals. Additionally, in the first two months, commanders take advantage of local schools. From the third month to the sixth month, units train at squad and platoon levels culminating in squad a platoon live fire exercises on local ranges. These live fire events include squad level convoy live fire exercises, and maximum use of simulations at
company and below occur during this training period. Concurrently, higher-level staffs accomplish the daily tasks of managing subordinate units, but also begin training for their capstone event. From months seven to ten, company and battalions complete all prerequisites for their capstone event and maximum use of simulations occurs during this period. Higher staffs continue to train and manage daily duties. During month eleven, companies and battalions execute live fire exercises and complete all training associated with company and battalion collective training requirements in preparation for a capstone event at the Training and Readiness Center. Higher level staffs begin executing information management for the capstone event that occurs stair-stepped over the next three months.

During month twelve, BCTs deploy to the Training and Readiness Center and conduct external evaluations in battalion force on force missions and battalion level live fire exercises. During month thirteen, BCTs redeploy and recover, institute a two-week block leave period, and begin deployment preparations. Higher level staffs take advantage of block leave during the first two weeks of month thirteen, while month fourteen focuses on division level staffs, and month fifteen focuses on training and evaluating JTF/Corps level staffs. During months fourteen through fifteen, battalions and below begin preparation for deployment of equipment and personnel and focus on pertinent regional training for deployment. For example, the Defense Language Institute, or like organization, sends mobile teams to conduct focused language and cultural training during these months. Additionally, months fourteen through fifteen allow company and battalion commanders to focus on professional military education of their soldiers as described in the PME directives. Months sixteen and seventeen encompass equipment readiness and deployment, where required, integration of rapid fielding initiatives, staff retraining at brigade and higher, and another two week block leave period. Month eighteen builds flexibility into the deployment cycle as required delivery dates often shift to dates earlier than expected. Month eighteen can also be used to hone individual and squad level skills at local ranges, while staffs begin deployment cycles. Although this training model oversimplifies issues faced daily by commanders, the intent is to describe a single model centered on the need for consistency across the entire Army.

Conclusion

Today’s strategic environment requires an Army capable of rapid deployment followed by successful execution of missions across a wide spectrum ranging from disaster relief operations to major combat operations. The implications for the Army in achieving this standard demand the Army not only transform and rebase, but, that the Army revolutionize the way it trains the
force. Over the past 230 years, commanders and staffs struggled to meet daily requirements, train, and develop Soldiers and leaders, and prepare units for combat. With no foreseeable break in the future deployment cycle, and a continuation of transformation and rebasing, the Army faces tough decisions in an effort to continue to provide trained and ready forces capable of executing missions across the full spectrum of operations.

The current Army training paradigm possesses enormous potential in providing trained and ready forces, however, in order to meet the complexities of today and tomorrow’s challenges there must be change. This article offered three areas where change might occur. First, changes should be incorporated into the way the Army views training. More specifically, the Army must reorganize the training institution to meet the demands placed on the Army by the Nation. Second, the Army must do a better job of investing in the education and development of its Soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers. Finally, the Army should round out training changes by instituting an eighteen-month training model that all units adhere to prior to deployment. This article aimed at stimulating thought on how the Army can improve training. The suggestions offered, although general in nature, are meant to provide a starting point for considering what can be done to provide the best possible training and resources for the Soldiers serving the United States of America.

Endnotes


3 Ibid.

4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 14 November 2000), II-1.

5 Ibid.


