# USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# SOF ENABLERS: ENHANCING USSOCOM CAPABILITIES WITH CUTTING-EDGE EXPERTISE

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

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U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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1. REPORT DATE 15 MAR 2006		2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED						
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER					
SOF Enablers: Enhancing USSOCOM Capabilities with Cutting-Edge					5b. GRANT NUMBER			
Expertise		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER						
6. AUTHOR(S)  Kenneth Wright					5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
					5e. TASK NUMBER			
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER							
	ZATION NAME(S) AND AE bllege,Carlisle Barra	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER						
9. SPONSORING/MONITO	RING AGENCY NAME(S) A		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)					
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)					
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAIL Approved for publ	LABILITY STATEMENT ic release; distributi	ion unlimited.						
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NO	OTES							
14. ABSTRACT <b>See attached.</b>								
15. SUBJECT TERMS								
16. SECURITY CLASSIFIC	17. LIMITATION OF	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF					
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE unclassified	ABSTRACT	24	RESPONSIBLE PERSON			

**Report Documentation Page** 

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

#### **ABSTRACT**

AUTHOR: Commander Kenneth S. Wright

TITLE: SOF Enablers: Enhancing USSOCOM Capabilities with Cutting-Edge

Expertise

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 15 March 2006 WORD COUNT: 6044 PAGES: 23

KEY TERMS: Civilian Expertise, Specialized Reserve Program, Military Retainer,

Flexible Reserve Component Funding

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

United States Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) cornerstone role in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) will continue well into the foreseeable future. The networked-cell structure and worldwide span of potential GWOT adversaries requires Special Operations Forces (SOF) operators to rapidly access and integrate cultural and linguistic expertise from a broad range of countries. Highly specialized technical knowledge is needed to exploit and/or deny these enemies the use of high technology commercial communication, information, and economic systems in their operations against the United States and its allies. Modifications to USSOCOM's reserve components can provide a rapidly accessible pool of diverse, cutting-edge subject matter experts needed to support SOF GWOT operations. In a time of unprecedented SOF growth and high SOF operational tempo, these changes may also serve as an integral component of the SOF for Life concept to retain former active-duty SOF personnel within the SOF community. This paper will examine the potential for this new USSOCOM reserve component program, provide recommended legislative and policy changes necessary to establish these programs, and detail how these capability-expanding changes can be instituted with a minimum commitment of new resources.

## SOF ENABLERS: ENHANCING USSOCOM CAPABILITIES WITH CUTTING-EDGE EXPERTISE

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has been fully committed in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The networked-cell structure, asymmetric nature, and worldwide span of potential GWOT adversaries are uniquely suited to be countered by the capabilities of USSOCOM's Special Operations Forces (SOF) operators. The recognition of SOF's innate capability to engage these non-state actors has shifted USSOCOM's traditional focus as a force provider to unified combatant commanders to that of a supported commander charged with planning and executing the GWOT.<sup>1</sup>

To win the GWOT, USSOCOM has placed a priority on, "producing next-generation capabilities that will provide competitive advantages over future adversaries." Reflecting the nature of the GWOT opponents and their operating environment, these new capabilities will require the application of a broad range of expertise from many civilian-orientated fields. Some of these new skillsets will be highly specialized, quickly perishable if not regularly used, and may lie outside the norm of a viable military career path, even within the unconventional realm of the SOF community. Further challenging SOF planners seeking to develop these capabilities is the fiscal reality of rapidly increasing military personnel costs in a time when growing federal budget deficits are limiting the potential for real growth in Department of Defense (DOD) budgets.

In seeking to develop and integrate such expertise into its forces, USSOCOM should turn to where the U.S. military has long gone to access civilian-focused skills to fill military requirements - its reserve component. Establishing a specialized program within USSOCOM's existing reserve component can provide a rapidly accessible pool of diverse, cutting-edge subject matter experts needed to develop the next-generation SOF capabilities vital to USSOCOM GWOT operations. Using modified personnel policies and funding mechanisms found in other military components, the annual programming costs for these specialized reservists can be substantially lower than those of traditional USSOCOM reserve units. Additionally, in a time of unprecedented SOF growth and high SOF operational tempo, this new reserve component program may also serve as an integral component of the SOF for Life concept to retain former active-duty SOF personnel within the SOF community.

To understand the need for a specialized program of this nature within SOF, it is important to consider the revolutionary nature of the opponents USSOCOM has been tasked to find, fix, and finish in America's struggle against terrorism.

GWOT Opponents: Geographically Diverse, Culturally Astute, and Technologically Savvy

As a nation, we are at war. It is unlike any war we have faced in the past. Today and for the foreseeable future, we face enemies that fight not for the conquest of people or terrain, but pursue a war of ideas, and have the destruction of western civilization as their ultimate goal.

- USSOCOM 2005 Annual Report

The terrorist networks that the United States faces in the GWOT - with al Qaeda and its associated movements among the most hostile and capable of such groups <sup>3</sup> - represent a unique and challenging opponent. Ideologically-based on a religious order with over one billion followers spread around the world, these non-state actors have successfully recruited active fighters from a large and diverse range of countries. <sup>4</sup> Culturally astute in the nature of both their targeted societies and potential supporters, terrorist groups receive assistance and manpower from, and find cover and concealment among various civilian population centers world-wide. These source communities range from the anarchic "failed states" of the third world to the wealthy suburbs of the great powers. <sup>5</sup>

These groups are highly adaptive and have rapidly embraced the information age and the benefits of increasing globalization. Technological advancements in communications, information systems, and transportation networks have given capabilities to potentially hostile non-state parties that were formerly only available to the military forces of the most developed nations. The Internet global data network allows a terrorist entity to identify and mobilize likeminded individuals to their cause from countries throughout the world. Scheduled airline transportation allows for the rapid movement of personnel between continents while satellite telephones provide real-time command and control regardless of location. Similarly, expanding economies and market globalization throughout the world have, through both legitimate and illegitimate venues, provided opportunities for non-governmental organizations (and in some cases individuals) to amass monetary resources greater than some nations. This enormous financial base has provided on-going funding for the military operations of various hostile organizations and will likely continue to do so into the foreseeable future.

The tactics, techniques, and procedures of global terrorist networks require a new operational paradigm for the use of the military instrument of national power. Traditional military engagements require relatively low levels of resources to locate one's opponent.

Modern conventional forces require large and robust logistical support mechanisms that provide overt clues to their location and possible intentions. Once the enemy is located, large numbers

of friendly forces, along with their equally expansive support elements, must typically wage a sustained effort in order to achieve a decisive victory.

In the GWOT, this model is reversed. Terrorist cells tend to blend almost seamlessly into their environment. Whether in a remote village deep within the ungoverned interior of a developing state or dispersed within an ethnic community in a large metropolitan city, successful terrorist operators leave few clues as to their actual identities and objectives. Supporting mechanisms and resources can be easily transported into, or often obtained completely from within the target country itself. As shown by the hijackers on 9/11, the "means" for a terrorist group to wage war against a modern, technologically advanced society can be little more than some determined individuals, a few thousand dollars, and a handful of common household items. Once identified and located however, the terrorist cell can be rather quickly dispatched, whether through a direct action raid of in-theater SOF forces, or with a single flight of strategic bombers armed with precision guided munitions launched from half a world away. <sup>8</sup>

In his famous treatise *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz provides the basis for defeating one's opponent, regardless of the exact nature of the conflict or its participants.<sup>9</sup> His method for calculating the power of an opponent's resistance - resistance = means x will - provides the template for success in war. Reducing either an opponent's "means" or "will" will diminish his ability to continue the fight. In the ideological-driven GWOT, defeating an opponent's "will" is far and above the most critical factor for long-term success. The overwhelming prominence of non-state actors employing asymmetrical tactics requires that the "will" to be engaged is not only that of the actual combatants themselves, but of the civilian communities in which they dwell. Positively influencing the will of the resident populations to reject terrorist groups and their associated ideology will be a decisive determinant in the long term defeat of GWOT opponents.

To counter these formidable opponents, address the newly emerging challenges of a globalized world, and succeed in its mission to "...disrupt, defeat, and destroy terrorist networks that threaten the United States...," USSOCOM must continually develop and field new capabilities that will allow SOF forces to seamlessly operate within the ever-changing locales of its highly mobile adversaries and to exploit and/or deny their use of readily available, rapidly-evolving civilian high technology. Key to this continuous evolution of SOF capabilities necessary for effectively defeating such geographically diverse, culturally aware, and technologically savvy foes of the GWOT is the ability to integrate cutting-edge, civilian skills-based expertise into SOF warfighting systems.

# Integrating Cutting-Edge Cultural and Technological Expertise into SOF

Joint SOF will develop and integrate the capabilities needed to find and fix the enemy.

- USSOCOM 2005 Annual Report

There are numerous fields of study and areas of expertise which offer the potential for aiding SOF in fighting the GWOT. The below list is a small example of the wide range of subject areas that could provide SOF with increased capabilities. It is by no means all-inclusive in either the fields listed or the given SOF Core Tasks which may be enhanced by a particular field.

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	Check P	¢dig	J. Mar.	Skip	Sala	Civil P	I WATE	Contestor
Cellular Systems Design				X	X	X	X	
Cultural anthropology		х	x		x	x		
International Finance						x		
International Marketing					x	x		
Linguistics/ Languages		x	x		x	x	x	
Microbiology/ Genetics								x
Multi-media production					х	x		
Nanotechnology	х			x			x	x
Network Systems Engineering				X	X	X	X	
Robotic systems engineering	х			X				

Areas of Civilian Expertise and Potential Applications to SOF Core Tasks

FIGURE 1.

Identifying cutting-edge areas of civilian expertise that can potentially enhance SOF operations is a relatively straight-forward exercise. Integrating the associated skills into the traditional SOF military organizational structure is not. As detailed in a 2003 study by the RAND Corporation, these types of expertise are typically, "...'cutting-edge' in the civilian sense of the term, but because they are often removed from the military's 'shooters,' they might not be thought of as cutting-edge in a military sense."

11 The characteristics of these fields that make them difficult to develop and maintain within a military organization are further defined as:

- Complex "time-consuming and expensive to train."
- Rare "...generally either not produced in large numbers or, as in information technology (IT) and other engineering fields, subject to 'boom and bust' cycles, periodically making them in scarce supply for the military."
- Civilian-orientated "...primarily developed and used in the civilian world, but less
  frequently or intermittently used in the military world (for instance, linguists, area
  specialists, information system designers)."
- **Limited Military Applicability** "...generally without a long-term career development path or even requirement within the military."
- Highly Perishable in Military Practitioners "...difficult to keep current. For
  instance, the military is normally a consumer of rapid technological advances but only
  infrequently a producer; specific language skills are infrequently used in the military
  and are hence hard to maintain."
- Enabling in Nature "...often not tightly connected to the combat components of the military"
- **Needed Quickly in a Crisis** "The military cannot wait for months or years to obtain such skills when war or international crisis is imminent." <sup>12</sup>

Determining where and how best to develop and maintain these types of skills within the current USSOCOM organizational structure poses a daunting challenge. It would be perhaps most difficult within the SOF active component. There have been several recent proposals for developing desirable civilian skills in active duty military personnel, many of which involve military personnel temporarily working in the civilian sector. These proposals range from short-term internships <sup>13</sup> to long-term sabbaticals.<sup>14</sup>

Setting aside the potential political/economic issues that could arise from large numbers of full time government employees regularly entering and leaving the civilian job market (e.g., resistance from trade unions and professional associations, impacts of economically-driven boom/bust hiring cycles, compensation fairness and equalization issues, training and

certification costs, impartial civilian-sector assignment policies, etc.), practical considerations cast doubt on the ability of active duty SOF personnel to participate in such programs on anything more than an occasional basis. In addition, USSOCOM's leading role in the GWOT has resulted in record levels of SOF operational deployments since September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001. While the inevitable drawdown of forces from the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters will no doubt ease the strain, these reductions will likely fall short in freeing enough SOF personnel to cover the SOF operational and staff positions left vacant when 10-20% of their peers are off gaining civilian skill experience. These vacancies would come at a time when USSOCOM is working to meet SOF manning challenges associated with growing SOF to meet post-9/11 increases in force structure, and amid calls for even further SOF growth.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, these breaks to acquire civilian experience would also be competing against other existing draws on the limited non-operational time available for active duty SOF personnel (e.g. required Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), instructor and joint staff/non-SOF assignments, graduate education, etc.).

Assuming for the moment that these challenges could be overcome, after an active duty SOF member has returned to the SOF community from an extended tour in the civilian sector, sustaining a truly cutting-edge level of expertise in a civilian-based field may prove difficult. As embodied by the remarkable 40-year viability of Moore's Law, 16 the rate of technological advance in the semiconductor industry (and in many of its derivative industries of information systems, digital communications, etc.) is very high. The realities of a compressed business cycle and never-ending international competition in a globalized economy require cutting-edge companies to invest billions of dollars in research and development to maintain the lead (and hence market share) in their respective fields. Lacking both the drivers and resources of the civilian sector, USSOCOM may find that after devoting 3-5 years developing cutting-edge civilian expertise in an active duty SOF member (at the expense of operational commitments), the member's knowledge of his chosen civilian field with respect to his former civilian associates may be nearly obsolete in less than half that time.

When faced with the inability to provide needed capacity or capabilities with its active duty forces, militaries have frequently turned to the civilian sector. The use of civilian contractors to provide support for military operations has been part of the U.S. military from its inception through current operations in the GWOT.<sup>17</sup> The use of contractors to support military operations has taken on an expanded role in the post-Cold War era for a host of reasons, including as a means to offset DOD personnel cuts, limit military personnel operational tempo, comply with operation-limited troop ceilings, and "maintain increasingly complex weapons systems." <sup>18</sup>

Reflecting the high level of contractor support in the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters, DOD recently released a new instruction in an attempt to clarify the roles and status of "contractors on the battlefield."

While undoubtedly useful to the conventional military's mission, the use of contractors to provide cutting-edge expertise to support SOF GWOT operations presents many unique challenges, especially if the support function is to be performed with SOF personnel forward deployed outside of the U. S. While the principal focus of contractor battlefield support to military operations in the GWOT has been in the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters (each with a large and robust conventional military presence), USSOCOM is also engaged in numerous other GWOT operations around the world.<sup>20</sup> Keeping with the nature of SOF, these operations are "often conducted at great distances from the supporting operational bases."<sup>21</sup> Such remote operations, combined with the frequently ambiguous battlefields of the GWOT and the small unit nature of SOF units, may result in situations that unacceptably blur the line between authorized contractor support and restrictions on those activities deemed "inherently governmental functions."<sup>22</sup> Additionally, depending on the countries involved, international/host nation support agreements and Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) may negatively impact the legal status of contractors accompanying SOF personnel and possibly restrict or prohibit their use altogether.<sup>23</sup>

The nature of the civilian companies involved in cutting-edge industries may also hamper USSOCOM's ability to use contractor personnel to enhance SOF capabilities through the integration of advanced civilian expertise. A significant portion of these high-tech producers (several of which are in fields that didn't exist a decade ago), have little, if any experience in defense-related contracting. In a globalized economy, the development and marketing of new technologies to a worldwide audience by leading companies often involves the collaborative efforts of different consortiums from a variety of countries. Closely interconnected through complex cooperative arrangements described by such terms as "outsourcing", "offshoring", "insourcing", and "supply-chaining,"<sup>24</sup> some of these companies may find it too costly to separate into a "U.S. only" division to meet defense-related security concerns. Alternately, other international corporations (especially those in the information systems and communications realm) might decline to participate altogether, fearing the negative impact the perception of a too-close, official relationship to the U.S. military (especially the "commandos" of SOF) could have on sales in those markets throughout the world that are opposed or hostile to the U.S.

To develop and integrate SOF capability-enhancing civilian expertise into its forces, USSOCOM should turn to where the U.S. military has long gone to access civilian skills to fill military requirements - its reserve component. Nearly every branch of service has utilized their

reservists for their civilian skills as doctors, lawyers, police officers, and a host of other specialties. Establishing a specialized reserve component program, specifically for the integration of civilian personnel possessing cutting-edge expertise, would be the most effective and efficient means to bring these capabilities to SOF.

## Specialized Reserve: Enhancing Capabilities vs. Increasing Force Structure

I think if I had to pull out one lesson that we've learned over the past four or five years, it would be that in the 21st Century we're going to have to stop thinking about things, numbers of things, and mass...

- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld<sup>25</sup>

A specialized USSOCOM reserve component to integrate cutting-edge civilian skills into SOF must be designed to fit the realities of the GWOT. The traditional model for the employment of reserve personnel (including reserve SOF) envisions the use of the services' reserve components to expand existing service capacity. <sup>26</sup> This reflected the traditional military conflict where large masses of friendly military units were required to decisively defeat the enemy. The reserve component provided the needed extra mass, typically in the form of units identical (in terms of personnel, equipment, and skills) to their active component counterparts. Matching the military capabilities of the active component requires a large reserve component management infrastructure and a significant investment of time by reservists training in military-unique skills.

As noted above, the GWOT's operational paradigm is reversed. Gone is the need for the additional mass of military capacity to finish the enemy, replaced by the need for an increased ability to locate and identify the enemy and to influence their supporting population bases to turn away from the terrorists' ideologies. Reservists in the envisioned USSOCOM Specialized Reserve (SPECRES) program would use their civilian skills to serve as enablers for SOF-qualified personnel to engage with the enemy, not as a means for providing additional force structure to USSOCOM. Their role would be to enhance, not duplicate, existing SOF capabilities. Hence, the structure, training, and funding for this reserve program would be markedly different from other existing USSOCOM reserve components.

The selection of which civilian skills would be targeted for recruiting to SPECRES would be done by the individual USSOCOM service component commands – the Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and the Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM). To establish their SPECRES, each service component would submit proposals on desired capabilities, their anticipated

enhancement to existing and/or potential new SOF capabilities and the projected number of specialists required for each to USSOCOM for review and approval. Once established, this review and approval process would become part of the service components' yearly budgetary submissions. While the actual number of personnel to eventually be recruited will vary between the service components, the highly specialized nature of the expertise sought would limit the total composition of SPECRES to approximately 300-500 for all of USSOCOM.

The process for recruiting civilian experts for SPECRES would use a variety of approaches to identify and attract potential candidates. Existing service reserve component recruiters would be briefed on USSOCOM's requirements and provided with USSOCOM-developed, program-specific literature and multimedia support. Active duty SOF personnel whose duties involve high interaction with the civilian community, (e.g. those attending a civilian educational institution, managing research and development projects, etc.) would be kept abreast of currently needed civilian expertise. Reserve SOF and participating retired SOF personnel would also be regularly updated in order to help them identify likely SPECRES candidates amongst people that they encounter in the course of their civilian careers.

The personnel recruited for SPECRES would be sought after for their civilian-based cutting-edge skills, not to be trained or serve as additional military force structure. Their accession training would be modified from the standard Selected Reservist to reflect this difference. Those potential candidates without previous military service would attend limited basic officer or enlisted training, similar to training offered by the Navy Reserve's 12-day Direct Commission Officer Indoctrination Course<sup>27</sup> and the 17-day enlisted Navy Reserve Accession Course.<sup>28</sup> This orientation training would provide them with basic information to allow them to function in the military environment, not to train them for specific, traditional military duties. Their status would be similar to members of U.S. Marine Corps' Marine Band, who are selected solely for their civilian musical skills, and are not required to attend recruit training prior to beginning their service on active duty in the Marine Corps.<sup>29</sup> To familiarize them with SOF, all SPECRES personnel would then be required to attend a short, SOF-specific orientation course, similar to the "Introduction to Special Operations Course" offered by the Joint Special Operations University. Any mission-specific training required for a particular operation would be conducted after the SPECRES member has been activated. To enable their rapid deployment overseas, the enacting legislation for the SPECRES program would authorize the same reduced basic training requirement as armed forces medical personnel.30

As the SPECRES would not be part of USSOCOM's operational force structure, SPECRES reservists would not be assigned to a specific billet, but recruited directly into the

Individual Ready Reserve for an 8-year term of obligated service. They would be organized similar to the Navy Reserve's Voluntary Training Units. As such, they would typically provide support to USSOCOM components as Individual Augmentees (IA), or as small groups of individuals with a background in similar fields of expertise.

To provide the proper administrative control and ensure effective integration of SPECRES personnel into USSOCOM component commands, each USSOCOM service component would establish a small active duty element within their existing reserve component tasked with managing their respective SPECRES reservists. Because of the nature of the SPECRES, the total number of additional Full-Time-Support (FTS) personnel (i.e. active component, Active Guard/Reserve (AGR), or civilian) needed to administer the program is small. Each FTS member would be assigned as a "case manager" for approximately 20-30 SPECRES reservists, providing administrative support and ensuring their assigned reservists maintain their readiness for mobilization and other qualifications for service in the SPECRES program. The FTS case manager also would serve the key role as interface between the operational requirements of the USSOCOM component commands and the expertise of the SPECRES members.

While each of the USSOCOM service components would develop this support element based on the unique requirements and capabilities of their branch, one possible model for these units currently exists in the form of the Naval Special Warfare Operational Support Teams (OST). Commissioned in October of 2003 as part of a comprehensive reorganization of NAVSPECWARCOM's reserve component, the OST's are active component commands tasked with the training, administration, and operational integration of reserve SEALs, Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC), and Naval Special Warfare technicians. As part of the reorganization, NAVSPECWARCOM's reserve component was transformed from unit-based augmentation forces into capabilities-based operational elements. To integrate these reserve component capabilities into the operational realm, OST active duty personnel are "embedded" into the staffs of the Naval Special Warfare Groups to identify operational support requests as they emerge and match the appropriate reserve capabilities to requirements. Using innovative personnel management practices, the OST's are able to utilize the experience and expertise of SOF-qualified Navy Reservists regardless of where they live. Although the OST's predominantly use Selected Reserve personnel to fill operational taskings, several of the policies and procedures they have developed are nearly identical to those needed for successful operation of the USSOCOM SPECRES program.

### Smart Funding for Specific SPECRES Requirements: Buying Only What Is Needed as Needed

We must manage diminishing P&R (Personnel and Readiness) resources in the most effective and productive manner using best business practices, continually improving and refining our policies, practices, and processes and incorporate evolving technology to enhance our ability to meet mission and organizational needs.

- OSD Personnel and Readiness 2001-2006 Strategic Plan<sup>31</sup>

While providing needed SOF capability enhancement in the GWOT, the SPECRES program would also serve as a vehicle for the innovative management of personnel resources. Mounting federal deficits combined with growing domestic entitlement spending will serve to necessarily curtail substantial increases in future military spending.<sup>32</sup> In such a resource-constrained environment, the metric for a successful program is not only the ability to deliver the desired effect, but also how efficiently the program utilizes its allotted resources.

When not mobilized or on extended active duty, the traditional Selected Reservist is compensated through two days (i.e. 4 drill periods) of Inactive Duty for Training (IDT) per month and two weeks (i.e. 12 days) of Annual Training (AT). The purpose of these training periods is to maintain the individual reservist's proficiency in his or her individual Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) to ensure the overall military capacity of the reservist's unit. As the specialty of SPECRES personnel is by definition their regular civilian occupation, this type of training is unnecessary. Also, though eligible for paid Active Duty for Training (ADT) and mobilization as members of the IRR, SPECRES personnel would not be eligible for paid IDT. Thus to attract and retain the highly specialized individuals needed in the SPECRES program, another method of compensation is needed.

Instead of the typical monthly weekend drill pay, SPECRES personnel would receive a reserve accession bonus (e.g. \$5,000 per year) paid out in installments over the term of obligated service. To remain eligible for each year's installment of the bonus, SPECRES reservists will be required to maintain their readiness for mobilization and complete an annual 3-4 day active duty training period with their USSOCOM service component. The purpose of this annual period would be to verify their mobilization status, both administrative and medical, and update the reservists on changes to DOD, USSOCOM, and/or service-specific policies. During this time, the reservists would also be required to certify that they are still serving in the civilian specialty field for which they were recruited to SPECRES, and provide to USSOCOM personnel a briefing on the latest advances and trends in their field of expertise. The annual bonus installment would be paid following successful completion of this ADT period. Failure to meet these requirements would result in the reservist being disenrolled from the SPECRES program,

loss of all future bonus installments, and transfer to their service component's standard IRR for the remainder of their obligated service.

At first glance, this level of compensation might appear excessive for 3-4 days of active duty per year. However, closer examination shows that this form of compensation has benefits over the traditional Selected Reserve structure. Essentially, the SPECRES reserve accession bonus serves as an 8-year retainer for the highly specialized talents of the SPECRES reservist, making him or her subject to involuntary mobilization in the event of a national emergency. From a purely budgetary perspective, this arrangement would also be less costly than simply placing the members in traditional Select Reserve billets. The following figure illustrates the fixed cost differential between a traditional Select Reserve billet and the annual cost of one member of the SPECRES program. This example assumes identical costs for accession training and equipping reserve members:

		SOF Specialized Reserve	Selected Reserve Billet Cost <sup>33</sup>	Cost Differential	Percentage Differential
	Bonus Payment - Yearly 4-day	\$5,000			
Officer	ADT@\$500/day <sup>34</sup> -	\$2,000 \$7,000	\$20,838	\$13,838	66.41%
	Bonus Payment - Yearly 4-day	\$5,000			
Enlisted	ADT@\$266/day -	\$1,064			
		\$6,064	\$9,156	\$3,092	33.77%

TABLE 1. ANNUAL FIXED COST OF SOF SPECIALIZED RESERVE MEMBER VS. SELECTED RESERVE BILLET

The SPECRES program would also reduce future personnel costs over a traditional Selected Reserve assignment. A portion of the bonus payment would compensate the SPECRES reservist for the lack of deferred compensation normally accrued by a member of the Selected Reserve. The SPECRES reservist would enjoy certain benefits available to a Selected Reservist (e.g. Commissary/Exchange privileges, participation in Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance (SGLI), etc.), however unlike the Selected Reservist, the SPECRES individual would be unlikely to qualify for reserve retirement benefits without performing substantial additional yearly periods of active duty. While the SPECRES reservists would receive retirement point credit for their membership in the IRR and the annual active duty period with USSOCOM, these minimal points would not be sufficient to generate a "qualifying year" for the purposes of earning

reserve retirement benefits.<sup>35</sup> The lack of ability to qualify for reserve retirement would be explicitly explained to SPECRES personnel at the time of their accession into the program.

The funding for the operational employment of SPECRES personnel could also utilize unique resource management procedures. As with any member of the IRR, SPECRES personnel may be mobilized to support long-duration, large-scale USSOCOM requirements; however the nature of special operations often means that the event or crisis in which they are employed may not rise to a scale that would cause the President or Congress to authorize a reserve mobilization or recall. Additionally, the relatively long lead time associated with mobilizations and recalls (i.e. the time from requirement identification to the member completing the mobilization "process" and available for duty), would preclude the use of reserve support for time-critical special operations. To rapidly and efficiently support USSOCOM requirements, funding for SPECRES personnel to support particular operations or exercises would come from Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations dedicated to the specific tasking.

The ability to use non-reserve personnel appropriations to pay for reserve component support is not a new concept. Such authorization has been in place for over a decade to allow for the reimbursement of pay and expenses of reserve component intelligence personnel through O&M appropriations.<sup>36</sup> The use of this policy has generated a long record of meaningful intelligence support to numerous military commanders, including USSOCOM. Expanding this authorization to cover support to SOF operations would require Congressional legislative action. This legislative change would not increase USSOCOM's budget appropriations; rather it simply provides USSOCOM component commanders with increased flexibility to apply their existing resources to obtain the proper type of assets, in this case specialized expertise, necessary to accomplish their assigned missions.

With this reimbursement funding mechanism in place, a USSOCOM component commander needing SPECRES personnel support would use a standard Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR) to transfer funds to the unit exercising administrative control over the desired SPECRES reservist. Once the funds have been received, active duty orders can be quickly written, enabling an available SPECRES specialist to report to the supported command in 24-48 hours. This portability of funding also increases the joint SOF nature of SPECRES personnel by allowing one SOF service component (e.g. USASOC) to easily employ another SOF service component's (e.g. AFSOC) dedicated SPECRES personnel without negatively impacting the other component's reserve operations budget.

Integration with SOF for Life: Extending the Spectrum of Service to the SOF Community

It is important that we retain as many of our highly-trained and experienced personnel as possible.

- USSOCOM 2005 Annual Report

Although primarily established to facilitate the integration of cutting-edge civilian knowledge and expertise into the SOF community, the SPECRES program and its support infrastructure can also serve to support other various aspects of USSOCOM manning requirements, including portions of the SOF for Life Concept. Recognizing the fundamental role of the individual SOF operator in the success of special operations, SOF for Life "describes how the United States Special Operations Command... will select, prepare, and utilize individuals capable of accomplishing the command's strategic roles and functions globally, across the spectrum of conflict, in support of national goals and objectives associated with the planning and prosecution of the War on Terrorism..." The SOF for Life program seeks to address the challenges faced by SOF in the GWOT and other future scenarios owning to the uniqueness of the potential adversaries and their operating environment, and changes in the people and culture from which future SOF personnel will be drawn. The unique nature of the SPECRES program would aid in meeting theses challenges by extending the spectrum of opportunities available for experienced and proven SOF-qualified personnel to continue to support USSOCOM's efforts in the GWOT.

Ideally, all SOF-qualified personnel separating from active duty and wishing to continue to serve would be able to affiliate with a SOF Reserve or National Guard unit. However, individual life circumstances often inhibit those who would like to continue to serve the SOF community in some capacity. Civilian career requirements, geographic location, and other personal obligations can often prevent a highly trained and experienced SOF-qualified member from affiliating with a SOF Reserve/Guard unit after leaving active duty. Enrollment of these individuals in the SPECRES program would serve to retain a ready pool of talented individuals available for support to USSOCOM, while maintaining the members' connection with the SOF community until such time as their individual circumstances allow for a more active role in the SOF reserve component.

The supporting infrastructure of the SPECRES program provides many opportunities for enabling SOF for Life initiatives. The program's personnel management systems and "case manager" format could be scaled-up to incorporate the database of the former military and current civilian skills of ex-SOF personnel for the "Ex-SOF as Global Scouts", "Ex-SOF in

Civilian Corporations"<sup>38</sup>, and "Citizen Soldier Access/Tracking"<sup>39</sup> concepts, either for administration through the SPECRES program itself or in support of other programs. These same systems could also be tailored to include retired SOF personnel data to leverage the knowledge and experience of retired members through the "Institutionalize 'Graybeards'" proposal, as well as for providing a geographically disperse pool of retired SOF mentors to assist in nation-wide SOF recruiting efforts to include the "Remote Recon for Recruits." Other support roles could include providing community interface and administrative support to active duty SOF personnel on extended tours outside of USSOCOM, and performing SOF community oversight of former active duty SOF personnel with remaining obligated service in the IRR, thus ensuring they maintain the proper level of readiness for mobilization should the need arise.

## Implementing USSOCOM's SPECRES Program: A Way Ahead

Establishment of the SPECRES program in USSOCOM should begin with the identification of 3 to 5 cutting-edge technology fields to serve as the basis for a pilot program with an initial goal of recruiting a total of 30-40 civilian experts. The pilot program phase would serve to develop the specific administrative and management policies, procedures, and supporting systems needed to effectively run the program. The pilot program would run 12-24 months, followed by a phased-in scale-up of the program. The pilot and scale-up periods would allow for the programming of funding for the required infrastructure (e.g. FTS personnel billets, administrative spaces, automated management systems, bonuses, etc.), needed coordination between USSOCOM service components and parent services (e.g. recruiting issues, MOS(s) establishment, changes to existing personnel policies, etc.), and enactment of necessary legislative authorities (e.g. bonus authorization, reduced basic training requirements, reimbursable funding, etc.) to achieve full SPECRES program capabilities. During the pilot program, other potential USSOCOM-supporting features of the SPECRES program (e.g. SOF for Life initiatives, SOF IRR personnel management, etc.) can also be tested and evaluated for their effectiveness.

Each USSOCOM service component would be encouraged to participate in the pilot program. As noted above, some components, such as NAVSPECWARCOM with its Operational Support Teams, may be able to stand up the pilot program rather quickly. Other components, especially those that have a unit-based Guard/Reserve component, may require additional lead time. To maximize the utility of the pilot program to support all of USSOCOM, the civilian fields chosen for initial recruitment in the pilot program should be as broad-based as possible to allow for their integration into all SOF components regardless of parent service.

#### Conclusion

The successful conduct of SOF operations on the battlefield relies on nonconventional skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, and innovation.<sup>42</sup> To retain the ability to employ these time honored SOF characteristics in an era of exponentially advancing technology, <sup>43</sup> USSOCOM must develop the ability to rapidly integrate a diverse pool of cutting-edge experts to enhance its warfighting capabilities. The establishment of the SPECRES program offers a vehicle through which USSOCOM can interface with some of the architects of tomorrow and provide the SOF community with the tools necessary to operate in a dangerous and uncertain future.

In World War II, one of the founding fathers of special operations, Major General William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan, sought out America's best and brightest in academia and business to join the ranks of his "glorious amateurs" that formed the Office of Strategic Services and led the U.S. unconventional war effort against the greatest threats to the free world in the 20th century. At the dawning of the 21st century, the U.S. faces an enemy as potentially devastating, if not more so, than the combined might of the forces of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Once again, General Donovan's successors at USSOCOM must call on America's best and brightest and incorporate their skills and talents as they do battle at the tip of the spear in defense of freedom.

#### **Endnotes**

<sup>1</sup>United States Special Operations Command, 2005 Annual Report (Tampa, FL: USSOCOM, 2005), 3; available from http://www.socom.mil/Docs/2005\_Annual\_Report.pdf; Internet; accessed 6 November 2005.

<sup>2</sup>lbid., 6.

<sup>3</sup>Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly, *The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2004), 20; available from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/2005/MR1782.pdf; Internet; accessed 12 December 2005.

<sup>4</sup>John C. K. Daly, "Revealed: the nationalities of Guantanamo," *United Press International*, 4 February 2005; available from http://www.upi.com/inc/view.php?StoryID=20040204-051623-5923r; Internet; accessed 20 December 2005. Based on a survey of media reports from around the world and interviews with foreign government officials, UPI concluded that nationalities of 38 separate countries are represented in the U.S. military detention center located at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

<sup>5</sup>Carl Ballard, "American Taliban," *The Newshour with Jim Lehrer*, available from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/jan-june02/walker\_john\_1-2.html; Internet; accessed 5 January 2006.

<sup>6</sup>Juan C. Zarate, "Terrorist Financing," speech, Harper's Bazaar/International Anticounterfeiting Coalition Summit, New York, NY, 1 February 2005; text available from http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2005/Feb/01-479860.html; Internet; accessed 18 September 2005.

<sup>7</sup>Naval Special Warfare Command, "NSW Force Brief", briefing slides with scripted commentary, NAB Coronado, CA, May 2003.

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<sup>9</sup>Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 77.

<sup>10</sup>United States Special Operations Command, 2005 Annual Report, 6.

<sup>11</sup>Gregory F. Treverton et al., Attracting "Cutting-Edge" Skills Through Reserve Component Participation (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2003), 1; available from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/2005/MR1729.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 October 2005.

12 Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> James Stavridis, "Deconstructing War," *Proceedings*, December 2005; available from http://ebird.afis.mil/cgi-bin/ebird/displaydata.pl?Requested=/ebfiles/e20051213406843.html; Internet; accessed 13 December 2005. Vice Admiral Stayridis proposes sending junior officers on one year assignments outside the military in industries that are "enmeshed in change."

<sup>14</sup>United States Special Operations Command, *USSOCOM Concept: Special Operations Forces (SOF) For Life* (Tampa, FL: USSOCOM, 30 April 2003), 9. To demonstrate the possible use of civilian institutions to "develop SOF-applicable skills", this document uses the example of, "placing a PSYOP NCO into a marketing firm for a five year period, then having the soldier return to SOF."

<sup>15</sup>Bradley Graham, "Shortfalls of Special Operations Command Are Cited," *The Washington Post*, 17 November 2005 [LexisNexis Academic Search Page]; available from http://80-web.lexis nexis.com.650z.carlisle.army.mil/ universe/document?\_m=2a841a62fd3994e0b12b01bd4bf015bf&\_docnum=17&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVb&\_md5=fb01d03fbc812bc949cfe16ff2cd576c; Internet; accessed 9 January 2006.

<sup>16</sup>Michael Kanellos, "FAQ: Forty years of Moore's Law," *CNET News.com*, 1 April 2005 [journal on-line]; available from http://news.com.com/FAQ+Forty+years+of+Moores+Law/2100-1006\_3-5647824.html?tag=st.num; Internet; accessed 8 January 2006. First formulated in 1965 by Intel Corporation co-founder Gordon Moore, Moore's law states that semiconductor computer chip processing speed would double every 24 months.

<sup>17</sup>Paula J. Rebar, *Contractor Support on the Battlefield*, Strategic Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 9 April 2002), 2.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 5-6.

<sup>19</sup>Jason Sherman, "New Defense Policy to Guide Role of Contractors on the Battlefield," *Inside the Pentagon*, 20 October 2005 [LexisNexis Academic Search Page]; available from http://80-web.lexisnexis.com.650z.carlisle.army.mil/universe /document?\_m=86be1539da00e91205aa7fa1951d97e3&\_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkVA& md5=803a475a7b73a78b81c3eff2ce451c99; Internet; accessed 9 January 2006.

<sup>20</sup>United States Special Operations Command, 2005 Annual Report, 12-13.

<sup>21</sup>Joint Special Operations University, *Special Operations Forces Reference Manual* (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, June 2005), 1-2.

<sup>22</sup>U.S. Department of Defense, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces*, DOD Instruction 3020.41 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 3 October 2005), 8.

<sup>23</sup>lbid.

<sup>24</sup>Thomas L. Friedman, "It's a Flat World, After All", New York Times, 3 April 2005; available from http://www.iowacontingencyplanners.org/library/published/FlatWorld.pdf; Internet; accessed 27 October 2005.

<sup>25</sup>Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Secretary Rumsfeld's Remarks to the John Hopkins, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies," transcript, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., 5 December 2005; text available from http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20051205-secdef4421.html; Internet; accessed 13 January 2006.

<sup>26</sup>U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 [revision 3<sup>rd</sup> draft] (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 10 August 2005), I-10.

<sup>27</sup>Officer Training Command Pensacola, "Direct Commission Officer Indoctrination," available from http://www.nsgreatlakes.navy.mil/otcp/dco/dco.htm; Internet; accessed 5 November 2005.

<sup>28</sup>Recruit Training Command, "Navy Reserve Accession Course (NRAC)," available from http://www.nsgreatlakes.navy.mil/nrac/index.html; Internet; accessed 5 November 2005.

<sup>29</sup>United States Marine Band, "Recruit Training (Boot Camp)", available from http://www.marineband.usmc.mil/career\_information/learn\_more/recruit\_training.htm; Internet; accessed 20 December 2005.

<sup>30</sup>Members not to be assigned outside United States before completing training, U.S. Code, Title 10, sec 671 (2005). Title 10, section 671, paragraph (c) (1) exempts "members of the armed forces who have been credentialed in a medical profession or occupation and are serving in a health-care occupational specialty" from the requirement for 12 weeks of basic training prior to being assigned outside the U.S..

<sup>31</sup>Office of the Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), "Personnel and Readiness 2001-2006 Strategic Plan," available from http://www.dod.mil/prhome/stratplan.html; Internet; accessed 11 December 2005.

<sup>32</sup>Richard L. Kugler and Hans Binnendijk, *Shaping Future Defense Budgets* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, November 2004), iii; available from http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Def\_Tech/DTP6%20Defense%20Budget.pdf; Internet; accessed 14 January 2006.

<sup>33</sup>Deputy Chief of Naval Personal (Manpower and Personnel), "PR07 N1 Integrated Strategic Capability Plan (ISCP)", briefing slides with scripted commentary, 1 February 2005, available from https://wwwa.nko.navy.mil/portal/ page?paf\_pageld= pg2020017&ch2230028folderId=libfold6460026&ch2230028kcid=libkc272260; Internet; accessed 11 October 2005. Costs shown reflect current PR-07 Selected Reserve billet programming rates.

<sup>34</sup>Craig Janecek, Naval Special Warfare Command Reserve Program Manager, email to author, 9 January 2006. Daily ADT costs shown are current USSOCOM ADT programming rates for officer and enlisted reserve personnel.

<sup>35</sup>U.S. Department of the Navy, *Administrative Procedures for Navy Reservists on Inactive Duty*, Bureau of Naval Personnel Instruction 1001.39E (Millington, TN: Bureau of Naval Personnel, 26 April 2005), 20-5.

<sup>36</sup> Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1995, Section 8130 of Public Law 103-335 (1994). This legislation allows for the use of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds to reimburse National Guard and Reserve appropriations when, "members of the National Guard and Reserve provide intelligence support to Unified Commands, Defense Agencies and Joint Intelligence Activities."

<sup>37</sup> United States Special Operations Command, *USSOCOM Concept: Special Operations Forces (SOF) For Life*, 1.

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38 Ibid., 27.
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<sup>43</sup>John Smart, "How to Be a Strategic Futurist: An Evolutionary Developmental Perspective on Accelerating Change," briefing slides, October 2005; available from http://www.accelerating.org/slides.html; Internet; accessed 22 October 2005.

<sup>44</sup>Office of Strategic Services Society, "Close OSS-CIA Ties Commemorated at 63rd Anniversary Reunion", O.S.S. Society Newsletter (Fall 2005), 2; available from http://www.osssociety.org/pdfs/oss\_fall\_05.pdf; Internet; accessed 15 January 2006.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup>Ibid., 21.

<sup>40</sup> lbid., 27

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup>Ibid., 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup>Joint Special Operations University, 1-2.