CHALLENGES FACING MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURAL REFORM: A STUDY OF THE 2004 AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND REORGANIZATION

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THESIS

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Challenges Facing Military Organizational Cultural Reform: 
A Study of the 2004 Air Force Materiel Command Reorganization

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Abstract

The purpose of this research was to measure the success of the Product Center (PC) portion of the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) reorganization initiated in 2004. The purpose of this study is threefold, (1) to determine if the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has met General Martin’s four intended objectives, (2) the reorganizations effects on AFMC employee job satisfaction and organizational commitment and (3) to gather some general opinions about the reorganization overall. The literature review consisted of a detailed look at the history of AFMC, areas of organizational culture, and gathering detailed information regarding the 2004 reorganization itself. This research measured the success of the PC portion of the reorganization to date; assistance was solicited and provided from HQ AFMC/A8M in development of the survey instrument for such measurement. Upon completion of development, electronic dissemination of the survey instrument was utilized to send it to the three AFMC PCs. Survey results were summarized and the overall conclusion reached that the AFMC PC reorganization initiated in 2004 has had little or not impact to date based on the opinions of PC employees who responded to the survey. Recommendations for further research avenues are also discussed.
To my children
Acknowledgments

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my faculty advisor, Maj Carolyn Macola for her outstanding support throughout this thesis effort. She went above and beyond to provide assistance and guidance whenever needed. Her support was the key factor that guided me successfully through the thesis process. I would also like to thank the personnel at HQ AFMC/A8M for their support and guidance. Specifically, Col Dan Badger, Lt Col Kimberley Daeger, Lt Col Cynthia Shewell and Mr. Tom Bellnoski were all of great help.

I am also thankful for the AFMC PC personnel who completed my survey. Without their responses this effort would not have been successful.

Joy D. Mikulcik
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I. Introduction

Overview

Change management, organizational culture and organizational theory have a strong impact on any type of reorganization. In 2004, Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) initiated a reorganization under the command of General Gregory S. “Speedy” Martin. The reorganization consisted of three major change areas: Headquarters (HQ) AFMC, transfer of installation commander responsibilities, and the Product Centers (PC) and Air Logistics Centers (ALC). The HQ AFMC portion and the transfer of installation commander responsibilities have been completed. The PC and ALC reorganizations are still ongoing and are expected to be completed sometime in 2006. This thesis research will focus on the PC portion of the reorganization. For purposes of this research, military organizational culture narrowly focuses on AFMC.

Background

Since its creation on 11 July 1992, AFMC has remained essentially the same in structure and mission for over 10 years. Prior to this time, reorganization occurred continually as the military strove to unearth the best way to manage a weapon system throughout its entire life cycle.

One of the key factors in the decision to reorganize AFMC was the 2003 realignment of Program Executive Office Responsibilities (PEO). This realignment included Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio;
Electronic Systems Center (ESC) at Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts; and Air Armament Center (AAC) at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Previously, these three PCs were organized separately and connected indirectly to the acquisition chain of command. In 2003, the PC commanders each assumed new roles working directly for the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ): the ASC Commander is the PEO for Aircraft, the ESC Commander is the PEO for Command and Control (C^3), and the AAC Commander is the PEO for Weapons and Munitions. This federally mandated change further solidified General Martin’s belief that AFMC needed significant change to meet the recent responsibilities assigned to the PEOs.

General Martin had four stated objectives that the reorganization was to meet: “First, we want to strengthen support to operational commands and warfighters in the field. AFMC’s number one job is to deliver war-winning capabilities on time and on cost. If we can’t do this for all weapon systems then we are adding no value. Second, we must continue supporting and maturing the PEO realignment. This will continue the age-old debate of when an acquisition program shifts into the sustainment phase. Third, there is a need to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major commands operate. The incorporation of the standard wing/group/squadron structure will make it easier for people to understand AFMC. It will also ease in identification of what each organization is responsible for. Fourth, we must structure the command with a capability-based versus platform-based focus. Rather than having separate organizations for every weapon system, they will be grouped based on similar capabilities. Platforms can then share the responsibility and knowledge base among similar systems.” (Martin, 2004h).

The reorganization of Headquarters (HQ) AFMC focused on the mission, resources and support functions. There were specific areas that AFMC felt were being neglected: capability planning, acquisition logistics, and fielding (Martin, 2004c). Through the creation of some new divisions and a new directorate, AFMC hoped to change this lack of oversight perception.
After the HQ reorganization, the next significant change occurred in March 2004 with the movement of installation commander responsibility from the PC and ALC commanders to the Air Base Wing (ABW) commanders. Since the PC commanders would now also occupy the role of PEOs, it was considered more important they keep their focus on acquisition, logistics, or test and evaluation than the everyday activities of running an installation. Traditional installation support duties and responsibilities, and some jobs, transitioned to the respective ABW but no jobs were eliminated overall.

The standardization of PC and ALC staffs into groups, squadrons and wings was the next challenge. This new structure was designed to clarify lines of authority, establish command responsibility (i.e., Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authority), define ownership of manpower and budget resources, reduce reliance on matrixed support and, of course, make the PCs and ALCs look like the rest of the operational Air Force (AF). It was also hoped this new structure would make AFMC more recognizable and easier to understand for the rest of the AF.

Problem Statement

The purpose of this study is threefold: 1) to determine if the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has met General Martin’s four intended objectives, (2) the reorganizations effects on AFMC employee job satisfaction and organizational commitment and (3) to gather some general opinions about the reorganization overall.

Research Objectives/Investigative Questions/Hypothesis

The research objective of this study is to gauge the success of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization by surveying personnel assigned to the PCs. It was
hypothesized that the reorganization had been successful in all areas to date.

Investigative questions to support this objective include the following:

1) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization succeeded in strengthening support to operational commands?

2) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization succeeded in strengthening support to warfighters in the field?

3) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization supported the PEO realignment?

4) Has the PEO realignment matured as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization?

5) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization successfully restructured AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major commands operate?

6) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization created a capability-based versus platform-based focus?

7) As a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization, are AFMC Product Center employees satisfied with their jobs?

8) As a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization, are AFMC Product Center employees more or less committed to their organizations?

9) This study identified areas related to the reorganization that may need additional attention.

Methodology

The methodology employed by this study was a web-based survey administered to AFMC employees (military, civilian and contractor) at the three PCs: Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB), Ohio; Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts; and Air Armament Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Approval was obtained through the WPAFB Civilian Personnel Office to include civilian union members at the three PCs in the survey pool. This survey
was endorsed and distributed through HQ AFMC/XPM (Plans and Programs Directorate, Manpower and Organization Division). The survey attempted to measure the perceived success of each of General Martin’s four objectives, job satisfaction and organizational commitment and general opinions of the reorganization overall. Once the data was collected, it was analyzed using the predictive analysis software program Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 13.0. Analysis included reliability measurements on each of the objectives, the general reorganization questions, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and a combination of all four objectives and the general reorganization questions. Frequencies were calculated on all questions to determine the mean scores per question and per objective overall.

**Limitations**

The survey was administered to current employees of AFMC PCs only. It did not collect information from any other members of AFMC or previous members of AFMC who are now assigned to other commands. The draft survey was administered to a pilot group of ten respondents for review/comment, and then finalized for the identified respondent group.

**Preview**

Chapter II provides the literature review information utilized for this study. Chapter III includes development of the investigative questions, the data collection method chosen and proposed data analysis. Chapter IV includes an analysis of the
respondent data collected and discussion of these results. Chapter V contains the conclusions made from this study and recommendations for further research.
II. Literature Review

This chapter begins with an overview of change management, organizational culture, organizational culture reform movements, and organizational theory (job satisfaction and organizational commitment). The chapter then describes more detailed aspects of the 2003 PEO Realignment, a historical overview chart of AFMC, and aspects of the 2004 AFMC Reorganization (including transfer of installation commander responsibility, the PCs and ALCs). Lastly, the chapter concludes with a detailed look at the Product Center portion of the reorganization.

Change Management

Effective management of change entails asking some key questions (Chapman, 2005): What do we want to achieve with this change, why, and how will we know that the change has been achieved? Who is affected by this change, and how will they react to it? It is the responsibility of management to manage change. Managers should facilitate and enable change from an objective position. This helps people to understand the reasons for change and ways to respond positively according to their own situations and capabilities. Managers should interpret and communicate versus instruct and impose. Someone in management is often the “change agent” who gets the process going (McNamara, 1999). This is a challenging role, especially as successes as well as problems arise.

If you force change on people, normally there are more problems. Management can be the settling influence to help people understand and
manage the change. Involving and informing people creates opportunities for participation in the planning and implementation of change. Creating a sense of ownership among those most affected can be very beneficial (Chapman, 2005).

Normally, senior managers and directors do not fear change; they may even thrive on it. It is the people below them they need to be concerned about. Change is often seen as threatening and fearsome. When change is forced, people often feel they must be doing something “wrong” that caused the need for change (Chapman, 2005). If people are not approaching their jobs effectively, the organization is to blame not the people themselves. Strong resistance to change is often rooted in deeply conditioned or historically reinforced feelings. A lot of patience is required in these situations to help people begin to see things differently. Recognizing that different personality types react differently is also important. Traits like reliability and dependability are opposite characteristics to mobility and adaptability.

Traditionally, e-mail and written documentation are weak tools to convey and develop understanding for the change occurring (Chapman, 2005). Face-to-face contact is always the best approach. Surveys are a good way to repair any damage or lack of trust as a result of change, but only if (1) they are anonymous and (2) management publishes and acts on the survey results.

There are several traditional change management principles. The first is to at all times involve and seek support from people within the organization. Secondly, understand where the organization is at the time. Then, understand where the organization wants to be and how it will get there. Next, organizations should plan development towards reaching the goal identified in measurable stages. Lastly, communicative, enabling involvement from the people should be pursued as early and freely as possible (Chapman, 2005).
Kotter (1995 and 2002) advocates eight steps to successful change. In each step, he identifies a key principle relating to people’s response and approach to change.

1. Increase Urgency – inspire people to move, make objectives real and relevant.

2. Build the Guiding Team – get the right people in place with the right emotional commitment and the right mix of skills and levels.

3. Get the Vision Right – get the team to establish a simple vision and strategy, focus on emotional and creative aspects necessary to drive service and efficiency.

4. Communicate for Buy-In – involve as many people as possible, communicate the essentials, simply, and appeal to and respond to people’s needs. E-clutter communications – make technology work for you rather than against.

5. Empower Action – remove obstacles, enable constructive feedback and lots of support from leaders – reward and recognize progress and achievements.

6. Create Short-Term Wins – set aims that are easy to achieve – in bite-sized chunks, manageable numbers, of initiatives and finish current stages before starting new ones.


8. Make Change Stick – reinforce the value of successful change via recruitment, promotion, new change leaders and weave change into culture.

Change management is but one of many aspects of managing people and their environment which falls under the context of organizational culture.
Organizational Culture

One of the most widely accepted definitions of organizational culture is: a pattern of basic assumptions, invented discovered or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, is to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems (Schein, 1990).

So what effect does organizational culture have on implementing change? Similar attempts at change may succeed in one organization yet fail in another. Understanding the organizational culture is a prerequisite to implementing transformational change and development (Manley, 1998). Change that happens to an organization is very different from change that is planned by the organization’s members (Cummings and Huse, 1989). There are different ways of looking at change. One example would be through leadership styles. Some leaders take the approach of bold strategic moves while others change through diligent, continuous improvements. Another way to look at the change is based on the magnitude of the change itself. The magnitude of change in an organization can vary tremendously case-by-case. One such aspect of change management within an organization is when the change affects the organization’s entire culture and creates reform.

Organizational Culture Reform Movements

In the business sector, organizational culture reform movements have two key features: (1) their origins in the realization that U.S. companies had lost their competitiveness in the last three decades of the twentieth century and (2) their
commitment to increasing organizational effectiveness, competitiveness, flexibility, and responsiveness by changing organizational cultures (Shafritz and Ott, 2001). Increased competition in global markets has forced the U.S. industry to take a new look at the way they do business. Reform movements seek to increase productivity, flexibility, responsiveness and customer service by reshaping organizational cultures. One example of a reform movement initiative that General Martin has referenced specifically is Business Process Reengineering (BPR).

BPR is defined as “the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of performance, such as, cost, quality, service and speed” (Hammer and Champy, 1993). BPR gets down to the fundamental level of processes by asking things like “why are we here?” and “what is our process now?” before initiating any change. Once processes are identified, the change is typically radical and dramatic, going to the root of the problem and making orders of magnitude in changes. As BPR is applied to a process, the BPR team is always looking at the impact on the customer. Although BPR has not been applied specifically to AFMC processes yet, General Martin had tasked organizations to identify low yielding tasks for reengineering (Martin, 2004d). This organizational culture reform movement has an associated domino effect on the organizations employees, especially with their job satisfaction.
Organizational Theory – Job Satisfaction

Job satisfaction and organizational commitment are two work attitudes that are often looked at in organizational culture (Williams, no date). Many factors in the workplace can contribute to these attitudes, especially reorganization. Theorists within this area of specialization include Frederick Hertzberg, Abraham Maslow, and A.B. Mumford.

Job satisfaction is defined as “the extent to which people like (satisfaction) or dislike (dissatisfaction) their jobs“ (Spector, 1997). There are different dimensions of satisfaction that can include factors such as co-workers, pay, job conditions, supervision, nature of the work and benefits. Research has shown that satisfied employees tend to be more productive, creative and committed to their employers (Syptak, 1999). It is even theorized that creating a positive workplace for employees can actually increase the job satisfaction of management as well (Spector, 1997).

There are many different theories on job satisfaction. Hertzberg’s theory includes two dimensions to job satisfaction: motivation and hygiene (Gawel, 1997). Hygiene issues would include environment related factors like company policies, supervision, salary, interpersonal relationships and working conditions. Motivators can create satisfaction by fulfilling individual needs for meaning and personal growth. These are issues like achievement, recognition, the work itself, responsibility and advancement. Hertzberg states that once the hygiene areas are addressed the motivators will promote job satisfaction and encourage production (Chapman, 2005).

Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs has been adopted as an explanation for motivation in the workplace (Gawel, 1997). This theory concludes that as needs are met on each
level; the person is then motivated by the need at the next level. As needs are satisfied at each level, employees subsequently will want more from their employers. The five levels are: (1) physiological needs such as hunger and thirst, (2) security needs such as shelter and protection, (3) social needs such as the need for satisfactory and supportive relationships, (4) higher order needs like self-esteem, the need for recognition and belief in oneself and (5) self-actualization which is defined as realizing one’s full potential (Gawel, 1997). Although many people never reach the top level, it is essentially an end goal point for which we may not even realize we are striving.

Mumford assumed employees do not just see their job as a means to an end but have needs, which relate to the nature of their work. He stated that workers have (1) knowledge needs for work that utilizes their knowledge and skills; (2) psychological needs such as recognition, responsibility, status and advancement; (3) task needs, which include the need for meaningful work and some degree of autonomy; and (4) moral needs to be treated in the way that employers would themselves wish to be treated (“Motivation and Job Satisfaction”, no date).

Employee’s satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with their job parleys into another subfield of organizational commitment.
Organizational Theory - Organizational Commitment

Organizational commitment is defined as “a psychological state that (a) characterizes the employee’s relationships with the organization and (b) has implications for the decision to continue membership in the organization” (Meyer and Allen, 1994). There are three focus areas for organizational commitment: affective, continuous and normative (Meyer and Allen, 1994). Affective refers to the employee’s perceptions of their emotional attachment or identification with their organization. Continuance refers to perceptions of the costs associated with leaving the organization. Normative refers to an employee’s perception of obligation to their organization.

It is also important to look at what builds an employee’s organizational commitment. There are four main areas that work together: competency, comfort, leadership and communication (NEHRA, 2002). Competency relates to understanding their role in the organization, seeing how they add value, being challenged by their work and having clarity about their goals. Comfort relates to feeling part of a community, believing their organization is viable, experiencing a sense of team, feeling they are treated equally and fairly and engaging in dialogue with management. Leadership should understand the employee’s vision for leadership and personal growth, create a sense of stability, be empathetic and stay in tune with issues. Communication with employees ensures they receive valuable information frequently, helps employees see managers as trustworthy and candid and should allow employees regular face-to-face meetings with management.

Organizational commitment in a military organization is not consistent with civilian organizations in some areas. There are distinct differences between fulfilling a
wartime mission and completing a typical task in the business world. The military has a congressionally controlled budget and other guiding documentation such as the Federal Acquisition Regulation that must be followed at all times. The chain-of-command and military customs and courtesies are rooted in military tradition. This is not the same environment you would experience in a civilian organizational hierarchy.

Using this literature review as a foundation, the research now narrows down to these areas as applied within a military setting. Some specific military issues addressed for this research were 1) the PEO realignment, 2) AFMC History, 3) the 2004 AFMC Reorganization and 4) the PC reorganization portion.

**Program Executive Officer Realignment**

PEO responsibility encompasses a variety of functions. The PEO for a particular system, or family of systems, may handle procurement, development, implementation, deployment, maintenance, and even operations. Their overarching mission is program oversight of their assigned system(s). A PEO in the civilian community is often referred to as the executive officer. In civilian companies, this person occupies a similar role for whatever service or product in which that particular company specializes. PEOs are used in all branches of the military; but for this research, the focus was on the acquisition community due to its specific impact on AFMC.

Just before General Martin’s arrival in AFMC in August 2003, the AF decided to realign PEO responsibilities. The Secretary of the AF and Chief of Staff of the AF signed a memorandum called the “PEO Restructure” (Martin, 2005). This memorandum reorganized the acquisition structure so both the management and execution of programs
for major weapon systems reside with the commander of one of the three PCs. The
individual accountable for program performance and the individual responsible for
supplying the resources to get the job done are now the same. The PEO would no longer
work directly for the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (SAF/AQ) in Washington,
D.C.; instead, each of the AFMC Product Center commanders would become the new
PEO (Martin, 2004h). This realignment included Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) at
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; Electronic Systems Center (ESC) at Hanscom
Air Force Base, Massachusetts; and Air Armament Center (AAC) at Eglin Air Force
Base, Florida. Previously, these three product centers were organized separately and
connected indirectly to the acquisition chain of command. The Product Center (PC)
commanders each assumed new roles working directly for SAF/AQ; the ASC
Commander is the PEO for Aircraft; the ESC Commander is the PEO for Command and
Control (C^2); and the AAC Commander is the PEO for Weapons and Munitions (Martin,
2004h). As Center commanders, they also work directly for the AFMC commander.
Each center vice commander and executive director was redesignated as a deputy, one for
acquisition and one for support (“Agile Acquisition” 2004).

In addition to the three PEO positions working directly for SAF/AQ, two of the
AF’s major weapon systems have an individual PEO: the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and
the F/A-22 Raptor. The F-35 PEO will rotate annually between the Navy and the Air

When General Martin arrived in AFMC, he felt tension between AFMC and
SAF/AQ over who was responsible for acquisition programs (Martin, 2004c).
Conflicting guidance led AFMC and SAF/AQ to each believe they were responsible,
when in reality AFMC organizes and staffs the system program offices for acquisition
support and the PEO directs the program offices under SAF/AQ guidance.

General Martin stated that while attending program management reviews
with SAF/AQ, he observed there was not one responsible person who
answered to the Under Secretary for Acquisition-related issues and to the
AFMC/CC for train-organize-equip issues. As of 2003, there’s no longer
finger pointing between PEO and center commanders because they are
now one and the same. It makes for improved efficiency and
accountability. (Martin, 2005)

Now, the center commander’s primary responsibility is as a PEO. To assist with
their responsibilities as center commanders, PEOs have two assigned deputies. Both
deputies are at the General Officer/Senior Executive Service (SES) level, one is the focal
point for acquisition and the other for support. In the future, the plan is to transfer PEO
ownership for weapon systems in the sustainment phase to the ALC commanders. This
will eliminate the old title center commanders held of Designated Acquisition
Commander when they managed non-PEO programs (“Secretary of the” 2003). The
federally mandated PEO realignment further solidified General Martin’s belief that
AFMC needed significant organizational change to meet the recent responsibilities
assigned to a PEO. This federally mandated realignment is one of the differences
between the military and private sector organizations with respect to organizational
culture reform. It is mandated by Congress, not by profit or competitive edge. Now, it is
helpful to review the background of AFMC and the “what and why” General Martin
believed AFMC “organizational change” was necessary.

**Historical Look at AFMC**
The history and evolution of AFMC was looked at in detail to gain an understanding of how we arrived where we are today. Although AFMC itself was created in 1992, there are many years of prior history to be considered in this command. The complete review is available in Appendix 1 of this research.

In order to touch on the key occurrences, Table 1 provides an overview of this information. This brief chronological timeline eludes to some of the added burdens a military organization must contend with to stay “on top”: congressional oversight, federal acquisition regulations, budget cycles, 40-60 year life cycles of weapon systems, research and development efforts; just to name a few. All of these concerns and events over the past sixty plus years within the AF acquisition community provide the backdrop which, combined with the 2003 PEO realignment, perhaps influenced General Martin’s decision to reorganize AFMC.
Table 1: Overview of the Evolution of AFMC  
(Carlin; 1992, 2001)

<table>
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<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Key Aspects</th>
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<tr>
<td>1900s- 1940s</td>
<td>Basic functions of material support were completely separate. Creation of Air Materiel Command (AMC) and Air Research and Development Command (ARDC)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
| 1950s         | Program Management Responsibility Transfer (PMRT)  
The Anderson Committee  
Creation of the System Program Office (SPO)                                                                 |
| 1960s         | AF acquired space mission  
AMC became Air Force Systems Command (AFSC)  
ARDC became Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC)                                                                 |
| 1970s         | PMRT still a concern                                                                                                                                 |
| 1980s         | Packard Commission  
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act  
National Security Review (NSR) 11  
McDonald-Loh Study  
Merger of AFSC and AFLC was proposed  
Defense Management Report Decisions                                                                 |
| 1990s to present | AFSC and AFLC Integration Plan created  
AFMC was created (1992)  
Integrated Weapon System (ISXM) was developed and had many challenges and obstacles  
Depot Maintenance Review Team (DMRT)  
Homeland Defense and Combat Support Sector established in AFMC |

2004 AFMC Reorganization

The AFMC reorganization initiated in 2004 consisted of three major change areas. First was HQ AFMC, then the transfer of installation commander responsibilities from the center commanders to the Air Base Wings (ABW), and finally the standardization of the PCs and ALCs. The previous AFMC structure had lasted for decades before our most recently departed AFMC commander, General Gregory S. Martin, recognized the need for organizational change. The HQ AFMC portion and the
transfer of installation commander responsibilities have been completed. The PC and ALC reorganization is still ongoing and is expected to be completed sometime in 2006.

General Martin took over as AFMC Commander on 22 August 2003. At this time, AFMC looked nothing like the rest of the Air Force structurally. The title of “SPO” and “home office” was alien to the other operational commands. SPOs were considered “nonunits” under Air Force Instruction 38-101, *Air Force Organization*.

AFMC was the only Major Command (MAJCOM) not organized into the wing, group and squadron structure. AFMC had always mirrored the business world, even though it is clearly a military organization. It was believed by senior leaders in AFMC (and others) that most people in other MAJCOMs did not understand the composition or the mission of AFMC specifically for this reason. The 2004 restructuring was designed to make AFMC more recognizable to the rest of Air Force by grouping like elements.

General Martin outlined four objectives that the reorganization was supposed to meet. The first objective was to strengthen support to operational commands and warfighters in the field. Second, AFMC must continue supporting and maturing the PEO realignment. Third, there is a need to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major commands operate. Fourth, AFMC must structure the command with a capability-based versus platform-based focus (Martin, 2004h).

The plan from the beginning (March 2004) was to conduct 6, 12 and 18-month reviews of each area to identify seams or gaps between new functional areas (Martin 2004a). A 6-month review was conducted within Headquarters AFMC in May 2005. This review consisted of an automated survey and personal interviews with certain directors and division chiefs. Automated survey inputs came from the director and
his/her key staff only, not the subordinates within the headquarters. No measurement of General Martin’s four key objectives have occurred prior to this thesis.

**Headquarters AFMC (2004)**

The reorganization of HQ AFMC focused on the mission, resources and support functions. The headquarters mission is to “shape the workforce and infrastructure to develop, field, and sustain war-winning expeditionary capabilities.” The HQ mission statement read too much like the AFMC mission statement (Martin, 2004c). AFMC needed a distinction between the role of a MAJCOM HQ and the centers. A directorate-by-directorate scrub of non-MAJCOM work was accomplished to ensure HQ is only doing the tasks appropriate for a MAJCOM HQ (Martin, 2004e).

The AFMC command management structure includes the AFMC Council who receive oversight and secretariat duties from the Plans and Programs Directorate and the Commander’s Action Group. The AFMC Council approved the HQ AFMC reorganization in January 2004 (Martin, 2004a). General Martin briefed AFMC’s desire to reorganize to the Chief of Staff of the AF (CSAF) and Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) before he approved the Organizational Change Request (OCR), which was then submitted to Air Staff for approval (Martin, 2004b). After Air Staff approval, in April 2004, changes to offices that did not require union bargaining occurred first (Martin, 2004f). Next, union bargaining occurred and all union requirements were met before June 04. Now the AFMC reorganization process could begin.

First, a review of manpower authorizations required in each area occurred for the Capabilities Integration Directorate (XR), the Operations Directorate (DO), the
Engineering Directorate (EN), the Logistics and Sustainment Directorate (LG), the Transformation Directorate (TR) and Mission Support Directorate (MS) because these directorates were the most significantly affected by the reorganization. There were new mission statements, new task lists, new responsibilities and skill set mismatches to be considered, resolved and explained.

The headquarters reorganization moved Requirements (DR), Science and Technology (ST), Acquisition Center of Excellence (AE), Intelligence (IN) and EN’s modeling and simulation into the new XR. XR is responsible for AFMC’s development mission and is the focal point for science and technology. The goal is to have a single office responsible for integrating science and technology, intelligence, modeling and simulation and incorporating them into the capabilities produced by the AFMC acquisition process (Martin, 2005). Technical orders and sustainment engineering was moved from EN to LG in order to consolidate all logistics and sustainment functions. Creation of a new Fielding Division in DO was accomplished to reenergize weapon system fielding. TR and IT were combined into the new TR to focus on leveraging information technology and process improvement. Day-to-day network operations moved from IT to MS. Responsibility for workforce management in DP was centralized. The Director of Staff’s role expanded to include directing everyday activities of the MAJCOM headquarters staff. These changes created new organizations to fulfill areas that AFMC was neglecting like capability planning, acquisition logistics and fielding (Martin, 2004c). Headquarters directorates were tasked to re-engineer and map the processes for areas where transformation could occur.
Three tenets guided General Martin so the HQ will better meet customer expectations. They are 1) the goal, 2) the means and 3) the attitude. The goal represents the focus of delivering war-winning capabilities on time and on cost. The means represent reorganizing to provide what customers need, divest of low value tasks and reengineer to become more efficient. The attitude represents being professional enough to make the changes. Directors were charged with transforming their organizations by fundamentally changing what they do to better support the AF of the future.

Another change was implemented on 1 October 2005. HQ AFMC has decided to mirror joint forces nomenclature for their organizations (Ely, 2005). If an employee is working at a joint job and wants to contact someone in personnel, the office symbol is not DP. It is the number one preceded by the letter J for joint. AFMC plans to incorporate this same naming system. As of Oct 05: A (for Air) then 2 is Intelligence (IN), A3 is Operations (DO), A4 is Logistics and Sustainment, A5 is Plans and Programs (XP), A6 is Communications and Information (new), A7 is Installation and Mission Support MS), A8 is Financial Management (FM), and A9 is Capabilities Integration and Transformation (XR). Even since Oct 05 designators continue to change. For example, A5 has now changed to A8. It will take some time to get used to the new nomenclature but the end goal of following what other services already do will be met. The goal of this change is to improve communication flow and reduce spin-up times as our people transition from one headquarters assignment to another (Ely, 2005). The biggest challenge will be that not all of AFMC’s work fits easily into the A-staff designations. A few areas will remain the same.
This change in headquarters organizations, and subsequently nomenclature as well, was supported by the decision to transfer installation commander responsibility.

Transfer of Installation CC Responsibility

After the headquarters reorganization, the next significant change occurred in March 2004 with the movement of installation commander responsibility from the PC and ALC commanders to the ABW. Since the PC commanders now also occupy the role of PEO, it was more important they keep their focus on acquisition, logistics, or test and evaluation than the everyday activities of running an installation (Martin, 2004j). This change also gave “colonel level” responsibilities back to colonels. The ABW commanders will now gain more of the valuable experience needed to progress to the senior officer level. Traditional support duties and responsibilities, and some jobs, transitioned to the ABW but no jobs were eliminated overall. The personnel change gives ABW commanders direct authority over the people and processes they require and makes AFMC look more like the rest of the AF MAJCOMs (Martin, 2004g). (This change did not affect the Commander at Arnold Engineering Development Center, Tennessee, who will remain installation commander or the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center, which is a tenant on Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, where Air Combat Command (ACC) already fills the installation commander role.)

The next required step to implement AFMC organizational change was the standardization of the PCs and ALCs, and the main purpose of this thesis research.

Product Centers and Air Logistics Centers
Overview

The reorganization of the PCs and ALCs, to become standardized, changed structures that had existed for decades, even before AFMC itself was created. These changes were outlined in OCR packages with the Product Center changes occurring first. Planning was substantially complete in Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 but the implementation did not occur until FY 2005. Some of the OCR packages (as of March 2006) are still outstanding and hopefully will be completed sometime later this year (2006). At the center staff level, the PC/ALC reorganization took some 79 different (and often redundant) office symbols and created only 20 authorized office symbols. This would standardize the center staff functions at each of the centers.

Challenges

There were three major challenges to overcome with this portion of the AFMC reorganization: standardization, decentralization of personnel and unit nomenclature (Ferguson, 2005). The biggest challenge was the standardization of PC and ALC staffs into groups, squadrons and wings. Directorates can now be System Sustainment Wings, Groups or Squadrons based on size, funding, and mission. This new structure was designed to clarify lines of authority, establish command responsibility (like Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authority), define ownership of manpower and budget resources, reduce reliance on matrixed support and, of course, make the PCs and ALCs look like the rest of the operational AF (Ferguson, 2005). It was hoped by the AFMC senior leaders that through these changes, no longer will people struggle at each AFMC installation to find a particular functional area.
AFMC has been decentralized for most of its existence. The key unit in the Product Centers prior to the reorganization was the SPO. Personnel working in the SPOs were assigned to functional directorates. The directorates matrixed personnel based upon the needs of the individual SPOs at any given point in time. In the instance of matrixed personnel the term “home office” was used to designate the organization they were actually assigned to. This term was only used in AFMC.

For example, the previous horizontal structure of the Engineering Directorate (EN) providing matrixed engineers wherever needed is gone. The new vertical structure permanently assigns engineers to manpower-coded positions. This means when an engineer completed a project under the old structure, EN could move him/her wherever he/she was needed most. Under the new structure, the engineer remains in the same position even if there isn’t a new project waiting for him/her to start. Another organization may be in need of additional engineering support but cannot task that potentially underutilized engineer. Adjusting to this loss of flexibility has been, and will likely continue to be, a challenge.
Drawbacks to the System Program Office Concept

As programs progressed through the acquisition cycle from the earliest phases of concept development to the procurement and delivery of completed systems to the Air Force, the number of personnel and the mix of skills required could be expected to change substantially (Ferguson, 2005). Other factors like Foreign Military Sales would require more personnel assigned. Most SPOs were responsible for a single system. Basket SPOs were responsible for a group of systems or subsystems that had similar missions or purposes. For example, at ASC the Reconnaissance SPO and the Special Operations Systems Forces SPO were basket SPOs. ASC alone had over 15 unique SPOs. This means no two SPOs were the same size or organized the same internally and crated several drawbacks to the SPO, which are highlighted next. (Please note unit nomenclature will be discussed at the end of this section, as it is still an open OCR at the time of this research).

The Air Force and senior leaders saw many drawbacks with the SPO concept. Two concerns are the lack of operational AF alignment and promotion opportunity (Ferguson, 2005). The primary concern was the lack of standard group/wing/squadron structure like the rest of the Air Force. Since AFMC looked different, it was harder for other MAJCOMs to understand. General Martin made it a central point that AFMC should strive to look like the rest of the AF as much as possible. This lack of standardized structure also affected AFMC’s manpower. There was no clear standard for manpower required to handle the systems acquisition mission. Proposals to incorporate wings or groups were first suggested in the 1990s but were rejected at higher levels (Carlin, 1992).
Another opinion raised by senior leaders was that the SPO placed its officers at a
disadvantage for promotion. Since most officer promotion boards consist of officers
from operational commands, their understanding of AFMCs unique structure was often
limited. The duties and responsibilities of a unit commander were standardized while the
duties of a SPO director were not. Other personnel in the SPO were even more limited
by their unique titles. This may have made it less likely for promotion boards to
recognize the performance and accomplishments of personnel assigned to AFMC SPOs
(Ferguson, 2005).

All of these previously discussed issues with the PCs and ALCs, as well as the
drawbacks with the SPO concept, forced the need for a new center concept.

Developing the New Center Concept

In FY 2004, AFMC was tasked to develop a new structure that would apply to all
the product centers (Carlin, 2001). This also fell in line with the PEO realignment of the
Center Commander and PEO now being the same person. Previous jurisdictional barriers
to establishing wings/groups/squadrons had been lifted.

The commander of ASC, the largest of the PCs, worked with the AFMC
Transformation Directorate to develop this new concept. In November 2003, the then
ASC Commander, Lieutenant General Richard Reynolds, met with the CSAF, the
Secretary of the AF and the Assistant Secretary of the AF for Acquisition to expand on
the details. For the next several months, an Integrated Product Team (IPT) led by
AFMC/XP accomplished this tasking. General Martin briefed this new concept at
CORONA SOUTH (a general officer level meeting) on 11 February 2004 and received endorsement by the CSAF.

On 4 March 2004, Colonel Daniel Badger of AFMC/XPM briefed the concept to the AFMC Center Commanders (Carlin, 2001). This gave the center commanders the opportunity to address the organizational templates as a group. They looked at the Center staffs, the PCs and the ALCs. It was decided the wings/groups/squadrons at the PCs would all use the word “Systems” in their new titles and the ALCs would all use the word “Materiel” in their new titles. Despite the lack of resolution on a few issues, the new concept was incorporated into the OCR for submittal to the AF for approval by 30 April 2004. The issues raised included finalizing a structural template for each center, nomenclature for wings/groups/squadrons, the roles and responsibilities of the Center functional staffs and civilians leading AF units.

The unit structures for each of the PCs were completed after a month of planning and data collection. When this information was briefed to General Martin, detailed criteria were outlined in explanation of the structure. The size, echelon and desired leadership rank would be based on the number of manpower authorizations (including contracted personnel), matrixed personnel, dollars managed and Acquisition Category (ACAT) of the programs managed (Carlin, 2001). After Col Badger presented this portion, Colonel Andrew Weaver, then Special Assistant to the Commander, presented a briefing on study results regarding the resizing of headquarters based on ratios found in industry of supervisors-to-workers. General Martin questioned several areas: the nomenclature for the units, the proposals for structure of the Center-level staff organizations and the way in which the proposed unit structure had been developed. He
did not feel they were transformational and possessed too much of the old way of looking at things. He redirected the IPT to apply the concepts from Col Weaver’s briefing to the PC structure. Some of the proposed groups and wings could possibly be combined into larger wings and also become less platform specific; the idea was to organize around capabilities regardless of platform.

The AFMC Council met again on 7 April 2004 and presented a revised proposal to the AFMC Vice Commander. This meeting clarified that the IPT was moving in the right direction to implement General Martin’s previous comments. The proposed ASC structure did not change significantly but the AAC and ESC structures did. Unit names were now less system specific and the number of reporting units was reduced. (These new names were also meant to be more recognizable outside of AFMC.) Although budget was clearly still a factor in the chosen echelon, this method was still in question. Gen Reynolds raised the question of what budget figures should be used: the future year, the current year or total program cost? Another concern raised was that very large wings may require General Officer or Senior Executive Service leadership, which would adversely affect the position of the Center commander and the number of promotable Colonel positions. It was concluded that consistent budget numbers should be used to establish standards and that a peer review process should be used to finalize the individual center proposals.

The AFMC Council met one last time on 15 April 2004 to present the revised proposal to General Martin. The organizational structure for the three Product Centers was approved to go forward to a General Officer Reconciliation Board to perform the peer review; this would ensure consistency across the centers. General Martin also
indicated the peer review would look closely at the criteria for determining echelon. The timeline for Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the new structure was set for implementation by 1 October 2004. Also under discussion were the standardized templates for Center staffs and civilian led AF units.

The General Officer Reconciliation Board was chaired by Gen Reynolds. The board proposed changes to the echelon that were incorporated into the proposal. The changes were briefed and approved at the AFMC Spring Commander’s Conference on 11 May 2004. The three PCs submitted their OCR to AFMC/XP for finalization. The end result was the requested creation of 66 new units. These units consisted of: 11 wings, 31 groups and 24 squadrons. The remaining challenge with the centers is naming the new units.

Nomenclature of the New Center Units

The main outstanding issue under consideration now was the nomenclature of these new units. There was extensive processing behind the scenes to determine if the units should bear names or numbers. If they used numbers, the issue of new versus historical also had to be considered. Initially, named units was the approach, with the idea of numbered units to be considered later in the process. This still left the debate over wording of the names. Rather than specific names like Air Interceptor Missile Wing, General Martin asked for broader, less-specific titles like “Air Superiority Wing” or “Counter Air System Wing.” This concept was then applied to all the proposed names. The idea of using historical numbered units was still on the table as well; over
the course of several weeks this idea was explored but not implemented. Concerns were raised over using numerical designators for completely different missions than what they had originally been created for. A template was created with all new numerical designators for the proposed units. The numbers came from a group of unused numbers in the 500-series. The theory behind this approach was that numerical designators would clearly distinguish which organizations fell into each chain of command while names only would not. It would also shorten some of the lengthy proposed names on the table. This proposal was sent to General Martin for approval in early July 2004 and approved by him later in the month. While AFMC continued to explore the idea of historical numerical designators, leaders at Air Staff expressed their disapproval of numeric designators completely. In order to expedite the process, General Martin decided to go back to named units for the time being. The final OCR package for the PCs requested named units but the ALC package still request numbered units. The OCR package(s) that address the office symbols for centers are still outstanding at this time.

Summary

In the future, the new units should enable AFMC to build standard sized units and resources to field a weapon system or follow aircraft through depot maintenance (Martin, 2004k). The rest of the MAJCOMs have already been doing this for years. There is a specific requirement for a fighter squadron as far as aircraft, resources and personnel. This has never been the case in AFMC. As new programs develop, there is no system in place to get the personnel and resources needed. Often within AFMC, we must “take” people from other organizations and hire contractors to fill the gaps. With the
establishment of resource earning units, the basis for decisions about manpower needs will follow. Numbers of personnel will vary depending on the stage in the program life cycle. This will essentially reduce waste of personnel and resources in the acquisition community.

The 2004 AFMC reorganization was prompted by a federally mandated change (PEO Realignment) which created culture reform within AFMC. General Martin chose to be proactive about “fixing” known inefficiencies within AFMC (historical background) during his tenure as AFMC/CC by his 2004 AFMC Reorganization initiative. The research now attempts to measure this success by looking General Martin’s four objectives the reorganization was supposed to meet: job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and general overall opinions through a web-based survey. This methodology is discussed in the next chapter.
III. Methodology

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the methodology used in this research effort. Development of the investigative questions is addressed first. Then, the rationale for the use of a survey as the data collection method is explained. Lastly, the chapter outlines the data analysis procedures. It was hypothesized that the reorganization was successful in meeting each of the four objectives and that AFMC employees are satisfied in their jobs and committed to their organizations.

Development of the Investigative Questions

The investigative questions were based on General Martin’s four objectives for the 2004 AFMC Reorganization effort. The objectives were used as a basis for measurement of success of the reorganization. Each objective has investigative questions designed specifically to measure the success of that particular objective. Each area consisted of a set of survey questions that attempt to answer the investigative questions presented. There are a total of eight investigative questions, listed below with their corresponding objective or organizational theory aspect.

Objective 1: Strengthen support to operational commands and warfighters in the field.

1) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization succeeded in strengthening support to operational commands?

2) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization succeeded in strengthening support to warfighters in the field?
Objective 2: Continue supporting and maturing the PEO realignment.

3) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization supported the PEO realignment?

4) Has the PEO realignment matured as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization?

Objective 3: The need to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major commands operate.

5) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization successfully restructured AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major commands operate?

Objective 4: A capability-based versus platform-based focus.

6) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization created a capability-based versus platform-based focus?

The following investigative questions are based on the organizational theory aspects of this research:

7) As a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization, are AFMC Product Center employees satisfied with their jobs?

8) As a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization, are AFMC Product Center employees more or less committed to their organizations?

Additionally, this study identified areas related to the reorganization that may need additional attention through open-ended questions at the end of the survey instrument.
Data Collection Method

The data collection method chosen for this research was a web-based survey of all personnel currently assigned to the three AFMC PCs. This survey was sponsored by HQ AFMC/A8M, who distributed the survey electronically to the three PCs. This method of data collection used random sampling where every sample unit has an equal chance of selection. The PC commanders were tasked to disseminate the survey to all personnel assigned to their respective PC; Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts; or Air Armament Center, Eglin AFB, Florida. Participation in the survey was completely voluntary and the anonymity of all respondents was maintained.

The rationale for use of a survey was related to obtaining information directly from the people most affected by the 2004 reorganization. Senior management played a huge part in the implementation but may not be aware of the impact on the other levels of personnel within the bureaucratic hierarchy affected. A survey provides an anonymous outlet for PC personnel to voice their opinions about the reorganization without any fear of reprisal. The goal was to reach personnel in all levels of the PCs through this web-based survey. Web-based surveys are effective tools because the survey itself can be completed from any location that has internet access. Web-based surveys are also less costly and time consuming than surveys distributed through the mail.

Use of a survey instrument for an AFIT thesis entails following a detailed approval process. Before release to the public, the requirements included: human subjects training, development of the survey instrument, thesis committee approval of the
survey instrument, Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) approval of the survey instrument and Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) approval of the survey instrument.

The CITI (Collaborative Institutional Review Board Training Initiative) Course in the Protection of Human Research Subjects Training was completed in accordance with this process (see Appendix X). The survey was then designed with inputs from thesis committee members and additional personnel assigned to HQ AFMC/A8M. Once approval was obtained from these parties, the survey was pilot tested among several fellow AFIT student members. Recommendations and comments from all parties were taken into account when finalizing the instrument. Once finalized, the survey was submitted for exemption from human experimentation requirements approval to AFRL, Wright Site Institutional Review Board. This approval was obtained on November 3, 2005 (see Appendix X). The next step in the process required approval from AFPC, Air Force Survey Program. This approval was obtained on December 14, 2005 (see Appendix X). Once the approval process was complete, the survey was sent to HQ AFMC/A8M, for dissemination among the three PCs. Mr. James Engle, HQ AFMC/A5 sent the survey link and corresponding e-mail request out on December 21, 2005. The survey was available for responses through January 13, 2006. Once all responses were collected the data analysis process began.

**Data Analysis**

A survey is an effective tool for quantitative research because it focuses on measurable variables. By creating groups of targeted questions for each of the four
objectives, their success is a measurable item for final analysis. The choice of multiple item measures was made since the use of single item measures for psychological constructs is typically discouraged because they are presumed to have unacceptably low reliability (Wanous and Reichers, 1997).

Within the survey instrument, specific sets of questions were designed to answer each of the investigative questions. Survey questions 1-6 measured Objective 1. Survey questions 7-16 measured Objective 2. Survey questions 17-26 measured Objective 3. Survey questions 27-32 measured Objective 4. Survey questions 33-39 gathered a general overview opinion of the success of the reorganization. Survey questions 40-52 measured job satisfaction. Survey questions 53-58 measured organizational commitment. Survey questions 59-71 collected demographic information on the respondents. Survey questions 72-74 provided a forum for open-ended answers regarding the reorganization. The responses to questions 72-74 are included in Appendices G, H and I, respectively. HQ AFMC/A8M verbally indicated these responses will be included as input to SAF/AQ as to the efficiency and effectiveness of the reorganization to date.

Data cleaning was performed to identify any errors and/or potential conflicts with the data entries. Each survey response was automatically assigned a survey identification number. Questions within the survey maintained the same numbering assigned on the survey instrument itself (Appendix B). Frequencies were calculated for all questions to determine if any answers were out of the 1 to 7 Liker scale range. The following errors were identified, and corrective actions taken, using SPSS and a visual check of the data:

- Removed the following survey responses because the respondents failed to answer any of the questions: identification numbers 20, 29, 40 and 95. This was visually evident in the data by the input of “999” showing up in every field.
- Removed the following survey because the respondents failed to answer 29 of the questions: identification number 146. This was visually evident in the data by the occurrence of “999” 29 times.

- Survey questions that were skipped within survey id numbers that were primarily answered in whole were given a neutral value of 4:
  - Survey identification number 9 – Question 103
  - Survey identification number 10 – Question 103
  - Survey identification number 18 – Question 112
  - Survey identification number 22 – Question 118
  - Survey identification number 28 – Questions 28, 143
  - Survey identification number 30 – Questions 73, 122
  - Survey identification number 34 – Question 30
  - Survey identification number 35 – Question 11
  - Survey identification number 36 – Question 7
  - Survey identification number 37 – Question 21
  - Survey identification number 43 – Question 134
  - Survey identification number 44 – Question 143
  - Survey identification number 45 – Question 92
  - Survey identification number 47 – Question 92
  - Survey identification number 50 – Question 79
  - Survey identification number 52 – Question 122
  - Survey identification number 55 – Question 121
  - Survey identification number 58 – Question 104

For ease of analysis, it is often helpful to recode some responses into single digit values instead of the actual response value chosen. Data integrity is not affected in any way when this is done.

- Recoded the responses to question 59, age: a value of 1 represents 19 or younger, a value of 2 represents 20-29, a value of 3 represents 30-39, a value of 4 represents 40-49, a value of 5 represents 50-59, a value of 6 represents 60 or older and a value of 9 represents a missing answer.

- Recoded the responses to question 60, gender: a value of 1 represents male and a value of 2 represents female.

- Recoded the responses to question 61, marital status: a value of 1 represents single, a value of 2 represents married, a value of 3 represents divorced and a value of 4 represents widowed.
- Recoded the responses to question 62, civilian or military: a value of 1 represents Department of Defense (DoD) civilian, a value of 2 represents retired military member now working as a civilian, a value of 3 represents retired military member now working as a contractor, a value of 4 represents active duty officer (not prior enlisted), a value of 5 represents active duty officer (prior enlisted), a value of 6 represents active duty enlisted and a value of 7 represents contractor.

- Recoded the responses to questions 66-70 to consolidate the wide variety of responses into variables of 1 through 7. Each of these questions had a response of various years and months of duty: a value of 1 represents 0-5 years, a value of 2 represents 6-10 years, a value of 3 represents 11-15 years, a value of 4 represents 16-20 years, a value of 5 represents 21-25 years, a value of 6 represents 26-30 years, a value of 7 represents 31-35 years and a value of 8 represents 36 or more years.

- Recoded the responses to question 71, current AFMC Product Center duty location: a value of 1 represents Wright-Patterson, a value of 2 represents Hanscom and a value of 3 represents Eglin. This immediately identified the lack of responses from one PC, Hanscom.

Questions that are negatively worded are looking for a response at the opposite end of the Likert scale than questions that are positively worded. This is often a good indicator if the respondent is thoroughly reading each question or just marking along one side of the survey only. In order to accurately assess responses to negatively worded questions, the answers must be reversed (1 becomes 7, 2 becomes 6, etc.) to vary in the same direction as the positively worded questions.

- Reverse coded the following survey questions identified as falling into this category: 10, 28, 49, 54, 57 and 58.

Once the data was cleaned, it was analyzed using the predictive analysis software program SPSS. SPSS eliminates the use of manual calculations by providing both simple and complex types of data analysis techniques. These can range from simple tests to validate reliability and general trends in data to analyzing complex relationships through
techniques like linear regression and then providing detailed quantitative results. SPSS can also create output tables and diagrams upon request. For this research effort, the analysis conducted included reliability measurements on each of the objectives, the general reorganization questions, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and a combination of all four objectives and the general reorganization questions. Reliability measures each included all of the survey questions in that section. For example, the reliability of Objective 1 was calculated using survey questions 1 through 6. The reliability of the combination of all the objectives and the general reorganization questions was calculated using questions 1 through 39. Frequencies were calculated on all questions to determine the mean scores per question and per objective overall. Mean scores on survey questions represent the average of all responses for that particular question. The mean is a good measure of central tendency in normal distributions (Litwin, 1995). Since this survey instrument had set parameters for responses (1 through 7), the responses did not contain extreme scores. The measurement of reliability in a survey instrument determines whether the instrument accurately met its intended objective and if the results can be duplicated.
Reliability and Validity

Reliability is a statistical measure of how reproducible the survey instrument’s data are (Litwin, 1995). Reliability is freedom from measurement or random error. When repeated measurements of the same thing give identical or very similar results, the measurement instrument is said to be reliable. In survey research, there are typically two types of error, random error and measurement error (Litwin, 1995). Random error is the unpredictable error that occurs in all research. One way it can be reduced is by a larger sample size. Measurement error refers to how well or how poorly a particular instrument performs in a given population (Litwin, 1995). Statistics are used to calculate the probability that a particular result is due to random error. Once the type of error is assessed and a measure is deemed reliable, the data results can be duplicated with a satisfactory degree of accuracy. In this research effort, there was one overarching hypothesis (that the 2004 reorganization made a positive difference) and eight investigative questions. In quantitative research, the hypothesis is either supported or not supported by the data. The null hypothesis states that there is no difference among the groups being measured. If the data does not support the hypothesis, then the null hypothesis is supported. If the data does support the hypothesis, then the null hypothesis is rejected.

Besides determining a survey item’s or scale’s reliability, the researcher must assess its validity, or how well it measures what it sets out to measure (Litwin, 1995). Just because the item in question is a good measure of reliability does not guarantee validity. Content validity was determined by the thesis committee members prior to entering the survey approval process. It was determined that the survey’s contents
included an appropriate set of items. Content validity is not statistical in nature but represents the overall opinion of a group, in this case the thesis committee members. Criterion validity between survey instruments was not measurable because this was the first survey to look at the PC reorganization results. Concurrent validity judges the survey instrument against some other standard for measurement that is already accepted. In this instance, the job satisfaction and organizational commitment sections were not taken from an already accepted standard for measurement. To prove construct validity, replication is necessary to show that similar answers would be obtained in both occurrences.

Once the analysis procedures were completed, the results were gathered for review in relation to the investigative questions being answered.
IV. Results and Analysis

The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the data analysis procedures utilized in relation to the investigative questions being answered.

The sample size that this survey was intended to reach was approximately 5,250 personnel. This total is based on the combined authorized positions at each of the three product centers. (ASC at Wright-Patterson has approximately 2,450 personnel; ESC at Hanscom has approximately 1,950 personnel; and AAC at Eglin has approximately 850 personnel.) The total responses received were 164 with 5 responses being removed in the data cleaning process leaving 159 survey responses for analysis. Unfortunately, survey responses were only received from two of the three PC locations. (No responses were received from ASC at Wright-Patterson.) Since the survey was disseminated via electronic mail, it is impossible to determine where the distribution stalled. This shortfall prevents analysis among responses between the three different PCs.

The dependent variable is the one being caused or affected and the independent variable is the one causing or affecting the other. The reorganization represents the independent variable with each of the measured areas representing dependent variables. Whether a variable is dependent or independent varies based on the measure being used. If a relationship between the two variables is statistically significant, it indicates the variables are related to one another. Significance is related to the importance of a relationship between two variables (Alreck and Settle, 2004).

For General Martin’s four objectives, the general reorganization questions, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment measures, the same Likert scale of 1 through
Survey responses of 1-Strongly disagree; 2-Disagree and 3-Slightly
Disagree were judged as indicating a negative opinion of the reorganizations impact. 
Survey responses of 5-Slightly agree; 6-Agree and 7-Strongly agree were judged as
indicating a positive opinion of the reorganizations impact. A survey response of 4 was
considered “Neutral” indicating the reorganization had little or no impact.

Each objective and general question will now be discussed individually and
include a summary statistics table with the mean, median, and mode of all responses.
These statistics directly support the conclusions reached. Within the tables, “Q1”
represents question number one on the survey instrument, “Q2” represents question
number two on the survey instrument, etc. The term “ObjectiveX” used in the correlation
table represents a grouped analysis of the survey questions that answered Objective X.
Some of the tables appear slightly compressed due to page width constraints.

**Objective 1**

Regarding Objective 1 (strengthen support to operational commands and
warfighters in the field), the results indicate a negative opinion of the reorganization’s
impact. The mean scores for all six questions were within the 3.08-3.66 range, indicating
the average response was slightly disagree or neutral (Table 2). For both investigative
questions 1 and 2, if the reorganization had an effect in strengthening support to
operational commands and warfighters in the field, the hypothesis would have been
supported. In this case, the reorganization does not appear to have made a difference in
these areas, so the null hypothesis is supported.
The internal consistency for Objective 1 is .959 based on a commonly used measure of reliability, Cronbach’s Alpha. If a Cronbach’s Alpha score is higher than .70 the measure is said to be reliable (Litwin, 1995). Therefore, the measurement of Objective 1 was reliable.

Table 2: Statistics for Objective 1

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Statistics</th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
<th>Q3</th>
<th>Q4</th>
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</tr>
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</table>

Objective 2

Regarding Objective 2 (continue supporting and maturing the PEO realignment in the field), the results indicate the reorganization had little or no impact in this area. The mean scores for all ten questions were within the 3.56-4.55 range, indicating the average response was neutral (Table 3). For both investigative questions 3 and 4, if the reorganization had an effect continuing support for and maturing the PEO realignment, the hypothesis would have been supported. In this case, the reorganization does not appear to have made a difference in these areas, so the null hypothesis is supported.

The internal consistency for Objective 2 is .816; therefore, the measurement of Objective 2 was reliable.
Objective 3

Regarding Objective 3 (the need to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major commands operate), the results indicate the reorganization had little or no impact in this area. The mean scores for all ten questions were within the 3.04-4.65 range, indicating the average response was neutral (Table 4). On four of the survey questions in this section, the mode was either 5-Slightly agree or 6-Agree indicating a slightly more positive response for this section. For investigative question 5, if the reorganization successfully restructured AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major commands operate, the hypothesis would have been supported. In this case, the reorganization does not appear to have made a difference in this area, so the null hypothesis is supported.

The internal consistency for Objective 3 is .897; therefore, the measurement of Objective 3 was reliable.
Table 4: Statistics for Objective 3

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<th>Q19</th>
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<td>484</td>
<td>551</td>
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</table>

Objective 4

Regarding Objective 4 (create a capability-based versus platform-based focus), the results indicate the reorganization had little or no impact in this area. The mean scores for all six questions were within the 3.48-4.04 range, indicating the average response was neutral (Table 5). For investigative question 6, if the reorganization had an effect creating a capability-based versus platform-based focus, the hypothesis would have been supported. In this case, the reorganization does not appear to have made a difference in this area, so the null hypothesis is supported.

The internal consistency for Objective 4 is .838; therefore, the measurement of Objective 4 was reliable.

Table 5: Statistics for Objective 4

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<tr>
<th>Statistics</th>
<th>Q27</th>
<th>Q28</th>
<th>Q29</th>
<th>Q30</th>
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<td>643</td>
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General Questions

Regarding the “General Questions” section pertaining to the reorganization as a whole, the results indicate the reorganization had little or no impact. The mean scores for all seven questions were all in the 3.02-4.12 range, indicating the average response was neutral (Table 6). This indicates the reorganization as a whole does not appear to have made a difference. Increased effectiveness, efficiency and improved morale responses were primarily neutral. Adaptation to reorganization changes, being well-informed about reorganization goals and being well-informed about actual changes that would occur were also primarily neutral.

The internal consistency for the General Questions is .865; therefore, the measurement of the General Questions was reliable.

Table 6: Statistics for General Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistics</th>
<th>Q33</th>
<th>Q34</th>
<th>Q35</th>
<th>Q36</th>
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</table>

Four Objectives and General Questions Combined

Regarding the Four Objectives and the General Questions combined, the results indicate the reorganization had little or no impact. The mean scores for all the questions were within the 3.02-4.65 range, indicating the average response was neutral. There was no investigative question targeted for this measurement.
The internal consistency for the Four Objectives and the General Questions combined is .959; therefore, this measurement was reliable.

**Job Satisfaction and Organizational Commitment**

The next two sections, job satisfaction and organizational commitment, did not specifically request responses be given in relation to the reorganization. (This was noted as a shortcoming of the survey itself upon data analysis.) Subsequently, the job satisfaction and organizational commitment measures are actually a snapshot in time of AFMC PC employee job satisfaction and organizational commitment when this survey was administered. Job satisfaction and organizational commitment are not directly tied to the measurement of success of the reorganization and therefore cannot effectively answer the investigative questions, which, in turn, does not support the hypothesis.

Regarding job satisfaction, the results indicate job satisfaction is at a satisfactory level. The mean scores for twelve of the thirteen questions were within the 4.33-5.55 range (Table 7). The mode for the same twelve questions was 6-Strongly Agree indicating a generally positive response to job satisfaction related questions. One question, number 49 (reverse coded), had a significantly lower mean of 2.81. (Question 49 was, “I often have to bend a rule or policy to get things done.”) This may indicate a separate problem within the AFMC PC community. For investigative question 7, if AFMC Product Center employees are satisfied with their jobs as a result of the reorganization, the hypothesis cannot be answered with this measurement tool.

The internal consistency for Job Satisfaction is .851; therefore, the measurement of Job Satisfaction was reliable.
Table 7: Statistics for Job Satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistics</th>
<th>Q40</th>
<th>Q41</th>
<th>Q42</th>
<th>Q43</th>
<th>Q44</th>
<th>Q45</th>
<th>Q46</th>
<th>Q47</th>
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<th>Q50</th>
<th>Q51</th>
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<tr>
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<td>2.81</td>
<td>5.54</td>
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</table>

Regarding organizational commitment, the hypothesis was intended to measure whether AFMC PC employees are more or less committed to their organization as a result of the reorganization. The mean scores for four of the six questions were within the 4.25-5.20 range (Table 8). Two questions, number 54 (reverse coded) and 57 (reverse coded), had significantly lower means of 2.55 and 2.23 respectively. (Question 54 was, “If another organization offered me a promotion or pay raise I would leave.” Question 57 was, “I don’t feel a sense of pride or accomplishment as a result of the work I do.”) This may indicate other problems within the AFMC PC community. For investigative question 8, if AFMC Product Center employees are more or less committed to the organization, the hypothesis that they are more committed as a result of the reorganization cannot be answered with this measurement tool.

The internal consistency for Organizational Commitment is .290; therefore, the measurement of Organizational Commitment was not reliable.
Table 8: Statistics for Organizational Commitment

<table>
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<th>Statistics</th>
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<th>Q56</th>
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</table>

**Correlations**

Correlations represent the extent to which two or more things are related to one another. The correlation coefficient shows the degree to which the variables are related. The correlation range is from -1 to +1 with zero representing no correlation. The Pearson Product Moment Correlation (Pearson r) shows the degree of linear relationship between two variables that have been measured on interval or ratio scales (Litwin, 1995).

In this research, all measures of the reorganization itself are statistically significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). The correlations between the four objectives and the general questions are all positive indicating that each of these measures vary together in the same direction (Table 9). This positive correlation is appropriate because the stronger any respondent may have felt about the reorganization in one area, the stronger the same respondent would most likely be in other areas as well.
### Table 9: Correlations

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<th>ObjectiveThree</th>
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** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

### Demographics

The demographics of respondents were not a consideration in measuring the success of the reorganization. This data was gathered primarily for comparisons between the three PCs, which is not possible because one of the PCs provided no responses to the web-based survey. ESC at Hanscom provided 38.4% of the responses, AAC at Eglin provided 59.1% of the responses, and ASC at Wright-Patterson provided 0.0% of the responses (2.5% of respondents did not answer this question).

Overall, respondents were primarily between 40-59 years of age, married, male, DoD civilians, and possess a graduate degree. Rank and AFSC varied greatly and showed no significant trends. Time in current position was primarily 0-5 years. Respondents spent a variety of years assigned in AFMC but primarily less than 0-5 years assigned outside of AFMC. Overall, the most common total time working for the Air
Force (both military and civilian) was 16-25 years. This data is broken down in Tables 10 through 18.

### Table 10: Age Dispersion

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<th>Age Group</th>
<th>19 or younger</th>
<th>20-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-49</th>
<th>50-59</th>
<th>60 or older</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
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<td>7.5%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
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### Table 11: Marital Status Dispersion

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<th>Divorced</th>
<th>Widowed</th>
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<td>76.1%</td>
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### Table 12: Civilian or Military Dispersion

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<th>Military Status</th>
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<th>Retired Military now Contractor</th>
<th>Active Officer (not prior)</th>
<th>Active Officer (prior)</th>
<th>Active Enlisted</th>
<th>Contractor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 13: Level of Education Dispersion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>GED/High School</th>
<th>Some College</th>
<th>Associates Degree</th>
<th>Bachelors Degree</th>
<th>Graduate Degree</th>
<th>Doctorate</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>.6%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 14: Time in Current Position Dispersion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>0-5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16-20</th>
<th>21-25</th>
<th>26-30</th>
<th>31-35</th>
<th>36 or More</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>.6%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 15: Years Assigned in AFMC Dispersion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>0-5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16-20</th>
<th>21-25</th>
<th>26-30</th>
<th>31-35</th>
<th>36 or More</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 16: Years in Other Air Force Commands Dispersion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>0-5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16-20</th>
<th>21-25</th>
<th>26-30</th>
<th>31-35</th>
<th>36 or More</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 17: Years Assigned to Secretariat or Headquarters USAF Dispersion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>0-5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16-20</th>
<th>21-25</th>
<th>26-30</th>
<th>31-35</th>
<th>36 or More</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>65.4%</td>
<td>.6%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18: Total Time Working for The Air Force (military and civilian duty) Dispersion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>0-5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16-20</th>
<th>21-25</th>
<th>26-30</th>
<th>31-35</th>
<th>36 or More</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Open-ended Questions

The survey data also included responses to open-ended questions number 72 –74; however, the focus was not on analyzing this data. The complete set of responses to these questions was a total of 209. For these three questions only, all 164 survey respondent responses were included. For question 72, 44% chose to answer and 56% did not provide any response (72 out of 164). For question 73, 52% chose to answer and 48% did not provide any response (85 out of 164). For question 74, 32% chose to answer and 68% did not provide any response (52 out of 164). In some answers, responses were edited to protect the anonymity of respondents.

Summary

Overall, measurement of the 2004 reorganization success indicated lack of a strong impact in any of the four objective or general areas measured. The measurements of job satisfaction and organizational commitment in relation to the reorganization were not valid. However, 209 comments indicate many other areas of concern within the AFMV PCs. Despite the lack of any significant statistical trends, conclusions can be drawn from this research that will be helpful for further analysis of this area in the future.
V. Discussion

The purpose of this chapter is to draw conclusions regarding the 2004 AFMC PC Reorganization. This research also generated recommendations for future research. As with all research, limitations were also identified.

Conclusions

This research indicates that the 2004 AFMC PC Reorganization did not have a significant impact in the areas identified by General Martin’s four objectives or in a general overview of the reorganization.

Job satisfaction and organizational commitment results were not valid based on the manner in which questions were presented. In not specifically instructing respondents to answer these sections based on the reorganization, the data collected was unable to answer the hypotheses. The job satisfaction section itself was a reliable measure but did not statistically measure in relation to the reorganization. This could certainly be duplicated with the emphasis placed on the reorganization in future studies. The organizational commitment section was not a reliable measure so it most likely could not be duplicated in the same form.

There could be many causes for the lack of significant impact of the reorganization. The primary cause may be that since the reorganization is still ongoing (and less than 15 months old), the desired effects may not be evident yet. There may also be the impact of General Martin’s retirement in August 2005. Since he was the change
agent, he was intimately familiar with all aspects of the reorganization process and status. His successor has many areas to become familiar with in a short time and the reorganization is just one. In contrast to the measured areas of the survey, although most respondents did not feel the reorganization had a significant impact, their responses to questions 72-74 indicate many areas of concern. It is these areas of concern that will be of value in future assessments of the reorganization.

**Recommendations**

During the course of this research there were five areas identified for future research opportunities: other surveys, civilian leadership, impact of a new AFMC/CC, acquisition metrics and organizational culture. They will be highlighted below.

First, since the reorganization is still ongoing there are five opportunities in the future where a survey could be a valuable tool for measurement:

- Fine-tuning this survey to be able to statistically measure ALL responses.
- A survey of all AFMC personnel when the reorganization is officially complete
- A follow-up survey for the PCs after the reorganization is complete
- A survey of the Air Logistic Centers
- A survey of AFMC customers (all-inclusive)

Second, a new area of concern as a result of the reorganization is the impact of civilian leadership within a base level military unit. It would be valuable to evaluate the effectiveness of operational civilian leadership as compared to operational military
leadership. The introduction of civilian leadership in military units has raised considerable controversy due to various reasons such as, potential changes in promotion rates as a result of the reorganization. This could be measured through a study of promotion rates among previously assigned (old duty titles) or current (new duty titles) AFMC personnel.

Third, there is the consideration that now General Martin has retired and AFMC is under a new commander. It will be interesting to observe the future process of the reorganization since its primary change agent, General Martin, is no longer in command. It is also often thought that every leader wants to leave a distinct legacy and perhaps this reorganization was General Martin’s. Looking into the impact of dynamic leadership changes made in an organization would be an excellent topic for another thesis.

Fourth, the development of metrics for the acquisition community would be another excellent way to measure success in AFMC. This has been attempted in various ways throughout history and one consistent measure, AFMC wide, would prove to be very valuable to measure effectiveness and efficiency. Currently, there is really no measure of success for acquisition programs in place. A good startup point would be to matrix the open-ended comments received (Appendices G, H and I) to determine the “priority” perceived by the respondents.

Lastly, the reorganization certainly had considerable organizational culture impacts on AFMC. Awareness of these types of changes and their affects on AFMC employees would be useful. Another assessment of job satisfaction and organizational commitment in relation to the reorganization could be completed individually or in conjunction with any of the other areas identified above.
The research, of course, had its own limitations that must be taken into consideration.

**Limitations**

There were four limitations identified in the completion of this research: the survey instrument, privacy act considerations, respondents were internal to AFMC and time constraints.

First, the use of survey in itself creates limitations. The respondents who chose to take the survey may have preconceived opinions about surveys that affected their responses. Respondents may also feel it necessary to respond in a particular manner based on their placement in the organization. Any number of unknown factors could have impacted the responses on the particular date and time a respondent chose to complete the survey. The data collected also represents only one point in time and was only collected via the survey instrument. Since the anonymity of respondents was completely preserved, this may have impacted the decision whether or not to complete the survey as well as the responses selected.

Second, in order to preserve the anonymity of respondents, assigned organizations were not obtained. The data could only be broken down into the PC assigned. It might be useful to have specific duty assignment positions with which to identify problem areas in the organizations. Currently, it is not possible to determine if there are significant problems in any one duty section.

Third, the survey was also only administered to current AFMC employees. This target audience could inadvertently left out valuable responses from personnel outside
AFMC. Responses from customers of AFMC were also not gathered. The reorganization impact on customers of AFMC may have been more significant than on AFMC employees.

Lastly, the survey was only available for response for a limited time period due to the constraints of the AFIT thesis timeline. It is possible a larger response could have been obtained if the survey was available for a longer period of time. The dissemination process used was not as effective as hoped. The first e-mail message sent out was sent to the PCs and the ALCs. This caused some confusion as the survey was only intended for the PCs. A follow up e-mail was sent out to clarify this point but there is no way to accurately assess how well the survey was disseminated. It may have been better for it to be sent out in a different manner.

In summary, great potential for future research was identified as well as building blocks for AFMC to further assess the success of reorganization objectives. The survey instrument developed, data collected, and conclusions reached in this research effort serve as a valuable contribution to the planned follow-up reorganization assessments HQ AFMC/A8M will be administering in the near future.
Historical Look at AFMC

Military leaders have been trying to figure out the best way to do things for as long as we can remember. Reorganizations, realignments, restructuring, and whatever the “buzz” word of the time seems to occur almost continuously. A great example of this attempt is the evolution of AFMC. It is the unique and diverse missions within AFMC that have so challenged military leaders for years and continue to do so today.

AFMC was established on 1 July 1992 with the combination of Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) and Air Force Systems Command (AFSC). AFLC and AFSC were not just merged together but integrated through their overlapping roles. The overarching goal of the merger was to manage weapon systems throughout their entire life cycle. One overarching command would now be responsible for “cradle-to-grave” management including research and development, acquisition and sustainment. The establishment of AFMC was based on “certain reoccurring issues…all stemmed from the common problem of finding an effective way to manage a weapon system throughout its life cycle” (Carlin, 1992). Unfortunately, the answer to this question changed frequently over the years depending on the leadership of the time. To understand the theory behind the creation of AFMC, it is helpful to look at AFMC from its earliest beginnings.

1900’s – 1940’s

When the Army Signal Corps controlled military aviation in 1917, the three basic functions of materiel support, research and development (R&D), supply and maintenance
and procurement and production were completely separate (Carlin, 1992). In the Army Air Corps years, R&D was mostly left to private industry and the Material Division unified the three remaining functions.

For most of World War II the Materiel Command (MC) handled procurement and the Air Service Command (ASC) handled logistics. Problems occurred when the MC and the ASC overlapped in functions. Senior leaders recognized the need for change and in 1944 combined the two commands into the Air Technical Service Command, which a year later was renamed the Air Materiel Command (AMC). The changing role of R&D throughout this process was best addressed by General Henry H. Arnold. He believed that science and technology was the key to an effective Air Force in the future (Carlin, 1992). This led to the decision to separate R&D from procurement and the subsequent establishment of the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) in 1950.

1950’s

The problem now was figuring out when each command would assume responsibility for a weapons system; there was no distinct dividing line between the commands. Offices became known as Joint Program Offices (JPO) and the two commands worked in conjunction on weapon systems. Division of funding and engineering and the issue of Program Management Responsibility Transfer (PMRT) were ongoing concerns. PMRT was designed to occur between the two commands when a weapon system moved into the sustainment phase. It was difficult to determine in the “cradle-to-grave” life of a weapon system, at what point would PMRT be shifted from one command to another. Often when a system shifted, too much knowledge and
background was essentially “left behind” in the old command despite the supposed JPO structure. In an effort to solve the responsibility problems between the commands, another organizational change occurred. The informal JPO structure was restructured to the Weapon System Program Office (WSPO) and was now tightly structured under several AF regulations. Still, the concern of whether R&D should be separate from acquisition lingered.

In 1959, General Curtis LeMay formed a study group, headed by General Samuel Anderson, to address the management of weapon support systems throughout their life cycle. This huge undertaking, known as the Anderson Committee, came up with several ideas to determine a concept of efficient weapon system management and any organizational changes needed to make the concept a reality. One leader of the time, General Mark Bradley, Jr., proposed minor realignment of functions versus reorganization. General Bradley felt this would improve the present way of doing business yet not make any fundamental changes. It was General Anderson who believed that fundamental change was necessary to fix what was broken and truly integrate development, procurement and production. General Bernard Schriever proposed one large acquisition command that was responsible for R&D and procurement and a separate command for logistic support. It was General Schriever’s belief that engineers and logisticians were not meant to be in competition with one another but actually represent the present and future of the service. In all, the Anderson Committee came up with four proposed courses of action and the Chief of Staff, General Thomas White, made the final selection. In 1960, the final report outlining the decision most closely resembled General Bradley’s proposal. Although General Anderson’s proposal to reunite ARDC and AMC
was not adopted at this time, it ended up happening some 31 years later with the creation of AFMC.

This led to the creation of a new series of AFRs starting with 375-1 that governed weapon system management. More importantly, it created the organization that remained in place in AFMC for over 40 years, the System Program Office (SPO). With the demise of the WSPO the SPO was lauded to be able to, “carry on concurrently a wide range of diverse yet highly integrated acquisition activities” (Carlin, 1992). This was the overarching goal of everyone involved.

1960’s

Another major change occurred in the Air Force in 1961 when the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, assigned the space mission to the Air Force. With the incorporation of this new mission, AMC and ARDC were renamed AFSC and AFLC. AFSC would handle R&D, procurement and production while AFLC would handle supply, maintenance, transportation, and procurement of spare parts and miscellaneous items. This change was very similar to both General Schriever’s un-adopted proposal during the Anderson Committee years and to the original format of ASC and MC sharing responsibility. It may have seemed unsure to some people whether we moved forward or took a step back in time with this change.

Although the creation of AFSC and AFLC created organizational stability, the concern over PMRT had to be addressed again. The AFLC commander at the time thought PMRT was a bad idea and that one manager should be responsible for both the development and modification/sustainment of a weapon system; too much knowledge
was lost when PMRT occurred. It also threw the budget into limbo for sometimes as long as two years because AFSC and AFLC were funded from different pots of money.

1970’s

In the early 1970’s, another study group was formed to look at the AFSC/AFLC processes and recommend improvements. Despite the research performed, no significant changes occurred and the organizational problems continued. In early 1978, with new AFSC and AFLC commanders in place, the problem of PMRT was again identified for improvements. The primary focus was to expedite the transfer of weapon system programs; over 60 programs were identified for transfer from AFSC to AFLC in the following three years. This was good start but more problems followed with the transfer of the TR-1 and the KC-10 aircrafts. The problems were so severe; another study group was formed to assess the program responsibility assignments of these weapon systems. This review group suggested a new format of single management of the entire program by one office. It was even suggested that perhaps this new format could apply to other weapon system programs in the future. AFSC thought this was a great idea but AFLC did not agree. AFLC suggested the systems selected were not good examples for this new template. AFSC showed otherwise with a good case example of the time, the B-52. Although the B-52 program had transferred to AFLC in 1965, AFSC was still providing continuous technical assistance that the program could not have been managed without.

1980’s
The latter part of the 1980s brought increased attention to the acquisition community. President Reagan’s arms buildup led to many reports of contractors severely overcharging the government and acquisition personnel letting it happen. Countless Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition studies flowed at the same time with little or no change until the Packard Commission.

The most important occurrence in acquisition during this time was the 1986 President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, more commonly known as the “Packard Commission” after its chairman Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard (Carlin, 1992). The reports from the Packard Commission set the tone for all future acquisition reports that followed. The primary problem identified by the Packard Commission was the lack of effective organization in the acquisition community; no DoD person, in charge of acquisition, existed to regulate the different branches of service.

The goal of the Packard Commission’s findings was to, “establish unambiguous authority for overall acquisition policy, clear accountability for acquisition execution, and plain lines of command for those with program management responsibilities” (Carlin, 1992). The position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition was established to oversee DoD acquisition. Each branch of the military would then appoint a Service Acquisition Executive as a subordinate. The Service Acquisition Executives would then appoint a PEO to manage a chosen group of weapon system programs. The direction for future acquisition reform efforts had been established.

In the same year, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. This act was designed to consolidate acquisition functions primarily
by strengthening civilian control over acquisition and reducing levels of bureaucracy in the Pentagon. This would reduce the duplication at the secretariat level and the Chief of Staff level. The new consolidated group was placed under the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition and was responsible for over 400 programs. The AF appointed eleven PEOs, mostly commanders of current acquisition organizations.

The next major step in acquisition reform occurred in 1989 with President George Bush’s National Security Review (NSR) 11. This instructed DoD to “develop a plan to accomplish full implementation of the recommendations of the Packard Commission and to realize substantial improvements…in defense management overall” (Cheney, 1989). The original structure was already in place and now Program Managers (PMs) were directed to report to their respective PEO on cost, schedule and performance of their respective programs. This change removed some of the responsibility from the service logistical commands and the systems acquisition commands. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney provided further instructions by recommending establishment of specially trained acquisition officers, and further consolidation and streamlining of existing acquisition and logistical organizations. Secretary Cheney stated that these changes would save the DoD approximately $30 billion by FY 93. Secretary Cheney and Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood held a press conference to share this information. It was during this conference that the first mention of merging AFSC and AFLC was presented. No answer was provided at that time because the Air Force would have to conduct a review to consider the possibility.

In the early summer of 1989, the McDonald-Loh study was instituted to study (not recommend for or against) the question of merging AFSC and AFLC into the
unnamed command of AFXX. The study was co-chaired by Lieutenant General Charles McDonald and Lieutenant General John Loh. The study identified three major categories that the functions of the two commands could be divided into; more of the functions were unique to each command than common between both commands. Some of the unique AFSC functions were initial system development, major system acquisition, management of the AF science and technology program, operation of AF test facilities and operation of the space launch system. Some of the unique AFLC functions were modifications, reliability and maintainability upgrades, the operation of a wholesale and retail supply system, and commodity acquisition. Common functions were resource allocation, planning and programming, contracting, the comptroller, program management and engineering.

The McDonald-Loh study also came up with two models of operations that could be implemented. The first was to simply have AFXX as oversight for the contracting activity, allocation of work and resources, management of professional development and training, management of the infrastructure and oversight of the logistics operations. PEOs and product division commanders would be one and the same. This clearly did not follow the new plan for acquisition reform. The second model, called NSR 11, would keep PEOs separate from product division commanders. The PEOs would manage all major acquisition programs with their own staff. The headquarters of AFXX would provide administrative support and direct logistics operations. The commanders of product divisions and ALCs would manage the “non-major” programs, support PEOs and PMs, and conduct logistics operations. This model complied with acquisition reform and directed a new command towards life cycle management of weapon systems. The main
concern with NSR 11 was the combination of so many diverse functions. The final result of the study was that the Air Force could implement NSR 11 with or without a merger of the commands. If the merger was chosen though, it would possibly yield substantial monetary savings and the AF would have to accomplish a merger very carefully.

At the same time, the commanders of AFSC and AFLC were voicing their opinions that a merger was a bad idea. In AFLC, General Alfred Hansen stated, “My concern is that we will take an efficient logistic structure and destroy it to fix an acquisition function that really needs only fine tuning in the AF” (DMR, 1989). The AFSC Commander, General Bernard Randolph, agreed. Both commanders presented success stories of improvements they were making within each command. AFLC was working on network modernization programs streamlining existing logistics processes. At the end of 1987, AFSC’s PEOs worked further toward fulfilling the Packard Commission goals with streamlining of their command procedures. Although the cases were valid, the possibility of increased functional efficiency and potential manpower savings was too strong. On 7 August 1989, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Larry Welch broke the news to the AFSC and AFLC commanders that a merger would occur.

Only a couple days later, the merger was put on the back burner as AFSC offered staff and command manpower reductions of ten percent instead. This counter offer would leave AFSC HQ with barely 800 personnel assigned. An AFSC command wide reduction of 5,000 slots was also projected for the coming years. AFLC followed suite and reduced its structure in the areas of staff offices (from 17 to seven), Defense Contracting Service (DCS) offices (from nine to five) and direct reporting units (from 23 to eight). The personnel reductions in AFLC HQ were projected to be almost 700 slots.
over the next two years. The total reductions in both commands were projected to eliminate almost 10,000 positions by the end of FY 94.

Although this effort was noted, the merger wasn’t cancelled. In the fall of 1989, the Comptroller for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) began releasing proposals called Defense Management Report Decisions (DMRD). These documents were designed to propose changes that would ultimately increase economy and efficiency. Some of the DMRDs seemed openly hostile to the future of AFSC and AFLC. One DMRD specifically, DMRD 943, called for eliminating most of AFSC and then combining the key staff with AFLC. The idea for AFLC to absorb AFSC was based on its larger size and purportedly better organization than AFSC. The proposed savings by FY 97 were estimated at $562M and a position reduction of approximately 1,300. DMRD 943 stalled in the Pentagon in late fall of 1990, but by December 1990 talk of creating a new acquisition and support command was shared with the key players. Neither command was to be absorbed by the other but a whole new command created in their place. The final decision to merge AFLC and AFSC can be attributed to SECAF Donald Rice in early November 1990.

1990’s

General McDonald, Commander of AFSC, and General Ronald Yates, Commander of AFLC, were tasked to come up with an integration plan for the combining of their two respective commands. It was determined there were four overall objectives: (1) to integrate the work force and resources of the two commands, (2) improve the existing business practices by providing a completely integrated weapon system
management process throughout a weapon system’s life cycle and (3) to provide a single face to operational commands that covers all aspects of integrated weapon system management and (4) establish a clear line of accountability and responsibility (Carlin, 1992). Five goals were also identified: to provide total weapon system support to users, to enhance the excellence of the work force, to nurture aerospace technology, to fulfill all aerospace logistics needs, and to establish a world class quality organization and infrastructure. Even with clear objectives and goals, it was challenging to combine the personnel of two commands who had previously looked at weapon systems from different perspectives. The official announcement of the merger was on 3 January 1991, with scheduled steps to the establishment of the new command on 1 July 1992. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB) was chosen over Andrews Air Force Base as the HQ location.

The initial cost projection for the merger was $14 million, primarily for movement of personnel to Ohio, both civilian and military. The groundwork for the new command was performed by a special team, unofficially referred to as the “Magnificent 11.” The team consisted of four AFSC members, four AFLC members, two Air Staff members and one member from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The team did an outstanding job anticipating problems, using historical lessons, and ultimately building the new command. They also selected the final name choice, AFMC from a list of five options that were presented to Secretary Rice a few months prior.

The team broke their job down into special tasks in the format of a Work Breakdown Structure. The team considered their primary tasks to organize the HQ and to find a way to implement Integrated Weapon System Management (IWSM). Organization
of the headquarters was tackled by Mr. Keith Dumas (Assistant DSC Plans and Programs from AFLC) and Brig Gen John Nauseef (DCS Financial Management from AFSC). Dumas-Nauseef decided to have each of the deputy and assistant chiefs design their own offices with guidance letters for assistance. Quality was designed into the new format instead of inspecting for quality after the fact. The guidance letters were a tool to ensure, “the headquarters offices conformed to the basic stipulations of the new command” (Carlin, 1992, p. 43). This included answering a detailed questionnaire as a requirement with your final input of proposed ideas. For the issues that needed to be settled, it was determined a meeting of all the senior officials was necessary. An advisory committee was formed of senior leaders (EXCOM) to work with Dumas-Nauseef. Several meetings were held that united the senior officers from AFSC and AFLC as a new command. With all this oversight, General Meyer was concerned the EXCOM might stifle the creativity of the integration team (Carlin, 1992, p. 45). General Yates again emphasized to the integration team to remember to be creative.

It was time to start moving people to Ohio but a concern was raised about assigning everyone to AFLC just because it was already there. Instead, a provisional AFMC headquarters was established at WPAFB to start the process. In this way, personnel would become part of AFMC instead of either command feeling absorbed by the other. The provisional headquarters lasted from 15 April 1991 to 30 June 1992. While in effect, the skeleton staff of the provisional headquarters laid the groundwork for each type of office in preparation for their successors. The heart of the provisional headquarters included financial management, manpower and personnel. Along with this, the concept of integrated staff ensured AFSC and AFLC functional chiefs prepared joint
transition plans for the phased transfer of people and tasks into the new headquarters (Carlin, 1992, p. 47). This ended up being very successful. As the different areas were divided into groups, DCS/Requirements stood out as the organization that would truly blend the perspectives of the two old commands. DCS/Science and Technology brought in the AFSC side while DCS/Logistics brought the AFLC portion. The final structure of the new command was completed on 21 May 1991 and approved by General Meyer with only slight modifications on 6 September 1991.

Manpower considerations also had to be addressed. The combined force of AFSC and AFLC was approximately 2,600 people. It was decided this figure would gradually decrease over the next year to avoid a reduction-in-force (RIF) to get to the goal of 2,100. AFSC previously had an almost equal number of military and civilians; AFLC previously had significantly more civilians than military. Generals Yates and McDonald agreed to 30% military and 70% civilian ratio for AFMC. Of course, the entire relocation process was significantly harder for the AFSC folks who were not already in Ohio. They were concerned about having to move and that AFMC might just be AFLC "disguised." General Yates announced that all civilians willing to move to Ohio were guaranteed a job in the new command. If a civilian job was considered a transfer of function (TOF) (not a job already in Ohio), employees who chose not to move would not have RIF rights and would be placed in other positions at Andrews Air Force Base. If a civilian job was not a TOF, employees declining to move were given RIF rights. AFSC personnel were moved to another temporary organization known as Detachment One until they could be assigned to AFMC. Out of the 538 civilians who could have moved, 424 chose not to
move. This 79% non-relocation of personnel alleviated a lot of other potential concerns about a huge influx of personnel.

**Integrated Weapon System Management Challenges**

The greatest challenge of the new command was Integrated Weapon System Management (IWSM), labeled the heart of AFMC by General Yates and General McDonald. Of the one and a half years spent on formal planning and preparation for the new command, three months were dedicated to developing the basic concept of IWSM. General Alfred Hansen, the AFLC Commander from 1987-1989, strove to remove seams and disconnects from logistical functions and was the first to use the term IWSM (Carlin, 1992). The position of system Program Manager (PM) was created to strengthen the control of PMs in the 1980’s. Over the years, the term IWSM expanded to include more than just logistical functions. An AFLC Process Action Team announced that their overall objective was to “baseline requirements processes as they should work in the product division concept to position and empower the weapon system management organization to act more like a SPO.” (Carlin, 1992 p 58) This new concept was expanded as the two commands were joined. It appeared AFLC was becoming more like AFSC in operating principles. IWSM was defined as “empowering a single manager with authority over the widest range of weapons system program decisions and resources to satisfy customer requirements throughout the life cycle of that weapon system.” (Carlin, 1992 p 59) Certainly there was risk in the single manager approach but in the end it was concluded that it possesses the same leaders and personnel with an approved organizational structure and communications. Integration planners had high hopes for
the possibility of a single manager being responsible for weapon systems from cradle to
grave, presenting a single face to the user, eliminating the need for PMRT and creating a
seamless organization. Hopefully, this single manager concept would also fully integrate
logistics support for initial and replenishment supplies. In order to turn this concept into
a reality, eight core processes were identified to fit all the elements of managing a
weapon system. The final list consisted of: Requirements, Management, Financial
Management, Systems Engineering and Configuration Management, Test and Evaluation,
Contracting, Technology Insertion, and Logistics.
Integrated Weapon System Management Development

After three months of developing IWSM, the next 15 months (April 1991 – June 1992) were dedicated to examining and documenting the processes that would make the IWSM concept work. This time period of “Process Development” consisted of four phases. First there was program analysis to examine the sub-processes involved in each program to integrate a way to manage that program by each process. Second, program integration identified management tasks, the most effective organization and responsibilities, and location of the designated single manager for each program. Third, the process analysis phase consisted of Process Action Teams (PAT) looking at each of the eight core processes. Lastly, in process integration, the findings of the PATs would be utilized to facilitate the establishment and continuing operation of the new command. (Carlin, 1992, p 61) The whole process was outlined in a roadmap as a type of charter for the development of IWSM.

The IWSM project managers had their own tasking, to select programs as candidates to test the new approach. Programs selected were required to be connected to both AFLC and AFSC, representative of activities performed at both logistic and product centers, representative of all phases of the life cycle, and made up a variety of weapon systems, items and customers served. The final selection consisted of 16 weapon system programs. As recommendations were made for single manager locations, the IWSM steering committee realized it had to identify its vision of the long-term relationship of logistics and product centers. It came up with six possible options but found that it was not easy to come to an agreement of how to organize the new command. Some of the
discussions were very heated as workload and jobs became key factors. The committee did not want to see the logistic centers become only repair depots with all program management ending up at the product centers. On the other hand, if program management automatically moved with the system when it became operational, product centers could end up almost non-existent.

General Yates and General McDonald spent several weeks reviewing the issues raised by the IWSM steering committee. They revised the roadmap and produced a new memorandum of agreement to outline changes to the future course of IWSM. It was decided that the program managers would initially be placed at the product centers but would work closely with the logistics centers as well. When a program reached “maturity,” the manager would move with the program to the logistics center. Programs that had already been partially or completely transferred would be handled individually. Another major change was the inclusion of Air Force Communications Command (AFCC) in the IWSM experiment; this would add 5 additional AFCC programs to the 16 test programs selected for IWSM. The question of AFCC’s fate had already been under discussion with the combination of AFLC and AFSC. A study was undertaken to look at “organizational alternatives leading to the merger of AFSC/AFLC/AFCC C4 elements under AFMC.” (Carlin, 1992, p 68)

Integrated Weapon System Management Obstacles

As the IWSM experiment progressed, various obstacles arose. Valuable time was wasted when it was initially assumed that the IWSM steering committee would designate...
the single managers. In reality, only the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, John J. Welch, Jr. had the authority to do this. There were also different procedures in place in the different commands that would need to be reorganized. Some of the affected processes involved contracting, systems engineering, configuration management, and technology insertion. The overall goal was a clear, consistent approach that all parties could agree on. One of the largest problems was financial management. In the past, Congress gave large sums of money to AFSC for development of a product that it could spend freely; AFLC was not given the same freedom. Its money was divided in separate pots for separate functions; this made it difficult to transfer funds between pots. Sorting out all the funding issues was a huge challenge.

By the end of 1991, the 21 candidate programs were well on their way into the IWSM approach. A second edition of the roadmap was also produced to include what had happened so far. This document defined the SPO as “the integrated AFMC organization responsible for cradle to grave military system management” (Carlin, 1992). The System Program Director (SPD) was defined as “the individual in an AFMC SPO who is ultimately responsible and accountable for decisions and resources in overall program execution…the single face to the user who oversee the seamless processes…the SPC is the designated title for the single manager of a program who reports to a PEO or Designated Acquisition Commander.” (Carlin, 1992)

Along with Roadmap II, a White Paper was put out by General Yates and General McDonald on the IWSM effort, the future of the Air Force and the pending establishment of AFMC. Policy formulation ensued and continued through AFMC’s activation. Still a
lingering concern was the management position of the logistics centers, which was not clearly stated.

**AFMC: The New Command**

During the creation of AFMC on 11 July 1992, the IWSM controversy remained intense. That same day, Secretary Rice and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Merrill McPeak, produced a policy memorandum on their views of the roles of the product and logistic centers. As soon as General Yates took command of AFMC he issued a policy letter to clear up any misunderstanding regarding management. Weapon system management would be conducted at both product and logistics centers. The extent to how this would be implemented was the only part that was still undefined. This unresolved issue simmered for the next several years.

Three key elements of AFSC were used as the backbone of AFMC strategic planning. The first was known as Command Management Framework. This consisted of four major parts of AFMC’s mission: science and technology, systems acquisition, test and evaluation, and base operating support. The goal was to focus attention where it was needed for success in these areas. The second was a quarterly conference called Horizons. Each conference would address one of the four mission areas so all four would be covered each year. The third was the implementation of metrics. Although it was clear that metrics should be a tool for measuring progress toward a goal, no specific structure was specified.
For the entire year prior to AFMC activation, General Yates conducted off sites specifically to address the new command. These four conferences created the statements of mission, vision, goals and objectives endorsed by the commander. The group was focused on providing lasting capabilities to AFMC customers. Some obstacles were found in decreasing workforce and funding levels; increasing environmental costs; lack of funding flexibility; the size, diversity and complexity of the command they were creating; and the sheer number of initiatives that were being proposed in the name of the new command. (Carlin, 1992) After much discussion, five goals were decided upon that were broad enough to apply to the entire command. The AFMC vision was also developed, “Be an integrated team delivering and sustaining the best products for the world’s best Air Force.” (Carlin, 1992) The mission statement developed was, “Through integrated management of research, development, test, acquisition, and support we advance and use technology to acquire and sustain superior systems in partnership with our customers. We perform continuous product and process improvement throughout the life cycle. As an integral part of the Air Force war fighting team, we contribute to affordable combat superiority, readiness and sustainability” (Carlin, 1992). It was decided that the objectives had to be not only meaningful, but quantifiable and measurable, applicable throughout the command, understandable at all levels, be of enduring importance, reflect consensus, contain a target date for completion when appropriate, and be directly related to the five goals. The hard part was figuring out how to measure progress towards a goal. General Yates himself observed that, “we can expect to revise the metrics 100 times.” (Carlin, 1992)
As the activation date drew closer, General Yates remained focused on integrating acquisition and logistics into one unified command. Logistics was renamed sustainment and the proposed direction included integrated processes between the two areas. This would continue to evolve as the new command matured.

In 1998, a group of senior AFMC planners undertook a reexamination of the roles, responsibilities and relationships within the organizational structure of the command. (Carlin 2001) This new concept was titled Centers of Excellence (COE). It was realized that AFMC was not operating as efficiently as it should be and IWSM was not working as designed. In some ways, AFLC and AFSC were still operating independently within AFMC. After designing a new framework, the whole idea was completely abandoned as AFMC feared congressional opposition to making changes.

A major incident occurred in 1998 that caused a new look at the engineering of a weapon system. A B-1B bomber crash, due to a fire in the plane’s electrical system, started an inquiry into the safety engineering of the system. The assignment and understanding of responsibility for this accident was questioned; AFMC was the owner of the weapon system and therefore considered responsible for its flight and ground safety.

General George Babbitt, AFMC Commander at the time, pronounced the PEO system to be a dysfunctional mechanism that worked because people made it work. (Carlin, 2001) General Babbitt felt that the reporting responsibilities of single managers needed clarification. This was a question AFMC thought they had answered back in 1992. He directed product center technical responsibility for comprehensive insight into their product line, including periodic evaluation of a product line’s technical “health” and
the chief engineer in support of a single manager is responsible and accountable for the
operational safety, suitability, and effectiveness of their weapon system throughout the
life cycle. (Carlin, 2001)

In July 2001, AFMC sponsored the creation of the Depot Maintenance Review
Team (DMRT). Their primary objectives were to improve depot maintenance support to
the warfighter and improve depot maintenance financial performance (McCoy, 2003).
The depots focused on reengineering their processes to reduce flow time and increase
production. The original DMRT evolved into Depot Maintenance Reengineering and
Transformation, which looked at workload and production, workforce, materiel support,
financial management, infrastructure, information technology, organizational structure
and metrics.

With the tragedy of September 11, 2001 still fresh in everyone's minds, AFMC
took another look at the way they did business.

General Lester Lyles, AFMC Commander at this time, stated "The
administration is setting new priorities and a new strategy for the nation's
defense. The recent terrorist attacks on America dramatically and tragically
emphasized the need for these changes. We in AFMC need to help shape and
lead that change by acquiring and sustaining the new capabilities the Air
Force will need in the future to maintain its dominant combat edge. If we're
to continue providing world class materiel support to our customers, we must
clearly understand their changing requirements and periodically review how
we do business," (Faulkner, 2001).

To fulfill the mission of homeland defense is a two-step process for AFMC. First
is the "pull" where the warfighter establishes requirements for new technologies. Then
comes the "push" when AFMC provides the solution. AFMC has many technological
programs and initiatives that can be provided at increased speed when there is a
requirement and funding is made available. AFMC has sustained the capabilities that were dominant in major conflicts like Desert Storm, Deliberate Force, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (Martin, 2004i). Through the establishment of the Homeland Defense and Combat Support Sector within XP, AFMC hopes to ensure 24/7 capability to respond to critical requests.
Appendix B: Survey Instrument

2004 AFMC Product Center
Reorganization Survey

**Purpose:** The purpose of this survey is threefold: (1) to determine if the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has met General Martin’s four intended objectives, (2) its effects on AFMC employee job satisfaction and (3) to gather some general opinions about the reorganization. The four objectives are clearly stated within the survey itself.

The data collected will be used to identify any areas that may need additional attention as a result of the reorganization. The analysis of the data collected, corresponding research, and conclusions reached will be documented within a current AFIT student thesis.

This survey has been endorsed by HQ AFMC/XPM for distribution throughout the AFMC Product Centers. To access the survey simply click on the link listed below. The survey itself should take no longer than 10 minutes.

**Participation:** Your COMPLETELY VOLUNTARY participation is greatly appreciated. Your decision to not participate or to withdraw from participation will not jeopardize your relationship with the Air Force Institute of Technology, the U.S. Air Force, or the Department of Defense.

**Confidentiality:** We ask for some demographic information in order to interpret results more accurately; ALL ANSWERS ARE ANONYMOUS. No one other than the research team will see your completed survey. Various reports summarizing trends may be published as part of the thesis process.

**Contact information:** Any questions or comments about the survey, please contact Capt Joy Mikulcik at joy.mikulcik@afit.edu.

**Web Link to Survey:** XXXXXXXXXXXXX

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Captain Joy Mikulcik

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Phone: DSN 785-3636, ext. 6553, commercial (937) 255-3636, ext. 6553
Fax: DSN 986-4699; commercial (937) 656-4699

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84
Please respond to the following statements based on the scale provided:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**General Martin’s Objective 1:** We wanted to strengthen support to operational commands and warfighters in the field. AFMC’s number one job is to deliver war-winning capabilities on time and on cost. If we can’t do this for all weapon systems then we are no adding value.

1. I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has succeeded in strengthening support to operational commands (ACC, USAFE, PACAF, AFSOC, AMC, AFSPC)
2. I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has succeeded in strengthening support to warfighters in the field
3. My organization has experienced improvements in cost management as a result of the reorganization
4. My organization has experienced improvements in schedule management as a result of the reorganization
5. My organization has experienced improvements in its ability to deliver war winning capabilities as a result of the reorganization
6. I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has strengthened our support to operational commands because they better understand where and how to find acquisition assistance

**General Martin’s Objective 2:** We must continue supporting and maturing the PEO realignment. This will continue the age-old debate of when an acquisition program shifts into the sustainment phase.

7. Overall, I feel well informed of the PEO realignment changes
8. I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has supported the PEO realignment
9. I feel the PEO realignment has matured as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization
10. I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has detracted from supporting the PEO realignment
11. I am well informed of the changes in PEO functional areas
12. I am well informed of the changes in PEO chain of command
13. I feel when the PEO functions were less effective when they were in Washington, DC (SAF/AQ)
14. I feel PEO functions are now at the right levels in AFMC
15. My organization has experienced significant changes in acquisition program management as a result of the PEO realignment
16. I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has improved our communication with SAF/AQ
Please respond to the following statements based on the scale provided:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Martin’s Objective 3:</strong> The need to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major commands operate. The incorporation of the standard wing/group/squadron structure will make it easier for people to understand AFMC. It will also ease in identification of responsibilities of each organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has successfully restructured AFMC similar to all other Air Force MAJCOMS</td>
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<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>I support the standardization of wing, group and squadron titles</td>
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<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>My organizational structure positively changed as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization</td>
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<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>I clearly understand the new structure</td>
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<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>My reporting chain positively changed as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>I clearly understand my new reporting chain</td>
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<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>I have a positive opinion about the removal of the organizational title “System Program Office (SPO)”</td>
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<td>24.</td>
<td>I feel the new structure allows me to work more effectively</td>
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<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>I feel the new structure allows me to work more efficiently</td>
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<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>I feel the new structure makes it easier for other MAJCOMs to find and communicate with AFMC offices</td>
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**General Martin’s Objective 4:** We must structure the command with a capability-based versus platform-based focus. Rather than having separate organizations for every weapon system, they will be grouped based on similar capabilities. Platforms can then share the responsibility and knowledge base among similar systems.

| 27. | I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has successfully created a capability-based versus platform-based focus |
| 28. | I felt the previous platform-based focus was working well for AFMC |
| 29. | I feel the new capability-based focus is working well for AFMC |
| 30. | I feel my organization is now grouped more effectively with other capabilities |
| 31. | I feel my organization is now grouped more efficiently with other capabilities |
| 32. | I feel the new capability-based focus makes it easier to communicate and share ideas across programs |
Please respond to the following statements based on the scale provided:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**General Questions:**
33. I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has met its intended objectives
34. The 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has improved my morale at work
35. I feel the Product Centers are more effective under the new structure
36. I feel the Product Centers are more efficient under the new structure
37. I feel my organization has adapted fairly easily to changes related to the reorganization
38. I feel I was well informed about the objectives/goals of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization PRIOR to any actual changes occurring
39. I feel I was well informed about the actual changes that would occur in the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization PRIOR to any actual changes occurring

**Job satisfaction questions:**
40. I am satisfied with my current job
41. The amount of work I am expected to do at my job is reasonable
42. I am satisfied with the amount of resources I have to do my job
43. I feel my job is important to the organization
44. I get a sense of satisfaction from the work I do
45. I can get my job done in a normal duty day timeframe (8 hours)
46. I am proud to work in AFMC
47. I am satisfied with the level of work required for my job
48. I know what my job responsibilities are
49. I often have to bend a rule or policy to get the job done
50. I am able to act independently of my supervisor in performing my job
51. I can help in making decisions, which affects my work in a positive manner
52. I don’t mind spending additional hours at work to complete my tasks

**Organizational Commitment:**
53. I feel secure with my job as long as I am getting the work done
54. If another organization offered me a promotion or pay raise I would leave
55. Management at my organization acts sincerely
56. I really feel as if the organizations problems are my problems as well
57. I don’t feel a sense of pride or accomplishment as a result of the work I do
58. I feel I have too few options to consider leaving this organization
Demographics:
59. What is your age?
   o 19 or younger
   o 20-29
   o 30-39
   o 40-49
   o 50-59
   o 60 or older
60. What is your gender?
   o Male
   o Female
61. What is your marital status?
   o Single
   o Married
   o Divorced
   o Widowed
62. Civilian or Military?
   o DoD Civilian
   o Retired military member now working as a civilian
   o Retired military member now working as a contractor
   o Active duty officer (not prior enlisted)
   o Active duty officer (prior enlisted)
   o Active duty enlisted
   o Contractor
63. Rank? _____
64. AFSC/Occupational Code? _____
65. Level of Education?
   o GED/High School
   o Some College
   o Associated Degree
   o Bachelors Degree
   o Graduate Degree
   o Doctorate
   o Other
66. Time in current position? _____ year(s) _____ months
67. Years assigned in AFMC(includes AF Systems Cmd and/or AF Logistics Command)? _____ year(s) _____ months
68. Years in other Air Force Commands? _____ year(s) _____ months
69. Years assigned to Secretariat or Headquarters for the USAF? _____ year(s) _____ months
70. Total time working for the Air Force (combine military and civilian duty)? _____ year(s) _____ months
71. What is your current AFMC Product Center duty location:
   o Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
   o Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom AFB, MA
   o Air Armament Center, Eglin AFB, FL
Open ended questions:
72. What is working well for you as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization?
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
73. Please identify any areas of concern for you as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
74. Please tell us anything else about your experience with the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization that you think we should know for future reorganization improvement.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

Definitions:
Matured - to evolve toward or reach full development
Successfully - having succeeded or being marked by a favorable outcome
Effective - producing or capable of producing a desired effect
Efficient - acting or producing effectively with a minimum of waste, expense, or unnecessary effort or exhibiting a high ratio of output to input
Capability Based - grouped by like use, design or specific purpose (fighter attack, training, etc.)
Platform Based - each item has its own intended military structure or vehicle and typically does not share information with others
Appendix C: Human Subjects Training Certification

Tuesday, December 20, 2005

CITI Course Completion Record
for Joy Mikulcik

To whom it may concern:

On 12/20/2005, Joy Mikulcik (username=jmikulcik; Employee Number=) completed all CITI Program requirements for the Basic CITI Course in The Protection of Human Research Subjects.

Learner Institution: U.S. Air Force

Learner Group: Group 5

Learner Group Description: This course is suitable for investigators and staff conducting research with human subjects at the AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY (AFRL) and for investigators and staff at other sites conducting RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, AND EVALUATION (RDT&E) activities with human subjects.

Contact Information:
Gender: Female
Please Provide Your Current Performance Site: USAF Research Laboratory at Wright Patterson AFB
Department: AFIT
Which course do you plan to take?: Air Force Research Laboratory Course
Role in human subjects research: Student Researcher
Mailing Address:

Email: joysjm@sbcglobal.net
Office Phone: 937-848-4423
Home Phone:

The Required Modules for Group 5 are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Module</th>
<th>Date completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>12/19/05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
History and Ethical Principles - SBR  12/19/05
Privacy and Confidentiality - SBR  12/19/05
Basic Institutional Review Board (IRB) Regulations and Review Process  12/20/05
Informed Consent  12/20/05
Social and Behavioral Research for Biomedical Researchers  12/20/05
Records-Based Research  12/20/05
Research With Protected Populations - Vulnerable Subjects: An Overview  12/20/05
International Research  12/20/05
Workers as Research Subjects-A Vulnerable Population  12/20/05
Conflicts of Interest in Research Involving Human Subjects  12/20/05
U.S. Air Force  12/20/05

Additional optional modules completed:  
Defining Research with Human Subjects - SBR  12/20/05

For this Completion Report to be valid, the learner listed above must be affiliated with a CITI participating institution. Falsified information and unauthorized use of the CITI course site is unethical, and may be considered scientific misconduct by your institution.
Paul Braunschweiger Ph.D.
Professor, University of Miami
Director Office of Research Education
CITI Course Coordinator
MEMORANDUM FOR AFIT/ENV
    AFIT/ENR
    AFRL/HEH
    IN TURN

FROM: AFIT/ENV/GRD


1. Request exemption from Human Experimentation Requirements of AFI 40-402 for the proposed 2004 AFMC Product Center (PC) Reorganization Survey (attached) to be conducted in conjunction with thesis research at the Air Force Institute of Technology. Purpose of this study is to determine if the 2004 reorganization of AFMC PCs has successfully met the AFMC/CC’s four key objectives: to strengthen support to operational commands and warfighters in the field, to continue supporting and maturing the PEO realignment, to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major commands operate and to structure the command with a capability-based versus platform-based focus. The results of this study will be utilized by AFMC/XPM as input data for SAF/AQ to gauge the success of the PC reorganization.

2. This request is based on the Code of Federal Regulations, title 32, part 219, section 101, paragraph (b) (2): Research activities that involve human subjects will be exempt when the research involves the use of survey procedures provided (i) information obtained cannot be directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects, and (ii) disclosure of subjects' responses does not place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability, financial strain, employability or reputation ruin.

Methodology used to collect information for organizational theory research is based on survey procedures. The following information is provided to show cause for such an exemption:

2.1. Equipment and facilities: No special equipment or facilities will be used.

2.2. Subjects: Subjects will be employees of AFMC Product Centers. HQ AFMC/XPM will send the link to the web-based survey, via electronic mail, to the Product Center commanders for distribution to all employees.
2.3. Timeframe: Data will be collected via online survey over a period of 5-10 days

2.4. Description of the survey: The survey is broken down into seven main sections to measure different areas: Objective 1, Objective 2, Objective 3, Objective 4, job satisfaction, organizational commitment and demographics. Each section has specific measurable variables selected based on their correlation to the overall section descriptor. Personal information will remain anonymous.

2.5. Data collected: No identifying information, such as names or social security numbers, will be obtained through this survey. Data collected on individual subjects includes: Age, Gender, Marital Status, Civilian or Military, Rank, Years of Education, Duty Location, Years in Job, Years in AFMC, Prior Military Service, Years in AF/government work, etc. All final data will be reported collectively.

2.6. Informed consent: Subjects selected will include all employees of the AFMC Product Centers. Since respondents will only answer voluntarily there is a concern that the response will be biased. No adverse action will be taken against those who choose not to participate. Subjects are made aware of the nature and purpose of the research, sponsors of the research, and disposition of the survey results. A copy of the Privacy Act Statement of 1974 is presented for their review.

2.7. Risks to Subjects: Individual responses of the subjects will not be disclosed. This eliminates any risks to the subjects as noted in paragraph 2. There are no anticipated medical risks associated with this study.

3. If you have any questions about this request, please contact the Faculty Advisor, Major Carolyn Macola – Phone 785-3636 x4511; E-mail – Carolyn.macola@afit.edu or the Graduate Student, Captain Joy Mikulcik – Phone 684-7652, E-mail – joy.mikulcik@afit.edu.

//signed//
JOY D. MIKULCIK, Capt, USAF
Graduate Student, AFIT/ENV/GRD

//signed//
CAROLYN M. MACOLA, Maj, USAF
Faculty Advisor, AFIT/ENV

Attachment:
2004 AFMC Product Center Reorganization Survey
MEMORANDUM FOR AFIT/ENV
AFIT/ENR
AFIT/HEH
IN TURN

FROM: AFIT/ENV/GRD


2. Therefore, please amend as follows:
   a. Please remove the attachment that was submitted originally and replace with the survey attached. Attached is a revision of the original proposal. The revisions include 1) the deletion of one of the survey questions, (“Unit currently assigned to),” and 2) change of spacing of questions to improve readability

3. If you have any questions about this request, please contact Capt Joy D. Mikulcik (Joy.Mikulcik@afit.edu) or Maj Carolyn M. Macola (937)255-3636 ext. 7386 (Carolyn.Macola@afit.edu)

//signed//
Joy D. Mikulcik, Capt, USAF
Graduate Student, AFIT/ENV/GRD

//signed//
Carolyn M. Macola, Maj, USAF
Faculty Advisor, AFIT/ENV

Attachment: 2004 AFMC Product Center Reorganization Survey
MEMORANDUM FOR: Joy D. Mikulcik, Capt, USAF  
AFIT/ENV/GRD  

FROM: AFRL/Wright Site Institutional Review Board  

SUBJECT: Request for exemption from human experimentation requirements  


3. The above protocol has been reviewed by the AFRL Wright Site IRB and determined to be exempt from IRB oversight and human subject research requirements per 32 CFR 219.101(b)(2) which exempts "research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior."  

4. Data collection for this study can begin immediately. The IRB must be notified if there is any change to the design or procedures of the research to be conducted. Otherwise, no further action is required.  

5. For questions or concerns, please contact the IRB administrator, Helen Jennings at (937) 255-0311 x232 or helen.jennings@wpafb.af.mil. All inquiries and correspondence concerning this protocol should include the protocol number and name of the primary investigator.

JEFFREY BIDINGER, Maj, USAF, MC, FS  
Chair, AFRL/Wright Site IRB
MEMORANDUM FOR AFPC/DPSAS

FROM: CAPTAIN JOY MIKULCIK

SUBJECT: Request for Survey Control Number for 2004 Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) Product Center Reorganization Survey

1. Please consider this letter as a formal request for a survey control number. As part of my graduate degree thesis I would like to conduct a web-based survey. The tentative administration date for the survey is November 2005.

2. Pursuant to AFI 36-2601, paragraph 2, the following information is provided:

   2.1 State the purpose and justification for the proposed research (include name of AF sponsor and how agency will benefit from the survey findings): The purpose of this study is to determine if the 2004 reorganization of AFMC PCs has successfully met the AFMC/CC’s four key objectives: to strengthen support to operational commands and warfighters in the field, to continue supporting and maturing the PEO realignment, to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major commands operate and to structure the command with a capability-based versus platform-based focus. Sponsorship of this survey is provided by HQ AFMC/XPM, Colonel Dan Badger and Lieutenant Colonel Kimberly Daeger.

   2.2 Indicate how you will use the survey results: The results of this study will be utilized by AFMC/XPM as input data for SAF/AQ to gauge the success of the PC reorganization and for me personally to fulfill the thesis requirement for graduation from the Air Force Institute of Technology with a masters degree in Research and Development Management in March 2006.

   2.3. Provide a POC with phone number: If you have any questions about this request, please contact my Faculty Advisor, Major Carolyn Macola – Phone 785-3636 x4511; E-mail – Carolyn.macola@afit.edu or myself, Captain Joy Mikulcik – Phone 684-7652, E-mail – joy.mikulcik@afit.edu.

   2.4. Identify which population is of interest, how large the proposed sample size is, and how the sample will be selected: Subjects selected will include all employees (civilian, military and contractors) of the AFMC Product Centers. Their responses will be completely voluntary. The approximate number of personnel contacted will be 5,250. This includes approximately 850 personnel at the Air Armament Center (AAC), Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; approximately 2,450 personnel at the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC), Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; and approximately 1,950 personnel at the Electronic Systems Center (ESC), Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts.
2.5 Tell how you expect to collect the data, such as computer-administered survey, mail-out survey, etc.: Data will be collected via online survey over a period of 5-10 days.

2.6 Provide a copy of the proposed data collection instrument: Please see attachment.

2.7 Specify when and how often people will be surveyed: Respondents will only be surveyed once, tentatively scheduled for early November.

3. If you have any questions about this request, please contact me directly at (937) 684-7652 or via e-mail at joy.mikulcik@afit.edu. Thank you for your help

//signed//
JOY D. MIKULCIK, Capt, USAF
Graduate Student, AFIT/ENV/GRD

Attachments:
1. 2004 AFMC Product Center Reorganization Survey
2. Human Subjects Request for Exemption Letter
3. Amendment to the Human Subjects Request for Exemption Letter
MEMORANDUM FOR AFPC/DPSAS

FROM: CAPTAIN JOY MIKULCIK

SUBJECT: Amendment to Request for Survey Control Number for the 2004 Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) Product Center Reorganization Survey


2. Changes include the addition of one question:

71. What is your current AFMC Product Center duty location?
   - Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
   - Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom AFB, MA
   - Air Armament Center, Eglin AFB, FL

3. If you have any questions about this request, please contact Capt Joy D. Mikulcik (937) 684-7652 (Joy.Mikulcik@afit.edu) or Maj Carolyn M. Macola (937) 255-3636 ext. 4511 (Carolyn.Macola@afit.edu)

//signed//
Joy D. Mikulcik, Capt, USAF
Graduate Student, AFIT/ENV/GRD

//signed//
Carolyn M. Macola, Maj, USAF
Faculty Advisor, AFIT/ENV

Attachment: 2004 AFMC Product Center Reorganization Survey
MEMORANDUM FOR CAPT JOY D. MIKULCIK

FROM: AFPC/DPAPS

SUBJECT: Request for Survey Approval

We have reviewed your request to conduct the 2004 Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) Product Center Reorganization Survey and approved it for use for Air Force personnel assigned to the Air Armament Center (AAC) at Eglin AFB; the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) at Wright-Patterson AFB; and the Electronic Systems Center (ESC) at Hanscom AFB. We have assigned a Survey Control Number (SCN) of USAF SCN 05-130; valid through 30 June 2006. Please ensure that the SCN and expiration date appear within the survey, survey instructions and appropriate web site as well as on the initial document/e-mail introducing the survey.

With regard to the survey and its associated results, it is important to draw your attention to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Under the FOIA, the public can request the results of your survey. Furthermore, if the results will be released outside the Air Force, please follow proper approval procedures through Public Affairs before the results are released.

Questions or concerns can be directed to me at DSN 665-2448. We wish you much success with your data collection effort.

//Signed//

LOUIS M. DATKO
Chief, Air Force Survey Program
MEMORANDUM FOR AFRL/HEH

FROM: AFIT/ENV/GRD
2950 Hobson Way
WPAFB, OH 45433

SUBJECT: Final Report for 2004 AFMC Product Center Reorganization Survey

Status of study: Completed.

//signed//
JOY D. MIKULCIK, Capt, USAF
Graduate Student, AFIT/ENV/GRD

//signed//
CAROLYN M. MACOLA, Maj, USAF
Faculty Advisor, AFIT/ENV
Appendix I: Answers to Survey Question Number 72

Question 72. What is working well for you as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization?

- It had absolutely no impact on my work. Change was just cosmetic from my standpoint.
- I was unaware of the changes since I recently arrived at AFMC. My experience has been the "grumblings" of co-workers who seem to collectively view this as a change for the sake of change.
- I'm in a staff position, so I've not seen a lot of change/impact on my office.
- Wing, Group, Squad, Flight re-org
- Capability and Results Focus
- Having the PEO local is definitely beneficial.
- Users better understand our organization structure with Wing/Group/Squadron structure.
- Ability to work well with others to complete my job.
- Having the PEO local works well for program decisions and information passing, but leaves a hole in the Washington arena for program advocation.
- Senior Leadership involvement
- Opportunities for Military Command slots for our AD military officers.
- I have not really seen much improvement (as far as my job area is concerned) from the previous organizational structure.
- Definitely more priority to meet the users need- mission orientation-strategic focus/results oriented-performance based incentives
- It is more in line with the rest of the military structure so it is easier to understand.
- The commanders assigned at the squadron level are a move in the right direction.
- I'm getting commander credit which is important in the rest of the AF.
- Nothing has changed other than organization names.
- Promotion potential.
- Much more "busy" work
- My job is to support my customer in a technical support role. The re-organization just complicates my daily work schedule with all the additional overhead.
- Nothing changed within organization, just confusion on "who are we today" (what title, numbered or not)? So work goes on.
- The whole system seems to work well. I entered the AF after the PEO realignment and in the beginning of the restructuring into Wings. So, I didn't know the organizational structure prior to the changes. But, it makes sense to me how it is organized now.
- Making the Product Center Commander the PEO and grouping weapon systems according to their function. (This was accomplished before and without becoming Wings, Groups, Squadrons and Flights!!!!!)
- A lot of people can't find what org I am in know so I don't get as many calls.
• This kind of stuff is well and good but for most of use we could care less as long as the work we do is of value. For the junior force, it's just another waste of government money trying to improve already broken government processes. It's like all that strategic plan stuff no one reads. Who cares where the PEO sits, it's still just as hard to get something through OSD no matter where someone is.
• The initiative to group similar weapons capabilities into the same organization has been very helpful in sharing very useful business and technical information.
• For the most part line control of employees
• Essentially, nothing has changed for my position as an engineer. My responsibilities did not change, nor did my reporting chain. So, things remained status quo. Things were going smoothly before and after the change.
• Generally, don't see much change.
• I do understand the sq/wg structure better than the old SPO names. I agree with functionally aligning similar projects in the same 'wing'. I like the Weapons PEO being here at Eglin where the weapons are planned, developed, tested, and acquired. We brief him regularly (6/times/yr) and discuss issues. Makes more sense than being in Wash DC.
• Better team work effort due to all playing on the same team.
• Little change. The deck chairs have been rearranged
• More opportunities for deserving military members to assume command positions.
• Less cumbersome policies and procedures; first class learning organization--training is key to enhanced job knowledge and increased productivity
• Because of the new wing structure, there are greater opportunities within the organization which may be taken advantage of without a lot of paperwork or administrative headaches.
• Very little as a result of the reorganization, which was one of the typical periodic reshuffles making it look like leadership is doing something important, but that really makes the bureaucracy even worse to deal with.
• Nothing!!!
• Focus at multiple levels on personnel.
• Nothing! I lost my supervisory position after 15 years. I was moved out of my career field. I have been placed in an oppressive organization with little in terms of goals and visions and micromanagement for transactional functions. IT support, resources and capabilities are a mere shadow of what I was accustomed to having. I no longer know what office to contact for what and many people have been shifted thus losing the continuity that once existed. Gen Anzalone once announced at a public meeting that the purpose of the reorg was to provide military a career path. It was "hoped" that the new civilian system, NSPS, would provide for them. I see many leader positions being filled by military very junior and not knowledgeable compared to the civilians in that organization. The military are receiving credit for the work of the civilians and have a path while many good civilians suffocate. NSPS will only exasperate the situation by creating the biggest "good old boy" system known to the Air Force.
In spite of the reorg, the capabilities based focus works.
Really I have seen very little change in anything that affects me. My disagree statements were not that things were going bad, but basically that I disagree that I see anything going better because of the re-org. I would say that the best benefit from the re-org would be that younger officers may have stronger promotion potential.
Nothing changed for me as a functional, other than the confusion of the new names.
Knowledge
Having the PEO at Hanscom is a big improvement over the old model. Our PEO has a lot more involvement in the programs in his portfolio than he would otherwise.
Being briefed and aware of the current changes
Not answering this question but overall comment: If the definitions below were at the beginning of the questionnaire, I missed them. If you have a chance, I would move them to the front of the instrument. The capability based improvements outweigh any of the negatives associated with the reorganization. I question the time energy and cost to the tax payer with the reorg in general. I believe we could have achieved the same outcome with less negative impact to the organization.
Consistency of Wing, Group, Squadron structure across the Air Force.
Understanding an actual chain of command. (although, you still have multiple reporting chains--PMs, CFOs, FM functionals, Group, Wing agencies outside of your chain)
Organizational/reporting structure is a lot clearer
I know very little about the reorganization. My squadron is a tenant unit of the AAC Eglin, and was already structured with Wing, Group, Squadron, and Flights (to a certain extent).
My job really didn't change as I work for a "Functional" organization.
The wing/group/sq structure provides a great sense of camaraderie
I see the reorganization as an unnecessary step backward that was motivated primarily to create more Commander positions for field grade officers.
In my last job, the AFMC structure was more recognizable to the operator -- less ambiguous.
The program that I work seems to have higher visibility.
The Major AF Product Centers reorganized IAW General Martins & AF Organizational Structure
No significant changes.
Wing structure makes communication easier. Integration among like systems.
I better understand Industry
Morale at ESC has been bad for years, so it is hard to determine what can be attributed to the reorgs.
Nothing very much! I miss the SPO organization structure.
• Not much there still seems to be confusion. I will grant you the fact that at least it is organized now.
• Minimal changes at the office/working level--maintains work continuity.
• In my position as Human Resources Manager for one of the functional areas, I now deal directly with the 4 Wing CFO's, as opposed to the 8-10 SPO CFO's. That gives me less people to negotiate with, but it also gives me less flexibility.
• There is no detectable positive change.
• The movement of the PEO from DC to the product center headquarters was good.
• Clear lines of communication.
• Co-located PEO with program offices.
• Knowing where to get answers for air to ground or air to air.
• Better training, improved communications across orgs, improved speed to get the work done
• Chain of command reporting.
• There are clearer lines on command. It's just too bad not everyone uses them.

92 respondents selected “no answer” to this question.
Appendix J: Answers to Survey Question Number 73

Question 73. Please identify any areas of concern for you as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization.

- I was assigned as the Director and then CC for a SPO from May 03 - Jun 05. Although we reorg'd the levels of reporting did not decrease. The intermediate level actually became more controlling; I and my successor ask "why do you even need us?" 2) I do not believe the Wg, GRP, SQDR designation will help acq orgs execute any better, in fact, I believe it will take away managements attention of cost, schedule, performance, issues.
- Negative impact on morale. From what I've observed, the message either didn't get out or didn't make a lasting impression on the workforce.
- Getting all the organization names nailed down - figuring out who is who. Also, there is still confusion regarding the authority of the Wings/DRG versus the ALC -- who's the boss? Growth of employees via moving around to gain different experiences is more difficult now that the "functional" director no longer "owns" the positions. This also makes it more difficult to backfill key positions (by moving from one Wing/DRG to another) when people are promoted, retire, or otherwise leave the organization -- limits flexibility.
- Going back to PMRT type or relationship between AFMC development and sustainment organizations. Worst decision was to take away the cradle-to-grave management structure that put one belly button over organizations regardless if they were development or sustainment!
- Lack of culture change within work force, unethical leadership, lack of promotion opportunities within Group
- I can no longer identify what anyone does. It makes it harder to determine who is in acquisition and who is not.
- The removal of the term SPO is confusing to many people and we have to explain it to our customers often.
- Too few people to get the job done
- Seeing others being promoted before me just because they work in a SPO while I am in a support organization (Pricing). This is very disheartening to me and to all Pricing personnel. No matter what we do we cannot win! Supervisors who rate you the same as the person before--no matter what you accomplish. Even if you have worked in all areas of contracting (SPO, Lab, etc.) and you have had the top rating, whenever you move your rating goes down automatically and it tends to stay there--not really fair at all!! It means you cannot compete with the SPO personnel who tend to get top grades at all times.
- Changes from SPOs to Group/Wings has done actually worsened an outsider's ability to identify who does what within AFMC. Wing/Grp names are generic and do not create the clear phonebook Gen Martin often alluded to. In addition, we have now split the baby so many different ways (UMD, functional allocations and
responsibilities); I feel we have significantly sub-optimized the Center's ability to perform resource leveling. Ownership of authorizations by these new mini-wings/grps has only exasperated the rice-bowls that existed under the SPO organizations. The reorganization also has not been resource neutral with each organization looking out for themselves, in that each new organization is attempting to become self-sufficient. As a result, each commander is building a support structure for the care and feeding of a smaller entity (compared to the previous functional matrixed arrangement.) I could go on, but one can extrapolate on the inefficiencies of taking larger organizations and breaking them up in to numerous very small self sustaining entities.

- Split responsibilities for similar systems (sustainment vs. development) resulting in duplication of responsibilities and duplication of efforts.
- Two areas - First, by standing up a wing level in the center organizational structure, we added another layer of staffing, and sourced that staffing from the old SPOs. Our overall line versus staff ratio has decreased, and the program offices have loss billets and experience to set up the wing staffs. The group staffs by and large are the old SPO staffs. Secondly, if we gave the Wing CC/Director PEO authority for the lesser ACAT 3 programs, we could regain some of the inefficiencies the new wing structure has levied on the center.
- Consistent disagreement between Product and Logistics Centers regarding who does what, who will take what and the definition of sustainment, acquisition, development etc... Also not sure why we have stated that the Wing/CC is not in the Acq chain of command -- why remove a link in the chain -- it's not like that in Operational structures.
- It is my opinion that we are now in the wing/group/squadron organizational structure but we are still acting like SPOs. There are too many people who may have been in the systems world too long or have never been in an operational environment and as a result, they have no clue how the interaction between wings/groups/squadrons really work...in an operational environment.
- Application of policy: development to development centers/sustainment to the sustainment centers. -Lack of human resources at the product centers -Reluctance to change
- Size of work force needs to be addressed. Acq reform cut workforce to low.
- People are getting OPRS, etc signed at lower levels. In the long run, this will be good, but some people will be hurt during the change. Also, I don't think AFMC has really figured out how they're going to treat command billets. In the rest of the AF, it's a 2 yr billet, yet I'm being told I could stay in it for my whole assignment (3-4 yrs). That would cheat other people of the opportunity to be a commander, and commander jobs are usually limited to 2 yrs because people need a break. Being a commander is significantly different than being a PM or SPD, but we're still treating them as the same thing. My last concern is that organizations are not standardized. What constitutes a group at one product center would only be a squadron at another--no standard criteria ($$ amounts, number of people, number of programs etc.) between product centers. Seems like it was based more on "How
many command billets did a product center get?"--let's organize around that number.

- We seem to have some kind of "change" every 2 to 4 years--but at the working level, all that changes is nomenclature. Usually the change in names is a waste of time and energy.
- Not enough work and too many people to include SETA support.
- Increased levels of management have resulted in more micromanagement.
- Too many layers of management now. I.e. Flight leader, Squadron leader, Group Leaders, Wing leaders, each with a staff and execs???, who is doing the work?. All want briefed on program status, delays quick communication with user, all outgoing info must be coordinated thru all levels.
- Chain of command, way too much management! -Dealing with other groups (SPOs) and organizations is much more difficult. -It's harder now for others to figure out what AFMC does! Numbering the groups complicates the problem further.
- Additional layers of bureaucratic management were added to justify additional AF civilian supervisor positions. No value added. The management chain is cumbersome, lethargic, and unwieldy. Responsibility and independent thinking is not allowed without first checking with higher HQ. Squadron CC positions are hollow and are name only dept titles, not real commanders like in a flying squadron. No G-series orders nor orderly room authorized, hence the cc has no UCMJ authority, which is the true test of command authority. Total mismanagement of AFMC. Morale is lower than anytime before.
- Incorporating all the "rah-rah"/legacy stuff which adds nothing to doing my job. I served in combat units in my previous life so I know what legacy means. Assigning combat unit designations to acquisition organizations doesn't change the king's clothing--a SPO is still a SPO no matter what you call it; e.g., SPO people don't get shot!!
- User will eventually not have a clue on who to contact. If we're the "802 ASS" (armament system sqdn), what does that mean to ACC if we're actually the JDAM SPO. Old titles conveyed direct meaning on who we are. Remember, most important connections are at worker level, not just GO's knowing which wing commander to call...
- One concern is placement of future programs that may not fit exactly into one of the groups formed based on commonality of systems. I suppose if that situation arises though, a new group can be formed to support that new program and new capabilities.
- International Squadron created under the Air to Ground Wing, however, personnel were kept in the respective groups. International Squadron just added another layer of coordination and one more staff meeting to attend and prepare charts for--no value added.
- Under new structure--seems like there are too many managers. We have functional area managers at the group level (FM/PK/LG)(GS-14) and then at the
wing functionals again (GS-15). Not really sure how the introduction of the wing concept has helped the group (formerly SPO) more productive.

- The restructure into Wings, Groups, Squadron and Flights is a farce!!! This along with the restructure at our using command ACC has really messed with the workers' minds. We are still working with the same folks as before---they and we just don't know who we are!!! The Group, Squadron and Flight office symbols still have not changed. "Haven't been approved yet"? ? ?
- People can not find people any more. It has been difficult locating people in other organizations, not knowing what they are in now. I need to contact a lot of people in different Org., and I have found this to be my worst area since reorg.
- It appears to be a lot of resources unnecessarily expended...........
- Greatly increased overhead and associated oversight has decreased the ability to respond in a timely manner
- The exchange of information between weapons' groups and aircraft groups is still not as effective or as efficient as is needed to meet the users' needs to defend our country as quickly or as affordable as the taxpaying citizens deserve.
- Under the new structure, the Wing/Group CC controls the UMD slots, removing the functional home office from any decision regarding resources. Wing/Group CCs have the best interests of THEIR organization at heart, rather than the best interests of AAC. This results in fewer rotations of personnel for career broadening, as the CCs now decide who they will allow to move and who they will retain. Currently, there are NO individuals qualified to become PCOs in my organization. There are several individuals in other organizations who are well qualified, but cannot move because their CCs refuse to release them and the PK home office, not having control of the UMD, cannot force a move. The Center Commander has been unwilling to intervene. This results in more work for existing PCOs, who must take-up the slack. We are now in a situation where we will give warrants to the best candidate available, instead of the best candidate in the Center.
- No UCMJ authority for Wing /CCs, Additional layers of management, more bloated staffs Wings are created to be able to be picked up and moved in their entirety, Business organizations(and let's face it, AFMC is by and large a business) are designed to share personnel and functional resources across divisions without having to duplicate expertise and functions in each organization. We've shoe-horned a business entity into an operational structure and it doesn't fit. If one of the major reasons for restructuring was to look like the rest of the AF so the war fighter's would understand AFMC, wouldn't it have made more sense to just educate the other commands?
- I'm not sure of the value of the change to producing our products more efficiently. It seems false reasoning to me to say that the acquisition field needs to "look like the rest of the operational AF" so that they can better identify with us. While there are advantages to the metric system, I don't have any trouble remembering that 12 inches are in a foot and 3 feet are in a yard.
• See some duplication of effort between staffs and multiple wings; used to have one office providing service, now that is duplicated in each wing.

• All of the Centers still have their separate org’s: whether it's a wing or a SPO, they still work for an O-6 or GS-15. Hard to say that the reorg creates more effective or efficient environment - it's probably the same, just with new (but better) names.

• Insufficient training/mentoring of persons now in supervisory or "chain of command" positions. The "system" did not groom people for these positions, thus we will struggle with inexperienced (read inept in too many cases) people making less than optimum decisions because they somehow think that position equivocates to knowledge. It does not.

• Front end planning prior to Milestone A is not consistently implemented. The Organization structure is different at each of the Centers. The relationship of the planning activity to the AFMC Commander vs the PEO is not clearly understood or implemented. I do not think that the Jul 2003 Memo for Record signed by the CSAF and SAF stating that "The Commander of AFMC is responsible for front-end planning prior to Milestone A as user's requirements are being defined..." is understood by the users or well defined within AFMC as part of the AF Capability Planning Process.

• The General does not see himself as a tenant on another's installation, though technically he is. And there's good reason for this--many view him as still responsible for the installation, though technically he doesn't have authority. Worse, with the reorganization of the Center, it is harder to get through to see him. Where once we worked directly for him, now for some issues to see him I have to meet first with a Director, the Group Commander and the ABW commander, often in that order. This takes additional time and effort and yet produces no greater benefit.

• Changed for the wrong reasons. Saw the clamor for "Commander" and little else changed about the overall attitude. Felt the Center commander and AFMC Commander had sincere intentions. Too many opportunists morphed the commanders' visions.

• Creation of an additional level of bureaucracy with new Wing and Group structure in addition to the former SPO structure, that is still there, just not called "SPO". Removal of highly qualified people from former SPOs to populate the Wing/Gp staffs Conflict with DP over grade structure based on number of direct reports and conflict between functional and line-management organizations caused by the reorganization

• Need to use metrics to determine the quality and value of products produced; is the customer satisfied? senior military officer turnover--too frequent resulting in instability and a lack of continuity; the product centers need good, stable military leadership from the commander down to the lieutenants

• The original renaming of the organizations caused some confusion with our warfighters in the field as well as the Army, Marines and Navy organizations we deal with. The current approach of going to a numbered Air Force like the operational commands is going to be much worse. I have had some very adverse
feedback from my other service counterparts. A direct quote from an Army person at Redstone Arsenal is "This is dumber than dirt". Titles are important and the ability to immediately know what system the organization is responsible for without consulting a master checklist (which may be unavailable or outdated) is only part of the issue.

- Many of the day-to-day tasks were over looked. Even though "wings, groups, and squadrons" were established they are not complete. They do not have commanders on "g-series" orders. Things like orderly rooms, first sergeants, vehicle control officers and unit training managers were not considered. If your wing does not have a VCO you may spend days looking around for a unit who has one who is willing to sign your forms to get a government drivers license. As a military person I still have to deal with multiple chains of command. For my daily work assignments I may work for the "Air-To-Ground" wing commander. However, for any legal issues I have to contact a first shirt and a commander in a different unit’s orderly room who takes care of us as an additional task. Those are just a few examples.

- There are many, but I can't say I'm really concerned, as I plan to get out of here as soon as I'm retirement-eligible.

- All!!!

- Loss of focus on program management by most senior/seasoned acquisition professionals. Attention is constantly diverted to wing/group/squadron responsibilities.

- Don't know how the decision was made to identify an office as a wing vs. group vs other -- based on dollars spent, political oversight, number of employees, etc.? Affects how one feels about the office they are working in and potential promotion opportunities.

- Civilians are getting deputy positions rather than director positions. Looks like we are going to all military for commanders of groups, wings, etc.

- Long delays in restructure below wing level, and Center-level restructure still pending -- organizational identities and individual contacts lost, org charts still TBD, many interim and obsolete names and symbologies are still in use. Severely limited my ability to maintain or re-establish "official" contacts, chains of command. I think this whole exercise is another change for the sake of change. I see no value whatsoever.

- Hidden costs. The cost of the reorg has not been seen. There has already been grade creep and increased layers of management put in place. As these organizations mature staffs will become heavier because the "zero" growth rule will be a thing of the past. Turmoil in the workplace continues to degrade our ability to perform up to our ability and desire. Define turmoil as the continuing flood of seemingly irrational taskings, requirements, training, surveys and other distractions that prevent us from sticking to Job #1 as outlined in our PD's.

- We did not more easily identify ourselves to our customers; AQ still says - oh yeah, you used to be SPO Yxxx. It was not resource neutral - whenever you build
organizations, you build fiefdoms - you now have many fiefdoms conflicting with functionals instead of a core functional staff supporting many offices focused on producing a product. The reorg took the focus off the programs for some senior acquisition folks.

- This change was non value added from my view.
- communication
- The reorg has been extremely costly to both the programs and the people with little to no benefit to show for it. Each program is being assessed to fund these grotesque staffs at the wing & group level. I strongly feel that the Center, and the program offices, functioned much much better under the old organizational structure.
- The Wing has seemed to place an additional layer of bureaucracy on top of the program offices. When the DoD is trying to decentralize control of the programs, their goal was to reduce bureaucracy, but the opposite has occurred.
- The Wing they assigned my office to does NOT fit in with what we do
- Do not know enough about what happened. I really didn't notice any difference.
- Very difficult to understand what organization's new office symbols and organizational alignment are.
- Overhead has increased as a result of the re-org
- There are a lot more layers of coordination/approval to go through; there seems to be a lot more duplication of effort
- Wing structure creates bureaucracy and overhead. The product center should be run like a business or any other corporation, organized around product lines, and focused on corporate profitability. For us corporate profitability is the ability to field systems at the lowest cost possible. If it were up to me, product centers would compete for work with other product centers.
  - Geographically separated units that have no in-house legal support in places where there should be day to day interaction with active program offices. (2) The restructuring (both at the AFMC PC level and the PEO level) has program offices going through more layers of management then ever before. For instance, you have DFSG/PN going to DFSG and through its structure, to OSSW and its structure, and then finally to ESC proper and its structure. (3) The delegations from the PEO or the commander levels have become difficult to figure out.
- The reorganization created another level of bureaucracy that adds no significant value to mission accomplishment.
- Structure of the OSSW Wing! Too large (span of control) for coordination matters -- too many layers -- too spread out. Needs to be examined and reconfigured -- maybe even divided into "2" parts.
- Too many layers of Bureaucracy NO LG/A4 at ESC No Logistics Emphasis at any level. All/Most ESC Logisticians are contractors (95%)
- There is nothing intuitive about the changes. Nothing seems to flow in a logical way. The standard structure is being forced on an organization which is in fact different from the operational Air Force.
We're trying to integrate a Tactical Datalink Network (TDN) "capability" on all USAF Platforms. However, the Platforms don't recognize the shift from Platform based integration to Capability based integration. Many, if not all, of the Platform PM's do not appreciate our involvement in "their" Platform. Their lack of cooperation inhibits our ability to substantiate/defend the funding required to integrate this capability into their Platform, as result we constantly have our funding cut which adversely affects the Platforms. The TDN AFI and the TDN AFPD, which defines MAJCOM roles and responsibilities, needs to be signed at the highest levels to mandate cooperation ASAP.

How does this action keep the AF relevant with regard to current events facing the nation?

Reorg cannot fully accomplish goals of integration because of the nature of the funding system. Not an issue with reorg per se, but something that should be tackled at the higher levels. We are going after the personnel system (NSPS) so let's revamp the PPBS next!

SETA contractors making and influencing decisions that are in their best interest, not the USAF.

My functional used to be a matrix. The reorg has created little dictatorships, and added another level to the reporting/suspense chain.

It was bad enough when we had to learn the new Wing/Group naming convention, but now I heard we are scraping that for a numbering identifying naming convention. I hope this isn't going to be something similar to TQM or other poorly executed management decisions.

Yes a major area of concern is that its not a full integration with the operational world. We only go as far as Sqd CC's? Why is that? Is there a reason we do not want our junior officers (Maj and Capts) to have Flight Commander status?

I was present for a realignment of test centers within AAC and significant downgrading of positions within the civilian workforce occurred.

There is more bureaucracy and layers of management to get through then there were before the reorg. My chain of command hasn't changed because I'm in a Staff organization; however, I hear all the grumblings of those in the program offices and how their workload has increased because of more levels of management. Things take longer to get through the red tape now than they did before because more people are involved in the process.

The redesignation of SPOs to wings and groups provided for numerous wings with only several hundred people assigned to each, an unnecessary proliferation of wing-level units. I believe a better approach would have to create an acquisition wing at each product center in which the SPOs would have been groups.

Positions and functional areas have been created to "save" jobs as opposed to streamline the business.

Civilian "Commanders" of Wings/Groups/Squadrons.

Too much work load, not enough people to do the job. Need to stabilize organizations titles.
• Staffing a package to AQ now requires heroic efforts--AQ has to be "informally" checked with before the PEO signs. There are still the un-clear lines of command, and petty food fight between AFMC and AQ. We need a clear chain of command in the field. The reorg didn't do it--made it less clear

• Too few workers for increasing work requirements, poor quality physical work environment, increased mandatory requirements [time consumers: mandatory trainings, audits, defending audit findings] equals decreased amount of time to get the work done. Drastically less mil, A&AS and civ manpower, high turnover of military members, loss of experienced civilian workers to other State and Federal orgs and to commercial jobs. Training and technology doesn't make up for eroding quantity of resources.

• The new Wing Structure was put in place, which placed another level of overhead in between the SPD and the PEO. This additional administrative overhead was not budgeted for (or at least appeared not to be), and the "Group" organizations were expected to provide funds to pay for this new structure. Additionally, I'm in an organization that resides under a Group, but was not identified as a Squadron, so we are still a division. If the reorganization was meant to emulate the standard, Wing/Group/Squadron structure, then what does our user/warfighter think a "Division" is? Finally, a cross reference matrix of organizational name and responsibility changes. Before I could find people in the global in a particular organization because I knew what aircraft platform they supported. With the change to "Numbered" organizations, it is not readily evident whom that individual is working for.

• The reorganization has still not been fully completed. ESC, PK and FM functional still refuse to fully comply with the AFMC CONOPS. They still control all of the Contracting and Finance personnel as if they were there own instead of the Wing to which they are assigned. Wings are dabbling in execution when they should be focused on organizing and equipping. Our UMD is still not where it should be and the POM process was a disaster.

79 respondents selected “no answer” to this question.
Appendix K: Answers to Survey Question Number 74

Question 74. Please tell us anything else about your experience with the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization that you think we should know for future reorganization improvement.

- Too many name changes in such a short time has only added to confusion within and outside the Command. Our warfighter Command counter parts, at least from my experience, find the numerous name changes our attempt to look like them amusing. They also have the perception we reorg’d to mask our faults -- Druyan backlash.

- A survey such as this should be performed ahead of the change. This would allow the people expected to make the change and eventually benefit from it to voice their opinions. The results should be carefully considered before making sweeping changes to organizational structure. I was very disappointed when I arrived at AFMC to find out that there was a MAJCOM change which was going thru seemingly without any support or input from the people it affected. Also, during all of my inprocessing, no one ever mentioned a reorganization. AFMC should be spreading the word at each base either in person or electronically.

- It seems that we make these changes to be known for something different as we progress through our career. I have seen all kinds of reorganizations and changes. The Air Force is in a cycle. Each person would like to leave his mark without checking historical data prior to making the decision. Changing to numbers has no reality for an acquisition environment. I do believe that moving the PEO's closer to the field was a good idea.

- The realignment of management was helpful, but changing the names to numbers will not get us anywhere. Numbers are not descriptive to the human mind. Imagine if we went by social security numbers instead of names.

- Communication of the changes was handled well. Believe the key is to tell early what is planned and continue giving updates on the status of the reorganization.

- In my years with AFMC I have witnessed a re-organization / change in strategic focus about every 2-3 years. How successful would a large firm be if they changed their strategic focus every 2-3 years. It takes that long to simply implement the changes. I realize that the world is changing very quickly and we must adapt to this to remain on top, but so must every private business also. We must develop a strategic business focus that can be executed and not discarded every 2-3 years and focus our energies on flexing with the changing threat environment. A productive, learning organization not focused on names, commanders, etc can be created and I think we can grow and improve far beyond the "clear phonebook", "Business Area", or "Mission Area" concepts. AFMC is part of a military organization, but it is the business arm of the AF and by definition is different than the Tip of the Sword and it difference should become it's strength not it's weakness as many allude.
Better define the interface between organizations such that MOAs and Memorandum of Agreements are not needed for specific programs.

 Desire HQ AFMC to step forward to adjudicate manpower positions when work transfers. It should not be the responsibility for one center to agree, disagree, approve or disapprove of the quantity and mix another center has stated they need to execute a mission.

- Be consistent- the more you allow for exceptions to policy the more meaningless all this reorganization becomes.

AFMC needs more field experienced logisticians in the acquisitions process. Acquisition Reform cut the working levels to low and we lost a large portion of our experience personnel. We need to return to the manpower levels and core knowledge of how Air Force operates when dealing with both active base units and dealing with the acquisition process.

I still think the main redeeming quality of the reorg will be to define a baseline program office size and then use that to drive billet moves between organizations as work loads change.

Let's go back to SPOs to define functional areas. At least we'll know who does what and who to contact to work together!

Seems to me the Wing/Group/Squadron structure is another way to provide jobs for additional senior gov't/civilian folks. From the bottom looking up, I don't see what our SES wing guy adds to the process. People get things done--not organizations.

By creating Wg/Gp/Sq, you've created a "pecking order" on which SPO's are more important than others. ACC may not always feel that way. If resources fall according to your title (i.e., top folks go to Gp over Sq, or Wg over Gp), user may not get the support they require from a SPO.

Very few people were having any problems with the structure of the Product Centers with the possible exception of Operational Members sitting on Promotion Boards. But then, they have problems accepting the importance of their own Commands non flying jobs. This probably could have been better accomplished by educating the folks on the Promotion Boards of the involvement and responsibilities of the non flying jobs.

Don't assume that reorganization equals progress...........

Competition and recognition among the squadrons, groups and wings are good as long as the common good for all is not lost.

The functional home offices are dinosaurs; relics of the past, serving no useful purpose. Their past function was to ensure the Center had the functional resources necessary to get the job done. With the new structure, the CCs have a very myopic viewpoint, caring little for the Center well-being. They should either be eliminated to save resources, or should have their responsibilities restored. 2. The justification for the AFMC reorganization was eyewash. The true reason for this reorganization will only be known by the AFMC leadership. While the warfighter might not understand SPOs, they didn't need to. ACC understood the organization very well, and served as the go-between for the warfighter and SPOs. I will never
understand why every new Commander believes a new organizational structure will ensure their legacy, when improving the efficiency and accountability is what really counts. The new organization does neither. We are making changes for the sake of making changes.

- I noticed that the reorganization seemed to place the PEO back at the Center Level, just like it was in the '70s. So, took us 30yrs to go full circle. I guess this means that in 2030 the PEO (or whatever the position is called then) will be moved back to the Pentagon, so save yesterday's organizational charts.

- Be more discriminating when selecting persons for flight/group/wing commander. Rank and time in grade does not equal competence. Some people should be left as Majors or GS-9s. We have only started to feel the negative effects of the reorg.

- In the last 4 years our organization has changed name and structure 3 times. More energy and management time and effort went into reorganization than acquisition

- Accountability is not there. A foundation without firm, concise and understood "simple metrics" will evolve to entropy.

- It would be useful to start looking at organizational structure from the bottom up rather than the top down. After all, it's the people on the bottom who actually do the work. If you want to enhance efficiency, try it that way. The current structure is all about the prestige, convenience and careers of the SES'ers and GO's (and those who want to be SES and GO). It does not fool most of us at all.

- These constant reorg's waste time and resources. They cause confusion here and with others. They cause extra layers of management and build new empires, all of which, costs money, time, and resources. They also lower moral and cause more work for the rank and file.

- Having worked many years in operational MAJCOMs, I feel those customers would have never wanted such a large level of AFMC resources focused on this reorg. They weren't from my perspective ever terribly uncomfortable with the previous arrangement. The XP and XR communities knew who was supporting them. Their concern continues to be cost, schedule and performance.

- Slower is not necessarily better! It has taken a ridiculously long time for someone to decide how to create squadrons and flights within acquisition and other non-flying wings -- probably because of the forced superposition of a flying wing structure on non-operational entities. The Navy never seemed to have a problem understanding the differences between sea and shore organizations and billets, and inherently fundamental differences in missions and functions. The Army seems to do just fine without calling their acquisition and logistics functions brigades or battalions. Our next big reorganization will probably being before this one is complete. These events regularly occur on 5-7 year cycles.

- Convert AFMC to almost entirely civilian. I highly respect military individuals but the need for military in this command is almost non existent. The military billets could be better used in the operational commands. AFMC should probably become an agency and run under civilian control to provide goods and services for the warfighter, not occupy the warfighter in day to day non military functions.

- Funding and Strengthening IT
• The power structure is now more lopsided than ever. The Wings offer no value added to the acquisition & execution of the program. The Wings have turned into nothing more than these huge dynasties.
• Most enjoy their job, but get frustrated by the multiple "taskers" for information. Most ask for similar things, but not exactly the same. You get tasked from SAF, then the functional, but then get something a little different from the CC, and again, more tasks from Wing, Group. Their needs to be one single funnel for information. Just because a task has Finance in the title, doesn't mean that it’s a Finance task, but that is what happens. If it deals with the program, the Program Manager should answer, if it deals with contracting, PK should answer.
• Get the information out to all and request comments & concerns. I felt that no one cared about the workers and that this was something that the disconnected bosses forced on us.
• Too many changes from initial briefed plan to final outcome (and it still isn't complete as Wing names have not yet been changed to numbered Wings).
• Organic Manpower was not provided to stand up the Wings, three of the four "new" wing staffs are full of contractor support, increasing the overhead costs for the center....
  o I believe that if you are going to orient based on capabilities, then the organizations have to be collocated to provide for an opportunity to cross-fertilize and learn from each other on a day to day basis. (2) The GSUs, even with technology, are greatly disadvantaged by the fact that few employees ever see their Product Center Commanders or their staffs on a regular basis. (3) Activities, such as source selections and contract review, become harder and harder to maintain to do because of the cost of travel that is necessary and is not planned into the overall process. (4) Real consolidation (i.e., moving bodies to where the work really is) has to follow re-organization.
• Don't attempt to artificially overlay an operation structure onto what had been properly organized on a "business organization" model.
• Use the KISS Principle Follow the REORG Rules or Don't Reorganize! Too much Political and Bureaucratic Management layers
• Try to come up with easier to understand/remember unit identifications.
• Platforms don't recognize the shift from Platform based integration to Capability based integration. Many, if not all, of the Platform PM's do not appreciate our involvement in "their" Platform. Their lack of cooperation inhibits our ability to substantiate/defend the funding required to integrate this capability into their Platform, as result we constantly have our funding cut which adversely affects the Platforms. The TDN AFI and the TDN AFPD, which defines MAJCOM roles and responsibilities, needs to be signed at the highest levels to mandate cooperation ASAP.
• Keep organizations properly manned, if we are not, it inhibits our ability to capitalize of any "new and improved" method.
• More consideration for integration among systems.
• A squadron is defined more by the activities and interaction that happen outside of the mission. We need more Cols and Lt Cols that will spend time with the troops, in an informal setting.
• Keep people better informed.
• With limited resources being separated into Wings / Groups, how about forcing the Wing Commanders and Group Commanders to play nice together? It is way to often the case that they are empire building and can't play together in the same sand box. Get rid of the grey hairs that can't adjust to change and remind these over zealous commanders that they work for the US Air Force and not for them selves. It is very embarrassing to see and hear how childish these Colonels, SES's and GO's have been behaving!! Get with the program...you work as a team and get the job done! Then you can go home and build your empire in your private life.
• Yes this goal day thing is silly. The basis of allowing personnel to have a day off based on the actions of senior leadership sounds like a broke process. Give your people time off...you certainly can't affect their pay. Overall I think the command could learn a lot from ACC, AMC and PACAF on how to take care of their troops better. Work load compared to manning here is definitely not balanced. Some offices work 6 day weeks while others have time to give off. Some worked through the holidays while other offices were able to tell people to "go home and just stay local".
• A new commander = reorganization. The only variable is the degree of the magnitude of the reorganization. Relearning and training take a significant level of resources.
• The reorganization was supposed to be "resource neutral." However, it has not worked out that way and there were new positions established and new contractors hired to do the new tasks that were previously done elsewhere (i.e., resource management at the Wing level vs. centrally at the Functional area level.)
• I came in on the tail end of the current reorganization. I heard a lot of "...it was better back then because...."; however, overall everyone picked up the new organization. You have to be careful to not loose functionality in the reorganization. Some crucial cross functional integration activities can get lost in the reorganization with everyone thinking that this will be taken up by a different office. Ensure that functionality still exists with information cross flow.
• Realign manpower, which was totally neglected in reorg.
• Good communication on upcoming changes.
• Wing/group/squadron initiative is a good idea, but devil is in the details. There is now another layer of management (the wing) when it wasn't there before. Staff work has increased dramatically. Resources the same--Three reasons people fail per Gen Martin--lack of resources (yes--same job, more management, more work, people being pulled off programs out of hide to man the new and growing staffs), training (no real problems here--you have a bunch of heroes in the workforce who will succeed in spite of the every-other-year change the names reorgs for reorg sake), and guidance (very poor guidance--who is the boss? Who should I be loyal
to--my program, my group, my wing, the PEG, the PEO, SAF/AQ? So, the reorg exacerbated our already existing resource problem and muddied the water on guidance. Guess what--we will succeed anyway, and I love my job and the AF--will keep coming to work to field systems to the warfighter in spite of all this mess. That is what is important anyway.

- I think you're on the right track with the reorg...just need bodies to do the work.
- Cross-reference matrix of old organization name to new organization name/number.
- At least at the lower levels, there is still a huge resistance to adapt to the Wing, Group, and Sq structure. Communications and tasking still come in from multiple directions and responses do not always get fully coordinated. Empire building is still a big problem. Our Group still is trying to figure out how they can bring more business in and not on how they can deliver the capabilities they've already been tasked to procure better, cheaper and faster.

110 respondents selected “no answer” for this question.
Appendix L: Acronyms Used

AAC – Air Armament Center
AE – Acquisition Center of Excellence
AF – Air Force
ABW – Air Base Wing
AFMC – Air Force Materiel Command
ALC – Air Logistics Center
ASC – Aeronautical Systems Center
DO – Operations Directorate
DoD – Department of Defense
DR – Requirements Directorate
EN – Engineering Directorate
ESC – Electronic Systems Center
FY – Fiscal Year
IN – Intelligence
LG – Logistics and Sustainment Directorate
MAJCOM – Major Command
MS – Mission Support Directorate
PC – Product Center
PEO – Program Executive Officer
SES – Senior Executive Service
SPSS – Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, Version 13.0
ST – Science and Technology
TR – Transformation Directorate
XR – Capabilities Integration Directorate
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Challenges Facing Military Organizational Cultural Reform: A Study of the 2004 Air Force Materiel Command Reorganization

The purpose of this research was to measure the success of the Product Center (PC) portion of the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) reorganization initiated in 2004. The purpose of this study is threefold, 1) to determine if the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has met General Martin’s four intended objectives, (2) the reorganizations effects on AFMC employee job satisfaction and organizational commitment and (3) to gather some general opinions about the reorganization overall. The literature review consisted of a detailed look at the history of AFMC, areas of organizational culture, and gathering detailed information regarding the 2004 reorganization itself. This research measured the success of the PC portion of the reorganization to date; assistance was solicited and provided from HQ AFMC/A8M in development of the survey instrument for such measurement. Upon completion of development, electronic dissemination of the survey instrument was utilized to send it to the three AFMC PCs. Survey results were summarized and the overall conclusion reached that the AFMC PC reorganization initiated in 2004 has had little or not impact to date based on the opinions of PC employees who responded to the survey. Recommendations for further research avenues are also discussed.

Reorganization, Survey, Air Force Materiel Command, Product Center, Organizational Culture