INFORMED QUESTIONS ON THE RUSSIAN MILITARY

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### Report Documentation Page

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*Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18*
INFORMED QUESTIONS ON THE RUSSIAN MILITARY

NATO

Since 1949, NATO has expanded four times.¹ Until the most recent expansion, the focal point of the alliance had been defending against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Most recently, after the demise of the U.S.S.R. and the addition of three former eastern bloc nations, questions have arisen about NATO’s mission and role. This is of concern not only to NATO and the West; Russia also has significant interest in NATO’s future. A quick summary of NATO initiatives and issues provides a foundation for examining the Russian perspective.

• On 20 February 2002, Tajikistan became the last of the former Soviet Republics to formally join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Tajik’s Ambassador Sharif Rakhimov expressed hope that this enhanced relationship would contribute to regional stability and provide the opportunity for modernizing Tajikistan’s armed forces.²

• On 26 February 2002, NATO offered to form the new NATO-Russia Council (or “NATO at 20”), which will allow a Russian ambassador to attend meetings and address issues of mutual concern, such as fighting terrorism, nonproliferation, SAR (“search and rescue”) missions, and peacekeeping operations. Russia, however, will not have a veto and will not be a member of the North Atlantic Council. NATO contends the proposed council is an improvement upon the Permanent Joint Council, which many claimed simply handed Russia final decisions with no Russian input or consultation (and from which Russia withdrew in 1999 protesting NATO’s decision to bomb Serbia). The idea behind the new

council is to pull Russia into a more permanent relationship with NATO without decreasing the effectiveness of alliance. On 27 February, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov indicated that Russia was willing to strengthen its relationship with NATO, as current security threats were global in nature. Some headway in developing the framework for the new Council had been made by 5 March. However, the Russians’ emphasis is to move beyond “cosmetic changes” to the old Permanent Joint Council. Foreign Minister Ivanov stated that the Council must be “an organ that genuinely works out decisions, takes them and jointly carries them out.” The goal is to have the specifics worked out before offering admission to any new members, ideally by the NATO ministerial meeting in May.

- On 1 March, the three Baltic States’ Defense Ministers signed an agreement on cooperation in obtaining invitations to NATO.

- With the inclusion of Central/Eastern European countries in NATO, and considering the greater role Russia could play in NATO, the Organization will become less important as a forum for Western “use of force” decision-making. Kosovo already proved the difficulties of wartime consensus building, and NATO’s future composition won’t make it any easier. The addition of new members may change NATO into more of a political organization than a military one, a transformation that Russia has been encouraging.

- Encouraging Central and Eastern Europe’s new democracies to join some regional organization will enhance stability, bolster their fledgling governments and strengthen their

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economies. However, admitting them to the European Union (EU) would place a substantial financial burden on the member states. The costs of integrating them in NATO are far less. The U.S. is likely to push for NATO enlargement, perhaps by as many as 7 countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia) – maybe even lowering military capability and democratic reform standards for new members. The decision on who to admit will be made at NATO’s ministerial meeting in Iceland 14-15 May and the Prague Summit in November.⁹

- For the most part, NATO’s military forces have not been used in the war against terrorism. One reason is that our European allies have minimal force projection capabilities. The U.S. has urged NATO to close the military technology gap between the U.S. and Europe and to acquire a more robust power projection capability. Doing so would allow them to meet challenges posed by international terrorism and WMD proliferation outside of the immediate European area.¹⁰

- The Russian military has opposed President Putin’s support for the United States’ war on terrorism, and hard-liners pressure him to resist NATO expansion, especially in light of the U.S. unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty. On the other hand, there are critics in Europe and the U.S. who say that broadening NATO and including Russia in at least some of the decision-making will weaken NATO and change its raison d’être. Still others, both in Russia and the West, sense the opportunity expansion brings and the growing role Russia will play in the future. In the end, it is likely NATO will expand; the question is only how much it will grow. Russian objections have become less muted over the course of the last six months. There are three principal reasons: Russia’s participation in the global coalition

⁹ Ibid.
against terrorism; the perception that NATO is becoming more political as opposed to more militaristic; and the possibility of increased Russian participation in NATO.\textsuperscript{11}

**Questions.**

- Considering regional security, the possibility of a NATO politicization, and the potential of NATO becoming more Eurocentric and therefore less likely to take action beyond its borders, isn’t NATO expansion in Russia’s interest? In fact, European allies have often provided a balancing perspective to U.S. policies.
  - Does the new NATO-Russia Council offer any advantages over the Permanent Joint Council?
  - With which are you more comfortable, a EU Rapid Reaction Force or an expanded NATO? Why? What factors make you uncomfortable with NATO expansion?
  - Assuming Europe does attempt to close the technology gap with the U.S., as well as increase its force projection capability, are you concerned that NATO may take on greater offensive missions beyond its borders? Where do you think NATO forces should be deployed? Under what circumstances?”

**Fighting Terrorism in Russia’s Back Yard**

Post 911 saw significant changes in global alliances and nations’ security priorities. Among these has been an increased Western presence, predominantly U.S., in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The regions are well within Russia’s sphere of influence, and foreign military and diplomatic advances in the area have significant security, political, economic,
and national psyche implications for Russia. A chronology of recent regional activities is provided below.

**Central Asia**

- On 22 January, the U.S. and Uzbekistan signed a bilateral military agreement. The U.S. will provide almost $10 million in military aid. On 18-19 February, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, visited Uzbekistan and met with President Islam Karimov and Defense Minister Kadyr Gulyamov to discuss prospects for increased bilateral military cooperation, including joint training in both Uzbekistan and the U.S. General Myers indicated that the U.S. would supply unspecified equipment for the Uzbek armed forces. He also stated that the antiterrorist campaign appeared to have weakened the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

- On 5 February, Kyrgyzstan and U.S. military personnel began a 10-day joint exercise (10 U.S. troops and 90 from the Kyrgyz armed forces). On 18 February, General Myers met with Kyrgyzstan’s President Akaev and indicated that while the U.S. presence in Kyrgyzstan depends on the length of the Afghan campaign, it would not be permanent. General Myers further stated that cooperation would include military exercises and training Kyrgyz personnel in the U.S. Prime Minister Nikolai Tanaev, who just returned from a trip to Washington, said that the U.S. would provide Kyrgyzstan with $50 million in aid. On 27 February, French Mirage-2002D fighters arrived at Manas airport. Their arrival was called

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the “true beginning of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ on Kyrgyz territory.” As of 28 February there were 700 U.S. and 460 French troops at Manas.

- On 20 February 2002 Tajikistan became the last of the former Soviet Republics to formally join NATO’s PfP program.\textsuperscript{16} That same day, French General Philippe Rondeau met with Tajik President Imomali Rakhmonov to discuss regional security issues.\textsuperscript{17}

  - On 5 February, Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister, Kassymzhomart Tokaev stated that talks were underway concerning stationing U.S. forces at an air base in his country.\textsuperscript{18}

  - On 12 February, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told reporters that the presence of the U.S. and other antiterrorism coalition members in Central Asia “is a positive factor for Russia” since they helped Afghanistan rid itself of the terrorist camps.\textsuperscript{19} However, he noted that it was critical that the U.S. and Central Asian states abide by their promises to Russia that the antiterrorism coalition’s presence be temporary and end once the mission is completed.\textsuperscript{20} That same day, Beth Jones, the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, said that the U.S. will remain engaged in Central Asia, but is not seeking permanent military bases there.\textsuperscript{21} (Ivanov also said that if the coalition remains more permanently, it’s Russia’s fault for the “longstanding lack of a Russian strategy and resources adequate to the problems of the region.”)\textsuperscript{22}


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.


The Caucasus

- On 27 February, U.S. military personnel met with Georgian Defense Ministry officials to review plans for U.S. military and security aid programs to Georgia. Twenty U.S. servicemen have been in Georgia since last Fall. Eventually, as many as 200 U.S. Special Forces personnel will be stationed there, focusing on antiterrorism security measures in the Pankisi Gorge. On 27 February, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov stated that the presence of U.S. troops would “further aggravate the situation in the region.” Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage briefed Russia last Fall on the plan to provide training and helicopters to Georgia, so current comments from Ivanov could simply be seen as a reminder that the U.S. role should remain limited. The situation in Georgia is sensitive, since Georgia accepted U.S. proffered assistance while refusing Russian offers of military help in Pankisi Gorge. After 8 years of conflict in Chechnya, the prospect of U.S. forces arriving in Georgia appears as a failure for Russia, since they could not solve the situation either militarily or diplomatically. Some Russians have criticized Putin for allowing the “encirclement” of Russia by the U.S. and NATO. While the U.S. deployment substantiates Russia’s concern with the conflict in Chechnya, the U.S. will focus on Arab extremists and those with al Qaeda links. Russia sees the whole Chechen separatist movement as identical to al Qaeda. Another consideration is that Georgia is anxious to increase its independence from Russia, while Russia supports the separatist movements in Abkhazia and South

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Ossetia. By 7 March, Russian objections had become more muted: President Putin stated he supported U.S. presence since it would help rid the region of terrorists; Georgian President Shevardnadze made conciliatory comments toward Russia, stating that he trusts President Putin but asking that the Duma back down from its threats to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; and then the Duma, by a vote of 364-3, signaled its support of Georgia’s attempts to bolster its security. The Duma did not recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

- On 4 February, at the Conference of NATO defense ministers, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stated that Russia was unified with the antiterrorism coalition, but has distinct goals and targets for next phase. Additionally, he took exception to President Bush’s “axis of evil,” especially Iran, whom Russia is supplying conventional arms and with whom Russia will continue normal commercial dealings. Ivanov added, “Russia has its own list of countries of concern.”

- Regarding the next step of the campaign in the war against terrorism, Russia urged the U.S. to be cautious. On 3 February, Sergei Ivanov emphasized a multilateral approach, using military force only if there is a U.N. mandate (“the use of force should be based on the norms and principles of international law”). Also, Russia believes that the U.S. has a double standard: we condemn Iraq, Iran, and North Korea for sponsoring terrorism, yet fail to

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hold Saudi Arabia accountable for funding Islamic terrorism.\textsuperscript{33} Ironically, the next day Taha Yasin Ramadan, Iraq’s Vice President, criticized the Russian foreign ministry for cooperating with the U.S. in proposing a new set of “smart” sanctions, replacing the more comprehensive trade embargo. The “smart” sanctions are intended to procure Iraqi compliance with U.N. inspections. Russia has significant business contracts (“billions of dollars” in primarily oil contracts) that could be affected. Ramadan implied that “smart sanctions” would prevent already ongoing Iraq-Russian trade (large-sized wheels, heavy equipment, tower cranes, pumps, machinery).\textsuperscript{34} Additionally, during January 2002, Russia signed agreements to supply sophisticated weapons technology to Iran. The U.S. believes Iran is intent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction and missile technology.\textsuperscript{35} Russia has significant economic ties to Iraq and Iran, which will affect their decision on whether to support the next stage of the war on terrorism.

- In return for Russian support of the U.S.-led coalition, the Bush Administration promised to exempt Russia from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment’s restrictions, affecting Russia’s trade status, and support Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization. But there are limitations to what the Administration can do, as Congress and other WTO members have input as well. Putin’s critics contend that Russia does not appear to have gained much in return for his support of President Bush, especially after the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.\textsuperscript{36} This appears to be true, in the near term. Over the long-term, the economic benefits from the U.S. presence should stabilize the region and ultimately help

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
Russia, from both an economic and security perspective. Additionally, Russia has
collaterally benefited from U.S. efforts in Central Asia and Georgia, as Chechen separatists
are no longer able to train in Afghanistan and will soon be less able to seek sanctuary in
Georgia and conduct cross-border operations from there.\(^{37}\)

In summary, it appears to Russians that President Putin grants every request from
President Bush, getting nothing in return. The pressure is on for a new nuclear arms
reduction agreement.

**Questions**

- In response to President Bush’s identifying Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an “axis
  of evil,” Russian Defense Minister Ivanov stated that “Russia has its own list of countries of
  concern.” Who are they?

- Is Russia concerned with Iraq’s, Iran’s, and North Korea’s efforts to obtain weapons
  of mass destruction? What is the best method for the U.S. and Russia to jointly prevent the
  proliferation of WMD? Can Russia truly be objective in its appraisal of the situation when
  support for the U.S. risks the loss of significant economic benefits from Iraq and Iran? The
  contracts with Iraq and Iran provide a short-term solution to a weak economy and military
  and technology production concerns. Are there longer-term problems that are being ignored?

- Is the presence of the Coalition forces in Central Asia and the Caucasus merely
  filling a vacuum created over the last decade? Do you believe U.S. representations that their
  presence is only temporary in light of similar representations made to Saudi Arabia in August
  1990?

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\(^{36}\) Some say that the Kremlin encouraged the U.S. to withdraw from the ABM treaty, rather than negotiate
an amendment, in order to resolve the matter quickly. Alan Cullison, “Russia’s Left-Wing Politicians

\(^{37}\) Ibid.
The Russian military is suffering from numerous problems, including conscription evasion and desertion; low retention, pay, and morale; poor training opportunities; and aging military equipment and infrastructure.

- The military currently drafts 400,000 males each year, which is only 12% of those males aged between 18 and 27. The rest avoid the draft or are exempted as students or due to poor health. Of those drafted, half are considered unfit for operational units.\(^{38}\)

- Last November, the Russian Ministry of Defense proposed, and President Putin approved, plans to end conscription and turn Russia’s military into an “all-professional” force. However, the Russian General Staff criticizes the alternative service options, arguing that they should be more stringent than the current 2-year military service requirement and should serve as “punishment” for those who avoid military service. On 14 February, the government approved the draft “Law on Alternative Service.” Under the law, the term of alternative service will be double that of compulsory military service.\(^{39}\)

- Demographically, Russia’s population is aging and declining. The number of males born in 1995 was half what it was in 1987.\(^{40}\) Estimates are that Russia’s population could decrease as much as 20 million by 2016.\(^{41}\) Additionally, President Putin has placed an emphasis on economic development and is unlikely to want a sizeable portion of the labor force in uniform during peacetime.\(^{42}\)

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• In January 2002, Unified Energy Systems, Russia’s energy monopoly, cutoff power to Pacific Coast military bases because the government owed the utility $85 million.  

Although the Russian military budget has increased by one-third over the last two years, the proposed U.S. military budget for 2003 is $379 billion- 41 times Russia’s defense budget.  

• Significant numbers of officers are leaving the Russian Army, citing low salaries, substandard living conditions, lack of status, and poor equipment as reasons. On 5 February 2002, police shot two Airborne deserters after they killed 10 people. Airborne Troops Commander Gennadii Shpak said that 20% of his troops have criminal records.  

• On 22 February, Sergei Ivanov, commemorating Defenders of the Fatherland Day, discussed the Russian military. He said that while Russia had no global aspirations, military readiness is still a priority given the longest borders of any of the world’s countries with neighbors whose stability and intentions are “not always encouraging.”  

• Within the next 20 years, it is predicted that the Russian Army will be half Muslim. Two concerns are whether to provide mullahs and mosques for soldiers and sailors and if there will be rising Islamic fundamentalism within the military. One option-form religious units as they did in Tsarist Russia.

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49 Ibid.
The proposed strategic arms agreement between the U.S. and Russia will reduce the Russian inventory to somewhere between 1500 and 2200 warheads.50

Questions

• Will Russia be able to recruit enough young men for the military, especially in light of reducing population, the opportunity to elect alternative service, and President Putin’s focus on the economy?

• Can the military continue to research, develop, and procure new equipment and technology without selling sophisticated weapons to China, Iran, India, and Vietnam?

• Assuming Russia trusts U.S. representations and regional aspirations, can Russia leverage the U.S. presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus to transform its military into a properly sized, trained, and equipped force?

• If strategic force reductions occur, will the additional resources be used to assist in transforming Russian conventional forces?

• Are U.S. regional and global actions a threat to Russian national interests?

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