

# **The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict - A Case Study for the United States Military in Foreign Internal Defense**

**A Monograph  
by  
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<b>13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words)</b> <p>From the end of the Vietnam War until Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States military did not engage in significant counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The decline in the U.S military's experience in this area is evident in the fidelity of the joint doctrine and service manuals such as Joint Publication 3-07.1, <i>Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense</i> and U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, <i>Stability Operations and Support Operations</i>. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication MCWP 3-33.5, <i>Counterinsurgency Operations</i>, contains some detail for planning COIN operations, but is a reprint of Fleet Marine Field Manual 8-2, and is somewhat dated from its original publishing in 1980.</p> <p>Operation Iraqi Freedom has required the U.S. military to relearn the COIN lessons forgotten from campaigns in Central America, the Philippines, and Vietnam. However, as mentioned above, a corps planner will find little guidance in military literature. This monograph seeks to provide that guidance by providing an analysis framework, the theoretical knowledge, and sources of additional guidance.</p> <p>Drawing primarily from academia, this monograph analyzes insurgencies using the familiar METT-TC format to understand an insurgency's motivations, strategies, tactics, targets, and means. It then uses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a case study against which the reader may test the theoretical knowledge presented on insurgencies .</p>				
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## Abstract

THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT - A CASE STUDY FOR THE UNITED STATES MILITARY IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE by Lt Col Reid M. Goodwyn, USAF, 51 pages.

From the end of the Vietnam War until Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States military did not engage in significant counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The decline in the U.S military's experience in this area is evident in the fidelity of the joint doctrine and service manuals such as Joint Publication 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense* and U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, contains some detail for planning COIN operations, but is a reprint of Fleet Marine Field Manual 8-2, and is somewhat dated from its original publishing in 1980.

Operation Iraqi Freedom has required the U.S. military to relearn the COIN lessons forgotten from campaigns in Central America, the Philippines, and Vietnam. However, as mentioned above, a corps planner will find little guidance in military literature. This monograph seeks to provide that guidance by providing an analysis framework, the theoretical knowledge, and sources of additional guidance.

Drawing primarily from academia, this monograph analyzes insurgencies using the familiar METT-TC format to understand an insurgency's motivations, strategies, tactics, targets, and means. It then uses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a case study against which the reader may test the theoretical knowledge presented on insurgencies.

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## INTRODUCTION

Consider the challenge of a Corps planner tasked to plan Phase IV or Stability and Support Operations (SASO) following the Major Combat Operations (MCO) of Phase III—a clear example is Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). After realizing they had not planned any operation like this before, most planners would ask themselves an initial series of questions using the basic METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time and Civil Considerations) framework. However, inevitably the planner will ask himself, does this framework apply for my SASO planning? What is the desired objective—is it military, political, or both? What are the anticipated obstacles to achieving this outcome? Do we expect resistance from the local population? What types of forces will I need to accomplish the mission? What expertise outside a normal planning staff do I need to accomplish my task?<sup>1</sup>

This monograph is written for the conventional forces planner to frame the problems associated with counterinsurgency (COIN) operations broadly outlined in Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, however, it will focus on the higher intensity end of the spectrum envisaged in this JP. This monograph will provide this planner the intellectual framework and methodology to rationally analyze the problem, understand the information required to answer critical questions, and know potential sources for this information.

Planning this type of operation can be a daunting task because of its differences from many of the experiences of a conventional forces planner. However, when broken into its components, the task is manageable with the proper approach. The first requirement is to start

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<sup>1</sup> A brief explanation of terms will preclude confusion on the terms used historically and currently on this subject. With the publication of JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense* and U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, the term Foreign Internal Defense (FID) replaced the term counterinsurgency (COIN). In this monograph the terms COIN and FID's associated activities identified in the publications mentioned above will be used interchangeably.

from a known point, then gain basic understanding of the new issues, and test your understanding with a case study as similar to your anticipated scenario as possible. Finally, gather your planning team and start the detailed planning.

### **Start from a Known Point**

While the implementation of SASO planning, the sources of your information, and members of your planning team may differ significantly from those of MCO; the methodology to solve this planning problem will be one commonly used by all of the U.S. armed services. The most important step in this process is a clear understanding of the operation's objective and potentially the nation's strategic objective. Investment of your time at this stage is critically important—planning for the incorrect objective can introduce fatal errors. Once you believe you understand the strategic objective, obtain concurrence from the highest possible leadership levels in your chain of command.

### **Gain a Basic Understanding**

Following in importance of clearly defining the campaign objective, understanding a potential adversary's motivations, objectives, and tactics are critical to operational success. Often carefully studying the history of the conflict will reveal its origin and participants' motivations, tactics, and the viewpoints of their adversary. This historical understanding should properly orient the planner to complete the succeeding steps analyzing the insurgency.

This monograph will use military doctrine from the U.S. Army, U.S. military joint publications, and sister service manuals in addition to academic research to help solve this planning problem. Interestingly, the capstone U.S. military doctrine document on FID, JP 3-07.1 and its associated U.S. Army document, FM 3-07, lack the detail necessary to construct the intellectual framework for this monograph. Only the U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, partially contains the requisite detail for this

study.<sup>2</sup> This author, and likely, planners for future conflicts will draw heavily on academic research to put flesh on the military doctrine skeleton.

Using the METT-TC framework, this monograph will sequentially examine finite elements of insurgencies. It will first examine the theory associated with that element and then use the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a case study.

## **Use a Case Study as a Test**

After reading the theoretical knowledge mentioned above, the critical reader might ask, “So what?” In his book, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, Bard E. O’Neill answers this question, “Accordingly, case studies are crucially important because of what we learn about the particular situations under consideration and because of ideas and findings that will improve the framework.”<sup>3</sup> This monograph will use the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict as a case study for several reasons. First, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is arguably one of the most complex intrastate, interstate, and regional conflicts of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Both sides of this conflict have a form of legitimacy to their claims, have used terrorism to further their cause, and have developed widespread distrust and hatred within their own population of the opposition. This complex conflict may contain elements common to many other potential areas of operation for U.S. armed forces. Second, and practically, information on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is readily available to develop and expand a theoretical framework. Finally, a number of the sources are written from a subjective viewpoint requiring the reader to critically assess the accuracy and usefulness of the material.

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<sup>2</sup> Joint Publication 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., 2004; Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 2003; Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, 2004.

<sup>3</sup> Bard E. O’Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Herndon: Brassey’s, 1990), 11.

## **UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

The requirement for analysis and preparation in understanding your adversary for battling an insurgency is no different than that for conventional major combat operations. While notable examples exist of insurgents and revolutionaries, such as Mao Tse-Tung and Ché Guevara, publishing their tactics, a planner must be prepared to intelligently plan military operations without possessing the adversary's manifesto. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5 states, "We cannot hope to carry out successfully any mission which requires the establishment or reestablishment of law and order within a nation without a proper understanding of the characteristics which make that nation unique."<sup>4</sup> Therefore, the planner's objective must be to piece his plan together using mostly unclassified information to identify the potential for an adversary during the operation, understand his motivations, strategy and tactics, potential targets, etc. While reading a conflict's history may not be as rewarding as planning and problem solving, this is a necessary step to ensure the planner understands the historical context in order to correctly address the problems.

### **Early History of the Jewish and Palestinian Peoples**

In the book of Genesis, the Bible foreshadowed the conflict over land between the Jews and Palestinians. Ishmael was the son of Abraham and maid of his wife Sarah while Isaac was born to Abraham and Sarah. God promised land to both sons, specifically telling Abraham after he forced Ishmael and Hagar into the wilderness, "And I will make a nation of the son of the slave woman also, because he is your offspring." Ishmael's 12 sons became the founders of Ishmaelite tribes that spread from Egypt to what is today Iraq. Many modern Arabs recognize they are the descendants of Ishmael, while the Jews and the rest of the Israelites are descendants

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<sup>4</sup> MCWP 3-33.5, 7.

of Isaac.<sup>5</sup> Hence, the earliest references to conflicting legitimate rights to these Middle Eastern lands were established.

## Westphalian Influences

Discussing the state of Palestine is difficult in western European terms because the Westphalian concept of a nation state was unknown to the people of the Middle East until the early twentieth century.<sup>6</sup> “Palestine was little more than a geographical expression, defining an area with no clear-cut boundaries.”<sup>7</sup> However, most experts consider the areas roughly bordered by modern Israel, Jordan, the Gaza Strip and West Bank to encompass Palestine as shown in Figure 1. By the mid-twentieth century, the nation-state concept including established borders was accepted throughout the region.<sup>8</sup> The imposition of this concept and the borders developed by western powers, primarily after World War I, would later complicate the resolution of this conflict.




Figure 1. Historic Palestine<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> <http://www.keyway.ca/htm2002/ishmael.htm>, accessed 28 Jan.

<sup>6</sup> Ruth Michelle Margolies, *The Path to Mass Rebellion: A Study of the Tactics and Countertactics in the Israeli Occupied Territories* (The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1993), 73.

<sup>7</sup> F. Robert Hunter, *The Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other Means* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 7.

<sup>8</sup> Margolies, 109.

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.masada2000.org/historical.html>, accessed 11 Jan.

## History of Palestine Prior to 1948

The first of three major Palestinian revolts occurred in 1834 against the Egyptian governor of the Ottoman Empire to end the requirement for conscripts into the Ottoman army.<sup>10</sup> The governor, Muhammad Ali, brutally crushed this revolt.<sup>11</sup>

From 1882 until 1947, the historical timeline of Arab/Palestinian-Israeli interaction was marked by three major influences: a series of Aliyahs (Jewish immigration into the region), Jewish acquisition of Arab/Palestinian land, and British rule. All three of these influences proved significant irritants to the Arabs and Palestinians while Table 1 illustrates the increasing Jewish immigration into Palestine during this period. Considering there were less than 50,000 Jews living in Palestine prior to 1900, this immigration is significant.

Alyiah	Years	Number of Jewish Immigrants
First	1882-1903	25,000
Second	1904-1914	40,000 – 50,000
Third	1919-1923	35,000
Fourth	1924-1928	67,000
Fifth	1929-1939	250,000

**Table 1. Jewish Immigration into Palestine**

The First Zionist Congress declared the formal goal of establishing a Jewish national homeland in 1897.<sup>12</sup> The British assumed the mandate to rule Palestine, taking over from the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Following World War I, the League of Nations legitimized the British mandate over Palestine and directed the British to “encourage close settlement of Jews

<sup>10</sup> Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal. *The Palestinian People: A History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 6.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*, 11.

<sup>12</sup> Calvin Goldscheider. *Cultures in Conflict: The Arab Israeli Conflict* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2002), xvii-xxii.

upon the land.” From 1945-1951, a further 725,000 Jews emigrated, primarily from Europe, into Palestine and later Israel.<sup>13</sup>

Regarding the Zionist goal of a national homeland, in 1917 the British governor of the region, Lord Balfour, issued the significant declaration creating a Jewish political legitimacy to the land:

“His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”<sup>14</sup>

The Palestinians rejected the Balfour declaration<sup>15</sup> and a distinct Palestinian nationalism began. Previously, Palestinians considered themselves an integral part of the Arab world, while simultaneously maintaining a special connection to their homeland.<sup>16</sup> Throughout the years of British rule, the Palestinian national demands were consistent: a national parliament elected by the people and an end to the establishment of Jewish colonies on Palestinian soil.<sup>17</sup> This demand was formally declared in 1920 by the Palestinian National Congress and again in 1933 by the Arab Executive Committee.<sup>18</sup> In short, the Palestinians sought their own nation/state.

The second major Palestinian revolt occurred from 1936-1939, mobilizing thousands of Arabs from every stratum of society. This revolt was directed against British rule over Palestine and was the Palestinians' first attempt to demonstrate their political will.<sup>19</sup> The results of this second revolt were disastrous for the Palestinians: the Palestinian population was worn down and disarmed, the Jewish population was increasingly militarized with 15,000 under arms by the end

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid, xvii -xxii.

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/balfour.htm> accessed 11 Jan.

<sup>15</sup> Goldscheider, xxi.

<sup>16</sup> Margolies, 72.

<sup>17</sup> Hunter, 9.

<sup>18</sup> Goldscheider, xxii

<sup>19</sup> Kimmerling, 102-105.

of the revolt, and the Jewish leader, David Ben-Gurion, changed his Zionist strategy to prepare to fight the Arabs vice the British.<sup>20</sup>

The second significant international declaration regarding the status of Palestine was the 1947 United Nations Resolution 181, which recommended the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states as depicted in Figure 2 and reinforced the early Balfour mandate. While the Zionists accepted the proposal, the Arabs and Palestinians rejected it.<sup>21</sup>




Figure 2. UN Resolution 181 Partition Plan<sup>22</sup>

## History of Palestine and Israel 1948-1987

### The 1948 Arab-Israeli War to the Development of the PLO

Despite numerous threats to declare war on the Jews if a Jewish state was declared, David Ben-Gurion established the state of Israel on May 14, 1948 covering an area roughly 80 percent

<sup>20</sup> Kimmerling, 102-103.

<sup>21</sup> Goldscheider, xxii.

<sup>22</sup> <http://www.masada2000.org/historical.html>, accessed 11 Jan.

of historic Palestine.<sup>23</sup> The 1948 Arab-Israeli War began the following day with the invasion by Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon into the new Israeli state and led to the displacement of 750,000 or nearly 80 percent of Palestinians from their homes now included in Israeli's territory<sup>24</sup>. Most of these displaced Palestinians established refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the Gaza Strip (governed by Egypt), and the West Bank (governed by Jordan) leaving approximately 120,000 Arabs within the borders of Israel. Additionally, this war led to the confiscation of the displaced Palestinians' land by the Israeli government.<sup>25</sup> Further, not only did Israel hold all land assigned by UN Resolution 181, they also seized part of the land designated for the Palestinian state. Jordan annexed the West Bank, and Egypt gained control over the Gaza Strip<sup>26</sup> as depicted in Figure 3.



Figure 3. Borders Following 1948 Arab-Israeli War<sup>27</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Margolies, 75 and Hunter, 1.

<sup>24</sup> Goldscheider, xxii and Norman G. Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2d ed. (New York: Verso, 2003), xv.

<sup>25</sup> Hunter, 1, 11.

<sup>26</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* (New York: Anchor Books, 1989), 15.

<sup>27</sup> <http://www.masada2000.org/historical.html>, accessed 11 Jan.

Following the 1948 War, Israel signed separate armistice agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. Despite these agreements, these Arab states permitted frequent Palestinian groups to attack Israel from their territory and the Gaza Strip.<sup>28</sup> Looking beyond these attacks, Israel considered the conventional threat from the Arab armies as the major danger because they had the potential to destroy Israel. Therefore, the Israelis considered the Palestinian irregular threat secondary.<sup>29</sup>

In the Cold War period following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the bipolar world had formed neatly with the United States, Great Britain, and France allied with Israel and the Soviet Union allied with the Arabs. In 1956 the Israelis were convinced the Arabs were once again preparing for war, with this fear exacerbated by the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Gamal Abdal Nasser in July, 1956. On Oct. 29, 1956, Moshe Dayan led Israeli forces into Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, resulting in the capture of several key objectives, including the Gaza strip and Sharm el Sheikh, which controlled the approaches to the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel withdrew from these positions in 1957, after access to the Gulf of Aqaba had been guaranteed, ensuring Israel access to the Indian Ocean.<sup>30</sup>

While the Palestinians accepted neither the Egyptians nor Jordanians as their legitimate rulers or leaders, the Palestinians believed Arab countries were more justified in controlling another Arab people than the Zionists who were perceived as an extension of European imperialism.<sup>31</sup> However, the Jordanian and Egyptian approaches to ruling the Palestinians differed significantly. The Egyptians ruled the Strip with an iron-fist, preventing any mass political action from erupting and did not implement any policies for integrating their two societies or promoting the Palestinian economy. In contrast,

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<sup>28</sup> Friedman, 15.

<sup>29</sup> Margolies, 76.

<sup>30</sup> <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0856667.html>, accessed 26 Jan.

<sup>31</sup> Margolies, 96.

“The Jordanians co-opted the Palestinians into their society and discredited the growth of a separate Palestinian identity. The heavy-hand of the King’s men and his insight that the way to pacify the population was to place them in positions of authority, was farsighted. Many Palestinians became accustomed to their positions and were not interested in jeopardizing their newly found power, despite its limitations.”<sup>32</sup>

F. Robert Hunter noted, “In order to control the resistance groups, Egypt and the other Arab states created the PLO in 1964.”<sup>33</sup> The PLO was designed to represent Palestinians everywhere and to symbolize the Arab World’s commitment to their cause. The first Palestinian National Council convened in 1964 and adopted its charter as the basic constitution of the PLO.<sup>34</sup> However, contrary to this display of Arab support and unity, neither Egypt nor Jordan permitted the Palestinians to form their own independent government in the Gaza Strip or West Bank.

## The 1967 Six Day War

Gamal Abdel-Nasser entered military alliances with Syria and Jordan to support his declared intention of destroying Israel. In early 1967, he concentrated troops along the Egyptian-Israeli border and blockaded shipping to the Israeli port of Eilat. Feeling increasingly threatened, Israeli attacked Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in a June 1967 war lasting six days.<sup>35</sup> The momentous repercussions for the Palestinians included Israeli rule in the Gaza Strip and West Bank and a requirement to find a more effective strategy to achieve Palestinian statehood.<sup>36</sup> For the Arab world, the massive defeat in the Six Day War resulted in a sweeping revolutionary mood.<sup>37</sup> Margolies wrote, “The Palestinians looked to the Algerian victory in 1962 as a model to illustrate self reliance was a more viable option to achieving their goals than dependence upon other nations.” The Palestinians realized the Arab world could not crush Israel and decided to make life

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid: “preventing any mass political action from erupting” – 95, “promoting the Palestinian economy” – 88, “The Jordanians co-opted the Palestinians” – 105

<sup>33</sup> Hunter, 14.

<sup>34</sup> Goldscheider, xii.

<sup>35</sup> Friedman, 15-16.

<sup>36</sup> Margolies, 81.

<sup>37</sup> Friedman, 16.

difficult for Israel and adopted the Fedayeen strategy of guerilla tactics to play a more central role in achieving their objectives. This strategy's objectives included: reminding Israeli society the Palestinians could not be ignored, begin a long process of attrition, and to negate Israel's technological superiority and external state support. The Six Day War ended with Israel's retaining possession of the Gaza Strip and West bank, with their large and potentially hostile populations. This forced Israel to develop policies and tactics to combat civil disobedience and a Palestinian revolution. Responding to the increased guerilla attacks, Israel established Unit 101, a small unit of hand-picked men under the command of Ariel Sharon, to retaliate for incursions and raids into Israel.<sup>38</sup>

## Black September

The PLO chose Jordan as the primary location to organize, train, and from which to execute these guerilla attacks against Israel. By 1970 at least seven Palestinian guerrilla organizations were identified in Jordan including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by George Habash.<sup>39</sup> King Hussein was initially supportive of the guerilla activities in his country, but Israeli reprisal raids, and more importantly, Palestinian increasing demands for greater control of Jordan, put the Jordanian King and the Palestinians on a collision course.

Repeated Jordanian attempts to compromise with the Palestinian guerillas were unsuccessful, forcing King Hussein to view the Palestinians as a direct threat to his authority in Jordan. In response, he reaffirmed martial law and formed a cabinet composed of loyal army officers. Additionally, King Hussein appointed Field Marshal Habis al Majali, an intensely proroyalist Bedouin, commander in chief of the armed forces and military governor of Jordan with full powers to implement the martial law regulations and to quell the fedayeen. On the same

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<sup>38</sup> Margolies: "achieving their goals" – 110, "Fedayeen strategy of guerilla tactics" – 80, "the Palestinians could not be ignored" – 111, "negate Israel's technological superiority" – 81, "develop policies and tactics" – 2, "Israel established Unit 101" – 83.

<sup>39</sup> <http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/bravo/blacksept1970.htm>, accessed 26 Jan.

day, Arafat became supreme commander of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), the regular military force of the PLO. The ensuing conflict in September 1970 was a ten-day civil war with Syria backing the Fedayeen and resulted in an estimated 3,500 fatalities.<sup>40</sup>

In spite of the post hostility agreements, fighting continued. “The closing months of 1970 and the first six months of 1971 were marked by a series of broken agreements and by continued battles between the guerrilla forces and the Jordanian army, which continued its drive to oust the fedayeen from the populated areas.” In April 1971, Al Fatah issued a statement demanding the overthrow of the Jordanian "puppet separatist authority." King Hussein struck at the remaining guerrilla forces in Jordan with the Jordanian army beginning an offensive against Fedayeen on July 13, 1971. The result of the conflict with Jordan for the Palestinians was loss of support and an operational base for attacks into Israel. King Hussein became “virtually isolated from the rest of the Arab world, which accused him of harsh treatment of the fedayeen and denounced him as being responsible for the deaths of so many of his fellow Arabs.”<sup>41</sup>

## The 1973 Yom Kippur War

In September 1973, the Israelis accepted Egyptian explanations of Egyptian troop movements as part of military exercises and Israeli intelligence did not expect an attack during the Jewish festival Yom Kippur and the Islamic month of Ramadan. One reason was both religions prohibited warfare during these festivals. On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria (backed by Iraq, Jordan, and financially by Saudi Arabia) executed a surprise attack against Israel. The Arab primary objective in this war was to regain territory lost in the 1947-49, 1956, and 1967 wars with the Israelis and to answer a growing frustration in the Arab world concerning the lack of political progress in solving the land and Palestinian issues. Lasting three weeks and costing an estimated US \$7 billion, the war resulted in exposing previously unseen Israeli weaknesses,

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

demonstrating the new strengths of Egypt and Syria, and the loss of previously occupied Israeli territory.<sup>42</sup>

## Development of PLO Factions

Al-Fatah was formed in 1959 by Yasser Arafat as a pragmatic and non-doctrinaire organization<sup>43</sup> joining the PLO in 1968, winning the leadership role in 1969. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 led to the group's dispersal to several Middle Eastern countries, including Tunisia, Yemen, Algeria, Iraq. Fatah operates military and intelligence wings, including Force 17 and the Western Sector, instrumental in terrorist attacks. Two of its leaders, Abu Jihad and Abu Iyad, were assassinated in recent years.<sup>44</sup>

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is a self declared Marxist-Leninist group founded in 1967 by George Habash which believes the liberation of Palestine could only come through Arab unity and the struggle of the Arab peoples against Israel.<sup>45</sup> “The PFLP does not view the Palestinian struggle as a religious one, seeing it instead as a broader revolution against Western imperialism.”<sup>46</sup> The group has a reputation for international terrorist attacks, including airline hijackings that have killed at least 20 US citizens and is opposed to the Oslo process.

The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) is also a Marxist-Leninist organization founded in 1969 when it split from the PFLP believing Palestinian national goals can be achieved only through mass revolution. The DFLP further split into two factions in 1991; with Nayif Hawatmah leading the majority and more hard-line faction. The DFLP joined with other rejectionist groups to form the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF) to oppose the Declaration of Principles signed in 1993. “The Declaration of Principles, signed by the PLO and Israel, contains

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<sup>42</sup> <http://lexicorient.com/e.o/yomkipwr.htm>, accessed 11 Jan.

<sup>43</sup> Hunter, 25.

<sup>44</sup> <http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/alfatah.htm>, accessed 11 Jan.

<sup>45</sup> Hunter, 25.

<sup>46</sup> <http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/pflp.htm>, accessed 11 Jan.

a set of mutually agreed-upon general principles regarding the 5-year interim period of Palestinian self-rule.”<sup>47</sup> The DFLP and PFLP later left their alliance with the APF over ideological differences, but have made several attempts toward merging with the PFLP since the mid-1990s.<sup>48</sup>

## **The Palestinian Intifada – “Babies are our Atomic Bombs”<sup>49</sup>**

### **Background**

The twenty years of Israeli occupation established a new social situation for the indigenous population in the territories and created an environment conducive to unrest.<sup>50</sup> The third major Palestinian revolt is the Intifada, beginning December 3, 1987, aimed at laying the foundation for Palestinian political independence.<sup>51</sup> While this specific beginning date is widely accepted, the Intifada developed in stages rather than fully emerging on that day. The beginning of the Intifada also marked the end of another Palestinian tactic, their period of samud (Arab noun for steadfastness or staying put) used since 1967. “Samud connoted a determination by Palestinians to construct, build and cling to their lands.” Further, the goals of the Intifada were limited, the “Intifada was a struggle for the freedom and independence of Gaza and West Bank only, and it was a war waged with limited means.”<sup>52</sup>

The Intifada gave new life to the peace process, still for almost a decade with the PLO officially recognizing Israel, renouncing the use of terrorism, and accepting UN Resolutions 338

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<sup>47</sup> [http://www.unitedjerusalem.com/DECLARATION\\_OF\\_PRINCIPLES\\_1993/declaration\\_of\\_principles\\_1993.asp](http://www.unitedjerusalem.com/DECLARATION_OF_PRINCIPLES_1993/declaration_of_principles_1993.asp), accessed 26 Jan.

<sup>48</sup> <http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/dflp.htm>, accessed 11 Jan.

<sup>49</sup> Hunter, 1.

<sup>50</sup> Margolies, 15.

<sup>51</sup> Kimmerling, 6.

<sup>52</sup> Hunter, 2.

and 342 (stating the principle of peace in exchange for the return of lands conquered by Israel in the Six Day War).<sup>53</sup>

## Historical Causes

“In the Israeli occupied territories, the preconditions for violence were in place (and indeed violence had been occurring) prior to 1987, yet it was the lack of successful political movement, coupled with Israeli counterinsurgency tactics designed to ‘quiet the population’ which eventually led the Palestinians to choose the tactic of unarmed insurrection.” The Palestinians do not accept the Israelis as their legitimate rulers. Therefore, Israeli tactics to suppress unrest and disperse demonstrations, which Israel perceived as a threat, increased Palestinian frustration.<sup>54</sup>

The implementation of Israel’s counterinsurgency tactics since 1967 was a major factor influencing the Palestinians’ adaptation of their tactics and subsequently their emergence as major actors in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The political/military policy of the Israeli government played an active role in determining whether mass collective action would assume broad revolutionary or peaceful means.<sup>55</sup>

Several factors increased the Palestinians’ perception of relative deprivation. The availability of higher paying jobs for Palestinians in Israel increased their standard of living but did not result in a corresponding increase of political and social freedoms, resulting in an escalated Palestinian frustration. Also frustrating to the Palestinians was although they made more money in Israel than the occupied territories; they made less money than Israelis doing the same menial tasks.<sup>56</sup> And everyday witnessed the Israeli society enjoying a better lifestyle than the Palestinians. Another source of relative deprivation was the increasing education levels of

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<sup>53</sup> Hunter, 4.

<sup>54</sup> Margolies, 5, 45.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, 29

many Palestinians' leading to higher expectations for better opportunities and civil rights. Yet another source of increased Palestinian frustration was their inability to conduct a "normal" life and an incapability to adjust to the source of stress.<sup>57</sup>

## **DEVELOPING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

With the historical information of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the foundation of understanding, the author will analyze the counterinsurgency aspects of the conflict using the previously mentioned METT-TC methodology. However, before the analysis can begin, the author must define the term insurgency and identify its basic causes.

### **Basic Insurgency Analysis**

Bard O'Neill wrote "Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics."<sup>58</sup> He later recommends a thoughtful and objective analysis of "demography, social structure and values, economic trends, the political culture, and the structure and performance of the political system" to reveal the causes of the insurgency and identify the obstacles both sides face regarding implementation of their strategies and policies. "The important thing to bear in mind is that insurgency is essentially a political legitimacy crisis of some kind."<sup>59</sup>

In his book, *Why Men Rebel*, Ted Robert Gurr bifurcates organized revolutionary violence into conspiracies and internal war. Conspiracies are highly organized with limited participation and violence including assassinations, small scale terrorism and guerilla attacks, coups, and mutinies. At the other end of the violence spectrum, is internal war with highly

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid, 30, 23.

<sup>58</sup> O'Neill, 13.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, 133, 17.

organized political violence incorporating widespread participation, large scale terrorism, guerilla wars, civil wars, and revolutions.<sup>60</sup>

Prior to the publishing of his book in 1990, O’Neill did not believe any “cohesive doctrine and organization” had been very successful coping with low-intensity conflict primarily because drug dealing, transnational terrorism, and insurgency differ substantially from other forms of conflict. These differences include objectives, modus operandi, and susceptibility to countermeasures. These are the key issues which require careful consideration when studying all insurgencies, regardless of time or location.<sup>61</sup>

Loosely following the METT-TC methodology, the author will analyze insurgencies from a government’s viewpoint as follows: Mission (basic understanding of the problem - insurgent motivations and insurgency types), Enemy (insurgent strategies, insurgent forms of warfare, and targets), Terrain (insurgent environment), Troops (means and popular support), Time (government response), and Civil Considerations (civilian culture, organizations, and media). Following an introduction to the subject area with the appropriate theoretical information, the author will use the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to apply the theory.

## **Mission**

### **Insurgent Motivations**

Gurr wrote insurgencies are “An innate response to our inability to obtain satisfaction is to strike out at the sources of discontent.”<sup>62</sup> O’Neill adds the cumulative effects of societal divisions and economic and political disparities result in particularly violent insurgent action.<sup>63</sup> Other experts put it another way, believing societies are systems requiring balance among the

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<sup>60</sup> Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 10.

<sup>61</sup> O’Neill, 10.

<sup>62</sup> Gurr, 22.

<sup>63</sup> O’Neill, 4.

various components such as economic, political, and social factors. When this balance is upset, individuals or groups will attempt to restore the balance and if the required rebalancing is perceived to be extreme, the result is latent violence. Rapid social change resulting in upsetting a society's balance can come from foreign conquest inflicting social, economic, and political dislocations; resulting in increased individual frustration, and potentially, revolution.<sup>64</sup> A particular group may also perceive a sharp reversal in their economic, social, or political status as a systemic disequilibrium requiring a violent action. An example is that of the Sunni community following Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Gurr proposes the theory of Relative Deprivation (RD) as a potential source of violence in insurgencies or revolutions, defining this term “as a perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations and their value capabilities.” Concerning the cause of insurgency and revolution, Gurr believes relative deprivation’s resulting discontent “is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective violence.” Value expectations are the goods and circumstances of life to which they are entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and circumstances of life people believe they are capable of obtaining.<sup>65</sup> In other words, people or groups feel deprived when they do not believe they can obtain what is rightfully theirs—and it is important to emphasize, it only requires their subjective perception of RD. Further, RD is not a digital, phenomenon—either on or off. Rather, the planner should consider the scope (the prevalence with respect to the other members of the group) and intensity (“the extent of negative affect that is associated with its perception”) of RD over each of the group’s most significant value expectations. These significant value expectations could include: food, shelter, family, security, money, and political or military power or influence. However, simple presence of RD

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<sup>64</sup> Margolies, 17, 20, 18.

<sup>65</sup> Gurr, 13, 24.

does not predict imminent violence as these conditions may be present for lengthy periods and only assist in the generation of violence when the RD increases in scope or intensity.<sup>66</sup>

Gurr identifies three possible methods for a group to develop RD. The first method is when the value expectations remain constant and the value capabilities decline over time such as loss of political power, or loss of critical resources in competition with another group. The second method occurs when the value expectations increase over time, but the value capabilities remain constant. A very common example of this case is when a family moves to a new neighborhood with wealthy neighbors and the family's young children ask the parents why they can not have the same cars, clothes, and toys as the neighbors. The third method occurs after a period of both rising value expectations and value capabilities, the value capabilities reverses and begins decreasing as in an economic depression. Another way to understand RD intensity mentioned above is thinking of it as the magnitude of the difference between value expectations and value capabilities.<sup>67</sup>

Psychological and group conflict theories predict a greater likelihood of violence with an increasing level of discontent.<sup>68</sup> Additionally, Gurr writes, "Psychological evidence demonstrates unequivocally that the intensity of anger varies with the degree to which the response is frustrated." In the language of the military planner, the intensity of a group increases with each unsuccessful attempt to achieve their goal. Another societal variable affecting the likelihood of violence is "the extent and degree of success of past political violence, the articulation and dissemination of symbolic appeals justifying violence, the legitimacy of the political system, and the kinds of responses it makes and has made to relative deprivation." Further, a group's history of violence portends the group's future violence. "The more common collective violence is in a society, the more likely it is that some individuals will find it rewarding and hence be prepared to

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid: "subjective perception of RD" – 24, "most significant value expectations" – 29, "RD increases in scope or intensity" – 15, "three possible methods" – 46.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, 46.

<sup>68</sup> Gurr, 13.

engage in it in the future. And the more common such violence is, the more likely it is that nonparticipant observers will choose to emulate the behavioral models it provides.” As an example, prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom the Ba’athists, drawn primarily from the Sunni community in Iraq, routinely used violence to retain power, therefore one should expect them to use violence to regain power following their removal from power. Deeper frustration produces greater levels of violence with intense frustration potentially leading to either short, intense attacks or to less intense, but longer term attacks.” With respect to collective violence, Gurr provides the worst case scenario “The potential would be greatest in a nation most of whose citizens felt sharply deprived with respect to their most deeply valued goals, had individually and collectively exhausted the constructive means open to them to attain those goals, and lacked any nonviolent opportunity to act on their anger.”<sup>69</sup> Margolies further extends Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation, “It is not deprivation alone that causes people to exhibit an aggressive response to frustration, but an anticipation of not obtaining expectations.”<sup>70</sup>

The Palestinians exhibited all three motivations for a group to develop relative deprivation throughout their interaction with the Jews. With each Aliyah, and increased Jewish immigration since, the Palestinians lost land and political power. As participants in the growing Israeli economy, the Palestinians working in Israel, often as common laborers, experienced growing value expectations as they witnessed the growing Jewish prosperity without a corresponding increase in their own value capabilities. The third method of developing RD occurred when Palestinian political fortunes (value capabilities) were significantly reversed, especially with the establishment of the Israel as a nation and subsequent 1948 and 1967 wars, thereby decreasing their value capabilities. Furthermore, the Palestinians nearly continuous series of frustrations in achieving their goals, dating back to at least the 19<sup>th</sup> century, has led to a change

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid: “Psychological evidence demonstrates” – 60, “dissemination of symbolic appeals” – 13, “emulate the behavioral models” – 172, “Deeper frustration produces greater levels of violence” – 9, “lacked any nonviolent opportunity to act on their anger” – 92.

<sup>70</sup> Margolies, 28.

in tactics from their revolt against the British rule, to dependence on Arab states' militaries, to insurgency.

## Insurgency Types and Problems Identifying Them

O'Neill defines six types of insurgencies by their primary goal: anarchist, egalitarian, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, and preservationist. He also identifies four problems encountered identifying insurgency types: goal transformation or conflicts, misleading rhetoric, and goal ambiguity.

The anarchist insurgency seeks to eliminate all institutionalized political forms because "they view the super ordinate-subordinate authority relationships associated with them as unnecessary and illegitimate." The Black Help in West Germany in 1970s is an example of an anarchist insurgency.<sup>71</sup>

Egalitarian insurgencies seek to impose a new system based on the ultimate value of distributional equality and centrally controlled structures designed to mobilize the people and radically transform the social structure within an existing political community. "Despite their populist rhetoric, egalitarian insurgents who come to power normally establish political systems that are authoritarian, repressive, and elitist."<sup>72</sup> The Shining Path in Peru, Viet Cong in South Vietnam, Fedayeen-i-Khalq in Iran and the Ba'athist groups that seized power in Iraq and Syria are examples of egalitarian insurgencies.

Pluralist insurgencies seek to establish a system where the values of individual freedom, liberty, and compromise are emphasized and where branches of government are separate and autonomous. "Case studies of almost every major insurgency since the mid-1970s suggest that while many groups use pluralistic rhetoric, their ultimate goals and behavior are anything but

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<sup>71</sup> O'Neill, 17.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

pluralistic.”<sup>73</sup> UNITA in Angola and the National Resistance Movement in Uganda are possible examples of pluralistic insurgencies.

Secessionist insurgencies “renounce the political community of which they are formally a part. They seek to withdraw from it and constitute a new and independent political community.”<sup>74</sup> Despite this desire to withdraw from the established political structure, secessionists consider themselves nationalists. The Confederate States of America, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, Kurdish insurgents in Iraq, Sikhs of the Khalistan Liberation Front in India, Southwest African People’s Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia are example of secessionists.

Reformists seek more political, social, and economic benefits for their constituencies without rejecting the political community, system, or authorities. Examples of these least ambitious types of insurgencies include the Kurds in Iran and the Miskito Indians in Nicaragua.<sup>75</sup>

Preservationists are oriented toward maintaining the status quo because of the relative political, economic, and social privileges they derive from it. Examples include the Afrikaner Resistance Movement in South Africa and Ulster Volunteer Force in Northern Ireland.<sup>76</sup>

Identifying the goals is a key step in understanding an insurgency. Different goals place different demands on insurgents with respect to resources. Secessionist and anarchistic, traditionalist, pluralist, and egalitarian aims are not amenable to compromise; therefore, they are normally strongly resisted by the government. As a result the insurgents must mobilize greater support and be prepared for a sustained commitment if they expect to succeed. Geographically isolated egalitarian movements, like the Thai National Liberation Front, are at a significant disadvantage because of their limited ability to mobilize support from the majority group, which

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid, 19.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, 20.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

sustains the political system and authorities. However, limited insurgent activity can help reformist and preservationist groups convince the authorities to make concessions.<sup>77</sup>

Intentionally or not, insurgent groups may mask these goals using four methods. Some insurgent movements experience goal transformation because new leaders emerge with other goals in mind or because existing leaders calculate that less ambitious aims stand a better chance of being accomplished. The Dhofar insurgency in Oman from a secessionist to an egalitarian is an example.<sup>78</sup>

Often distinct groups or factions in an insurgent movement have different and at times mutually exclusive goals. An example is the uprising against the Marxist regime in Afghanistan involving reactionary-traditionalist, egalitarian, and pluralist factions. Identifying this lack of consensus is important because of the significant effects this can have on the progression of the insurgency, to include internecine fighting, which can significantly undermine its capability.<sup>79</sup>

Frequently insurgent groups will mask their ultimate goals by democratic rhetoric. It is particularly important to examine carefully the public and internal documents of the insurgents and the way the movement is governed before attempting to determine their primary goals. “The democratic pronouncements of movements that are politically pluralistic, like the Jewish Agency in Palestine during the 1940s, are far more convincing than those of central controlled and authoritarian organizations, such as Marxist and religiously inspired ones that claim to monopolize the truth.”<sup>80</sup>

Goal ambiguity occurs when two or more aims may be evident, neither of which clearly predominates. The Shining Path in Peru is not as clear as its Maoist ideological pronouncements

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid, 22.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

might suggest, because Indian mysticism and symbols are extolled in what seems to be an attempt to synthesize traditionalism with egalitarianism.<sup>81</sup>

All of the three major PLO groups (PLO, PFLP, and DFLP) are secessionists and to date have not effectively negotiated a peace treaty or agreed to the establishment of a Palestinian state with Israel. Although Yasser Arafat was widely considered the Palestinian leader, his goals transformed from his rise to power in the 1960's until his death in 2004. Additionally, conflicts have and will continue to exist between the PLO and PFLP/DFLP on what the ultimate Palestinian goals are and how best to achieve them. A disparity in goals like this requires the planner approach each group differently, based on their goals and the tools they use in their attempt to achieve them. An additional strategy may include splitting the groups along the seams of their goals and attempting to turn one group against the other.

## Insurgent Faction Analysis

John Darby analyzes the composition of insurgent groups and intra-organizational conflict in his book, *The Effects of Violence on the Peace Process*, “paramilitary organizations are not the monoliths presented by their opponents. They are complex organisms performing different functions, and their complexity is compounded by misinformation routinely propagated by both the paramilitaries and their opponents.”<sup>82</sup> He identifies several potential types of factional members: dealers, zealots, opportunists, and mavericks. Darby defines dealers as those prepared to make a deal with the government, zealots seek to spoil deals by stopping the process through violence, opportunists may be persuaded to end violence as a coercive means under some circumstances, and mavericks as those whose violence is primarily motivated by personal rather than political objectives.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid, 22.

<sup>82</sup> John Darby, *The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), 46.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid, 48.

The existence of these competing factions presents opportunities for exploitation, such as the operational seams between the factions, competition for preeminence and distrust between the factions. However, the varying strategies and goals of each group require a different approach to each of these factions. After categorizing the major factional actors, the following general approaches may be used for each group. At times, Yasser Arafat was a dealer while at other times he appeared more of an opportunist. Early evaluation of Mahmoud Abbas appears to determine he is more of a dealer than his predecessor. Dealers are critical to the FID process and therefore must be protected and retained and involved in the process. Early in the FID operation, reciprocal confidence building measures are critical such as the release of political prisoners and protection of their landmarks or religious sites. Separating the opportunists from the zealots is also important. If the insurgents, or opportunists specifically, receive external support, then political pressure (most likely obtained through the Combatant Commander) on the supporting government can be effective. Further, do not specifically exclude opportunists from the settlement process. Isolating the zealots, such as George Habash (PFLP) and Nayif Hawatmah (DFLP) and mavericks is critical and can be accomplished through aggressive capture or killing campaigns, but in the long term is more effectively accomplished through criminalizing the violence by processing the zealots through the judicial system.<sup>84</sup> Public trials can be part of an effective psychological operations campaign by removing the insurgent's appearance of invincibility and aura of a freedom fighter.

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<sup>84</sup> Darby, 58-59.

## Enemy

### Insurgent Strategies

When non-ruling groups believe existing social, economic, or political policies discriminate against their particular groups they resort to violence to change in the policies.<sup>85</sup> Revolutionaries do employ military tactics, but the primary component of their strategy is psychological. “Revolutionary appeals typically provide justification for new or intensified value expectations, and enhance men’s value capabilities by specifying appropriate kinds of actions (value opportunities) which make it possible to attain those value expectations.”<sup>86</sup> The military planner must understand this aspect of the threat to create an effective counterinsurgency strategy.<sup>87</sup> Finally, remember insurgents make mistakes and sometimes badly perform their own METT-TC analysis, and therefore choose the wrong strategy. The following list of insurgent strategies is not all inclusive, but these strategies have guided and inspired many insurgent leaders.

The conspiratorial strategy is the oldest and least complicated as it seeks to remove the ruling authorities through a limited but swift use of force such as a coup. The crucial instrument for seizing power is a small, secretive, disciplined, and tightly organized group. An example is the coup d’etat overthrowing President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam.

“The strategy of protracted popular war articulated by Mao is undoubtedly the most conceptually elaborate and perhaps the most widely copied insurgent strategy.” Mao came to the conclusion that the revolutionary struggle in China would be a long one and the peasantry, not the urban proletariat, as in Russia was the most important revolutionary class.<sup>88</sup> The Maoist strategy

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<sup>85</sup> O’Neill, 17.

<sup>86</sup> Gurr, 216.

<sup>87</sup> Margolies, 14.

<sup>88</sup> O’Neill, 34-35.

used three sequential phases: strategic defense, strategic stalemate, and strategic offense as the violence transformed from guerilla to conventional warfare.

The Military Focus Strategy differs from the strategy of protracted popular war as it gives primacy to military action and makes political action subordinate. The insurgents make no systematic, sustained effort to acquire popular support through extensive political organizing efforts in the rural areas believing instead the current support is sufficient or will be a by-product of military victories. Furthermore, widespread popular support may be unnecessary if the government's forces are defeated on the battlefield."<sup>89</sup> An example is the Confederate States of America in the American Civil War.

Insurgents engaged in urban violence pursue the goal of eroding the government's will to resist. The essential strategy of the urban terrorist is to "turn political crisis into armed conflict by performing violent actions that will force those in power to transform the political situation of the country into a military situation. That in turn, will alienate the masses, causing a revolt against the army and police, blaming the government for the current problems. Factors favoring this strategy include the lack of rural areas in which to operate, mass movement of populations to urban areas, "development of teeming slums filled with poor, psychologically disoriented people whose search for a better life had yielded little more than bitter disillusionment."<sup>90</sup>

Early in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Palestinians sought support for a military focus strategy through the neighboring Arab states. Following the Six Day War, the Palestinians used a combination of urban violence and terrorism with the forms divided because of the various independent groups pursuing several strategies simultaneously. The Palestinian Resistance had the Popular Democratic Front (Maoist protracted-popular war), Fatah (less rigid approach) and PFLP-GC and Abu Nidal organization (military focus – principally terrorist actions).<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> O'Neill, 41.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid, 46.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid, 48.

## Insurgent Forms of Warfare

Insurgent warfare takes many forms, with the three most common being terrorism, guerilla war, and conventional warfare. Each one may be viewed as one of several types of organized violence emphasizing particular armed forces, weapons, tactics, and targets. Terrorism is violence directed primarily against noncombatants.<sup>92</sup>

“The essence of guerilla warfare is highly mobile hit-and-run attacks by lightly to moderately armed groups that seek to harass the enemy and gradually erode his will and capability.”<sup>93</sup> In his 1937 treatise on guerilla warfare, Mao wrote, “Guerilla strategy must be base primarily on alertness, mobility and attack. It must be adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain, the existing lines of communication, the relative strengths, the weather, and the situation of the people.”<sup>94</sup> Guerilla warfare differs from terrorism because its primary targets are the government’s armed forces, police, or their support units and, key economic targets, rather than unarmed civilians.<sup>95</sup>

Many insurgent movements, including Mao’s, have found it necessary to combine guerilla warfare with other forms of violence or to make a transition into conventional warfare to achieve success. The combination of terrorism and guerilla warfare is the most common and the analyst will need to determine the most prevalent type.<sup>96</sup>

As stated in the previous section, prior to the Palestinian Intifada, the Palestinians first used military focus and then changed to a urban violence form of warfare. Interestingly, with the Intifada, the Palestinians added a more widespread form of collective protest to a continued use of urban violence. The widespread protests carefully avoided the used of firearms and thus provoking an armed Israeli response, but more powerfully, adroitly used the world media to paint

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid, 24.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid, 25.

<sup>94</sup> <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerilla-warfare/ch01.htm>, accessed 26 Jan.

<sup>95</sup> O’Neill, 26.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

the picture of a oppressed people throwing rocks at Israeli tanks and armored vehicles. For two primary reasons, the form of protest and violence used by the Intifada would significant for a military planner. First, it indicates a level of frustration in the wider population who believe they are unable to achieve their rightful goals and aspirations—the problem has grown in scope. Second, the 24-hour news cycle can introduce an impatience from political leadership for rapid solutions when the only rapid solution may be capitulation. When the level of anger has spread among the population sufficiently for many to risk death in their protests, the likely response will include meeting their demands to some extent. The best advice you may be able to provide your chain of command in a similar situation is to avoid U.S. involvement.

## Insurgency Targets

The three major insurgent targets are: the political system, specific individuals, and governmental policies. Given sufficient irritation, violence may be directed by an insurgent group at any of these targets, but Gurr believes the likelihood of violence, sources of violence, and targets, can be predicted with some accuracy. The potential for collective violence varies with the depth and breadth of shared discontent within members of a society. The potential for political violence varies with the extent to which discontent is blamed on the political system and its representatives.<sup>97</sup>

The political system is a common target of insurgencies when a consensus on its legitimacy does not exist. Every form of political system may be an insurgent target, whether it is a traditional autocracy (leaders drawn from a small group with an exclusive right to rule), modernizing autocracies (birthright and religious values form the leadership rights and building state power is the highest value), totalitarian (goal to completely control all aspects of the

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<sup>97</sup> Gurr, 8.

political, economic and social life of its citizens), and pluralistic (principal values are individual freedom, liberty and compromise).<sup>98</sup>

When a group does not see conflict with the entire political community, they may consider specific individuals “illegitimate because their behavior is inconsistent with existing values and norms or because they are viewed as corrupt, ineffective, or oppressive.” The insurgent result of this situation is normally a coup where important decision-making offices are seized without changing the political system.<sup>99</sup>

The Palestinians have never experienced significant military success targeting Israeli armed forces. Nor have their terror attacks significantly altered civilian Israeli society. The Palestinians have achieved their greatest victories in Information Operations on the world stage. They have been able to portray themselves as an oppressed people through film media chronicling young Palestinian men and boys using low levels of violence to protest against more heavily armed Israeli forces the occupation of what they consider their rightful land. The lesson for the planner is to remember the importance of the many audiences of their and their enemy’s information operation campaign—achieving the campaign goals must be accomplished in a just manner

## **Terrain**

### **The Insurgent Environment**

“The first major criterion for evaluating an insurgency is the environment.”<sup>100</sup> Ché Guevara believed secure bases out of reach of the enemy were critical for early success in guerilla warfare to avoid being eliminated. The elements of the physical environment the planner must consider include the terrain, climate, and the transportation-communication system. The terrain

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<sup>98</sup> O’Neill, 14-16.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid, 16.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid, 53.

can be the significant determinant on the choice of insurgent strategy. For example because of the relative small size of Northern Ireland and lack large rural areas, the Irish Republican Army chose urban warfare and conversely, Ho Chi Minh utilized the mountainous, triple jungle landscape to wage guerilla warfare. Insurgents can use the climate to their advantage if the government relies on aircraft, armored personnel carriers, tanks, and trucks as poor weather can restrict their use. The Soviet military activity was severely restricted in the Afghanistan winters is an example. The transportation-communications infrastructure is critical to governments which commonly emphasize mobile-reaction forces to compensate for insufficient static forces to guard the countryside. Many experts believe governments need a favorable ten-to-one ratio of military forces to subdue guerillas.<sup>101</sup> Guerilla war is more common in underdeveloped countries because of poor transportation and communication networks and the isolation of rural areas, which facilitate guerrilla incursions.<sup>102</sup>

The next major environmental element, after the physical, is the human environment which includes demography, social structure, economics, and the political culture and system. Some experts believe small and concentrated populations are easier for the government to sever the links between the insurgents and people. Additionally, the authorities can compel the insurgent to use terrorist tactics in an urban environment by demonstrating both the resolution and competence to combat the insurgent threat and compel a protracted war.<sup>103</sup>

O'Neill wrote, "Societal cleavages along racial, ethnic, and religious lines are frequently among the root causes of insurgency and can be either helpful or detrimental to the progression of an insurrection." These cleavages are accentuated when a minority possesses a disproportionate share of the political and economic power. Furthermore, most societies are internally structured along three lines of authority which determine how "conducive the structure is to organization

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<sup>101</sup> O'Neill: "early success in guerilla warfare" – 55, "elements of the physical environment" – 53, "Soviet military activity was severely restricted" – 57, "favorable ten-to-one ratio" – 70.

<sup>102</sup> Gurr, 263.

<sup>103</sup> O'Neill, 59.

and discipline.” Hierarchical structures, such as the Roman Catholic Church are the most organized of the three. Pyramidal structures, such as the Shiite grand ayatollahs in Iran, have a central authority figure but also contain multiple centers of power, which can lead to confusion and friction. The least cohesive structure is segmentary which is characterized by the diffusion of power to local groups that act autonomously. This structure is not favorable for military-focus and especially protracted-popular-war strategies because they obstruct the organizational development associated with those strategies. Disunity often results when insurgencies are waged by groups with segmented structures.<sup>104</sup>

The remaining elements of the environment include economic factors and political culture. Institutionalized economic discrimination is often a significant, if not the primary underlying cause of insurgency. Understanding this can assist the planner identify disgruntled groups and their motives. The political culture is defined as the observable salient and enduring attitudes of people toward politics and can be useful in categorizing people by their awareness of the political process and their ability to affect it.<sup>105</sup> Parochials have little, if any, awareness of national level political system and no perception of their ability to influence it. Subjects consider themselves part of the political system, are aware of its impact on their lives, but they are not active in shaping policy. Participants are aware of the national political institutions and policies and cognizant of the policy process and wish to actively engage in it. These attitudes involving acceptance of authority, interpersonal and intergroup trust, and tolerance of violence and foreigners can be important to analyze insurgencies.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict highlights the many divisions between the two peoples, with the most important being religion, economic, and political. While the military planner with representatives from other government agencies can address economic and political inequities, the religious issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are the most difficult to resolve because of

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid, 60-62.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid, 62-63.

the conflict over claims to the same religious sites dating back a millennia and conflict between the basic dogma between the two religions. Settlement of religious issues is beyond the scope of this monograph. With regard to the political culture, the questions for the military planner then are: Who are the “participants” in the government and insurgency? What are their motives? How do they interact economically and socially with the other groups in their society? How has each group used violence in the past?

## **Troops**

### **Insurgent Means**

To achieve their goals, insurgent movements use political resources and violence against the government. Political activities include: dissemination of information (propaganda), protest demonstrations, recruiting cadres, training and infiltrating agents into the official establishment, obtaining assistance from external sources, raising and managing finances, creating supportive groups, providing services to the people, and devising and implementing strategies and plans. An insurgent group requires an effective organization to successfully obtain and utilize these resources. Generally speaking, there are two types of insurgent organizations: small, elite groups which threaten or carry out violent acts; and larger, mobilizational groups, where insurgent leaders seek to actively engage large segments of the population on the behalf of their cause.<sup>106</sup>

As stated earlier, the most effective means used by the Palestinians included the media’s widely publicized use of mass demonstrations against the occupying Israeli forces.

### **Insurgent Popular Support**

Popular civilian support is the essential element of successful guerilla operations, specifically either passive or active in nature. Individuals provide passive support when they

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<sup>106</sup> O’Neill, 24.

quietly sympathize with the insurgents but are unwilling to provide material assistance. Additionally, they are not likely to betray or otherwise impede the insurgents.<sup>107</sup> People willing to make sacrifices and risk personal harm actively support the guerillas by providing them with intelligence information, concealment, shelter, hiding places for arms and equipment, medical assistance, guides, and liaison agents. Obviously, active popular support is more important than passive support in insurgencies.

A society's intellectuals defined as a graduate degrees in developed countries or undergraduate training in third world countries, are particularly important with respect to active coalescing popular support because they are the principal source for recruitment to both high- and middle-level leadership positions. Intellectuals provide the insurgent movement's strategic vision, organizational expertise, and technical competence. Desertion from the government of officials from this group has repeatedly been a predictor of revolution.<sup>108</sup>

Insurgent groups use a number of methods to attract and maintain popular support. History is replete with successful, charismatic leaders and insurgent movements are often built around the nucleus of this type of leader. Charismatic leaders have perceived supernatural qualities, or manifest impressive speaking skills and a dynamic, forceful personality. Because of the strong security surrounding insurgent leaders, instead of trying to kill or capture the charismatic leader, it may be more successful to use propaganda and disinformation campaigns designed to discredit him. Another option is for government agents to attempt penetrating the insurgent apparatus by jealousies and rivalries.<sup>109</sup>

In contemporary terminology, insurgencies use information operations to obtain popular support. Insurgent movements use esoteric appeals to intellectuals with orderly interpretations and explanations for all perceived social, economic and political realities. These appeals may

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid, 70.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid, 73.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid, 75, 136.

have no basis in fact or logic, but will likely appeal to local passions. An effective psychological operations campaign should address esoteric appeals with logical presentation of the true facts, presented within the framework of the local social culture. Exoteric appeals focus on the substantiated grievances of both the intelligentsia and the masses, including underemployment or psychological dissatisfaction (lack of recognition, status, and self-worth).<sup>110</sup> Exoteric appeals are more difficult to address, requiring the government to at least partially solve the underlying problems.

Insurgent movements may also use the threat of, or actual, violence to obtain support from the masses. Insurgent's use of terrorism's seeks to demonstrate the government's weaknesses in the face of insurgent initiatives. If individuals or groups disliked by the people are the target, terrorism may lead oppressed and exploited people to identify with the insurgents. However, if the terrorist actions are prolonged, intensified, or perceived as indiscriminate, this tactic may become counterproductive because it can make life miserable for the general population and may create the impression insurgents have lost the initiative. Beyond the government providing the best security possible, an effective psychological operations campaign portraying the terrorism as selfishly motivated and indiscriminate will be the most effective counterstrategy. The insurgents may also attempt to provoke a government overreaction through strong government repression. Government armed responses to terrorism must be precisely targeted and often explained to the population. The last method insurgents may use is coercion. This is the least effective of the means because of the resentment it causes and weak commitment it obtains. Mao understood this and demanded courteous relations from his military forces in his "Eight Points of Attention."<sup>111</sup>

The change in Palestinian tactics from a military centric to an insurgency was a direct result of the Israeli successes on the conventional battlefield. Likewise, the Israel government's

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<sup>110</sup> Ibid, 75.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid, 79-84.

long term lack of solutions to appropriately deal with the underlying Palestinian issues resulted in the coalescing of the Palestinian population generally around Yasser Arafat. The key for the military planner to seek is the level of popular support to understand the depth of the problem.

## **Time**

### **The Government Response**

An effective government response to an insurgency will contain many components. Too often governments rely on military solutions to political problems with cultural roots. It is treating the roots of the problem which are most likely to be the most effective in counter-insurgency campaigns. The resolution of social and economic problems that are often the root causes of insurgencies is contingent upon political decisions.<sup>112</sup>

O'Neill noted, "History suggests that the most effective way a government can undercut insurgencies that rely on mass support is to split the rank and file away from the leadership through calculated reforms that address the material grievances and needs of the people." As a starting point, the government must carefully analyze each group from which the insurgents hope to obtain support and adopt policies tailored to each. A key point to remember this is an iterative process, with the government adapting to the techniques employed by the insurgents. These tailored policies should emphasize an administrative and military presence as well as health, educational, and agricultural services to mitigate the population's hostility toward the government. An appreciation of social values and structures can help prevent counterinsurgency blunders that threaten closely held social values such as the ambitious land, educational, and marriage reforms in Afghanistan in 1978. To help dissuade intellectuals from joining the insurgents, compelling alternative values, arguments, and ideas are required and the basic points of the insurgents' theories must be critiqued and refuted as simple psychological warfare

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid, 135

operations will not suffice for the intellectuals. “Religious appeals also present a difficult problem for governments because, unlike the appeals of secular ideologies, which are primarily directed at elites, they tend to have much greater influence on the attitudes of the masses; witness the role of Islam in Afghanistan.” To counter the attraction of religious insurgent ideologies the government should cultivate support from other, more moderate leaders and persuade the masses propaganda or disinformation campaigns insurgent religious leaders are disingenuous, selfish individuals.<sup>113</sup>

The government must protect officials enacting critical reforms must be protected to insure these reforms are implemented. Insurgents recognize this vulnerability and make officials targets for assassination, kidnapping, and other violence. “To protect their officials from terrorist attacks, governments have found that patient intelligence and police work designed to uncover, detain, or eliminate terrorists is more effective than reliance on the military.”<sup>114</sup>

While not the primary component in an effective counter-insurgency campaign, the host nation and supporting militaries play a critical role. MCWP 3-33.5 states, “the greatest single contributive factor to insurgency is the existence of a clandestine power structure which seeks to depose the existing socio-political, economic structure.” This manual continues, concluding, “the necessity of an active campaign to identify and neutralize the clandestine power structure. Any counterinsurgency campaign which does not include specific actions to destroy the clandestine organization will be unsuccessful.”<sup>115</sup> Government forces need to isolate areas favorable to guerilla operations by consolidating their own area of control and then surrounding and moving gradually into the areas with rugged terrain. The British did this in Malaya in the 1950s, but it required substantial resources and patience. O’Neill identifies a very important consideration as the U.S. armed forces support FID, “Since nationalistic appeals are especially powerful because they exploit the natural tendencies of people to distrust and dislike foreigners who rule over them,

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid, 134-138.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, 139.

<sup>115</sup> MCWP 3-33.5, 5.

and because they ascribe psychological (or cultural) traumas, economic deprivation, political disenfranchisement, and repression to foreign rule, it is difficult, if not impossible, for colonial or imperial regimes to counter effectively with esoteric appeals of their own.” Therefore, the U.S. military must seek the supporting role in the counter-insurgency as quickly as possible to minimize inflaming nationalist passions. Further, host nation and supporting military forces must show respect and compassion while conducting their operations—in short, benevolence to the masses is productive and repression is counterproductive.<sup>116</sup> History is filled with examples of errors and successes with this approach. In the Spanish guerilla war against Napoleon, French General Suchet in Aragon undercut support for the guerillas with his goodwill toward the local population while his contemporary, General Augereau in Catalonia, was more ruthless—he played into guerilla hands and facilitated their acquisition of popular backing. Nearly one hundred years later, the Germans learned the same lessons with the Ukrainians during WWII. The Ukrainians did not like Stalin and appeared ready to assist the Germans, but often their repression turned them against the Third Reich. On the other hand, Colonel General Schmidt proved effective in harnessing popular support using benevolent and effective reforms.

U.S. political leadership must reconcile themselves that all nations, their governments, and political processes may not or even should mirror those in the U.S or Western Europe. The governments should represent the people in their own political and cultural context. “In the context of the political culture and style of Persian Gulf countries, for instance, participation is more apt to mean a role in the consultative process, than ‘one man, one vote.’”<sup>117</sup>

## **Civil Considerations**

Many of the important civil considerations for the military planner are intertwined with the previously mentioned subject areas. However, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication

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<sup>116</sup> O'Neill, 134-138.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid, 135.

(MCWP) 3-33.5, includes several areas not previously mentioned, such as cultural taboos and beliefs, in-group antagonism, extent of nationalism, and primary means of cultural identification (national, racial, religious, or other).<sup>118</sup>

Tactically, the Israeli responses to the military and insurgent threats, prior to the Intifada, were brilliant. However, “Israeli government’s decision to employ collective force against the entire population brought virtually everyone, young and old, rich and poor, actively into the struggle.”<sup>119</sup> The Israeli government was slow to recognize the mutation of the Palestinian response and development of the Intifada as a more widespread and grassroots response to the lack of progress in addressing decades old grievances. The military planner would be wise to seek insight from cultural experts to understand the inherent problems and develop an effective approach to their solution.

## WHERE TO GO NEXT

To this point the author has detailed the importance of understanding the historical context of a conflict developing an approach to the FID problem. Next the author presented academic insurgency concepts and compared them to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to demonstrate how they might be used in an actual planning process. As stated in the introduction, this monograph is intended only as a primer for the reader to understand how to approach the planning problem, not to solve the planning problem itself. However, the author suggests the following directions on the next segment of the planner’s journey—specifically what documents will help him begin the planning process.

To develop a campaign objective or national strategic objective review Presidential speeches, Secretary of Defense guidance, Combatant Commander guidance, or Corps Commander mission statements. Additional information may be obtained from speeches or

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<sup>118</sup> MCWP 3-33.5, 5.

<sup>119</sup> Hunter, 2.

statements made by leaders of the nation you are planning to assist. These inputs may include force structure or operational constraints.

For an overview of the planning process, read JP 3-07.1, *JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense*, Chapter III, Planning for Foreign Internal Defense, to obtain a broad overview of the planning process and requirements. Next, read in order, JP 3-07.1 Appendixes C (Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace to Support Foreign Internal Defense), E (Civil Affairs Estimate of the Situation), F (Psychological Operations Estimate of the Situation), and D (Illustrative Interagency Political-Military Plan for Foreign Internal Defense). Finally, skim Chapter IV, Foreign Internal Defense Operations, and if desired, skim Chapters I and II to learn the strategic context of FID.<sup>120</sup>

From Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, read Stability Operations Overview – Considerations, pages 1-4 to 1-5 and Battlefield Organization, pages 1-14 to 1-18, and Chapter 2, Planning Considerations. Skim Chapter 3, Foreign Internal Defense, for Army specific terms and planning issues. Finally, skim Appendixes A (Interagency Coordination) and C (Rules of Engagement).<sup>121</sup>

Nearly all U.S. military doctrine lacks the specific detail necessary to plan in detail tactical FID, SASO, or COIN operations. One exception to this is MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, formerly known as Fleet Marine Force Manual 8-2. First published in 1980, this publication is somewhat dated with repeated concentration on communist inspired and supported insurgencies. However, this publication is a very good source on the planning considerations required at the strategic through tactical levels of warfare and is available at <https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/aspweb/type-ops.asp>. MCWP 3-33.5 generally follows Mao Tse-Tung's doctrinal construct by identifying the three stages of an insurgency: passive

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<sup>120</sup> Joint Publication 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., 2004.

<sup>121</sup> ; Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 2003.

(insurgents on the defensive and seeking to set conditions for the active stage), active (further the insurgent cause and accelerate the increase in their military capabilities), and counteroffensive (seeks to defeat the government forces in decisive combat). It then uses this framework to analyze the employment of governmental forces, governmental agencies, and non-governmental agencies at the operational level. More importantly for the tactical level planner, MCWP 3-33.5 details counterinsurgency planning considerations, including: offensive operations, civil affairs, reconnaissance and intelligence, area security, combat support and combat service support, and indoctrination and training. Read the entire publication. These readings should provide the planner with sufficient guidance to begin this task.<sup>122</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Primarily due to Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. military is relearning many counterinsurgency lessons forgotten in the thirty years following the Vietnam War. The loss of the military's planning and execution skill is a result of the emphasis placed on MCO and to a lesser extent a desire to forget the painful Vietnam experience. This monograph attempts to demonstrate FID planning is not more difficult than MCO planning—it is simply new and different to many planners. Breaking the project into manageable pieces and understanding the enemy makes the planning process more likely to produce a successful plan. However, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also clearly demonstrates despite intimate understanding of the enemy, excellent intelligence, and brilliant tactical execution, to date the conventional Israeli forces have been unable to achieve strategic victory for their nation. The primary reason for this is the Israeli's government inability to obtain a political settlement with the Palestinians.

As the U.S. military relearns FID planning and execution lessons, the astute planner will understand from this monograph the importance of enemy culture, religion, strategies, and

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<sup>122</sup> Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, 2004.

motivations in the planning for counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, he will know there are valuable lessons to retain from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, but many may not necessarily apply to future FID operations—history is a guide, not a recipe for the future.

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