USAWC STRATEGIC RESEARCH PROJECT

NOUVEAU ADJUNCTS: SERVICE TO THE NATION

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### Noveau Adjuncts Service to the Nation

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**ABSTRACT**
See attached.
The United States has placed increasing demands on its military services. These demands, especially those generated by the Global War on Terror, are depleting the reserve forces. This essay illustrates the Army’s Ready Reserve personnel shortages and some of the administrative weaknesses contributing to the shortages. The author proposes creation of nouveau adjuncts (NOADs) – a new service, or a new branch of the reserves, as a means to alleviate the shortage. Noveau adjuncts would possess specific skill sets needed in nation-building and other non-warrior endeavors. Given the limited need for these specific skills, NOADs would provide their skills for shorter terms of service. As a relatively temporary force, NOADs would not need to meet the Army’s health and physical standards. Similarly, NOADs would not qualify for the benefits received by active and reserve service members. While the nation considers the merits of a NOAD service, the leadership of the reserve forces should consider implementing relatively minor administrative changes in the involuntary separation process. Simple regulatory changes should assist commanders in processing reservists who have stopped participating in the program, thereby enhancing the accuracy of the reserve rolls.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower once remarked that, “what counts is not necessarily the size of the dog in the fight – it’s the size of the fight in the dog.” His sentiment has proved to be true many times throughout history. Consider the relatively small size, and type, of the “terrorist dog” that bit the Twin Towers, and launched the War on Terror. To combat the terrorist threat and other threats, our military must have “dogs” of some size and type to face multiple fights.

Regardless of their size or type, all “dogs” have a cost. No entity achieves victory “at bargain basement prices.” Politicians, and the public, do not seem to understand that truism as they increasingly call for expanded military missions without indicating how the military will resource concomitant capabilities. For example, President Bush’s plans for managing an avian flu outbreak contain provisions for the military to enforce quarantines and travel restrictions. After hurricane Katrina, the media cited the “administration’s failure” to effectively use the military during those trying times, calling the “failure” a national disgrace. Moreover, political pundits call for an increased military role in nation building. Meanwhile, the Global War on Terror continues.

As for the War on Terror, President Bush indicated “[t]he best way to honor the sacrifice of our fallen troops is to complete the mission and win the war.” Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, highlighted the inability to predict when the military would complete their given mission, and end the war. He compared the struggle to the processes that eventually ended slavery, piracy, and the Soviet Union’s expansionist policies. He emphasized sustained perseverance. Since 9/11, service members, active and reserve, have persevered.

Legislators and policy makers should honor all soldiers’ service by carefully contemplating the future of military service and not “sleepwalk through history.” In 2003, Senator Byrd (D-WV) opposed the War on Terror and called for robust discussion. Again, in 2005, he asked for congressional debate, and answers regarding the administration’s budget for the war. The Senator’s requests were valid, but too narrow. In addition to monetary issues, legislators and policy makers should become actively engaged in determining overall military missions. Congress should participate in the military’s transformation to ensure legislation and resources (personnel, equipment, money, and the like) are adequate to meet the nation’s needs.

Given the current pressing demands on the military’s reserve forces, legislators and policy makers must give immediate attention to personnel policies affecting readiness. Responsible planners must find viable sources of employees to meet the urgent need for continued service. This essay suggests the nation tap alternative personnel sources, Nouveau
Adjuncts, either to add another reserve “service” or to create another Army Reserve “career field.” The proposed relatively radical paradigm change would require significant legislative change and a national effort. The increased personnel pool and the benefits of more inclusive national service, however, would far outweigh legislative effort and military reform.

Radical paradigm changes undoubtedly would engender vigorous discussion for an extensive period. Additionally, full implementation of this essay’s proposal would require creation of administrative processes with long start-up periods. Consequently, no relief for the shortage of military personnel is foreseeable in the near future. Therefore, leaders administering the force should look to fixes within their reach that may make significant inroads into the immediate and long-term readiness problem. One problem area managers should tackle is the administration of the significantly large number of non-deployable troops. This essay will offer suggestions for efficient management of one resource-intensive aspect of the non-deployable troop problem. That aspect concerns the processing of reservists who have stopped attending training periods (non-participants), thereby becoming non-deployable.

Significance of the Army Reserves

Despite recent decrements, the “Total Army” is a very large organization. The reserve force comprises a considerable portion of the Army that is actually greater in size than the population of six of the states. At the end of fiscal year 2005, the Army’s active duty end strength was 492,728. A year earlier, it was 499,543. The Army Reserve began fiscal year 2006 with 1,058 million people (15,500 fewer Selected Reservists than in fiscal year 2004). The significance of the reserve force is more striking when considering the makeup of the soldiers involved in the Iraq conflict. At the end of 2004, about 150,000 troops served in Iraq and Kuwait. Roughly 30,000, or 20%, were reservists. By the end of October 2005, the Army had mobilized 36,691 selected reservists. On average, the Army deployed 45,000 reservists each month in calendar years 2003 and 2004. Since 9/11, an astounding number of reservists have mobilized – 161,219 troops. That figure represents over half of the entire Ready Reserve force and 15% of the entire Army Reserve. “The widespread utilization of reserve forces in combat theaters is unprecedented in American military history.”

The large numbers of reservists mobilized within the last three years is consistent with a pattern of increased utilization of the reserve forces over the past fifteen years (see Figure 1). In the 1990s, military forces downsized as policy makers capitalized on the “peace dividend.” Active forces decreased in size by 36%; while the Reserve decreased by 27%. These reductions created an increased reliance on reserve capabilities. In their mission statements,
Secretaries of Defense, Perry and Cohen, supported the expanded use of reserve forces. Their plans for increased use of reserve forces however, conflicts with the intent of legislators in creation of the reserves. Additionally, on the surface, the repetitive use of reservists to meet the Army’s expanding missions seems contrary to the purpose of a reserve force.

FIGURE 1. RESERVE FORCE UTILIZATION.

Legislative Intent Regarding the Army Reserve

When creating this nation, our founding fathers intended to rely on a small Regular Army augmented by civilian soldiers during dangerous times. In the 19th Century, state militias and volunteer forces met the country’s needs. During the Civil War, both sides augmented their “regular” troops with militias. Finally, in 1908, Congress began to create a formal structure for the volunteer emergency force by authorizing a reserve corps of medical officers. Four years later, Congress created the regular Army Reserve. Over time, Congress expanded the structure, and increased the size of the Army Reserve. Modern legislators stated the purpose of the “reserve component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty . . . in times of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces.” Congress intends to order units and organizations to active duty, when they determine there are insufficient resources within the regular components to ensure national security. The structure and required authority for mobilization of the Reserve force reflects congressional intentions.
Structure of the Reserve

Federal statutes provide the overall structure of the reserve force. The structure seems to embody: 1) the perceived need for a call to active duty, 2) the authority required for a call to active duty, 3) the relative ease of activation, and 4) reservists’ expected capabilities. The reader should bear in mind those four aspects when reviewing the structure of the reserves and considering the proposal presented in this essay. Pursuant to statute, reservists are assigned to one of three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. Figure 2 illustrates the structure and the populations within these categories.

In creating the Ready Reserve, legislators undoubtedly intended to have a source of trained personnel ready to mobilize rapidly in times of grave need. Their purpose is suggested by the category’s title and by the authority required for a call-up. The President, without congressional approval, may call-up a maximum of 200,000 selected reservists for up to 270 days of duty. If the President declares a national emergency, he may call one million ready reservists to active duty.

The President cannot call-up the Standby or Retired Reserve. Congress must approve the mobilization of these service members after Congress declares war or a national state of emergency. In addition to the requirement for congressional approval, another statute limits mobilization. By law, standby or retired reservists cannot be activated unless the Secretary of the Army determines there are insufficient qualified ready reservists. Possible delays due to congressional or secretarial deliberation are not the only impediments to the use of the standby or retired reserve. The availability of personnel in these two categories presents formidable readiness problems. Standby reservists are key civilian employees, or persons with temporary hardships or disabilities. They do not belong to units, nor train regularly. Retired reservists present a wide range of readiness issues beyond the scope of this essay.
Given the characteristics of the categories of reservists, the prime target for available personnel is the Ready Reserve. Examination of this group reveals further compartmentalization into the Inactive National Guard (ING), the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and the Selected Reserve (SELRES) (see Figure 3). A discussion of National Guard issues is outside the scope of this essay; thus, the author will not discuss the ING.

![Figure 3. Army Ready Reserve Structure and Size](image)

The IRR consists of personnel who obtained some military training while serving on active duty or as selected reservists. Some IRR members have remaining military service obligations. Officers who left service, but did not formally resign their commissions are in the IRR. The IRR also has soldiers who do not meet medical fitness, body composition, or physical standards; are surviving sons or daughters; are pregnant; or have hardships. Finally, commanders have involuntarily transferred soldiers into the IRR who could not, or would not, serve on a regular basis in the SELRES.

The Selected Reserve has three subcomponents differentiated primarily by soldiers’ commands or affiliations (Figure 4). Most SELRES members belong to inactive reserve Troop Program Units (TPU); they are already trained, or are in training pipelines (non-deployable). Trained soldiers assigned to an active component organization, the Selective Service System, or the Federal Emergency Management Agency are termed Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs). Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) members constitute the last subcomponent of the SELRES. These soldiers primarily provide full time support to the reserve forces.
Availability of the Ready Reserve

As illustrated by Figures 3 and 4, the ready reserve (IRR and SELRES) represents the largest readily available pool of personnel to mobilize. The IRR is significantly smaller than the SELRES. Given the IRR’s composition, the availability of personnel within the pool is doubtful. Consider the results of the Desert Storm call-up. An Army spokesperson reported, “more than 20,000 former soldiers were called up for the first Gulf War. With medical problems and no-shows, only about 14,400 actually deployed”\(^\text{32}\) (13.75 soldiers called to yield 10 soldiers). More inclusive data, predating 2004, indicates the Army must issue orders to 13 IRR soldiers to obtain 10 soldiers for duty.\(^\text{33}\)

Desert Storm data, and other historical data, presents slightly more successful call-ups than the Army’s recent IRR call-up. In the summer of 2004, the Army began mobilizing IRR soldiers, issuing orders to more than 5,700 IRR soldiers. As of 11 December 2005, “3,954 IRR soldiers had reported for duty. In addition, more than 1,600 had been excused from duty and 463 . . . had not reported. Of those 463, the Army has been unable to locate 383.”\(^\text{34}\) Over 1,800 soldiers requested exemptions or delays. Of 2,500 soldiers scheduled for refresher training, 733 did not show up.\(^\text{35}\) Considering these figures, the Army ordered about 14.5 IRR soldiers to active duty in order to have 10 soldiers report for duty. The number of IRR soldiers physically fit and ready to deploy among those who reported for duty is unknown.

Those IRR soldiers willing and able to serve may have already volunteered for tours or complied with orders. Since 9/11, over 2,500 IRR soldiers have mobilized. The majority of those soldiers volunteered for service.\(^\text{36}\) Soldiers in the IRR who wished to continue service in
some capacity, volunteered for active duty, transferred to the standby reserves, complied with mobilization orders, or requested exemptions. As a group, the remaining IRR soldiers are generally resistant to mobilization as indicated by the number of lawsuits filed by IRR soldiers fighting activation.\textsuperscript{37}

In November 2005, Army Secretary, Francis Harvey, announced the discontinuation of involuntary mobilizations from the IRR. Secretary Harvey cited problems with records management.\textsuperscript{38} Anyone familiar with the administrative management of the reserves knows Secretary Harvey’s claim is not baseless. The intrinsic nature of the IRR, combined with poor records management, yields an unreliable source of personnel. While the Army has 111,953 IRR soldiers, perhaps 56,000 may realistically report for duty – if administrators can deliver orders to correct addresses.

Military planners thus must turn from the IRR to the SELRES. As discussed above, the selected reserve has three components: soldiers in units (89.2%), IMAs (2.6%), and AGR soldiers (8.1%).\textsuperscript{39} A review of the October 2005 end of the month strength data indicates the Army mobilized those subcomponents at the following levels: 19.7%, 18.7%, and 16.8% respectively. Those levels however, do not provide a complete picture because of repeat mobilizations. Since 9/11, the Army has mobilized 43% of the SELRES.\textsuperscript{40} Although, that percentage seems innocuous and gives the impression of prospective capacity, further analysis reveals a distressing situation.

Federal statutes and Army policies limiting mobilization tours to 24 cumulative months have created a significant workforce problem for the reserves.\textsuperscript{41} Long ago, legislators and policy makers designed the Army reserve to be a reserve force. As discussed above, legislators intended to mobilize large numbers of soldiers for extended periods, only after they declared war or a national emergency. No one intended to mobilize reservists as the Secretary of the Army has done for the past four years. Since 9/11, six separate rotations of troops supported Operation Enduring Freedom and four rotations supported Operation Iraqi Freedom. Troops were identified for the seventh and fifth rotations respectively (expected to deploy in 2005). Troops for the last two rotations constituted 7% of the SELRES.\textsuperscript{42} Taken together, the 43% previously mobilized and the designated 7%, renders 50% of the selected reserves unavailable for call-up (approximately 94,300 soldiers\textsuperscript{43}). Figure 5 illustrates the “repeat tour” readiness problem, as well as other latent problems.

Figure 5 shows 16% of the selected reserves are unavailable because they have medical or administrative conditions preventing mobilization (March 2005 data). Another 5% are untrained. Taken together, 21% of the SELRES cannot be mobilized. October 2005 end of the month
strength data revealed 22% of the SELRES were unavailable for mobilization (41,504 soldiers). The Active Army accounts for unavailable soldiers of this type in the "Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS)" account. The TTHS account held approximately 13% of the active force from fiscal year 2001 to 2005. In addition to the large hole in the reserve force created by their TTHS account, approximately 9.7% (16,137 soldiers) of the drilling reservists (TPU) have stopped participating for more than 90 days. The Reserve TTHS account (21%) combined with the number of non-participants (9.7%) represents a daunting readiness problem for the reserves. Roughly, 30% of the SELRES (57,641 soldiers) are not available for mobilization.

FIGURE 5. AVAILABILITY OF ARMY SELECTED RESERVISTS FOR MOBILIZATION.

The Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported in March 2005, that after removing non-deployable soldiers, the “available piece of the SELRES” was 16% (31,395). Current mobilization demands, policies, and inherent problems within the reserves yield a situation likely to “break” the force. In December 2004, Lieutenant General (LTG) James R. Helmly, Chief Army Reserve, forwarded a private memo to the Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, expressing concern that the Army reserve might be unable to meet the demands of Iraq and Afghanistan, and other potential missions. LTG Helmly enclosed a chart with his
Unfortunately, for LTG Helmly, his memo became public and upset various leaders at the Pentagon. Sadly, Pentagon leaders’ apparent disregard of LTG Helmly’s concerns also became public knowledge. A cynical outsider might well believe the Defense Department’s leadership is “sleepwalking through history” along with Congress. While the exact cause or source of the disinterest is unclear, the serious nature of the problem is clear to any informed policy maker. Civilian and military leaders must identify viable, long-term sources of personnel to meet the urgent need for continued service to the country. The author proposes new sources of personnel – noveau adjuncts – as a means to help address this national security issue.

At the very least, military planners must immediately implement corrective measures to enhance the readiness state of the reserve force. Leaders and administrators must process non-deployable soldiers more rapidly to reduce the unacceptably large reserve TTHS account (22%). Leaders and administrators must be equally aggressive in processing non-participants (9.7%). Specific suggestions for more efficient processing of non-participants appear later in this essay. Additionally, while “cleaning up the books,” progressive leaders and administrators should seek solutions for avoiding these readiness problems in the future.

**Personnel Proposal – Noveau Adjuncts: Necessary Skill Sets**

If the Army is to perform the role suggested by the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Army must find more employees. Presently, the Army is “scraping the barrel” by deploying troops from the Old Guard, South Korea, recruiting stations; and by easing recruiting standards. Legislators never envisioned using reservists as the Army has over the past few years. The active and reserve Army barrel is no longer a robust keg ready for any engagement. It is time for policy-makers to wake up, to be responsible, and to consider long-term solutions. Policy makers should begin a comprehensive consideration of the Army’s personnel shortage by completing a denovo review of the skills needed to meet military missions. Published strategic guidance regarding these missions is available. Definitive guidance regarding the personnel skills necessary to implement the strategy however, is very limited, almost non-existent. Planners could construct a vague outline of the skills by considering stated national strategies.

Consider President George W. Bush’s introductory remarks to the NSS. The United States “will defend the peace by fighting terrorists . . . [and] actively work[ing] to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.” In the
National Defense Strategy, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, indicated his understanding of the President’s strategic goals and his commitment to implement those goals. The Secretary, however, gave no direction regarding personnel. General Richard Myers, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, hinted as to the necessary skills when he indicated the Joint Force would transform and field new capabilities that required intellect and cultural awareness. General Myers’ allusion is better understood when considered with indirect direction found in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT). The NSCT establishes a goal of diminishing the “underlying conditions” exploited by terrorists. “Underlying conditions” include unstable economic, social, and political situations. Further, if the NSCT were successful, the nation would ostensibly “win the war of ideas.”

A combination of General Myers’ comments, NSCT guidance, and common sense yield a rough personnel blueprint. As General Myers stated, the armed forces must transform, and not continue to rely upon its traditional structure for war fighting and nation building. Tomorrow’s force must rely heavily upon intellectual skills rather than physical skills. Service members should understand, or have experienced, complex cultural and historical issues. More individuals, with skills in management and nation building, are needed. Tomorrow’s soldiers should possess abilities in the areas of diplomacy, management, law enforcement, medicine, engineering, social services, counseling, and theology.

Members of the reserve force offer some of those skills. Years ago, planners decided the Army so infrequently needed certain skills sets that reservists could maintain those capacities. Accordingly, they relegated 97% of civil affairs units to the reserves and National Guard. For instance, most of the military police units are in the National Guard structure. Likewise, the reserves contain a multitude of medical and legal personnel. Given the changed nature of war, Army planners must “grow,” or “evolve,” their force management policies to address future needs. New policies, providing a different paradigm, would allow the military to create a larger, more robust, “reserve service.” Personnel with cultural and nation-building skills do not necessarily require traditional “Army” skills or need to meet Army health and physical standards. Planners should abandon the “Total-Army,” the “One-Army,” and “The Army” concepts and recognize the “reserves” as a unique force. Given that realization, planners could seek creative ways to provide personnel or nouveau adjuncts (NOADs) to meet future needs.

The time has come for our leaders to develop a NOAD branch or service. Noveau adjuncts would possess skills needed for nation building; work involving culture or language; or stateside administrative or training missions. Adjuncts would be required to meet only those
mental, health, and physical standards (hereinafter health standards) necessary to perform their unique service. These individuals would provide adjunct or auxiliary service for the nation, or the military, only when called upon. As such, NOAD compensation and benefit packages should differ from active duty and reservist packages. Legislators could design retirement plans for national service, such that NOADs, as non-career track, employees could leave service with retirement savings of some type. Service by NOADs would be similar to that provided by skilled mercenaries, contractors, technical personnel, or attorneys on retainers. Certainly, creation of NOAD service would require legislative action. The managing entity, perhaps the Army, would have to create administrative systems for NOADs. Certainly, “birthing” of NOADs would require significant time.

Personnel Proposal – Noveau Adjuncts: Possible Sources

The Army’s discarded troops are the most readily available source of NOADs. The Army discharges many skilled soldiers for health reasons. Consider the reserve force. LTG Helmly reported 2.7% of the SELRES had medical problems. In February 2005, a deputy assistant secretary of defense reported about 3% of the troops mobilized from December 2002 to October 2003 did not deploy because of medical or dental problems. Those percentages represent over 10,000 soldiers.

The Active Army separates many soldiers for issues other than performance, or misconduct. Consider the data presented below in Figure 6. The listed percentages are based

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause of Separation</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Loss Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hardship/Dependency</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexual Conduct</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed Procurement Standards</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical (not disability)</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Disability</td>
<td>1492</td>
<td>1.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pregnancy</td>
<td>1047</td>
<td>0.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parenthood (involuntary)</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parenthood (voluntary)</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight Control</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>27.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>4755</td>
<td>45.12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 6. SEPARATION OF ACTIVE DUTY SOLDIERS IN FISCAL YEAR 2005

upon an average inventory of 134,670 soldiers. Note that 45.12% of the Army’s unit losses, (4755 soldiers) were due to problems associated with hardships or parenthood, health, or
One researcher indicated the Army lost 6,273 troops since 1998 for homosexual behavior alone. Clearly, the Army has significant losses in the reserve force for health reasons, and in the active force for non-performance issues. Personnel managers might be able to convert these losses, these discarded soldiers, to NOADs.

If planners would abandon the sole option of “returning” retired troops to the “One-Army” or “The Army,” the retired reserve would constitute another pool of talented NOADs. Retired troops with valuable skills could serve as NOADs. Undoubtedly, retired personnel could more than adequately backfill many medical, administrative, recruiting, and training positions, thereby freeing up regular Army troops for deployment.

If NOAD recruiters applied less restrictive health standards, than those used by military recruiters, more people would qualify for service. An Army nutrition expert indicated weight standards limited the pool of available recruits. Using federal weight guidelines, 43% and 18% of recruiting age women and men respectively, exceeded military weight standards. Many more people would be available if health restrictions regarding various medical conditions, such as asthma and diabetes, were loosened. In the spring of 2005, Army decision makers decided to allow recruits up to 39 years old, with no prior military service, to enter the reserve as part of a three-year test. In the fall of 2005, the Senate approved the admission of persons, up to 42 years of age, into the military. Planners are concerned the older recruits will not be able to meet the physical standards required as they age further. If these recruits were NOADs, planners’ concerns would be alleviated because of the inherent differences in “regular service” and NOAD service. Consider how a paradigm shift would increase the available pool of personnel. People in their 40s and 50s could serve the country as NOADs.

Given the nature of their service, various demographic groups and occupational fields may yield NOADs. Many more individuals may opt to serve their country, if their service was for limited periods under different “contracts” than those used for regular troops or reservists. Engineers, technicians, instructors, medical personnel, linguists, and many others may willingly serve their country, or work on humanitarian missions in other countries. Computer hackers may welcome the challenges of chasing terrorists over the internet as part-time jobs.

Undoubtedly, managing a NOAD force would present significant administrative challenges. The size and talent of the personnel pool however, would far outweigh the administrative challenges. An additional benefit may be cost savings. Nouveau adjuncts would not necessarily require generous compensation packages. Training costs may be significantly lower. Housing and medical costs may be lower. Retirement costs could be appreciably reduced. Finally, an added potential benefit would accrue from the service of ordinary citizens.
As Korean and World War II veterans die, fewer and fewer Americans have intimate knowledge of service to their nation. Service by more citizens would increase citizens’ awareness and appreciation of national service, and of military concerns. National service should also enhance American’s knowledge of global issues.

**Personnel Proposal – Change Processing of Non-Participants**

As previously mentioned, reservists are non-deployable if they are not participating, either by not reporting for active duty or by failing to attend training assemblies. As of October 2005, 9.7% of reservists in troop program units were non-participants. For decades, commanders and senior leaders put minimal effort into reengaging, or processing for separation, reservists who stopped participating. Some dedicated retention officers and first sergeants strived for full participation, but most individuals were too burdened with other tasks. Equally burdened, unit administrators likewise failed to send letters to absent reservists. Commanders and administrators did not take the time to administratively separate absent reservists, preferring instead the easier method of transferring their soldiers to another command – the individual ready reserve.

Since 9/11, LTG Helmly has attempted to engage more of the reserve force and discovered the readiness problems previously discussed. To improve the actual readiness status of his forces, LTG Helmly has attempted to change the laissez-faire culture regarding absent drillers. Through multiple memorandums, he essentially demanded commanders change their attitudes and take proper action. LTG Helmly directed commanders to attempt to retain good soldiers, to determine whether soldiers have potential for future service, to discharge those without potential, and to stop unwarranted transfers to the IRR. General Helmly’s labors yielded some results, but his efforts should extend beyond modification of the administrative culture. General Helmly should increase the efficiency of the administrative process and attack underlying contributory problems. Suggested changes are: 1) regulatory modifications streamlining the separation process, 2) investigation of the effectiveness of current collection processes used to reclaim bonuses or educational incentives paid to unsatisfactory participants, and 3) development of a process to pursue soldiers for damages due to breach of contract.

Separation procedures are inefficient and resource intensive. Army Regulations 135-91 (Service Obligations, Methods of Fulfillment, Participation Requirements, and Enforcement Procedures) and 135-178 (Enlisted Administrative Separations) govern the process. The initial problem with the process is satisfaction of the regulatory elements necessary to deem
non-participating soldiers as unsatisfactory participants, thereby determining their eligibility for separation. Element one concerns absence. Army Regulation 135-91 indicates sufficient absence occurs when a soldier either fails to appear for a period of active duty, or fails to attend nine training assemblies in a twelve-month period. Generally, four training periods are scheduled a month, thus soldiers would miss twelve sessions if they were absent for three months.

The first, or “absence,” element of the regulation is relatively straightforward. The element not easily achieved, is the second element – the due process or notification element. Soldiers must be notified in a timely, reasonable manner of a call to active duty, or their failure to attend training assemblies. The notification should contain information regarding the consequences of continued absence, such as involuntary separation. Unfortunately, commanders infrequently send active duty orders in a timely, verifiable manner. Likewise, commanders often fail to send timely, verifiable notices of missed training assemblies.

Despite LTG Helmly’s motivational directives, commanders rarely succeed in properly establishing the two regulatory elements required to designate non-participatory soldiers as unsatisfactory participants. If commanders do satisfy the “definitional” elements, they encounter another seemingly minor hurdle when attempting involuntary separation of unsatisfactory participants. They must properly notify soldiers of the separation proceedings and possible characterizations of service.

A full discussion of problems encountered by commanders in providing soldiers with proper written communication regarding separation is outside the scope of this paper. However, senior leaders should sincerely investigate notification problems and stop merely berating subordinates for inattentiveness, or seeming unwillingness, to comply. Senior leaders could implement obvious simple regulatory changes to assist commanders, while seeking further solutions to commanders’ tribulations.

One simple beneficial regulatory change would be the establishment and acceptance of computer generated notification forms for missed training assemblies. Pay centers already have many aspects of pay automated. Operators could modify “systems” so that when commanders notify pay centers of absences, the “system” would automatically generate proper absentee notifications. With pay center notifications, soldiers would receive proper, timely notice, commanders would be relieved of an administrative burden, and the absentee element for separation would probably be achieved.

An easier regulatory change would mandate use of one notification procedure for the separation of unsatisfactory participants. The current regulation, 135-178, provides for two
separate processes primarily corresponding to years of service. Commanders separate junior soldiers via the “notification process,” while separating senior soldiers through administrative board procedures. If commanders seek to characterize junior soldiers’ service as other than honorable, commanders must use the administrative board procedure, regardless of soldiers’ length of service. Arguably, Chapter 13 of Army Regulation 135-178 directs use of the administrative board procedure for all unsatisfactory participants, but commanders and administrators are confused by the two processes. Generally, most administrative personnel ignore the specific guidance found in Chapter 13, do not seek legal advice, and proceed according to the seniority of the soldier. 81

A mandate to use only the administrative hearing notification procedure should eliminate confusion as to notification. Further, required use of the administrative hearing process, may well change the perception of separation for unsatisfactory participation, given the severity of an other than honorable characterization of service. 82 Further, mandating use of one procedure, could enable fielding of a standardized, automated tool for creation of notification forms, such as the highly successful tools used by the 99th Regional Readiness Command located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 83

Automated tools would also allow for drastic revision of the maligned “Commander Report” currently required by regulation. Much of the information in this report is already available to senior leaders through automated personnel systems found at higher headquarters. Although required, these reports are infrequently completed properly, in part, because Commanders and unit administrators view them as busy work given the availability of information at higher headquarters. The report could be easily revised to yield a simpler form that would enable commanders to provide input efficiently regarding soldier performance, character of service, and other matters that commanders feel separation authorities should consider.

The simple regulatory changes discussed above (automated absence forms, mandated notification letters, and revision of Commanders Reports) 84 can easily be implemented if senior Army reserve leadership supports the changes. Before leaders will support such change; however, they must change their views of the current problems with unsatisfactory participants, and “failure” on the part of subordinate leaders. Senior leaders must approach the situation with open minds.

An earnest, non-threatening approach must also be used as senior leaders investigate the administrative processes used to collect bonuses and educational benefits received by unsatisfactory participants. It is uncertain whether any Army authority enforces regulations
designed to recover unwarranted monetary benefits. Given the current administrative burdens on staffs greatly reduced by mobilization, recoupment efforts would seemingly have a low priority. While a low priority in the short-term, the lack of recoupment supports an image of the reserves as a government funded training program and waste of valuable resources. Reservists are aware their absent peers received “free rides.” That awareness harms command climates, which arguably influences productivity.

After investigating recoupment problems, senior leaders should be able to determine whether to pursue revolutionary, highly political changes in enlistment contracts. Enlistment is voluntary. Many Americans view service as a choice, not an obligation. Including “penalty or damage clauses” for breaches of service contracts would be a political hot potato. Given the public’s increasingly negative view of the Global War on Terror, few senior leaders would pursue such legislative changes. Military and civilian leaders however, would be well advised to study contract change. The American public may find contract change far more palatable than re-institution of a draft. A plausible public relations pitch would be the active pursuit of apparent irresponsible soldiers who breached their contracts and reaped unwarranted government benefits while responsible soldiers honorably served their country. Further, the implementation of NOAD service would provide an entirely new dimension to the public view of “contractual service” to the country.

Conclusion

To win the Global War on Terror, the nation must have “a dog in the fight.” While the size, and type, of the dog may not matter as much as the fight in the dog, some canine has to attempt to complete a desired mission. Given the current heavy demands upon the Army Reserve, coupled with the Reserve’s inherent problems, planners cannot realistically consider the Reserve as a robust, viable, ready force for extended service. Policy makers must seek other sources of personnel. If legislators created a nouveau adjunct force imbued with those skills, or attributes, necessary to support various national goals, the nation could tap additional personnel sources. A nouveau adjunct force may be more robust and less expensive; it could greatly increase public interest in, and awareness of, national service. The time has come for policy makers to stop sleepwalking through history and consider not only the size, but also the breed of dog they intend to take to the fight. While policy makers debate dog breeds, Army leaders should streamline management processes for non-deployable soldiers who have stopped participating in the reserves. By doing so, at least planners would know if the dogs on their roll-call lists are actually available and ready.
Endnotes

1 Dwight D. Eisenhower, speech to the Republican National Committee, January 31, 1958. Quote also attributed to Mark Twain.

2 Quote widely attributed to Dwight D. Eisenhower.


9 This paper focuses on the Army Reserve; however, the author’s proposals may also apply to the other services.

10 Key personnel recognize the need for dramatic change. In 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld argued the War on Terror made his plans for military transformation more relevant and urgent. J. Gilmore, “Rumsfeld: Terror War Drives Transformation,” LookSmart, 14 August 2003 [newspaper on-line] available from http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_pfr/is_200308/ai_435629562/print; Internet; accessed 1 November 2005. Rumsfeld posited the military had to change to face the new enemy that is not constrained by conventional rules. Recently, he maintained the Federal government may need a “transformative cultural, if not institutional, shift” similar to that caused by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation. “The old, rigid divisions between war, peace, and diplomacy, conflict and reconstruction – and the roles of the various


15 Tom Bowman, “Army Reserve Fast Becoming ‘Broken’ Force,” Baltimore Sun, 5 January 2005; copy of archived article purchased by author. Tom Bowman’s figures are comparable to those presented by General Richard B. Myers to the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on 27 April 2005. General Myers indicated about 140,000 United States troops were serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Of those troops, 33% were Guard and Reserve personnel or 46,000 soldiers. http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/CJCSPostureStatementforSAC-DHearing27Apr20051.htm; Internet; accessed 15 October 2005. Lieutenant General (LTG) James R Helmly, Chief of the Army Reserve, reported 31,829 reservists were deployed. Reserve Officers Association (ROA), Washington D.C., 15 February 2005.

16 ROA Keynote address, see endnote 15.

17 USARC G1 data, see endnote 13. The numbers do not include National Guard soldiers. A discussion of problems facing the National Guard is outside the scope of this essay.


19 The Army War College staff maintained that “[o]ver the last 15 years, the Army has relied more and more on the [reserve component] to meet demanding mission requirements in support of the” National Military Strategy. Army War College, How the Army Runs: a Senior Leader Reference Handbook 2005-2006 (Carlisle Barracks, 2005), 93.

20 Ibid.
Note that the data concerns Army Reserve and Army National Guard members. The use of both services has increased significantly. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense*, 20 December 2002 (Washington, D.C.), 8.


10 USC 10102.

10 USC 10103.

10 USC 10141(a).

USARC G1 data, see endnote 13.

The President must notify Congress after he declares a national emergency and calls up reservists. The President’s congressional notification must occur within 24 hours and include a justification for his action. 10 USC 12304.

10 USC 10151, 10152, 10153.

USARC G1 data, see endnote 13.


USARC G1 data, see endnote 13.


Davey, see endnote 32.

GlobalSecurity.org, see endnote 33.

A Google search will provide many articles concerning soldiers who fought mobilization.

USARC G1 data, see endnote 13.


The statutory problem is exacerbated by the Office of the Judge Advocate General’s interpretation of 10 U.S.C. 12302. The statute has been interpreted to mean 24 consecutive months and/or 24 cumulative months.

U.S. General Accounting Office, see endnote 40, 9.

USARC G1 data, see endnote 13.

USARC G1 data, see endnote 13.


USARC G1 data, see endnote 13. The leadership of USARC has a historical goal of maintaining the non-participant “account” at 6%, or less, of the SELRES force. Assume the reserve personnel managers could maintain their TTHS account at levels similar to the active duty force – 13%. The 6% non-participant rate combined with the 13% TTHS would yield 19% of the SELRES unavailable for mobilization at any given time. In November 2005, at a national conference, USARC personnel briefed commanders on the leadership’s strategy for building a 21st Century Army Reserve. That strategy included full implementation of a TTHS account, and maintenance of the account at less than 10% of end strength. Given current reserve and active duty TTHS levels, USARC’s goal of 16% seems ambitious. USARC Commanders Conference briefing slides with commentary, Atlanta, GA, dated 14 November 2005.

Non-participants on Army rolls create problems in addition to an inaccurate impression of the number of reservists ready for duty. Absent soldiers consume valuable resources. The Army has fixed costs for every member of a troop program unit (TPU). The costs in fiscal year 2006 are: $277 for defense health care accrual, $27.00 for group insurance (partially recoverable from participating soldiers), and $98.75 for maintenance of soldier’s pay account. Thus, each TPU soldier costs an amazing $402.75. The Army transferred money to the treasury at the beginning of fiscal year 2006 for health care accrual costs. As such, no health care savings will be gained if non-participants are separated. The health care and insurance costs are “wasted” resources for non-participants. United States Army Reserve Command (USARC), G1, Ramona H. Scheer, Acting Chief, Military Personnel Management Division, email message to author through Herman Whitley, USARC G1, and Thomas Rahe, Program Analyst, DAPE-PRR, 8 February 2006. Additionally, if the unit is processing non-participants for separation, the unit will pay over $12 a soldier in order to properly notify the soldier. Clearly, the Army’s expenditures for non-participants represent significant lost opportunity for the reserves.

End of the month data for November 2005 indicated 11,989 soldiers were not participating. Each month, reserve leaders expend $4,828,570 for those soldiers. To separate them properly, probably $143,868 will be spent on mailing costs. The figures are startling!

Troops who do not mobilize with their peers also create morale problems. Those who answer the call to duty, hold their missing peers in contempt. Compliant troops also disparage
their leaders for allowing soldiers to “sit out the war.” Soldiers often know non-participants from
their hometown reserve units and are aware of the missing soldiers’ physical locations.
Participating soldiers often are also aware of enlistment benefits received by missing soldiers.
Some troops, upon returning, decide they too will “sit out” the rest of the war. Considering the
lack of effective punishment, “administrative corrective action,” or even reclamation of benefits
in the case of non-participants, returning soldiers’ decisions to ignore service contracts are
understandable.

The author, as Deputy Staff Judge Advocate for the 99th Regional Readiness Center,
reviewed many separation actions during her tenure from 2003 to 2005. She noted many
separation packages for soldiers who had served recent tours. The separation actions for those
soldiers seemed disingenuous given the rather insignificant corrective actions, or punishment,
meted out to non-participants and those individuals who failed to report from the IRR. In the
author’s experience at several reserve commands, the usual consequence for non-participation
is involuntary separation with service characterized as general under honorable conditions.
Recent reports from LTC Bryan Hiftidy, an Army spokesperson from Human Resources
Command, indicated IRR members who failed to report for duty would probably receive similar
treatment, rather than face criminal charges. Will Dunham, “U.S. Army to Boot Reserve
Soldiers who won’t Fight,” Reuters Foundation Alert Net, 6 January 2006; available from
http://www.alernet.org/printable.htm?URL=/thenews/newsdesk/N09187506.htm; Internet;
accessed 13 January 2006.

48 USARC G1 data, see endnote 13.
49 U.S. General Accounting Office, see endnote 40, 18.
50 Bowman, see endnote 15.
51 Chief, Army Reserve, LTG James R. Helmly, “Readiness of the United States Army
Reserve,” memorandum for Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington D.C., 20 December
2004.
52 Reporters contacted Army officials shortly after LTG Helmly’s memo (Ibid.) became
public. “Peter Bechtel, deputy chief of the army’s war plans division, acknowledged that the
situation posed difficulties, but said there were solutions. ‘There are some concerns for the
long-term access to the Reserve component,’ he said. ‘But it does not pose an insurmountable
challenge.’” LTG James Lovelse, “the army’s chief of operations, dismissed concerns that the
Guard or Reserve was ‘broken,’ saying, ‘We still have a rich reservoir to draw on to fill those
units.’” Eric Schmitt and David S. Cloud, “U.S. Effort Faces Skill Shortages as Part-Time
Lexis-Nexis; accessed 12 October 2005. Interestingly, LTG Helmly later downplayed his own
alarmist memo. He stated, “[w]e’ve now moved past that. The issues that I cited there [memo]
have been addressed.” William Cole, “Army Reserve Altering Message,” Honolulu Advertiser,
F508290332.html/?preing=on; Internet; accessed 22 October 2005. An analyst would find the
various public statements regarding the continued capacity of the reserves very interesting. A
thoughtful review of the data presented in the Government Accounting Office’s July report
contradicts Pollyannaish statements.
In his memo, LTG Helmly requested consideration of significant policy changes. He proposed changes to the length of mobilization tours, active prosecution of reservists who fail to deploy with their units, and discharge of reservists who do not attend training sessions. Others considering reserve issues, call for a return of the draft. Far reaching proposals such as these, undoubtedly, will be discussed for some time. Unfortunately, given the emotional nature of these proposals, little progress towards implementing solutions is foreseeable in the near future. LTG Helmly, see endnote 51.


Editorial quoting Senator Lindsey O. Graham, member of the Senate Armed Services, “Reserves in Name Only,” Washington Post, 27 April 2003 [newspaper on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 15 November 2005. Eliot Cohen maintained “[t]he increasing use of reservists . . . for routine military operations not only puts stress on the lives of those called up for months or even a year at a time. It also runs the risk of exhausting their willingness to serve and indeed undermines the very idea of the citizen soldier.” Eliot A. Cohen, “A Tale of Two Secretaries,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002 [journal on-line], available from ProQuest; accessed 15 November 2005.


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington D.C, 2004) iii. Unfortunately the brief mention regarding transformation is the only substantive discussion regarding personnel attributes within the 23-page document.


Washington Post Editorial, see endnote 55.

A more sensible future approach would be to have the NOAD, or future reserve force, be totally “purple” or joint. Administrators could manage service members possessing cultural or nation-building skills together, as one force, available to meet the nation’s needs. The services would need to operate in a more unified manner however, before administrators could create an effective purple NOAD force.


LTG Helmly, see endnote 51.
64 Anna Taylor (Attrition Program Analyst, Office of the G1, DMPM), e-mail message to author, 20 January 2006.

65 Figure 6 only provides data on attrition from Army units. The author did not consider losses during initial entrance training in this essay. If the author considered those losses, the total number soldiers separated due to problems associated with hardships or parenthood, health, or homosexual conduct would be greater.

66 Nathaniel Frank, “Rvolving Door for Troops,” Washington Post, 12 July 2004, sec. A, p. 17. the Army experiences losses due to sexual preferences. Dr. Frank is a senior research fellow at the Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military at the University of California, Santa Barbara. It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss the circumstances associated with service by lesbians and gays.

67 Any military position filled stateside by a NOAD would free up a soldier for deployment. The suggestion to use NOADs to free up service people for deployment is similar to proposals for contracting out non-essential tasks.

68 Marilyn Marchione, “Military Worried Troops not Fit to Fight; Overweight Soldiers told to lose Pounds or Leave; Large Recruits Fail to Qualify,” Washington Post, 17 July 2005 [newspaper on-line], available from ProQuest; accessed 11 December 2005.

69 USARC Commanders Conference briefing slides with commentary, Atlanta, GA, dated 14 November 2005.


In November 2005, United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) personnel presented a brief at a commanders’ conference. In their brief, personnel managers probably highlighted the growing gap, as indicated by the use of the chart provided below. USARC Commanders Conference briefing slides with commentary, Atlanta, GA, dated 14 November 2005.
Further discussion of national service is outside the scope of this paper. For additional information see LTC Otis L. Brown II’s strategic research project entitled, *Universal National Service Policy*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 2006.

The common practice of transferring absent soldiers into the IRR created part of the SELRES readiness problem. As discussed earlier in this essay, the IRR is not a reliable pool of available personnel for mobilization.

LTG Helmly signed many memos, regarding processing of non-participants. Memorandum, HQ, USARC, AFRC-PRP, 30 May 03, subject: Reassignment of US Army Reserve (USAR) Troop Program Unit (TPU) Soldiers to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR); Memorandum, HQ, USARC, AFRC-PRP, 18 Jul 03, subject: Processing Unsatisfactory Participants for Separation from the US Army Reserve (USAR); Memorandum, HQ, USARC, AFRC-CG, 7 Nov 03, subject: Army Reserve Retention Strategy; Memorandum, OCAR, DAAR-HR, 26 Apr 04, subject: Reassignment of Army Reserve Troop Program Unit (TPU) Soldiers to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Processing Unsatisfactory Participants (Non-Participants (NPs)) for Separation from the Army Reserve; Memorandum, HQ, USARC, AFRC-PRP-E, 8 Nov 04, subject: Expeditious Processing of Personnel Actions and Removal of Non-deployable Soldiers; Memorandum, OCAR, DAAR-RT, 3 Jan 05, subject: Reassignment of Army Reserve Troop Program Unit (TPU) Soldiers to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR); Memorandum, HQ, USARC, AFRC-PRP, 15 Feb 05, subject: Approval Authority and Processing Procedures for Reassignments of Army Reserve Troop Program Unit (TPU) Soldiers to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

Chapter thirteen of the regulation governs unsatisfactory participants. Often personnel refer to these separations as “chapter thirteens” or “unsats.”

Near the beginning of 2004, LTC Carrie Chaplin, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, 90th Regional Readiness Command, proposed commanders satisfy the definitional elements of Army Regulation 135-91 by ordering absent soldiers to periods of active duty. By doing so, commanders could seek to reengage interested troops, or satisfy regulatory requirements for separation. By using annual training, overall processing time for separations would be reduced by the time required to miss nine training periods. As a whole, a Command would save significant processing time given the extensive number of Commands who have not notified soldiers of their absences. If commanders implemented the “active duty process” to define unsatisfactory participants, they would also gain efficiencies by focusing on all of their truant soldiers at one time. The 99th Regional Readiness Command began to employ the process about mid-2004 with significant success. In November 2004, LTG Helmly supported this process. See endnote 75.
The “active duty process” avoids the extensive time required by the “nine missed assembly process,” but exclusive use would be short sighted. LTG Helmly’s goal is not to discharge soldiers who may serve when called upon. The goal is to ascertain why absences occur, fix problems, or change the status of soldiers faced with temporary insurmountable mobilization problems. Separation is seen as a last resort. Thus, commanders should not be allowed to bypass the “nine missed assembly process” completely. Ibid.

78 In the past two years, the Army Reserve modified procedures to allow the use of computer generated test results in establishing definitional elements for separation processes for illegal drug use. Computer generated absentee letters sent from pay centers seems to be a very similar definitional issue.

79 Pay centers would have to implement mailing procedures to satisfy the requirements set forth in Army Regulation 135-91 (Service Obligations, Methods of Fulfillment, Participation Requirements, and Enforcement Procedures).

80 The author fully recognizes there are many pertinent aspects of this proposal not discussed in this paper. Length requirements preclude full discussion.

81 Another regulatory requirement often ignored, or satisfied in minimalist fashion, is the “retention” element. Regulations require retention personnel to contact absent soldiers and provide input to the commanders. This input may be valuable in assisting commanders in determining what actions to pursue and whether soldier have future mobilization potential. U.S. Department of the Army, Service Obligations, Methods of Fulfillment, Participation Requirements, and Enforcement Procedures, Army Regulation 135-91 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1 February 2005); U.S. Department of the Army, Assignments, Attachments, Details, and Transfers, Army Regulation 140-10 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 15 August 2005); U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), USARC Retention and Transition Program, USARC Regulation 140-6 (Fort McPherson, GA); Memorandum, HQ, USARC, AFRC-PRP, 15 February 2005, subject: Approval Authority and Processing Procedures for Reassignments of Army Reserve Troop Program Unit (TPU) Soldiers to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR); Retention Memorandum, HQ, USARC, AFRC-CG, 7 November 2003, subject: Army Reserve Retention Strategy.

82 The author fully recognizes the appalling lack of understanding by officers and enlisted personnel at all levels of experience regarding characterization of service. Given insufficient knowledge, the impact of a mandated notification procedure for an other than honorable characterization of service on Army reserve culture may well be minimal.

83 The author noted that implementation of automation tools resulted in a 67% reduction in the overall number of “drug cases” awaiting successful administrative separation processing in the first year of use (May 2004 – May 2005). A similar result would be reasonable if commands implemented automated procedures for Chapter 13 separations. Note that Ed Corgiat, 99th Regional Readiness Command (RRC), is primarily responsible for development of the automation tools in conjunction with the staff from the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 99th RRC.

84 Another seemingly simple change involves changing recruiting regulations. Currently, soldiers discharged by the Army Reserve or Army National Guard for unsatisfactory participation are allowed to enlist in the Army Reserve at later dates after receiving waivers.
Such reenlistments foster the image of a part-time job and the practice of sitting out unpopular wars. Understandably, blanket prevention of future enlistments by unsatisfactory participants has multiple policy implications that should be considered further.

85 The author has not encountered recoupment efforts outside of those experienced by a few medical professionals. The author has not participated in any discussion, regarding recoupment, in any administrative settings, or conferences. Nor has she viewed any memorandums regarding recoupment.
