The United States National Security Strategy for Colombia

Is Plan Colombia the right solution?

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The United States National Security Strategy for Colombia

Is Plan Colombia the right solution?

The security relationship between the United States and Colombia has reached a critical junction, and the entire South American continent is watching. Colombia is on the brink of overcoming many of the problems the country has experienced in the past half century – ending the narcotics trade, eliminating the three major guerrilla organizations that have plagued internal security, getting the economy back on track, and gaining international approval for improving human rights. The United States must make sure that Colombia succeeds. A stable and democratic Colombia is a national interest of the United States, primarily because of the threat of drugs, and the tremendous impact that associated narco-terrorism could have on the nation. A close look at the elements of the United States National Security Strategy for Colombia will reveal that the US strategy is working, and that the US-Colombian relationship will be the model for engaging other democratic countries on the continent. The blueprint for the United States strategy is “Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State,” a five year, interagency plan that uses US military, economic, and diplomatic instruments to assist Colombia. Funded by Congress in 2000, Plan Colombia is an extremely effective strategy, and with some minor adjustments, should be continued past 2005.

Why is Colombia important to the United States?

Colombia’s strategic importance to the United States is multi-faceted. The most visible security concern revolves around the impact Colombia has on the flow of narcotics to the United States. Colombia produces 90% of the cocaine used by Americans and nearly 70% of the world’s total of heroin.1 The cost of the flow of these two drugs into the US is staggering. In 2000,
260 metric tons of cocaine and 13.3 metric tons of heroin were consumed by Americans. Cocaine and heroin usage in 2000 led to an American economic loss of $160.7 billion in health care, productivity, and other costs. Over seventeen billion dollars was spent on the United States counter-drug mission in fiscal year 2000.

In economic terms, Colombia is an important trading partner with the United States. Forty three percent of Colombia’s exports go to the United States, making the US the largest importer of Colombian coffee, cut flowers, coal, apparel, and bananas. Colombia is the eighth largest exporter of oil to the United States, two-way trade with Colombia was nearly $11 billion in 1998, and direct US investment in Colombia exceeds $4 billion. In 2003, there are 250 businesses operating in Colombia and about 25,000 US citizens registered with the US embassy in Bogotá. The US has already invested nearly a billion dollars in Colombia’s future from 1986-1999.

Colombia’s guerrilla organizations are a serious threat to Colombia and US National Security. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN) are the two largest insurgent groups, and the largest anti-insurgent paramilitary group is the United Self-Defense Groups of Columbia (AUC). Each of these groups resort to drug trafficking, murder, and kidnapping as the methods to finance their operations, intimidate the local population, and advance the violent overthrow of the Colombian government. The FARC, ELN, and AUC have each attacked critical Colombian infrastructure such as oil pipelines and electrical grids, and have threatened to destabilize the fragile Colombian economy that has recently rebounded from a recession in the late 1990s. There have been relatively few American citizens murdered or kidnapped, but the recent abduction of American defense contractors by the FARC in February 2003 and the arrival of a package bomb in September 2003 at the Weatherford International oil company headquarters in Bogotá show any reluctance to target Americans has disappeared.
How does Columbia get to the end state the US envisions?

In order for Colombia to become the economically stable democracy that the US envisions, a four-goal strategy is needed. The first goal is to eliminate the production and distribution of illegal drugs. The second goal is to build and strengthen Colombian public institutions and increase the State’s presence. The third goal is to revitalize the economy of Colombia. The fourth goal is to advance the Colombian peace process with illegally armed groups. These goals are articulated in the inter-agency “Plan Colombia” strategy proposed by Colombian President Andres Pastrana and US President Bill Clinton.\(^{11}\)

Plan Colombia was developed bi-laterally by Colombian and American policy-makers as “a plan for peace, prosperity and the strengthening of the state” and involved an investment of $7.5 billion over 3 years, with $4 billion provided by Colombia. Congress in 2000 approved with bipartisan support, $1.3 billion in aid for two years, and has approved $2.5 billion to date. Colombia has upheld its commitment to Plan Colombia by funding $4.9 billion to date.\(^{12}\)

Since the implementation of Plan Colombia, the US and Colombia have elected new presidents, both of whom view the strategy in a different light due to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. President Alvaro Uribe sees Plan Colombia as part of the US global war on terrorism and deserving of international support. President George W. Bush also sees Colombia as an area of interest in the war against terrorism as stated in the 2002 National Security Strategy:

“Parts of Latin America confront regional conflict, especially arising from the violence of drug cartels and their accomplices. This conflict and unrestrained narcotics trafficking could imperil the health and security of the United States. Therefore, we have developed an active strategy to help the Andean nations adjust their economies, enforce their laws, defeat terrorist organizations, and cut off the supply of drugs… In Colombia, we recognize the link between terrorist and extremist groups that challenge the security of the state and drug trafficking activities that help finance the operations of such groups.”\(^{13}\)
Clearly, Plan Colombia is the way the United States will attempt to deal with the dual problems of drugs and terrorism in Colombia.

**What use of US power does Plan Colombia require?**

Plan Colombia is a blending of economic, diplomatic, and military uses of US power. According to the Embassy of Colombia in Washington, DC, Plan Colombia consists of two major components. The first component is social and economic aid, which brings into play the economic, and diplomatic use of US power. The second major component is enforcement, which is the use of primarily US military power. Each of these means is used to support the four goals of Plan Colombia outlined earlier.

Economic efforts of the US directly affect Plan Colombia’s third goal of revitalizing the economy. The US and Colombia have continued to be partners in the Andean Trade Preferences Act which encourages export trade from Colombia of products to the US. Another example of economic effort is US foreign aid assistance that has helped Colombia’s economy through programs like Families in Action, Youth in Action, and Jobs in Action. In addition to these economic measures, significant funds have been allocated to the Colombian government to assist farmers in drug-producing areas switch from illegal drug crops to alternative crops, while infrastructure and roads have been constructed to get crops to the market. Humanitarian aid is also provided to the hundreds of thousands of displaced population due to past violence with the FARC, ELN, and AUC. Programs have been set up to provide special protection for high-risk groups such as human rights workers, labor leaders, teachers, journalists, and local government officials. Overall, much of the economic use of US power has gone toward funding programs that provide the Colombian government the means to establish a much needed social safety net for the poorest and most disadvantaged Colombian citizens.
United States diplomatic power has also been a means used in Plan Colombia. Much of this power has revolved around the improvement of the human rights record of Colombia. The US Justice department, working closely with the US State Department, has worked to support the goal of building and strengthening public institutions and increasing State presence throughout Colombia. A major effort has been made to reform and strengthen the Colombian judicial system by transforming the system into an accusatory, versus inquisitory system. Colombian penal code has been amended to establish harsher penalties for human rights offenses, genocide, and torture. Thirty-one justice centers have been established in low-income areas to educate the public and assist the court system by solving minor disputes. Colombian judges, lawyers, and law enforcement officials have been trained in anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, and anti-kidnapping measures. With US assistance, Anti-Corruption and Money Laundering/Asset Forfeiture units have been established to attack narcotic financial networks.

Colombia has used US assistance to establish a National Human Rights Unit with the mission of investigating and prosecuting human rights offenses. Sophisticated techniques and equipment have been provided for this unit to analyze ballistics, collate and check fingerprints, identify DNA evidence, and establish robust forensics analysis. An early warning system has been established to alert the Colombian government to situations that could lead to massacres or forced displacements and has to date provided for government responses on 153 occasions.

With regard to human rights and illegal armed groups, US and Colombian diplomatic efforts have attempted to establish dialogues with the FARC, ELN, and AUC. Peace talks collapsed with the FARC and ELN in 2002, but an exploratory commission has been formed with the AUC designed to reincorporate the AUC into Colombian society. A further diplomatic mean has been the cooperation between the US government and Colombia in the area of extradition. Since August
2002, sixty-four individuals have been extradited to the US, and 137 individuals since 2000 have
been extradited on narco-terrorism charges.\textsuperscript{20}

The use of the US military in support of Plan Colombia has been limited, but it has still played
an important role in support of the Plan Colombia goal of reducing the production and distribution of
illegal drugs and dismantling terrorist organizations. The main role of US military power has been
to train Colombian forces and provide direct support to the coca eradication effort. The United
States Military provided advisors to train three anti-narcotic brigades of 2,300 troops each, and five
riverine brigades of thirty troops apiece.\textsuperscript{21} Military training for Colombian forces includes
counterinsurgency training, force protection training, pilot training, and military professional
military education exchanges. As of July 2003, 358 US troops were in Colombia,\textsuperscript{22} but these troops
operate under some checks and balances. Domestic laws require no US military assistance be given
to any unit of the security forces for which the US government has credible evidence of commission
of gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary of State is able to certify that the Colombian
government has taken effective measures to bring those responsible to justice.\textsuperscript{23}

Plan Colombia uses the means of economic aid, diplomacy, and military assistance to support
the four main goals of the strategy. These means are synergistic and have produced some dramatic
results over the first three years of the strategy. A close look at these results will show that Plan
Colombia is succeeding in assuring that Colombia remains a stable and vibrant democracy.

**What are the successes of Plan Colombia?**

The success of Plan Colombia has been difficult to measure from 2000-2002, but results in
2003 have shown that the strategy is working. Many indications of success are evident for each of
the four major goals of the plan. For goal number one, there are numerous indicators that the flow of
illegal drugs is diminishing and that the illegally armed groups in Colombia are being dismantled.
Colombia’s goal is to reduce illegal drug crops by fifty percent by 2005. In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 30 September 2003, President Uribe announced that seventy percent of illegal crops had been eliminated, and that he will not stop until all illegal drugs are eliminated. Anti-narcotic operations have also improved, with an increase by sixty percent of combat-ready troops over three years. Over 1,000 coca laboratories have been destroyed and 4,000 weapons were seized from guerrillas and drug traffickers. There have been forty percent fewer attacks on critical oil infrastructure during the first quarter of 2003, compared to 2002. From August 2002 to June 2003, only nine settlements were attacked compared to forty attacks the year before.

The visible results of success for the goal of strengthening public institutions and increasing state presence in Colombia are as dramatic. Physical security for many Colombians has increased tremendously. Terrorist attacks have declined by fifty three percent, falling from 687 attacks in the first half of 2002, compared to the first half of 2003. Homicides have fallen 44.9 percent, kidnappings declined 34.2 percent, and massacres (defined as acts in which three or more persons are killed) declined by 44.9 percent in first half of 2003, compared with the first half of 2002. Colombia is in the process of training 78,000 new police officers to serve in rural towns where there has been no police presence. The military is also being restructured and modernized as indicated by proposed spending for the military increasing from 3.5 percent of Colombia’s GDP in 2002 to 4.1 percent by 2006.

The Colombian economy has also shown many positive signs of revitalization. For the first quarter of 2003, GDP grew at 3.8 percent, exceeding the governments target of 3.1 percent, and significantly above the growth rate of 1.4 percent in 2001, and 1.7 percent in 2002. Colombian unemployment has decreased from 15.3 percent in 2002 to 13 percent in 2003, with 1.4 million new
jobs created in the past year. United States imports from Colombia have increased by thirty four percent in the first quarter of 2003.\textsuperscript{29}

Colombia has made gains in advancing peace with the FARC, ELN, and AUC. In his UN speech of 30 September 2003, President Uribe outlined his current efforts to deal with the illegally armed groups. He states, “It is clear that we must continue with a policy of extending the rule of law as well as maintaining a firm determination to seek a negotiated solution based on a previous cease of hostilities”. President Uribe also explained to the General Assembly that he is working with many governments to negotiate a peace solution with the FARC, but the FARC has rejected his efforts. President Uribe also quoted some statistics to illustrate limited success in his negotiations with the armed groups. He said, “During my administration, 2,215 members of terrorist groups have demobilized. Seventy percent of them belong to the FARC, eighteen percent to the ELN, and twelve percent to the illegal self defense groups.”\textsuperscript{30} Overall, the numbers quoted by President Uribe are not impressive compared to the problem of approximately 30,000 Colombians illegally belonging to the FARC, ELN, and AUC, and the task of disarming these groups may be the most difficult issue in Plan Colombia to solve.

\textbf{What are the risks and consequences the United States faces with Plan Colombia?}

Illegal drugs in the United States continue to be a large problem for the American society. While Plan Colombia is making excellent progress at eliminating the flow of narcotics to the US, there is a risk that this strategy may force the drug traffickers and narco-terrorists to set up business in other Andean countries. There is no multi-lateral approach to Plan Colombia involving Colombia’s neighboring states. Venezuela is an example where efforts are underway by President Chavez’s government to actively undermine Colombia’s efforts to eliminate illegal drugs and the corollary aim of disbanding illegally armed forces. Venezuelan military forces are providing
training, sanctuary, arms, and a ready outlet for narcotics to flow. The consequence of not expanding US strategy to include other countries on the continent is that the US may trade one problem for another.

Another risk associated with Plan Colombia is that the FARC, ELN, and AUC may turn their sights on Americans, both in Colombia and in the US. Since these groups are fighting for their very survival, there is incentive to begin a terrorist campaign against the US with the aim of stopping the economic, diplomatic, and military support the US is providing Colombia. The consequences of Americans being targeted in Colombia would lead to a much greater commitment of military force that would go well beyond the scope of Plan Colombia. Dr. Virginia Bouvier, of the U.S. Institute of Peace, suggested, “The US should reorient its support for the counterinsurgency war toward initiatives that will lead to a just and equitable peace”. Her premise is that the US should change its security objectives to include consideration of socioeconomic needs, democratization, respect for human rights, and support for the rule of law in order to alleviate the causes for the illegally armed groups to form. If this approach is taken, the US may avoid the risk of being a terrorist target in this internal Colombian struggle.

A further risk for Plan Colombia is that President Uribe’s political survival may be threatened by the US strategy. President Uribe focused his campaign and his first year in office on eliminating the three major illegally armed groups in Colombia. This get tough strategy for his policy of “democratic security” has made him extremely popular with approval ratings from the Colombian people around seventy percent. President Uribe has also declared that guerrilla and para-military groups are not legitimate political actors but outlaws and they must be crushed. The danger for President Uribe is that if the FARC, ELN, and AUC can continue to control areas of the country, commit terror attacks like the 7 February bombing of a popular Bogotá nightclub, and command
international attention from countries like Venezuela or Cuba, then he ultimately may be forced from office.\textsuperscript{33}

President Uribe’s recent initiatives with the AUC have caused concern with the US. In an apparent reversal, President Uribe in August 2003 proposed amnesty for members of the AUC who have committed massacres in the past. Fifty-six members of congress wrote President Uribe in late September 2003 that the amnesty deal would “amount to impunity for serious human rights violations.”\textsuperscript{34} The purpose of President Uribe’s trip to the US, and his speech to the United Nations on 30 September 2003 was to allay US fears on his human rights stand and to shore up support for Plan Colombia. The risk is that as President Uribe goes, so goes Plan Colombia.

**Recommendations**

The Colombians themselves must solve the problems in Colombia. By providing diplomatic, economic, and military support to the Colombian government through Plan Colombia, the US has created an environment that allows Colombia the ability to tackle its complex internal problems. President Uribe is the dynamic leader that Colombia (and the US) needs to handle the FARC, ELN, and AUC. History will tell if President Uribe emerges as Colombia’s version of “George Washington” (or more aptly, Abraham Lincoln).

The risks for Plan Colombia are negligible compared to the opportunity to greatly reduce the illegal drug trade and provide the South American continent with a model of US-Latin American cooperation. Colombia is not a failed state, nor is it in danger of becoming one, but the flow of narcotics to the US has ruptured the fabric of its society. A possible addition to the next version of Plan Colombia would be a “Plan America” to reduce the demand for narcotics in the United States. A two-pronged approach linking together Plan Colombia with a comprehensive anti-drug strategy in the US would attack both sides of supply and demand for illegal narcotics. Until demand for drugs
in the Americas is eliminated, the US and South American countries could find itself in an endless
resource battle chasing the drug suppliers across the continent.

The US should consider expanding the parameters of Plan Colombia to include other countries
of the Andean region to ensure the gains made in Colombia are not undermined. If the US does not
build an alliance against drugs with all of South America, it may see a sort of reverse “domino
effect” where drugs and associated narco-terrorism will simply move from country to country.

A concern the US should have is the possible lack of a clear-cut exit strategy from the plan.
Questions that need to be asked are - at what level does the narcotics trade need to be reduced to,
when are the guerrilla and para-military groups no longer a threat to internal Colombian security or a
terrorist threat, and when does Colombia’s human rights record reach a point that the US can feel
comfortable withdrawing its current levels of support for the justice system, military training, and
police enforcement.

Combating drugs and eliminating associated narco-terrorism in Colombia is clearly in the
national interests of the United States. Plan Colombia is a robust, proactive, synergistic, and
affordable plan involving multiple uses of US power to achieve realistic national objectives while
protecting US security. Plan Colombia is working now, and the United States should not withdraw
from this strategy until the end state of a stable, economically viable democracy is achieved in
Colombia.
Endnotes


2 In 2000, there were 251,000 Americans in prison with an average 27-month sentence for drug related offenses. For a complete breakdown of the costs of illegal drug use, see Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, March 2003, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/pdf/drug_datasum.pdf [Accessed 11 October 2003].


6 “Background Note: Colombia”, Department of State, April 2002.

7 The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN) are the two largest insurgent groups, with 18,000 members in the FARC and 5,000 members in the ELN. The largest anti-insurgent paramilitary group is the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) with 10,000-15,000 members. Virginia M. Bouvier, “Colombia Quagmire: Time for U.S. Policy Overhaul”, Americas Program, Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC), September 2003, http://americaspolicy.org/briefs/2003/0309colombia.html [Accessed 11 September 2003], 2.

8 In relation to the rest of the world, Colombia has the highest murder rate per 100,000 with over 26,000 murders, and almost 4,000 Colombians were kidnapped at a rate of 10 per day in 2000. Michael Reid, “Colombia – Drugs, war and democracy”, The Economist, 21 April 2001, 2.


12 Reid, 2.


14 “Plan Colombia – Three years of successful U.S.-Colombia cooperation in the fight against drug-trafficking and terrorism”, Embassy of Colombia, Washington DC web site.
The Families in Action program has assisted 80,000 families by providing food and health care to the poorest families in rural areas in Colombia. The Youth in Action program provided job training and employment assistance for 49,000 young Colombians in the four largest cities in the country. The Jobs in Action program has approved 3000 projects that provide short and medium term employment for low income Colombians. For more on these three programs see “Plan Colombia – Three years of successful U.S.-Colombia cooperation in the fight against drug-trafficking and terrorism”, Embassy of Colombia, Washington DC web site.

The US and Colombia have assigned $25 million to provide security training, communications systems, and self-protection equipment. “Plan Colombia – Three years of successful U.S.-Colombia cooperation in the fight against drug-trafficking and terrorism”, Embassy of Colombia, Washington DC web site.

For the coca eradication effort, the US provided seventy-two helicopters for mobility and support for anti-narcotics operations, aircraft for aerial spraying, logistical support, upgraded radar systems, communications equipment, ammunition, spare parts, and training. “Plan Colombia – Three years of successful U.S.-Colombia cooperation in the fight against drug-trafficking and terrorism”, Embassy of Colombia, Washington DC web site.

At the end of 2002, coca cultivation has decreased in Colombia from 163,289 hectares to 102,071 hectares, a reduction of 37 percent. In addition, 22,829 families have agreed to stop growing coca and plant alternative crops, and 16,673 hectares of illegal crops have been manually eradicated. “Plan Colombia – Three years of successful U.S.-Colombia cooperation in the fight against drug-trafficking and terrorism”, Embassy of Colombia, Washington DC web site.


In interdiction terms, Colombia has seized 320 tons of cocaine since the year 2000, and interdiction efforts are becoming more efficient in 2003. “Plan Colombia – Three years of successful U.S.-Colombia cooperation in the fight against drug-trafficking and terrorism”, Embassy of Colombia, Washington DC web site.

More than 4,600 guerrillas and 1,986 members of the AUC were captured during the last year. “Plan Colombia – Three years of successful U.S.-Colombia cooperation in the fight against drug-trafficking and terrorism”, Embassy of Colombia, Washington DC web site.

Bouvier, 2.

US military assistance to the Colombian military falls under Section 556 (Leahy Amendment) of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Public Law 107-115) with Section 8098 of Department of Defense Appropriations Act (Public Law 106-79). “Background Note: Colombia”, Department of State, April 2002.
President Uribe in his 30 September speech to the UN stated, “A year ago, of a total of 1,100 municipalities, 170 did not have a police presence. Today, the police is present in 151 municipalities and we hope to have police in all municipalities within a few weeks.” President Uribe statement to the 58th session of the United Nations General Assembly, 30 September 2003.

“Plan Colombia – Three years of successful U.S.-Colombia cooperation in the fight against drug-trafficking and terrorism”, Embassy of Colombia, Washington DC web site.

With regard to the AUC, President Uribe has asked the Catholic Church to mediate a cease-fire and allow the AUC to demobilize. President Uribe statement to the 58th session of the United Nations General Assembly, 30 September 2003.

The article quotes an unnamed US official – “It’s no secret the level of cooperation that the Venezuelan government is giving to the Colombian groups, from the shipment of arms in, to the shipment of drugs out, to the movement of people in and out of Colombia.” Linda Robinson, “Terror Close to Home”, U.S. News & World Report, 6 October 2003.

Bouvier, 6.


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