

Marine Expeditionary Brigade: Centerpiece of the Future

A Monograph

by

Major Tye R Wallace

United States Marine Corps



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

AY 04-05

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 074-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 052605	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Monograph	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Marine Expeditionary Brigade: Centerpiece of the Future			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Tye R. Wallace				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) US Army Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies 250 Gibbon Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words) Marine Expeditionary Brigade: Centerpiece of the Future by Major Tye R. Wallace, USMC, 68 pages. Professional standing Marine Expeditionary Brigade headquarters and their associated subordinates will be the centerpiece of Marine Corps operations in the future. The Marine Corps needs to reorganize the operating forces to create a single warfighting Marine Expeditionary Force, a Marine Logistics Command, five professional standing Marine Expeditionary Brigades, and six Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable). This monograph identifies the need for change. The new world environment, Marine Corps' future concepts, and a redefinition of world conflict are key factors requiring organizational change in the United States Marine Corps. I provide a unique reorganization of the Marine Corps' operating forces to enhance unit cohesion, combat efficiency, and overall Marine Corps / Joint Force capabilities. These improvements include a cost savings of 3635 personnel structure spaces. This monograph directly supports the Marine Corps' family of concepts and programs outlined in the Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2004. It provides a solution preparing the Marine Corps for the future. It will ensure America's premier Expeditionary Force stands ready when called upon.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Marine Corps, Future Concepts, Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Future Operational Environment, Reorganization			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 66	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT U	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE U	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT U	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT none	

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Tye R. Wallace

Title of Monograph: Marine Expeditionary Brigade: Centerpiece of the Future

Approved by:

Jeffrey A. Bowden, Colonel, USMC

Monograph Director

Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR

Director,
School of Advanced
Military Studies

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

Director,
Graduate Degree
Programs

Abstract

Marine Expeditionary Brigade: Centerpiece of the Future by Major Tye R. Wallace, USMC, 66 pages.

Professional standing Marine Expeditionary Brigade headquarters and their associated subordinates will be the centerpiece of Marine Corps operations in the future. The Marine Corps needs to reorganize the operating forces to create a single warfighting Marine Expeditionary Force, a Marine Logistics Command, five professional standing Marine Expeditionary Brigades, and six Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable). This monograph identifies the need for change. The new world environment, Marine Corps' future concepts, and a redefinition of world conflict are key factors requiring organizational change in the United States Marine Corps. I provide a unique reorganization of the Marine Corps' operating forces to enhance unit cohesion, combat efficiency, and overall Marine Corps / Joint Force capabilities. These improvements include a cost savings of 3635 personnel structure spaces.

This monograph directly supports the Marine Corps' family of concepts and programs outlined in the *Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2004*. It provides a solution preparing the Marine Corps for the future. It will ensure America's premier Expeditionary Force stands ready when called upon.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	1
Introduction	1
Background and Significance.....	1
Methodology.....	2
Organization of the Monograph	3
CHAPTER 1 FUTURE PERSPECTIVE AND ANALYSIS	3
Introduction	3
Joint Operational Environment.....	3
Contemporary Theorists	7
Marine Corps Future Concepts.....	11
Analysis	16
Conclusion	18
CHAPTER 2 MEB HEADQUARTERS ORGANZIATION AND CAPABILITIES	18
Introduction	18
Past	19
Today’s MEB	22
Analysis	23
Conclusion.....	30
CHAPTER 3 REORGANIZE THE MARINE CORPS	30
Introduction	30
Single Warfighter	30
II MEF reorganization	33
III MEF reorganization.....	38
I MEF reorganization	45
Analysis	55
Conclusion.....	58
CONCLUSION	58
Introduction	58
What was the need.....	59
The solution.....	60
How to get there	60
The benefits	60
BIBLIOGRAPHY	62
Books.....	62
U.S. Government Publications	63
Articles	64
Miscellaneous	65

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1. MEB / ESG / Phib Group.....	28
Figure 2. MEB Headquarters Echelons	28
Figure 3. JTF / MNF / Functional HQ.....	29
Figure 4. Marine Operating Forces	32
Figure 5. Locations of MAGTFs	33
Figure 6. MARFORLANT	34
Figure 7. 2 MEB	36
Figure 8. 6 MEB	37
Figure 9. 4 MEB(AT).....	38
Figure 10. MARFORPAC	39
Figure 11. 3 MEB	42
Figure 12. MLC.....	44
Figure 13. I MEF	45
Figure 14. 3 MAW	47
Figure 15. 1 MARDIV	49
Figure 16. 1 FSSG	51
Figure 17. 1 MEB	54

TABLE OF TABLES

Table 1. Future environmental / Marine Corps requirements	19
Table 2. Advertised MEB Headquarters Capabilities	23
Table 3. Past MEB Headquarters	24
Table 4. Current MEB Headquarters	26
Table 5. II MEF Savings in Table of Organization	56
Table 6. III MEF Savings in Table of Organization	57
Table 7. Cost to make new organization	57

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The purpose of this monograph is to recommend the development of standing Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), headquarters. The monograph addresses a number of issues regarding the MEB headquarters and the capabilities it should possess. Specifically, what are the nature and dynamics of the future environment and the future Marine Corps concepts? What are the most significant factors? What are the requirements of this future environment that the Marine Corps must possess to operate effectively in the joint military arena? What capabilities does the Marine Corps currently possess to meet these requirements and where are the deficiencies? The answers to those questions resulted in a set of recommended changes to restructure the Marine Corps organization creating innovative new ways improving unit cohesion, combat efficiency, and increasing both the Marine Corps' and the Joint Force's capabilities.

Background and Significance

The Marine Corps' current concept for organizing and sourcing the MEB headquarters does not provide the necessary flexibility that the future operational environment or the Marine Corps future concepts demand. Each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) command element has a MEB headquarters embedded within its structure. The Marines assigned by battle roster to the MEB headquarters have to fulfill two jobs. When the MEF forms and deploys the MEB headquarters, it severely degrades the ability of the remainder of the MEF staff to function and operate properly. Currently the only viable concept of employment for the MEB headquarters is to be an advance element for the MEF. The MEF has to quickly follow and reabsorb the MEB headquarters to function effectively. The Marine Corps is fighting the global war on terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. Each of these cases arguably should have a MEB headquarters in command of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). However, the Marine

Corps has a MEF headquarters in Iraq, a Marine Division Headquarters in Africa, and a Marine Regiment headquarters in Afghanistan. The Marine Corps does not have the ability to employ the MEB and MEF independently from each other for an extended period-of-time. The new environment demands this capability.

Methodology

The methodology began with a perspective on the future environment and the future United States Marine Corps concepts. I focused the analysis on the following: the Joint Forces Command draft paper on the Joint Operational Environment, Marine Corps future concepts, and contemporary theorist. The purpose of this analysis was to determine the nature and dynamics of the future environment and the Marine Corps future concepts and identify the most significant factors. The intent was to further categorize these factors into requirements that the Marine Corps must meet to operate effectively in the future joint military arena.

Second, research methodology reviewed and analyzed of the Marine Corps past and current MEB headquarters capabilities comparing and contrasting them to the requirements identified in the future perspective. This historical examination focused on the MEB in the 1990s before its dissolution. The Marine Corps describes its current MEB headquarters capabilities in its doctrinal, warfighting, and reference publications. These documents were used to address capability shortfalls and develop recommended solutions to the MEB headquarters organization.

The final step analyzed the Marine Corps force structure and developed a recommended solution to create standing MEBs. I did this within the constraint of a “zero sum gain” in force structure. The end product is a proposed Marine Corps structure that is more capable and ready to meet the future.

Organization of the Monograph

I have organized the monograph into an introduction and four chapters. Chapter 1 is a future perspective and analysis of the future environment and the Marine Corps future concepts. Chapter 2 examines the Marine Corps past and present MEB headquarters capabilities and recommends a “new” MEB headquarters design. Chapter 3 presents a proposed reorganization of the Marine Corps’ operating forces creating standing MEBs. Chapter 4 explains my conclusions and the benefits inherent in reorganization.

CHAPTER 1 FUTURE PERSPECTIVE AND ANALYSIS

Introduction

Does the future environment require the Marine Corps to develop a standing Marine Expeditionary Brigade Headquarters? The world is changing and the military must change to meet the challenge. Contemporary theorists have espoused their ideas about the nature and dynamics of this changing environment. In this chapter, I examined the future world environment by looking at the Joint Operational Environment, the works of contemporary theorists, and the Marine Corps Future Concepts. From this examination, I identified significant factors that the future presents that led to future requirements. The Marine Corps must possess the capabilities to meet these requirements to operate effectively.

Joint Operational Environment

The Joint Forces Command draft paper, the Joint Operational Environment (JOE), points to a volatile, complex, and dangerous world.¹ It is important to examine this perspective since it provides insights into how our own military establishment views the future. The purpose of the JOE is to provide a common reference of the future environment to our senior civilian and

¹ Joint Forces Command, "Summing Up the Future Operational Environment, The Joint Operational Environment - Into the Future," Final Draft, Joint Forces Command (5 March 2004), 167.

military leaders.² An understanding of the JOE helps us determine the military capabilities necessary to meet future demands. Through a comprehensive examination of JOE, we can fully understand the nature and the dynamics involved.

In order to examine the nature of the future environment it is first necessary to define what is meant by the term nature.³ Nature is the inherent character or basic constitution of a person or thing. In short its essence. Four distinct characteristics define the nature of the future environment as seen from the JOE. These defining characteristics are chaos, complexity, scope, and volatile.⁴

The future environment over the next twenty years is going to be more chaotic than the past.⁵ Chaos will be present within all aspects of society and the world at large. New and / or failing governments will be unable to provide the public services that their populations require.⁶ Large population growth rates, in underdeveloped nations, will create large segments of society that are unemployed and frustrated.⁷ This frustrated segment of society will cause problems by undermining local authorities. Coupled with this, the increase of technology, if not managed properly, will also add to this chaos by creating increasingly complex systems.⁸

The world of the future will be increasingly more complex. Three distinct variables define complexity.⁹ These variables are the number of components in a system, the variety of these components, and the interdependence among the components. The numbers of nations in the world are increasing. This increases the number of components, nation-states, which must

² Ibid., 7.

³ Merriam-Webster, Dictionary [on-line] (Springfield, MA.: Merriam-Webster Inc.), accessed 19 December 2004, available from <http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=nature>, Internet.

⁴ Joint Forces Command, "Summing Up the Future Operational Environment, The Joint Operational Environment - Into the Future," Final Draft, Joint Forces Command (5 March 2004), 14, 18, 25, 35, 44, 68, 70-77, 96, 118, 132, 133-135.

⁵ Ibid., 14, 18, 70-72, 118, 132-134.

⁶ Ibid., 17.

⁷ Ibid., 21.

⁸ Ibid., 69.

⁹ M. Mitchell Waldrop, *Complexity – The emerging science at the edge of order and chaos* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 11.

interact together. In addition, the economies of the world's nations are becoming more interconnected.¹⁰ This interdependence of economies will make it more difficult to forecast the effects of the economic system in one nation with that of another. The numbers of non-state power players are also increasing. These new entities are super-empowered individuals, transnational organizations, and sub-state groups. The increased number of components, the variety of components, and the higher levels of interdependence, point to a more complex world.

The scope of the future environment, as described by the JOE, requires a global view. It includes the standard land, sea, air, space, and information domains. However, it will stretch beyond the standard regional perspective. It will require a worldwide awareness. Adversaries will try to limit or prevent the application of our traditional sources of power through anti-access schemes. The United States needs to project and sustain ourselves anywhere in the world overcoming our adversaries' efforts to limit us.¹¹

The world over the next twenty years will become more volatile. There are at least thirty new nation-states having the potential to fail creating conflict.¹² There are also vast differences in cultural, religious, and ethnic views increasing friction throughout the world. All of these facts coupled with large population growth rates and dwindling natural resources will create a spiraling competition for the little resources left. Multiple flashpoints will emerge across the globe.

Dynamics represent the process of change in the future environment. In short, it represents those factors that are changing. The Joint Operational Environment describes four key areas that will have the greatest impact on our future environment. These four dynamics are demographic, geopolitical, economic, and technological.¹³

¹⁰ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999), ix.

¹¹ Joint Forces Command, "Summing Up the Future Operational Environment, The Joint Operational Environment - Into the Future," Final Draft, Joint Forces Command (5 March 2004), 75,83.

¹² Ibid., 72

¹³ Ibid., 13-14.

Demographic changes point to greater conflict and strife across the world. By 2030, the world's population will grow to over 8.2 billion people.¹⁴ The majority of this growth will occur in the developing poor countries of the world. Urban populations will explode as more than 60 percent of the world's population moves to and lives in growing urban centers. Out of these over populated urban sprawls, large slums will develop. Local governments unable to care for their people will allow crime, terror, and hatred to breed. As the world's population continues to explode the disparity of wealth and education will rise within a shrinking segment of society. Western culture spreading across the globe will dominate through the information technology revolution.¹⁵ All of these changes will foster extreme religious and cultural ideologies. These ideologies will fuel anti-western violence.¹⁶

Geopolitical changes point to the weakening of traditional political structures. The development of supra-organizations (European Union) and multi-national corporations blur the traditional powers held by local and national governments. Strong stable nations will continue to be relevant even though lesser-developed nations will fail. Primitive forms of governments will rise as failing nations slip backwards. Tribal, family, or even religious organizations will replace failing governments. The lack of traditional nation-states will create large ungoverned spaces providing refuge for terrorists. These geopolitical changes will create the need to develop nontraditional applications of power.¹⁷

Economic changes point to a future that is more integrated and interdependent. The world's economy will become more vulnerable to short term manipulation. The global economy will also grow creating competition for scarce resources. Nations, corporations, and groups will

¹⁴ United Nations Populations Division, "World Urbanization Prospects: 2001 Revision" [on-line PDF document] (New York, NY.: United Nations), accessed 19 December 2004, available from <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wup2001/WUP2001-pressrelease.pdf>, Internet.

¹⁵ Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC), *Strategic Trends: The Social Dimension* [on-line] (United Kingdom: Ministry of Defense), accessed 19 December 2004, available from http://www.jdcc-strategictrends.org/Pages/st_frames.asp?view=dim&dim=2&id=0, Internet.

¹⁶ Joint Forces Command, "Summing Up the Future Operational Environment, The Joint Operational Environment - Into the Future," Final Draft, Joint Forces Command (5 March 2004), 14-30.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 31-40.

compete over limited precious resources such as water and oil. Globalization¹⁸, with the aid of information technology, will tie the world together in unforeseen and complex ways.¹⁹

Technological changes will accelerate in the future. This acceleration will cause segments of society with no access to suffer. People will have an improved ability to connect with each other across the globe through future developments in information and computer technologies. Individuals and groups capitalizing on this will shrink the normal time and distance factors. The distinction between man and machine will blur as people and machines cooperate effectively in all aspects of life. These general technological advances will change the way we all see and interact with our world.²⁰

Contemporary Theorists

Contemporary theorists give us a glimpse of how non-military men view the future. These other views are important since they provide us with a variety of perspectives. Multiple perspectives give the military sounding boards from which to bounce our future ideas off. For these reasons it is important to understand how contemporary theorists view the future. They represent unique views on the nature and dynamics present.²¹

Contemporary theorists predict an unstable future. They see the nature of the world as changing. Multiple factors are causing a set of unique characteristics to come to the forefront: chaos, complexity, scope, and volatile. First, the various theorists see the world situation growing

¹⁸ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999), ix, xix-xx.

¹⁹ Joint Forces Command, "Summing Up the Future Operational Environment, The Joint Operational Environment - Into the Future," Final Draft, Joint Forces Command (5 March 2004), 41-47.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 47-58.

²¹ Multiple contemporary theorists present varying opinions on the future environment and the implications that it holds. Robert Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003); Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999); Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (New York: Random House, 2000); Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God – The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (California: University of California, 2001); Alvin Toffler, *Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence At The Edge of the 21st Century* (New York: Bantam Books, 1990).

more chaotic. They base this on the fact that 160 wars broke out during the last half of the 20th century.²² Competing groups fighting over precious resources were the catalyst for these wars. The 21st century does not bode any better. The predicted lack of natural resources coupled with large third world population growths forecasts large cultural and racial clashes. These clashes will spread across normal state boundaries. Weak nation-states will collapse and powerful non-state actors will emerge in the turmoil.²³ A continuous state of change will be the norm. The majority of the lesser-developed countries of the world will endure the worst of this chaos.

Second, contemporary theorists view the world during the 21st century as growing in complexity every day. The economies of the world's countries will become more intertwined and interdependent.²⁴ New power players will emerge replacing the traditional nation-state model. Transnational entities (Corporations, United Nations, European Union), super-empowered individuals²⁵, religion, and criminal syndicates will replace traditional sources of power in some countries.²⁶ The number and variety of these new sources of power will grow. The way in which they all interact will be unpredictable. The complex world of the future will require a new paradigm²⁷ to replace the old paradigm of the nation-state.

Third, several theorists believe that traditional nation-states must develop a global view to survive and thrive in the emerging new world. Western, specifically American, culture will spread through globalization.²⁸ Western culture does not appeal to many non-western cultures as well as religious groups and they will violently oppose its encroachment. Religion knows no

²² Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1993), 13.

²³ Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (New York: Random House, 2000), 22-27.

²⁴ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999), xx.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 336.

²⁶ Alvin Toffler, *Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence At The Edge of the 21st Century* (New York: Bantam Books, 1990), 456.

²⁷ Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, synopsis by Frank Pajares [on-line article] (Atlanta, Ga.: Emory University), accessed 19 December 2004, available from <http://www.emory.edu/EDUCATION/mfp/kuhnsyn.html>, Internet.

²⁸ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999), 437.

borders and is a global entity itself.²⁹ Radical Islamic groups will be determined to wage a “cosmic war” trying to beat back the west and impose their own views on the world.³⁰ The world will become smaller and smaller. The United States must understand these implications and continue to develop a global view.

Fourth, almost all of the contemporary theorists believe the world will become more volatile. Conflict and violence will break out more often than the past. The growing disparities in economics, religions, sources of power, and the greater separation of the world’s rich from the poor will all lead to greater conflict. Poor people often find liberation in violence.³¹ Alvin Toffler predicts the worst bloodshed in years due to the effects of globalization.³² The future will present a more violent world as people struggle into the information age.

The future is about change. Several key dynamics are present throughout the writings of our contemporary theorists: power, economics, technology, and warfare. First, power will shift away from the normal nation-state model. A more fragmented version will develop to replace it. The new version will disperse power through a variety of groups including religion, crime syndicates, and transnational corporations.³³ Currently, one third of the states that make up the United Nations have rebel groups threatening to splinter the existing state structure.³⁴ The global trend is a shift of power from the states and bureaucrats to the private sector.³⁵ If this trend

²⁹ Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (New York: Random House, 2000), 34.

³⁰ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God – The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (California: University of California, 2001), 169.

³¹ Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (New York: Random House, 2000), 45-46.

³² Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1993), 24.

³³ Alvin Toffler, *Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence At The Edge of the 21st Century* (New York: Bantam Books, 1990), 456.

³⁴ Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1993), 242.

³⁵ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999), 336.

continues, city-states, shanty-states, and nebulous anarchic regionalism will develop in its place.³⁶

In the 21st century, the sources of power will change.

Second, contemporary theorists predict changing economies of the world's nations will become more intertwined and interdependent through globalization.³⁷ Economic globalization will shape countries domestic policies, internal and external commerce, the environment, and their international relations.³⁸ Knowledge will become the foundation of the new world economic system.³⁹ The richer more developed countries will be less free to act. They will be highly susceptible to outside influences. Their economies will be largely dependent on other countries to run properly.⁴⁰ The economies of the World's nations will develop into a single global economy.

Third, theorists believe technology will change the way people, corporations, and countries operate. The increase in technology will continue to fuel globalization. It will also change the way modern countries prosecute war.⁴¹ The growth of technology will create a new source of power - knowledge.⁴² By leveraging advanced technology, an information civilization will emerge. A nation-states success will depend on its ability to harness technological advances dominating the lesser-developed cultures of the world.

Fourth, some of the theorists view War as changing; it no longer is just a tool for the nation-state. They believe future wars will become more prevalent.⁴³ Communities will struggle

³⁶ Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (New York: Random House, 2000), 43-44.

³⁷ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999), xix-xx.

³⁸ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999), xx.

³⁹ Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1993), 4.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 247.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 4-5.

⁴² Alvin Toffler, *Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence At The Edge of the 21st Century* (New York: Bantam Books, 1990), 470.

⁴³ Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (New York: Random House, 2000), 6.

with each other over a lack of environmental resources.⁴⁴ Radical Islam will fuel the fires of war as it appeals to the world's economically depressed. Nation-states will still wage war with each other. The new twist rises from the fact that non-state actors, transnational businesses, super empowered individuals, and tribal communities will all wage wars against each other in an unimaginable number of combinations. The poor small remote countries of the world will not be the only victims of war.⁴⁵ War has the potential to start anywhere and grow into a world war encompassing the globe.

Marine Corps Future Concepts

The Marine Corps specifies the characteristics and capabilities it believes are necessary in its future concept documents. Marine Corps Strategy 21 provides the overall strategic vision, goals, and aims for the development of future capabilities.⁴⁶ Derived from this document, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) provides the foundation for the future conduct of operations.⁴⁷ The Marine Corps is basing EMW around the deployment and employment of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).⁴⁸ Linked with and supporting EMW, Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) presents an operating concept on how to project naval power ashore.⁴⁹ Subordinate to this concept, Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) presents an operating concept combining the maneuver space afforded by the sea and maneuver warfare. STOM projects Marine forces inland against operational objectives. It eliminates the traditional

⁴⁴ Ibid., 49.

⁴⁵ Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1993), 17.

⁴⁶ Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Strategy 21, (Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2000), Introduction.

⁴⁷ Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare – Marine Corps Capstone Concept, (Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2001), Introduction.

⁴⁸ Michael Peck, "Marines Sketch 'Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare' Scenarios", (National Defense, October 2003), 28-29.

⁴⁹ Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Operational Maneuver From the Sea – A Concept for the Projection of Naval Power Ashore, (Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 1996), Introduction.

ship-to shore movement and beachhead establishment phases of an amphibious assault.⁵⁰ All of these concept documents are nested supporting the overall Marine Corps strategy of Marine Corps Strategy 21.

The Marine Corps future concepts define the unique set of characteristics it believes are necessary in the 21st century. Ever since its birth on November 10, 1775, the Marine Corps has been evolving to meet future challenges. The unique characteristics represented in the future concepts are expeditionary culture, sea-based, general purpose, and scalable combined arms MAGTFs.⁵¹

An expeditionary culture will continue to dominate the development of Marine Corps concepts. The Marine Corps is and will continue to be the nations premier expeditionary force.⁵² Expeditionary is part of the Marine Corps ethos.⁵³ Marines expect to deploy anywhere in the world operating under austere conditions with no host nation or outside support. The Marine Corps future concepts demand this expeditionary characteristic be prevalent in all aspects of Marine Corps life. The way people and units operate to the selection and fielding of equipment must reflect this expeditionary culture.

A defining characteristic of Marine Corps future concepts is the fact they are heavily sea-based. The Marine Corps will stick to its traditional naval roots projecting power from the sea. However, the difference between the future and the past is in the Marine Corps' view of the sea and the percentage of Marine Corps forces that will stay afloat. Traditionally Marines viewed the sea as an obstacle to overcome in the ship-to-shore movement phase of an amphibious operation. In the past, Marines normally phased ashore their combat, combat support, combat service

⁵⁰ Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, (Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Quantico, VA 1997), II-6.

⁵¹ Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Strategy 21, (Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2000), 1-9.

⁵² Ibid., 2.

⁵³ Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare – Marine Corps Capstone Concept, (Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2001), 4.

support, and command elements. In the future, Marines will view the sea and land as one. They will maneuver at sea as freely as they do on land. A large portion of Marine combat support, combat service support, and command elements will remain at sea. The sea and the sea-base will be the Marines “home base”. This shift in the Marines view towards the sea and the ships that compose the sea-base is an important aspect of the future.

Marine Corps forces will need to continue to be general-purpose forces for the future. Marine future concepts present the need to be able to operate across the spectrum of crises and conflict.⁵⁴ Marine forces will execute missions ranging from humanitarian operations to conventional combat in major theater wars. To meet this wide range of tasks, Marines will continue to train their personnel developing the mental agility needed for these uncertain situations. The Marine Corps expects all Marines to thrive in the future chaotic environment best described by former Marine Commandant General Krulak as the “Three Block War”.

Marines will continue to deploy and employ scaleable combined-arms MAGTFs.⁵⁵ Marines will form MAGTFs around the standard four elements of command, ground combat, air combat, and combat service support. The size and composition of the MAGTF will be dependent upon the mission assigned. Each MAGTF will have the flexibility to conduct its current mission as well as the ability to rapidly reorganize conducting the next.⁵⁶ Marines expect MAGTFs to be fully interoperable with the joint world, other government agencies, non-government agencies, and coalition partners. A key characteristic of MAGTFs will be their ability to serve as Joint Task Force, Multi-National Force, Functional or Service component headquarters.

The dynamics of the Marine Corps future concepts represent things Marines are trying to change or improve upon. Marines believe these factors will lead to a more effective force. These

⁵⁴ Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Strategy 21, (Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2000), 7.

⁵⁵ Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare – Marine Corps Capstone Concept, (Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2001), 6.

⁵⁶ Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Strategy 21, (Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2000), 2.

dynamics are joint / multinational enabling, strategic agility, operational reach, tactical flexibility, and support / sustainment.

Marine Corps forces must possess the capabilities to provide the means or the opportunity to make joint or multinational operations possible.⁵⁷ The Marine Corps' concept of EMW and its supporting document Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Capabilities List spell out the added capability enhancements the Marine Corps desires. Enhancements to their command and control systems will allow a joint or multinational force to plug into them freely. Marine forces will also enhance their ability to defeat enemy anti-access capabilities seizing advance forward operating bases. These advance forward operating bases allow the rest of the joint or multinational force to close with and assemble in the theater of operations. Marines expect to be the lead element of the joint force. They foresee the need to be capable of serving as the Joint Task Force or a Functional component headquarters.⁵⁸ Marines envision the sea-base supporting an amphibious MAGTF staff with an integrated joint staff. Both the Navy and Marine Corps plan to develop the sea-base supporting a forward deployed Joint Force Command staff of up to 500 personnel.⁵⁹

Marines believe they need the ability, strategic agility, to move from pre-crisis readiness to full combat capability anywhere in the world.⁶⁰ To do this, the Marines will keep their forces at the ready ensuring their ability to swiftly deploy. The Marine Corps plans to do this by blending the capabilities of amphibious and future maritime preposition forces. Marines want to have the ability to deploy a MEB to the sea-base and conduct at sea arrival and assembly within 7 days of an execute order. In addition to the first MEB, they want the ability to deploy a second

⁵⁷ Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare – Marine Corps Capstone Concept, (Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2001), 2.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 3.

⁵⁹ Operations Division, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Capabilities List, (Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Quantico, VA 2003), 9.

⁶⁰ Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare – Marine Corps Capstone Concept, (Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2001), 3.

MEB within 14 days of the original execute order. Amphibious MEBs, capable of forcible entry, must arrive in the combatant commander's theater of operations within 30 days of an execute order. The long-term goal is the ability to task organize MAGTFs at sea forming a MEF through a combination of forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), amphibious, and maritime preposition force MEBs.⁶¹

Marines want to enhance their ability, operational reach, to project forces inland from the sea. The goal is to project and sustain effective Marine forces across the depth of the battle space.⁶² The envisioned depth is 250 nautical miles by 2009 and 400 nautical miles by 2014.⁶³ OMFTS and STOM provide concepts on how to achieve these goals. The main point is the ability to focus potent forces against an operational objective. To do this, the Marines plan to enhance their command and control, intelligence, fires, logistics, and maneuver systems.

MAGTFs will need to increase their ability, tactical flexibility, to conduct multiple concurrent missions across the spectrum of conflict. Marines and their sub-elements have to be able to rapidly shift from one type of mission to the next as the situation dictates.⁶⁴ Leveraging future weapon systems, Marines will be able to scale their application of force between lethal and non-lethal responses. The Marine Corps will enhance its ability to re-task-organize MAGTFs as they arrive in theater. MEBs must be able to absorb MEUs the initial responders. In turn, the MEF will grow out of the MEBs present in theater. Marines view their ability to tailor the size, composition, and mission capabilities of the force as an essential factor to their success and that of the joint force.

⁶¹ Operations Division, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Capabilities List, (Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Quantico, VA 2003), 11-18.

⁶² Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare – Marine Corps Capstone Concept, (Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2001), 3.

⁶³ Operations Division, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Capabilities List, (Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Quantico, VA 2003), 10-11 and 20-21.

⁶⁴ Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare – Marine Corps Capstone Concept, (Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2001), 3.

Marines want to enhance their ability to provide focused logistical support / sustainment to Marine, Joint, and Multi-National Force operations across the width and depth of the battle space. Independent of host nation support, they will not be reliant upon existing ports and airfields.⁶⁵ Compared to today, future MEUs and MEBs will carry a reduced amount of sustainment. MEUs and MEBs will carry 10 and 20 days of sustainment due to the limitations of naval shipping. Even with the reduction of initial sustainment, future MAGTFs will be self-sufficient until the logistics system of the sea-base is established. Once established, the sea-base will sustain operations indefinitely.⁶⁶ A final sustainment enhancement to the Joint or Multi-National Force is the Marine Corps plan to improve the Marine Logistics Command's (MLC) ability as a joint enabler.⁶⁷

Analysis

Several significant factors are present after examining the Joint Operational Environment, contemporary theorists, and the Marine Corps future concepts. These factors lie in two general categories: environmental and Marine Corps specific. An analysis of these factors led to defining specific requirements. The Marine Corps must possess capabilities to meet these requirements to be successful in the future.

The Joint Operational Environment and contemporary theorists both point to significant environmental factors. The future presents an ever-increasing likelihood of conflict in a more complex and volatile world. Conflict will be more complex as non-traditional adversaries, nation-states, and transnational powers interact. Environmental factors as well as the adversaries' ability to adapt will contribute to the complexity of warfare. Smart adversaries employing anti-access strategies will try to negate our conventional power. They will attempt this by preventing

⁶⁵ Ibid., 3.

⁶⁶ Operations Division, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Capabilities List, (Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Quantico, VA 2003), 24-25.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 22-23.

United States forces from utilizing host nation support and denying our ability to move and muster forces in theater. Conflict will present the need for general-purpose forces. Military forces will be required to execute multiple simultaneous operations spanning the spectrum of conflict. Units and sub-units will perform operations ranging from security, transition, and reconstruction to major combat operations.

The Marine Corps future concepts point to specific Marine Corps significant factors. EMW focuses on the operational objective. It depends on the ability of the Marine Corps to deploy / employ MEBs to and from the sea-base. As the initial force on scene, naval forces must be able to defeat enemy anti-access strategies allowing for the formation of the Joint Force. Amphibious MEBs present the Joint force commander with his only robust forcible entry capability. Marines need the ability to flow forces to the sea-base subsequently task organizing them into larger MAGTFs. These forces will need the ability to operate independently of host nation support. They will also have to act as a Joint, Multi-National Force, or Functional headquarters. EMW requires all Marine forces to conduct multiple concurrent operations across the spectrum of conflict.

Marines need a professional scaleable multipurpose expeditionary force to meet future requirements. The key to this is the MEB headquarters. The MEB headquarters is the key integrator between the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), MEU(SOC), and the MEF. It must be able to act as Joint, Multi-National Force, or Functional (JTF/MNF/Functional) headquarters. The importance of a MEB headquarters is its ability to meet the increasing small-scale contingencies that are outside the capabilities of a MEU(SOC). The MEB fulfills the crucial / centerpiece role in the EMW family of concepts as amphibious and Maritime Preposition Force (MPF) operations are blended together. In addition, amphibious MEBs present the Joint Force with its only true self-sufficient forcible entry capability. These requirements must be met with multiple Marine Corps' MEBs that are able to deploy and employ independently from their parent MEFs. The Marines must develop and practice the

procedures for absorbing forward deployed MEU(s) into a MEB and subsequently MEB(s) into a MEF. The MEB must master both amphibious and MPF operations. Marines must ensure the MEB headquarters can operate effectively from amphibious shipping, the sea-base, and from ashore.

Conclusion

Clearly, the MEB is an important MAGTF for the future of the Marine Corps. By examining the Joint Operational Environment, contemporary theorists, and Marine Corps future concepts, I found significant factors leading to specific Marine Corps requirements. If our current organization of three Marine Divisions, three Marine Air Wings, and their associated supporting forces presents an old paradigm incapable of fulfilling these requirements, we must adapt or develop a new organization. If we do not we will fail. The following chapter will examine our past and present MEB organizations and their capabilities to see if we can meet the Marine Corps future requirements.

CHAPTER 2 MEB HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES

Introduction

The Marine Corps needs to develop a new standing MEB headquarters to meet the requirements of the future. In order to best design the headquarters, I first examined our past and present MEB headquarters. Comparing the capabilities of these organizations against the identified future requirements I determined the shortfalls present. From this, I finally designed our new MEB headquarters to meet the future requirements.

Chapter one defined the requirements of the future which specified the need for a professional standing MEB headquarters competent both at sea and ashore. The MEB must be an expeditionary force capable of operating as a JTF/MNF/Functional component headquarters. It

has to be able to execute both amphibious and MPF operations compositing forces at sea growing from MEU(s) to MEB(s) to a MEF. The Marine Corps must have the ability to deploy / employ multiple MEBs independently from their parent MEFs. The Marine Corps must also enhance its ability to conduct MEB-level forcible entry operations overcoming enemy anti-access strategies. See Table 1.

Table 1. Future environmental / Marine Corps requirements

Future environmental / Marine Corps requirements as per Chapter 1
1. Professional standing MEB headquarters
2. Multipurpose expeditionary force
3. MEB HQ able to function as Joint / Multi-National Force / Functional headquarters
4. MEB HQ able to perform both amphibious and MPF operations
5. Ability to deploy / employ multiple MEBs independently from parent MEFs
6. Capable of forcible entry (MEB level)
7. Able to composite / absorb MEU --> MEB --> MEF
8. MEB HQ effective both at sea and ashore

Past

I examined the Marine Corps past standing MEB headquarters organization and capabilities. It is important to understand that the Marine Corps has a rich heritage of employing Marine brigades starting in 1901. However, an examination of all of these former brigade headquarters is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, I focused my past examination of the MEB headquarters to the time-period of 1983-1992. This period encompasses the establishment and demise of the permanent MEB headquarters. It also enabled me to examine the MEB's capabilities during four major operations: Desert Storm, Eastern Exit, Desert Shield, and Sea Angel.

The standing MEB headquarters, during 1983-1992, came in two varieties. The Marine Corps established two MEB headquarters per MEF for a total of six. Each MEF would have a MEB headquarters that specialized in amphibious operations and one for MPF operations. MPF

operations are not forcible entry operations. They are operations characterized by the integration of Marines and their equipment utilizing strategic airlift, pre-positioned equipment aboard civilian contract ships, and sets of secure ports / airfields. A Brigadier General commanded each MEB. The Marine Corps organized the MEB headquarters along the traditional general staff sections (G1, G2, G3, G4, G6 etc...). The size of each MEB headquarters was relatively small. Often varying between 68 and 100 personnel⁶⁸ the norm was 76 personnel.⁶⁹

The past MEB headquarters were excellent organizations that possessed both permanent staffs as well as Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). A division of labor between amphibious and MPF MEBs allowed each headquarters to focus on building and maintaining a certain level of expertise. This structure guaranteed the Marine Corps three MEBs each capable of conducting amphibious forcible entry operations. The MEB's Navy counterpart conducted integrated training building a common understanding of the intricacies of each operation.⁷⁰ MEBs regularly participated in exercises with Regional Combatant Commanders and key alliance members such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.⁷¹ All of these facts including the relative small size and permanence of the MEB headquarters created a very experienced cohesive team.⁷²

The past MEBs possessed key deficiencies as well. They were unable to fully composite / absorb smaller MAGTFs during Desert Storm. Even though the landward Marine forces, 7th MEB and I MEF, were able to composite successfully, the seaward Marine forces could not. The 4th and 5th MEB as well as 13th MEU never composited at sea, even though Marine Corps doctrine

⁶⁸ Major Craig Burns, "The Role and Requirements of the New MEB Headquarters," (Command and Staff College Thesis. Marine Corps University, 2000), 3-7.

⁶⁹ I took the total cost savings number from Major Craig Burns thesis, "The Role and Requirements of the New MEB Headquarters" and divided by 6 the total number of MEB headquarters dissolved. Ibid., 12.

⁷⁰ History and Museums Division, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991 WITH MARINE FORCES AFLOAT IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM, (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Washington, D.C. 1998), 9.

⁷¹ Ibid., 16, 71.

⁷² Captain Matthew J. McDivitt, "MEB-Be We Should Reconsider," *Marine Corps Gazette* (July 1999): 43; and Major Craig Burns, "The Role and Requirements of the New MEB Headquarters," (Command and Staff College Thesis. Marine Corps University, 2000), 10.

called for this to happen. The failure to composite was due to the lack of an adequate command and control ship to embark the “new” headquarters.⁷³ Another shortfall, the Marine Corps did not structure the MEB headquarters to perform duties as a JTF/MNF/Functional component headquarters.⁷⁴ III MEF had to perform this duty during Operations Sea Angel. Lastly, even though the MEB headquarters were permanent, often the subordinate elements of the MEBs were not. This created a need for extensive training and rehearsals before employment. The 4th and 5th MEB conducted numerous large-scale amphibious exercises, designated Sea Soldier I – IV, to properly coordinate the ship-to-shore movement, fire support, embarkation, and logistics plans for Desert Storm.⁷⁵

After Desert Storm, the Marine Corps dissolved the standing MEB headquarters in an effort to reduce its overall personnel end strength. The Marine Corps, along with the other military services, was downsized. The decision to eliminate the MEB headquarters was purely a manpower decision and not a warfighting decision based on capabilities. The former 32nd Commandant General James L. Jones stated in an interview with the *Armed Forces Journal*, “For reasons that had nothing to do with warfighting but a lot to do with manpower, we stood down our standing MEB headquarters, and subsumed those headquarters into the larger Marine Expeditionary Forces.”⁷⁶ Once the Marine Corps eliminated the MEB headquarters, it developed the Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), MEF(Fwd), headquarters as a replacement. The Marines embedded the MEF(Fwd) within the MEF staff; it would theoretically be able to perform all the same functions as the former MEB headquarters.

⁷³ History and Museums Division, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991 WITH MARINE FORCES AFLOAT IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM, (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Washington, D.C. 1998), 9, 105.

⁷⁴ Colonel Andrew F Mazzara, “Integrating the MAGTF Into Joint Operations,” *Marine Corps Gazette* (July 1994): 68.

⁷⁵ History and Museums Division, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991 WITH MARINE FORCES AFLOAT IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM, (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Washington, D.C. 1998), 16-108

⁷⁶ Marty Kauchak and Glenn W. Goodman, “Leading the Corps into the Future,” *Armed Forces Journal International* (September 2001): 58-62.

Today's MEB

Today's MEB headquarters are little more than the MEF(Fwd) headquarters with a new name.⁷⁷ Still embedded within the MEF headquarters, the MEF forms the MEB headquarters only when needed. To help the MEF staff as it creates this Ad Hoc⁷⁸ headquarters, each MEF maintains a MEB SOP. These SOPs attempt to alleviate problems for the new MEB staff as they transition from their MEF to their MEB duties. One of the weaknesses of the embedded MEB structure is that a significant portion of the newly stood up MEB staff are assigned different billets than they filled in the MEF headquarters.⁷⁹

The Marine Corps builds this Ad Hoc organization along a traditional general staff section model. The parent MEF provides both essential personnel and equipment to the MEB headquarters. A manning document, "battle roster", specifies who is to serve in both the MEF and MEB headquarters. The Deputy MEF commander, a Brigadier General, commands the MEB. The size of his MEB headquarters varies from MEF to MEF. I MEF has a baseline organization of approximately 339 personnel as compared to II MEF's 165.⁸⁰ The differences are due to the fact that each MEF has tailored its MEB headquarters focusing on specific employment / regional requirements.⁸¹ The different MEB headquarters have varying degrees of capabilities; these are due to the unique amounts of personnel and equipment allocated by each of the parent MEFs.

⁷⁷ Major Craig Burns, "The Role and Requirements of the New MEB Headquarters," (Command and Staff College Thesis. Marine Corps University, 2000), 40.

⁷⁸ Major Keith J. Teister, "Organizational Change for the United States Armed Forces," (Command and General Staff College Monograph. School of Advanced Military Studies, 2004), 31.

⁷⁹ Major Michael LeSavage, "Building the Marine Expeditionary Brigade Command Element," (Command and Staff College Thesis. Marine Corps University, 2000), 30-32.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 46.

The Marine Corps claims that today’s MEB is a scalable multipurpose force that can operate across the spectrum of conflict.⁸² The middleweight fighter for the Corps bridges the gap between the lighter MEU(SOC) and the larger warfighting MEF. Capable of conducting sustained operations ashore, it rapidly deploys by either amphibious shipping or strategic air in combination with MPF assets. Carrying thirty days of supplies, the MEB is capable of independent operations. It is proficient in both amphibious and MPF operations. It can serve as the link between the forward deployed MEU(SOC) and the follow on MEF. The amphibious MEB is capable of forcible entry and with added MEF augmentation it can serve as a JTF headquarters.⁸³ See Table 2.

Table 2. Advertised MEB Headquarters Capabilities

Advertised MEB Headquarters Capabilities
1. Ability to transition between a MEU to MEF
2. Scalable warfighting capabilities across spectrum of operations
3. Multipurpose expeditionary force
4. Rapid deployment (Amphibious or Air/MPF)
5. Self sufficient 30 days of supplies
6. Capable of forcible entry (Amphibious Assault)
7. Can conduct sustained operations ashore
8. Operate independently from parent MEF
9. Forward echelon of a MEF
10. Able to perform both amphibious and MPF operations
11. With added MEF augmentation serve as JTF headquarters

Analysis

Both the past and current MEB headquarters organizations are inadequate to meet the requirements of the future. Each has its own strengths; yet, they still fall short in multiple categories. By examining these shortfalls, we can build a construct for what our new MEB headquarters should look like and the capabilities it should possess.

⁸² Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2004, (Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2004), 243.

⁸³ Ibid, 243.

The past MEB headquarters falls short in three of the eight future requirements. First, it was unable to function as a JTF headquarters. At the time, the Marine Corps did not design nor man it to possess this capability. Secondly, it was unable to conduct both amphibious and MPF operations. The Marine Corps designed the MEB headquarters to be experts in a single skill set not both. Finally, it was unable to successfully composite 4th and 5th MEB at sea. The key reason for this shortfall was the lack of a suitable amphibious command and control ship for the combined headquarters. The United States Navy made the decision designating the USS Blue Ridge as the flagship for the Commander United States Naval Forces Central Command rather than allocating it to the amphibious forces.⁸⁴ See Table 3.

Table 3. Past MEB Headquarters

Past MEB Headquarters	Yes	No
1. Professional standing MEB headquarters	x	
2. Multipurpose expeditionary force	x	
3. HQ as JTF/ MNF/ Functional headquarters		x
4. Able to perform both amphibious and MPF operations		x
5. Multiple MEBs independently from parent MEFs	x	
6. Capable of forcible entry (MEB level)	Amphib	
7. Able to composite / absorb MEU --> MEB --> MEF	Land	Sea
8. MEB HQ effective both at sea and ashore	x	

The current MEB headquarters falls short on five of the eight requirements. The majority of these problems can be traced to the lack of a permanent headquarters. Specifically, the MEB does not meet requirements 1, 4, 5, 7 and 8.

First, the current MEB staff is not a professional standing headquarters. It is an Ad Hoc staff that is forced to both form and fight at the same time. It has no long-term staff experience or

⁸⁴ History and Museums Division, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991 WITH MARINE FORCES AFLOAT IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM, (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Washington, D.C. 1998), 105.

unit cohesion to rely on during the formation period. This Ad Hoc-ery⁸⁵ is a recipe for disaster. Historically amphibious operations are the most difficult of all military operations to conduct. OMFTS and STOM will compound these difficulties by adding unforeseen complexities to an already difficult operation.

Second, the MEB is not able to conduct both amphibious and MPF operations. Today's MEBs are MPF centric. The Marine Corps has not embarked a full MEB and conducted training with its Navy counterpart, the amphibious group, since Desert Storm.⁸⁶ By not practicing with a full MEB and loading the fifteen amphibious ships necessary for the assault echelon, we are breaking the cardinal rule of training the way you are going to fight. The time to wrestle with embarkation, landing, fires, aviation, and command/control plans is not the first time the command forms for a real world contingency.

Third, the Marine Corps is unable to deploy multiple MEBs independently from their parent MEFs. If the MEF deploys the MEB, it loses a significant portion of its essential personnel, equipment, and cohesion.⁸⁷ When the MEB is out, the MEF's ability as a warfighter is in question. To operate effectively as a Corps level warfighting organization, the MEF must absorb its deployed MEB. If the MEB is not absorbed the MEF will be lacking in critical communications equipment and a large portion of its most critical staff officers.⁸⁸

Fourth, the MEB is unable to composite / absorb MEUs to form a MEB and subsequently absorb MEBs to form a MEF. The Marine Corps does not practice nor have SOPs to conduct this

⁸⁵ Major Keith J. Teister, "Organizational Change for the United States Armed Forces," (Command and General Staff College Monograph. School of Advanced Military Studies, 2004), 31; Lieutenant Colonel Asad A. Khan, Lieutenant Colonel Michael B. West, and Major Michael H. Brown, "Let's Organize and Train as We Would Fight," *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 2002): 42.

⁸⁶ Even though elements of 2d MEB deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom aboard amphibious shipping, the entire 2d MEB was not embarked. Many elements of 2d MEB deployed to the Central Command theater by strategic airlift vice amphibious shipping.

⁸⁷ Major Michael LeSavage, "Building the Marine Expeditionary Brigade Command Element," (Command and Staff College Thesis. Marine Corps University, 2000), 47.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 47, 55-56, 71.

process between MEU(s) and a MEB. However, it does practice this skill between the MEB (MPF) and the MEF.

Finally, the MEB headquarters is not effective both at sea and ashore. The simple size of I MEF's 339 man MEB headquarters is too large to fit on amphibious shipping exceeding the available billeting and working spaces.⁸⁹ Today's MEU headquarters fills the command and control spaces onboard the Navy's current amphibious assault ships. The Navy in conjunction with the Marine Corps needs to upgrade its current set of command and control ships. It also needs to build some dedicated amphibious command control ships that can carry the MEB and amphibious group headquarters. The command and control ships must provide enough space, living and working, to accommodate a Joint Headquarters. OMFTS and the Sea base cannot become a reality until the amphibious command and control problems are resolved. See Table 4.

Table 4. Current MEB Headquarters

Current MEB Headquarters	Yes	No
1. Professional standing MEB headquarters		x
2. Multipurpose expeditionary force	x	
3. HQ as JTF/ MNF/ Functional headquarters	MEF spt	
4. Able to perform both amphibious and MPF operations		x
5. Multiple MEBs independently from parent MEFs		x
6. Capable of forcible entry (MEB level)	Amphib	
7. Able to composite / absorb MEU --> MEB --> MEF		x
8. MEB HQ effective both at sea and ashore		x

The Marine Corps must design a MEB headquarters that can meet the requirements of the future. By reorganizing elements of the operating forces with a zero sum gain, we can create this new organization. Improvements in the MEB headquarters organization, training, and support will ensure we are prepared for the future.

⁸⁹ Major Craig Burns, "The Role and Requirements of the New MEB Headquarters," (Command and Staff College Thesis. Marine Corps University, 2000), 3, references Commander, Marine Forces Atlantic, "Force List/Movement Requirements Working Paper," OPLAN 2000x, January 10 2000.

The MEB headquarters needs to be a standing professional headquarters. A Major General should command the MEB and his deputy commander should be a Brigadier General. The headquarters should be approximately 100 personnel in size and be assigned its own table of equipment (T/E). The small size of the headquarters will allow effective operations from both amphibious shipping and ashore. Its own T/E will also allow independence from the MEF without degrading the MEF's warfighting capability. The MEB headquarters will gain expertise, cohesion, and efficiency.

The addition of a deputy MEB commander will enhance the Marine Corps and the MEB's ability to transition to and operate from the sea-base. Each MEB will have a subordinate MEU that draws elements of its MAGTF from its parent MEB. The deputy MEB commander and a small portion of the MEB headquarters can deploy as the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) commander and staff. This places an advance command from the MEB in charge of the ESG. The MEB and the subordinate MEU(SOC) will share the same SOPs enhancing the ability of the force to operate effectively once rejoined. The MEB headquarters can easily join the advance echelon headquarters in the ESG. By falling in on an already established headquarters and infrastructure, we increase the MEB's ability to operate effectively from the sea-base. See Figure 1.




Figure 1. MEB / ESG / Phib Group

The Marine Corps can build the headquarters along either traditional staff or modern functional lines. It must be capable of echeloning into at least two comparable command groups and a rear command group. This allows for the transition of forces ashore, mobile operations, and the ability to stay tied to the sea-base. This configuration also supports the deputy MEB commander as the ESG commander. All of these are necessary for the fast paced operations that EMW demands. See Figure 2.




Figure 2. MEB Headquarters Echelons

The new MEB headquarters training focus will be to conduct integrated training and experimentation with its naval counterparts making EMW a reality. The MEB must perfect the use of the sea-base as an enabler for OMFTS / STOM. The MEB must aide in building a coherent expeditionary doctrine blending amphibious and MPF operations together.

In conjunction with perfecting our future concepts, the MEB must train across the spectrum of conflict. Training needs to encompass MEB amphibious forcible entry operations to reinforcing forward deployed MEU(SOC)s for humanitarian operations. The MEB must train to composite with a forward deployed MEU(SOC). The MEB and peer naval forces must train to overcome enemy anti-access strategies enabling the Joint Force. It must also train to become the core of a JTF/MNF/Functional component headquarters.

The MEB headquarters with external support will be able to function as a JTF/MNF/Functional component headquarters. Through the addition of a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), a MEB will be able operate as a JTF/MNF headquarters. By augmentation from either the Marine Component command or the MEF, it will be able to operate as the Functional component headquarters. See Figure 3.




Figure 3. JTF / MNF / Functional HQ

Conclusion

The Marine Corps needs a new standing MEB headquarters. The past and present MEBs each had their strengths and weaknesses. However, they fall short in meeting the requirements of the future as laid out in chapter one. We must take a hard look at adapting the Marine Corps' organization to meet our future challenges if we want to be successful.

CHAPTER 3 REORGANIZE THE MARINE CORPS

Introduction

The Marine Corps needs to reorganize the operating forces to meet the future environment and implement our future concepts. We need to realize that the Marine Corps does not need three MEF level headquarters. Not since World War II have we employed more than one MEF at a time. A reorganization of the operating forces into multiple MEBs, a Marine Logistics Command (MLC), and a single warfighting MEF headquarters is the solution.

Single Warfighter

I MEF should be the Marine Corps single warfighter. Over the past 14 years, I MEF has been at the forefront of Marine Corps operations. It is the corps-level warfighting organization of choice having fought in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Iraqi Freedom. Practical reasons as well as enhanced warfighting capabilities point to the need for I MEF as the Marine Corps' single warfighter.

In all practicality the Marine Corps uses nearly all of its resources to field a single corps-level warfighting organization capable of operating in a major theater war. Historically this is borne out by the fact that the Marine Corps has not sent more than a single MEF into action since the end of World War II (59 years). More recently, II and III MEFs provided considerable resources supporting I MEF's efforts during Operations Desert Shield, Storm and Iraqi Freedom. As an example, II MEF provided 2d Marine Division (MARDIV), 2d Force Service Support

Group (FSSG), and elements of 2d Marine Air Wing (MAW) during Operations Desert Shield / Storm. Again, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, II MEF provided the Marine Component Commander and I MEF with 2d FSSG and Task Force Tarawa. Task Force Tarawa was a task force built around II MEF's 2d MEB. In effect, the Marine Corps cannibalized II MEF to support I MEF. The practical reality is the Marine Corps already pools its assets to provide support to a single warfighting MEF.

It allows the Marine Corps to do two things. First, the Marine Corps can develop a MEF that is expert at conducting corps-level operations. The I MEF staff will not have to bounce back and forth between MEF and MEB level operations. The staff will be free to focus on corps-level operations supporting the various Marine component commanders. Secondly, it greatly simplifies the compositing of subordinate MEBs. The Marine Corps simplifies the process by retaining the I MEF organization and its associated subordinate organizations MAW, MARDIV, and FSSG. A simple example will illustrate this point.

A MEB, responsible for initial operations, opens the theater for the MEF. Operating from amphibious shipping and the sea-base, it conducts a forcible entry operation establishing conditions for the MEF to follow. The MEF flowing into theater absorbs the subordinate components of the MEB. The composite Marine Air Group (MAG), Regimental Landing Team (RLT), and Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG) are absorbed into the MEF's MAW, MARDIV, and FSSG. The MEB headquarters is not absorbed into the MEF's headquarters. The MEF keeps the MEB headquarters intact operating as a contingency headquarters for the MEF. The MEB headquarters starts to plan operations for the post major combat operations of the MEF. As the MEF starts to conclude major combat operations, the MEF reforms the MEB placing its subordinate elements under the operational control of the MEB headquarters. The MEB then conducts stability and support operations allowing the MEF to transition home.

I propose the Marine Corps reorganize and selectively reposition Marine forces within Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT) and Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) to provide

multiple standing MEBs, a single MEF, and the MLC. MARFORLANT will provide three standing MEBs 2d, 4th (Anti-Terrorism (AT)), and 6th MEBs. MARFORPAC will provide I MEF, the MLC, 1st, and 3d MEBs. The creation of the standing MEBs and the MLC will be possible through the cost savings incurred by the elimination of certain MEF, MAW, MARDIV, FSSG, and key subordinate unit headquarters within the operating forces. See Figure 4-5.




Figure 4. Marine Operating Forces




Figure 5. Locations of MAGTFs

II MEF reorganization

Three standing MEBs, 2d/4th(AT)/6th, will replace II MEF. These MEBs will absorb the majority of the forces present in II MEF. Through the elimination of certain key headquarters, a force savings of 709/1758/58/84 (Marine Officer/Marine Enlisted/Navy Officer/Navy Enlisted) is accrued. From this structure savings, we can build our MEB command elements (CE) and our BSSG headquarters. There is no need to build RLT or MAG headquarters since they already exist. I will address how to reorganize II MEF by looking at each element of the MAGTF. I will not address 4th MEB(AT) since it already exists as a standing MEB. See Figure 6.




Figure 6. MARFORLANT


The 2d and 6th MEB CEs will be formed from the reorganization of the II MEF CE. The Marine Corps can save 280/570/19/21 personnel spaces by eliminating the II MEF CE and the MEF Headquarters Group (MHG). Key elements not used to form 2d and 6th MEB CEs will be sent to California to aide in the formation of 1st MEB's CE. The II MEF Marine Liaison Element (MLE) Company, Intelligence Battalion, and Communications Battalion will be split into thirds providing elements to 2d, 6th, and 1st MEBs. The Force Reconnaissance Company and Radio Battalion will be split into half providing forces to both 2d and 6th MEBs. This will result in fully formed CEs for 2d and 6th MEBs. Each MEB's CE will be composed of detachments from Force Reconnaissance (three platoons), MLE (a platoon), Intelligence Battalion, Communications Battalion, and Radio Battalion. Key elements of 1st MEB's CE will also be filled. See Figure 7-9.

The composite Marine Air Groups (CMAG) of 2d and 6th MEBs will be formed from reorganizing 2d MAW. Through the elimination of the MAW, a fixed wing MAG, a rotary wing MAG, and the Marine Wing Support Group (MWSG) headquarters a cost savings of 141/424/21/28 is accrued. Two squadrons not used in the formation of 2d and 6th MEB's CMAGs, a fixed wing attack squadron (VMA) and a fixed wing all weather fighter / attack squadron (VMFA(AW)), will be sent to aide in the building of 1st and 3d MEB's CMAGs. Each

MEB's CMAG will possess a mixture of fixed wing, rotary wing, and supporting assets. Each will be capable of performing the six functions of Marine aviation. See Figure 7-9.


The RLTs of 2d and 6th MEBs will be formed from the reorganization of 2d MARDIV. The savings are 210/470/9/20 personnel spaces by eliminating the headquarters from the Division, an Infantry Regiment, an Artillery Regiment, a Reconnaissance Battalion, Tank Battalion, Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, Amphibious Assault Battalion, and Combat Engineer Battalion. By splitting the Division's forces into thirds, the Marine Corps can build a robust RLT for each MEB. Each RLT will be built around a four infantry battalion base and possess the following units: detachment Division Headquarters battalion, reinforced artillery battalion, reconnaissance company, and reinforced companies of tanks, light armored reconnaissance, combat engineers, and amphibious assault vehicles. Elements not employed in the formation of these RLTs will be moved to California and Okinawa to reinforce 1st MARDIV and aid in the formation 1st and 3d MEB's RLTs. See Figure 7-9.

The BSSG of 2d and 6th MEBs will be built from the reorganization of 2d FSSG. The Marine Corps saves 78/294/9/15 personnel spaces by eliminating the FSSG group headquarters. 2d FSSG will be split into thirds. Each third will form the BSSG of 2d, 6th, and 3d MEBs. 3d MEB's BSSG would be moved from North Carolina to Okinawa. See Figure 7-9.




Where units came from

Figure 7. 2 MEB



Where units came from

Figure 8. 6 MEB




Where units came from



Figure 9. 4 MEB(AT)

III MEF reorganization

A standing MEB and a MLC will replace III MEF. Operating from Okinawa, 3d MEB will be built from forces present in III MEF. The Marine Corps will convert 3d FSSG into the Marine Corps' MLC and station it in Hawaii. By eliminating certain headquarters within III MEF, the Marine Corps can save 612/1527/53/73 force structure spaces. From this savings, the Marine Corps can establish 3d MEB's headquarters. In addition, the Marine Corps can use the personnel savings to tailor the 3d FSSG fulfilling duties as the MLC. If necessary, the structure savings can be reinvested into the MLC creating support companies that 3d FSSG currently lacks (two engineer companies, beach and terminal operations company, two direct support motor transport companies, and a surgical company). The MLC will be under the control of Headquarters Marine Corps supporting either MARFORLANT or MARFORPAC. See Figure 4 and 12 for MLC; Figure 10 for MARFORPAC.



Where units came from



Figure 10. MARFORPAC

The 3d MEB CE will be formed from the reorganization of the III MEF CE. The Marine Corps can save 288/494/18/21 personnel spaces by eliminating the III MEF CE and the MHG. After forming the 3d MEB CE, the Marine Corps will send the excess units to California for use by I MEF and 1st MEB. The III MEF MLE and the Intelligence Battalion will be split into thirds providing one third of its elements to 3d MEB. The other two thirds will be sent to I MEF and reinforce its MLE and Intelligence Battalion. The Communications Battalion will be split into half providing forces to both 3d MEB and I MEF. The Force Reconnaissance Company will be split into half providing forces to both 3d and 1st MEBs. MARFORPAC will provide the Radio Battalion Detachment to 3d MEB. 3d MEB's CE will consist of detachments from Force Reconnaissance (three platoons), MLE (a platoon), Intelligence Battalion, Communications Battalion, and Radio Battalion. See Figure 11.


By reorganizing 1st MAW, the Marine Corps can form the CMAG of 3d MEB. The CMAG will also receive two permanent aircraft squadrons from 2d and 3d MAWs. 2d MAW

will provide one VMFA(AW) squadron and 3d MAW will provide one attack helicopter squadron (HMLA). The Marine Corps will move all of the Hawaii based medium lift helicopter squadrons, CH-53D and training, to Okinawa. By eliminating the MAW, a fixed wing MAG, the Aviation Support Element Kaneohe Bay Hawaii, and the MWSG headquarters a personnel structure savings of 141/424/21/28 will be accrued. The 3d MEB's CMAG will not possess the standard three medium and one heavy helicopter squadrons present in 2d, 6th, and 1st MEBs. The risks associated with the CMAG's force structure are the lack of heavy lift payload capacity and range of support that a heavy-lift helicopter squadron provides. The CMAG's six medium helicopter squadrons, which can provide an equivalent payload capacity due to the greater number of aircraft available, can mitigate the first risk. The 3d MEB can mitigate the second risk, lack of long-range support, by employing its major subordinate elements appropriately. Once the MV-22 Osprey becomes operational, with an in-flight refueling capability, the second risk is negated as well. See Figure 11.

By reorganizing 3d MARDIV, the Marine Corps can form the RLT of 3d MEB. The Marine Corps saves 183/609/13/24 personnel spaces by eliminating the following headquarters from the Division: Division Headquarters, Infantry Regiment, Artillery Regiment, Reconnaissance Battalion, Artillery Battalion, and Combat Assault Battalion Headquarters. 3d Marines and its associated artillery battalion, 1st Battalion / 12th Marines, will form the nucleus of the RLT. 3d MARDIV's headquarters battalion will be split into thirds providing one third to 3d MEB and the other two thirds to 1st MARDIV. 3d MEB will receive the reinforced Combat Engineer Company from the dissolved Combat Assault Battalion. 3d Reconnaissance Battalion will be split into half providing one of its companies to 3d MEB and the other to 1st MARDIV. II MEF will provide 3d MEB with an infantry battalion and reinforced companies of Light Armored Reconnaissance and Amphibious Assault Vehicles. The only difference between 3d MEB's RLT and its sister MEB's RLTs will be the lack of a Tank company. The risk associated with this structural difference is the loss of armored combat power a Tank company provides.

The 3d MEB can mitigate this risk by the missions assigned to the RLT, anti-armor fires from the CMAG, assignment of a reserve Marine Tank Company, and / or the placement of an Army Tank company under the operational control of the RLT through the Joint Force Commander. See Figure 11.

The BSSG of 3d MEB will be built entirely from elements from 2d FSSG as previously mentioned in the description of II MEF. The Marine Corps will permanently assign this BSSG to 3d MEB in Okinawa. This allows for the conversion of 3d FSSG into the Marine Corp's MLC. See Figure 11.



Where units came from

- I MEF (White box)
- II MEF (Cyan box)
- III MEF (Red box)
- MARFOR PAC (Blue box)

Figure 11. 3 MEB

The Marine Corps will convert 3d FSSG into the MLC and station it in Hawaii. Currently 3d FSSG is short some critical units that are needed to function properly as a MLC. It is short two engineer companies (3/123/0/0 each), two direct support motor transport companies (3/100/0/0 each), a beach and terminal operations company (7/187/0/0), and a surgical company (0/19/52/117). By reinvesting a portion of the cost savings associated from the reorganization of III MEF, the Marine Corps can develop a fully functioning MLC that can support either Marine Component Commander. See Figure 12.




Figure 12. MLC

I MEF reorganization

I MEF will become the Marine Corps single warfighter. It will remain intact retaining its standard MAW, MARDIV, and FSSG. The Marine Corps will form 1st MEB from select elements of I MEF and excess elements from the former II and III MEFs. Any excess units not used in the formation of 1st MEB will reinforce I MEF.

The I MEF CE will become stronger through the Marine Corps reorganization. Excess units from III MEF will reinforce the I MEF Headquarters Group. III MEF will provide I MEF with two MLE Platoons, two thirds of an Intelligence Battalion, and half of the Communications Battalion. These additions will enhance I MEF CE's capabilities. See Figure 13.





Figure 13. I MEF

The 3d MAW's organization will be modified to accomplish three tasks: provide aviation support to I MEF, provide the core of 1st MEB's CMAG, and develop the ability to absorb different MEB CMAGs. 3d MAW's organization will contain three MAGs (two fixed

wing and one rotary wing), a Marine Air Control Group (MACG), and a MWSG. See Figure 14. MAG-16, currently 3d MAW's fourth MAG, will form the nucleus of 1st MEB's CMAG. The new organization will allow 3d MAW to continue to provide the six functions of Marine Aviation to I MEF while developing the ability to absorb subordinate MEB CMAGs. The subordinate CMAGs, when absorbed, will easily plug into 3d MAW's existing architecture. With the ability to grow, 3d MAW will have the capability to become a reinforced Marine Air Wing controlling up to seven MAGs.



Where units came from

Figure 14. 3 MAW

The 1st MARDIV will remain as the core of I MEF's ground combat element and retain its current capabilities. When needed it will absorb various MEB RLTs bringing it up to full or even reinforced strength (up to six infantry regiments). It will provide 1st MEB with the majority of the units needed to form its RLT. It will detach a four battalion Marine Regiment, a Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, and two Amphibious Assault Companies. In return, it will receive an additional reconnaissance company from II MEF and two thirds of a Division Headquarters Battalion from III MEF. 1st MARDIV will present the MEF with a uniquely capable organization quickly flexing to meet the mission at hand. See Figure 15.




Figure 15. 1 MARDIV

The Marine Corps will reorganize elements of 1st FSSG providing combat service support to I MEF and the BSSG to 1st MEB. It will be able to absorb subordinate BSSGs bringing it to full strength or over-strength as needed. 1st FSSG will plug into the Marine Corps' MLC providing the bridge between theater logistics and tactical combat service support. By providing an organizational architecture that can grow, 1st FSSG provides I MEF with a flexible organization. See Figure 16.




Figure 16. 1 FSSG

The Marine Corps will form 1st MEB from various units in I MEF and surplus units from the reorganizations of II and III MEFs. 1st MEB will be reinforced due to the fact that it will be responsible to source all three of the West Coast MEU(SOC)s. I will explain each element of the MEB's MAGTF separately. See Figure 17.

The Marine Corps will form the MEB CE from a combination of units from the former II MEF, III MEF, and MARFORPAC. II MEF will provide a MLE platoon and detachments from Intelligence and Communications Battalion. III MEF will provide the Force Reconnaissance element consisting of three platoons. MARFORPAC will provide the Radio Battalion Detachment. The MEB's CE will be fully capable of providing command and control to its subordinate MAGTF elements. See Figure 17.

The Marine Corps will form the MEB's Air Combat Element from a combination of units from all of the MEFs. I MEF will provide the CMAG headquarters (MAG-16), a VMFA(AW) squadron, two VMFA squadrons, three medium lift helicopter squadrons (HMM), a heavy lift helicopter squadron (HMH), a HMLA squadron, a Combined Marine Air Logistics Squadron, a Combined Marine Wing Support Squadron, and a HMMT squadron. II MEF will provide a VMA squadron. III MEF will provide detachments from the Marine Wing Headquarters, KC-130 refueling (VMGR), and Marine Air Control Group squadrons. 1st MEB's CMAG will be capable of performing all six functions of Marine Aviation in addition to sourcing composite squadrons for the deploying MEU(SOC)s. See Figure 17.

The Marine Corps will form the MEB's Ground Combat Element from elements of all three MEFs. I MEF will provide the RLT headquarters (1st Marine Regiment), four infantry battalions, a Light Armored Reconnaissance battalion, and two Amphibious Assault companies. II MEF will provide the detachment from headquarters battalion, a reinforced artillery battalion, and reinforced companies of tanks and combat engineers. III MEF's contribution will be the reconnaissance company. The RLT will be reinforced in order to provide the Battalion Landing Teams for the deploying MEU(SOC)s. See Figure 17.

The Marine Corps will form the MEB's Combat Service Support Element exclusively from I MEF. 1st FSSG will provide the BSSG. It will contain detachments from the Headquarters and Service, Maintenance, Supply, Engineer Support, Transportation, Medical, and Dental battalions. The BSSG will be capable of providing all the necessary logistical functions to 1st MEB as well as sourcing the MEU Service Support Groups for deploying MEU(SOC)s. See Figure 17.




Figure 17. 1 MEB

Analysis

A MEF, a MLC, five independent MEBs, and six MEU(SOC)s give the Marine Corps unmatched flexibility to meet the requirements of the future. The Marine Corps will have professional organizations at each level easily capable of conducting operations across the spectrum of conflict. A single MEF provides the Marine Corps with a dedicated expert that focuses solely on conducting corps level operations. A permanent MLC bridges the gap between service responsibilities and theater logistics. Five independent MEBs and six MEU(SOC)s provide the Marine Corps with the ability to quickly echelon forces compositing from a MEU to a MEB to a MEF. The fact that the ESG commander and the MEU(SOC) come from the follow on MEB presents a tremendous increase in effectiveness and efficiencies. Standing MEBs allows the Marine Corps to have organizations dedicated to experimenting and perfecting the concepts of EMW. Marine Corps combat capabilities will rise to a new level as we move away from Ad Hoc organizations towards standing professional organizations. The Marine Corps gains all of these enhancements including a savings of 3635 personnel. See Tables 5-7.

Table 5 II MEF Savings in Table of Organization

Savings in Table of Organization II MEF							
Unit	Marine Officers	Marine Enlisted	Navy Officer	Navy Enlisted	T/O number	Ref Pub	Remarks
Command Element							
MEF Headquarters Group	16	274	3	10	4701B	TFS	
MEF Command Element	264	296	16	11	4918L	TFS	
Air Combat Element							
MAW Headquarters	81	215	8	8	8600	TFS	
F/W MAG Headquarters	22	84	5	8	8800	TFS	
R/W MAG Headquarters	23	85	5	8	8900	TFS	
MWSG Headquarters and Headquarter Squadron	15	40	3	4	8701	TFS	
Ground Combat Element							
Division Headquarters	79	213	7	17	1986J	TFS	
Recon Bn Headquarters	12	96	-	-	1424B	TFS	
Infantry Regt Hq Co	23	161	2	3	1096F	TFS Troop List	
Arty Regt Hq Btry	30	352	-	-	1101H	TFS Troop List	Not counting enlisted Marines due to the need to break out Radar and MET sections
Tank Bn Hq	28	429	-	-	4237G	TFS Troop List	Not counting enlisted Marines due to the need to break out supporting elements for companies
Amphibious Assault Bn Hq	22	347	-	-	4654F	TFS Troop List	Not counting enlisted Marines due to the need to break out supporting elements for companies
Combat Engr Bn H&S Co	16	127	-	-	1377C	TFS Troop List	Not counting enlisted Marines due to the need to break out supporting elements for companies
Combat Service Support Element							
FSSG Group Headquarters	78	294	9	15	3111X	TFS	
Totals II MEF							
	709	1758	58	84			

Table 6. III MEF Savings in Table of Organization

Savings in Table of Organization III MEF							Remarks
Unit	Marine Officers	Marine Enlisted	Navy Officer	Navy Enlisted	T/O number	Ref Pub	
Command Element							
MEF Headquarters Group	13	199	3	9	4701C	TFS	
MEF Command Element	275	295	15	12	4918M	TFS	
Air Combat Element							
MAW Headquarters	81	215	8	8	8600	TFS	
F/W MAG Headquarters	22	84	5	8	8800	TFS	
R/W MAG Headquarters	23	85	5	8	8900	TFS	
MWSG Headquarters and Headquarter Squadron	15	40	3	4	8701	TFS	
Ground Combat Element							
Division Headquarters	77	205	7	17	1986X	TFS Troop List	
Recon Bn Headquarters	12	82	-	-	1424C	TFS Troop List	
Infantry Regt Hq Co	23	161	2	3	1096F	TFS Troop List	
Arty Regt Hq Btry	25	269	-	-	1101P	TFS Troop List	Not counting enlisted Marines due to the need to break out Radar and MET sections
Arty Bn H&Hq Btry	23	161	5	4	1142G	TFS Troop List	
Combat Assault Bn Hq	23	241	-	-	4661F	TFS Troop List	Not counting enlisted Marines due to the need to break out supporting elements for companies
Combat Service Support Element							
FSSG Group Headquarters	-	-	-	-	-	-	Converted into MLC
Totals III MEF							
	612	1527	53	73			
Savings II and III MEF							
	1321	3285	111	157		4874	

Table 7. Cost to make new organization

Cost to make new organization			
MEB CE	Raw Numbers		
1st	100		
2d	100		
3d	100		
4th (already formed)	-		
6th	100		
MLC			
Engineer Company x 2	252		Needed to create MLC
B&T Ops Company	194		Needed to create MLC
Direct Spt MT Company x	206		Needed to create MLC
Surgical Company	187		Needed to create MLC
Total Costs		1239	
Final Savings		3635	

The Marine Corps' new organization will enhance the Joint World's capabilities. The Marine Corps will provide six headquarters (1 x MEF and 5 x MEBs) that are capable of functioning as a JTF/MNF/Functional component headquarters. Today we provide three (3 x

MEFs). The Marine Corps will enhance the Joint communities forcible entry capability. Four dedicated MEBs perfecting the concepts of OMFTS and STOM overcoming today's deficiencies. The new organization enhances our abilities to deploy and employ operating either from the sea-base or ashore. Forces that are more capable, due to proper organization and team building, will provide the Marine Corps with an enhanced ability to set conditions for the introduction of follow on joint forces. Today we rely on our MEU(SOC)s to do this. Unfortunately today, we are not very effective at compositing MEU(SOC)s into MEBs if the need arises. The new organization provides this ability. The proposed new Marine Corps organization enhances the Joint World's capabilities by increasing the effectiveness of the Marine Corps contributions to the Joint team.

Conclusion

The Marine Corps needs to reorganize the operating forces to meet the requirements of the future environment and our future Marine Corps concepts. A single warfighting MEF, a MLC, five MEBs, and six MEU(SOC)s provide the optimal organization to meet the challenge. The Marine Corps will enhance its overall capabilities by developing standing cohesive professional organizations vice Ad Hoc teams. The new organization saves the Marine Corps 3635 personnel spaces. To remain entrenched in our same structure is insane if we know we will not be able to meet the challenges of the future.

CONCLUSION

Introduction

Professional standing MEB headquarters and their associated subordinates will be the centerpiece of Marine Corps operations in the future. Even though Marine Corps organizational structure has been relatively stable since 1952, the Marine Corps must break the old paradigm of three Marine Divisions, three Marine Air Wings, and their associated supporting forces. The old organizational construct is no longer sufficient failing to meet the future environmental and

Marine Corps conceptual requirements. The Marine Corps must create new MEB headquarters to meet the future challenge; it can do this with the added benefit of saving 3635 personnel spaces in the new organizational structure.

What was the need

The future environment and Marine Corps future concepts point to the need for a professional multipurpose expeditionary force that can operate across the spectrum of conflict. The world and conflict is going to be more volatile and complex. Multiple problems; demographic, geopolitical, economic, and technological; are causal factors leading to greater world instability. The United States of America will be required to employ its expeditionary forces more frequently and in greater quantity placing tremendous strain on an already stressed operating tempo.

EMW and its subordinate supporting concepts rely heavily on the MEB. In fact, the MEB is the centerpiece of OMFTS and STOM. It will bridge the gap between the forward deployed MEU(SOC) and the MEF. It will also bridge the gap between the sea-base and sustained operations ashore blending amphibious and MPF operations together. Joint / Multinational force operations will be the standard rather than the exception. The Marine Corps, specifically the MEB, will have to enhance our amphibious forcible entry capability ensuring American access to any region of the globe. The MEB as a mid-level professional standing headquarters is vital to achieving these goals. Ad Hoc organizations cannot hope to compete and win against a cohesive professional organization in a time compressed and chaotic environment. The new MEBs are the key to providing the Marine Corps with greater unit cohesion, combat efficiency, and flexibility.

The solution

The solution is to create new standing MEB headquarters. The size of the new headquarters should be roughly 100 Marines in strength allowing for effective operations from amphibious shipping. Past and present MEB headquarters designs are inadequate to meet our future needs. The new headquarters will enable effective operations between forward deployed ESGs / MEU(SOC)s, the formation of the sea-base, and operations ashore. With the proper augmentation from either the SJFHQ or Marine Component Commander, the MEB headquarters will be capable of functioning as either a JTF/MNF/Functional component headquarters. The new headquarters provides dedicated training and expertise, along with its Navy counterparts, perfecting the Marine Corps' EMW concepts. Standing MEBs will raise amphibious forcible entry and expeditionary operations to a new level of expertise increasing the Marine Corps value to the Joint Force.

How to get there

The Marine Corps can reorganize the operating forces creating a single warfighting MEF, a MLC, five MEBs, and six MEU(SOC)s. II and III MEF's will eliminate their MEF, MARDIV, MAW, FSSG, and key subordinate headquarters. The elimination of these headquarters allows for the formation of two MEBs on the East coast joining the already formed 4 MEB(AT). It also allows for the creation of a MEB in Okinawa and the MLC in Hawaii. The Marine Corps will form its final MEB from select units from I MEF as well as excess units from II and III MEFs. I MEF will remain the Marine Corps single warfighter. Reorganization will create the necessary MEB headquarters in addition to saving 3635 personnel spaces.

The benefits

The Marine Corps and the Joint Force benefit from the reorganization and creation of standing MEBs. Expertise will be developed at each echelon of the operating forces: I MEF –

corps level operations, MEBs – OMFTS / STOM, MEU(SOC)s – forward deployed crisis response, and the MLC – theater sustainment. Improved unit cohesion, combat efficiency, and professional standing MAGTF headquarters will allow Marines to meet the challenges of the future. Four more JTF capable headquarters operating either freely from the sea-base or ashore will greatly benefit the Joint Force. Marines will raise amphibious forcible entry to a new level of expertise ensuring the Joint Force access anywhere in the world. As a whole the Marines will be more effective at setting theater conditions for follow on Joint Forces due to greater competencies and cohesiveness within the Marine Corps team. Marines must lead the way creating innovative new ways improving both our and the Joint Force's capabilities. If we do not America's force in readiness will fall short when it is needed the most. Marines must stand ready to face the chaotic and volatile future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Kaplan, Robert. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003.
- Clifford, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. *Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States Marine Corps, 1900-1970*. Washington: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1973.
- Friedman, George and Martha Friedman. *The Future of War*. New York: Saint Martins Ness, 1998.
- Friedman, Thomas L. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999.
- Huntington, Samuel. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Touchstone, 1997.
- Juergensmeyer, Mark. *Terror in the Mind of God – The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. California: University of California, 2001.
- Berman, Paul. *Terror and Liberalism*. New York: Random House, 2000.
- Krulak, Victor H. *First to Fight*. Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1984.
- Lind, William. *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*. London: Westview Press, 1985.
- Macgregor, Douglas A. *Breaking the Phalanx. A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century*. London: Praeger, 1997.
- Merriam-Webster. Dictionary [on-line] Springfield, MA.: Merriam-Webster Inc. accessed 19 December 2004. <http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=nature>, Internet.
- Millett, Allan, R. *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps*. New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1980.
- Murray, Williamson. *The Emerging Strategic Environment Challenges of the Twenty-First Century*. Connecticut: Praeger, 1999.
- Murray, Williamson. *National Challenges for the 21st Century*. Pennsylvania: United States Army War College, 2003.
- Murray, Williamson. *Transformational Concepts For National Security in the 21st Century*. Pennsylvania: United States Army War College, 2002.
- Owens, Admiral Bill. *Lifting the Fog of War*. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2000.
- Pfaltzgraf, Robert L and Richard H. Shulz. *War in the Information Age: New Challenge for U.S Security*. Washington: Brassey's, 1997.
- Scales, Robert Major General. *Future Warfare Anthology*. Pennsylvania: United States Army War College, 2001.
- Tangredi, Sam. *Globalization and Maritime Power*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 2002.
- Toffler, Alvin. *Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence At The Edge of the 21st Century*. New York: Bantam Books, 1990.

Toffler, Alvin and Heidi Toffler. *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1993.

Waldrop, M. Mitchell. *Complexity – The emerging science at the edge of order and chaos*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.

U.S. Government Publications

Air Land Sea Application Center. Army and Marine Corps Integration in Joint Operations MAY 1996. Fm 90-31, MCRP3-3.8. MCCDC Quantico, VA 6 November 1995.

Air Land Sea Application Center. Joint Task Force Liaison Handbook. FM90-41, MCRP5-1.A. NWP 5-02, AFTTP(I) 3-2.21. MCCDC, Quantico, VA 26 August 1998.

ALMAR 23/99. "Reestablishing the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)". CMC. Washington, D.C., 23 August 1999.

Commander, Marine Forces Atlantic. "Force List/Movement Requirements Working Paper." OPLAN 2000x, 10 January 2000.

Department of the Navy. Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision. Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2002.

Department of the Navy. Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003. Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2003.

Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare – Marine Corps Capstone Concept. Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2001.

Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2004. Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2004.

Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Marine Corps Strategy 21. Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2000.

Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Operational Maneuver From the Sea – A Concept for the Projection of Naval Power Ashore. Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 1996.

History and Museums Division. U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991 WITH MARINE FORCES AFLOAT IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Washington, D.C. 1998.

Joint Forces Command. "Summing Up the Future Operational Environment, The Joint Operational Environment - Into the Future." Final Draft, Joint Forces Command. Joint Forces Command, 5 March 2004.

Joint Staff. "An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century." White Paper, Joint Staff. Joint Staff, 28 January 2003.

JV 2020. Joint Forces Command, 2000.

Joint Operations Concepts. Department of Defense, 2003.

Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Ship-to-Objective Maneuver. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Quantico, VA 1997.

Marine Corps. MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations. Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2001.

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The President of the United States of America, 2002.

National Military Strategy. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997.

National Strategy For Combating Terrorism. The President of the United States of America, 2003.

Naval Amphibious Warfare Plan Decisive Power Global Reach. Director, Expeditionary Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2002.

Navy Warfare Development Command. Sea Power 21. Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2002

Navy Warfare Development Command and Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Enhanced Networked Seabase. Department of the Navy. Washington, D.C. 2003

Operations Division. Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Capabilities List. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Quantico, VA 2003.

Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Secretary of Defense, 2001.

Articles

Barnett, Jeffery R., Colonel, USAF. "Nonstate War." *Marine Corps Gazette* Vol 78, no.5 (May 1994): 84-89.

Bozelli, Major Robert J. "Rethinking MACCS." *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 1988).

Builder, Carl H. "Looking In All the Wrong Places." *Armed Forces Journal* (May 1995).

Bunker, Robert J. "The Transition to Fourth Epoch War." *Marine Corps Gazette* Vol 78, no.9 (September 1994): 20-30.

Brown, Will, Col., "Reengineering the Marine Expeditionary Brigade." *Marine Corps Gazette* (July 1993): 32-33.

Chandler, Colonel Kurt and Cisneros, Lieutenant Colonel Phillip. "MAB CAX." *Marine Corps Gazette* (May 1985): 60-65.

Cramer, J. Scott, LtCol, USMC. "An Atrophied Capability." *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 83, no. 11 (November 1999): 86-87.

Decker, Michael H., Capt., "Three MAFs for the Corps." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (November 1987): 74-81.

Duffy, Thomas, "General Jones Bringing Back Marine Expeditionary Brigade." *Inside the Navy* (November 1999): 1.

Flynn, Lieutenant Colonel J. and Major D. A. Quinlan. "The Brigade is Beautiful." *Marine Corps Gazette* (September 1972).

Foster, Gregory D. "America and the World: A Security Agenda for the Twenty-First Century." *Strategic Review* (Spring 1993):20-29.

Griffin, Major Sean D., USMC. "Making Sense of the MEF (Fwd) Nebula." *Marine Corps Gazette* (April 1999): 39-42.

Hammes, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas X., USMC. "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation." *Marine Corps Gazette* Vol 78, no. 9 (September 1994): 35-44.

- Kauchak, Marty and Glenn W. Goodman. "Leading the Corps into the Future." *Armed Forces Journal International* (September 2001): 58.
- Keefer, Hunter. "Marines to Revive Expeditionary Brigade." *Defense Daily* (November 2, 1999).
- Khan, Lieutenant Colonel Asad A., Lieutenant Colonel Michael B. West, and Major Michael H. Brown. "Let's Organize and Train as We Would Fight." *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 2002): 40-46.
- Kreinbring, Captain Jeffery L. "Let's Organize for the Mission." *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 1987).
- Lind, William S., Major John F. Schmitt, USMCR, and Colonel Gary I. Wilson, USMCR. "Fourth Generation Warfare: Another Look." *Marine Corps Gazette* Vol 78, no. 12 (December 1994): 34-37.
- Marine Corps Gazette. "New MAGTF Headquarters Concept." *Marine Corps Gazette* (September 1982): 4.
- Marine Corps Gazette. "Permanent MAGTF Headquarters Concept is Approved." *Marine Corps Gazette* (August 1983): 6.
- Marine Corps Gazette. "Permanent MAGTFs Established." *Marine Corps Gazette* (June 1985): 5.
- Mazzara, Colonel Andrew F. "Integrating the MAGTF Into Joint Operations." *Marine Corps Gazette* (July 1994).
- McDivitt, Captain Matthew J. "MEB-Be We Should Reconsider." *Marine Corps Gazette* (July 1999): 42-45.
- Peck, Michael. "Marines Sketch 'Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare' Scenarios." *National Defense* (October 2003): 28-29.
- Shea, Captain Stephen R. "The Case for Retaining the Amphibious Marine Expeditionary Brigade Command Element." *Marine Corps Gazette* (August 1992) 34-35.
- Shulinson, Jack and Major Edward F. Wells. "First In, First Out." *Marine Corps Gazette* (January 1984).
- Wilhelm, Lieutenant General Charles E., USMC. "Expeditionary Warfare." *Marine Corps Gazette* (June 1995): 1-3.

Miscellaneous

- Burns, Major Craig. "The Role and Requirements of the New MEB Headquarters." Command and Staff College Thesis. Marine Corps University, 2000.
- Brennan, Major Robert. "The MEF in Yankee Stadium? The Marine Expeditionary Force and Joint Operations." Command and Staff College Thesis. Marine Corps University, 1994.
- Center for Naval Analyses. "Information about Reestablishing Standing MEBs." CNA Memorandum for the Record. Alexandria, VA, 30 August 1999.
- Christie, Major R. "U.S. Expeditionary Force Alternatives." Command and Staff College Thesis. Marine Corps University, 1992.
- Doolin, Major D. "Marine Corps Logistics in the 21st Century: Is the BSSG Relevant?" Command and Staff College Thesis. Marine Corps University, 2000.

- Evans, Michael. "FROM KADESH TO KANDAHAR: Military Theory and the Future of War." Naval War College Review. Naval War College, Summer 2003.
- Henderson, Major Charles. "The MEF Command Element: Vestige of Attrition Warfare, Or Golden Child of Maneuver Warfare?" Command and Staff College Thesis. Marine Corps University, 2001.
- Hudson, Major Charles. "Remaining Relevant in the 21st Century." Command and Staff College Thesis. Marine Corps University, 1996.
- HQMC. "The Permanent MAGTF Headquarters Concept and How it Applies in the Formation of a Composite MAGTF: Second Edition". Advanced Amphibious Study Group, Washington, D.C., 15 Jul 1985.
- Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC). *Strategic Trends: The Social Dimension* [on-line] United Kingdom: Ministry of Defense. accessed 19 December 2004. http://www.jdcc-strategictrends.org/Pages/st_frames.asp?view=dim&dim=2&id=0, Internet.
- Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. synopsis by Frank Pajares [on-line article] Atlanta, Ga.: Emory University. accessed 19 December 2004. <http://www.emory.edu/EDUCATION/mfp/kuhnsyn.html>, Internet.
- LeSavage, Major Michael. "Building the Marine Expeditionary Brigade Command Element." Command and Staff College Thesis. Marine Corps University, 2000.
- Looney, Major Patrick. "Reestablishing the MEB Right or Wrong?" Command and Staff College Thesis. Marine Corps University, 2000.
- Lopez, Major Albert. "The Development of A Joint Operational Concept, "Effects Based Operations And Rapid Decisive Operations."" Command and Staff College Thesis. Marine Corps University, 2001.
- Matthews, Lyod J. *Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated?* Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S Army War College, 1998.
- Oros, Major Carl. "The Reestablishment of The Amphibious Marine Expeditionary Brigade And Its Implication For The Aviation Combat Element." Command and Staff College Thesis. Marine Corps University, 2000.
- Populations Division, United Nations. "World Urbanization Prospects: 2001 Revision." [on-line PDF document] New York, NY.: United Nations. accessed 19 December 2004, <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wup2001/WUP2001-pressrelease.pdf>, Internet.
- Schmid, Major Joseph. "Reorganizing The Fleet Marine Force: From Division-Wing Teams To Marine Expeditionary Brigades." Command and Staff College Thesis. Marine Corps University, 1989.
- Taylor, Charles W. *Alternative World Scenarios For A New Order of Nations*. Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993.
- Teister, Major Keith J. "Organizational Change for the United States Armed Forces." Command and General Staff College Monograph. School of Advanced Military Studies, 2004.
- White, Major Glen. "U.S. Marine Corps Force Structure: Another Look." Command and Staff College Thesis. Marine Corps University, 1992.