

# **Beginning With the End in Mind: Post-Conflict Operations and Campaign Planning**

**A Monograph**

**by**

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## ABSTRACT

Beginning With the End in Mind: Post-Conflict Operations and Campaign Planning by Major Travis E. Rooms, USA, 49 pages.

Accepting that post-conflict operations are part of campaign planning continues to be a challenge for the U.S. military. This monograph proposes that current Joint and U.S. Army doctrine is deficient in addressing the importance of post-conflict operations to campaign success. For the purpose of this monograph, the definition of post-conflict operations is Stability and Support Operations conducted after the conclusion of major combat to achieve the strategic policy objectives for peace.

This monograph addresses three central questions. First, is there a need for post-conflict planning in the campaign process? Brief case studies of U.S. military actions in post-World War II Germany, Panama, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrate the importance of post-conflict planning and the effects of inadequate execution. The U.S. military and the U.S. Army in particular, have a long history of conducting post-conflict operations, showing that it is a consistent aspect of the framework of war.

Second, what conditions are necessary to achieve success in the post-conflict environment? This study identifies five conditions: national and domestic security, a governing body, a judicial system, an economic system, and a populace capable of making the first four work. To achieve these conditions requires an interagency planning process oriented to establishing a legitimate host nation governing body. The U.S. Joint Forces Command is developing systems to address post-conflict planning and execution in the 'Security, Transition, and Reconstruction' and 'Operational Net Assessment' concepts, as well as the Joint Interagency Coordination Group organization.

Third, is the conduct of post-conflict operations the decisive phase? Successful conclusion of major combat is not the culmination of U.S. military involvement in a campaign. Conflict termination and the transition from combat to Military Operations Other than War must be part of campaign planning to ensure conditions are set effectively for the transition to and execution of post-conflict operations. Post-conflict operations create conditions in which governments can pursue a stable peace.

This study concludes that PCO is the decisive phase of operations and offers a planning model based on academic and doctrinal sources. Additional conclusions are that the U.S. military acknowledge its leading role in planning and executing post-conflict operations, major war games should incorporate post-conflict planning and execution, and the Department of Defense should pursue the developing Joint Interagency Coordination Group concept.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....	iii
IMPORTANCE OF POST CONFLICT PLANNING .....	6
Post Conflict Operations in Military Operations Other Than War .....	8
Organization, Methodology, and Criteria .....	10
U.S. EXPERIENCE IN POST CONFLICT OPERATIONS .....	12
Post World War II Germany and ECLIPSE .....	13
De-Nazification.....	14
Post Operation JUST CAUSE .....	15
Security Vacuum.....	17
Plan and Prepare for Success .....	17
Post Operation IRAQI FREEDOM .....	19
Lack of Coordinated Interagency Planning .....	20
Abolishing the Army.....	20
Summary .....	21
Military Operations Other Than War: Doctrine and Theory in the Joint Operating Environment	23
Military Operations Other Than War Doctrine in Post Conflict Operations .....	25
Principles of Military Operations Other Than War .....	27
Legitimacy .....	28
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction.....	29
Operational Net Assessment .....	30
Joint Interagency Coordination Group.....	31
Summary .....	32
WINNING THE PEACE.....	33
Elements of Planning for Post-Conflict Operations.....	35
Planning Factors.....	36
Military Responsibilities in the Post-Conflict Environment.....	40
A Model .....	41
Incorporating “Members” of the Old Regime .....	45
Summary .....	46
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	47
Post Conflict Operations: An Interagency Endeavor.....	47
Recommendations.....	49
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	52
Books .....	52
Journals and Periodicals.....	53
Theses, Studies, Presentations, and Other Papers.....	55
US Government Documents .....	58
Internet Resources.....	60

## List of Figures

Figure 1-1. Range of Military Operations.....	4
Figure 3-1: Principles of Military Operations Other Than War.....	23
Figure 3-2. Levels of Warfare, Traditional Model.....	24
Figure 3-3. Levels of Warfare, In Post Conflict Operations.....	24
Figure 3-4. System of Systems Analysis.....	28
Figure 4-1. Post Conflict Synchronization Matrix.....	40

## CHAPTER ONE

### IMPORTANCE OF POST CONFLICT PLANNING

If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.

B.H. Liddell Hart<sup>1</sup>

The function of the U.S. Army is to conduct sustained combat operations to “defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas.”<sup>2</sup> Achieving victory through land dominance is a primary role of the US Army with victory traditionally understood to be winning wars through decisive ground combat operations. However, the emerging operating environment described by *The Joint Operating Environment – Into the Future*, begets a crucial question: is winning through major combat operations merely a component of the military’s role in securing the ultimate objective of peace?<sup>3</sup> The end of decisive ground combat is actually the beginning of another phase of operations, one in which the peace is secured. Most likely, this next “phase” of operations begins before the conclusion of active combat, even as a city or region is secured, post-conflict operations begin.

The US military traditionally overlooks the importance and complexity of Post-Conflict Operations (PCO). While high-intensity combat operations are of major importance, they may not be relevant if the planning and conduct of PCO fails to achieve the political objectives, resulting in the war won, but the peace lost. Historical precedent points to post-conflict operations as “an inevitable, and ultimately decisive, part of war.”<sup>4</sup> However, current U.S. Army doctrine, training, and planning focus primarily on winning the war through decisive combat and

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<sup>1</sup> B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, (New York: Praeger, 1967), 366.

<sup>2</sup> Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components*, August 1, 2002. Available online at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html2/d51001x.htm>

<sup>3</sup> US Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operational Environment – Into the Future* (Coordinating Draft), (Norfolk, VA., 5 March 2004).

<sup>4</sup> Daniel S. Roper, *A Dual-Edged Sword: Operational Risk and “Efficiency”-Based Operations (EBO)*. Fort Leavenworth, KS, School for Advanced Military Studies, 2004, 1.

less on securing the peace. Destroying an enemy's ability to resist through the destruction of his military potential may merely set the conditions to obtain the original objective for entering into war, which in most cases, is to alter the political state of the enemy nation.<sup>5</sup>

It is in the post-conflict "phase" in which the peace is won and secured. With this in mind, is a change required in the how the Army, joint forces, and other government agencies view victory? Developing doctrine on Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (STR) establishes broad guidelines for considering actions in a Post-Conflict environment.<sup>6</sup> There are trends toward reevaluating successful conflict termination as the development of a recognized host nation governing body capable of conducting effective security operations.<sup>7</sup> The developing concept of Security, Transition, and Reconstruction attempts to address the possibility that successful conflict resolution resides in the post-conflict environment.

With a number of failed states serving as breeding and training grounds for terrorist organizations, and the increasing influence of trans-national actors and organizations, the possibility of winning purely through major combat operations may be an outmoded concept. There is evidence throughout history that the "longest, and most important work comes after the bombing stops, when rebuilding replaces destroying and consensus-building replaces precision strikes."<sup>8</sup> According to Michael Evans in *From Kadesh to Kandahar*, "We have to undertake an intellectual exploration of the growing interaction between interstate, substate, and transstate conflict and conduct a rigorous investigation of the phenomenon of merging war forms—internal,

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<sup>5</sup> Kenneth O. McCreedy, *Winning the Peace: Post conflict Operations*. Fort Leavenworth, KS. School for Advanced Military Studies, 1995, 2.

<sup>6</sup> US Department of Defense Working Paper, *Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.06 (Draft)*, 8 June 2004.

<sup>7</sup> For the purpose of this monograph, security in a post-conflict environment is a state in which unconstrained movement of host nation personnel and coalition forces is possible in the absence of overt force protection measures. Matthew Williams. "The British Experience In Iraq From 1914-1926: What Wisdom Can the United States Draw from Its Experience?" (Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004), 94.

<sup>8</sup> Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003), 19.

international, postmodern, modern, and premodern.”<sup>9</sup> This statement suggests that conflict, conflict termination, and post-conflict operations evolve differently among varied societies and cultures, requiring individual detailed analysis. A method of thoroughly analyzing potentially hostile or unstable environments is in development through the U.S. Joint Forces Commands (USJFCOM) Operational Net Assessment concept. This emerging concept conducts an assessment of the political, military, economic, social, infrastructural, and informational background of regions and nations of interest to provide a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment. Chapter three addresses the Operational Net Assessment process.

The post conflict environment in which this work occurs has its own vocabulary. To understand post-conflict operations requires an understanding of the words used to describe them. Key terms involved in an examination of this environment are Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), Stability and Support Operations (SASO), war, conflict, decisive-combat operations, and post-conflict operations.

### **Post Conflict Operations in Military Operations Other Than War**

Post-conflict operations are a sub-component of Noncombat operations/MOOTW and possess elements of the general U.S. goals of “Deter War and Resolve Conflict” and “Promote Peace.”<sup>10</sup> Military Operations Other than War involve “operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions

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<sup>9</sup> Michael Evans, “From Kadesh to Kandahar; Military Theory and the Future of War” *Naval War College Review*, Summer 2003. Available online at <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Summer/art6-su3.htm>.

<sup>10</sup> Post-Conflict Operations do not fit neatly into the Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 *Operations* construct of the range of military operations since it contains elements of both “resolving conflict” and “promoting peace.”

can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war.”<sup>11</sup>

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS			
Military Operations		General US Goal	Examples
Combat	War		Fight & Win Large-scale Combat Operations: Attack/Defend/Blockades
	Non combat	Military Operations Other Than War	Deter War & Resolve Conflict Peace Enforcement/ Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) Strikes/Raids/Show of Force Counterterrorism/Peacekeeping Counterinsurgency
			Promote Peace & Support US Civil Authorities Antiterrorism/Disaster Relief Peacebuilding Nation Assistance Domestic Support Counterdrug/NEO

Figure 1-1. Range of Military Operations<sup>12</sup>

While the term Military Operations Other Than War implies an accepted definition for “war”, war has no military definition in Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* or FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Graphics*. The fact that there is not an agreed upon military or national definition for war may lead to confusion in a number of areas, including: when does high-intensity warfare become a post-conflict operation, what constitutes a post-conflict operation, and who should contribute?

Although not a prescribed military definition of war, JP 3-0 *Operations* characterizes it as:

When the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, informational) are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to employ large-scale, sustained combat operations, to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, placing the United States in a wartime state.<sup>13</sup>

JP 1-02 does not define Post-conflict operations. This monograph uses the term “Post-conflict operations” to describe Stability and Support Operations conducted after the conclusion

<sup>11</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 12 April 2001), available online at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/>.

<sup>12</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 10 September 2001, 1-2.

<sup>13</sup> JP 3-0, 1-2.

of major combat operations to achieve the strategic policy objectives for peace.<sup>14</sup> Stability and Support Operations is a U.S. Army term meaning the use of military capabilities for any purpose other than war.<sup>15</sup>

Conflict entails “an armed struggle or clash between organized groups to achieve limited political or military objectives . . . military power in response to threats may be exercised in an indirect manner while supportive of other instruments of national power. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of force.”<sup>16</sup> Both insurgent activity and guerrilla warfare possess elements of conflict. The term “Post-Conflict Operations,” while not wholly accurate, suffices to define operations conducted in the aftermath of high-intensity warfare where major combat operations are the active phase of combat bringing about a definitive end to a state of war.<sup>17</sup>

## **Organization, Methodology, and Criteria**

The U.S. military has been involved in post-conflict operations since before the U.S. Civil War. Completion of major combat operations brought about issues of security, transition, and reconstruction in most conflicts. How the U.S. government and the military approached this environment varied over time with differing degrees of success. As the post-conflict environment changes across time and region, some elements and challenges remain constant.

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<sup>14</sup> This definition is a modification of one used in McCreedy, 49.

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 30 September, 1997), 1-143.

<sup>16</sup> JP 1-02 defines conflict as “An armed struggle or clash between organized groups within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. Although regular forces are often involved, irregular forces frequently predominate. Conflict often is protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. Within this state, military power in response to threats may be exercised in an indirect manner while supportive of other instruments of national power. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of force.” U.S. Department of Defense, *JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 12 April 2001, available online at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/>.

<sup>17</sup> This definition of “Decisive Combat Operations” is an author adaptation derived from conjoining definitions of “decisive operations” from FM 3-0 (Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 14 June 2001, 4-23), and “decisive” and “combat” from Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary: Retrieved 20 September 2004 from the world wide web at <http://www.m-w.com/dictionary.htm>

This study examines the importance of post-conflict planning by examining post-conflict planning for World War II, OPERATION JUST CAUSE (OJC), and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). These reviews suggest that the U.S. military should anticipate an extended commitment to an operation even after conclusion of major combat. Analysis of current MOOTW doctrine as well as developing models encompassed in the three concepts of Security, Transition and Reconstruction, Operational Net Assessment, and the Joint Interagency Coordination Group provides a lens for assessing U.S. military capabilities for post-conflict operations.

Experience in post-war Germany, JUST CAUSE, and IRAQI FREEDOM identify the challenges in the post-conflict setting. Applying these concepts relies on an understanding of the political intent for going to war, which frames the desired endstate and defines the requirements for conflict termination. Criterion for analysis is determining whether current understanding of post-conflict operations is applicable in Military Operations Other Than War, and Security, Transition, and Reconstruction operations in the Joint Operating Environment. Key to these concepts are the elements of unity of effort in U.S. operations and developing legitimate host nation governments while performing in a manner which lends credibility to the new government. Understanding the enemy, an accepted tenet passed down through time from Sun Tzu, is as critical today as ever and also applies to the post-conflict setting. Current and developing U.S. Army and joint doctrine for post-conflict operations provide the basis for evaluating the current and projected understanding of necessary planning elements. This study identifies elements of successful conflict termination and presents recommendations for the future.

This study also attempts to determine if a shift is required in the how the U.S. Army, joint forces, and other government agencies view and plan for victory. Current U.S. military focus is on winning through major combat operations. Overwhelming U.S. ability to defeat enemy forces

reduces the impetus to address the post-conflict setting resulting in indecisive conclusion to operations.

## CHAPTER TWO

### U.S. EXPERIENCE IN POST CONFLICT OPERATIONS

History shows that gaining military victory is not in itself equivalent to gaining the object of policy. But as most of the thinking about war has been done by men of the military profession there has been a very natural tendency to lose sight of the basic national object, and identify it with the military aim.

B. H. Liddell Hart<sup>18</sup>

Dr. James Carafano, a Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation writes that the U.S. Military did not adequately plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and thought it due to a “lack of historical memory”.<sup>19</sup> Even though a conflict’s end state is difficult to predict, he points out that the military, especially the Army, has long conducted Military Operations Other Than War type missions. These operations, discussed below, provide many insights into the dynamics of the post-conflict environment and the dangers of inadequate planning. Analyses of three post-conflict operations, after World War II, the Panama Invasion, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, demonstrate elements of effective planning, as well as implications of inadequate post-conflict planning. A review of the post World War II occupation of Germany provides a view toward the level of detailed planning that occurred over a period of years prior to their capitulation. Panama provides a glimpse into how a populace responds to a vacuum of law and order in a post-conflict environment. The current U.S. military operation in Iraq offers evidence of a growing realization of the importance of post-conflict operations, within the framework of poor PCO execution.

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<sup>18</sup> Hart, 351.

<sup>19</sup> James J. Carafano, PhD. “Post-Conflict Operations from Europe to Iraq,” (The Heritage Foundation, Heritage Lecture #844, July 13, 2004), 1. Available online at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/h1844.cfm>.

## Post World War II Germany and ECLIPSE

Allied occupation planning began in early 1944 when planners realized there were no allowances for a sudden collapse of the German state.<sup>20</sup> As Allied forces entered Germany beginning in September of 1944, they began conducting PCO in occupied areas in accordance with their plan of action. This plan, named ECLIPSE, provided for either of two eventualities: a formal surrender or a decision from General Eisenhower once most enemy forces were defeated or destroyed. As events unfolded, ECLIPSE became more of a “state or condition, namely, the end of hostilities and the beginning of the occupation.”<sup>21</sup> ECLIPSE focused on five objectives: (1) primary disarmament and control of the German forces; (2) enforcement of the terms of surrender or the will of SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) in the event there was no surrender; (3) establishment of law and order; (4) beginning of the total disarmament of Germany; and (5) redistribution of Allied forces into their national zones.<sup>22</sup> An important element of the plan depended on the Germans accepting that they were decisively defeated and too exhausted, both physically and mentally, to continue.

As resistance ceased, tactical commanders implemented elements of ECLIPSE.<sup>23</sup> Occupation tasks, beyond the direct handling of the German Army, included disposing of the large amount of battlefield debris accumulated in the field, at depots, and in factories. Additional tasks included preparing for the expected riots and looting due to the elimination of an organized security force. These tasks increased the requirement for Allied soldiers in the collection, disposal, and destruction of German war material and facilities beyond those required for security, transition, and reconstruction.

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<sup>20</sup> Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 26.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 163.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> Oliver J. Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953*. (Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 1953). 6.

To help combat commanders adequately address post-conflict operations after the devastation that occurred during combat, SHAEF created the European Civil Affairs Division (ECAD), a unit of military government detachments, whose primary purpose was to enable the introduction of military government in occupied territory and aid in the restoration of a normal and peaceful Germany.<sup>24</sup> The detachments had many soldiers who were either students or skilled white-collar workers prior to the war. Military government duties for ECAD officers ran the gamut from “prosecutor in a military government court one day, sewage and waterworks inspector the next, and financial, transportation, rationing, or police expert as the situation might require.”<sup>25</sup>

## De-Nazification

A major difficulty for military government detachments in accomplishing their objectives was the prohibition of employing former Nazis.<sup>26</sup> While General Eisenhower and his planners did not receive any guidance concerning political objectives for the post-war environment, they understood the political implications of retaining former Nazi party members in positions of authority.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, General Eisenhower mandated their removal from positions of responsibility in post-war Germany. He “was willing to accept diminished administrative efficiency in return for thorough denazification.”<sup>28</sup> In a late 1945 speech, General Eisenhower addressed the importance of de-Nazification, stating: “The success or failure of this occupation

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<sup>24</sup> For a detailed account of ECAD organization and duties, see Ziemke, Chapter 1 in *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*.

<sup>25</sup> Ziemke, 71.

<sup>26</sup> Another impediment to establishing a viable German administration system was ensuring no Nazis remained in positions of authority. The first step was determining what definition of Nazi would apply, followed by deciding what constituted a Nazi. Did being a Nazi require a certain ideology, or was it more tangible, as in a specific date of joining the party or possessing a certain rank or privilege? It was hard enough finding those with ability and interest to serve in the new government, but even harder finding someone without the previous stain of the Nazi brush. McCreeley, 8.

<sup>27</sup> William Hawkins, “Imposing Peace: Total vs. Limited Wars, and the Need to Put Boots on the Ground,” *Parameters*, Summer 2000. Accessed 21 October, 2004 at <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/hawkins.htm>.

<sup>28</sup> McCreeley, 18. Military Government Law Number 8, effective in September 1945, “made it mandatory to dismiss anyone who had ever been a member of the Nazi party for whatever reason from any position save one of ordinary labor.” Eugene Davidson, *The Death and Life of Germany: An Account of the American Occupation* (New York: Knopf, 1959), 130.

will be judged by the character of the Germans fifty years from now. Proof will come when they begin to run a democracy of their own and we are going to give the Germans a chance to do that, in time.”<sup>29</sup> The U.S. Army developed a plan for German post-conflict operations in the absence of political guidance from the civilian administration. Accepting that no agency was prepared to manage the German occupation, the Army planned and executed PCO to the best of its ability by providing security and military government until the German state could administer its own affairs.

The U.S. State Department did not relieve the U.S. Army of responsibility for Germany and end the military occupation until 1949.<sup>30</sup> In the intervening years from the beginning of the German occupation in September of 1944 through 1949 when the U.S. State Department assumed responsibility of Germany, the U.S. Army maintained a significant number of soldiers in Europe. They performed the varied and necessary duties in securing the peace and showing the long-term military commitment required to set the conditions for a democracy to develop in a previously authoritarian nation. Post-war requirements of reestablishing civil administration under the denazification policy, and the number of soldiers to assist in clearing the impedimenta of war while providing security and guarding against an expected insurgency were more demanding than expected by Allied planners and impacted the pace of Germany’s recovery. Forty years later, U.S. troops performed many of the same duties in Panama during Operation JUST CAUSE.

### **Post Operation JUST CAUSE**

Manuel Noriega, the commander of the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) was a brutal drug trafficker and the real power in Panama. Through his efforts to consolidate power, he began impinging upon Panamanian civil liberties and harassing U.S. military personnel. The

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<sup>29</sup> Gunter Bischof, “*Eisenhower and the Germans*,” in Bischof and Ambrose, eds, *Eisenhower and the German POWs*, 35.

<sup>30</sup> Frederiksen, 31.

increasingly repressive actions toward Panamanians and assaults on Americans precipitated the U.S. to launch Operation JUST CAUSE in December, 1989

The rapid military success of JUST CAUSE revealed shortcomings in post-conflict planning and the inability of the new Panamanian government to assume leadership of a democratic nation. Compartmentalized planning between major combat operations and post-conflict operations and the expectation of their sequential vice simultaneous execution were primary reasons for the ad hoc appearance of post-conflict operations. BLIND LOGIC, the post-conflict civil-military operations plan, was prepared in large part separately from the tactical plan, BLUE SPOON. Early in the process, General Woerner, Commander of SOUTHCOM, made the decision to separate combat and post-conflict operations planning instead of conducting a phased plan.<sup>31</sup> The planners for XVIII Airborne Corps, the operational headquarters for JUST CAUSE, understood that success depended on more than just military forces and they “tried to determine...what the end of the war should look like (and) work backwards.”<sup>32</sup> With this in mind, they focused mainly on the culmination of military operations, i.e. rapidly seizing key terrain and killing or rendering the enemy forces ineffective.<sup>33</sup> They planned in great detail to successfully achieve these objectives; however, seizing and killing were not the endstate from which to backward plan. The endstate as defined by President Bush was for the U.S. military to “create an environment safe for Americans [in Panama], ensure the integrity of the Panama Canal, provide a stable environment for the freely elected Endara government, and bring Noriega to justice.”<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Fishel, 31.

<sup>32</sup> Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama*, (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 58.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 59.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. xi. Foreword, as written by GEN Maxwell Thurman.

## Security Vacuum

A major element showing the lack of preparation for the transition to and conduct of post-conflict operations was evident in the chaos that followed Noriega's departure. Rampant looting and lawlessness throughout the country ensued during the vacuum of security between the end of open combat and re-establishment of the Panamanian government. Looting in the center of Panama City and Colon, the country's two largest cities, began early on December 20, 1989 with the defeat of the Panamanian Defense Force.<sup>35</sup> The PDF's rapid elimination removed the established instrument of security, thus creating an environment in which lawless behavior thrived. Looting came from all strata of society: members of "Noriega's Dignity Battalions through common criminals to wealthy citizens."<sup>36</sup>

In the immediate aftermath of combat operations, infantrymen provided stability in the leadership vacuum. As US soldiers occupied more of the country, infantry company commanders became mayors, and soldiers assumed wide-ranging responsibilities from weapons buy-back programs to garbage men. As soldiers established order, law enforcement responsibilities transferred to the military police, who took control along with former PDF soldiers who were vetted and allowed to join the new police force.<sup>37</sup>

## Plan and Prepare for Success

Reestablishment of order occurred in a relatively short period of time, but the negative effect on U.S. and Panamanian public opinion remained. Images of looting and disorder contributed to the perception that post-conflict planning did not occur.<sup>38</sup> In fact, the original planners in SOUTHCOM expected looting and allowed for it in their original plan.<sup>39</sup> Like

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<sup>35</sup> Fishel, 29.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Donnelly, 308.

<sup>38</sup> Fishel, 31.

<sup>39</sup> General Woerner attributed shortcomings in the area of reestablishing security and civil administration in BLUE SPOON to an inability "to enter into plans with the Department of State, for security reasons." GEN Woerner further states in explanation that "we're now planning an invasion of a

Woerner, Lieutenant General Stiner, XVIII Airborne Corps commander, and his planners gave less emphasis to post-conflict operations in preference to detailed tactical planning considerations. Likewise, General Thurman focused on the combat phase to the detriment of the post combat phase stating, “I did not even spend five minutes on BLIND LOGIC during my briefing as the incoming CINC (Commander in Chief) in August (1989).” In retrospect, he concluded that they spent too little time preparing for the post-conflict environment and the restoration of Panama.<sup>40</sup>

Militarily, JUST CAUSE was a clear success, but the transition from combat to PCO was awkward. The lack of preparation to provide security in the absence of a government had a negative impact on Panamanian attitude toward their U.S. “liberators”. RAND, a federally funded public policy research and analysis institution, conducted a study of the invasion and found a number of areas in which better planning could have occurred. The RAND study concluded that the U.S. was not prepared to provide immediate assistance to civilians as areas were cleared of Panamanian Defense Forces.<sup>41</sup> RAND determined this was due in large part to poor planning for stability and restoration largely owing to a lack of civilian agency input. Moreover, combat units found themselves unprepared to conduct the many jobs necessary in the operation’s aftermath pending the reestablishment of the local infrastructure through traffic control, garbage collection, establishing law and order, and providing food, water, and health care to the local population.<sup>42</sup>

Planning for OOTW (Operations Other Than War) must not overlook or underemphasize stability operations, as was done in OJC. If the traditional process of assigning planning responsibilities for combat and noncombat

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friendly nation with whom we have diplomatic relations from bases internal to that country. Pretty sensitive issue, especially when you’ve got base negotiations going on in the Philippines.” Donnelly, 25.

<sup>40</sup> Richard H. Schultz, Jr., *In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause*. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. Air University Press, August 1993. 16.

<sup>41</sup> Jennifer M. Taw, *Operation Just Cause: Lessons for Operations Other Than War*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996), 26.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

operations to disparate organizations is continued, sufficient coordination must take place. Alternatively, combat and postcombat planning could be conducted together.<sup>43</sup>

## **Post Operation IRAQI FREEDOM**

Planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM revealed a lack of emphasis on the importance of planning for the post-conflict environment. During operational planning, and approximately one month prior to initiation of combat, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) planners developed a heightened understanding of the importance of post-conflict operations. The Chief of Intelligence planning in CFLCC during IRAQI FREEDOM stated that the Phase IV planning group determined that campaign success would create a state of affairs contrary to the strategic objectives.<sup>44</sup> Planners realized that a great danger would exist in the aftermath of regime collapse. Assessments of post war Iraq predicted “the risk of an influx of terrorists...rise of criminal activity [and] the probable actions of former regime members...” These assessments concluded with recommended actions including “planning to control the borders, analyzing what key areas and infrastructure should be immediately protected, and allocating adequate resources to quickly re-establish post-war control throughout Iraq.”<sup>45</sup> The Phase IV group determined that reestablishing security against both external and internal threats was of paramount importance. Unfortunately, as in JUST CAUSE, institutional bias, training, and education led the planners and the Commanding General to give inadequate emphasis to the post-conflict environment.<sup>46</sup> A realization of the importance of post-conflict planning did not develop. This is partly due to a lack of imagination reinforced by mental models primarily oriented to fighting and winning major combat operations.

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid., ix.

<sup>44</sup> Peterson, Steven W. LTC, USA. *Central but Inadequate: The Application of Theory in Operation Iraqi Freedom*. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: National War College AY 2003/04, Course 5602, “The Nature of War”) 10. Available online at <http://www.ndu.edu/library/n4/NWCAY04Index.html>. Phase IV for OIF is the post-conflict operation phase encompassing security, transition, and reconstruction, of the Iraqi nation-state.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid. 11.

## Lack of Coordinated Interagency Planning

Knowing the U.S. must provide a caretaker government for a period of time after the fall of Saddam Hussein, earnest but compartmented planning in the U.S. Departments of State and Defense for administration of post-conflict Iraq began in October 2002. On 9 January 2003, retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner became the head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA),<sup>47</sup> an interagency team responsible to administer and rebuild the country and provide humanitarian aid.<sup>48</sup> Lieutenant General Garner stated that the civil side of post-war planning did not commence until 1 February 2003, a mere six weeks before the invasion.<sup>49</sup> Also in February 2003, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College published a study stating that post-conflict Iraq would contain religious, ethnic and tribal schisms that would complicate the post war administration.<sup>50</sup> The study also stated “To be successful...requires much detailed interagency planning, many forces, multi-year military commitment, and a national commitment to nationbuilding.”<sup>51</sup>

## Abolishing the Army

Starting with the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance framework, Mr. Paul Bremer assumed responsibility of the newly renamed Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) on 23 May 2003. One of Bremer’s first acts was to abolish the Iraqi army.<sup>52</sup> This decision was contrary to the military plan of using the Iraqi soldiers for internal security and border security, which was thought to prevent them from turning against coalition forces. Eliminating the Army

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<sup>47</sup> Martin Smith, *Truth, War, and Consequences* *Frontline*, (Public Broadcasting Service. Documentary aired 9 Oct 2004. Interview conducted 17 July 2003 with retired LTG Jay Garner.) Full transcript accessed 22 October 2004 and available online at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/truth/interviews/garner.html>.

<sup>48</sup> Nadia Schadlow, “War and the Art of Governance,” *Parameters*, Autumn, 2003, 89.

<sup>49</sup> Smith, Garner Interview.

<sup>50</sup> Conrad C. Crane and Andrew W. Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post Conflict Scenario*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2003, 1. Available online at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=182&CFID=100720&CFTOKEN=88607703>.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> Michael R. Gordon, “Catastrophic Success’: Debate Lingered on Decision to Dissolve the Iraqi Military,” *New York Times*, 21 October 2004.

had major repercussions in a nation prone to various deep cultural differences coupled with a poor understanding of Westerners. Not only were individuals with martial training not being occupied, they had no income. Colonel Paul Hughes, an aide to retired Lieutenant General Garner at ORHA, stated, “By abolishing the army, we destroyed in the Iraqi mind the last symbol of sovereignty they could recognize and as a result created a significant part of the resistance.”<sup>53</sup> Lieutenant General Garner originally planned to utilize the Iraqi army for reconstruction and security which would keep them employed, provide income, and give them a stake in their nation’s future. Coalition forces effectively had compounded their problems. Not only were they expected to rebuild and secure the nation, they now had to rebuild and train an Iraqi defense force.

Robert Perito, a special advisor to the Rule of Law program at the United States Institute of Peace gave a briefing to the Defense Policy Board, also in February 2003. Perito predicted that a post-conflict Iraq would be very violent.<sup>54</sup> He recommended that the U.S. military should prepare for looting in the immediate aftermath of fighting, and plan to involve people with law enforcement experience in the training of Iraqi security personnel.<sup>55</sup> According to the initial planning, one of the crucial purposes of maintaining the Iraqi military forces and employing them in security and reconstruction operations was to prevent their disaffection to the point of joining an insurgency.

## Summary

In each instance [from military government in Mexico in 1847 through World War I], neither the Army nor the government accepted [the occupation] as

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Martin Smith, *Truth, War, and Consequences* Frontline, Public Broadcasting Service. Documentary aired 9 Oct 2004. Interview conducted 5 September 2003 with Robert M. Perito, “a career Foreign Service officer.” Full transcript accessed 22 October 2004 and available online at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/truth/interviews/perito.html>.

<sup>55</sup> Perito’s assertion is supported by a previous example of looting in a post-conflict Iraq. As Turkish troops retreated northward from the British advance during World War I, they left behind a security vacuum, in which rampant looting of businesses and government buildings occurred. Matthew Williams. “The British Experience In Iraq From 1914-1926: What Wisdom Can the United States Draw from Its Experience?” (Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004), 68.

a legitimate military function. Consequently, its imposition invariably came as a somewhat disquieting experience for both, and the means devised for accomplishing it ranged from inadequate to near disastrous.<sup>56</sup>

The U.S. military is uncomfortable conducting the business of government. Tension exists between diplomats and soldiers when the armed forces are required to establish military governments. This task falls to the military for the simple reason that it is the only entity capable of undertaking an endeavor of such magnitude. Soldiers seek to transfer governmental responsibilities to civilian authority as soon as possible, which is often not for years. The U.S. Army was responsible for the military government of Germany for over four years before relieved by the State Department. Failing to plan for post-conflict operations is not a solution to avoiding responsibility for post-war military government.

The successful reconstruction of Germany after World War II provides evidence of the importance of effective, detailed planning for the post-conflict environment. The lack of a popular uprising can be attributed to physical and mental exhaustion on the part of the German populace, but there were allowances for this in ECLIPSE in any case. European Civil Affairs Division detachments greatly assisted in the re-establishment of administrative government functions, providing for the Germans what they could not provide themselves. Roots of the former dominant party may run deep in a nation, including civic administrators and schoolteachers. An overarching policy of removing all members of the former regime can impact the pace of recovery.

In the aftermath of Operation JUST CAUSE, there was a legitimate Panamanian government waiting to assume control as soon as the major fighting swept through the capital of Panama City. This government already had an amount of legitimacy provided by elections previously annulled by Noriega. However, order suffered in the short-term from a lack of

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<sup>56</sup> Ziemke, 3.

preparation for the resultant widespread looting and general anarchy. History shows that looting occurs in the absence of a security apparatus in all societies around the world.<sup>57</sup>

As of December 2004 in Iraq, it appears the U.S. military and Department of Defense is not learning from past operations. The multiple reports in February 2003 of hurried planning efforts for post-war Iraq indicate a lack of appreciation for the complexity involved and number of soldiers required to reinstate national infrastructure. Evidence of poor interagency planning surfaced as combat operations came to a close, a security vacuum opened, and unrestrained looting commenced. The mixed results apparent in the development of a viable Iraqi security force and reestablishment of civil infrastructure gave testament to a culture that de-emphasizes post-conflict operations planning.<sup>58</sup>

### CHAPTER THREE

## Military Operations Other Than War: Doctrine and Theory in the Joint Operating Environment

Yet it is surely a mistake to equate intensity of violence with strategic significance or policy interest. Both World War II and the Gulf War of 1990-1991 provide clear evidence of the consequences of failure on the part of an American president to recognize the point at which considerations of the shape of the international political order should take priority over the perceived requirements of the military endgame.<sup>59</sup>

Carnes Lord

In *The Mission*, Dana Priest presented a view of Secretary of State Colin Powell as a modern-day George C. Marshall. “Having championed the use of overwhelming military force at the outset of any war..., Powell was now arguing for overwhelming economic and political force

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<sup>57</sup> Smith, Perito interview.

<sup>58</sup> Carafano, 6.

<sup>59</sup> Carnes Lord *Crisis Management: A Primer*, (Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, IASPS Research Papers in Strategy, August 1998, No. 7), Accessed 23 October 2004 from <http://www.israeleconomy.org/strategic7/crisis.htm>

to settle a rattled post-September 11 world.”<sup>60</sup> Powell’s argument for overwhelming economic and political force is consistent with the ‘Powell Doctrine’ that requires an assessment of the nation’s commitment to follow-through . . . in “will we commit sufficient resources to win?” before deciding to commit military resources.<sup>61</sup> He acknowledges that the instruments of national power should be used concurrently, not sequentially.<sup>62</sup>

U.S. combatant commanders exercise great influence on the use of U.S. national power around the world. This helps frame a discussion on Military Operations Other Than War theory and doctrine within the Joint Operating Environment (JOE).<sup>63</sup> An imbalanced application of national power will tax U.S. ability to affect conflict resolution in the chaotic world projected by the JOE.

As operations transition from war to Military Operations Other Than War, military effort transitions from combat operations to non-combat operations.<sup>64</sup> In *Post-Conflict Operations from Europe to Iraq*, Dr. James Carafano states that the U.S. military conducted PCO throughout its history but continually overlooked this fact as it planned for and entered into new conflicts.<sup>65</sup>

The Army would rather not conduct post-conflict operations due to their extended nature and necessary investment of manpower and equipment. It prefers to use these resources to prepare for

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<sup>60</sup> From a statement by retired Marine General Anthony Zinni. Colin Powell is the current Secretary of State and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. George C. Marshall was a Secretary of State and former General of the Army who authored the Marshall plan to rebuild post World War II Europe. Priest, 13.

<sup>61</sup> The basic elements of the Powell Doctrine include: 1. Is a vital US interest at stake? 2. Will we commit sufficient resources to win? 3. Are the objectives clearly defined? 4. Will we sustain the commitment? 5. Is there reasonable expectation that the public and Congress will support the operation? 6. Have we exhausted our other options? Accessed 17 October 2004 from *Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia* at [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Powell\\_Doctrine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Powell_Doctrine)

<sup>62</sup> The U.S. military considers Diplomacy, Information, the Military, and Economy elements of national power. U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 14 November, 2000), I-6.

<sup>63</sup> US Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operational Environment – Into the Future* (Coordinating Draft), (Norfolk, VA., 5 March 2004), 7. The Joint Operating Environment manual is the common joint planning reference seeking to show trends shaping the future environment, and attempts to define the consequences of military operations in that environment.

<sup>64</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 16 June, 1995), I-6.

<sup>65</sup> Carafano, 1.

fighting and winning major ground combat operations. Even so, there is a growing acceptance in the U.S. military that its roles and responsibilities do not end with the conclusion of major combat operations. A January 2003 Joint Staff publication stated:

. . . history has shown that the US military is a tool of statecraft that leaders use in roles beyond the mission of fighting and winning the nation's wars. Indeed, the US military has been and will continue to be employed in crisis resolution situations across the globe and across the range of military operations. Therefore, US joint forces must be capable of adapting their warfighting capabilities to crisis resolution situations without loss of operational effectiveness.<sup>66</sup>

The U.S. military is a multi-purpose tool capable of a broad range of operations beyond full-scale maneuver warfare. It has a long history of involvement in Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and post-conflict operations.

### **Military Operations Other Than War Doctrine in Post Conflict Operations**

Successful conclusion of major combat is not the culmination of U.S. military involvement in a campaign undertaken to secure regime change. Conflict termination and the transition from combat to Military Operations Other than War must be part of campaign planning to ensure conditions are set effectively for the transition to post-conflict operations. Joint Publication 3-07 *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* states that planning for MOOTW should include actions to be taken upon the completion of operations. The manner in which U.S. forces transition from the theater may significantly influence the perception of the operation's legitimacy; therefore this phase requires careful planning.<sup>67</sup> Projected post-conflict issues could determine the positioning of operational forces at the conclusion of major combat operations. In addition, proper positioning and political guidance are necessary for a smooth transition to post-conflict operations. Doctrine requires commanders to plan for transition from high-intensity warfare to post-conflict operations at the beginning of hostilities, as it is necessary

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<sup>66</sup> J7 (Joint Force Development for Doctrine and Training). US Department of Defense, *An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution In the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, (Washington D.C.: 28 January, 2003), available online at [http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jwcr\\_screen.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jwcr_screen.pdf)

<sup>67</sup> JP 3-07, IV-12.

to ensure the accomplishment of political objectives.<sup>68</sup> At the conclusion of decisive combat operations, military forces control the nation, but power begins to transition to civilian control as the infrastructure stabilizes and the threat decreases.<sup>69</sup>

Military Operations Other than War involve the use of all military capabilities in operations short of war and include operations ranging from counterinsurgency to disaster relief. Post-conflict operations encompass a gamut of activities during the transition from major combat. The goal of post-conflict operations is providing a secure return to host nation civilian effectiveness and legitimacy. Post-conflict activities include transitioning government to civilian authorities, supporting truce negotiations, and providing necessary civil affairs support to aid reestablishment of civilian government. Other actions include psychological operations and logistical support to the host nation until civil infrastructure is again capable of self-sufficient operations.<sup>70</sup> While conducting these activities, military forces must be prepared to revert rapidly to combat operations in the uncertain post-war environment. During the reestablishment of civilian government, political considerations play a large role in prioritizing the conduct of operations. Every activity can have a political consequence in this environment, whether constructing a school or conducting an offensive operation. Principles of Military Operations Other Than War (figure 3-1) closely follow the principles of war, with the exception of political considerations, which play a more overt role during post-conflict operations. When conducting Military Operations Other Than War, commanders must be aware of changing events in the political realm that may cause the mission to change.<sup>71</sup> Significant among these principles in the post-conflict environment are unity of effort, security, perseverance, and legitimacy.

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid., IV-11.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., IV-12.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, II-2.

<b>Principles of Military Operations Other Than War</b>
<b>Objective:</b> Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
<b>Unity of Effort:</b> Seek unity of effort in every operation.
<b>Security:</b> Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage.
<b>Restraint:</b> Apply appropriate military capability prudently.
<b>Perseverance:</b> Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.
<b>Legitimacy:</b> Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable.

Figure 3-1: Principles of Military Operations Other Than War<sup>72</sup>

Post-conflict operations possess elements of all three levels of war: tactical, operational, and strategic. However, the post-conflict environment resides mainly at the operational level. The conclusion of high intensity conflict alters the common understanding of the three stratified levels of war (figure 3-1). In post-conflict operations, they become constricted as if with a belt (figure 3-2). There are tactical military objectives, but each directly affects the operational level of war. The post-conflict environment offers few purely military objectives. Each incident, and especially each battle, may have operational and strategic impact throughout the spectrum of conflict, to include the political realm. Outside theoretical constructs, it is not possible to separate political considerations from military operations.<sup>73</sup>

### Levels of Warfare

#### Traditional Model



Figure 3-2

#### In Post Conflict Operations



Figure 3-3<sup>74</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., II-2. The Principles of War are: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity. JP 3-0, II-1

<sup>73</sup> A member of the School of Advanced Military Studies guest speaker program, 2004-05 academic year.

<sup>74</sup> Andrew Steel and Andrew Marriot, "Briefing on Peace Support Operations," (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence). Copy on file with author.

In *The Pursuit of Victory*, Brian Bond suggests that decisive victory can have different meanings to different parties. He postulates that it is better to have a party with which to reach a negotiated settlement, even if it is an unconditional surrender.<sup>75</sup> In other words, if a nation does not accept that it is defeated, then the war is not over. Bond finds that it is important to develop an agreement acceptable to other interested parties beyond those at war, which may preclude them from collaborating against the winner.<sup>76</sup> An agreement acceptable to the major players in the conflict and the post-conflict setting, acts as an early encouraging move toward legitimizing the developing government.

## **Legitimacy**

Of major importance to success in Military Operations Other Than War and post-conflict operations is the establishment of a legitimate governing body. “If an operation is perceived as legitimate, there is a strong impulse to support the action...legitimacy is frequently a decisive element.”<sup>77</sup> Population perception is also integral to success. For this reason, a primary goal is to establish legitimacy in the mind of the people. Peace will not last in a government without legitimacy, which is a confidence only the populace can bestow.<sup>78</sup> A positive public opinion is crucial. While initially large numbers of soldiers are required to instill order in a society that lacks trust in its own government, the soldiers must win public acceptance. Policing is evidence of public acceptance of the government; it only works in an environment of trust.<sup>79</sup>

Bond proposes two requirements to consider prior to claiming battlefield success. First, he posits that the controlling force must have “firm, realistic statecraft with specific aims.”

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<sup>75</sup> Brian Bond. *The Pursuit of Victory from Napoleon to Saddam Hussein*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 5.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>77</sup> JP 3-07, II-5.

<sup>78</sup> This study uses John Fishel’s definition of legitimacy; “the perception that a government has the moral right, as well as the legal right, to govern and that governments or international actors are perceived to be acting in morally and legally right ways.” *Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff college Press, 1998, 179.

<sup>79</sup> From a presentation in the School for Advanced Military Studies Academic Year 2004/05 speaker program.

Secondly, a “willingness of the vanquished to accept the verdict of battle” must exist.<sup>80</sup> Frederick Kagan carries this line further in *War and Aftermath* stating, “The true center of gravity in a war of regime change lies not in the destruction of the old system, but in the creation of the new one.”<sup>81</sup> Achieving legitimacy in the mind of the populace predicates successful post-conflict operations. Once the people believe in the legitimacy of the operation and government, the operation is on its way to success. “Legitimacy is a product of fact and perception. By acting under the direction of legitimate civil authority the joint force ensures legal and moral legitimacy for both the force and the operation.”<sup>82</sup> “In many cases, restorative operations can be characterized as a fight over legitimacy – old versus new.”<sup>83</sup>

### **Security, Transition, and Reconstruction**

The Security, Transition and Reconstruction (STR) concept outlined in U.S. Joint Forces Command’s *Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept*, developed from the understanding that post-conflict operations involve detailed planning and are impacted by the major combat phase of the war. This broad concept encompasses the rebuilding of a nation in the post-conflict environment and acknowledges that the conclusion of major combat is only the beginning of the peace process. Security, Transition, and Reconstruction operations involve many agencies and departments beyond the Department of Defense (DoD), as well as members of the international community. Post-conflict operations support major combat operations as required, aid in planning for the reestablishment of security after major combat, and in transitioning to a legitimate government. Security, Transition, and Reconstruction operations also assist in reconciliation among host nation parties and the reestablishment of civil administration.<sup>84</sup> Security, Transition and Reconstruction operations involve a wide spectrum of

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<sup>80</sup> Bond, 61.

<sup>81</sup> Frederick W. Kagan, “War and Aftermath,” *Policy Review*, Number 120, August and September 2003, available from <http://www.policyreview.org/aug03/>.

<sup>82</sup> *Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, 36.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

activities and contributors, thus requiring an understanding of how these elements relate to each other. These operations also attempt to establish a “new normal” for the host nation populace in which they realize greater freedoms and less oppression. This transition may be difficult for people previously ruled by a caretaker type government. An Operational Net Assessment of the region facilitates a better understanding of the environment and types of embedded thinking among its inhabitants.

### **Operational Net Assessment**

Operational Net Assessment (ONA) is a concept that allows a staff to use multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to develop a common body of knowledge on the enemy, the environment, and friendly forces.<sup>85</sup> It is built upon a continuing System of Systems Analysis (SoSA) (figure 3-1). The SoSA views the enemy as a network of systems incorporating political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) elements. By analyzing the PMESII elements, SoSA endeavors to determine relationships, dependencies, vulnerabilities, and strengths of the many systems that make up an adversary. Products of the Operational Net Assessment include actions and leverage points available to a combatant commander through an internet accessed database. The database includes a web-based SoSA, and an assessment of friendly and enemy objectives, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. Operational Net Assessment supports existing planning processes by providing a baseline analysis of a potential crisis environment from which to begin planning. This analysis may save time and provide efficiencies through a better understanding of complex environments. A more

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<sup>85</sup> The Secretary of Defense directed each combatant commander to incorporate a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) into his staff by 2005. Joint Warfighting Center, Pamphlet 4, *Doctrinal Implications of Operational Net Assessment (ONA)*, (USJFCOM, 24 February 2004), 1. Available online at [www.dtic.mil/doctrine/](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/)

The SJFHQ is a joint command and control headquarters functionally comprised of four primary teams: information superiority, plans, operations, and knowledge management. Douglas Zimmerman, Colonel, USA. “Understanding the Standing Joint Force Headquarters,” *Military Review*, Fort Leavenworth, KS, July-August 2004, 28 One of its major functions is to conduct and produce a baseline Operational Net Assessment with the collaboration of subject matter experts from the interagency and military community on specific areas as directed by the combatant commander

comprehensive understanding of societal and cultural inter-relations can elicit a plan for combat and post-conflict operations to better achieve the strategic objectives. By using the ONA process, leaders can focus resources to produce desired effects and preclude negative unintended effects.<sup>86</sup>




Figure 3-4. System of Systems Analysis<sup>87</sup>

### Joint Interagency Coordination Group

The military understands very well that we are the hammer in the tool kit, but not every problem is a nail. There are other instruments.

General Hugh Shelton<sup>88</sup>

The Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) is an emerging concept organization currently undergoing experimentation. It attempts to address the coherent application of the elements of national power during military operations. The JIACG is an advisory element on a combatant commanders staff, designed to facilitate planning and interagency cooperation, as well as the sharing of information. It uses an effects based approach to planning which incorporates elements of Operational Net Assessment as developed by a Standing Joint Force Headquarters. The JIACG conducts additional System of Systems Analysis, incorporating its interagency

<sup>86</sup> Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 4, 9.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>88</sup> Attributed to GEN Hugh Shelton, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff during post 11 September planning in Priest, 37.

members to ensure the synchronization of ends, ways, and means in the application of national power for regional engagement or campaign planning.<sup>89</sup>

During peacetime, the Joint Interagency Coordination Group advises the combatant commander on regional engagement issues relating to military and civilian agency policy and planning considerations. It maintains links with government agency planners and regional organizations to include U.S. Ambassadors and their staffs.<sup>90</sup> During crisis situations the JIACG maintains situational awareness of civilian and military activities and ensure both are synchronized with regional commander's objectives in support of the National Security Strategy.

In post-conflict operations, a plethora of civilian organizations may be involved in addressing the many requirements of transition and recovery. Private volunteer organizations, international aid organizations, lending institutions, and others play a part in reestablishing national and domestic security, civil government, and judicial and economic systems. National strategy should guide the implementation of Security, Transition, and Reconstruction. A Joint Interagency Coordination Group can offer a coordinated joint and interagency post-conflict plan since it possesses the knowledge base to understand and synchronize in advance the players involved. With the ebb and flow of interest and participation of private and international civilian agencies and militaries, the Joint Interagency Coordination Group's relationships and communication links to policy makers should contribute to stability in a chaotic environment. As the fledgling post-conflict host nation government assumes responsibility, the Joint Interagency Coordination Group can provide ready access to logistical support and knowledge.

## Summary

In *Mastering Violence: An Option for Operational Military Strategy*, authors Francart and Patry state that "Military operations are . . . completely integrated with political, diplomatic,

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<sup>89</sup> Joint Warfighting Center, Pamphlet 7, *Operational Implications of Effects-Based Operations (EBO)*, (USJFCOM, 17 November 2004), 6. Available online at [www.dtic.mil/doctrine/](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/)

<sup>90</sup> Joint Warfighting Center, Pamphlet 6, *Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)*, (USJFCOM, 27 June 2004), 5. Available online at [www.dtic.mil/doctrine/](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/)

economic and cultural activities.” They continue that the “problem is now, more than ever, *to conceive military operations in a political framework.*”<sup>91</sup> Every element of national power plays a part and requires synchronization across the spectrum of conflict to achieve an acceptable victory in both major combat operations and post-conflict operations. Incorporating the Operational Net Assessment concept and a Joint Interagency Coordination Group into a combatant commander’s staff will better realize the level of synchronization and understanding of complex social systems required.

As intimated in the opening paragraph of this chapter, political considerations play a more overt role in Military Operations Other Than War and post-conflict operations, and require the military to consider how their actions directly support the overall political intent.<sup>92</sup> The goal in Military Operations Other Than War, as in war, remains the achievement of national objectives; however, the time horizon may be much longer in post-conflict operations than in major combat operations. Today’s fast-paced campaigns and their resultant quick “victories” in major combat increase expectations of a rapid termination of overseas deployments in hostile environments. The U.S. military may be victims of its own success in quick conclusions to major combat operations, when post-conflict operations take much more time and may involve more casualties than the initial major combat operations. Resolute national patience involving all elements of diplomacy, information, military, and economy is a large part of the formula for success in post-conflict operations and the MOOTW environment.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **WINNING THE PEACE**

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<sup>91</sup> Loup Francart, BG (French Army) and Jean-Jacques Patry, “Mastering Violence: An Option for Operational Military Strategy,” *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 53, No. 3, Summer 2000, p 145.

<sup>92</sup> JP 3-07, vii.

And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.<sup>93</sup>

Machiavelli, 1513

If the past sets a precedent, the U.S. Army will maintain significant responsibility for post-conflict operations, which usually begin prior to the conclusion of decisive combat operations. The war's objectives are not achieved if post-conflict operations are not successful. Inadequate planning and conduct of post-conflict operations can reduce or negate the success of combat operations and result in a failed peace. While the conduct of major combat may initially be harder and involve more casualties in the short run, Military Operations Other Than War proves much more complicated and can be equally resource intensive.<sup>94</sup> The post-conflict setting involves a larger spectrum of operations and encompasses great political implications. The *2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities* by the Defense Science Board (DSB) states that "Achieving political objectives, not "just" military objectives, depends on preparation years in advance and stabilization/reconstruction years after open hostilities."<sup>95</sup> Ultimately, post-war stabilization and reconstruction requires an investment measured in years, and involves as many soldiers, and possibly more, as required for high-intensity combat.<sup>96</sup> Successful post-conflict operations create conditions in which governments can successfully "wage peace."<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Machiavelli, *The Prince* (1513). Retrieved from the World Wide Web 22 September 2004 from <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/machiavelli-prince.html#CHAPTER%20VI>.

<sup>94</sup> Defense Science Board, *2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*, 2 September 2004. The Undersecretary for Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics commissioned this study to determine the implications of transitioning to and from hostilities.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid. The DSB defines Stabilization as "The period following cessation of high-intensity conflict wherein violence is the decisive factor in daily life and indigenous capabilities, e.g., law enforcement, are unable to achieve security and stability."

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> McCreeedy, 31.

## Elements of Planning for Post-Conflict Operations

The end of strategy is peace, not military victory. As much as for war, sustainable peace requires detailed planning.<sup>98</sup> Joint Publication 3-0, *Operations*, and the *Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations* working paper both state that post conflict planning should begin as early as possible with the transition to civil authority being the point from which to begin backward planning.<sup>99</sup> The STR paper also recommends pre-conflict consideration of the effects of combat actions on post-conflict recovery.<sup>100</sup> The national objective is not a military victory; military operations set conditions for an acceptable political state of affairs. A change in the political state requires detailed planning which is intertwined with major combat operations.<sup>101</sup> How major combat ends impacts how the peace begins.

Understanding the strategic significance of both conflict termination and the immediate aftermath of combat operations is necessary to understanding the importance of detailed planning for post-conflict operations. Post-conflict planning considerations are similar to those for major combat operations. A primary difference is that the post-conflict setting requires forces flexible enough to undertake security operations and peace enforcement but still capable of conducting combat operations. Ensuring unit integrity with a clear chain of command maintains equal importance in both major combat and post-conflict operations. Unit manning levels may need an increase in staff personnel as more liaison officers and advisors may be necessary to coordinate actions among the numerous interagency and civilian organizations operating in common areas.

Developing an understanding of the concerns of the defeated nation and other parties involved produces a more stable transition to peace through the conduct of post-conflict operations. The conditions imposed by the victor upon conflict termination have an impact on

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<sup>98</sup> Raymond Aron, *Clausewitz, Philosopher of War* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1985), 97.

<sup>99</sup> JP 3-0, E-3. *Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, 42.

<sup>100</sup> *Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, 42.

<sup>101</sup> Kagan.

future regional and international relations.<sup>102</sup> An understanding of the conflict battlespace through Operational Net Assessment can provide a framework for understanding the relation of parties in the post-conflict environment.

## **Planning Factors**

“Achievement of the strategic aims in war also consists of winning the confrontations that always follow even successful combat.”<sup>103</sup> Post-conflict operations actually begin prior to the conclusion of major combat operations and continue through a long-term campaign to win the peace. Prior to embarking on this type of endeavor, an assessment of the nation’s endurance is required in order to see the campaign through to the end of post-conflict operations. Since adversaries are unlikely to defeat the U.S. in open battle, enemies may use a strategy of protracted conflict such as the guerrilla war in Vietnam, or the current insurgency operations in Iraq. To set the conditions for development of a defeated nation, U.S. and coalition forces should prepare for Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations immediately upon conclusion of major combat. A counterinsurgency is a marathon, which requires endurance, consistency, and transparency. It takes time to establish a legitimate government capable of sustaining and protecting itself.

Occupation forces and government should help establish the following five conditions respectively: national and domestic security, a governing body, a judicial system, an economic system, and a populace capable of making the first four work.<sup>104</sup> This order is a guide; elements of each may occur simultaneously, not just sequentially. Post-conflict operations, while generally diplomatic and economic in nature, must involve civilian and military elements to ensure the necessary conditions for the safe development of a national infrastructure.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Bond, 202.

<sup>103</sup> *Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, 24.

<sup>104</sup> Dr. Terrence Kelly, Director of Transition and Reintegration Programs, Coalition Provisional Authority. E-mail from 22 July, 2004

<sup>105</sup> *Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, 29.

A stable security environment is a crucial precondition to providing an environment secure enough for the nation to regenerate. A range of belligerents and threats may exist, seeking to impede a nation's growth. The Department of Defense (DoD) working paper *Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations* Joint Operating Concept identifies three types of spoilers who have a negative impact in the uncertain aftermath of combat: total, limited, and greedy. Total spoilers must be isolated and defeated. They are irretrievably opposed to the U.S. and coalition position, and have no interest in a stable society.<sup>106</sup> Limited spoilers may be "mid- or low-level members of a deposed regime or defeated military" and may seek to preserve prestige and privilege, or they may try to profit from the disorder by "filling a power vacuum." Limited spoilers can be individuals, organizations, movements, or government elements.<sup>107</sup> Those limited spoilers "of strong belief in either religious, ethnic, or national superiority or endangerment may be induced into the STR process if their needs concerning group identity are satisfied in political or economic terms."<sup>108</sup> Likewise, greedy spoilers can be a useful element of the STR process if their utility outweighs their demands. They try to enhance their own interests. However, any appearance of providing legitimacy to a greedy spoiler may discredit Security, Transition, and Reconstruction in the eyes of the populace.

"Coercion defeats total spoilers and contains limited and greedy ones."<sup>109</sup> There are dangers to physically and psychologically isolating total spoilers through the removal of critical support such as travel and work permits. A large pool of unemployed young males, many of whom may have been soldiers in a former regime, can become fodder for an insurgency. Planners should allow for large numbers of dislocated people in the post-conflict environment and provide an outlet for their energy through employment in security forces, reconstruction workers, or interpreters. Furthermore, gainful employment provides a sense of purpose and hope.

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<sup>106</sup> *Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, 15.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

Realization of a stable society takes more time if a new regime does not make available a manner to provide for self and family in the short term, and hope for the long term.

Spoilers are not limited to individuals and groups internal to the host nation. Contrarian elements may extend from limited spoilers who seek to enhance their position locally to adjacent nations with little interest in allowing development of a democratic government. Trans-national groups may seek an opportunity to establish a theocratic-based regime. Likewise, factions recently out of power may attempt to coalesce once again to control the nation.

Establishing a national governing body begins with a stable security environment in which to gain the people's confidence. This body grows to administer the essential services of daily life, which initially are provided by the occupying force. A process of selecting administrators acceptable to the citizens and, if possible, to the victors, takes place over time. This also includes selecting civil administrators who are 'generally' reliable, lack the appearance of corruption, and can foster an environment in which businesses can develop to provide an economic underpinning.<sup>110</sup> Any appearance of stain due to association with the previous regime should preclude membership in the new government.<sup>111</sup> General Eisenhower's mandate against employing former Nazis is an example, as is the restriction against Ba'ath party members in Iraq. A vetting process will determine an individual's level of participation in the former government's illegal activities prior to employment in the new administration.

To achieve legitimacy, the new government needs a constitution and judicial system acceptable to its citizens. Host nation responsibility for its own judicial process is a precursor for legitimacy. The longer it operates under a process imposed by an occupying power, the longer it takes for its people to accord it legitimacy.

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<sup>110</sup> 'Generally' is used to connote differing standards and expectations for public servants and administrators in other cultures. It is unrealistic to expect other nations to immediately begin performing according to Western standards.

<sup>111</sup> Defense Science Board.

Once security, a governing body, and a legal system are in place, the economic structure can begin to improve. Economic reconstruction begins immediately upon conclusion of hostilities in some respects through reconstruction and hiring of laborers. However, true economic revitalization occurs with the assistance of the international community and is erratic at best until security is in place to make an area safe for investment. An editorial in the *Boston Globe* chastised the Bush administration for not “creating jobs for Iraqis immediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime.”<sup>112</sup> While acknowledging Secretary Powell’s statement that “Reconstruction and security are two sides of the same coin,” they did not allow that a secure environment must first be established.<sup>113</sup>

Foundation for a working economy begins with a nation’s human capital. People provide the manpower for the security apparatus, which supports the establishment of government, a judicial system, and an economy. The army of a former regime has potential to be either a spoiler or an enhancer to the new nation. On the negative side, the wholesale disbanding of an army produces ready grist for a mill of dissatisfaction containing trained leaders and organizers with martial skills. However, a plan that provides a livelihood, meaningful employment, and hope for the future may turn these trained leaders around and prevent their dissatisfaction and need to become recruits for an insurgency. The development of these five conditions is the point from which backwards planning should begin.<sup>114</sup>

These five building blocks (national and domestic security, governing body, judicial system, economic system, human capital) are expansive, and require resources beyond the scope of the Departments of Army and Defense. However, history shows that responsibility for the establishment and conduct of occupation government falls to the US Army and coalition forces for a period of time following hostilities. For example, the US Army was responsible for

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<sup>112</sup> Editorial, “The Next Mission In Iraq,” *Boston Globe*, August 3, 2004.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

<sup>114</sup> Kelly, E-mail from 22 July, 2004

Germany until well into 1949. While broad, these building blocks are useful for developing a post-conflict campaign plan involving joint, interagency, and multi-national players.<sup>115</sup>

Incorporating the results of an Operational Net Assessment through the efforts of a Joint Interagency Coordination Group may produce a more coherent plan for post-conflict operations and lead to better coordination with non-governmental organizations and private volunteer organizations. The interrelation of these five conditions is addressed in a report from the United Kingdoms Ministry of Defence concerning Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Delegating funding to commanders to undertake projects of relatively low cost, but quick in impact, was a highly successful means of enhancing UK forces' ability to make overt progress on infrastructure and related projects, and helped to develop the consent and build the trust of the Iraqi people, thereby improving levels of force protection.<sup>116</sup>

### **Military Responsibilities in the Post-Conflict Environment**

One of the Defense Science Board recommendations to the Secretary of Defense was to “Direct the Services to reshape and rebalance their forces to provide a stabilization and reconstruction capability, meeting as well as possible the criteria we have proposed for an effective S&R [Security and Reconstruction] capability.”<sup>117</sup> In concurrence with this recommendation, the Department of Defense’s *Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations* working paper offers principles for pre, during, and post conflict operations to establish an environment conducive to reforming a nation state. Significant among these principles are: organizing military and civilian agencies for unity of purpose and coherence of action, acting from a position of legitimacy, neutralizing or co-opting those who threaten security and reconstruction, and pursuing interim conditions for a stable state during transition.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. *Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, Chapter 11 “Post-Conflict Operations”*. Retrieved 22 August 2004 from [http://www.mod.uk/publications/iraq\\_futurelessons/chap11.htm](http://www.mod.uk/publications/iraq_futurelessons/chap11.htm)

<sup>117</sup> Defense Science Board.

<sup>118</sup> Other principles of STR are: Incorporate information operations into every action, tactical and operational; Impose security by adopting an assertive posture; Defeat those violently opposed to STR; Act

Current methods of warfare as practiced by the U.S. in Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) and Effects Based Operations (EBO) involve limiting damage to basic power facilities and governmental infrastructure. The purpose is to minimize impact on civilians and post-conflict reconstruction. A challenge in the 'high-tech' RDO method of warfare involves defeating an enemy without forcing or allowing its forces to disintegrate. A post-conflict military problem can become a host nation security concern by transitioning former enemy military and security forces into a security organization supportive of the new government.<sup>119</sup> To accomplish this, a way must be found to prevent and discourage the enemy military from dissolving into the populace. If they disband, a power vacuum and a dearth of law and order with resultant looting and sacking of government offices may erupt. A secondary effect is that strong men rise to prominence to either seize an opportunity, or truly attempt to restore order in the resulting chaos.

As U.S. and coalition forces move into an area, they should begin establishing administrators friendly to the new government, while simultaneously deposing the rogue leaders established in the power vacuum. However, this can cause resentment and anger toward the foreign power, which could lead to a popular resistance.<sup>120</sup> An assessment must be made of the efficacy of using the popularly accepted community leaders to limit the formulation of spoilers.

## **A Model**

JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations* provides the "Post-Conflict Synchronization Matrix" as a tool to aid in planning the interaction of military and other government and non-governmental organizations for PCO.<sup>121</sup> With minor modifications, the matrix contributes to understanding and aids the tracking of major combat impact on post-conflict

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with precision quickly: balance restraint and overmatching power; Operate within the law; Develop reliable local intelligence. *Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, iv.

<sup>119</sup> Rephrasing of a question posed by LTC Daniel S. Roper, Seminar 5 Leader, School for Advanced Military Studies, 2 Sep, 2004. "How do we turn a military problem into a law-enforcement/security issue?"

<sup>120</sup> Kagan.

<sup>121</sup> Joint Publication 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Operations*. Washington, D.C. GPO, 8 February 2001, I-21.

conditions (figure 4-1). Used in conjunction with the Operational Net Assessment process and products it may provide insight to a nation's government institutions, economy, society, and infrastructure as well as what international government and non-government organizations are available, and what they can provide. From top to bottom, the matrix is divided into three sections to evaluate (1) the conflict environment, (2) government organizations, and (3) other organizations. The top section aides in evaluating the pre-hostility environment, the projected impact of conflict, the desired immediate objective, and the initial desired endstate as they are affected by changes due to conflict. Figure 4-1 is an example of using the matrix to analyze the effect of removing Ba'ath party members from positions of power.

<b>Post Conflict Synchronization Matrix: De-Ba'athification</b>							
	<b>Govt: Civil Admin</b>	<b>Gov't: Law and Order</b>	<b>National Security</b>	<b>Humanitarian</b>	<b>Economic and Commerce</b>	<b>Social/Cultural</b>	<b>Infrastructure</b>
<b>Pre-Hostility</b>	Ba'ath Party dominant	-Ba'ath Party -Hussein loyalist security	Ba'ath dominated military	-U.N. and other Humanitarian Org's -Oil for food	-Supports Ba'ath -Limited due to sanctions -Oil for food	-Arabic -Ba'ath/Sunni (20%) dominated -Kurdish (20%) -Shiite (60%)	-Ba'ath managed -Reduced capacity; neglect, sanctions, war
<b>Impact of Conflict</b>	Ba'ath Dissolved	Nonexistent	Dissolved	U.S. military and International Org's	-Local level only	-Arabic -Ba'ath out - Sunni's losing power monopoly	-Further reduced. -Ba'ath Admin dissolved
<b>Immediate Objective</b>	-Interim govt managed by U.S./ Coalition	-Reestablish with Coalition forces -Interim gov't -Assess and develop legal apparatus	-U.S. forces -Reformed Iraqi military	-Prevent humanitarian disaster	-Establish oil export capability	Stabilize for open democratic elections	-Assess current system -Rebuild, employ Iraqi soldiers
<b>Desired End State</b>	-Vision, Objective govt system	-Legitimate legal system -Human rights	-Pro. Army that supports nation, not individual	-Self supporting state -Economic and land equity	-Open to world market (import/export)	-Arabic -Self-determination -Not minority dominated	-Rebuilt and self-sustaining
<b>Potential Involved Governmental Organizations</b>							
<b>Indigenous (Host) Gov't</b>	-Interim governing body	-Vetted former Iraqi police	-Reformed and vetted Iraqi military	-Red Crescent	-National Bank -Finance Ministry	-Not dominated by single party	-Administrative services (water, electricity, etc.)
<b>Internat'l Orgs</b>	U.N.	U.N.	-Arab Union -U.N.	→	→	-Reduced corruption from HN gov't	-Arab Union -U.N.
<b>Other Foreign Govt</b>	-NATO? -EU? -Coalition members	-Law Enforcement Trng cadre	-Coalition members -Diplomacy with neighboring countries	→	→	-Regional Alliances	-Economic Aid -Forgive/restructure Debt
<b>US Civilians</b>	-CPA -DoS -USAID -DoTreas.	-FBI -DoJ	-U.S. Military -CIA	-NGOs	DoTreas.	-Doctors without Borders	-Contract personnel
<b>Military Forces</b>	-Joint and Coalition	- In interim, Coalition military	→	→	-Limited impact on recovering economy	-No requirement to be member of Ba'ath party	-Iraqi forces can help rebuild
<b>Potential Involved Organizations Other Than Nongovernmental Organizations</b>							
<b>NGOs</b>				-Red Crescent -ICRC	-World Bank/WTO	Arab Union Org's	
<b>Commercial Orgs</b>		-Consultants -Contractors		-Contractors			
<b>Other Foundations, Orgs, Unions</b>							

Figure 4-1. Post Conflict Synchronization Matrix<sup>122</sup>

<sup>122</sup> This matrix is based on the "Post Conflict Synchronization Matrix" from JP 3-57, page I-21, and Flavin, 104. The intent is to meld an endstate planning tool and a post conflict synchronization matrix into an interagency post-conflict planning and tracking matrix for use through major combat operations for execution in PCO. Author alterations to the Post-Conflict Synchronization Matrix from JP 3-57 include the

With this matrix, planners can maintain situational awareness of how combat actions may affect civil-military operations (CMO) in the post-hostility environment. Through continual analysis and updates, planners can adjust actions and operations and, if necessary, make recommendations on adjusting the endstate.<sup>123</sup> Successful conclusion to hostilities and establishing a stable government relies on effective CMO during the Security, Transition, and Reconstruction phase.<sup>124</sup> This matrix, when used in conjunction with the results of an Operational Net Assessment, may help form an understanding of the post-conflict environment involving the dimensions of security, government, judiciary, economy, and populace. By using these processes, a Joint Interagency Coordination Group can coordinate the activities and operations of its component members. With continued monitoring, reassessment, and updating during major combat operations, the matrix can contribute to unity of effort across the joint and interagency community. With a plan for coordinated interagency post-conflict security, transition, and reconstruction, a nation's populace may experience less instability. Properly conducted civil-military operations attempt to separate potential insurgents from the populace through improving stability and reducing dissatisfaction with post-conflict reconstruction, thereby reducing desire to support an insurgency. Lowered support for an insurgency aids the transition from military operations to host nation policing concerns thereby speeding the withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces. For this reason, pre-hostility planning should consider post-conflict civil-military operations during the development of the campaign plan.<sup>125</sup>

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following on the horizontal axis from left to right: (1) Altering column one to "Governance: Civil Administration" to "describe the state of civil society and the vision for future governance, including education and the media", (2) adding column two for "Governance: Law and Order" to monitor the establishment of legitimate law enforcement organizations and a professional judiciary, and (3) altering the column for "Civil Security" to "National Security" to describe the status of military forces in the country. Two revisions to the top of the vertical column allow an understanding of (1) the post-hostility environment, and (2) the impact of combat operations on the post-conflict environment.

<sup>123</sup> Flavin, 105.

<sup>124</sup> JP 3-57, I-7.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

Military officers have conducted post-hostility government throughout history. There are no indications this will change in the future. Furthermore, evidence points to growing complications due to the speed of U.S. maneuver through Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) as entire operations take on the duration of individual battles in previous wars. The speed of campaigns due to the combination of maneuver warfare, Effects Based Operations, and RDO may leave a populace insufficiently fatigued, mentally or physically, to readily accept defeat. The challenge this presents is most prevalent in post-conflict operations. Planning for the rapid establishment of security, preparing for a counterinsurgency, and laying the groundwork for economic revitalization, are keys to securing peace in future conflicts.

### **Incorporating “Members” of the Old Regime**

Post-conflict operations build upon a foundation of security. U.S. and coalition forces are responsible for security in the aftermath of combat operations. A method of rapidly establishing a secure environment is utilizing the former enemy’s military and security forces as post-conflict security forces. It generally is easier for host nation personnel to provide security than it is for U.S. or coalition forces. To realize this, the enemy force structure must first be defeated; moreover, they must accept their defeat. Their recognition of loss is necessary to reset their mental state and allow them a place in the new government. These newly established forces provide a cohesive organized body for maintaining order. In return, they receive prestige of position, a hand in reconstructing their country, and a means to provide for their families. With the new host nation administration painting them as honorable and loyal members of the government, they put a native face on security forces. This may afford a smoother transition to conflict termination and the post conflict environment. What initially is required from this force is a defined chain-of-command that follows the orders and directives of their political masters, while not subjugating the people.

A populace may be more hesitant to attack their own than they are to attack foreign forces. Transition to a native administration is necessary for a viable exit strategy predicated by formation of a viable and legitimate government. One way to speed transition to a host nation government is by utilizing previous administrators, to the extent possible, from neighborhood to national level.

The improper execution of a policy to remove all people capable of running local through national administration due to former party affiliation may be self-defeating. “De-Nazification” and “de-Ba’athification” were the policies for post-war Germany and Iraq respectively, with a commensurate loss of efficiency and effectiveness. In 1945 Germany, General Eisenhower accepted diminished administrative efficiency to achieve thorough de-Nazification.<sup>126</sup> The U.S. administration’s policy of de-Ba’athification in Iraq also realized reduced administrative efficiency. Members of the Ba’athist party were perceived as contributors to Saddam’s evil endeavors and therefore not deserving of a place in post-war Iraq. However, just as in Nazi Germany, common people had to be members of the party just to be allowed to function. With civil administrators, teachers, and police chiefs, throughout Iraq being affiliated with the Ba’athist party, their removal resulted in diminished administrative effectiveness and social upheaval, and led to greater social unrest and dissatisfaction with the U.S. Average members of society may be involved to some level with the dominant political party in order to function in society.

## **Summary**

The Security, Transition, and Reconstruction concept outlines a process in which the U.S. no longer seeks the “*status quo antebellum*.”<sup>127</sup> Instead, the United States and its coalition partners seek a new status quo in which a populace is “better off” than it was prior to the war.

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<sup>126</sup> McCreedy, 18.

<sup>127</sup> *Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, 2.

“Better off may mean more freedom, increased potential for economic prosperity, improved health and safety conditions, or some combination of the aforementioned.”<sup>128</sup>

A comprehensive plan for successful conflict resolution begins with a thorough understanding of the desired political endstate. Understanding the endstate comes from reviewing policy guidance, Presidential Decision Directives, the National Security Strategy, and others. Integrated conflict and post-conflict planning requires cooperation across the joint and interagency community. An important element for determining campaign objectives and preparing for post-war activities is an appreciation of “the necessary and sufficient conditions that must exist for the conflict to terminate and the post-conflict efforts to succeed.”<sup>129</sup> With this understanding, important aspects for post-conflict planning involve incorporating interagency elements early, and ensuring a common understanding of, and unity of effort toward, the objectives and endstates across the joint and interagency spectrum.<sup>130</sup> The Joint Interagency Coordination Group can provide the necessary structure for developing a combined U.S. interagency plan.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Clausewitz said that ‘war is an extension of politics’ but he should have added, ‘and to politics it must return’.

J.G. Wilford, OBE, LTC<sup>131</sup>

#### **Post Conflict Operations: An Interagency Endeavor**

Post-conflict operations are a long-term endeavor. Even the successful execution of PCO in post-war Germany required a large military presence for over four years. Expecting military

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<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> William Flavin. “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success,” *Parameters*, Autumn 2003, 101.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>131</sup> J.G. Wilford, LTC, *OP TELIC – COIN Lessons: SOI Lessons Learnt*. 21 January 2004. Analysis by United Kingdom of Lessons Learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom. Brief is on file with the author.

forces to redeploy rapidly upon the conclusion of decisive combat operations has little basis in history. When the U.S. occupies a nation, the post-conflict environment requires the continued presence of soldiers and interagency personnel for establishing security and maintaining and rebuilding civil infrastructure. The U.S. government and military should accept that establishing long-term stabilization and legitimate governance is a challenging and necessary component to conflict resolution.

Victory resides in establishing a stable and legitimate government, not in the successful achievement of military objectives. Post-conflict operations create conditions in which governments can pursue a stable peace, with combat forces providing the link between war and peace. They provide security and infrastructure support to allow civil administration time to organize and reinstitute civilian control and build confidence in the forming government. Establishing a stable environment is a reliable endstate from which to begin planning in the absence of clear guidance. Major combat operations and post-conflict planning should be part of the same planning cycle.

If the United States continues to attempt regime change to produce governments more amenable to U.S. interests, the basic concept of war may need revision. “*Combat* is characterized by breaking things and killing people; *war* is about much more than that.”<sup>132</sup> Future PCO may require better interagency coordination to reduce the amount of time U.S. and coalition personnel are exposed to the dangers of an unstable environment. Greater interagency coordination enables transition to an acceptable “new normal” that is necessary for U.S. and coalition forces to be withdrawn. Establishing a “new-normal” with commensurate government and civilian infrastructure is a daunting task and requires detailed planning. However, the lack of acceptance of post-conflict operations as a military mission results in a lowered planning priority. The

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<sup>132</sup> Kagan, 6.

developing concept of Operational Net Assessment can help address a lack of understanding of the intricate networks resident in societies.

## **Recommendations**

This monograph proposes the following recommendations to address post-conflict operations planning and impact members of the Department of Defence, Interagency, and Joint forces. Adopting these recommendations may result in greater success in a post-conflict setting, but the complexity involved in the chaotic post-conflict social environment negates assured success. The Department of Defense should accept that post-conflict operations are a part of the framework of war and begin contingency and campaign planning with the end in mind. Also, the U.S. military should acknowledge that it is the only organization in the U.S. government capable of occupying and administering a nation until the host nation government is reestablished and assumes control. Beginning campaign planning with the objective of a stable and secure political environment can frame the planning of major combat operations. Including post-conflict planning in combat training center rotations as the culminating exercise would emphasize its importance. Endorsing interagency involvement can add another level of intricacy and improve understanding of the post-conflict environment.

An understanding of the factors relevant in a post-war scenario may develop from an in-depth pre-conflict analysis as outlined in the Operational Net Assessment concept. Interagency efforts toward supporting Standing Joint Force Headquarters should accept and refine the ONA process, conduct the System of Systems Analysis, and incorporate it into databases available for use during contingency planning. With an available database of regional information, Joint Interagency Coordination Groups could draw from the relevant data to inform their planning team of the complex environment in which the strategic objectives must be met.

When planning post-conflict operations, joint planners should begin with the Security, Transition, and Reconstruction framework as defined in *Security, Transition, and Reconstruction*

*Operations Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.06 (Draft)* to establish an outline for securing the peace. Commencement of peace operations begins with the conclusion of major combat and requires the immediate establishment of security for host nation personnel as well as U.S. forces. The location of combat units can impact the level of disorder, looting, and general sense of insecurity in a populace, which affects its view of U.S. forces and the transition to post-conflict reconstruction. When possible, host nation law enforcement or military personnel can assist in re-instituting order. Security, re-establishment of civil infrastructure with the removal of former regime supporters, and facilitating judicial reformation and economic recovery are part of the Security, Transition, and Recovery concept.

Security, Transition, and Reconstruction operations, termed Phase IV in the current vernacular, are another phase of war, not Military Operations Other Than War (figure 1-1). The Department of Defense, and the U.S. Army in particular, should refine its doctrinal framework with Security, Transition, and Reconstruction being part of “fighting and winning” in the range of military operations. The war is not over until a nation is self sustaining and can defend itself against an insurgency. If post-conflict operations are another phase of war, it cannot be an operation ‘other’ than war. The ability to conduct a counterinsurgency is an inherent part of Security, Transition, and Reconstruction and may prevent an insurgency from forming through host nation populace satisfaction with the state of security and reconstruction. Major war games and exercises, such as ULCHI FOCUS LENS, involving military, interagency and multinational organizations, can incorporate Security, Transition, and Reconstruction rehearsals.<sup>133</sup>

With non –Department of Defense agencies lacking a planning culture, the Department of Defense should accept the Joint Interagency Coordination Group concept, which takes into account lessons learned in the global war on terrorism and stabilization operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. A JIACG staff should include officers with a broad range of knowledge

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<sup>133</sup> *Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, 12.

and ability to conduct detailed planning for the reestablishment of a nation's administration, judiciary, and economic activity. Competent resourced JIACG staffs can mitigate the impact of slow reaction time of other government agencies. With the changing environment as outlined in the Joint Operating Environment manual, the 21<sup>st</sup> Century provides opportunities and dangers requiring new solutions. The Department of Defense and other government agencies must adapt to the environment and seize the opportunity to develop as institutions to enhance their ability to protect and serve the American people.

Few major combat operations alone, no matter how decisive, can achieve the nation's strategic objectives. Major combat should be followed by the execution of a coherent plan for post-conflict operations when an enemy's government collapses or is replaced. The general theme of Dana Priest's book *The Mission* is summed up in the statement, "For America's military, though, it was almost business as usual. Taking the lead had become The Mission."<sup>134</sup> While she is discussing actions in an earlier conflict, this comment also applies to PCO. Because no other entity is capable of taking the lead in post-conflict operations, the U.S. military should accept its role as the lead agency, plan for it, and be ready to execute it as the next phase of operations until relieved of responsibility by civilian authority. Starting with the reestablishment of capable government to produce a stable environment and backward planning from there enables a more complete plan across the levels of war and incorporates all elements of national power. Beginning with the end in mind, the successful transition to host nation government, is the key to the decisive phase of conflict, post-conflict operations.

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<sup>134</sup> Priest, 40.

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