

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE KOREAN ARMISTICE: SHORT TERM TRUCE OR LONG TERM PEACE?**

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

# Report Documentation Page

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

|   |                                    |                                     |                            |  |                                 |
|---|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| 1. REPORT DATE<br><b>15 MAR 2006</b>  |                                    | 2. REPORT TYPE                      |                            | 3. DATES COVERED                         |                                 |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE<br><b>Korean Armistice Short Term Truce or Long Term Peace</b>  |                                    |                                     |                            | 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER                      |                                 |
|   |                                    |                                     |                            | 5b. GRANT NUMBER                         |                                 |
|   |                                    |                                     |                            | 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER               |                                 |
| 6. AUTHOR(S)<br><b>John Sanford</b>   |                                    |                                     |                            | 5d. PROJECT NUMBER                       |                                 |
|   |                                    |                                     |                            | 5e. TASK NUMBER                          |                                 |
|   |                                    |                                     |                            | 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER                     |                                 |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)<br><b>U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050</b> |                                    |                                     |                            | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER |                                 |
| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)   |                                    |                                     |                            | 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)         |                                 |
|   |                                    |                                     |                            | 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)   |                                 |
| 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT<br><b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.</b>                          |                                    |                                     |                            |  |                                 |
| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES   |                                    |                                     |                            |  |                                 |
| 14. ABSTRACT<br><b>See attached.</b>  |                                    |                                     |                            |  |                                 |
| 15. SUBJECT TERMS   |                                    |                                     |                            |  |                                 |
| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:   |                                    |                                     | 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT | 18. NUMBER OF PAGES<br><b>40</b>         | 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON |
| a. REPORT<br><b>unclassified</b>  | b. ABSTRACT<br><b>unclassified</b> | c. THIS PAGE<br><b>unclassified</b> |                            |  |                                 |

## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Captain John M. Sanford, United States Navy  
TITLE: The Korean Armistice: Short Term Truce or Long Term Peace?  
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project  
DATE: 13 January 2006 WORD COUNT: 9733 PAGES: 40  
KEY TERMS: ROK, DPRK, war termination, peace treaty, communism, democracy  
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

On July 27, 1953, the United States, China, and North Korea, signed the Korean War Armistice Agreement. What influence does a military truce signed by battlefield commanders more than fifty years ago have on the situation on the Korean Peninsula today? Some would argue that the Korean War was a proxy war of Great Powers to determine whether democracy or communism was the correct course for a nation state or was it a civil war shared with the world? This project will address this question as well as these: How has the United States developed its National Strategic Policy concerning Korea? Does it matter that no representative from South Korea signed the Armistice? Has South Korea attempted bilateral discussions with North Korea to develop a lasting peace treaty? Does the political situation and cultural differences between both the Koreas affect the ability to implement a peace agreement? What are possible alternatives for the armistice to include the success of the Six-Party Talks? This paper will view the Korean perspective in regards to war and peace on the peninsula. Finally, following analysis of historical realities, answers to the above questions and perspectives, the current Armistice's future disposition will be discussed.



## THE KOREAN ARMISTICE: SHORT TERM TRUCE OR LONG TERM PEACE?

On July 27, 1953, the U.S., China, and North Korea, signed the Korean War Armistice Agreement (KAA).<sup>1</sup> However, South Korea refused to sign it, leaving the two Koreas separate and technically still at war to this day. However, to reinforce the United States commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK), it signed The Mutual Defense Treaty on 1 October 1953.<sup>2</sup> What influence does a military truce signed by battlefield commanders more than fifty years ago have on the situation on the Korean Peninsula today? The dictionary defines armistice, as “a temporary suspension of hostilities by agreement; a truce.”<sup>3</sup> Over 52 years, this provisional delay has endured as the primary peace treaty for the region. But during this time, the Korean Peninsula has remained a very dangerous place, as demonstrated by the number of major armistice violations that has occurred and the number of killed in action experienced by both sides.<sup>4</sup> On 17 November 2005, President George W. Bush and President Roh Moo-hyun of the Republic of Korea (ROK) declared that they shared a common understanding in building a durable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and “moving from the armistice mechanism to a peace mechanism would contribute to the full reconciliation and peace reunification for the Korean Peninsula.”<sup>5</sup>

This paper will address the purpose of the KAA and why this temporary measure has lasted this long as well as the implications of the ROK representative refusing to sign the armistice. Over the last 50 years, how has the Republic of Korea and North Korea attempted to negotiate a bilateral permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and their failures on these actions. What conditions must exist for the peace regime process to move ahead which includes the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and defusing the overwhelming conventional force deployment on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)?

Depending on the kind of peace agreement taking shape, what does the peace agreement mean for the ROK-US alliance and the Northeast Asian region? To answer these questions, this paper will review war termination and its application to the KAA. South Korea’s perspective in regards to stability on the peninsula, continues to support democratization while taking into account the perspectives of all the concerned parties. Finally, following analysis of historical realities, answers to the above questions tempered by ROK perspectives, the current Armistice’s disposition will be evaluated for its relevancy as well as its impact on both the alliance and regional security.

## United States Policy Development for Korea

For over 50 years the ROK-U.S. Alliance has endured as a great success deemed “a friendship cemented in blood, marked by memories of shared sacrifice.”<sup>6</sup> During the Korean War, 37,000 U.S. soldiers were killed and 92,000 were wounded.<sup>7</sup> However, sometimes lost in this, is the fact that more than a million and half Koreans perished in the U.N. declared “police action.”<sup>8</sup> In the last couple of years, the alliance has been strained due to anti-Americanism in South Korea.<sup>9</sup> To gain peace on the peninsula, Seoul and Washington must overcome this strain and solidify their ties and prepare a roadmap that will ultimately lead to peace. The U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia especially Korea is deeply embedded in U.S. National Security Policy.

U.S. National Strategy specifically references South Korea and our Asian alliances when discussing doctrine; “America’s alliances in Asia not only underpin regional peace and stability, but are flexible and ready to deal with new challenges.”<sup>10</sup> United States Forces Korea (USFK) Headquarters defines several areas that are pertinent to U.S. interests in regards to the deployment of USFK as stated in our National Security Strategy. These include the prevention of war; the security of Korea; peninsular stability, which includes Korean reconciliation; countering the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), to include long range ballistic missiles; maintaining open markets for free trade; and the security of the United States and its citizens.<sup>11</sup>

However, debate rages on that U.S. interests are self-serving and continue to be “Great Power exploitation and victimization” in which the Korean peninsula was subjected to since the latter half of the 19th century.<sup>12</sup> These perceptions have hindered the Armistice conversion to the Peace process. However, the historical roots of the supposed exploitation and victimization should be examined to determine if they will be a major stumbling block to implementing peace on the peninsula.

For hundreds of years, the Korean Peninsula has been the battleground or invasion route from the periodic surges of ambition in each of Korea’s neighbors. Often Korea became the spoils for these enterprising countries.<sup>13</sup> A combination of the Korean educated class purges in the early sixteenth century by the Mongols and Manchu (China) invasions culminating with the devastation by the Japanese warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi, debilitated the Choson state (Korea).<sup>14</sup> Korea became more and more isolated resorting to loose ties with China. When Western influence spread to Asia in the 19th century, western trade efforts with Korea were thwarted by the Koreans treating these Western overtures with deadly rejection which included murdered French missionaries as well as American and Dutch seamen. Several punitive

expeditions by these Western nations against Korea failed to improve relations.<sup>15</sup> Unfortunately for Korea's privacy, in 1860, Russia reached Korea's borders.<sup>16</sup>

With regional countries fighting for control of Korea, the Korean people had little chance to learn self-government. They remained separate from the modern world and was forced to developed the diplomacy of exclusionism.<sup>17</sup>

In 1866, the United States tried its hand at opening Korea when the heavily armed merchant schooner, *General Sherman*, was warned that its presence disobeyed Korean law.<sup>18</sup> The *Sherman* ignored the warning and moved up the Taedong River towards Pyongyang. The Koreans killed all of the crew and burned the ship.<sup>19</sup> Because of this incident, the United State's failure to understand (or take the time to understand) Korea's Foreign Policy and its Asian Confucian ethics, the U.S. decided to open Korea's ports by force which The *New York Herald* labeled the "Little War with the Heathen."<sup>20</sup>

By 1882, the United States became the first Western nation to open Korea for trade which included a treaty. However, unlike the celebrated contact between Commodore Perry and Japan, the treaty between the U.S. and Korea was brokered by a Chinese official.<sup>21</sup> These actions coupled with Korea's penchant for being "ethnocentric and obnoxious to foreigners" obscured Korea's significant strategic nature of the United States. However, Russia and Japan understood Korea's regional strategic significance and continued to posture to control Korea.

After the Russo-Japanese War, Russia recognized Japan's paramount rights in Korea under the peace treaty signed in 1905, brokered by Theodore Roosevelt. It was these diplomatic exchanges that the United States would not challenge Japan in Korea.<sup>22</sup> When the Japanese took over Korea, the United States made no objection. President Theodore Roosevelt remarked, "We cannot possibly interfere for the Koreans against Japan. ... They could not strike one blow in their own defense." The Korean Emperor's appeal to the United States for help under the "good offices" clauses of the Shufeldt Treaty fell on deaf ears.<sup>23</sup>

These agreements allowed Japan uncontrolled access to Korea with most "Westerner's supporting Japan's "modernizing role" in Korea, from "callous diplomat to earnest scholar and Christian missionary."<sup>24</sup> Even though the United States was the first Western power to befriend Korea, it "had no intention of becoming her guardian."<sup>25</sup> It is at this point, we could conclude (as do many Koreans) that once again Korea was being used for "Great Power exploitation and victimization." Some would argue that Korea's failure to adhere to the Western World's Westphalia nation-state rules set and Korea's extreme isolationist diplomacy would not provide a reason for any western government including the United States to see Korea strategically as they do today.

Between 1905 and 1910, Koreans unsuccessfully attempted to rebel against the Japanese resulting in the brutal oppression of these Korean Freedom fighters.<sup>26</sup> It was during these attempted Korean freedom actions that the "flame of patriotism and independence remained alive in Korea."<sup>27</sup> It is important to note that during this drive for independence, the "Provisional Government of the Republic of Great Korea," was identified and would later become one of the two driving political factions involved in the Korean War. This group sought to achieve complete independence for Korea and to establish itself as the Korean Government. Its primary leader was Syngman Rhee<sup>28</sup> and in the mid-1930's, Rhee served as unofficial representative of the Provisional Government in the United States. Koreans in the United States and China had a considerable following and widespread passive support within Korea.<sup>29</sup>

The democratic Republic of Korea (ROK) was championed by Syngman Rhee<sup>30</sup> who was the ROK's first president (1948-1960) and a stubborn lifelong fighter for Korea's cause who personally experienced his country's failed leadership in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Japanese occupation, and learning the American way. General Maxwell Taylor described Rhee as "a curious mixture of an Old Testament prophet defying the devil and all his works and a shrewd Oriental politician, wise in the ways of the west."<sup>31</sup>

In the years before World War II, the President of the Korean Provisional Government in Chungking, Kim Koo, and its representative in the United States, Syngman Rhee, who styled himself as the Chairman of the Korean Commission, had sought United States recognition and support but without success.<sup>32</sup> In the closing months of the war, these men increased their efforts, seeking not only recognition by the United States and other governments, but membership in the United Nations. American national policy forbade such actions, however, and Rhee was told in June 1945, after an appeal to President Truman, that "It is the policy of this Government in dealing with groups such as the 'Korean Provisional Government' to avoid taking action which might, when the victory of the United Nations is achieved, tend to compromise the right of the Korean people in choosing the ultimate form and personnel of the government in which they may wish to establish."<sup>33</sup>

Organized in 1925, a strong Korean Communist party also sprang up directing an underground movement against Japan.<sup>34</sup> Communist power in Korea grew under the well-organized leadership of the anti-Japanese underground led by a young Soviet-trained infantry officer, Kim Il-sung.<sup>35</sup> The Korean Communists were in contact with the Russian Communists. It is believed, however, that, owing to a secret agreement with Japan, the Russians abstained from encouraging too greatly the Communists in Korea during Japanese occupation with many

Communist Koreans taking refuge in Manchuria, China, and Russia.<sup>36</sup> Kim later founded the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.<sup>37</sup>

Both Kim and Rhee were fanatical to invade each other's country and unite the Korean Peninsula under a common flag.<sup>38</sup>

Unfortunately, other world events such as World War I and World War II would preclude any focus on the 35 year reign of Japanese atrocities until the 1943 Cairo meetings where it was declared that "Korea shall become free and independent."<sup>39</sup>

At the end of World War II, Korea was ripe to be exploited by the winning Great Powers. Unfortunately, this exploitation would lead to a divided Korea, another "catastrophic war," and a "reordering of international politics in Northeast Asia."<sup>40</sup> One could also view events evolving on the Korean peninsula as providing the stage for Rhee and Kim to manipulate the Great Powers for their own political ends. In fact, up to the Korean War, the United States was more worried that South Korea would invade the north.<sup>41</sup>

President Harry S. Truman and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin agreed that they would share the task of disarming and repatriating the Japanese in Korea.<sup>42</sup> The initial goodwill message was that these Great Nations would repatriate those occupying Axis forces and return invaded states back to their original sovereignty. History reflects the true course of actions that evolved from this.<sup>43</sup> America selected the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel as the dividing line which would be an operational measure to provide easy, recognizable borders of jurisdiction for the Korean people and the occupying Soviet and American forces.<sup>44</sup> The United States continued to attach little importance to Korea as a strategic area.<sup>45</sup> Even though some historians felt that the Soviets viewed Korea as a strategic area, Stalin accepted the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel without revision instead of demanding for territory. Some of Truman's advisors believed the Soviets would not abide by this dividing line but they did.<sup>46</sup>

From an American perspective which was dulled by war exhaustion, Korea supported a relatively small population, and had neither important industrial facilities nor many natural resources. At this point in time, the occupation of Japan was the dominant concern. The United States had successfully kept Russia from taking any portion of mainland Japan. In 1945, China was under the control of a friendly government and there did not appear to be any near term major political posturing for Korea. As later events demonstrated, the Soviet Union would not tolerate control of Korea by another power and sought to control Korea itself.<sup>47</sup>

Between 1945 and 1950, the world order was threatened by the struggle between democracy and communism.<sup>48</sup> The Czech coup and the Berlin Blockade in 1948, the communization of China by Mao in 1949 and the 1949 successful test of the first Soviet atomic

bomb forced U.S. foreign policy to redefine its analysis of its former World War II ally.<sup>49</sup> On 12 January 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson proclaimed a “defense perimeter” in the western Pacific that left Korea outside the line.<sup>50</sup> Acheson proclaimed that should an attack occur beyond the line, “the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations.”<sup>51</sup>

Once again, it appeared that Korea was not on the U.S. strategic scope. In interviews with Acheson, he regretted that he did not phrase more carefully his description of the U.S. defense perimeter in his January 1950 press conference.<sup>52</sup> “Outlining the U.S. ‘defensive perimeter’ was a secondary issue in Acheson’s speech that reflected, in part, concern with President Syngman Rhee of South Korea might resort to military aggression against the north to achieve reunification. The Secretary of State was attempting to caution the South Koreans that the United States would not guarantee absolutely [South Korea’s] military security.”<sup>53</sup>

Acheson pointed out in his memoirs that he hadn’t specifically included Australia or New Zealand in America’s Pacific defense perimeter either. The United States’ first Asian mutual defense agreement had been with South Korea, something that the Communists could not have overlooked, Acheson wrote.<sup>54</sup> Interestingly, based upon research of voluminous memos, letters and cables, it revealed how cleverly North Korea’s dictator (Kim Il-Sung) played his mutually antagonistic allies, Stalin and Mao Zedong, off each other. “Kim Il-Sung displayed remarkable political talent, as he manipulated his patrons into supporting his plan for invasion. He was able to persuade Stalin and Mao that his forces would achieve victory before the United States could intervene, not because the Americans would not act to save South Korea.”<sup>55</sup> This is another example of Great Power manipulation by the Koreans.

The United States further refined its Foreign Policy in regards to the Soviet Union and the spread of communism by issuing the National Security Council (NSC) 68 report.<sup>56</sup> NSC 68’s theme was about protecting U.S. interests/influence around the world and formally implemented the strategy of containment against communism, more specifically the Soviet Union.<sup>57</sup>

NSC 68 was classified, in part, due to its inclusion of information relating to the Soviet atomic capability. It was assessed that the Soviet Union had a substantial atomic stockpile but these weapons would be used against the British Isles, Western Europe, Canada and/or the United States. NSC 68 did not highlight any Soviet intentions to employ atomic weapons in Asia.<sup>58</sup> Korea was still not considered a strategic area for either Soviet intervention or Western, at least from the NSC 68 point of view.

From the end of World War II, the Soviets began arming and training Kim Il Sung’s forces in North Korea, while the United States did the same, albeit less lavishly, with the forces of

Syngman Rhee in South Korea. By 1950, however, Stalin saw an opportunity to build on Communist success in Asia and, by so doing, relieving some of the pressure on the Soviet Union in Europe.<sup>59</sup> In the spring of 1950 Stalin's policy toward Korea took an abrupt turn. During meetings with Kim Il-Sung in Moscow in April, Stalin approved Kim's plan to reunify the country by military means and agreed to provide the necessary supplies and equipment for the operation.<sup>60</sup> The plan for the assault was Kim's idea, not Stalin's initiative. Furthermore, Stalin's purpose was not to test American resolve; on the contrary, he approved the plan only after having been assured that the United States would not intervene. Stalin gave his permission, provided that the Chinese agreed to support the North Korean action. China's Mao, in desperate need of Soviet military and economic aid, quickly agreed. Mao also released over sixty thousand combat-hardened ethnic Koreans from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) for duty with the Korean People's Army (KPA, the North Korean Army).<sup>61</sup> On 25 June 1950, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) invaded South Korea.<sup>62</sup>

Because of the North Korean attack, President Truman abruptly reversed the policy that had placed Korea outside the American defense perimeter, and instead committed U.S. armed forces to the defense of South Korea in a limited war or "police action." The United States considered this a test case of Soviet aggression and sought to respond by preparing militarily and politically to meet the next act of Soviet aggression probably in Europe.<sup>63</sup>

Within hours of the North Korean attack, the United States presented the problem to the U.N. where the U.N. Security Council demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of North Korean forces back to the 38th Parallel.<sup>64</sup> When the North Koreans refused and continued to attack, the Security Council passed a resolution on 27 June urging U.N. members to provide military assistance to South Korea in which President Truman quickly ordered General MacArthur to send military forces to aid South Korea.<sup>65</sup> Since other members of the United Nations indicated that they intended to send contingents to Korea, on July 7, 1950, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 84 outlining the organization and management of U.N. troops in Korea.<sup>66</sup>

By mid-September 1950, UNC forces had regained control of South Korea to the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel.<sup>67</sup> Americans wanted a resolution of the Korean question of reunification and requested to attack north of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel.<sup>68</sup> Morality forces within the U.N. were beginning to question if it was ethical to reunify Korea under the military force; the reason the U.N. became involved in the first place.<sup>69</sup> Nevertheless, the United Nations Command was authorized to cross the line into North Korea by a resolution passed on October 7, 1950, and captured the North Korean capital of Pyongyang on October 19, 1950.<sup>70</sup>

The United States sponsored attempt to reunify Korea failed because the People's Republic of China entered the war.<sup>71</sup> However, due to diplomatic maneuvering by nonaligned members, a call for an immediate cease-fire was approved which diluted the U.S. sponsored resolution's bite to identify China as an aggressor.<sup>72</sup> This would lead to a status quo armistice using the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel as the dividing line for Korea.<sup>73</sup> Battle fatigue for the world was starting to affect decision-making. Military strategists generally conclude that the war could have been brought to a successful conclusion.<sup>74</sup>

The Korean War started as a Kim Il-Sung-lead civil war which developed into a Proxy War by the Great Powers of Democracy and Communism. This war was temporarily ended by the KAA and has endured for over fifty years.

#### The Korean Armistice Agreement (KAA)

On 27 July 1953, U.S. Army Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, Jr., senior delegate, United Nations Delegation; North Korean General Nam Il, senior delegate, Delegation of the Korean's People's Army (KPA); and the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV), took ten minutes to sign 18 official copies of the tri-language Korean Armistice Agreement (KAA).<sup>75</sup> Several hours later, General Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; Kim Il-Sung, Supreme Commander, Korean People's Army; and Peng The-huai, Commander, CPV countersigned the KAA.<sup>76</sup> Thus, ended the longest armistice negotiations in history—158 plenary meetings spread out over two years and 17 days.<sup>77</sup>

The KAA was a military truce that signifies a temporary interruption of fighting between local forces for some reason such as the collection of the dead and wounded while the word "armistice" has a similar connotation, but is utilized to cover a temporary cessation of hostilities on a broader scale.<sup>78</sup> Several anomalies associated with the KAA remain decisive in the termination of this war. However, the KAA has been a lasting peace treaty in itself with no major wars in Northeast Asia since the end of the Korean War.

Can termination of war theories be applied when no war was declared during the Korean War in the first place? Neither the DPRK, ROK, U.S., Soviet Russia, China nor the U.N. openly declared war at any point in the Korean Conflict. In the case of the Korean War, it is of little legal significance that war was not declared prior to the hostilities.<sup>79</sup>

Can only one side be considered belligerents? The tension between the war as, on one hand, a civil war between the two Koreas and, on the other hand, an international war involving the armed forces of 21 countries created a legal issue concerning the legitimacy of the

participants. Both sides can be considered belligerents because there was no due process of an official declaration of war.<sup>80</sup>

The Korean War was the first major armed conflict after the founding of the United Nations and immediately called into question the peacekeeping provisions of the U.N. Charter which characterized the United Nations Command (UNC) as a "collective action" resisting an "aggression" identified as such by the Security Council. UNC participants were able to claim theirs was a "just war."<sup>81</sup>

The DPRK, PRC and their supporters characterized these actions as an internal Korean conflict. In such a "civil war," no foreign forces could properly intervene, and that the United Nations had no proper role. For this reason, the PRC disguised their armed forces as "Chinese People's Volunteers."<sup>82</sup>

Officially, the United States is not a signatory as well; Harrison and Clark had signed under the banner of the UNC which represented all of the 21 original countries who had contributed to the UNC.<sup>83</sup> For the peace process to be finalized, the United Nations must be one of the primary participants. However, based in large part on this lack of operational U.N. control over any aspect of the hostilities, most observers, including the leading U.S. legal expert at the time, concluded that the forces under the UNC, "although endowed with the name and flag of the United Nations troops, cannot in strict law be said to comprise United Nations troops, ... [and] the acts of the Unified Command and the United Nations Command are not the acts of the United Nations itself."<sup>84</sup> This could account for the fact that the UN does not list UNC Korea as one of its ongoing peacekeeping missions.<sup>85</sup>

China was also not an official signatory since it had no representative sign the KAA. Remember, China insisted the Chinese armed forces were "volunteers."<sup>86</sup> Thus, the future and current question will be who is legally binding to settle the peace process of the Korean War? Legal analysts state that all who participated in the Korean War including non-signatories such as South Korea can legally be involved with the KAA peace process.<sup>87</sup>

North Korea has stated that the cease-fire was originally premised on the peaceful solution to the Korean question. In November 1953, the United States adopted a National Security Council resolution which set the U.S. final goal in Korea-related affairs to realize "pro-American reunification" and its transnational goal to prevent Korea from being "communized" by maintaining the existing cease-fire (KAA) and turning South Korea into its "military ally."<sup>88</sup>

According to North Korea, the KAA signatories were obliged, within three months after being signed and became effective, to hold a political conference to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea as well as the peaceful

settlement of the Korean question.<sup>89</sup> North Korea “blamed” the United States with fixing the stationing of U.S. troops in South Korea via the Mutual Defense Treaty as well as “rupturing” the Geneva Conference in June 1954.<sup>90</sup> This North Korean rhetoric may be one-sided but does provide insight into the type of logic necessary for future negotiations to transform the KAA into a permanent peace process.

On 25 March 1974, North Korea proposed that it and the United States negotiate a bilateral peace agreement that would replace the KAA. North Korea’s proposal included a total withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, a prohibition of the introduction of weapons into Korea and the termination of foreign military bases in Korea.<sup>91</sup> This proposal contains the same elements that North Korea continually pushes for transforming the KAA: bilateral agreement with the United States (no South Korea participation) and the withdrawal of U.S. forces and bases from South Korea. Of course, this contradicts a parallel policy that North Korea appears to be taking with working a separate peace process with South Korea. For example, in December 1991, North and South Korea concluded an “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation,” which would “transform the present armistice regime into a firm state of peace...and shall abide by the present military Armistice Agreement until such a state of peace has taken hold.”<sup>92</sup>

The single most dominant aspect of the KAA is South Korea’s refusal to sign the document because any settlement would leave Korea divided and the Communists in control of the North.<sup>93</sup> Although he was the driving force for Korean democracy fighting North Korea’s communism, Rhee was also one of the primary roadblocks to the Armistice process. General Mark Clark who was the UN designated Armistice signer, wrote, “I found myself engaged in a two-front diplomatic battle; with the Communists in Panmunjom and with President Syngman Rhee in Seoul.”<sup>94</sup> However, Rhee realized that South Korea could not go against North Korea and its support Great Nation Communist hosts alone. He finally reluctantly acquiesced to the initiation of the truce talks.<sup>95</sup> Unfortunately, Rhee may have had the correct intentions in not signing the KAA but it has had lasting ramifications concerning the final termination of war efforts.

Because this Armistice Agreement did not bring final peace, can the belligerents of the Korean War be considered still at war? General Mark W. Clark called the signing of the Armistice Agreement, “The Unfinished War.”<sup>96</sup> The world was battle fatigued and needed a timely end to the war.<sup>97</sup> Despite limitations of the KAA, the Korean War did preserve the freedom and legitimacy for the Republic of Korea.<sup>98</sup>

## Korean Reconciliation

Korea has held a unique place in world history for nearly 4000 years. With their common language and culture, clear sense of national identity, strong sense of fatalism, and the determination to shape their own destiny, Koreans have stubbornly pursued the ancient dream of unification under a single government.<sup>99</sup> The splicing of Korean tribal units in the first century B.C.E. eventually yielded three confederated kingdoms: Koguryo in the north, Silla in the south, and Paekche in the southwest.<sup>100</sup> The three ancient Korean Kingdoms were often in conflict for control of the peninsula. The Silla kingdom ultimately vanquished Koguryo and Paekche and thus unified Korea.<sup>101</sup>

North Korea has always claimed to represent the Koguryo kingdom. An argument by China is that this kingdom (and North Korea) has always been influenced by China and even claimed to be a direct territory of the Han Dynasty.<sup>102</sup> This relationship remains important to the fundamental relationship between China and North Korea and provides further insight into background necessary for negotiating a peace treaty with North Korea.

North Korea has been isolated from the Western World for over half a century. In this time, you can develop a new culture. Although many would contend that North Korea has changed significantly from South Korea. However, that may not be the case.<sup>103</sup>

The basis for Korean culture is Confucianism (Philosophy) mixed with Taoism (Ethics) and indigenous Shamanism (religion).<sup>104</sup> However, Confucianism has dominated, and today, it still is dominating the culture in Korean society. This philosophy dictates the filial duty to parents, a precise order of respect, and difference between young and old, separation and responsibilities of sexes, trust between friends who are bound together by birth place, school, military, and work place, and so on.<sup>105</sup> Thus, the Korean society became hierarchical and authoritarian. Koreans operated on the basis of personal connections, while the basis of the western society was considered rational, impersonal, and objective.<sup>106</sup>

It is important to understand that historically and traditionally there have been sharp differences between the north and south. "South Koreans considered their northern neighbors crude and culturally backward. North Koreans viewed southerners as lazy schemers."<sup>107</sup> These historical cultural differences continue to create an atmosphere that was not conducive for the diplomatic process to begin. South Korea has always appeared to be the dominant leader in solving the issue of a unified Korea.

Aside from the Great Nations using the Korean Peninsula for their political ends, Kim Il-Sung and Syngman Rhee always demanded that Korea be reunited albeit under their political systems with military means. Rhee recognized prophetically that negotiations with the

Communists were likely to mean the division of their country on a lasting basis. Accordingly, President Syngman Rhee issued his own conditions for peace: withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces north of the Yalu, termination of arms shipments by China and the Soviet Union, and the disarmament of the North Korean People's Army; no peace settlement without ROK participation; and no terms contrary to the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea.<sup>108</sup>

The Republic of Korea, however, could not enforce this position in 1951.<sup>109</sup> The objectives of the UNC, on which South Korea depended for its national survival, no longer included Korean unification. Peace had become the objective of the United Nations; negotiation had become an objective of the Communists.

In 1972, Kim Il Sung and South Korean President Park Chung-Hee initiated a series of talks through the Red Cross, resulting in the July 4 1972, South-North Joint Communiqué.<sup>110</sup> This inter-Korean negotiation process was notable because for almost 20 years of not talking, the two sides were able to agree on the Red Cross as an instrument for pursuing an unmediated channel of communication.<sup>111</sup>

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, from 1990 to 1992, the two Koreas established a series of inter-Korean prime minister's level dialogue meetings. This was significant because it implied recognition of the legitimacy of the opposing governments.<sup>112</sup>

The inter-Korean dialogue for both 1972 and the 1990's revealed a non-governmental organization (NGO) such as the Red Cross was an effective mediator for the peninsular peace process. Perhaps because of the inherent mistrust resulting from centuries of Great Nation exploitation, one of the striking features of inter-Korean dialogue has been the relative absence of third parties capable of gaining trust to both Koreas as effective mediators.<sup>113</sup> The Red Cross has remained relatively neutral with no hidden political agenda.

One exception to the Korean suspicions of an outside mediator came in 1994 when former U.S. President Carter was invited by Kim Il-Sung to assist in the de-escalation peninsular tensions that evolved from 1992 and 1993 IAEA reported discrepancies on North Korea's nuclear programs.<sup>114</sup> Unfortunately, all of the goodwill that Carter's visit developed, disappeared when Kim Il-Sung abruptly died on 7 July 1994.<sup>115</sup>

The greatest single act of South Korean diplomacy reaching out to North Korea was the ROK President Kim Dae-jung's historic visit to North Korea in 2000 and the establishment of the "Sunshine Policy."<sup>116</sup> The handshake represented hope for the future vice the final exclamation of a completed process.<sup>117</sup> Of course, this positive act has been tainted by scandal of the North Korean's being paid off in millions of dollars by the representatives of the Kim Dae-jung's presidency as well as some stating that "there has been no tangible change in the security

situation since the summit.”<sup>118</sup> Once again, South Korea lead the way for diplomacy and negotiation. Since that time, although promised, Kim Chong-il has not visited his neighbors in the south.

The Sunshine Policy recognized that the best way to deal with North Korea was by offering humanitarian and economic aid, not threatening sanctions or war.<sup>119</sup> When President Bush branded North Korea as one part of the “axis of evil” in his first State of the Union speech, South Korean progressives were outraged.<sup>120</sup> This hard-line policy toward North Korea was considered typical of U.S. imperialism and obstructionism. Once again, the United States was perceived as the greatest obstacle to national reconciliation and reunification on the Korean peninsula.<sup>121</sup> South Korea fully understands North Korea needs to be accountable to improve security and uphold international norms. However, North Korea does not have the economic resolve to drastically change its politics nor drastically improve the standard of living to meet world standards.<sup>122</sup> The United States military is currently undergoing a drastic transformation from a threat-based planning and confrontation to one of effects-based operations. The United States Foreign Policy approach to North Korea should also adopt this transformation. The United States has a critical interest in understanding how the long-term goals of Korea as well as U.S. short-term decisions to further them will affect both the day-to-day operations of the alliance and its continued strength.<sup>123</sup>

South Korea has come to view the greatest threat from North Korea as emanating from its weakness: the country’s economic failure and the widespread deprivation of its people could fuel instability and lead to collapse—a burden most South Koreans believe their country would be unable to shoulder. Thus, the ROK has ardently pursued a policy of engagement, with the hope of gradually transforming the North, while resenting pressure from the U.S. for fear that an aggressive approach could provoke an unwanted conflict with the North. Such confusion about the true source of instability of the Peninsula only benefits the DPRK regime, whose long-held strategy has been to try and divide the alliance.<sup>124</sup> If the rising flame of anti-Americanism continues in the ROK, the above items can be used to force the U.S. to withdraw its forces. To the South Koreans, living in fear of the DPRK is better than trying to rebuild from a U.S.-instigated DPRK attack or paying for the unwanted burden of reunification.<sup>125</sup>

South Korea has undergone a demographic change in which two-thirds of its population is under the age of 40 and has no personal experience with the Korean War.<sup>126</sup> Another recent study described the South Koreans in the 30s and 40s age groups as “no longer fearing Pyongyang as their parents did and are less easily swayed by anti-communist appeals,” and is “less likely to be pro-American.” They oppose the way the U.S. appears to be heavy-handed

and unfair when dealing with the ROK. Many South Koreans are saying “what the South Koreans truly desire is respect and more equal status from the U.S.”<sup>127</sup>

ROK Korean officials and security experts also make it clear that if the U.S. is perceived to be an obstacle to reunification and the two Koreas manage to achieve a significant breakthrough, it will increase tensions between the two allies. More importantly, some warn that if the South’s rapprochement with the North fails, the U.S. could become an easy scapegoat for the failure. Many advised that it is in the interest of both countries to publicly narrow the North Korea policy gap as quickly as possible, especially if the U.S. truly believes peaceful resolution is the desired outcome. The ROK government has warned that it must be consulted prior to any military action, and if the U.S. chooses to act unilaterally, it would be unacceptable under present conditions and could threaten the Alliance. Since the U.S. has repeatedly declared it has “no intention of attacking or invading North Korea,” the two sides should be able to narrow the North Korean policy gap.<sup>128</sup> This will give more room for diplomacy to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis through the Six-Party Talks, and should improve America’s image in South Korea. All of these elements could lead to end result that for stability of the Korean peninsula to be maintained, U.S. military forces must depart.

However, this does not mean that the South Korean perception of North Korea is totally centered on friendship. Perceptions in South Korea include dualism, with both hostility and amiability coexisting.<sup>129</sup> North Korea’s actions or inactions will drive the dominant emotion (friendship or hostility) of the South Korean people.

Since the initial dealings between North Korea and the West, North Korea has perfected a negotiating strategy that takes full advantage of America’s willingness to resolve the issues North Korea creates.<sup>130</sup> However, one result from this negotiating strategy is that South Koreans are increasingly torn between the danger posed by North Korea’s nuclear threat and the possible promise of reconciliation and reunification with the North. Uncertainty is further heightened by a growing belief that tough U.S. policies toward Pyongyang constitute a threat that rivals the one from the North.<sup>131</sup> A RAND study revealed that the United States must do more to persuade South Koreans that American interest in their region goes well beyond the North Korean threat, and that the United States has a “long-term interest in peaceful, stable and economically vital Northeast Asia.”<sup>132</sup> The report further determined that the so-called “democracy generation” of young South Koreans gather their news and “facts” from Internet sources rather than the traditional media.<sup>133</sup> Even the famous Russian author, Leo Tolstoy understood that the only way to bring about a fundamental change in society is to realize a change in public opinion, a change in people’s minds.<sup>134</sup> Thus, for both Koreas, peace must be

established in the hearts and minds of the young Koreans which require media attention in shaping those attitudes.

South Korea has championed the idea of continuing with negotiations between the regional powers, the United States and itself in the form of Six-party talks. However, it is unclear whether these Talks can terminate the KAA.

#### Six-Party Talks

Six-party talks are a series of designed to mediate a resolution of the crisis over the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The participants include the People's Republic of China, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, Japan and the United States. Little headway has been made disarming North Korea as of yet.<sup>135</sup> On September 19, 2005, negotiators from all six sides announced that they had finally reached a preliminary agreement. Highlights of the agreement include: North Korea agreeing to abandon all nuclear weapons and nuclear programs, the United States and South Korea declaring they have no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, that the United States has no intention of attacking and/or invading North Korea and that Japan and the United States will work to normalize ties with North Korea.<sup>136</sup> A review of each country's role reveals their future impact on the cessation of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula.

China remains an important factor in the disposition of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. China's history with Korea reveals that although it exploited the country at times, it remained in the role of "big brother." If China can dismantle North Korea's nuclear program and it holds, China's will emerge as a major actor on the world stage.<sup>137</sup> China controls 30 percent of the food and at least 70 percent of the fuel going into North Korea.<sup>138</sup> North Korea previously had served to counter in part, the U.S. containment policies of communism. China was content to allow North Korea to serve as a distraction with its threats, bluster, promises and violations. Now China realizes that with a nuclear DPRK, it is only a matter of time before Japan goes nuclear as well; "China's ultimate nightmare."<sup>139</sup> Finally, that China is one of the U.N. Security Council members must always be taken into consideration to both control North Korea and to mitigate a peace treaty to end the Korean War.

In the 1930's, Kim Il-sung developed the North Korean philosophy of Juche which places Korea first as the opposite of accepting a subservient role for the country and bows to no one to include China.<sup>140</sup> China may be the only country to force North Korea to give way to The Six-Party Talk resolutions for peace, however, it will have to do so by erasing historical memories of exploitation and developing an equal standing with North Korea not one of a tributary status.

North Korea promotes aid from abroad, such as that from China, as tributes or gifts. These “gifts” are used to demonstrate that North Korea is a powerful and respected country.<sup>141</sup>

Understanding Juche provides insight into the pride and nationalistic aspects that would be required for a negotiation success with North Korea. A primary tenet of Juche which validates its existence to some extent is North Korea’s efforts to unification.<sup>142</sup>

Among the Korean War’s nineteen belligerents, the United States, South Korea, North Korea, China and Russia (by default for replacing the Soviet Union) qualify as the principal belligerents on the basis of the level of forces committed to the conflict and their subsequent sustained involvement in the temporary armistice arrangements over five decades. A comprehensive peace settlement among these four would represent, therefore, a legitimate formal conclusion to the war.<sup>143</sup> Since Japan is not considered a “belligerent” in the Korean War and some could rightly contend that Japan was the original root cause of the Korean War, Japan should not be allowed to participate in KAA termination process. However, Japan should be a primary party to settle the North Korean nuclear issue.

From a United States perspective, North Korea represents a dangerous element within the region. Using a multi-lateral approach to solve the DPRK nuclear issue truly empowers the regional nations to solve this sensitivity and potentially destructive issue. However, is there a relevant risk of a DPRK attack? Although some of the younger generation of South Koreans may believe there is no threat from the DPRK, there is an overwhelming DPRK military presence with the Peninsula as the most heavily militarized area in the world and a very real threat to U.S. and Allied interests.<sup>144</sup>

Adding to this dangerous DPRK conventional threat, is the heightened prospect that North Korea has developed a nuclear weapon capability and eventually could deploy operational nuclear weapons, or worse, sell them to global terrorists. Recently, Evans Revere, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, stated that “North Korea’s nuclear program remains the foremost challenge to South Korea and the region. The United States shares South Korea’s desire to pursue peaceful, diplomatic means to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue.”<sup>145</sup> However, the lack of a true peace treaty and the presence of U.S. military forces in South Korea help to reinforce the mindset for North Korea’s leadership especially in support of its military.<sup>146</sup>

The United States views the DPRK regime as a serious threat primarily due to the cumulative strength of its capabilities: WMD weapons, its missile and arms stockpiles, its immense conventional armed forces amassed on the border with the ROK along with its illicit activities. DPRK activities include trafficking of drugs, currency counterfeiting, weapons

proliferation and even its human rights abuses.<sup>147</sup> After the fourth round of six-party talks, the U.S. accused North Korea of manufacturing high-quality counterfeit \$100 “supernotes.”<sup>148</sup>

The round four Six Party talks revealed to some extent how to succeed with the North Koreans. The success of this round was due in large measure to a reversal in the manner in which the Bush Administration approached and carried out its North Korean policy within the multilateral talk’s framework.<sup>149</sup> Part of the decision to engage Pyongyang meant that the administration had to control its rhetoric. When President Bush referred to North Korea’s leader, as “Mister” Kim Jong-Il, rather than some of the previously used derogatory terms, such as “dictator” or “tyrant,” North Koreans took notice.<sup>150</sup> One may question the timing of the introduction of the criminal behavior of the DPRK into talks designed to solve a nuclear issue. During past deliberations with Russia on nuclear issues, these types of political mudslinging were not used to bring to fruition the SALT treaty or nuclear arms limitations enjoyed by the United States and Russia.

After the fifth round of Six Party talks, there appeared to be two distinct U.S. policy tracks regarding North Korea occurring simultaneously.<sup>151</sup> This reemerged bifurcation of U.S. policy reflects that the introduction of the illegal activities in the Six Party Talks may be inappropriate.<sup>152</sup> The victory gained after the fourth round of treating the North Koreans with respect may have been lost with the confrontation of the illegal activities. Even recently, South Korea has questioned the validity of the NK counterfeiting which is creating another seam for North Korea to exploit and drive a wedge between the United States and South Korea.<sup>153</sup>

North Korea is still widely viewed as an enigma—a secretive, isolated, and enfeebled state whose belligerence and anachronistic worship of its leader provoke unease among all of its neighbors.<sup>154</sup> Recently declassified documents from former DPRK allies in the Communist World revealed that Kim Il-Sung orchestrated several attempts to provoke South Korea or the United States to initiate hostilities which would appear that U.S.-ROK Alliance was “invading” North Korea. This “invasion” was the only way that the Soviet Union would support another regional conflict aimed at reunifying the peninsula under North Korean rule. From Stalin to Brezhnev, it was made clear to the DPRK and Kim Il-Sung that Soviet involvement in supporting DPRK would occur if the United States threatened the “state interests” of the Soviet Union.<sup>155</sup>

By the end of Kim Il-Sung’s reign, the North Korean leadership, presumable including Kim Jong-Il, had learned that the DPRK’s economic weakness and the U.S. nuclear power rendered a military solution impossible.<sup>156</sup> North Korea learned that if the U.S. nuclear deterrence had been successful why couldn’t North Korea develop a similar nuclear deterrence? Weathersby suggests that DPRK’s nuclear program does not necessarily signal aggressive intent by a

defensive mechanism for regime survival.<sup>157</sup> DPRK's record of deception to the United States as well as its former Communist patron states dictates that any future agreements must be accompanied with extremely vigilant monitoring of North Korean compliance.<sup>158</sup>

In 1994, The Clinton administration relied on both carrots and sticks to try to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. If Pyongyang returned to full compliance with international nonproliferation norms, then the international community would respond favorably, reassuring North Korea that compliance would enhance its national security, and even prosperity. This diplomatic tact required a "face-saving" escape mechanism to allow the North Koreans to comply with their non-proliferation obligations. This was the "escape valve" that President Clinton kept prodding his advisers to embed into the U.S. negotiating position and, *deus ex machina*, finally appeared in the form of Jimmy Carter.<sup>159</sup> The lesson here is that for the KAA to be transformed into a permanent peace treaty, there needs to be an escape mechanism for North Korea to "save face." In short, picking a clear boundary for acceptable behavior can prove a successful deterrent, but only if it is backed by the credible threat of force.<sup>160</sup>

Even after the attempts by the Clinton Administration to improve relations with North Korea and solve the nuclear issue, the Bush administration continues to use "the cold war confrontation" of the past five decades. North Korean sympathizers state that North Korea prefers to terminate the "state of belligerency between the Korea People's Army and the American forces and establishing full diplomatic relations."<sup>161</sup> DPRK has attempted numerous times to achieve a bilateral relationship with the United States to solve the KAA resolution. DPRK will contend that the United States is unable to bid farewell to the "second-class ally status" that the United States has conferred on South Korea.<sup>162</sup> DPRK will argue that South Korea has no legal foundation to participate in the KAA resolution process.<sup>163</sup> However, it has already been established that South Korea is one of the legally observed "belligerents" of the Korean War. What the DPRK is really establishing with these proposals of a bilateral treaty with the United States is legitimacy for North Korea and its dominant political control of the peninsula.

However, more than fifty years after the KAA, the Republic of Korea is a solid democracy, an economic success and proof that it was right to fight communism. The fact that the United States did not reunify the Korean Peninsula under democracy as was the original intent has left one of the world's most repressive and paranoid dictatorships controlling a significant WMD program which threatens its regional neighbors.<sup>164</sup>

## Conclusion

Korea's heritage and cultural shaping has defined their character and personality traits. Centuries of Great Nation exploitation forced Korea to adopt an extreme isolationist policy to the world with China being its only contact. Because of this isolationist policy and unique traits that comprised the character of the Koreans in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, western countries including the United States did not perceive any great strategically important reason to continue to engage Korea and thus, left Korea to be exploited by Japan. Japan's brutal colonization attempted cultural purge of the Korean people. This forced Korean freedom fighters to cast off their traditional Buddhist and Confucius polity and adopt either democracy or communism ways to achieve their ends of defeating the Japanese and returning to a unified country.

World War II achieved these ends of defeat but Kim Il-Sung, the dominant communist in the North, invaded and began a civil war to achieve a reunification under his rule and communist doctrine. This civil war drew in the Great Nations who championed each of the opposing factions of democracy and communism and transformed this limited action into a Proxy War.

Because of the weariness of two World Wars in the same century, the Korean War abruptly ended with a two-Korea solution under a temporary truce: the Korean Armistice Agreement. The influence of battlefield commanders signing the armistice truce more than fifty years ago has provided a set of rules of engagement that has endured for over fifty years. It provided a structure that both North and South Korea fell back on to establish and defend their positions. The Armistice provided an escalation control mechanism in the event of crisis (which has been shown to work). It provided a reason to meet and discuss military issues. However, it did maintain the role of the United States as the dominant player attempting to mediate the two but with more control over South Korea. The Armistice was the mechanism that allowed the Republic of Korea to achieve the economic dominance it enjoys today. However, it does provide the propaganda vehicle for North Korea to conduct its brinkmanship which occasionally results in hostilities. People die almost every year to maintain this fragile but enduring truce.

The Republic of Korea has attempted several times to solve the peace process bilaterally with North Korea. However, North Korea does not give the Republic of Korea legitimacy and remains determined to conduct any closure concerning the termination of the armistice and resulting peace treaty to be a U.S. and DPRK one only. Because the DPRK dictates (and probably believes) that the U.S. is its "main" enemy not South Korea, the DPRK has developed an overwhelming conventional force to combat mirrored forces in the south. To further DPRK's ability to keep in the forefront of world opinion, it has developed a significant WMD program

which includes a long range ballistic missile program and now has probably nuclear devices. This dangerous military threat feeds the United States' outdated Cold War approaches to strategic confrontation and threat based reactions.

The United States has been the Republic of Korea's biggest supporter since 1950 and remains committed to South Korea as documented in the United States Strategy documents. However, in recent years, it has also had its relationship strained and been characterized as villain in solving the reunification or reconciliation of Korea.

To solve this dilemma, the Korean War needs to have the termination process completed and move from a short term truce to a lasting regional peace process that stabilizes the region. However, this process will not be easy and will require a transformation of the current Cold War Policy from a treat-based approach to an effects based approach in which Cold War rhetoric, deep-rooted suspicions, hard-line confrontations, and dangerous saber-rattling needs to be replaced with engagement and reconciliation. However, the end results will be viewed by other world rogue states such as Iran. The success or perceived weakness of failure will determine how their future plays out with the United States and the world as well.

#### Future Peace Process

The first step in achieving a long, term lasting peace that cannot be used for political or propaganda and is legal and binding, is having the original signers complete and sign a set of accords that would result in a traditional conflict termination. These accords could be similar to the Middle East peace process beginning with the Camp David Framework Agreements of 1978 and culminating in the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979.<sup>165</sup>

Next, the United Nations Security Council or General Assembly should pass a resolution that also acknowledges the termination of the Korean War per its original Resolution in 1950. This resolution should identify that the key participants in the regional Five-party peace process should involve the Koreas, China, Russia and the United States. Japan should not be a party to the Korean War Peace Process since its 19<sup>th</sup> century exploitation and neutralizing the Chosen leadership, colonization and brutalization of Korea is responsible for the freedom fighters choosing sides between Communism and Democracy. Had the Japanese not colonized Korea, Korea may have remained a unified Korea. Of course, this unified Korea would probably have been invaded by Japan with Russia and the United States politically partitioning this country for Japanese repatriation. However, there would not have been 35 years of Japanese oppression and brutality to develop the South Korean acceptance of a Western polity such as democracy or communism.

Japan should issue a full apology to the Korean people for their colonization attempt in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century with the intent of laying the foundation for the final solution to the KAA. This apology could provide the common bond that unites the North and South in accepting one another. Japan should still participate in the 6-party talks to solve the nuclear issue as it is affected by this regional threat.

The next step is the completion of the Korean civil war termination. This would be accomplished by having both North and South Korea reaffirm their original agreements as set forth in the ROK/DPRK Talks of 1972 and 1990's. This would provide the basis for reconciliation in which democracy and Juche could co-exist on the Korean Peninsula (another form of dualism). However, North Korea will have to be coerced into adopting nation-state responsibilities that forego humanitarian issues (nationwide hunger to support their military), criminal activities to support their economy and finally the abolition of their significant conventional and WMD threat with non-aggression assurances from the surround regional Great Powers to include the United States. If North Korea is offered legitimacy and respect along with financial packages to support its people, then North Korea may not have to resort to illegitimate means for acquiring money.

The United States has a history of forgiving and forgetting the past in regards to diplomacy. Recently, Vietnam, a bitter reminder of the worst of U.S. history, completed the diplomatic process of exchanging ambassadors and opening embassy's in each other's country. The United States should implement an affects based approach to diplomacy in which a full and complete diplomatic exchange should occur with North Korea as well. The United States has used confrontation and containment with North Korea for over 50 years only to allow North Korea to become a dominant conventional military threat as well as developing nuclear and other WMD weapons. It should be noted that during 1994 and the establishment of the Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States, North Korea displayed openness to the United States. This openness included U.S. MIA body recovery teams to gain entry into North Korea as well as anti-American propaganda being diminished especially in Pyongyang.<sup>166</sup>

With the exchanging of ambassadors and opening of Embassy's in each other's capitals, both the United States and North Korea would require tremendous patience. Additionally, the United States should employ the same free market diplomacy it utilized with Vietnam and China. However, North Korea will move a much, much slower pace than other countries because of Juche and the DPRK suspicion that their regime legacy remains foremost. Signing a non-aggression pact with DPRK costs nothing. If future events necessitate, this pact can be considered null and void.

The United States must remain committed to South Korea and the Mutual Defense Treaty. One possible action would be to remove USFK and UNC and replace them with Multi-National JTF HQ that would promote regional stability, not a counter just a North Korean threat. Departing from its rigid stance that emphasizes the unconditional withdrawal of American forces, Kim Jong-Il is known to have concurred with South Korea's President, Kim Dae-Jung, and view of utilities of American forces in the South during the 2000 meeting.<sup>167</sup>

Finally, the future to the Korean Peninsula is the youth of Korea. They have no memories of the Korean War, Japanese Colonization, and Great Nation exploitation (except what they observe is currently ongoing). With the United States taking the above unprecedented steps, it would win the hearts and minds of the youth. With time, as history has shown, North Korea's government will change.

As a former U.S. Defense Attaché and Foreign Area Officer told me, if the armistice can't be replaced the alternative is war. For the near term, the Bush Doctrine of Pre-emption can still be held on the backburner for those other "options" if the United States is actually threatened. For the long term, it is in the best interest of the world and more importantly, the Korean people to solve this divisive mechanism and return them to their homogenous co-existence.

#### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> The Korean Armistice Agreement is unique in that it is purely a military document. A key feature of the armistice is that no nation is a signatory to the agreement. CINUNC signed the Agreement on behalf of the unified command, consisting of the military forces from 16 UN nations and the Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea does support and observe the Armistice Agreement. The 1953 truce set conditions to end the shooting war. It also provided binding terms to avoid a resumption of hostilities by either side until a peaceful solution to the problems, which led to warfare, could be found. To this end, the armistice recommended the holding of a political conference of a "higher level" of all nations concerned. This conference was held in Geneva in 1954, nine months after the truce was signed, but no agreement was reached. The Korean peninsula remained divided by a Military Demarcation Line and the truce remained in effect. The ROK Government has offered a number of initiatives to reach a peaceful accommodation with the north, but each has been rebuffed. The Military Armistice Commission serves as the only line of communication between the commanders of opposing military forces and its function is limited to military, not political, matters. The Armistice Agreement: (1) suspended open hostilities; (2) withdrew all military forces and equipment from a 4,000 meter wide zone, establishing the Demilitarized Zone as a buffer between the forces; (3) prevented both sides from entering the air, ground or sea areas under control of the other; (4) arranged release and repatriation of prisoners of war and displaced persons; and (5) established the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and other agencies to discuss any violations and to insure adherence to the truce terms. *Backgrounder (No. 7)*, "The Armistice & the Military Armistice Commission," United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, United States Forces Korea, Eighth United States Army; available from <http://www.korea.army.mil.pao/backgrounder/bg7.htm>; Internet; accessed 1 November 2005.

<sup>2</sup> The intent of the treaty included “Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples and governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area.” Of note, U.S. added an “understanding statement” which was communicated back to the ROK: “It is the understanding of the United States that neither party is obligated, under Article III of the above Treaty, to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against such party; nor shall anything in the present Treaty be construed as requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea.” “Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea; October 1, 1953,” available from <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/korea/kor001.htm>; Internet; accessed 14 November 2005.

<sup>3</sup> Henry Bosley Woolf, editor-in-chief, Webster’s new Collegiate Dictionary, (Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1977), 61.

<sup>4</sup> By 2003, there had been 1439 major provocations and DMZ Violations since 1953 with 90 U.S. killed in action (KIA), over 390 ROK KIA (to include six Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy seaman killed by an unprovoked attack by North Korea in June 2002); and 889 North Korean KIA. More significantly this includes five assassination attempts by North Korea against ROK Presidents. The 1998 UNC/CFC SOP defines a “major provocation” as an illegal intrusion of the MDL or HRE into the territory, waters, or airspace of the other side by personnel, weapons, or equipment. The continuous string of provocative incidents over the decades has occasionally been interrupted by gestures at peace and reconciliation. The most recent of these was the unprecedented North-South summit that took place in June 2000. However, beside the emotional boost provided to all Koreans by the summit, beyond the family reunions, there is very little empirical evidence of true reconciliation between the two Koreas. In fact, during the first anniversary of summit, the North caused a major armistice violation by transiting the Cheju Straits which are ROK territorial waters, even as the ROK Foreign Minister was meeting with SECSTATE Powell. United States Forces, Korea (USFK) Headquarters, “Korea Story Brief (KSB),” briefing slides with scripted commentary, United States Forces Korea, Combined Forces Command, and the United Nations Command, CP Yongsan, South Korea, 27 September 2004.

<sup>5</sup> White House News Release, “Joint Declaration on the ROK-U.S. Alliance and Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” November 17 2005; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051117-6.html>; Internet; accessed 29 November 2005.

<sup>6</sup> Lee Nae-Young, “Public Opinion About ROK-U.S. Relations,” *Challenges Posed by the DPRK For The Alliance And The Region*, James M. Lister, Ed., (Korea Economic Institute: United States, October 2005), 1.

<sup>7</sup> Of note, the Republic of Korea has responded when asked by the United States to provide military forces. From 1964 to 1973, a total of 300,000 Korean soldiers were deployed to Vietnam, and more than 5,000 were killed. *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> Peter Brookes, “It Ain’t Over,” The Heritage Foundation Press Release, 28 July 2003; available from <http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed072903b.cfm> ; Internet; accessed 5 November 2005.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>10</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 26.

<sup>11</sup> USFK Representative, "Korea Story Brief (KSB)," briefing slides with scripted commentary, United States Forces Korea, Combined Forces Command, and the United Nations Command, CP Yongsan, South Korea, 27 September 2004.

<sup>12</sup> COL Jiyul Kim, "South Korean Politics and Foreign Policy," panel discussion, Dickinson College, 5 October 2005.

<sup>13</sup> Sometimes described as a "dagger pointed at the heart of Japan," Korea became instead Japan's steppingstone to the Asian mainland. For China and, later, Russia, Korea was a back gate both to be locked against intruders and to be opened during any opportunity for expansion. Korea's ice-free ports fronting the Sea of Japan were especially coveted by the Russians. Korea therefore has seldom been completely free of domination by one of its stronger neighbors. James F. Schnabel, "United States Army in the Korean War - Policy and Direction: The First Year," Center Of Military History United States Army, 1972; available from <http://www.kmike.com/PolicyAndDirection/P&d.htm> ; Internet; accessed 4 November 2005; 2.

<sup>14</sup> At the height of Korea's pre-modern apogee, Korea had a moveable type long before Gutenberg's celebrated Bible; a gauge to measure rainfall, two hundred years before a similar instrument was devised in Europe; and numerous other advances in agronomy, mathematics, astronomy, sophisticated cannon and artillery; and medical sciences. From the Japanese kidnapping of prominent artisans to widespread famine from Japanese and Mongol invasions to the havoc wreaked by the Manchu forces, Korea "disintegrated as a civilization." Bruce Cummings, *Korea's Place in the Sun A Modern History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 76-86.

<sup>15</sup> Schnabel, 3.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Because of Korea's extreme isolationist, it earned the Western name "Hermit Kingdom." Koreans have always respected hermits, and the term expresses the pronounced streak of obstinate autonomy toward foreign power and the deep desire of independence that marked pre-modern Korea. Ethnocentric and obnoxious to foreigners, a self-contained, autonomous Korea not besmirched by things foreign remains an ideal for many Koreans. Cummings, 137.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 96-97.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 97.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 99.

<sup>22</sup> Roosevelt won a Nobel Peace Prize for his brokering of the peace between Japan and Russia. During diplomatic notes exchanged between Roosevelt and the Japanese (also known as the Taft-Katsura agreement), Japan would not question American rights in the Philippines. Cummings, 141-142.

<sup>23</sup> In the quarter century before the Japanese take-over, the United States showed a mild interest in Korea and made some effort to support Korean independence, at least in principle. In 1882, an American naval officer, Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt, negotiated a commercial treaty with the Korean Emperor. The result of four years' effort, this treaty was achieved through the reluctant good offices of the Chinese Government. It provided for exchange of diplomatic representatives, protection of navigation and of United States citizens, extraterritoriality, and trade under a most-favored nation clause. The treaty could have given the United States overriding influence in Korea. But when the Emperor sought an American foreign affairs adviser and Army military advisers, the United States moved slowly. The matter dragged on for several years. The American representative in Korea repeatedly appealed to Washington for action. Although requested in 1884, military advisers reached Korea only in 1888. Schnabel, 4.

<sup>24</sup> Cummings, 142.

<sup>25</sup> Schnabel, 4.

<sup>26</sup> According to Japanese statistics, 14,566 Korean "rebels" were killed between July 1907 and December 1908. Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Revolutionary groups and movements sustained the Korean hope for freedom, defying the Japanese whenever possible. One strong group working to free Korea from alien rule called itself the "Provisional Government of the Republic of Great Korea." It originated on 1 March 1919 when a declaration of independence, signed by Korean students, was read before a student gathering in Seoul. The Japanese ruthlessly hunted down the instigators of this declaration, and many patriots fled Korea to escape torture and death. On 10 April 1919 some of these refugees met in Shanghai and established the Provisional Government. Dr. Syngman Rhee headed the group as Premier. After the Manchurian incident in 1931, the Provisional Government moved to Nanking and, later, to Chungking. Ibid., 5.

<sup>28</sup> Most Americans are familiar with this name in its westernized form, Syngman Rhee. Koreans always take their family name and place it first, followed by surnames. Thus, to a Korean it would be Rhee Syng-man. Additionally, the Koreans refer to Rhee as Yi or Lee; all three are phonetic pronunciations of the Korean language. So to a Korean, you would refer to Rhee as Yi Syng-man. The Encyclopedia of Asian History, "Syngman Rhee (Yu Sungman; 1875-1965)," Asia Source, 1988; available from <http://www.asiasource.org/society/syngmanrhee.cfm>; Internet; accessed 13 December 2005.

<sup>29</sup> Schnabel., 5.

<sup>30</sup> Rhee, Syngman was born in Hwanghae Province of central Korea as Yi Sung-man in 1875. He died in Honolulu, Hawaii 1965. A distant relative of the Korean royal family, Rhee studied the Confucian classics, but then entered the American missionary Paejae High School in 1894. His activity in the reformist Independence Club led to imprisonment in 1897. Tortured at first, he later could write a somewhat prosaic political testament, "The Spirit of Independence," which was subsequently published in the United States. He was converted to Christianity while in prison. Released in 1904, Rhee went to the United States to plead unsuccessfully for American support against Japanese hegemony. With missionary support, he studied successively at George Washington, Harvard, and Princeton universities, earning his doctoral degree. In 1911, Rhee returned to Korea – now a Japanese colony – as a YMCA teacher-evangelist, but Japanese suspicions soon drove him back to the United States. From 1913 to

1940 he based his activities in Hawaii, where he was principal of a Korean school and leader of a Korean expatriate faction called Tongjihoe (Comrades' Society). He continued his vigorous campaigning for Korean independence. His work was plagued then and subsequently, however, by dissension with Korean political and church leaders. The Encyclopedia of Asian History.

<sup>31</sup> Andrei Lankov, "The Dawn of Modern Korea (254) Agreeing to Disagree," *The Korea Times*, 26 December 2004; available from <http://times.hankooki.com/1page/opinion/2004/200412/kt2004122619485154130.htm> ; Internet; accessed 31 December 2005.

<sup>32</sup> Schnabel, 14.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>35</sup> Richard Rhodes, *DARK STAR* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 434.

<sup>36</sup> Schnabel, 5-6.

<sup>37</sup> Rhodes, 434.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> One of the earliest signs that the Allied Powers were concerned about Korea appeared in a Joint statement by the United States, China, and Great Britain in December 1943, after the Cairo Conference, which said: "The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." Ibid., 6.

<sup>40</sup> Cummings, 185.

<sup>41</sup> Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin "worried about U.S. military intervention until the moment the Korean War began," James Matray, professor of history at New Mexico State University said. "Moreover, he feared that North Korea could not survive an attack that he was certain South Korea would stage in the future." Bruce Steel, "Historians debunk some popular myths about the war," *University Times*, Volume 32, Number 21, June 22, 2000; available from <http://www.pitt.edu/utimes/issues/32/000622/17.html>; Internet; accessed 11 December 2005.

<sup>42</sup> Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945-1950 A House Burning* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 45.

<sup>43</sup> Cummings, 186.

<sup>44</sup> Colonels Charles H. Bonesteel III and Dean Rusk selected the first major latitude line (38<sup>th</sup> parallel) north of Seoul and the Han River valley, one of the two political centers of Korea and the site of the headquarters of the Japanese colonial government and the 17<sup>th</sup> Area Army. This division allowed the U.S. Army to use the ports of Inchon, Kunsan and Pusan to evacuate the Japanese. Millett, 45.

<sup>45</sup> Schnabel, 7.

<sup>46</sup> The Soviets desperately sought machinery, food, raw materials, and human labor. However, there did not appear to be any strategic political desire on the Soviets to argue with the Americans on the dividing line. Millett, 45.

<sup>47</sup> Schnabel, 7.

<sup>48</sup> Department of National Security and Strategy, "National Security Policy and Strategy," Course Directive Academic (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2006), 53.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> David Jablonsky, "COLD WAR CHRONOLOGY," U.S. Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy Readings (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2005), 227.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> James Chace, "Shaping the State," PBS On-line News Hour; October 7, 1998; available from [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/authors\\_corner/july-dec98/acheson.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/authors_corner/july-dec98/acheson.html); Internet; accessed 11 December 2005.

<sup>53</sup> Steel.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> The Executive Secretary, "NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council." *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 27, no. 6 (May-June 1975), U.S. Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy Readings (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2005), 253.

<sup>57</sup> NSC 68 discussed the complex sets of factors that have altered the historical (western) distribution of power. It highlights that "the Soviet Union unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world." NSC 68 directs that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should carry out a military campaign if the Soviet Union attempted "to consolidate the Communist gains in the Far East." Ibid., 263.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 265.

<sup>59</sup> Mark O'Neill, "Soviet Involvement in the Korean War: A New View from the Soviet-era Archives," Organization of American Historians; available from <http://www.oah.org/pubs/magazine/korea/oneill.html>; Internet; accessed 11 December 2005.

<sup>60</sup> Kathryn Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; available from <http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ACFB76.pdf>; Internet; accessed 11 December 2005; 28.

<sup>61</sup> Mao will hoping that the Soviet Union would support its invasion of Taiwan but was upset when Stalin supported Kim over Mao. Had North Korea not attacked, China may have attacked Taiwan setting the stage for the inevitable U.S. confrontation. Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Schnabel, 61.

<sup>63</sup> Weathersby, 5.

<sup>64</sup> Walter G. Hermes, "United States Army in the Korean War TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT," Center of Military History; available from <http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/korea/truce/ch1.htm> ; Internet; accessed 17 December 2005; 9.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> President Truman accepted the responsibility of American leadership and named MacArthur as the first U.N. commander. By mid-September 1950, 16 nations had contributed ground forces to the UNC. Chuck Downs, "Limited War: The Initial Failures of Appeasement Policy Toward North Korea," The Heritage Foundation; available from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/HL680.cfm> ; Internet; accessed 13 December 2005.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> There were obvious reasons for the UNC to continue fighting after the 38th parallel had been reclaimed. Korea was generally viewed as a single polity, the weakened North Korean forces were in retreat, Americans wanted a resolution of the Korean question, and many believed that North Korea should suffer the consequences of its aggression. At the United Nations, the United States sponsored a resolution calling for all necessary steps "to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea." Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> But the logic of moral equivalency that would divide Korea so severely for so long was already beginning to emerge. The President of the U.N. Security Council, India's representative Benegal Rau, argued, "it would impair faith in the U.N. if we were even to appear to authorize the unification of Korea by the use of force against North Korea, after we had resisted the attempt of North Korea to reunify the country by force against South Korea." This argument set a tone for future positions taken by "neutral," "nonaligned" nations at the United Nations. Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> The two American divisions that had been chasing a retreating force of demoralized North Korean Army regulars back into the mountains of the North in October 1950 found themselves facing an advance of fresh Chinese forces. The United Nations Command's 500,000 troops were outnumbered by a combined Communist force of about 750,000. 14 The Communist forces pushed the front line some 50 miles south of Seoul by late January 1951. Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> The U.N. General Assembly approved a resolution sponsored by nonaligned members calling for an immediate cease-fire. In response, the United States initiated a resolution identifying the People's Republic of China as the aggressor and authorizing continued fighting to defend the Republic of Korea. The American resolution passed, but its goals fell considerably

short of earlier American objectives; there was no mention of reunifying Korea or punishing the aggressors. Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> The policy debate in America became polarized between those who sought an honorable means of resolving the conflict, restoring the status quo antebellum, and those who believed the American military should force the Communists out of the North and unify the country. Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> *Backgrounder (No. 7)*.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Walter G. Hermes, "United States Army in the Korean War TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT," Center of Military History; available from <http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/korea/truce/ch2.htm> ; Internet; accessed 12 December 2005; Chapter 2, End note 1.

<sup>79</sup> Maj Tan Edlin, "The Korean War Explained With Termination of War Theories," Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces; available from [http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2000/Vol26\\_4/2.htm](http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2000/Vol26_4/2.htm); Internet; accessed 12 December 2005.

<sup>80</sup> Patrick Norton, "Ending the Korean Armistice Agreement: The Legal Issues," Nautilus Institute, March 1997; available from [http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/armistice/2a\\_armisticelegal\\_norton.html](http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/armistice/2a_armisticelegal_norton.html); Internet; accessed 3 November 2005.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Background No. 7.

<sup>84</sup> These observers prefer to treat the forces under the UNC as sui generis: neither U.N. forces strictly speaking nor autonomous national contingents but a unique combination of the two. Still other commentators, because of the infirmities of U.N. authorization for the U.N. forces, and because those forces were autonomous from the United Nations itself, go one step further and treat those forces as an alliance of national armies pure and simple, operating pursuant to the collective right of self- defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter and customary international law. Norton. 19.

<sup>85</sup> United Nations Website, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," 31 October 2005; available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm> ; Internet; accessed 12 December 2005.

<sup>86</sup> Norton, 19.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Naenara is one of North Korea's website that offers DPRK commentary and provides a medium for its spin on events such as this article discussed the Korean Armistice Agreement.

Interestingly, no North Korea citizenry can access this website within North Korea; only aboard DPRK Naenara Website, "A Statement of the Spokesman for the DPRK' Foreign Ministry;" available from [http://www.kcckp.net/en/news/news\\_view.php?19+45](http://www.kcckp.net/en/news/news_view.php?19+45); Internet; accessed 1 November 2005.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Per the CANKOR Nautilus Institute, DPRK Briefing Book (available from [http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/armistice/2a\\_armisticelegal\\_norton.html](http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/armistice/2a_armisticelegal_norton.html)), Initial attempts at Panmunjom to arrange a political conference were unsuccessful. In February 1954, the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union agreed that a conference would be held at Geneva in April to discuss a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. They proposed that the participants be themselves, the two Korean governments, the PRC, and "the other countries the armed forces of which participated in the hostilities in Korea. The Geneva discussions on Korea lasted from April 26 until June 15, 1954. All of the states that had contributed armed forces to the UNC except South Africa participated. The talks soon foundered on basic issues, however, and were not resumed. The Naenara website blames the United States for this failure. Also, per the DPRK Briefing Book, by virtue of the participants at this Geneva Meeting, they are all considered belligerents and therefore can participate in any settlement of the peace process. Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Larry Niksch, "North Korea's Campaign Against the Korean Armistice," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 95-1187 F, 11 September 1995; available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/95-1187f.htm>; Internet; accessed 1 November 2005.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Donald W. Boose Jr., "Fighting While Talking: The Korean War Truce Talks," Organization of American Historians; available from <http://www.oah.org/pubs/magazine/korea/boose.html>; Internet; accessed 13 December 2005.

<sup>94</sup> Lankov.

<sup>95</sup> Boose.

<sup>96</sup> Military Bilateral Alliances, "The Blood-forged Alliance," Korean Embassy; available from [http://www.koreaembassy.org/bilateral/military/eng\\_military2.cfm](http://www.koreaembassy.org/bilateral/military/eng_military2.cfm); Internet; accessed 4 November 2005.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> Korea History Project Website; available from <http://www.koreanhistoryproject.org/>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2005.

<sup>100</sup> William J. Gilmore-Lehne, executive director, "The History of Korea Main Page," The Global History Consortium at Richard Stockton College of New Jersey; available from <http://loki.stockton.edu/~gilmorew/consorti/1deasia.htm>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2005.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> The Chinese argue that Koguryo was a local regime of China because it was founded within the Chinese territory, in Xuantu Commandery, one of the Four Han Commanderies of China, and continued to develop within the territory of Han Commanderies. Korea scholars, however, pointed out that not only did Han Commanderies not last long in their territories, but also, as soon as Koguryo gained power in the region, the Han Commanderies were forced to move westward. The development of Koguryo, therefore, can be described as the process of driving out Han Commanderies from its domain. As a matter of fact, the Chinese assertion that Pyongyang, where one of the Han Commanderies was located, was historically the territory of ancient China, contradicts the "united multi-ethnic state" theory in that Pyongyang is currently not in China but in North Korea. In addition, before Han Commanderies were put in place, the area around Pyongyang was the major base of Old-Chosun, thus having the historical significance as a former dynasty of Koguryo. Thirdly, (Koguryo was considered) a tribute-investiture system, a diplomatic formality in ancient East Asia, provides another argument on the sovereignty of Koguryo. If we understand the nature of the tributary system practiced in East Asia, the Chinese argument that Koguryo was not an independent kingdom, but a local regime of China as it paid a tribute to Chinese dynasties, can easily lose credibility. The biggest flaw in this argument is inconsistency. They never apply the same assertion to Paekje, Silla, and ancient Japan, all of which had a tributary relationship like Koguryo. Asia Finest Discussion Forum Website; available from <http://www.asiafinest.com/forum/lofiversion/index.php/t18309.html>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2005.

<sup>103</sup> Dr. Yo Taik Song was born in South Korea with a stint as a South Korean Air Force officer from 1955-57. Upon moving to the United States, he has since become a renown leader in the nuclear engineering field. He participated as a U.S. member on the Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to DPRK for various technical projects and on negotiations regarding implementations of the Agreed Framework. Provided US inputs to KEDO on Light Water Reactor (LWR) project, and participated in negotiations with DPRK on many technical issues on implementing the Agreed Framework Traveled extensively to various DPRK power generating stations and nuclear sites. Emailed to the author, 12 January 2006.

<sup>104</sup> Yo Taik Song, "A Korean? Who are you?" emailed to the author, 12 January 2006.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> During the Japanese occupation, Koreans in the north had been much less tractable than those in the south. Differences in farming accounted for some of the social differences in the two zones. A dry-field type of farming in the north opposed a rice-culture area in the south to produce marked variations in points of view. In the south were more small farms and a high tenancy rate, while in the north larger farms and more owner-farmers prevailed. Those differences the 38th Parallel promised to exacerbate. Another interesting fact is that the most beautiful women in Korea are from the North while the handsomest Korean men are from the South. Schnabel, 12.

<sup>108</sup> Downs.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Scott Snyder, “‘Intractable’ Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula: A contribution to Regional Stability?” in *Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict*, eds., Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.:United States Institute of Peace, 2005), 325.

<sup>111</sup> This communiqué laid out three principles through which national reunification should be achieved: “[through] independent Korean efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference; through peaceful means, not through use of force against each other; and through pursuit of great national unity, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.” Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> These meetings resulted in two agreements: The Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation (the Basic Agreement), and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Ibid., 327.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 325.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 328.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., 332.

<sup>117</sup> A distinctive characteristic of the inter-Korean peace process is that unlike with the Irish or Middle East peace processes, in which the symbolic “handshake” between leaders of opposing sides represented the consolidation and institutionalization of the process, thereby representing a symbolic hope of future reconciliation rather than the consolidation of work already accomplished. Ibid., 333.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 332.

<sup>119</sup> In the 1990’s, the fall of Pyongyang’s patron the Soviet Union, the reluctance of China to support North Korea’s adventurism, and the collapse of its economy made North Korea less of a threat to the outside world than to itself. With millions of its people starving to death, North Korea’s system was preoccupied with regime survival and little else. The recommended policy was to coax the reclusive regime out into the world and the ranks of normal states. Hahm Chaibong, “The Two South Koreas: A House Divided,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2005; available from [http://www.twq.com/05summer/docs/05summer\\_chaibong.pdf](http://www.twq.com/05summer/docs/05summer_chaibong.pdf); Internet; accessed 24 December 2005.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> South Korea is considered the 12<sup>th</sup> largest world economy with a 925.1 billion dollar GDP while in comparison; North Korea has a 40 billion dollar GDP. The World Factbook website, CIA; South Korea; available from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html>; North Korea; available from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kn.html>; Internet; accessed 28 December 2005.

<sup>123</sup> Jiyul Kim, "The Republic of Korea approaches the future," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 2002; available from [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq\\_pubs/0830.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0830.pdf); Internet; accessed 29 November 2005.

<sup>124</sup> Balbina Y. Hwang, "The Bush-Roh Summit: Building a Common Foundation for the U.S.-ROK Alliance," available from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm757.cfm>; Internet; accessed 5 November 2005.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Sue Yon Kang, "South Korean Politics and Foreign Policy," panel discussion, Dickinson College, 5 October 2005.

<sup>127</sup> LTC David W. Shin, "ROK and United States 2004-2005: Managing Perception Gaps?," Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Special Assess; available from <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/SAS/APandtheUS/ShinROK1.pdf>; Internet; accessed 14 November 2005; 12.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>129</sup> Lee, 1.

<sup>130</sup> North Korea has achieved the following through negotiations in the past 50 years: Seized territory during the armistice talks; Built up its military in defiance of the Armistice Agreement; Gained international influence and recognition through acts of terror; Manipulated South Korea's politics while espousing dialogue; Won concessions by denying inspections; and perfected, in the six-way talks, long-range weaponry and nuclear weapons while proclaiming the need for a peace treaty. Downs.

<sup>131</sup> RAND Corporation News Release, "RAND Study Warns that South Korean's Long-term Support for (the) Alliance with (the) U.S. Threatened By Differences over North Korea;" available from <http://www.rand.org/news/press.04/03.12.html>; Internet; accessed 3 November 2005.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> As many as 20 percent of the democracy generation of South Koreans (probably much more) acquire their news from the Internet. Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Daisaku Ikeda, *FOR TODAY & TOMORROW* (Hwa Kwang Shin Munsa: Seoul, Korea, 2001), 397.

<sup>135</sup> The first round was held in August 2003, the second round in February 2004, the third round in June 2004, the fourth round in July 2005, and the fifth round in September 2005. Wikipedia, "Six-Party Talks;" available at [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six\\_Party\\_Talks](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six_Party_Talks); Internet; accessed 17 December 2005.

<sup>136</sup> The difficult issue of the supply of light water reactors to replace North Korea's indigenous nuclear power program, as per the 1994 Agreed Framework, was left to be resolved

in future discussions "at an appropriate time". To break an impasse it was agreed that each country would issue separate more specific statements describing their understanding of the preliminary accord. Less than 24 hours later North Korea stated that until it is supplied with a light water reactor it will not dismantle its nuclear arsenal or rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This was met with sharp criticism from Japan and the United States. On November 12, 2005 a three-day meeting, the first session of the fifth round of the talks, was held in Beijing ended with little apparent progress, although they agreed to a "commitment for commitment, action for action" principle. North Korea wants aid in return for nuclear disarmament, however, the United States will not give aid unless North Korea shuts down all nuclear programs. The three-day talks ended with no set date for future meetings. The earliest possible date may be January 2006. Ibid.

<sup>137</sup> Charles Krauthammer, "China's Moment," Washington Post, 23 September 2005; available from [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/22/AR2005092202257\\_pf.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/22/AR2005092202257_pf.html); Internet; accessed 1 November 2005.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid.

<sup>140</sup> Juche (sometimes-spelled Chuch'e) is normally translated as "self-reliance," it is perhaps more accurate to translate it as "Korea first." Andrew Scobel, "North Korea's Strategic Intentions," (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute), 14.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., 14-15.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>143</sup> United States Institute for Peace, Special Report 106, "A Comprehensive Resolution of the Korea War;" available from <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr106.html>; Internet; accessed 1 November 2005.

<sup>144</sup> North Korea maintains the world's 5th largest military and 3rd largest Army (1.2 million active personnel and 5 to 7 million reserves); world's largest Special Operations Force (120,000+ personnel); world's largest artillery force (13,000+ artillery systems (300,000-500,000 rounds per hour) and 200-300 systems can range Seoul); world's largest submarine fleet (90+ submarines). Over the last 20 years, NK has methodically moved 70% of its military south of Pyongyang along the DMZ leaving only one to two days unambiguous warning of war. USFK Korea Story Brief, slide 13 and associated notes.

<sup>145</sup> Evans J.R. Revere, remarks at the Evolution of the U.S.-Korea Alliance and Future of Northeast Asia, May 2, 2005, available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/May/03-889289.html>; Internet; accessed 5 November 2005.

<sup>146</sup> Arthur Brig, "A formal end to the Korean War?" The Christian Science Monitor, 10 August 2005; available from <http://csmonitor.com/2005/0809/dailyUpdate.html>; Internet; accessed 14 September 2005.

<sup>147</sup> Hwang.

<sup>148</sup> Charles L. (Jack) Pritchard, "Six Party Talks Update: False Start or a Case for Optimism?" Paper Presentation at "The Changing Korean Peninsula and the Future of East Asia" discussions co-hosted by Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution, Seoul Forum of International Affairs, JoongAng Ilbo (newspaper), 1 December 2005; available from <http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/events/20051201presentation.htm> ; Internet; accessed 17 December 2005; 9.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

<sup>151</sup> Track one, represented by the good-faith effort of Ambassador Hill, is committed in the short run to a negotiated settlement that takes into account the concerns of the other players. Track two, represented by Undersecretary Bob Joseph, and is bent on cracking down on North Korea's illegal activities as well as enhancing the capabilities of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The second track is in the enviable position of being able to justify its actions based solely on the illegal actions of North Korea. Ibid., 11.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> On 16 December, U.S. Ambassador Hill had briefed diplomats from about 40 nations on the counterfeiting citing NK's purchases of the type of ink used in the notes and the discovery of substantial amounts of counterfeit currency in bank deposits made by NK agencies. Hill's evidence was questioned by both South Korean and Chinese officials at the meeting. A ROK official denied that the government was dragging its feet, but he said Seoul would act only if there was "absolute proof" of Pyongyang's counterfeiting program. Kim Chong-hyuk and Brian Lee, "Seoul not buying U.S. case against North's \$100 bills," JoongAng Daily, 22 December 2005; available from <http://joongangdaily.joins.com/200512/21/200512212214310809900090309031.html>; Internet; accessed 24 December 2005.

<sup>154</sup> Kathryn Weathersby, "The Enigma of the North Korean Regime: Back to the Future?" *Challenges Posed by the DPRK For The Alliance And The Region*, James M. Lister, Ed., (Korea Economic Institute: United States, October 2005), 43.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., 52.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid., 44.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid., 57.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>159</sup> The credit for acquiring Jimmy Carter is claimed by both sides. North Korea reportedly requested his presence. During the Carter Presidency, LTG Singlaub was forced to retire after publicly commenting against Carter's proposal to pull troops out of Korea. To the North Koreans, Carter represented someone who understood that the U.S. military presence in Korea was destabilizing. Joel S. Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert Gallucci, "Seven Lessons for Dealing with Today's North Korea Nuclear Crisis," *Arms Control Today*, April 2004; available at [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004\\_04/GoingCritical.asp](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_04/GoingCritical.asp); Internet; accessed 24 December 2005; 19-20.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>161</sup> Kim Myong-chol, "Discussion of Ending the Korean Armistice Agreement: The Legal Issues #2b," March 1997; available at [http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/2b\\_armisticelegal\\_disc.html](http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/2b_armisticelegal_disc.html); Internet; accessed 13 December 2005.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

<sup>164</sup> Anne Applebaum, "It's Not Whether You 'Win' or 'Lose'...", Washington Post, 7 December 2005; available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/06/AR2005120601217.html>; Internet; accessed 7 December 2005.

<sup>165</sup> MIDEAST Website, "Israel and Palestine: Middle East Historical and Peace Process Source Documents;" available at <http://www.mideastweb.org/history.htm>; Internet; accessed 14 January 2006.

<sup>166</sup> Dr. Yo Taik Song, (see end note 103 for bio information on Dr. Song), telephone interview by author, 4 January 2006.

<sup>167</sup> President Kim Dae-Jung justified the continuing presence of American forces on three accounts: as a credible deterrent to war on the Korean peninsula, as a dampener of regional strategic instability through the prevention of arms races and military conflicts among major powers in the region, and ultimately a peacemaker or peace insurer even after Korean unification. Kim Jong-Il recognized the instrumental values of American forces by quipping that, "American forces can prevent you from invading the North. Chung-in Moon, "Korean Peninsula Security: A South Korean View of U.S. Foreign Policy and Defense Strategies," Michael Kraig and James Henderson, eds., Strategy For Peace Conference, October 25-27, 2001; available at <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/reports/SPC01B.pdf>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2006.