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A NEW AIR SEA BATTLE CONCEPT:
INTEGRATED STRIKE FORCES

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I. Introduction

"Change is what makes us bold."
- Napoleon

It is, truly, a new world. We must explore new ways of using our military forces to meet the challenges that lie ahead. In an increasingly turbulent global environment, the most likely employment of U.S. military forces, particularly mobile and flexible air and sea power, will be in regional crisis control. This assessment is based on a variety of factors facing planners today:¹

- o The dissolution of the former Soviet Union with attendant instability in Eastern Europe and south-central Asia;
- o Proliferation of advanced weapons (including nuclear, biological, chemical and high technology conventional systems);
- o Unrest in many parts of the developing world (stemming from increased demands for democratization, expanding populations, deteriorating resource and ecological bases);
- o Increased U.S. and allied presence in the Third World (for markets and sources of raw materials, e.g. oil, minerals);
- o Continuing intransigence on the part of a variety of particularly unstable Third World regimes -- e.g. Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, and Cuba -- fostering regional crisis.

Forces capable of responding to these threats will require the ability to perform a wide variety of military tasks at every rung on the vertical ladder of escalation, including presence, demonstration, blockade/embargo, extraction, light/medium/heavy strike, opposed and unopposed insertion of forces, and seizure of

territory.² U.S. forces will face threats that are geographically distant from bases; the possibility of multiple simultaneous crises; a decreasing number of overseas bases; and a wide variety of demanding and unpredictable scenarios.³ Dealing with this environment will require new ways of organizing air and sea forces.

We need new ways to think about organizing, training, deploying, and employing integrated air and sea power. We need a new conceptual approach to melding the principle air and sea forces -- Navy Carrier Battle Groups, Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious Readiness Groups, and the developing Air Force Composite Wings. We need to provide the warfighting CINCs with immediately deployable strike packages composed of air and sea forces that have trained and operated together extensively. In short, we need an air sea battle concept centered on an immediately deployable, highly capable, and fully integrated force -- an Integrated Strike Force.

II. Integrated Strike Forces

"As a first order of business, the campaign (Desert Storm) fought for and gained **air superiority** and **maritime superiority** as preconditions for further operations."

- **Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces**⁴

An Integrated Strike Force (ISF) is a conceptual grouping of a Navy Carrier Battle Group, an Air Force Composite Wing, and a Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious Readiness Group with its embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit.⁵ The Integrated Strike Force concept recognizes that the warfighting CINC requires an immediately

employable, highly capable combat package that has trained and integrated its command structure **before the crisis begins**.

How would such an Integrated Strike Force be formed? While a great deal will depend on the ultimate force structure of the U.S. military, one possible conceptual approach follows:

- o Each ISF would be composed of a Navy Carrier Battle Group, a Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious Readiness Group, and an Air Force Composite Wing.

- o Ideally, two Integrated Strike Forces would be prepared for immediate combat at all times, one for each coast, reporting to USCINCPAC and USCINCLANT. These could be **either** forward deployed or maintained in a surge-readiness posture for roughly 180 days. If another CINC required use of the ready ISF, it could be chopped to him by order of the National Command Authority.

- o Integrated Strike Forces would be formed of units rotated together into a training phase for six months; then moved into a deployment or surge-readiness phase; then outchopped.

- o Obviously, this would necessitate at least two ISFs per coast, a significant percentage of overall U.S. warfighting capability. This is justified given that the vast majority of future contingencies will be conducted at the level of an ISF.

- o At the time of an ISF entering its training phase, it would become a joint task force and fall under command of either a Navy, Air Force, or Marine commander, with a deputy from one of the other services. In accordance with joint doctrine, COCOM

(combatant command) of the ISF would be exercised by a CINC through the commander of the ISF.⁶ Planning and doctrine would broadly follow current joint doctrine dealing with joint task forces.⁷

- o If an ISF was deployed to a conflict requiring more ground troops than currently assigned, additional Army troops could be attached to the ISF as necessary.

- o If a lower-level contingency erupted, the forward deployed or surge-ready ISF could send a subset of its combat power to handle the contingency as appropriate. If a higher-order contingency emerged, the ISFs could be deployed to the region together as a wedge until further assets were dispatched.

Truly integrated air and sea power will be increasingly necessary to establish control in a regional crisis arena early, effectively **stopping a crisis before it explodes**. Air-sea battle forces would provide a secure operating region in which further forces (follow-on land forces beyond the minimal Marine Corps capability, additional air forces, etc) could be introduced and conduct large scale operations involving occupation of enemy territory. Integrated air and sea power, when consolidated, would permit unhampered bombing of both a strategic (deep strike against enemy centers of gravity); and a tactical (on the battlefield) level. It would permit complete blockade of all ports and dominance of the littoral of a region with access to the sea -- meaning, for most countries, the end of many significant imports and exports.

An Integrated Strike Force capable of establishing air and sea power would be supported by overhead sensors, long range land-based aircraft (P-3 Orion antisubmarine aircraft, E-3A Airborne Early Warning AWACs, tankers, and bombers, etc), airborne and seaborne tanker support, and afloat logistics. It would have powerful offensive and defensive capabilities that would cover the complete range of the vertical ladder of escalation.

There are many advantages to the ISF concept. First, the forces would have trained, operated, and practiced warfare together at the level of both tactics and operational art for a period of months (or even longer) before a given deployment or operation. Many of the basic doctrinal and mechanical problems that currently tend to emerge only in the crucible of battle would have been dealt with early in the integrational association. Second, there are significant advantages of scale associated with training operations undertaken by three such large components. These would include expanded use of explosive ranges; high levels of target and air services to practice tracking, air combat maneuvers, and tanking; communication frequency allocation savings; shared national-level intelligence and briefings; and mutual use of support assets (AWACs, bases, etc.) Third, such operations would use assets more efficiently by allowing each combat asset to do what it truly does best -- long range strike by the Air Force bombers, maritime air superiority by Navy fighters, surveillance by joint E-2/E-3

operations depending on terrain and scenario, and so on.⁸

Fourth, such packaging would permit the use of organic strike force assets to cover shortfalls in logistics and basing. If forward bases were not available for Air Force fighters to cover Air Force land-based bomber missions, Navy fighters could provide such cover. Air control could be undertaken by Navy AEGIS Cruisers operating in the littoral areas for Air Force fighters operating overland who might otherwise lack forward air control. Fifth, such operations would result in truly viable integrated warfighting doctrine, validated in the real world by an integrated team. Sixth, the level of mobility and flexibility in such a strike force would be extremely high. Long range bombers could be overhead virtually any point on the globe in a matter of hours, followed by Carrier-based aircraft within days, and combined Air Force and Navy aircraft (assuming forward bases for the Air Force) within a week. The flexibility of such a force would provide a seamless time-line of attack in the crisis arena.⁹

In developing an air-sea battle concept to employ an Integrated Strike Force in regional crisis control, we will focus on five keys to war: Training, Deployment, Scouting, Targeting, and Striking.¹⁰ For our purposes here, **Training** includes all preparations leading to the constitution of a force-in-being, prepared to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations. **Deployment** is the logistics support and ultimate movement to a crisis arena and the positioning of forces within that arena.

Scouting includes the actions undertaken to ascertain the identity of all air, surface, and subsurface contacts within a specified geographic portion of the crisis arena. Scouting also includes battle damage assessment, which is scouting conducted after firepower has been applied to a target. **Targeting** is the bringing to bear of combat elements capable of applying firepower to specific structures, geographic areas, and concentrations of men and material. **Striking** is actually concentrating firepower on targets, i.e. attacking.

III. Training for Air-Sea Battle

"To lead an untrained people to war is to throw them away."
- Confucius: Analacts, xii, c. 5000 B.C.

The real essence of integrating air and sea power is the conduct of efficient training. Obviously, a great deal of training occurs at a single-service level. This is where pilots learn to fly, surface warfare officers learn to shoot Tomahawk missiles, marines to fire machine guns and so forth. These basic building blocks are assumed to be conducted well by the individual services, meaning that each single-service command -- a squadron of F-15s, an Arleigh Burke destroyer, a marine battalion -- is a combat capable element, assembled, equipped, motivated, and ready to fight. These units are then assembled by the services into large fighting groups -- CVBGs, ARGs, and Wings. When the ISF is assembled, the next level of training, between these large fighting groups, begins.

Training for the Integrated Strike Forces should be constant and continuous, both during the actual training phase and during

forward deployment or surge readiness. Training would be the responsibility of the USCINCLANT or USCINCPAC, who could draw on service assets as desired, or request training be conducted by a different CINC.

The training package for the Integrated Strike Force should consist of roughly 180 days of meetings, conferences, tactical reviews, intelligence assessment, and most importantly, exercises conducted at all levels of complexity. The training would encompass work at the tactical level initially, then focus on the operational level of war. A rough conceptual sequence might include:

Prior to Stand up: Develop Mission Analysis for a given ISF; Draft Planning Guidance (USCINCLANT and USCINCPAC Staff); select and brief ISF Commander; Select and brief ISF Deputy; Identify assets to compose ISF; Specify Mission (Deploy, Surge, Exercise Package, etc); Identify Training Assets; Develop Training Package; Select Key Commanders.

First Month: Familiarization Tours and Discussions; First Commander's Conference; Capabilities Training Focus; Area Intelligence Briefings; Draft Staff Estimates by appropriate CINC staff; coordinate with ALCON.

Second Month: Cross Training at Individual Level; Second Commander's Conference; Deployment/Logistics Training Focus; Area Intelligence Briefings; Draft Commander's Estimate by appropriate CINC; coordinate with ALCON.

Third Month: First Integrated Exercise (Ungraded);

Training at individual unit level; Third Commander's Conference; Scouting Training Focus; Area Intelligence Briefings; Draft Concept of Operations by CINC/ISF Commander.

Fourth Month: Second Integrated Exercise (Self Graded) More coordination between units; Fourth Commander's Conference; Targeting Training Focus; Enemy Capability Intelligence Briefings; Approval of Concept of Operations by CJCS.

Fifth Month: Third Integrated Exercise (Graded by CINC) Commander's Meeting with CINC; Striking Training Focus; Allied Capability Intelligence Briefings.

Sixth Month: Final Integrated Exercise (Graded by CINC/JCS) Final Commander's Conference; Final Intelligence Briefings.

After being placed in a surge-ready status (or actually deploying), the ISF would have a continuous training package that would be highly scenario dependent, but might generally look like this: Repetitive Training: Weekly Commander's Conference; Monthly Integrated Exercises; Monthly Coalition/Allied Exercises; Weekly Intelligence Briefings.

IV. Deployment for Air-Sea Battle

"I don't know what the hell this "logistics" is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it."
- Admiral E.J. King to a staff officer, 1942

Deployment is the movement to a crisis arena and the support and positioning of forces within that arena. For an Integrated Strike Force, most of the logistic support would come from the individual services during the training phase, and would remain a service responsibility in most cases during deployment.

Joint doctrine states that "Each military Service has the responsibility to develop and provide the elements of sustainment for the forces it provides to the theater."¹¹

The first key element in effective integrated air and sea power deployment is planning. Much of the deployment planning, including both logistics and positioning, is conducted as part of the training cycle described in the section above. A second key issue in deployment is system compatibility. Several critical areas include fuel, ammunition, communications equipment, and cryptological codes. The U.S. Navy and Air Force are conducting detailed planning to ensure compatibility in these key areas, with memoranda of agreement setting out the results.¹² A third vital issue is the prepositioning of equipment in potential crisis arenas. There is currently prepositioned equipment in Europe and the Persian Gulf region. Such equipment is under the purview of the warfighting CINC whose area of responsibility is involved.

The fourth deployment concern is the availability of overseas bases. The overseas base structure is rapidly contracting. This is a result of the end of the Cold War; the shrinking U.S. defense budget (with Congressional desire to cut bases overseas rather than lose bases in their districts at home); rising nationalism in some countries (notably the Philippines, and to some degree in Germany); and technological advances that obviate the need for certain bases. The declining overseas base structure is a major challenge to integrated air

and sea power, particularly in the forward deployment of significant land-based air power. The Gulf War, for example, would not have been possible on the scale it was conducted, without the wide variety of well-positioned bases in Saudi Arabia. While sea-based air power can deliver significant firepower, concerted, campaign-level bombing campaigns will require forward bases.

A fifth consideration in the deployment phase of integrated sea and air power is the positioning of assets in the crisis arena after arrival. Generally, the first U.S. assets to arrive in the crisis arena will be aircraft flown from other forward bases or the United States. Naturally, their positioning will be entirely scenario dependent, but if forward bases are available in the crisis arena, these aircraft can be flown and landed in the region almost immediately. If there are not bases available, as is frequently the case, the first assets to establish a significant presence will probably be U.S. Navy ships. Again depending on the scenario, this might be a Carrier Battle Group, a Surface Action Group, an Amphibious Readiness Group, or some combination.

Naturally, the first requirement for any forces arriving in the crisis arena is self-defense. As the United States saw in Lebanon in 1984, an unprepared force is a target waiting for a strike. If aircraft are landed in the crisis arena, they must be in a secure airfield, with substantial defensive capability available. If Navy ships are the first in the arena, they should

be at the highest state of alert, with the right mix of ships to provide defensive capability.

The integration of the forces can occur in a variety of ways. If the initial force package moved into the crisis arena is an Integrated Strike Force (ISF), the basic structure of the command will be in place and basically ready to operate. The land-based air power component will move into an air base either in the crisis arena (if one is available); or to the nearest U.S. base. Even in an era of dwindling overseas bases, many regions of the world will have available bases. The sea-based air and naval component of the ISF will be positioned in the littoral area. A defensive perimeter will be set up around both the land-based air and the sea-based force using organic assets of the ISF. Army forces could be added to the ISF at the discretion of the warfighting CINC to provide additional defense around the land-based forces. Naturally, the sooner in the process that the requirement for Army forces is identified, the better. Ideally, if an ISF mission would require Army forces, they would be assigned as early as possible in the training cycle prior to deployment.

The warfighting CINC responsible for the crisis arena will provide for air and sea ports, lines of communication, transit and overflight rights, and reception and onward movement arrangements -- with assistance as allocated by the NCA from other CINCs. This is in accordance with joint doctrine, and is a logical approach.¹³ The ISF is generally not equipped to handle

all those logistic concerns without outside assistance.

The key to positioning forces is to ensure they are effectively positioned to 1) maintain a secure defensive posture against all possible threats; 2) permit effective combat operations against postulated targets in the crisis arena; 3) are able to train, rehearse, and practice operations as required from the selected location; 4) are in a politically acceptable posture from the perspective of the host government (if there is one) and any allied forces also deployed; 5) have adequate and secure communications with other U.S. and allied forces in the region, including competent logistic support. If these constraints are met, the force will be able to quickly move into subsequent phases of the operation: Scouting, targeting, and striking.

V. Scouting for Air-Sea Battle

"You can never do too much reconnaissance."

- General G.S. Patton, **War as I knew It**, 1947

Scouting is the sum of actions undertaken to ascertain the identity of all air, surface, and subsurface contacts within a specified geographic portion of the crisis arena. Scouting also includes battle damage assessment, which is scouting conducted after force has been applied to a target. Scouting is immediately conducted upon arrival in the vicinity of the crisis arena.

The key to effective scouting is using sensors in an integrated fashion. In an increasingly technologically oriented world, overhead sensors (satellites) will provide an increasing

percentage of all scouting conducted for integrated air and sea forces, although they will never fully replace other sources. The key to effective use of overhead sensors is fusing their data with information collected by all the other means of scouting. Overhead sensors can collect information optically, electronically, and through heat sensing. Other means of scouting are through electronic and communication signal collection, radar, sonar, and visual.

Key scouting platforms in an integrated air and sea power scenario include:

- o Shipboard electronic and communications intercept stations (Aircraft carriers, large Amphibious ships, certain submarines, and some Cruiser and Destroyer size ships have detachments with this capability)
- o Airborne electronic and communications intercept operations (Navy E-2, EA-6B, S-3, EP-3, and some helicopters; Air Force E-3 AWACS, and some variants of the EC-135 and EF-111A)
- o Airborne early warning and electronic detection capability (Navy E-2 and Air Force E-3 AWACS)
- o Airborne reconnaissance (Navy F-14 POD configuration and Air Force U-2/TR-1, RF-4C)
- o Picket ship operations with Cruisers, Destroyers, and Frigates, particularly using embarked LAMPS Aircraft
- o Picket submerged operations with Submarines

Perhaps the key issue of scouting is data fusion. In modern battle, there will always be information saturation. The key to

effective scouting is sorting out the valid from the invalid or not relevant. This can only occur in a well-equipped and staffed fusion center, which should be located in the unit with the best overall communications suite and staff support complex. This could be afloat in an Aircraft Carrier, amphibious warfare ship, or command ship; or it might be ashore if an effective forward base in the crisis arena was available and suitably defended. Within the fusion center, access to overhead data is the top priority; followed, in order, by access to data link information, airborne early warning radar, airborne electronic and communication information, and airborne reconnaissance.

An integrated scouting commander should be assigned by the strike force commander, with assets provided to his command. The scouting commander could be either a Naval officer or an Air Force officer, depending on the geography and assets involved in the scouting scenario. He would normally be an O-6 with sufficient staff support to undertake the complex scouting problem in the designated fusion center.

Dissemination of scouting information is a frequent collapse point in integrated air and sea operations. It is difficult to "get the word out" to widely spaced units with a variety of means for injecting data into their combat systems. The best means of providing scouting information is via a suitable data link, either HF or UHF depending on the scenario. The data link provides a "real time" picture of the scouting results. Secondary dissemination can occur via other communications

circuits, including hard copy messages, verbal updates on various circuits, and teletype circuits. Each of these is a distant second to an effective and well managed primary "real time" data link between the units of the integrated air and sea forces.

Scouting is the most difficult of all warfighting operations, because it involves the sorting out of vast quantities of data -- often at critical speed. The task of fusion becomes more difficult as events accelerate. The key is remembering to prioritize scouting objectives. Each objective should be classed by the integrated force commander as a high, medium, or low priority scouting assignment. The scouting commander can then allocate resources to each assignment based on priority, ensuring that critical assignments receive top priority. Assignments can be made by geographic area, threat, speed, altitude, or any other attribute of the target grouping -- or some combination.

For example, an integrated force commander who arrives in the littoral area off the coast of central Israel might assign any air target coming "feet wet" from the coast of Lebanon a high priority. Any surface target moving south along the Golan heights would likewise be a high priority. An air target coming "feet wet" from the Israeli coast might receive a medium priority. One emerging from the air corridor from Cyprus would be a low priority. A scouting plan could be developed that would categorize the scouting objectives by providing a series of "gates" into which most scouting objectives would fit, although

no substitute exists for the initiative of forces in the field.

A Scouting plan might look something like this:

Scouting Plan			
	Syria	Israel	Egypt
Air			
Low/Slow	High	Medium	Low
High/Fast	Low	Low	Low
Commercial	Low	Low	Low
Surface (Land)			
Tank	High	Low	Medium
Truck	Medium	Low	Low
APC	Medium	Low	Low
Surface (Sea)			
Merchant	Medium	Low	Low
Patrol	High	Medium	High
Submarine	High	Medium	High
Combatant	High	Medium	High
Political			
Leadership	High	Low	Low
Mob Activity	High	High	High

(Note: This plan is merely representative of a concept of organization. A real scouting plan would be highly detailed, and include technical differentiation between various scouting objectives)

VI. Targeting for Air-Sea Battle

"What mark is so fair as the breast of a foe?"

- Byron: *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, ii. 1816

Targeting is the bringing to bear of combat elements capable of applying lethal force to specific structures, geographic areas, and concentrations of men and material. In simplest terms, it is the positioning of strike assets. During many regional crises, this placement of strike assets will have a demonstrable calming effect, and may obviate the need to apply combat power. Targeting assumes that deployment (positioning) and scouting have already been successfully conducted. This permits the assignment of strike assets to appropriate targets.

While it may be necessary in certain scenarios to send combat assets out in essentially simultaneous deployment/scouting/targeting/striking sequences, most regional crises (particularly at the early stage) will permit separation (and thus far better control) of each stage of the combat problem. Two plans could form the basis for integrated air-sea battle: A Target Alert Plan (TAP) and a Target Priority List (TPL). A TAP sets levels of readiness among targeting/striking assets. A TPL is a priority list of targets with broadly assigned "shooters." The TPL would be used to generate actual daily Strike Plans, discussed in the next section.

Target Alert Plan (TAP)

In supplying resources to the targeting problem, a useful construct is to think in terms of levels of targeting. Each targeting asset should be placed at a prebriefed level of alert. This would simplify C2 for the targeting assets in the air-sea battle package, prevent collapse of the targeting effort in the event of successful enemy intrusion on friendly C2 circuits, and ensure that air and sea forces are operating from a "single sheet of music" in the targeting plan. As a notional concept, air and sea forces in the crisis arena could be placed in four levels of target alert status as follow:

Levels of Target Alert

- White: Deployment and scouting completed. ID of targets completed. Ordnance can be fired within 24-48 hours.
- Yellow: Targets selected. ID validated. Mission planned. Crews briefed. Ordnance can be fired within 12 hours.

Red: Targets refined. Ordnance loaded. Strike platforms groomed. Ordnance can be fired in 4 hr.

Black: Targets under fire control. Strike platforms airborne/seaborne. All defensive systems up. Awaiting order to strike

Each of the strike systems is part of the Targeting Alert Plan, and is controlled by shifting its targeting status up or down as circumstances warrant. In a generalized format, the Targeting Alert Plan would appear something like the following:

Targeting Alert Plan

	Land-based Air	Sea-based Air	Tomahawk
White	Mission planning in progress Ordnance check Aircraft groom Tanker support arranged Air defense up 24-48 hr stby	Mission planning in progress Ordnance check Aircraft groom Carrier within 500 NM launch CAP/E2 up 24-48 hr stby	Mission planning in progress Missile groom Launcher groom CG/DD within 500 NM launch AAW Fire cont up 24-48 hr stby
Yellow	Missions planned Targets assigned Flight line check Crews briefed/rest Ordnance breakout All defenses up 12 hour stby	Missions planned Targets assigned CV within 200 NM Crews briefed/rest Ordnance breakout All defenses up 12 hour stby	Missions planned Missions loaded CG within 200 NM Fire tm briefed Missile regroom All defenses up 12 hour stby
Red	Mission review Targets review Flight line clear Crew ready 30 Ordnance loaded All defenses up 4 hour stby	Mission review Targets review CV on station Crew ready 30 Ordnance loaded All defenses up 4 hour stby	Mission review Targets review CG on station Fire team up Missile ready All defenses up 4 hour stby
Black	Aircraft airborne or alert 5 Radar ops permit All defenses up Base at Cond I Ready-to-launch	Aircraft airborne or alert 5 Radar ops permit All defenses up CV at Genrl Qtr Ready-to-launch	CG/DD in launch basket Nav check done All defenses up CG/DD Genrl QTR Ready-to-launch

Note: Naturally, this Targeting Alert Plan is provided for representative purposes. A real TAP would be far more complex

and detailed, and would generally include a far wider variety of targeting platforms. These might include, for an Integrated Strike Force: Land-based air, Sea-based air, Tomahawk land-attack missiles, Amphibious Assault Force, Naval Gunfire, Electronic Warfare (jamming), Tomahawk ship-attack missiles, Harpoon missiles, special forces, and so forth.

The preparation of the TAP is another key point at which integration of air and sea power occurs. The targeting commander for the Integrated Strike Force surveys the mission, lays out the TAP, and considers the options for sequencing forces. The targeting commander might begin by placing Tomahawk into red alert, while placing land-based air in yellow and sea-based air in white. Electronic warfare might be placed at the highest level of readiness, a black alert status. This would permit immediate execution of electronic warfare suppression of defenses, and closely follow with tomahawk, land-based air, and sea-based air strikes. At the point of execution, the targeting commander has placed each of the combat platforms at an optimal level of readiness and is ready to execute whatever level of strike function is ordered by the ISF commander.

Alternatively, the entire force can be moved up and down the ladder of targeting alert status together, shifting from white up through black as required. This type of pre-planned shifts in alert status might be extremely advantageous if the force were under attack or were in a communications minimize posture. It would also serve as a forcing function to ensure that related forces were moving up and down a readiness ladder in relative cohesion.

Target Priority List (TPL)

A Target Priority List is, as the name implies, a list of targets arranged in desired chronological order for strike. It consists of authorized targets cleared by higher authority (generally the warfighting CINC, with tacit approval of CJCS, SECDEF, and the President) for attack by strike assets from the sea and air power force. The Target Priority List is a reflection of the detailed planning that the warfighting CINC has undertaken and passed to the ISF Commander as part of a commander's estimate, a concept of operations, and a theater campaign plan. The TPL flows from the CINC planning process, and presents a chronological sequence to the ISF, beginning with targets that must be hit first. The TPL also identifies those targets that constitute "flow points," i.e. go-no go targets that must be destroyed before downstream operations can proceed. The TPL is arranged in order of strikes. It is the basic planning document for the air-sea battle campaign. The TPL is also the broad document from which the daily Strike Plans are prepared for attack missions.

VIII. Strike

"Strike -- till the last armed foe expires;
Strike -- for your altars and your fires;
Strike -- for the green graves of your sires;
- Fitz-Green Halleck: Marco Bozzariz, 1825

Striking is actually concentrating firepower on targets. It is the point at which ordnance meets target. If the previous functions discussed have been properly executed, it is simply a

matter of using the TAP and TPL to build a daily strike plan and giving authority to pull the trigger.

Generally, the targeting and striking functions are so closely related that the same decision-maker must assume responsibility for both. The essence of effective strike is the synchronizing of force on targets. In our discussion of integrated air and sea power in regional crisis, this is particularly important. The importance of proper synchronization stems from the tight control of the vertical ladder of escalation that typically categorizes regional crisis. Strikes must be carefully planned to minimize collateral damage, reduce casualties to essentially zero, avoid the giving of prisoners at all costs, and use the minimal level of force required to execute the mission. Joint doctrine states, "A key characteristic of a campaign is the commander's calculated synchronization of land, air, maritime, special operations, and space forces, as well as political and informational efforts to attain strategic objectives."¹⁴

In addition to synchronizing forces in proper order, the strike commander must as well integrate his forces. This is conducted in the development of the daily Strike Plans, which build from the TAP and TPL. The Strike Plan actually assigns targets to strike assets. It also lays out secondary strike concepts as a follow-on in the event of further hostilities.

Ordnance selection for strikes is a key element in the decision-makers calculus in regional crisis, principally due to

its effect on limiting collateral damage. Another issue for the strike commander is communications. In addition to the assignment of frequencies and crypto, which is laid out in the Integrated Strike Force communications plan, the strike commander must ensure the workability of the communications plan in the actual execution of the strike. What are the alternate communication and connectivity paths in the event of losses during the strike? Are communications relay aircraft and ships available if needed? This issues must be addressed by the strike commander.

Another key concern for the strike commander is battle damage assessment (BDA), which returns the entire combat process full circle to the scouting evolution, and begins again the process of scouting, targetting, and striking. The strike commander must work with the scouting commander to ensure the follow-on movement of battle damage assessment assets into the battle field as necessary (assuming overhead sensors cannot effectively conduct the BDA).

Taking into account these issues, a notional daily Strike Plan might appear as follows:

Daily Strike Plan, 21 May 1995

	Target	Shooter	Level	Time	
Tomahawk 1	C2 Node A	CG-54	6 TLAM	0300	
Tomahawk 2	Pres Palace	CG-54	6 TLAM	0300	
Tomahawk 3	AAW Batt A	CG-52	12 TLAM	0300	
Tomahawk 4	Airfield A	CG-52	6 TLAM	0300	
Tomahawk 5	Airfield B	DD-970	12 TLAM	0300	
Tomahawk 6	C2 Node B	DD-970	12 TLAM	0300	
NGFS 1	POL Site A	DD-963	100 Rds	0400	
NGFS 2	POL Site B	CG-50	120 Rds	0400	
NGFS 3	Gun Boats	DD-966	60 Rds	0400	
SEAD 1	AAW Batt B	F-117	4 A/C	0400	(1)
SEAD 2	AAW Batt C	F-117	4 A/C	0400	(1)
SEAD 3	AAW Batt A	EF-111	4 A/C	0400	
SEAD 4	AAW Batt B	EF-111	4 A/C	0400	
SEAD 5	AAW Batt C	EA-6B	2 A/C	0400	
A Strike	Pwr Plnt A	F-16/F-15	32 A/C	0500	(2)
B Strike	Pwr Plnt B	A-6/F/A-18	32 A/C	0500	(2)
C Strike	Water Plnt	F/A-18	18 A/C	0500	
EW 1	Scud C2	EC-130	1 A/C	0600	
EW 2	Guard C2	EA-6B	2 A/C	0600	
NGFS 4	LZ A	DD-971	250 Rds	0600	
NGFS 5	LZ B	LHA-1/2	250 Rds	0600	
D Strike	Beach Def	A-6/F/A-18	32 A/C	0600	

Note 1: Tankers - 2 KC-135
Note 2: Tankers - 11 KC-135

The daily Strike Plan is the planning document for commanders to prepare specific missions, brief air crew, load ordnance, and transmit further guidance -- such as the ATO, the Landing Plan, the Naval Gunfire Plan, and so forth.


IX. Command, Control, and Communications

"Order is Heaven's first law."
- Alexander Pope, **Essay on Man**, iv

It is not our intent in this discussion to lay out a detailed plan for controlling an Integrated Strike Force, which should be developed by doctrine agreed upon by the services, the warfighting CINCS, and the JCS staff. However, several observations about command, control, and communication (C3) that are germane to regional crisis control and integrated air and sea

power might be worthwhile.

As an Integrated Strike Force "works up" along the lines discussed in this study, much of the C3 will be resolved by the forces. Each ISF should mold the basic tactical doctrine to its particular strengths and weaknesses, intelligence forecasts, and probable area of operations. This is not to say that doctrine should be discarded -- rather, it should serve as a basic building block to be tailored to the specifications of the ISF. A generalized concept that would be useful would be to force integration by actually assigning senior officers in the ISF to direct the various warfighting phases discussed above: Deployment, Scouting, and Targeting/Striking. The choice of officer would be dependent on the desires of the ISF Commander, the background of the officers, their platform, and so forth. The various component commanders - Navy, Air, Ground, Joint Force Air (JFACC) -- might be "dual hatted." A basic "wiring diagram" might look like this:



These commanders would be linked by a UHF Secure Satellite Communications circuit. Additional circuits could be laid out roughly as follows:

Top Level Communications Circuits

	CKT	NECOS	TYPE	Participants
1.	Command	ISFC	HF/Sat	Senior commanders
2.	Strike	ITSC	UHF/HF	ISFC, strike
3.	Target	ITSC	UHF/HF	ISFC, targeteers
4.	Logistics	IDC	HF	All
5.	Navy Red	Senior Navy	UHF	Navy forces
6.	CATF	ARG Cdr	UHF	ARG, Navy escorts
7.	CVBG	CV CO	UHF	Sea-based air, escorts
8.	T-HAWK	CG/DD CO	TTY/Sat	T-HAWK shooters
9.	INTELL	ISFC	UHF/Sat	All
10.	TADIL A/B	ISFC	UHF/HF	All link capable

Naturally, there will be dozens more communications circuits, but these ten would provide the high-level connectivity between the senior commanders in the ISF.

X. Air-Sea Battle Concepts

"The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out."

- B.H. Liddell Hart

From the foregoing analysis, a group of air-sea battle conceptual guidelines can be developed for application to the Integrated Strike Force concept:¹⁶

- o **Conduct Training Early and Hard.** Even before forces enter the initial training phase of the ISF life-cycle, a realistic concept of employment must be generated by the CINC. Then a focused and demanding training cycle that brings together all the components of the ISF must be executed, under the direction of the CINC staff and the selected ISF Commander.

- o **Clearly Define the ISF Command Structure.** Assign the commanders for deployment, scouting, and targeting/striking early, and ensure all understand their role. All command

relationships should be in accordance with joint doctrine for joint task force operations as tailored by the ISF Commander in consultation with the CINC. As JCS publication 3-0 says, "establish a command structure that clearly defines overall command responsibility, as well as command responsibility for each phase of a campaign or operation."¹⁷ Authority must be delegated to the lowest level possible, preferably at the scene of action.

- o **Focus on Communications.** Every key decision-maker should be personally involved in the communications plan, ensuring it provides equipment compatibility, sufficient communications assets, and true connectivity between the warfighting elements of the ISF. Critical path concepts: interoperability, redundancy, and standardization of format and procedure.

- o **Tailor the Integrated Strike Force to the Mission.** Take only what is needed to execute the given mission. If the entire force is necessary, take it all -- but if only the ARG is required, leave the CVBG and the Composite Wing at home for further training while the ARG does its mission. (As a general comment, the entire ISF would provide the lowest-risk package and will probably deploy together in a real crisis). Overwhelming force should be applied at the decisive points.

- o **Let the ISF Commander make the key decisions on the scene.** This applies to the CINC looking down to the ISF Commander, and the ISF Commander looking down to his warfighters -- deployment, scouting, and targeting/striking commanders.

o **Execute the Principles of War.** Apply overwhelming force at decisive points, attack the enemy's center of gravity, and focus on basics: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity.

XI. Conclusion

"Nothing remains static in war or in military weapons."

- Admiral E.J. King

The President has discussed the need for mobile and flexible forces to control crisis. On 2 August 1990, at the Aspen Institute, President Bush discussed his emerging vision of a new world order and the related military requirements that would evolve. His speech underlined the need to face the challenges of third world instability and uncertainty. As he said, "In an era when threats may emerge with little or no warning, our ability to defend our interests will depend upon our speed and agility. We will need forces that give us global reach. No amount of political change will alter the geographic fact that we are separated from many of our most important allies and interests by thousands of miles of water."¹⁸ The Integrated Strike Force, as a primary instrument of integrated sea and air power, is a powerful evocation of U.S. capability and resolve that can be used in potential crisis throughout the globe.

Endnotes

1. See, for example, the **National Security Strategy of the United States - August, 1991**, pp. 5-11; the **National Military Strategy - January 1992**, pp. 1-4; and the **Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress - February 1992**, 2-8.

2. The vertical ladder of escalation discussed here is a simplified version of Kahn's classic vertical ladder, and is loosely based on concepts found in the Navy brief, "Seapower for a Superpower," and the comparable Air Force brief, "Global Reach, Global Power." Both are products of the respective Service staffs in the Pentagon.

3. See, for example, the "leaked" versions of the Defense Planning Guidance and the warfighting scenarios postulated by the Joint Staff in Patrick Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plann Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," New York Times, 8 March 1992, pp. 1, 12, 17; and "Pentagon Imagines New Enemies To Fight in Post-Cold-War Era," New York Times, 17 February 1992, p. 1, 8.

4. **Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces (Joint Publication 1)**, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1991, p. 66.

5. Navy Carrier Battle Groups typically include a CV and its associated airwing of 9 squadrons, 4-6 escorts, including Tomahawk-capable Cruisers and Destroyers, and logistic ships (oilers, ammunition ships, and supply ships). An Amphibious Readiness Group includes 5-7 large amphibious ships, an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit of 2,700 Marines and their associated air and fire support equipment, and logistic ships. The Air Force Composite Wing concept is in development now, and according to a recent Air Force staff brief, might include one of the following two concepts, depending on mission:

Air Intervention Wing

F-15C Air Superiority
F-15E Air Interdiction
F-16 Battlefield Attack
KC-135 Air Refueling
E-3B Command and Control
EF-111 Electronic Combat

Battlefield Attack Wing

F/A-16 Close Air Support
A-10 Close Air Support
OA-10 Forward Air Control
C-130 Intra-Theater Lift
AC-130 Battlefield Attack

6. **Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) JCS Publication 0-2**, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing, 1 December 1986, p. 3-10.

7. **Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations - Joint Test Publication 5-0**, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 26 July 1991 and **Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures - Joint Publication 5-00.2**, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September, 1991.

8. Chuck Myers, "Deep Six the Strike Mission," Proceedings, October 1991, pp. 51-54 discusses a potential division of roles and missions by the Navy and Air Force that would include transferring the deep strike mission exclusively to the Air Force.

9. This concept of sequencing Air Force and Navy forces into a crisis arena was suggested in discussion with Colonel Buzz Moseley for the National War College Faculty in Washington, D.C. in late August 1991.

10. These five keys were suggested to some degree by Captain Wayne Hughes' excellent work, **Fleet Tactics**, in which he identifies five "propositions": attrition/firepower, scouting, command/control, counterforce, and maneuver. Captain Wayne P. Hughes, USN, (Ret), **Fleet Tactics**, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1986, pp. 145-146.

11. **Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations (JCS Pub 3-0)**, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1990, p. II-3.

12. Interview, Captain Al Myers, USN, Head, Navy Tactical Doctrine Branch (OP-607), Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 15 March 1992.

13. **Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations - JCS Publication 3-0**, Op. Cit., p. II-3.

14. **Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations - Joint Publication 3-0**, Op. Cit., p. III-7.

15. A Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) should be selected in accordance with Joint Doctrine. There is a great deal of current discussion about the selection of the JFACC, including the developing concept of an afloat JFACC on an Aircraft Carrier. The JFACC would be a likely candidate to be dual-hatted as the Targeting/Striking Commander (ITSC).

16. Several of these air-sea battle concepts are adapted from Joint Doctrine either in force or currently in development, especially Joint Publication 3-0, "Guidelines for Joint Operations," pp. III-11.

17. **Joint Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations - Joint Publication 3-0**, Op.Cit., p. III-11.

18. President George Bush, remarks at the Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colorado, 2 August 1990.

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MARCHING TO THE BEAT OF HIS OWN DRUM:
THE STRATEGY AND STATECRAFT OF CHARLES DEGAULLE

by

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To say the least, Charles deGaulle stood in sharp contrast to the Western leaders of the early cold war era. From the late 1950's to the close of the 1960's, he perceived a vision for France that led him to pursue a controversial and single-minded style of statecraft that challenged and frustrated allies and opponents alike. To expect him to have been anything less would have been to ignore his performance throughout decades of French history leading up to his leadership of the Fifth Republic. No one familiar with this imposing ultra-nationalist had cause to be surprised by the course upon which he would steer the French ship of state, nor the tenacity with which he would pursue such a vision.

Who else was stirring up controversy throughout the French military establishment after the First World War with revolutionary ideas of military leadership? Who else predicted the Anschluss a decade before its fulfillment and challenged the military hierarchy with impassioned and desperate calls for the mechanization of the French Army as a replacement for outdated defensive fortifications? And in the darkest days of the republic during the Second World War, what one figure above all others kept total faith in the survival and eventual resurgence of France as a world power? The often irritating and intransigent position that deGaulle fostered in the cold war was, after all, the same that had advanced him throughout his career and had made it possible for him to keep French interests alive

throughout World War II with virtually no power base other than what he could singlehandedly muster.

France had much to be thankful for in deGaulle during the war years. Without his unfailing determination to continuously push for Free France's involvement in allied planning and operations - aimed, as far as he was concerned, at liberating France more than to save the rest of Europe - France's eventual part in a postwar European structure would have been uncertain. His determined leadership and diplomacy working with the allies on behalf of a vanquished nation was essential in receiving support for the French from Eisenhower and Macmillan at many crucial junctures. While deGaulle was not invited to participate at Yalta or Potsdam (for which he would never forgive the "Anglo-Saxon" camp), France still benefited from the terms of the latter agreement, undoubtedly a reflection of the general's uncompromising efforts on its behalf throughout four difficult years of world conflict.

His resignation from the French leadership shortly after the war was consistent with his so frequently demonstrated intransigence. Rather than accept the leadership under a constitution which he saw as placing limitations on his freedom of action as chief executive, he left the government. In the ensuing thirteen years of his life as a private citizen, deGaulle observed what he perceived to be the "disintegration" of France under a series of administrations. This decline was anathema to the Gaullist vision of nineteenth century-style French domination and

leadership on the European continent.

The forces that brought deGaulle back into power at the head of the French state in 1958 after so many years of self-imposed political exile are central to any understanding of how one man's personal vision could enjoy such unilateral control in the formation of French national policy for such a prolonged period. Since the end of the Second World War, France's political landscape had been shaped by fighting between various political parties and other factions, serious problems trying to rebuild a damaged economy, and dealing with the rise of independence movements in the former colonial territories. The inability of the French government in these intervening years to deal effectively with these threats to the state, brought to a head with the revolt in Algeria that brought France to the brink of civil war, resulted, in all practicality, in deGaulle's popular "call to power". Enjoying such a strong mandate in a national time of crisis, his new leadership at the French helm was, by necessity, to be characterized by a free hand in shaping what he deemed to be the necessary strategy to arrest French national decline.

The "necessary strategy" to deGaulle was one which had as its goal nothing less than the return of French power and grandeur to the continental stage. His view of the world placed France at the center, and the circumstances that brought him back into the political spotlight offered few constraints from his constituency in his efforts to lead her to that rightful position. In such an environment, it was inevitable that he

would bring to bear all of the independence of thought and uncompromising stubbornness which had been his hallmark for the previous twenty years.

If he saw little in the way of domestic constraints, there was certainly no paucity of external realities with which he would be forced to deal on his path to renewed French glory. Though not by his design, France was still linked to the British and Americans in the NATO military alliance under the leadership of an American commander. A military security arrangement founded on practical cold war balance of power principles, its premise was, nonetheless, diametrically opposed to deGaulle's idea of the independent nation-state. In addition to an uncomfortable involvement in NATO, the breakup of France's former colonial empire through independence movements continued to have a divisive effect on the French populace both at home and abroad, the severity of which was in full evidence previously in Indochina and at the time in Algeria. No less important, deGaulle perceived an Anglo-American economic hegemony which saw the United States and Great Britain at the controls of world financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It was in such an environment and under such constraints that Charles deGaulle began his crusade to make his vision for France a reality.

The major events of the period that best illustrated the deGaulle strategy and portrayed his unique style of statecraft were the French break from the NATO alliance, the building of an

independent French nuclear capability, and the determination of the French to dominate the European Common Market. In each of these vital areas, deGaulle was to demonstrate a nationalistic fervor that, predictably, sought to keep France always in charge of each element of her own destiny, always at the forefront. This unyielding position was repeatedly demonstrated to be a totally irretractable one, much to the chagrin of his western allies, particularly the United States and Great Britain, who sought time and again to derail or mollify this imposing leader's directed focus on French power.

Under deGaulle, France's national interest around which all policy would revolve for over a decade was a singular one - independence. This independence meant freedom of action with France at the center, free of reliance upon or constraints imposed by other nation-states or foreign powers. In the security arena, it meant breaking the Euratlantic security system, which he felt was built on a foundation of the familiar Anglo-Saxon hegemony he so despised. In his view, Europe had to wean herself from military reliance on the United States, preferably in favor of a French-dominated continental arrangement. His belief that the Americans had come very late to the aid of the French in both world wars and that the aims of the United States in future potential conflicts were not necessarily those of France - nor even the rest of Europe's - made any continuing Euratlantic security arrangement unthinkable. Britain's continued close ties and reliance on the Americans only

served as further proof to deGaulle that only France could effectively lead any security alliance of European nation-states. After stringing along the Americans and British in Machiavellian fashion with alternative security proposals for a tripartite system with Americans, British, and French as equal partners (an arrangement unacceptable to the Americans in view of the question of nuclear weapons control), deGaulle played the final act and withdrew France from the NATO integrated military structure in 1966. His first major step toward "independence" was complete.

France's rejection of NATO, of course, could only have been transformed into reality by her becoming a self-sufficient nuclear power. While this part of deGaulle's "grand design" did not originate with his administration, he made it a national priority, and as early as 1962 this crucial mechanism to support a break with the NATO alliance was in place. This nuclear capability, combined with an independent French strike force, would ensure France's independence in the future. Numerous attempts by the United States and Great Britain to bring France's nuclear capability under some type of collective security umbrella were doomed from the beginning. Employment, numbers, or control of nuclear weapons and technology would remain non-negotiable for the same reason that membership in NATO was untenable - cooperation at any level was synonymous with loss of independence.

The non-military aspects of French national interest in the Gaullist scheme revolved largely around her participation in the

European Common Market. His design, again, was not to have France merely "participate" in a multilateral economic arrangement, but rather to be at the center, with full veto power over the other members. The success of his efforts to thwart the British attempts to join the union came only after once again stringing them along for a lengthy period of time with false hopes and was packaged as part of a combined "one-two" punch along with the NATO withdrawal as another blow at the old nemesis - Anglo-American dominance.

But other than pulling out of an alliance and playing the part of spoiler in keeping the British out of the Common Market, did France really have the power required to take deGaulle's "grand design" to its full conclusion? There was no question in his mind, certainly. His steadfastness in standing up to the Soviet Union both in the Berlin Crisis in 1961 and the next year in support of the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis underscored France's ability to hold her own in an arena increasingly dominated by superpowers. But his vision of a French-dominated alliance of European nation-states that would serve as a balancing force between the two superpowers depended on France's ability to deliver. In spite of his magnificent efforts, the rest of Europe could not be convinced that what France had to offer them could replace the security of the NATO alliance. A failed attempt to enlist West Germany in a Franco-German alliance that would supersede her responsibilities under the NATO charter showed the inertia that would continue to

undermine deGaulle's great dream. France's recognition of the People's Republic of China and her strong anti-American stance in the Vietnam conflict helped distance him from the United States and won him support in the Third World, but it was not the kind of support that deGaulle could parlay into the kind of power shift he needed to succeed.

His assessment of the power wielded by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union provided the basis for the antagonistic style of diplomacy he frequently displayed. What diluted Britain's power, in Gaullist thinking, was her steadfast reliance on the United States. He was extreme in his distrust of both British and American motives and perceived the inherent unreliability of any Anglo-American arrangement, military or economic, to be a threat to French interests. A theme in his rejection of British entry into the Common Market was that Great Britain's refusal to sever her bilateral ties with the United States rendered her too non-European in her outlook to be a co-operative member (to say nothing of the challenge Britain's entry would make to French domination of the union...). Looking to the East, the French leader recognized the threat posed by the Soviets but, in his eyes, his own confident insight into Russian motives and maneuvering rendered them more predictable and manageable than France's western counterparts.

The doubts that deGaulle had concerning American and British resolve to stand up to the Soviet Union only heightened his desire to seek a pivotal role on the international scene. Of

one thing, though, deGaulle was certain: in future power struggles, Europe should be independent enough not to be a pawn in superpower confrontations. He rejected the idea of a bipolar world and perceived the balance of power to have become skewed by the two superpowers. His attempt to establish a separate Franco-German alliance and his overtures of detente toward the Soviet Union after Brezhnev came to power were manifestations of his desire to alter that equation.

DeGaulle's Machiavellian view toward relations between states - that they are based solely on power and guile - set the tone for his own brand of employment of the instruments of statecraft. The foregoing discussion reveals his alternating use of economic, political, and military tools in the conduct of his diplomacy throughout his tenure - whatever was needed for each occasion which promised the most potential to ensure France the upper hand. On other occasions where France was unlikely to achieve superiority, he was known to pursue the diminution of the power of others, illustrated well enough by his attempts to revive the gold standard in the world monetary system in 1965 and his siding the same year with the Soviet Union to condemn American policy in Vietnam. Perhaps the most telling about France's reputation with the rest of Europe - and maybe, as well, about the limitations of deGaulle's own statecraft - was his failure to coerce the Common Market off its increasingly supranational path through a French boycott of the organization. He was to find his overbearing approach to be far more effective

in the domestic setting than in the international arena, where France's pursuit of a central role was not always perceived to be in everyone's best interests by his European neighbors.

History must record the deGaulle years as a unique period in French diplomatic activity, marked by both success and failure. While his grand vision of France regaining its nineteenth century-style power and grandeur was not to be fulfilled, the unique position that France achieved in the world community following a devastating war was itself enviable. While his methods of diplomacy often frustrated and angered other statesmen, they were a key factor in the restoration of French national pride after years of decline following the war. The French economy grew throughout his administration, with the country's role in the Common Market playing no small part. His skillful handling of often volatile independence movements in the former African colonies not only gained him respect in the Third World, but a continuation of close economic and political ties in the region, as well. Franco-German relations improved, making the continent a safer place for all Europeans. The independence achieved by France with her withdrawal from NATO and stand-alone nuclear capability was a major success in deGaulle's view and a difficult dilemma for the rest of the world. While the West could count on, and often received, French support in superpower crises, her role as a "wild card" nuclear power rendered diplomatic maneuvering more difficult on both sides. This was just as deGaulle would have it.

On the other hand, one could argue that the extreme Gaullist vision of French resurgence was an impossible dream that defeated many of the promising features of multilateralism. DeGaulle's intransigence with the United States forced the Americans to increasingly base their European strategy on Bonn, leaving France with lost opportunities. His inability to convince the rest of Europe that France could take over as their guarantor of security or to force a break between the United States and Germany both contributed to the failure of the "grand design", as well. The Soviet rejection of deGaulle's potential as an arbiter between the superpowers was a tacit recognition that the French leader carried little credibility to any negotiations with the West, who had long been the recipients of his maverick diplomacy.

As France continues to move closer to the multilateralism that characterizes today's world, both through increased military cooperation and her role in the formation of an expanded European Community, she will undoubtedly attempt to retain some of the Gaullist trappings to which French culture seems accustomed. The potential benefits from her cooperation, however, are enormous. In the final analysis, this "cooperation" that deGaulle eschewed so adamantly for fear of losing France her independence may actually be the key to open the way for her real liberation.