THE MOBILIZATION OF ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS: ADDRESSING FUTURE CAPACITY GAPS ON POWER PROJECTION PLATFORMS

By

Colonel Kenneth D. Newlin
United States Army National Guard

Colonel Richard W. Dillon
Project Adviser

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ABSTRACT

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Not since WWII has the U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) relied so heavily upon the use of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve to prosecute a war. The “Total Force Policy” eliminated our nation’s ability to rapidly expand the size of our military force through the draft, and placed our Reserve Components (RC) in the role of a strategic reserve. Today, the RC role has expanded into one in which they are fully integrated into the NMS as an operational force. At the core of this strategy is the ability to respond to crises worldwide through the power projection of U.S. based active component (AC) and RC forces. Until recently, the large-scale mobilization of RC forces was rarely exercised or evaluated at a strategic level to determine the validity of these plans. When looked at critically, many mobilization plans were invalidated by the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) legislation of the last decade. This paper examines this perilous situation in more depth and offers strategic recommendations to better address capacity gaps and reduce the risks created by current BRAC actions, the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS), and the conversion of AC and RC to the modular force.
Not since World War II has the United States National Military Strategy (NMS) relied so heavily upon the use of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserve (USAR) to prosecute a war. The “Total Force Policy” instituted in 1973 eliminated our nation’s ability to rapidly expand the size of our military force through the draft, and placed our reserve components (RC) in the role of a strategic reserve. Today, the RC role has expanded exponentially beyond that of a strategic reserve, into one in which they are fully integrated into the NMS as an operational force. At the core of this strategy is the ability to respond to crises worldwide through power projection, primarily by the deployment of U.S. based active component (AC) and RC forces. Until recently, the large-scale mobilization of RC forces was the subject of many contingency and operation plans, but rarely evaluated at a strategic level to determine the validity of these plans. When looked at critically, many mobilization plans relied upon Power Projection Platforms (PPPs) that no longer existed, or were outdated due to the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) legislation of the last decade. This point is illustrated in a Government Accounting Office (GAO) report released in September 2004 that states:

The Army was not able to efficiently execute its mobilization and demobilization plans because the plans contained outdated assumptions concerning the availability of facilities and support personnel.¹

Recognizing this, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management has developed a “Strategy for the 21st Century” which states:

Power Projection Platform identifies the cooperative role and responsibility for installations in the active, direct execution of the National Military Strategy to project forces beyond the borders of the United States to anywhere in the world with little advanced notice. It reflects the normalization of an activity that traditionally has been approached on an ad hoc, crisis-induced basis.²

While a step in the right direction, this strategy fails to comprehensively evaluate and account for the effects that modularity, current BRAC actions, and the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) will have upon the current PPP inventory. The number one goal of this strategy is to “reshape installations to meet power projection specifications”, in order to better support their power projection responsibilities through the inherent phases of training, deployment, support, and follow-on.³ The biggest shortcoming of this strategy is that it relies primarily on the availability of resources through the Planning Programming, and Budget Execution System (PPBES) to provide military construction (MILCON) funds as means for accomplishing this strategy. Currently the Army is not adequately funded to take care of the facilities they already have, considering the latest facilities Sustainment, Restoration and
Modernization (SRM) backlog is reported as $17.8 billion, and the unfunded MILCON facilities deficit is $25 billion. In fact, Congress is concerned that current operations tempo is increasing this backlog of SRM, and has directed each service to report on this backlog within 90 days of enactment of the 2006 MILCON Appropriations Bill. The competition for fiscal resources within the Department of Defense (DOD) has and will continue to be fierce, and creates the most significant vulnerability or risk to this strategy.

In suggesting a more feasible solution to the current imbalance in this strategy, this paper examines four main areas. First, it establishes the increased reliance on the Army RC in executing our NMS. Second, it considers how modularity, current BRAC actions, and the IGPBS will impact the current PPP inventory. Third, it identifies current gaps and risks through an Ends, Ways, and Means analysis of existing mobilization strategy. Last, it concludes with a recommendation on ways to address these capacity gaps in order to reduce risk and achieve a more desirable and better-balanced strategy centered on providing a capable PPP inventory and the necessary enablers to mobilize our Army RC forces.

Strategic Relevance of the Reserve Components

The ARNG traces its roots to 1636, where in the Massachusetts Bay Colony the first permanent militia regiments where organized to provide for the defense of the colony. The formal creation of the ARNG however is traced to provisions of the United States Constitution, which declares:

Congress shall have power ...To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline subscribed by Congress.

This role of the ARNG remained largely unchanged until Secretary of War Elihu Root initiated the Militia Act of 1903, also known as the “Dick Act”, which strengthened the ARNG as a part of the national defense force and declared the ARNG to be the Army's primary organized reserve. Just over a decade later, The National Defense Act of 1916 further expanded the Guard's role by establishing the State militias' status as the primary reserve force of the Army. Additionally, this act required use of the term "National Guard" when referring to this force. Lastly, the President was given authority, in case of war or national emergency, to mobilize the NG for the duration of the emergency.

The USAR was formally organized in 1908, primarily as a reserve medical corps for the Army. Senate Bill 1424 authorized the Army to establish a reserve corps of medical officers that the Secretary of War could order to active duty during time of emergency. Four years later, a
provision of the Army Appropriations Act of 1912 created the Regular Army Reserve, a Federal Reserve outside the Medical Reserve Corps authorized in 1908. Until World War II (WWII), the USAR was little more than lists of individuals, somewhat akin to today’s Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). After WWII the USAR expanded into a numerically significant force, containing the preponderance of Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) capabilities for the AC, as well as responsibilities for Army RC training, and management and oversight of the IRR. Today the USAR provides 100 percent of the Army’s training and exercise divisions, as well as specialized units including railway and judge advocate general, enemy prisoner of war and chemical brigades, medical groups, and water supply battalions. The USAR also is the force provided for over two-thirds of the Army’s civil affairs and psychological operations units, medical brigades, transportation groups, theater signal commands, chemical and motor battalions, and hospitals.

At present, the ARNG and USAR both play a key role in the National Security Strategy (NSS), NMS, and the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS). As of 31 October 2005, a total of 168,828 ARNG soldiers have been called to active duty since September 11, 2001, with 74,497 currently serving in support of the Global War on Terror. The contributions of the USAR have been equally significant, with over 140,000 called to active duty during this same time frame, and nearly 62,000 currently serving. Prior to this period of current service, the ARNG and USAR accepted an increasing role in supporting the enduring missions of the last decade, including assuming major responsibilities in Bosnia - Herzegovina, Kosovo, and the Sinai.

This increased strategic reliance is illustrated in the following three cases: First, in January 2003 a bi-partisan delegation from Congress traveled to Europe to assess the employment of the RC in support of the U.S. European Command. This delegation concluded, “…U.S. military operations in support of the NSS cannot be accomplished without significant reserve component involvement.” Second, references to our nation’s increased dependence upon the reserves is contained in the 2002 NSHS that states: “The Department of Defense currently uses a “Total Force” approach to fulfill its missions overseas and at home, drawing on the strengths and capabilities of active-duty, reserve, and National Guard forces.” Third, this same increase in reliance on the RC is repeated in the 2004 NMS that emphasizes: “Executing this strategy will require a truly joint, full spectrum force – with a seamless mix of AC forces, the RC, DOD civilians, and contracted workforce, grounded in a culture of innovation.” In order to better integrate the RC into this “culture of innovation” The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter J. Schoomaker has worked hard to bring about a change in the organizational culture of
the Army by integrating the RC into all aspects of current operations. He has also been a
driving force in the development of strategies in which the reserves are essential to the future of
the Army, and supports a vision of embracing the reserves as full partners. One such example
of the RC importance as strategic players is illustrated in the Army’s plan for their conversion to
the modular force.

Modularity and the Army Reserve Components

The overwhelming share of the combat force within the Army RC resides in the eight
divisions of the ARNG. Starting this fiscal year and ending in FY 08, each of these divisions will
undergo conversion to the modular force. This is a significant departure from the concept
employed over the past decade of maintaining an increased level of readiness in the 15
Enhanced Brigades, and recognizes the robust capability of a Division headquarters to manage
multiple brigades given varying and complex mission sets. This concept was recently applied
with the 35th Infantry Division’s (Kansas ARNG) employment to manage modular forces
responding to hurricane Katrina recovery efforts in Louisiana, and the 42nd Infantry Division’s
(NY ARNG) employment as a headquarters for an AC/RC force in Iraq. Transformation will
affect 73% of all ARNG units as the existing force structure is converted to 34 Brigade Combat
Teams (BCTs), six Fires Brigades, ten Maneuver Enhancement Brigades, 12 Aviation Brigades,
11 Sustainment Brigades, three Sustainment Commands, and one Aviation Command. Key to
this transformation is the fact that each of these 34 BCTs will be organized, equipped, and
manned exactly as their AC counterparts.

The USAR is also restructuring and rebalancing its
force to meet the imperatives of the Army’s modularity initiative by allocating 30,000 spaces to
support modularity, and by developing smaller, more agile, interchangeable units with an
expeditionary mindset. By organizing, equipping, and manning these RC units the same as
their active duty counterparts, planners can easily develop models and plans that permit the
interoperability of both AC and RC formations into planning and contingency scenarios.

Modularity and the Active Component

The AC Army is also currently undergoing transformation to the modular force. The
current plan calls for all active forces to complete transformation by 2007, and expands the
number of brigade combat teams (BCT) from 33 to 43. This increase in active brigades will
posture our forces to better support the “1 – 4 – 2 – 1” model currently detailed in our 2004
NMS. This model calls for a military force sized and capable to defend the homeland, deter
forward in four regions, be capable of two, almost simultaneous "swift campaigns" and win
decisively in one of them, even if engaged in a number of smaller contingencies. The addition
of these BCTs will place additional stresses upon many of our existing military installations due to the requirement to support this increased troop density, and ancillary requirements such as family housing, community support, maneuver training areas, simulation systems, and health care, to name a few. Additionally, an underlying principle of the Modularity initiative is that our installations will become “flagships” for our units, providing support not only in peacetime, but assuming a larger role in supporting the deployed force by providing a robust reach-back capability through advanced communications technology. Key to the conversion to a modular force is the near simultaneous transformation of our installations that must also occur to complement and support that force.

Under the modularity initiative and BRAC recommendations. Fort Knox, Fort Campbell, Fort Bragg, Fort Benning, Fort Riley, and Fort Lewis all gain 1 BCT, Fort Carson gains 2 BCTs and a Unit of Employment (UEx) Headquarters, and Fort Bliss, gains 4 BCTs. Additionally, these 8 installations are also PPPs, and have a U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) mission to mobilize, train, and deploy RC soldiers. Furthermore, a recent Congressional Budget Office study finds that:

The modularity initiative will boost the number of combat forces available to the Army by up to 5 percent. But it may require an additional 60,000 personnel to do so (or twice the temporarily authorized increase), and it will make the Army more reliant on reserve support units. Moreover, modularity is unlikely to lead to substantial improvements in deployment times. Given this finding, the impact the addition of AC forces has on the ability of these installations to generate a “surge” in our military end strength through the mobilization of RC forces, along with how these forces are generated warrants further analysis.

The ARFORGEN Model

According to the 2005 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, implementing Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) will result in “Reduced stress on the force through a more predictable deployment cycle.” Key to this plan is the following deployment objectives:

— One year deployed and two years at home station for the active component;
— One year deployed and four years at home station for the Reserve Force;
— One year deployed and five years at home station for the National Guard Force; and
— Reduced mobilization times for the reserve component as a whole.

ARFORGEN is defined as:

…A force management process, leveraging modular unit designs and operational cycles, to provide a sustained deployment capability of operationally ready units
to satisfy the requirements regional combatant commanders will place on the Army.\textsuperscript{27}
The central principle of ARFORGEN is to supply regional combatant commands and civil authorities tailored conventional Army forces that can be rapidly deployed and utilized to accomplish specific mission requirements.\textsuperscript{28} ARFORGEN makes these units available through ...(A structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of regional combatant commander requirements.\textsuperscript{29}

In order to accomplish this strategy of "structured progression of increased unit readiness", RC forces must be afforded an increased number of resourced training opportunities as they progress towards their "ready cycle". Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, Chief of the Army Reserve, recently announced how the USAR will reorganize to meet the challenges of providing troops under the ARFORGEN model. The "Army Reserve Expeditionary Force" (AREF) is the name of this broad-based set of changes that defines how the USAR will organize, train and equip forces to meet the needs of the Army.\textsuperscript{30} In what looks to be closely modeled after the Air Force’s "Air Expeditionary Force" (AEF) rotations, approximately 80% of the USAR will be divided into 10 different force packages, two of which are available for each year of the five year ARFORGEN cycle.\textsuperscript{31} This means that on a cyclical basis, approximately 20% of the USAR will be required to maintain an increased state of readiness in order to meet the ARFORGEN criteria for deployment. The most challenging aspect of this increased readiness is mastery of the collective-level events that indicate a unit is proficient in these tasks and meets deployment criteria, or simply put, able to accomplish its wartime mission. By their very nature, these collective-level events tend to be resource intensive in terms of manpower, funding, equipment, and utilization of training areas. What is concerning about the availability of training opportunities under the current construct is that both the 2005 BRAC Act and the IGPBS potentially will further constrain the availability of these collective-level training opportunities at AC installations.

\textbf{The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC 2005)}

The 2005 BRAC became law on 9 November 2005.\textsuperscript{32} While none of the 15 existing PPPs were identified for closure, many of these are slated to gain additional units and responsibilities as second and third order effects of BRAC. As stated earlier, eight of these installations will gain one or more BCTs under the modularity initiative. Additionally, some of these will gain other functions that are being relocated due to BRAC. For example, Fort Eustis, VA will receive the Installation Management Agency (IMA) Southeastern Region Headquarters and the US
Army Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM) Southeastern Region Headquarters due to the closure of Fort McPherson.\textsuperscript{33} Fort Eustis will also gain the US Army Training & Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Headquarters, the Installation Management Agency (IMA) Northeast Region Headquarters, the NETCOM Northeast Region Headquarters and the Army Contracting Agency Northern Region Office as a result of DOD’s recommendation to close Fort Monroe, VA.\textsuperscript{34} Fort Benning will receive the Armor School from Fort Knox, supporting the consolidation of the Armor and Infantry Centers and Schools at Fort Benning, creating a Maneuver Center of Excellence for ground forces training and doctrine development.\textsuperscript{35} Fort Knox, while losing the Armor School, has gained a BCT, US Army Accessions Command and US Army Cadet Command.\textsuperscript{36} The net result is a diminished capacity to execute a mobilization mission due to competition for the fixed resources of these installations. Further impacting the ability of these installations to execute a mobilization mission is the IGPBS.

The Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy

On 16 August 2004, President Bush announced the IGPBS, a plan outlining far-reaching changes to the numbers and locations of military basing facilities at overseas locations.\textsuperscript{37} This plan has significant strategic impact upon our power projection platforms. IGPBS is the DOD’s long-term, comprehensive and integrated overseas strategy to rebalance and redistribute US force overseas to reflect current and future security concerns. The strategy supports the return of a significant number of forces to the continental United States. Within a decade, up to 70,000 soldiers and 100,000 dependents will relocate from Europe and Asia to military installations located in North America.\textsuperscript{38} While not all of the stationing decisions have been made concerning this return to a CONUS based force, two things are clear. First, this strategy will add significant stresses to the infrastructure of the installations designated to support this expanding population, and second, the financial cost associated with completing this strategy will be large. The cost of new MILCON required to support the IGPBS is currently estimated to be 2.6 billion dollars, and Congress has directed this to be funded out of the FY 06 - FY 11 MILCON budget.\textsuperscript{39} The implications here are that other programmed infrastructure requirements may have to be sacrificed in order to support this strategy. Since a significant number of the MILCON projects in the current FY 06 – FY 11 POM are related to modularity, many of these projects could be delayed for years. As these projects are delayed, our installations will be taxed to continue doing more with less and forced to make difficult resourcing decisions. Most often the projects delayed are those that are either discretionary, enhance soldier and family quality of life, or support primarily a RC population. Past examples of delayed projects include
construction of replacement barracks, administrative offices, motor pools, parking areas, and maintenance facilities. A working solution to providing a surge capability of quality facilities on PPPs to support a mobilized population is the development of Operational Readiness Training Complexes (ORTCs). ORTCs are mission support facilities to house transient units, both AC and RC. In October 2004 the Army G-3/5/7 issued a memorandum on ORTCs stating:

The Army is faced with a lack of transient training facilities. This shortage has developed over the past 60 years and is due to the tearing down of old facilities, little or no construction of new facilities, and the training requirements placed upon CONUS installations by Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. This situation adversely impacts both the mobilization of Army personnel and the Army concept of Train-Alert-Deploy. 40

Unfortunately, the construction of ORTCs is a long way from reality, given the current MILCON backlog, competing interests, and “must fund” requirements (BRAC, GWOT, etc…). As recognized in this memorandum, this lack of required resources is having a direct impact on the ability of these installations to execute their PPP and mobilization missions, thereby creating risk in current mobilization strategy.

**Ends, Ways, and Means**

The United States’ desired results (*Ends*) is the successful execution of its National Security and Military Strategies through the application of all of the elements of national power (*Ways*), including the use of military power when necessary. The preceding case poses the nexus of Modularity, BRAC, and IGPBS places considerable stress upon Army installations, particularly those designated as PPPs. These programs and the stresses outlined above will impact the capability (*Means*) of Army installations to generate, project, sustain and reconstitute the force. A key component of this capability is maintaining the capacity to mobilize and deploy large numbers of RC soldiers as necessary to support US strategic interests. Unless the Army better balances these particular *Means* with its *Ends* and *Ways*, the NSS and NMS face excessive risk. 41 This risk is illustrated in the fall 2004 GAO report referenced earlier that states:

The Army was not able to efficiently execute its mobilization and demobilization plans because the plans contained outdated assumptions concerning the availability of facilities and support personnel. As a result, some units were diverted away from their planned mobilization sites, and disparities in housing accommodations existed between active and reserve forces. 42

Furthermore, the same report concluded:

The presence of large active duty and reserve contingents on the same installations at the same time also strained training and medical facilities. Fort Hood officials said that the scheduling and rescheduling of training ranges presented major challenges during 2003 when the installation was preparing to
deploy both its active divisions and a large group of reserve component forces at the same time.43

Another example illustrating this point occurred in fall 2003, when news reports surfaced that due to facility shortages at many installations RC soldiers where being housing in substandard and sometimes deplorable conditions.44 These reports drew national media attention because many of these soldiers were the sick and wounded returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. The public response to this was severe, and two garrison commanders and the First Army Commander, Lieutenant General Joseph Inge, were called to testify about these allegations before the House Armed Services Committee.45 A few months later, the newly appointed First Army Commander, Lieutenant General Russell Honoré deemed the care and treatment of sick, wounded, and injured soldiers as the number one mission for the mobilization stations operating in First Army. Consequently, the inability of these PPPs to adequately support the surge population of reservists further stressed their effectiveness by causing them to shift and focus finite resources on quality of life issues, further detracting from their ability to generate, project, sustain and reconstitute the force.

In an Associated Press interview with General Schoomaker conducted on August 20th, 2005, General Schoomaker stated the Army is planning for significant troop levels in Iraq for four more years.46 If this becomes the reality, then the Army is going to continue its reliance on mobilizing the RC to meet mission requirements. Given this scenario or one in which we face a future requirement to rapidly increase the size of the Army through mobilization of our RC, the US must have a better solution than that executed during 2002 – 2003 for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

A Strategy of Balanced Means

One potential solution is to look to the Army RC to mobilize forces regionally in order to alleviate the additional stresses this mission places upon the active installations. Tasking the Army RC to execute a mobilization mission is not a new concept. Fort Dix in New Jersey, and Fort McCoy in Wisconsin are both USAR installations, and the only two USAR PPPs. Fort Dix has operated under the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) since 1 October 1997.47 Since then, it has been continuously involved in the mobilization of Army RC soldiers, supporting the peace mission to Bosnia, deployments to Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.48 Likewise, Fort McCoy was aligned under the USARC in 1993.49 Since September 11, 2001, Fort McCoy has been responsible for the mobilization/demobilization of over 36,000 soldiers from nearly 700 units.50
In a more recent example of this concept, two ARNG installations were called to execute their mobilization missions as FORSCOM mobilization stations. Camp Atterbury in Indiana and Camp Shelby in Mississippi were called into service in February 2003 and in June 2004 respectively, in response to the AC PPPs arriving at or nearing their “surge” capacity. Since being called into service as mobilization stations beginning in 2003, these installations have each mobilized over 20,000 RC soldiers.\textsuperscript{51} Camp Shelby also served as the location for Joint Task Force Katrina’s headquarters, allowing the DOD to take advantage of its central location, well developed infrastructure and robust communication backbone.\textsuperscript{52} The successes of Camp Atterbury and Camp Shelby in executing these missions validate an alternative means to accomplish Army RC mobilization, and compliments the two USARC installations previously mentioned. In fact, nearly every state in the nation operates at least one National Guard Training Site, the largest of which are categorized as Maneuver Training Centers - Heavy (MTC-H). FORSCOM has already designated a number of these National Guard MTC-Hs as State Operated Mobilization Sites (SOMS). This number has varied over the years, and currently stands at four, which include Camp Atterbury in Indiana, Camp Roberts in California, Camp Shelby in Mississippi, and Gowen Field in Idaho.\textsuperscript{53}

Each of the nine ARNG MTC-Hs have considerable infrastructure, range complexes, maneuver area, and housing capacity, and are capable of hosting major portions of post-mobilization training requirements. Greater utilization of these installations would relieve considerable stress from the AC PPPs trying to fulfill this mission. Units mobilizing from within a close geographic radius of these MTC-Hs, say 250 miles or so, could be housed, trained, and equipped at these installations, qualify on individual and crew served weapons, and complete required individual and collective warrior tasks. Given the right mix of enablers to support these units and operate these installations, post-mobilization training and certification could be accomplished under the same oversight as premobilization training; under the watchful eye of an ARNG division headquarters or the newly formed standing Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) located in each state, territory, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia.

This proposal also supports the Chief of National Guard Bureau and Adjutants’ General desire to accomplish home station mobilization, which could be conducted under the authority of the new JFHQ and oversight of the newly designated Training Readiness and Mobilization Command.\textsuperscript{54} The mission of each JFHQ is defined as follows:

The Joint Force Headquarters of each state, territory, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia exercises command and/or control over all assigned, attached or operationally aligned forces. It acts as a standing, forward-deployed joint force headquarters, within the geographic confines of the state/territory/
commonwealth or district; it provides situational awareness of developing or ongoing emergencies and activities to federal and state authority. As ordered, the JFHQ provides trained and equipped forces and capabilities to the services and the Combatant Commanders for federal missions. Under the “provide trained and equipped forces” provision of this mission many of the JFHQs could successfully provide the oversight and support necessary to perform the personnel or “Soldier Readiness Processing” (SRP), logistical operations, and individual and collective training necessary to certify their units as deployable per their specific FORSCOM deployment order. Ideally, this would be accomplished as a modified “Home Station Mobilization” program executed at their ARNG Training Site. Lieutenant General Stephen H. Blum, the Chief of National Guard Bureau supports this concept. In a November 2003 National Guard Magazine article he stated: “It’s time that we stop accepting the fact that nobody trusts us to check ourselves and hold ourselves to the standard.” Furthermore, he believes that the commanders and general officers in the peacetime chain of command should complete final certification of ARNG units at completion of post-mobilization training requirements.

This proposal is also supported by Lieutenant General James R. Helmy’s restructuring initiative for the USAR. In order to obtain the right force mix to support the war fight, the USAR has initiated a program to cut force structure from its generating base of Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) organizations in order to build the required number of deployable combat support and combat service support units for the AREF model described earlier. These organizations include Institutional Training (IT) divisions, Training Support (TS) divisions, and Garrison Support Units (GSUs). Included in this redesign is the establishment of four regional readiness sustainment commands (RRSCs), each charged with providing garrison type support to all USAR soldiers, units, and facilities located in a specific geographical area. These RRSCs will be well suited to facilitate and enable USAR home station mobilization much in the same manner as that proposed in the preceding paragraph for the JFHQ.

Tasking the RRSCs to conduct post-mobilization training and certification for subordinate units also supports the Army Campaign Plan (ACP) mission to “rebalance the generating force resourced by the USAR” (ACP Decision Point 57). In doing so, The Installation Management Agency has recommended transforming GSUs to better support a “continuous mobilization environment” (ACP DP 57.1). GSUs are the USAR units that currently manage the mobilization mission at active installations. Through rebalancing the generating force, the USAR hopes to yield over 20,000 soldiers for the operational force. The target established by LTG Helmy is to make available 90% of the 4,002 USAR soldiers currently assigned to GSUs, or a total of 3,602. In doing so, this leaves only 400 USAR soldiers available for direct assignment to
mobilization support. IMA plans to mitigate this “gap” through contract support for all but a handful of those positions deemed necessary to be filled by a soldier, such as command structure, chaplain support, and judge advocate general positions. This solution will work, but the cost has proven to be several million dollars per year per installation. A more reasonable solution that poses less risk is to build the necessary force structure into the RRSCs to accomplish this mission.

Lastly, this strategy supports building a tailored approach to Army RC mobilizations. As stated earlier, over half of our RC forces have been mobilized since 2001. To facilitate this significant number of mobilizations, many JFHQs and Regional Readiness Commands (RRCs) have cross-leveled significant numbers of personnel and equipment in order to meet the required level of readiness for deployment. This cross-leveling, and to a lesser extent volunteerism has caused second and third order effects requiring more of each of these actions as the donor units were subsequently mobilized. In turn, this has further increased the workload at the PPPs. Today, many RC soldiers and units have served multiple tours. However the existing training paradigm still assumes only little more than individual proficiency within our RC, and applies a “cookie cutter” template to mobilization that assumes if it is good for one, then it is good for all. Each JFHQ is accountable for the readiness of its subordinate units. It receives, reviews, and forwards quarterly Unit Status Reports to FORSCOM, and sends out numerous staff assistance teams to assess all aspects of unit readiness on a continual basis. Through flowing the required assets and emphasis to units that do not meet established readiness standards, the JFHQ assists in the development and monitors the execution plans established to remediate readiness shortfalls. Essentially this is no different than the post-mobilization responsibilities once a unit is mobilized and falls under the command and control of a PPP, except one is responsible for premobilization readiness, and the other is responsible for post-mobilization readiness. Not all tasks that support the validation of RC units can always be accomplished in totality within a state, but aside from the most significant and resource intensive of these, such as Combat Training Center Major Rehearsal Exercises, very few remain.

Conclusion

In summary, this paper has outlined the strategic relevance of the Army RC, and illustrated some of the seams in our ability to mobilize, train, deploy and reconstitute these forces under our current strategy. These seams are likely only to grow due to the impacts and costs of Modularity, BRAC, and the IGPBS to our current AC PPPs. To mitigate this risk to our current strategy of over reliance on existing AC PPPs and use of a relatively small number of
RC PPPs, we should explore additional RC assets within the Army inventory that are available to execute the mission of mobilizing our RC forces. The recent successes of two National Guard Power Support Platforms, Camp Atterbury and Camp Shelby, along with the many years of experience in large-scale mobilizations conducted by the USARC at Fort McCoy and Fort Dix, suggests that the ARNG and USAR can adequately shoulder the burden of this mission, given attendant resourcing. By adopting and further developing this viable and cost effective alternate means to accomplish RC mobilizations, we can ensure the availability of well trained, equipped, and available RC forces well into the 21st century, while allowing our AC installations to focus their limited resources on the challenges Modularity, BRAC, and the IGPBS will pose over the next decade.

Endnotes


7 The Constitution of the United States of America, Article I, Section 8.


9 Ibid.


12 Ibid.

13 Claire G. Henline, National Guard Bureau G5 – Strategic Communications Office, “31 October 2005 ARNG Operational Update”, a biweekly PowerPoint presentation distributed to ARNG senior leaders.


15 This statement was found in the Congressional Report submitted to the Honorable Duncan Hunter, Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, U. S. House of Representatives, dated 12 February 2003, submitted by John M. McHugh, Robin Hayes, Mike McIntyre, Jeff Miller, Members of Congress. p.2.


19 Ibid.


22 Ibid.


28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., 8.


31 Ibid.


34 Ibid., 16.


36 Ibid., 16.


39 Ibid.

40 MG George F. Bowman, “Operational Readiness Training Complexes (ORTCs),” memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3; Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8; Chief, National Guard Bureau; Commander, US Army Corps of Engineers; Commander, Training and Doctrine Command; Chief, Army Reserve; Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management; Director, Installation Management Agency; Washington D.C., 12 October 2004.


42 Government Accounting Office, 28-29.
43 Ibid., 29.


48 Ibid.


50 Ibid.

51 Herb Flora, G3 Current Operations, First U.S. Army, “1A Commander’s Update,” briefing slides, Fort Gillem, First U.S. Army, 3 January 2006. Actual numbers for Camp Atterbury as of 3 January 2006 are 22,277 mobilized, 13,199 released from active duty (REFRAD), and Camp Shelby 20,440 mobilized, 1,211 REFRAD.


56 Prawdzik.

57 Ibid.


60 Ibid.