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**INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM -- A WAR WITHOUT BOUNDARY: WAYS TO
COMBAT**

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ABSTRACT

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We live in an age of international terrorism with its ever increasing reach and brutality. The nature and type of terrorism has become more varied and complex and terrorist organizations even more evasive and difficult to understand. There is thus a strong need to combat this hydra-headed monster of international terrorism. Counter terrorism tactics and tasks are often expensive and difficult. But yet there is no alternative to developing a strong and effective counter terrorism capability to provide a measure of safety and security to the people from terrorist acts and defeat terrorist organizations. This study will examine in general the nature, types of international terrorism and threat posed by it and focus on the counter-terrorism approaches, and measures needed to combat international terrorism.

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM -- A WAR WITHOUT BOUNDARY: WAYS TO COMBAT

Terrorism is almost a part of human condition. There are always men and women who are prepared to use violence to achieve the group or political ambitions. Terrorism is a weapon of coercive intimidation designed to make established authority and governments to submit to demands.¹ Terrorism is often undeclared covert warfare and it has plagued mankind for centuries but today it has moved beyond simple assassinations and bombings, it has multiplied its lethal capabilities many times and is capable of killing thousands of people at a time and threaten entire nations. In spite of its lasting presence and ever increasing wrath, we still find it difficult to understand this complex and multifaceted monster and more so the question of dealing with it.

The phenomenon of terrorism has become a major concern of the international community and of nations around the world. Terrorism ebbs and flow like tide, one moment crashing frighteningly on the foreshores of our lives, then retreating to lie quiescent, gathering strength for the next assault.² But what is alarming about the trend is that it is hitting with accelerated frequency and with more brutal methods and tactics, causing far wider casualties and destruction³. Terrorism is an issue that has moved to the forefront of the international agenda.

The development of plastic explosives and compact automatic weapons gave terrorists the ability to exploit their targets and maximize their effects. In open societies, such as the United States and Western European countries, arms are also relatively readily accessible and movement is more or less free, these factors facilitate the terrorist groups or organization of political violence. The terrorist are therefore often better armed than the police forces that have to deal with them. Democracies, especially liberal democratic societies are therefore extremely vulnerable to political violence and terrorist acts.⁴ The current trends of adapting newer technology by the terrorist open up newer specters of violence. Technology has had great impact on the development of the terrorist threats emerging since the end of the Second World War.⁵ Access to new terrorist tools, the broadening of the terrorist market and the advent of sophisticated and readily available computer technologies are all significant factors in the evolving threat. The potential possibility of terrorist organization acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) further raises the level of possible damage and destruction beyond any imagined so far.⁶

The linkage pattern of the terrorist organization is also a complex subject of study. The web of linkages is often spread to different levels and countries. Terrorism today is rarely

confined to national boundaries. Almost all terrorist organizations have international linkages and connections, there is consistent mutual cooperation among these groups and their target area is often any where in the world. The phenomenon of transnational linkages is ever widening, with newer states and groups supporting a wide array of terrorist activities.⁷ The problem therefore needs a broad understanding to tackle at any meaningful level. Only a complete understanding of both internal and external dimensions may lead to a comprehensive approach and strategy to combat the menace of terrorism.

Defining Terrorism

What is terrorism? Terrorism is a global phenomenon which is easy to recognize but difficult to define. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as:

Terrorism: A system of terror. 1. Government by intimidation as directed and carried out by the party in power in France during the revolution of 1789-94; the system of `Terror`. 2. gen. A policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of terrorizing or condition of being terrorized.⁸

But the interpretation is too literal and historical to be of much contemporary use. Terrorism, in the most widely accepted contemporary usage of the term, is fundamentally and inherently political. It is also ineluctably about power, the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power and the use of power to achieve political change. Terrorism is thus violence or the threat of violence, used and directed in the pursuit of a political aim.

Apparently the word `terrorism` is interpreted to suit different interests.⁹ A widely accepted definition was offered by Yonah Alexander: "The use of violence against random civilian targets in order to intimidate or to create generalized pervasive fear for the purpose of achieving political goals".¹⁰ This definition is precise and often used by scholars; however, it fails to point out the international linkages. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines the term as, "The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."¹¹

There is, however, one common point of agreement, terrorism is a pejorative term.¹² It is a word with intrinsically negative connotations that is generally applied to one's enemies and opponents. What is terrorism thus seems to depend on one's point of view and goes with the common perception that one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist.¹³ The decision to call an organization or label an act as terrorist is therefore unavoidably subjective, depending on whether one sympathizes with or opposes the group. The meaning and usage of the word has

also changed over time to accommodate the political vernacular and discourse of each successive era, therefore terrorism has proved increasingly elusive in the face of attempts to construct one consistent definition for all time.¹⁴

It is also important to distinguish terrorism with other forms of violence. Terrorism is sometimes equated with, or treated as synonymous with, guerrilla warfare.¹⁵ There is a fundamental difference between the two. 'Guerrilla,' refers to a larger group of armed individuals, who operate as a military unit, attack enemy military forces, and seize and hold territory also exercising some form of sovereignty over a defined geographical area and its population. Terrorists, however, do not function in the open as armed units, generally do not attempt to seize or hold territory, deliberately avoid engaging military forces and rarely exercise any control either over territory or population.

Categories of Terrorist Groups

A large number of terrorist groups surfaced and became active over the past few decades. Though these groups had some common characteristics, they have different motives and objectives.¹⁶ On review of the post-Second World War experience on terrorism it is quite distinct to find the development of typology based on motivation. Categorization of terrorist activity in this manner is important in assisting us to determine the nature of the threat and the response which the threat demands. The categories of terrorist groups are:

Issue

The use of terrorist tactics by previously moderate protest groups is a relatively new departure, although it is gradually becoming more prevalent.¹⁷ Tactical 'successes' achieved by prominent terrorist groups e.g. Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in respect to ransoms paid, prisoners released, or the gaining of widespread publicity have encouraged emulation by animal-rights activists,¹⁸ ecologists, and others. Issue-group militancy usually stems from a wish to rectify a supposed grievance or wrong which is generally attributed to governmental action or inaction.

Ideological

Long associated with the reality of politically motivated violence, ideological doctrines form the backdrop of a marked proportion of terrorist groups. It is important to recognize from the outset that terrorist related to ideology, however, is not merely the purview of the Left of the political spectrum. Anarchists, nihilists, fascists, and neo-Nazis spread the use of terrorism across to the far Right.¹⁹ Terrorism based upon ideology is exemplified by the activities of the

Baader-Meinhof Gang and the Revolutionary Cells of West Germany, the Red Brigades and the Black Order of Italy, FP-25 in Portugal, and Grupo de Liberacion anti-Fascista Primero de Octubre (GRAPO) in Spain.

Exile

As the term implies, groups of this nature reside elsewhere than their homeland through personal choice or eviction. Exile groups often have a nationalist-separatist-irredentist motivation and an ideological basis, as well as the parallel desire to oust a regime in their established national home. The Armenian terrorist organizations, Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and Hoffman Military-Sports Group (HMSG) are respectively left and right in political affiliation.²⁰ Currently, serious friction between Sikh inhabitants of the state of Punjab and the central Indian government has caused the formation of Sikh exile groups.

State and State-Sponsored

Terrorism practiced by the ruling or governing powers of a state is another category. Control or repression is the purpose and, generally, the activity is confined within the national borders of the state.²¹ Idi Amin's regime in Uganda and 'Papa Doc' Duvalier's despotism in Haiti²² were based on state terrorism, as was Adolph Hitler's Third Reich. Not infrequently, in the case of Gaddafi's Libya or Khomeini's Iran for instance, the state will attack exile dissidents in an attempt to suppress opposition.²³ State sponsorship of terrorism is a worrisome trend which has emerged more openly over the past decade. The term 'surrogate warfare' is one consequence and refers to support of terrorist groups by one state to promote its aims in relation to another state.²⁴ While Gaddafi and Libya have been singled out as a prominent example of state-sponsored terrorism, other nations such as Syria, Iran, North Korea, and Bulgaria have also been accused of similar indulgence.²⁵ Burning example of such state-sponsored terrorism is Afghanistan.

Religious Fanaticism

Religious fanaticism has been a source of terrorist motivation over the centuries. The suicide bombing attacks by Shiite terrorists in Lebanon, do underline the extent to which religious fervor may be manipulated for political purposes.²⁶ The Muslim Brotherhood continues to pose a troublesome threat to stability within Egypt and the Sudan.²⁷ Religious fanaticism has contributed to the formation of exile terrorist groups, as in the case of the Sikhs in Canada and Great Britain.²⁸

Assessing the Threat

Terrorists differ in their level or scale of the threat they pose at different places or times, but however there are some common areas that one can identify. They have at their disposal a wide variety of tactical options. They can bomb buildings, hijack airlines, carry out assassinations etc. Terrorist operations are carried out in spectacular fashion by coordinated and synchronized waves of simultaneous actions. By general comparison, groups that were operating before were not as lethal as they are today. New methods, for example, the attack on Twin Tower and Pentagon on September 11 have added a new dimension to the technique evolved by the terrorist with regards to the high level of lethality that includes large populations. The real potential of terrorist groups using WMD brings extremely horrible possibilities and consequences.²⁹ A new breed of techno-terrorists using high technology skills is also beginning to make its mark. In an age of information and technology the potential threat that this new breed can pose is enormous. Terrorism of these types is called 'New Terrorism'.³⁰ A more contemporary assessment of the terrorist tactics and threat may be grouped as Traditional Terrorism and New Terrorism.

Traditional Terrorism

Bombs. Bombs are the main tool of the terrorist. More than half of all terrorist incidents involve explosive devices and, as with other terrorist tactics, bombs are being used to kill more and more innocent people. Most terrorists today have moved beyond these homemade improvised explosive devices. They use construction explosives that can be easily stolen from construction sites all over the world, or they use military explosives that can be purchased on the international market or stolen from military installations.³¹ The increase in state-sponsored terrorism has resulted in more sophisticated terrorist bombs. The vehicle bomb detonated at the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut on 23 October, 1983 is a prime example of this technology.

Arson. Arson is another tactic that has been a favorite of certain terrorist groups. Over the past twenty years, almost 14 percent of all terrorist incidents have been arsons, and in most cases an incendiary device was used to start the fire.³² The Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacist groups use it as part of their subversive campaigns.³³ Other groups around the world have repeatedly proven their proficiency in manufacturing and using Molotov cocktails.

Assassination. Assassination was the earliest tactic used by terrorists. In fact, the word "assassin" is derived from the Hashshasin, or the Society of Assassins, the Islamic terrorists who operated in the Middle East during the tenth century.³⁴ Diplomats and politicians have always been the favorite target of assassins, with military and police personnel coming the

second. Today's terrorists, however, also assassinate business and cultural leaders, high-ranking government and military personnel.

Armed Attacks. Armed attacks by terrorists have become increasingly lethal in the past few years. Sikh terrorists in India have stopped bus loads of people on numerous occasions and murdered all of the Hindus on the buses by machine-gunning them to death. The victims usually include children, women, and older Hindus, who are indiscriminately slaughtered by their attackers. The same tactic is used by Tamil groups operating in Sri Lanka.³⁵ In Peru, the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) has been responsible for more than 10,000 deaths.

Hostage-Taking. Hostage-taking is an art that has been fine-tuned by international terrorists operating in the world today. They have learned to create spectacular events that are guaranteed to capture the attention of the media. When we examine the tactics being used during those events, several alarming trends emerge. Most of today's hostage-taking events occur in a mobile environment. We no longer see the embassy takeovers of the 1970s.³⁶ Instead, we find that hostage-taking and hijackings have been combined into a single tactic.

Kidnapping. Kidnapping is an expensive event for a terrorist group unless they are operating in an environment like Beirut. To guard the victim and secure the area where he or she is being held requires a larger number of people than is usually found in a single tactical cell. And there is always the risk that the location will be identified by authorities.

Sabotage. Sabotage is an effective terrorist tactic against industrialized nations. Utility systems are one of the targets most frequently selected because they are extremely vulnerable and almost impossible to protect. More important is the fact that when they are hit correctly, a lot of people know it.

Threats. Threats can be an effective tool when used by an established terrorist group or its state sponsor. If a telephone caller in Ulster, claiming to be from the Irish Republican Army, says there is a bomb in a factory, that factory will probably be evacuated. Operations will be shut down temporarily even if no bomb is discovered.

New Terrorism

Since the end of the Cold War and especially in the wake of New York and Oklahoma City bombings and Aum Shinrikyo attacks in Japan (this had special WMD implications), there has been a dramatic shift in the perceived threat of new terrorism.³⁷ Although it is not yet the common tactic of most terrorist groups but the potential makes the danger real as was shown by the gas attack in the Tokyo subway station. A major group in the class of new terrorism is

chemical biological radiological nuclear (CBRN) terrorism. With this terrorism can reach an unprecedented level of destruction.³⁸

Chemical Terrorism. Terrorists could use chemical agents to cause mass casualty. Although the technicalities involved in some of the chemical process would be quite complicated, the intensity of the purpose makes it possible. The use of Sarin gas by Aum Shinrinko in Japan demonstrates the capability of the new terrorists.³⁹

Biological Terrorism. Terrorist may use biological agents to cause mass death. Like chemical capability it is not easy to get technical skills required to develop the agents but it is possible.⁴⁰ There are at least four primary acquisition routes that terrorists could conceivably pursue in acquiring a biological warfare capability. They are:

- Purchasing a biological agent from one of the world's 1,500 germ banks.
- Theft from a research laboratory, hospital, or public health service laboratory, where agents are cultivated for diagnostic purposes.
- Isolation and culturing of a desired agent from natural sources.
- Obtaining biological agents from a rogue state, a disgruntled government scientist, or a state sponsor.

Radiological Terrorism. It is quite possible for the terrorist to disperse radiological material in an effort to contaminate a target population or a distinct geographic area.⁴¹ The material could be spread by radiological dispersal devices (RDD) like dirty bombs etc. There are a number of possible sources of the material that could be used to make a radiological terrorist device like the nuclear waste stored at a power plant or radiological medical isotopes found in many hospitals and research laboratories.

Nuclear Terrorism. A real danger of mass destruction comes from the specter of nuclear terrorism. Nuclear technology and skills are not difficult to find, one can even piece together all the information needed from open literature.⁴² Terrorists can easily muster a few disgruntled scientists to do the job for them. In the post-Cold War period there could be many such scientists available to be hired. Terrorists may even steal a small nuclear device or buy one in the black market. In either way, it is quite possible for a terrorist group to acquire a nuclear device to use it for terrorist purposes with catastrophic results.

Agricultural Terrorism. Weaponizing pathogenic agents to destroy livestock and crops is far easier than creating munitions designed to kill hundreds. Sabotaging organic agricultural material is potentially easy. All major food crops come in a number of varieties, each generally suited to specific soil and climatic conditions and with differing sensitivities to particular diseases.⁴³ Plant pathogens in turn, exist in different strains with varying degrees of contagion

to individual crop types. A terrorist could take advantage of these properties to isolate and disseminate disease strains that are most able to damage one or more of a state's major arable food supplies.

Eco-Terrorism. Similar to the agriculture terrorism is the threat to environment and ecological system. Eco terrorists may easily damage the eco-system of a country causing immediate death and destruction with far reaching consequences.⁴⁴ These terrorist acts will also have devastating consequences beyond the immediate target area.

Cyber Terrorism. The latest threat from the front of new terrorism is posed by cyber terrorists.⁴⁵ Today's world is extremely dependent on the computer. In fact, use of computer technology is all pervasive in our everyday life. Modern finance, industry and defense can not function without computers. Skilled hackers can gain control of these systems; we have already seen the impact of isolated hackers penetrating the system. A concerted attack coordinated by terrorist motives can end up in cyber madness with devastating consequences or cyber paralysis with equally negative impact.⁴⁶

Combating Terrorism

Terrorism constitutes a serious challenge to domestic and international stability. Combating the threat of terrorism is therefore high on the agenda of most governments faced with this problem. Terrorists today are no longer confined to their national boundary; they operate from foreign bases with a wide and complex web of international linkage. Modern technology and the advent of the information age allure them to become global operators with little effort. Combating terrorism can no longer remain isolated national action programs; it requires a concerted and well coordinated international plan and response.⁴⁷ Because the nature of the problem is complex and multi-headed, it requires a clear and comprehensive policy and plan to combat it. It will need deep understanding of the problem and a robust response will involve a wide array of agencies and resources at a multi-level, multi-pronged approach. Combating terrorism is certainly not an easy task and it needs concerted effort by government and should include the people as a part of the plan. Most importantly, international initiatives and diplomacy must be exploited to the fullest to achieve greater degree of prevention. Ideally, all nations of the world agree that terrorism is wrong and join together to combat it. A shared, agreed assessment is needed for the menace of terrorism and of strategies for countering it. It will provide a common foundation for international policy and action in support of such collective endeavor.⁴⁸

Terrorism Counteraction Mind-Set. Before we can begin to intuitively comprehend the steps that need to be taken to manage this threat, we must first develop a terrorism counteraction mind-set.⁴⁹ People within the terrorism infrastructure do not think the way most of us think. They are fanatically committed to their cause, and they earnestly believe that every possible tactic and means is justified in achieving their goals, including the murder of old people, women, children, and babies. We all have our own ethnocentric limitations, that is, the set of values and beliefs. However, if we are going to understand the different forms of terrorism in the world today, we must learn to shed our own ethnocentric qualities and attempt to assume the mind-set of the adversary. This challenge is magnified by the fact that each of the major groups in the world has a different set of motivations, beliefs, and values.⁵⁰

The antiterrorism and terrorism counteraction planner must learn to think like a terrorist. He must understand that a terrorist is willing to murder innocent civilians, is totally committed to his cause, and may be willing to die for what he perceives as the "greater cause." The planner must adapt to the mind-set of the groups that present a threat to the assets he is responsible for protecting.⁵¹ He must be aware of the tactics they use, the training they have received, and the operational patterns they follow. After the threat analysis is developed and the antiterrorism program is in place, and the planner expects the unexpected.

Basic Objectives. The four basic objectives of most government terrorism counteraction programs are prevention, deterrence, reaction, and prediction.⁵² Reaction is a counter terrorism activity, whereas the other three objectives are antiterrorism considerations.

Prevention. It is achieved by hardening potential targets. Most of the U.S. diplomatic missions around the world have changed considerably in recent years. Barriers have been put into place to defend against car bombs, and access to many of these facilities is now tightly controlled. But as we harden one target category, such as government buildings, terrorists simply move to a different set of targets, such as commercial office buildings. When these targets are hardened, they hit random targets, such as department stores and apartment buildings. Although it is impossible to achieve total prevention through target hardening, we are forced to continue these efforts, especially when we are called upon to secure high-threat facilities.

Deterrence. Recent actions to fight terrorism worldwide have been very successful. Al-Qaeda has been severely disrupted. They have lost their ability to train, they're on the run, they're scattered throughout the world, and it's not safe for them anywhere. And that has a powerful deterrent effect. It is believed that the use of force against Iraq will similarly send a powerful deterrent message to terrorists around the world that the world community will take

every possible action to prevent terrorism. Another way to deter the terrorists is through demonstration of quick and decisive use of capable military force.⁵³ Direct action against actual and potential sources of terrorism is another effective way to deter terrorism and the terrorist acts.

Prediction. Prediction of terrorist activities and events is achieved through improved intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities.⁵⁴ Within the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is responsible for these activities; outside of the country the U.S. agency with primary responsibility for intelligence and counterintelligence is the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Both of these organizations have developed terrorism intelligence specialists during the past decade and have significantly improved their capabilities in this area. From an international perspective, other nations have improved their proficiency in terrorism intelligence and counterintelligence, and many of these nations have developed systems for sharing valuable intelligence in an effort to combat this problem.

Levels. There are three levels of terrorism counteraction, as shown in the table. The first level is the political/diplomatic level. The second level approaches the problem from an operational perspective and involves the antiterrorism measures used to manage the threat. The third level is the tactical level.⁵⁵

Level One-Political and Diplomatic. Level One includes two separate approaches to dealing with the problem of terrorism.⁵⁶ The political approach addresses problems within a nation, that is, the methods used by a government to respond to the problem of domestic terrorism and, in some cases, international terrorism occurring within its boundaries.⁵⁷ The diplomatic approach deals with communications and efforts between nations to address the problem. Level One diplomatic approach has ranged from diplomatic agreements to military attacks and all-out war. There have been a number of international agreements that were designed to help control terrorism. There have also been international initiatives between Western Nations that have resulted in improved cooperation in sharing intelligence and coordinating investigative activities.⁵⁸

<p>Level One-Political and Diplomatic Level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Negotiations Changes in diplomatic relations Sanctions Military options <p>Level Two-Operational Approaches</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Threat analysis <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Intelligence collection -Vulnerability surveys Asset protection <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Operations security -Personnel security -Physical security <p>Level Three-Tactical Responses</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Proactive operations Reactive operations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Tactical responses -Hostage negotiations -Retaliatory strikes

TABLE 1. LEVELS OF TERRORISM COUNTERACTION

Level Two – Strategic Approaches. Most terrorism counteraction planners attempt to manage the problem at the second level using a number of strategic antiterrorism measures.⁵⁹ These activities begin with a threat analysis that includes the collection of information on groups operating in the area and a series of vulnerability surveys.⁶⁰ Once the threat has been assessed

and the vulnerabilities have been identified one can develop asset protection approaches to manage the threat. It is important to remember that these are dynamic, rather than static activities. The threat is constantly changing, and one must be prepared to monitor the changes as they occur and respond accordingly.

Level Three – Tactical Responses. Most tactical responses to terrorism are proactive or counter terrorism measures. That is, they are initiated in response to a terrorist incident. These include the tactical team that goes into action during a hostage rescue mission, the hostage negotiation team that attempts to resolve the situation through negotiations, and the tactical team responsible for retaliatory actions that are sometimes taken after an incident.⁶¹ Counter terrorism measures also include the criminal investigation activities that take place after an incident occurs. Tactical antiterrorism measures are also possible. These include military strikes against known terrorists and their training camps to disrupt the group's activities and to prevent them from attacking their targets.⁶²

Combating Terrorism – State Policy

Combating terrorism starts with a correct policy regime by the state or a group of states. Christopher Hewitt in his study of the effectiveness of certain anti terrorist policies speaks of macro and micro policies.⁶³ Hewitt cites emergency legislation and the use of security forces as examples of the former; the liberal-democratic policy of adherence to the rule of law would also fall within that category. The macro policy has a wide application and a general dimension. On the other hand, micro policy is suggestive of a more narrow involvement, such as hostage negotiations and surveillance techniques. Micro policy encompasses individual circumstances, means, and methods. The Canadian Government's decision to allocate responsibility to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the development of a national hostage rescue team is an example of a micro policy emanating from the macro policy of use of security forces in response to terrorism.⁶⁴

The nature of the government's counter-terrorism policy differs in intent and approach. Over the years states have evolved policies to counter terrorism according to their own experience with the problem. It is however not a static approach and can change with time and demand of the situation. Generally such policies are categorized in two types:

Soft-line Approach. There are many governments, especially liberal states, who adopt a soft-line approach to counter terrorism. Such policies generally allow conducting often 'ill-judged' negotiations with terrorists and conceding to their demands. A Rand Corporation study shows world wide terrorists have a 79 percent chance of evading death or imprisonment for

their crime.⁶⁵ This is often the result of soft-line policy of government which is ready to make a deal with terrorists to gain the release of hostages and a rapid end to each terrorist attack. In such soft policy regime terrorists will attack with increasing frequency and boldness. The success rate of Japanese United Red Army was largely because of the ineptness and weakness of the government responses to their attacks.

Tough-Line Approach. The liberal state tough-line approach means combining harsh and effective measures to isolate and eliminate terrorist cells, their leaders and their logistic support, with the maintenance of liberal democracy, a vigorous political life of participation, debate and reform within the framework of the law.⁶⁶ The keynote of this approach is not panic, repression and over-reaction, which in any case plays into the hands of terrorists, but a consistent policy of maximizing the risk of punishment run by the terrorists and minimizing their potential rewards. There are some examples of the effectiveness of this approach. Pierre Trudeau and his Canadian Cabinet used draconian powers to suppress the terrorist acts of the Quebecois separatist organization, Front de Liberation du Quebec in October 1970.⁶⁷

Democracy and Counter Terrorism. Liberal democracy, by definition, precludes rule by state terror.⁶⁸ For liberals it is a matter for rejoicing that our societies do not have to suffer totalitarian governmental terror of the ex-Soviet kind.⁶⁹ For the Soviet system has snuffed out internal revolt only at the price of stifling freedom, dignity and creativity. The normal methods of control and terror in the totalitarian state are well known: ubiquitous use of party and secret police agents and informers; constant checks on identity documents and occupancy of residential accommodation and movements; rigid controls on travel, communication and publication. Liberal democratic states can not resort to terror and repression to answer revolutionary terrorism because to do so would be a violation of the fundamental dignities and rights of man. Such countries must not seek to eliminate the terrorists' violence by means of an even greater injustice, for this would be to fall into the same error as terrorists themselves.

Principles to Combat Terrorism. In the current period, when the US, Great Britain, Spain, Greece and other democratic states face continuing campaigns of violence, it is important to reiterate the cardinal principles of an effective liberal-democratic response to terrorism. These are:⁷⁰

a. No surrender to the terrorists, and an absolute determination to defeat terrorism within the framework of the rule of law and the democratic process.

b. No deals and no concessions, even in the face of the most severe intimidation and blackmail.

c. An intensified effort to bring terrorists to justice by prosecution and conviction before courts of law.

d. Firm measures to penalize state sponsors who give terrorists safe haven, weapons, explosives, cash and moral and diplomatic support.

e. A determination never to allow terrorist intimidation to block or derail political and diplomatic efforts to resolve the underlying conflicts in strife-torn regions.

Some Basic Counter-Terrorism Rules for Democracies. Democratic states are often in a dilemma to follow a consistent policy for counter terrorism because the tough polices may clash with its desire to follow a more humane and kind path in treating fellow and international citizens. But if counter terrorism is to be made effective, then democratic governments must follow some basic ground rules to combat terrorism.⁷¹

a. The democratically elected government must proclaim a determination to uphold the Rule of Law⁷² and constitutional authority, and must demonstrate this political will in its actions. There must be no resort to general indiscriminate repression. The government must show that its measures against terrorism are solely directed at quelling the terrorists and their active collaborators and at defending society against the terrorists. A slide into general repression would destroy individual liberties and political democracy and may indeed bring about a ruthless dictatorship even more implacable than the terrorism the repression was supposed to destroy.

b. The government must be seen to be doing all in its power to defend the life and limb of citizens. This is a vital prerequisite for public confidence and co-operation. If it is lacking, private armies and vigilante groups will tend to proliferate and will exacerbate civil violence. There must be a clear-cut and consistent policy of refusing to make any concessions to terrorist blackmail.⁷³

c. All aspects of the anti-terrorist policy and operations should be under the overall control of the civil authorities and, hence, democratically accountable. Special powers, which may become necessary to deal with a terrorist emergency, should be approved by the legislature only for a fixed and limited period.⁷⁴

d. Sudden vacillations in security policy should be avoided: they tend to undermine public confidence and encourage the terrorists to exploit rifts in the government and its security forces. Loyal community leaders, officials, and personnel at all levels of government and security forces must be accorded full backing by the civil authorities.

e. The government should not engage in dialogue and negotiation with groups which are actively engaged in promoting, committing or supporting terrorism.⁷⁵ No deals should be made with terrorist organizations behind the backs by elected politicians. Terrorist propaganda and

defamation should be countered by full and clear official statements of the government's objectives, and policies.

f. The government and security forces must conduct all anti-terrorist operations within the law. They should do all in their power to ensure that the normal legal processes are maintained, and that those charged with terrorist offences are brought to trial before the courts of law.⁷⁶ Terrorists imprisoned for crimes committed for professedly political motives should be treated in the same manner as ordinary criminals. Concessions of special status and other privileges tend to erode respect for the impartiality of the law, arouse false hopes of an amnesty and impose extra strains on the penal system.

Measures Against State-Sponsored Terrorism

There is no doubt that the democratic revolution in Eastern Europe dealt a huge blow against state-sponsored terrorism. All the one-party communist regimes were deeply implicated in the sponsorship of terrorism throughout the 1970s, certainly with the full encouragement of the Soviet KGB.⁷⁷ Information now leaking out from the files of the former security police has already confirmed that thousands of terrorists were trained and helped by Communist regimes, including Palestinian groups, and left-wing groups active in Western Europe. The East Germans helped the Red Army Faction by giving them safe haven, cover and new identities.⁷⁸ East German training camps like Finsterwalde, near Dresden, were particularly important for passing on techniques of terrorism and assassination.

State sponsorship greatly increases the danger of terrorism to the international community because it provides the client groups with far greater firepower than they would ever be likely to obtain in the normal arms market. What can be done to stop state sponsorship? The answer is , the powerful industrial nations have to combine their economic and diplomatic power to impose harsh sanctions on the guilty states.⁷⁹ Under certain circumstances the use of military measures may well be the most appropriate option as taken against Afghanistan in 2001.

Role of Intelligence in Counter Terrorism

Sound and accurate intelligence is a weapon. When properly understood and confidently used, it increases the capability for success at all levels. It is, therefore, absolutely essential that an antiterrorist organization knows the value of intelligence, the method by which it is produced and the manner in which it is used.⁸⁰ An antiterrorist force, to be effective, must have a data-bank of terrorists and their activities, their detailed profiles, types of weapons, ammunition and explosives used by them, names of contact men and accomplices, standard of their training, motivation, and modus operandi etc.⁸¹ It is essential that in the struggle against the terrorists the

security forces should rely more on intelligence than on guns. Proper and adequate collection and dissemination of intelligence is vital for any successful anti-terrorist operation. Surprise is the cornerstone of terrorist operations. As the security forces are stronger and equipped with greater resources than the terrorists, the latter try to make up this disadvantage by springing sudden attacks on the targets. The security forces can avoid the situation of being caught unawares if they have prior information about the plans, hideouts and intentions of the terrorists.

Three separate processes are involved in intelligence gathering.⁸² First, establishing detailed background dossiers on active and potential terrorists and those who might lend them support and compiling organizations' chart to show the command structure of underground organizations. Second, creating an efficient retrieval system so that the information can be passed on quickly to the men in the field as they need it. Third, developing strategic and tactical intelligence that will make it possible to lay hands on the terrorist's plots before they are carried out or, as a second-best response the intended targets can be protected.

Media and Counter Terrorism

This role of the media has a special relevance to terrorism which seeks and thrives on publicity. Media's global coverage and projection readily fulfill this need. It multiplies the terrorizing effect by many times and re-enacts the strike repeatedly which was not possible earlier. The terrorist knows and exploits this sensitivity of the media to propagate his movement and show of strength.⁸³ The manner in which media cover terrorist strikes is tantamount, de facto, to undertaking the publicity of the terrorist movement. This would not have caused that much of concern if the attention that the media gave to their activities was in a balanced manner. Unfortunately, it weighs heavily in favor of terrorists due to elements of sensationalism.⁸⁴

While the significance of the media to terrorism seems quite clear, the question arises as to what its role should be in the fight against terrorism. This aspect should be considered with the deliberation and seriousness that it deserves. It remains a grey area, in the total approach to tackling terrorism. There can be no difference of opinion that the role of the media is to render all the help that it can in resisting and countering terrorism.⁸⁵ The issue is the scope and the manner in which it can discharge this important duty.

A controlled press is not a desirable option.⁸⁶ On the other hand, it would be inadvisable to rule out the imposition of some measure of control altogether. Some form of control may become necessary to meet a particular phase of terrorism. Such necessity would be felt mainly in the containment phase of anti-terrorist operations. When the need arises, there should be no

hesitation to take such a measure. This measure should, however, be adopted only as an undesirable necessity to be withdrawn as early as possible.

There would also be occasions when withholding of a report may be necessary in the interest of anti-terrorist operations and public. The media should have a mechanism by which to realize the gravity of such a situation and observe self discipline voluntarily.⁸⁷ The right course is for the media to recognize their responsibilities and accept to exercise self-restraint. These restraints could take the form of a code of conduct formulated by the media themselves. The observance of such a code and checking its violation can be overseen by a watchdog committee constituted and composed by the media men themselves.⁸⁸ In a nutshell, the media have to act in an extremely responsible and cautious manner for the important influence they bear on the confrontation. While they should continue to cover a terrorist movement and its individual strikes freely, balance should be exercised in their reporting rather than resorting to sensationalism. The guiding principle for coverage of any incident or act of terrorism should be whether it would satisfy the terrorists, propagate terrorism, or have adverse effect on those engaged in anti-terrorism. The media would render immense service to the public by remembering that the best way to deal a severe blow to terrorism is to ignore it. While total ignorance may neither be practical nor even desirable, marginal coverage would be the answer.

Psychological Operations to Counter Terrorism

Terrorism, in essence, belongs to the realm of psychology and mental attitudes of all the people who get involved. Terrorists themselves are fanatics for a cause while their strikes aim at creating mass fright in the minds of the people and intimidation of those who are to deal with them. By terrorizing people, a movement expects to change the attitude of the society and the government in favor of their demands and thereby achieve its objectives. Along with terrorization, the terrorists continue to approach a select group of population at the psychological plane by making a common cause with them so as to win their support.⁸⁹ It follows, therefore, that measures against terrorism should be deeply concerned with the psychological impact created by the movement. This psychological influence, initially, would have to be neutralized and later, altogether eliminated. Countering the psychological impact of terrorism and strengthening the fortitude of the people to resist and fight terrorism are the most significant aspects of overall operations against terrorism.⁹⁰ In the grand strategy of a campaign against terrorism, success in this sphere is more vital than conducting counter-terrorism operations. Psychological operations are non-aggressive and non-lethal in nature and do not bring out tangible results immediately. Yet, if executed properly, these can be extremely hard

benefiting and highly effective in curbing terrorism. The overreaching psychological operations objectives should be:⁹¹

- a. Isolate the terrorists from domestic and international support.
- b. Reduce the effectiveness of the terrorists.
- c. Deter escalation by terrorist leadership.
- d. Minimize collateral damages and interference with counterterrorist operations.

Conduct of Psychological Operations. Conduct of psychological operations needs two basic ingredients; expertise to identify and formulate appropriate multifarious themes and means to propagate the desired themes among the target population in a successful manner.⁹² The former relates to planning and the latter to execution. Conduct of psychological operations comprises of collection of relevant information and data, its analysis, formulation of themes, projection and feedback.

Information. Information concerned with terrorism is of great value to the planners. For this, the planners have to lean heavily on the intelligence organization. Specific acquisition tasks would be assigned to intelligence agencies.⁹³ A substantial part of the information would pertain to various issues involved and some research and collection of data from the sources readily available may be necessary. Flow of information is not a 'one time' requirement for initial planning only; it is needed through out the planning and execution stages.

Analysis. Information and inputs about every aspect of the issues involved would need to be examined in detail primarily for their usefulness for the themes.⁹⁴ It would bring out the relationship among the groups within the movement (target audience)⁹⁵ and all pressures and pulls which are operative. It would also help in sifting the non-essential elements from the relevant information and crystallizing the inputs for the themes. This state would bring out the areas which are suitable for psychological operations.

Formulation of Themes and Messages. The inflow of information would provide the material for formulation of themes to be followed in the beginning of these operations.⁹⁶ At the outset, itself, lists of themes to be stressed and those to be avoided would have to be worked out. These would be kept updated as a continuing process of overall planning. Formulation of themes would also take the proposed modes of projection into consideration and undertake transformation of the selected themes into suitable material for projection.

Projection. This part is in the forefront. It involves bombarding the targets with the messages projected in a suitable manner. There is, however, a fine point in this 'bombing' which it is important to understand. It is not enough merely to direct the messages on to the targets but

also to ensure that the targets are prompted to receive, understand and ponder over the messages sent across.⁹⁷

Review and Modification. For the best results from these operations, it is necessary that the impact made on the target by the projection is made known to the planners. A well organized 'feedback' system forming an integral part of these operations is essential. It would cover the effect on and the reaction of every type of target. The feedback would help the planners in reinforcing or making adjustments in their themes and thrusts for better results.

Organization for Conduct of Psychological Operations

A study of the basics of a psychological operations network highlights the requirement of a competent team of experts for planning and conduct.⁹⁸ The experts would need to be drawn from the fields of psychology, sociology, economics, behavioral sciences, history, ethnical/religious sections, media and mass communications.⁹⁹ Although belonging to different and diverse disciplines and vocations, they would be required to work in close coordination with one another in a concerted manner. This body of experts would be concerned not only with the planning part of the operations but would also have to oversee the execution of operations.

Combating New Terrorism

Identifying the Indicators. The first step in developing an indications and warning plan for technology-enabled threats like chemical, biological and nuclear is to identify indicators of activity for such threats.¹⁰⁰ What signatures or footprints can the trained analyst or operator monitor for a group or individual, whether organized or not, planning to use chemical or biological agents? What footprints does the seasoned cyber-terrorist leave behind? Selecting the types of activity to monitor and ensuring that these activities are subject to monitoring is very important.¹⁰¹ Instead of focusing time and money on decomposing the threat presented by these weapons and their potential for destruction, policy makers should develop analytical frameworks to chart the observable activities that can be monitored. Those activities include such things as production capabilities, the theft or acquisition of precursor materials, and the existence of factories and processing facilities, to name just a few potential indicators.

Co-ordination and Information-Sharing. Although we can better interdict chemical, biological and information terrorism through the development and implementation of comprehensive analytical frameworks and tool-kits, rectifying problems in co-ordination and information-sharing among agencies and countries responsible for the problem continues to be essential.¹⁰² Co-ordination and information-sharing is even more important with this threat, as

critical data is often derived from diverse sources across the globe at the local, state, national, and international level.¹⁰³

An 'Indications and Warning' System. Co-ordination does not just entail developing indications frameworks for understanding the threat and information technologies for sharing data. Formal co-ordination also needs to be in place. Such co-ordination could include the development of an 'indications and warning' system.¹⁰⁴ Its activities should also be coordinated with those of international agencies sharing responsibilities for dealing with terrorist threats. This endeavour has a particular value in that it recognizes the extent to which the public and private sectors are linked via computer networks. It is also based on recognition of the fact that civilian and military threats are not distinct entities but rather part of a social network facing a common threat. An 'indications and warning' system could play an essential role in the development of vulnerability assessment and the dissemination of such assessments to user networks.

Detection Systems. Research on the development of more effective intrusion detection devices is essential if valuable data and services are to remain secure.¹⁰⁵ One of the greatest cyber-terrorist threats is that of the silent invader who alters computer procedures in such a way as to threaten public or institutional welfare. The threat to food production and medical operations cannot be removed without the introduction of detection systems to warn the victims that sabotage may have occurred. Designers of computer systems can contribute to anti-terrorism efforts by developing 'firewall techniques' which will limit or minimize damage in the event of a system's security being breached. Such innovations would play a crucial role in preventing the destructive consequences of an intrusion from spreading throughout the system and further undermining popular confidence in national institutions.¹⁰⁶

Conclusions

The term terrorism has been interpreted by many in different ways, mostly depending upon the point of view one takes on an issue. It has also gone through various transformations, to mean newer aspects. But some of the basic aspects and meaning of the term has remained the same to all, over the years. Terrorism involves acts of violence by groups of people with a political motive or purpose. Terrorism has existed in different forms since the early days of human civilization. What has dramatically changed is the great proliferation that has taken place. It now poses a threat to our societies and our democratic way of life. Terrorism has also become more rampant and its acts more lethal. What was once small and isolated acts of terror can now become large scale death and destruction. Although most terrorist groups have many things in common, they differ according to their background and motive. Since the 1960s which

is generally seen as the turning point of modern day terrorism, a wide variety of terrorist groups have sprung up around the world. The rise of ethnic movements and religion based movements has given further impetus to this trend. The threat posed by these terrorist groups is manifested by their tactics and approach to violence. Many of their acts involve hijacking, assassination; bombs blasting etc, these are now termed under the category of traditional terrorism and are the most common practice with most groups. But what is more worrisome is that terrorist groups are now capable of using WMD means which can have catastrophic results. These are the threats from new terrorism.

Combating terrorism is a very difficult and complex task. Terrorists are not a very defined and structured enemy; their elusive nature makes it even more difficult to counter it. An approach to counter terrorism needs a very clear understanding of the essence and the objectives of the counter terrorism. It is a multifaceted and multi functional task touching different professional and social groups. Each has a definite role to play in the counter terrorism battle. It is difficult to put more emphasis on one over the other and can not attach an order of priority. It is rather essential to understand and develop all approaches so that a comprehensive counter terrorism regime can be developed. Inter-organ support within a government and international cooperation is vital to developing this regime. Such a regime is always to be supported by clear policies at the national level and well regulated legal system at the national and international levels. Modern democracies, especially liberal democracies are very vulnerable to the threat of terrorism. Democratic states therefore need a well defined policy and approach to counter terrorism. Diplomacy also plays a crucial role in developing this international approach. To implement the policies against terrorism the state needs well articulated mechanisms and procedures. It also needs to muster the resources to implement the policies like an efficient intelligence system skilled special units. There is also a need for well laid out security arrangements to deter and deny terrorists any freedom of action. Preventive and active counter measures are also needed to combat terrorist in their most common battle ground - the bomb and explosive.

It may sometimes be easy to counter small groups and actors involved in terrorism when the might of a state backs acts of terrorism. The acts of state terrorism or state sponsored terrorism are quite common and it needs a different approach to counter it. Such an effort will commonly be an international collective effort to match the size and strength of the player. The new threats of terror under the new terrorism also need a different treatment to the problem. It also needs a different understanding of the nature of these types of techno-terrorism to counter the threat. The battle against terrorism is not all in the physical domain. The first battles against

terrorism that can give lasting victories are fought against the minds. Psychological operations therefore are an important aspect of the counter terrorism battle. An important tool exploited by the terrorist to advance their cause is the media. In this age of all encompassing influence of media, the role played by the media is crucial to any side of the battle line. But in an environment of free press and total coverage there is a big dilemma about media coverage of terrorist incidents. The need is one of self restraint on the part of a responsible media. Modern technology is having profound impact on the nature of contemporary or future terrorism. The possibility of terrorists using WMD is becoming real. The potential of cyber-terrorism is another growing threat that will have to be met by most countries. Counter terrorism efforts need concerted effort not only by national governments but by the international community.

Recommendations

1. A clear and comprehensive counter terrorism policy should be formulated by the state based on deep understanding of the nature, type of terrorism and threat analysis.
2. A national counter terrorism policy must have international cooperation and linkage because most terrorist activities today have international connection.
3. A concerted plan of action is to be laid to counter terrorism involving all concerned agencies of the government.
4. Effort should be made to assess the threat posed by new terrorism and adopt new technique to counter it.
5. Counter terrorism policies and actions should be governed by basic democratic principles.
6. Adequate resources must be made available to effectively implement a counter terrorism plan otherwise the cost of failure will be extremely high.

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¹⁰⁶“Countering Cyber War,” Timothy Shimeall, Phil Williams and Casey Dunlevy argue that defense planning has to incorporate the virtual world to limit physical damage in the real, 3; available from; http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:vEgLTpQoQAJ:www.cert.org/archive/pdf/counter_cyberwar.pdf+counter+cyber+terrorism--+detection+system&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1; accessed 15 January 2006.