A BLUEPRINT FOR
MILITARY CHANGE
IN CENTRAL EUROPE
1990-1996

MICHAEL J. PASQUARETT
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INTRODUCTION

For more than four decades, a myriad of political and military experts in both the United States and Western Europe have debated the inability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to defend itself from a surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact. This internal NATO debate has been dominated by heated arguments over the short-war versus long-war scenario, the validity of rapid reinforcement, the clash over standardization and interoperability issues, and the dilemma about emerging technologies. In the early and mid-1980s, nuclear force modernizations became the lightening rods to dominate NATO meetings and politicians' agendas throughout the Atlantic alliance. As late as 1989, the vast differences of opinion over transatlantic burdensharing were dividing alliance members and had politicians on both sides of the Atlantic crying "foul." Nonetheless, these NATO debates and the perpetual bickering over what equals an adequate defense would usually end in public solidarity because of the ever-present Soviet military threat to the survivability of a free and democratic Western Europe.

The past six months have literally transformed the European security debate. The political revolution that has swept through Eastern Europe and that is now affecting the Soviet Union itself has radically changed the relatively predictable NATO security agenda. Gone forever is the former demand of more financial allocations for military programs. Both the Soviet Union and the United States -- the two world superpowers --
cannot control the direction of crucial events that now seem to burst onto the scene with surprising regularity. Both superpowers are wary about the future. German unification, or some form of confederation, will most likely occur before the end of the year, greatly altering the existing landscape of Central Europe. The Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty, whose time has already passed, will probably be signed in late 1990 or early 1991. The CFE Treaty will reduce key offensive military equipment, as well as U.S. and Soviet forces in Central Europe; however, it is only the beginning of the massive restructuring necessary for both the withering NATO and the nonexistent Warsaw Pact in Central Europe.

The people of Eastern Europe have already made many provisions of the pending CFE Treaty obsolete. The Western Europeans' strong opinions on defense-related issues are beginning to be heard by their political representatives. They are pleased that Western Europe has survived the superpowers' armed stalemate for more than forty years, but they are now demanding that the world's heaviest concentration of conventional and nuclear weapons be removed from their "playgrounds and backyards" (Figure 1). German public opinion will have great influence on the focus and direction that the German leaders pursue and, thus, upon the future course of Central Europe. Both NATO and the Soviets must soon decide not on how much is enough, but on how few are enough for the future stability of Europe.
FIGURE 1
THE PRESENT NATO/SOVET FORCES POSITIONING

Netherlands
Belgium
Poland
Czechoslovakia
France

LANDJUT
NE
GE
BR
BE
CENTAG
NORTHAG
US
US
GE

LOCATIONS OF DIVISIONS
Many of the past assumptions governing a successful surprise Soviet attack against NATO (an idea that has terrorized Western leaders) have either disappeared or greatly dissipated in threat as the current CFE Treaty is being negotiated in Vienna. Nevertheless, to ensure a safe and secure future, the political leaders of NATO and the Warsaw Pact must formally conclude a CFE agreement. More importantly, they then must quickly negotiate a credible follow-on agreement that reflects the rapidly changing political environment. Many political commentators are now calling for an end to the CFE negotiations and are demanding that the people of East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia decide individually whether they want Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. Their argument is that CFE negotiations are only prolonging the Soviet stay in Eastern Europe. They may be correct, but after forty years of distrust, a verifiable step-by-step approach to both disarmament and arms control, as well as the future of German unification, is a necessity for the future of Europe.

This strategy paper will consider how NATO could find a better approach for concluding the Conventional Forces Europe Treaty. It then will describe a detailed proposal for developing a comprehensive follow-on agreement between NATO and the Soviet Union. The follow-on agreement will propose a radically different ground and air structure for military forces in Europe. It will also suggest policies that will make both
NATO and Soviet armies less sustainable and truly defensive in the forward areas. These policies will make both armies strictly follow intensive monitoring and verification procedures that will lead to greater stability. Furthermore, this political and military stability in Central Europe, based on a Europeanized Germany, will lead to NATO's concluding that the modernization of the U.S. short-range ground nuclear force is not a political or military necessity.

CFE NEGOTIATIONS

In March 1989, NATO began negotiations with the Warsaw Pact to obtain rough parity between the two alliances at key equipment levels that are 5-10 percent below current NATO levels. The CFE negotiations eliminated the need for the Mutual and Balanced Forces Reductions (MBFR) talks that had seen little progress since its inception in 1973, but it complemented the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and its forum, the Conference of Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). Trying to limit the ability of the Warsaw Pact to launch a massive surprise attack had to be the first priority of any NATO agreement. Asymmetric reductions were needed to reach parity in main battle tanks, armored troop carriers, artillery, helicopters, and combat aircraft.

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, his Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, U.S. President George Bush, and his Secretary
of State, James Baker have used the CFE forum to present their initiatives to reduce both personnel and equipment. The convergence of NATO and Warsaw Pact positions is remarkable, especially when one remembers the MBFR negotiations that resulted in few agreements in more than seventeen years of negotiations. Both the U.S. and the Soviet leadership and, especially, the West German leaders are hoping to bring the CFE agreement to a rapid conclusion so that they can begin negotiating a follow-on agreement. As of this writing, main battle tanks are limited to 20,000, armored combat vehicles to 30,000, and artillery pieces to 20,000 for each alliance. Minor disagreements remain regarding how to count and classify aircraft (i.e., both fixed-wing and helicopters), how to count stored equipment, and how to conduct detailed monitoring and verification measures to accompany the implementation of the agreement.

Soon the sixth round of CFE talks will commence in Vienna. Past optimism may be threatened by the growing political turmoil in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as by German unification. With this in mind, I propose that the time is now right to sign a CFE Treaty. Instead of allowing the arms control technocrats to debate politically divisive issues and the complexities of equally balancing future force structures, a treaty should be signed now that brings rough parity to each side in main battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery.
pieces. A signed CFE agreement will be a political plus for both NATO and the Soviets and will allow all parties to begin the long and tedious destruction process. Many arms control and disarmament experts will disagree on the need to hurry a detailed negotiations process, but the time used in Vienna to debate and to dot the "i's" can be better used to eliminate main battle tanks whose destruction will take many years. With a CFE agreement completed, NATO and Soviet on-site inspection teams can finalize administrative details just as they so successfully did during the INF Treaty inspections. Then they can and begin verifying the retrograde numbers and monitoring equipment destruction while arms control and disarmament negotiators conclude the details of a follow-on agreement.

THE CFE FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENT

If we can assume that an abbreviated CFE Treaty is concluded in May 1990, that the governments of NATO and the Soviet Union remain positive toward arms control and disarmament, and that changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are probably irreversible, a detailed follow-on agreement can be negotiated quickly to stay ahead of the people. During the early phase of this negotiation, NATO planners must begin to rethink three significant changes to their overall strategy: the forward defense of the inner German border, which never made much military sense, but now could affect even greater German political sensitivities; Central Europe's rapid reinforcement of
troops from the United States, Canada, and Great Britain; and the alliance's sacrosanct policy of flexible response. Those leaders, including the present SACEUR, who suggest that a CFE agreement will not make much difference in NATO's defense strategy, may need to rethink their positions. Furthermore, a follow-on agreement will greatly change the defense environment; neither the Western European people nor their defense budgets can tolerate policies and programs whose times have passed.

Before all parties finalize the negotiations for the CFE follow-on agreements, two things are important. First, the initial CFE agreement must be complied with; second, the political leadership must provide the necessary financial resources to reliably verify the withdrawal of military equipment, the dismantling of troop units, and the destruction of treaty-limited equipment. Initial Western and Soviet treaty inspectors will have to be drawn from the military units that are being dismantled under the Bush proposal to cut current troop levels from 255,000 U.S. and 565,000 Soviet troops in Europe down to 195,000 soldiers for each side. This inspection force could be augmented by the INF-oriented On-site Inspection Agency personnel, and by Pershing II and GLCM inspectors whose missile destructions will be complete in early 1991. The most difficult aspects on both sides will be efficiently administering the personnel assets and moving large numbers of military vehicles to several destruction points. Once begun,
destruction will go quickly, as both sides become efficient in
destroying main battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, and
artillery pieces.

The CFE Follow-On Agreement that I visualize will propose a
four-phase, five-year program to accomplish the following:
Before 1992, the agreement will finalize the remaining
outstanding items from the initial CFE agreement (i.e., fixed-
wing aircraft and helicopters) and will begin preparation for
the 1992-1993 NATO and Warsaw Pact restructuring. In 1992 and
1993, it will reduce NATO and Soviet forces in the Germanies to
between 60,000 and 80,000 each, and it will structure the newly
combined German forces. In 1994 and 1995, it will greatly
reduce the remaining artillery-fired atomic projectiles,
ground-launched nuclear missiles, and gravity bombs located in
Central Europe. And in 1996, it will reevaluate the need for
U.S. and Soviet forces stationed permanently in a united Germany
and it will strengthen the CSCE process.

Phase One: CFE Follow-On Agreement (Before 1992)

Before the European Community begins its long-proclaimed
success story in 1992, and before its most powerful state,
Germany, is united, we should appropriately and finally end
World War II. The Four Powers (United States, Soviet Union,
Great Britain, and France) should invalidate their special
powers in both German states, and especially in Berlin. This
peace treaty by the Big Four or an agreement under CSCE direction must also formalize the present German-Polish border. All Four-Power forces and, more importantly, their major intelligence-gathering points should be removed from Berlin prior to 1992.

After the Four-Power special nations have ended their jurisdiction in Germany, it may be the proper time to evaluate the proposed CSCE structure by creating a CSCE arms control organization and giving it narrow, yet meaningful, organizational powers over the monitoring, verification, and compliance process. It is imperative that both NATO and the Soviets support the CSCE process by quickly developing competent compliance teams to inspect sites, verify destruction, and collect data. Even though every NATO and Warsaw Pact country should have the right to inspect the opposing bloc, U.S. and Soviet technical means and experience will dominate. Foreign language ability will be critical. The Bundeswehr is now sending 500+ officers through Russian language training in Bonn.

The initial CFE inspection regimes could easily number more than 20,000 inspectors for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact with monitoring and inspection teams divided into 20- or 30-member teams. Joint and combined efforts could be spread throughout the alliances, but a distinct political-military chain of command would have to be established for effective
administration. As inspection teams are established and placed into the monitoring and verification roles, each country with foreign troops on its soil would have to develop host nation support activities that provide routine assistance and, most important, to report any violations of the treaties. Arms control regimes operating successfully under the CSCE umbrella as a new instrument of European security would, it is hoped, consolidate and build on the political momentum that CFE has returned to Europe.

In the pre-1992 period, as the national inspection regimes and host nation support activities under CSCE auspices are building up, countries that have forces stationed in Germany should be drawing down their soldiers, their families, and the family-support activities, so that when massive force movements begin to restructure Central Europe in 1992 and 1993, necessary turmoil will be significantly less. These countries include not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but also the NATO allies of France, Great Britain, Canada, Belgium, and the Netherlands.


It seems evident that both the United States and the Soviet Union have concluded that a major arms reduction in Central Europe is both a virtue and a necessity and that there will be a new, united Germany. A united Germany still stirs concern in
France, Britain, and the Low Countries, as well as in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and especially Poland. My proposal for a Phase Two, CFE Follow-On Agreement is a three-part build down to restructure the combined German armies, and to reduce NATO and Soviet forces within German borders to between 60,000 and 80,000 soldiers by the end of 1993. My basic assumptions are that both West and East Europeans will continue to be enamored with the notion of continued controlled disarmament and that a fundamentally optimistic outlook will remain between the two superpowers.

**Part I.** The first part of my plan would be to withdraw Dutch, Belgian, and Canadian ground forces from Germany. Dutch and Belgian forces are presently located in Northern Germany in the NORTHAG area. Some defense commentators will decry the removal of the Dutch and Belgium forward-deployed Corps, but in reality, the Dutch have only a reinforced armored brigade that is forward deployed and the Belgians have only two maneuver brigades (which are perpetually understrength) that are forward deployed in Germany. Canada's presence in Germany is also largely symbolic as its forces consist of only a mechanized brigade group and an air group consisting of approximately 44 CF-18 fighters. Although the Dutch and Belgian ground forces' training standards are excellent, their perpetual personnel understrength and equipment shortages hamper their combat readiness. The Dutch and Belgian forces in Germany could better
provide for the support of NATO from within their own borders while the Canadian mechanized brigade group of only 3,200 soldiers may be combined with either British or U.S. forces west of the Rhine River. Canadian forces could be better used as a ready expeditionary force that is based in Northern Germany or Great Britain. The Canadians could, thereby, better respond to AFNORTH or BALTAP contingencies.

**Part II.** The second and more ambitious part of the 1992-1993 plan would be to establish a new, combined German security force that would be strictly defensive in organization, preparation, and training. The force would be under direct national control in Berlin, yet associated through special status with NATO.

Under my proposed plan, the armies of both the present Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic would be totally restructured. The Bundeswehr field army (three corps consisting of twelve divisions) and the entire East German People's Army would be melded into a newly created command structure: six military districts in the present state of West Germany and three in East Germany (Figure 2).

All nine military district commands would have between three and seven active-duty strength brigades. Force composition and size would be determined by each district's geographic size and
population. The home districts' brigades would have heavy concentrations of anti-armor and anti-air defense forces. Because of its location, Bavaria may want to retain a mountain brigade. Baden-Wuerttemberg, because of present force structure, may want to create an airborne brigade from existing forces. Each military district would be limited to one armored brigade and 200 main battle tanks. The total active strength of a combination of all nine home district forces would be between 350,000 and 370,000 active-duty personnel. The German air force and navy would be retained to provide support to an active defense, but both should be quickly built down to the size needed for a defensive force.

German military conscription would continue to integrate the society within the army. Conscripts would serve in their home district. Officers' assignments would be centralized in Berlin, and they could be transferred easily from one military district to another.

The mission of the newly designed German military district command would be to form a well-trained force that is willing and able to defend present German territory from conventional aggression. Civilian-based defense would be practiced and would be an important component of all nine districts. Reserve forces would consist of light infantryman and support forces to augment international forces needed to secure borders of threatened
European states. Active and reserve brigades would be limited to a maximum of fifteen brigades for each home district. A lower German security profile in Central Europe will lead to less fear and frustration among all her neighbors, but German defensive forces would remain extremely potent.

**Part III.** The third and most ambitious part of my plan would be to withdraw or restation all remaining NATO and Soviet security forces on German territory. Stationing large numbers of NATO and Warsaw Pact (Soviet) forces on German territory has led to peace in Europe for more than forty years. But now, because of a reemerging politically and economically powerful reunited Germany, the military situation will lead directly to heightened sovereignty sensitivities. I propose that to continue to maintain stability and to foster sovereignty, both NATO and Soviet ground forces in a united Germany should be limited to between 60,000 and 80,000 soldiers for each security force. Further, NATO stationing should be limited to garrisons west of the Weser River in Lower Saxony and west of the Rhine River in Rhineland Palatinate. Soviet forces should be restricted to garrisons east of the Elbe River in the district of Dresden and in the Polish province of Wroclaw and Zielona Gora, if agreed to by the Polish government (Figure 3). One of the two Soviet divisions stationed in Poland is already located in the province of Wroclaw, and large numbers of U.S. and French forces are now west of the Rhine River. Contrary to popular
FIGURE 3
THE PROPOSED NATO/SOVIEI FORCES POSITIONING
belief, there will be fewer foreign troops in all three of the international zones of a reunited Germany than there are now.

Soviet forces would be reduced by approximately 330,000 in Germany and by at least 20,000 in Poland. Bilateral agreements with Czechoslovakia and Hungary would eliminate their Soviet garrisons. Approximately eleven Soviet armored and mechanized infantry regiments, appropriate artillery and forward support units, and their headquarters would remain in Germany and Poland. Main battle tanks would be limited to 1200.

NATO forces in Germany will have to be reduced by approximately 150,000 soldiers. NATO will have to meet force reductions, but still provide the security of the American presence on German soil that will continue to be demanded by the Poles, the British, the French, and probably even by the Soviets. The removal of the Dutch and Belgian forces would only reduce overall NATO numbers by only 40,000. The Canadian force could become a forward element based in Britain, thus reducing NATO forces by another 4,000. Or, the Canadians could become part of a newly configured British Army of the Rhine, which will now become British Army of the Weser with a minimum of one division less.

The British Army of the Weser would be renamed the Northern Corps Forward. It would consist of approximately five British
armored and mechanized infantry brigades, one Canadian armored
brigade, two U.S. armored brigades, limited artillery and
forward support, and a Northern Corps Forward Headquarters.
Both French and U.S. forces in southern Germany would be reduced
between 50 to 60 percent. The entire U.S. (VII) Corps and large
portions of the U.S. Army support base would be withdrawn from
Germany, while the French forces would have to readjust heavy
forces westward across the French-German border. The Southern
Corps Forward would consist of U.S. and French forces -- three
U.S. armored and one infantry brigade, and four French armored
brigades. Limited U.S. forces may have to be stationed on
French territory. Main battle tanks would be limited to 600 in
the Northern Corps Forward and 400 in the Southern Corps
Forward. Depot storage of main battle tanks would be limited to
400 for NATO forces and 200 for Soviet forces within Germany.

Command structure leadership for the Northern Corps Forward
would be rotated between British and U.S. three-star officers
and Southern Corps Forward would be rotated between French and
U.S. three-star officers. CINCENT, if retained, would be
rotated between German and French four-star flag officers, and
the SACEUR position would be rotated between the United States,
Britain, and France.

The withdrawal of more than 300,000 Soviet and more than
100,000 NATO ground forces would require both alliances to
realign defensively. Comparable cuts in Soviet and U.S. air offensive forces would also be necessary. Soviet forces' presence would preserve the integrity of the German-Polish border; their location, 100 miles from Berlin, would be a definite political statement. Poland would again be key to Soviet-German relations. NATO forces, especially U.S., British, and French, would ensure that stability is maintained and that a united Germany does not give new life to the Warsaw Pact with the Soviet Union again protecting Eastern Europe from "the Nazi threat." The present trend in Franco-German cooperation in combined organization and training should be encouraged to continue, but the inter-nationalization of brigades and battalions, which was recently portrayed by the SACEUR as a sign of the future, is not attractive. Under the guidance of the CSCE, combined civilian and military force defense training should be encouraged for all the smaller powers, especially Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.


As Phase Two of the Follow-On Agreement concludes, both NATO and Soviet military force structure would be much smaller, with less offensive breakthrough power, and both sides would depend heavily on reserve forces and mobilization infrastructures. Part Three of my proposed CFE Follow-On Agreement would restructure the nuclear forces in Central Europe.
Many proponents of tactical nuclear weapons would argue that in the stringent CFE Follow-On environment that I have proposed, the deterrent role of nuclear artillery and missiles would provide the ultimate counter to Soviet offensive actions. More importantly, to nuclear tacticians, the U.S. tactical nuclear forces would tie the steps of the critical nuclear escalation ladder to U.S. strategic systems. This accepted approach to nuclear warfighting forward deployment and modernization may have been valid in the early 1980s, but with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as a cohesive offensive threat, I believe it would be almost impossible for the Soviets to launch extensive offensive actions through Eastern Europe and into Western Europe. With fewer than 80,000 troops in Central Europe, it becomes almost impossible for the Soviets to launch the massive surprise attack that U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were placed in Europe to stop.

With the degraded Soviet offensive threat and the growing popularity among our European allies for a new concept of nuclear deterrence in Central Europe, there is little room for the large arsenal of nuclear warfighting artillery presently deployed for battlefield use or the modernization of that arsenal.

During Phase Three of my proposed CFE Follow-On Agreement, U.S. and Soviet artillery and land-based missiles would be
gradually eliminated from Central Europe. As artillery cannon
tubes and missile launchers are retrograded during 1992-1993,
their nuclear warheads would be returned to the United States
and the Soviet Union. U.S. nuclear support agreements for
tactical battlefield nuclear systems (M109 (155mm), M110 (8"),
Lance and Pershing 1a) with the Federal Republic, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Great Britain would be terminated when the
delivery systems are retrograded and when the allocated nuclear
warheads are returned to the United States. U.S. ground nuclear
systems (weapons and warheads) could be stored in Great Britain,
Italy, Greece, and Turkey, but the vast majority of nuclear
warheads being removed from Central Europe should be returned to
the United States.

By 1995, delivery system obsolescence would eliminate all
U.S. nuclear systems except the M109 howitzer. Pershing 1a will
be eliminated by treaty in 1991; the M110 will be replaced with
nonnuclear Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) by 1994; and
Lance, without modernization, will be beyond its life expectancy
by 1995. As Soviet artillery and missile systems are
retrograded from Central Europe, the nuclear weapons would be
removed to Soviet territory. Soviet short-range missile and
rocket systems with conventional warheads only should also be
limited to the numbers of launchers deployed by NATO.
In the present and probable future environment of increasing popularity among Europeans for pure deterrence between NATO and Soviet forces remaining in Central Europe, there are several nuclear restructuring options for the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. Among the options favored by the Europeans who do not possess nuclear weapons are virtual across-the-board opposition to nuclear artillery and very little support for Lance modernization or FOTL. There is lukewarm support for TASM if it is arms control friendly, and SLCM has become an attractive basing option across the political spectrum.

France and Britain -- the two nonsuperpowers possessing nuclear weapons -- are entirely out of step with the nonnuclear European states on the future of nuclear forces in Europe. France, in particular, places a premium on modernization and deployment of a national nuclear force. France supports European nuclear arms control, but demands exclusion of French nuclear forces. The modernization of ASMP is a high-priority program as is the development and deployment of Hades, a ground-based nuclear missile system. The French population -- left and right -- support pre-strategic and strategic roles for its nuclear forces. This consensus for French nuclear forces seems to be slowly waning, but the rationale seems to be based on budget priorities rather than arms control considerations. The British government continues to support SNF modernization,
including upgrading Lance and developing and deploying FOTL, as well as TASM. The British also support U.S. deployment of SLCMs. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's nuclear policies are very different from those of her continental allies.

While there are vague pronouncements of the creation of a European nuclear force, this idea seems to hold little chance now, or even by 1995, for either the United Kingdom or France even if massive changes occur in the European political order. French and British military strategies, release procedures, and targeting are radically different. A more workable solution may be French-British collaboration in future weapon/warhead development cooperation, in submarine patrolling stations and times, and in discussion of targeting data and options. By 1994, British and French nuclear forces will control more than 1,800 nuclear warheads, but those forces alone cannot provide the crucial strength that only the American strategic forces can to deter Soviet nuclear power.

By 1995, under my proposal to restructure nuclear forces, both U.S. and Soviet artillery-delivered atomic projectiles (155mm only) would number fewer than 180 for each side, and Soviet missile systems capable of delivering nuclear warheads would be fewer than 50. The Soviets would retain a declining number of short-range missiles in their international zone in Germany until the French take positive action on their
short-range Hades and obsolete Pluton. The final elimination of artillery and missile nuclear systems would be negotiated by CSCE.

As the vast majority of ground-based nuclear warfighting systems are withdrawn from Central Europe, both air and naval systems will be called upon to fulfill the nuclear deterrent. Both NATO and Soviet forces will rely on the development of longer-range and more accurately delivered air-to-surface nuclear missiles. Gravity bombs will remain the key nuclear weapon until these missile systems are produced and deployed to Europe. The air forces of all the nuclear countries -- the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and France -- will more than likely be directed to perform Quick Reaction Alert duty (a determined number of nuclear-capable aircraft and pilots on runway alert) from airfields in the German international zones and from British, French, and Soviet airfields. Naval nuclear systems will become a larger component of the European nuclear deterrent. By 1995, European leaders will have a more politically acceptable nuclear deterrent with few nuclear forces based on European soil. Instead of a high nuclear escalation ladder, the future will be protected by nuclear air and sea launched missile systems that will be directly tied to the strategic systems of the four European nuclear powers that will guarantee the stability of the center of Europe -- Germany.

After both NATO's and the Soviets' force structure and tactical nuclear weapons have been reduced substantially in Central Europe, it will be necessary to reevaluate the need for NATO and Soviet forces stationed permanently in a united Germany and to develop a larger role for CSCE. European leaders will soon discover that a united Germany will lead Europe again. U.S. dominance and Soviet aggression may be needed to be the hedge against German revanchism. I believe that five years may be long enough to complete a military restructuring of Central Europe, but the establishment of a new political order may need both U.S. and Soviet participation to ensure stability on both sides. Therefore, Germany is where the two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, must be tied together to keep the balance of power in Europe.

An institutionalized-CSCE that has successfully monitored and closely verified all conventional and nuclear reductions between 1990 and 1996 could gain the status needed to become the multinational tie between East and West. The CSCE verification regime -- heavily staffed by the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and the united Germany -- would ensure that all thirty-five nations share all important treaty-items movement information, exchange all key personnel and equipment data, and monitor all exercises. The CSCE organization would
establish and provide personnel for risk reduction centers located in Washington, Moscow, London, Paris, and Berlin, as well as in the three international zones in the united Germany.

Joint CSCE monitoring teams should participate in unannounced compliance inspections in all thirty-five nations. As offensive forces and tactical nuclear weapons are greatly reduced, it is imperative that mobilization, deployment, and readiness of offensive forces in all thirty-five states are monitored and reported so that all escalation triggers can be controlled by the major powers of CSCE.

CONCLUSIONS

Europe, unlike other less fortunate regions of the world, has remained remarkably stable even with its deadly concentration of the superpowers' conventional and nuclear forces. But, as superpower tensions recede, it is the time that less-threatening alliance arrangements become paramount in an emerging Europe. As the Soviet threat declines, it is apparent that the United States and its European allies are less and less willing to bear the heavy military burdens that NATO commitments have required them to pay for the past forty years.

In the 1990s, redefining the relationships among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the new Europe will be the greatest challenge for the world's diplomats. In the past,
European leaders have been afraid to take the initiative to change antiquated political and military arrangements. Instead, war did it for them. This time is different. The people of Eastern Europe have given the politicians of both the East and West an opportunity to change the international security order without war. As Europe changes, a continued but less-pronounced U.S. and Soviet political and military presence remains essential to sustain the critical balance of power -- a balance that will now be centered on a new, powerful Europe under CSCE. How well the two superpowers manage the transition from positions of dominant forces to very important members of CSCE will determine their future influence in European political, military, and economic affairs.