

**“VIRTUAL VICTORY”:
THE INFLUENCE OF “POST” MODERN WARFARE
ON
POST CONFLICT OPERATIONS:**

IS DEFEAT NECESSARY TO START “PHASE IV”

**A Monograph
by
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14. ABSTRACT

This monograph analyzes the interrelationship between new way the US forces will fight their wars in future - effects based operations (EBO) with network centered forces (NCO) - and the challenges after the major combat operations (MCO) ended, known as post conflict operations, reconstruction phase, or phase IV. The focus is on the prerequisite for phase IV, to get the acceptance of the population for an new start. The history suggests that only total defeat prepares the population for an new start. First, the monograph reviews the background of defeat. Herby lies the main emphasis on the situation and the will of the civilian population. Then the monograph examines the acceptance of defeat in two historical examples in detail. Japan and Germany. Some more recent examples, Dominican Republic (1965), Haiti (1994), and Kosovo (1999), are shortly considered too. The results of those examinations show that bombing did not lead to total defeat and is therefore not the necessary start point for phase IV. Second, the monograph describes the new kind of warfare. It explains the different kind of effects and analyses the interrelationship between those kinds of effects. The developments of NCO and EBO are described. The use of the new technology during the Operation Iraqi Freedom is assessed and investigated for the consequences for phase IV operations. Finally, the lessons learned out of history about the acceptance of defeat and the starting point for phase IV operations are mirrored against the ideas of EBO and NCO. The start of phase IV in the historical examples show that not the total defeat is responsible for the success within phase IV, but effects which are within EBO could be used even better to prepare during MCO for a great success of phase IV. The monograph concludes with the analysis of those effects within EBO. Those effects will be found mostly within the nonlethal effects and especially in the consequent use of information operations (IO) during the whole war. The monograph underlines the importance of IO and the concentration on cascading effects during different phases of the war. In support of this argument, the monograph recommends to separate the different campaigns to help the commanders and planners to concentrate on their phase but underline the total effort of the war.

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Abstract

“VIRTUAL VICTORY”: THE INFLUENCE OF “POST” MODERN WARFARE ON POST
CONFLICT OPERATIONS IS DEFEAT NECESSARY TO START “PHASE IV”

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THIS MONOGRAPH ANALYZES THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEW WAY THE US FORCES WILL FIGHT THEIR WARS IN FUTURE – EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS (EBO) WITH NETWORK CENTERED FORCES (NCO) – AND THE CHALLENGES AFTER THE MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS (MCO) ENDED, KNOWN AS POST CONFLICT OPERATIONS, RECONSTRUCTION PHASE, OR PHASE IV. THE FOCUS IS ON THE PREREQUISITE FOR PHASE IV, TO GET THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE POPULATION FOR AN NEW START. THE HISTORY SUGGESTS THAT ONLY TOTAL DEFEAT PREPARES THE POPULATION FOR AN NEW START.

FIRST, THE MONOGRAPH REVIEWS THE BACKGROUND OF DEFEAT. HERBY LIES THE MAIN EMPHASIS ON THE SITUATION AND THE WILL OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. THEN THE MONOGRAPH EXAMINES THE ACCEPTANCE OF DEFEAT IN TWO HISTORICAL EXAMPLES IN DETAIL. JAPAN AND GERMANY. SOME MORE RECENT EXAMPLES, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (1965), HAITI (1994) AND KOSOVO (1999), ARE SHORTLY CONSIDERED TOO. THE RESULTS OF THOSE EXAMINATIONS SHOW THAT BOMBING DID NOT LEAD TO TOTAL DEFEAT AND IS THEREFORE NOT THE NECESSARY START POINT FOR PHASE IV.

SECOND, THE MONOGRAPH DESCRIBES THE NEW KIND OF WARFARE. IT EXPLAINS THE DIFFERENT KIND OF EFFECTS AND ANALYSES THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THOSE KINDS OF EFFECTS. THE DEVELOPMENTS OF NCO AND EBO ARE DESCRIBED. THE USE OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGY DURING THE OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM IS ASSESSED AND INVESTIGATED FOR THE CONSEQUENCES FOR PHASE IV OPERATIONS.

FINALLY, THE LESSONS LEARNED OUT OF HISTORY ABOUT THE ACCEPTANCE OF DEFEAT AND THE STARTING POINT FOR PHASE IV OPERATIONS ARE MIRRORED AGAINST THE IDEAS OF EBO AND NCW. THE START OF PHASE IV IN THE HISTORICAL EXAMPLES SHOW THAT NOT THE TOTAL DEFEAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUCCESS WITHIN PHASE IV, BUT EFFECTS WHICH ARE WITHIN EBO COULD BE USED EVEN BETTER TO PREPARE DURING MCO FOR A GREAT SUCCESS OF PHASE IV.

THE MONOGRAPH CONCLUDES WITH THE ANALYSIS OF THOSE EFFECTS WITHIN EBO. THOSE EFFECTS WILL BE FOUND MOSTLY WITHIN THE NONLETHAL EFFECTS AND ESPECIALLY IN THE CONSEQUENT USE OF INFORMATION OPERATION (IO) DURING THE WHOLE WAR. THE MONOGRAPH UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF IO AND THE CONCENTRATION ON CASCADING EFFECTS DURING DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE WAR. IN SUPPORT OF THIS ARGUMENT, THE MONOGRAPH RECOMMENDS TO SEPARATE THE DIFFERENT CAMPAIGNS TO HELP THE COMMANDERS AND PLANNERS TO CONCENTRATE ON THEIR PHASE BUT UNDERLINE THE TOTAL EFFORT OF THE WAR.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In spring 2003, the United States and its coalition partners waged a war against Iraq and its dictator Saddam Hussein. A stable and democratic Iraq should be established to be the center piece for promoting stability and positive change in the region. At the same time, the Iraqi forces were to be disarmed of their weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorist organizations was to be stopped. To fulfill these objectives, especially the idea of stability in the region, there had to be a quick, decisive victory and a postwar reconstruction and successful political transformation.¹

Coalition forces fought the war brilliantly. The American forces especially were the most sophisticated and best equipped of all times and were able to fight a truly joint, combined arms operation.² The result of the fight against the Iraqi forces – defeating them and conquering Baghdad within a few weeks – demonstrated clearly the unmatched military superiority of US forces. The planning and execution of this war was very professional and showed the new kind of warfare of the American military. Army units, in close cooperation with forces of the Marine Corps, and with the support of the Air Force and Navy - with all their new equipment and their new C4ISR - demonstrated the superior way to win. The importance of networked forces and the concentration on effects rather than on attrition was a new kind of warfare. This is the way to win the war today and in the future.

Major combat operations ended in Iraq on 1 May 2003. The success of this operation was announced by the US President George W. Bush on board the USS *Abraham Lincoln*. “Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our

¹ RAND, *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, Washington, 2003, p.168 - 169

² Max Boot, “*The New American Way of War*”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.82, No4, July/August 2003, p. 43

allies have prevailed. And now, our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country³.” At this time the coalition forces had overrun the Iraqi defense, seized Baghdad, and controlled the northern part of Iraq.

The perception of the American and international public was that combat activities were over and everybody could concentrate their efforts on rebuilding Iraq. Few foresaw any major problems at the start of this task. However, the situation in the country did not develop as expected. The security of the American and coalition soldiers and international aide workers in Iraq was threatened; many of them were wounded and several were killed.⁴

Therefore, the seizure of the capital and the destruction of the enemy’s armies is only one step to final victory. Long ago, Clausewitz stated, “If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strengths of his will⁵”.

In recent history, the operation after the military victory – nation building or reconstruction – was an essential part of the problem solving strategy to deal with unstable areas. This phase has become more and more important over the last years. In Iraq, this was one of the major objectives.

The goals of our coalition are clear and limited. We will end a brutal regime, whose aggression and weapons of mass destruction make it a unique threat to the world. Coalition forces will help maintain law and order, so that Iraqis can live in security. We will respect your great religious traditions, whose principles of equality and compassion are essential to Iraq’s future. We will help you build a peaceful and representative government that protects the rights of all citizens. And then our military forces will

³ Remarks by the President from the USS *Abraham Lincoln* on the 1st of May 2003 May 01, 2003 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html>

⁴ There have been 559 confirmed coalition deaths, 478 Americans, 53 Britons, four Bulgarians, one Dane, 17 Italians, two Poles, one Spaniard, two Thai and one Ukrainian, in the war as of December 30, 2003. There also have been 2,696 Americans wounded in the war, according to the Pentagon. This list is updated regularly.

⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Ed. And trans. By Michael Howard and Peter Paret, New York, 1993, p. 86

leave. Iraq will go forward as a unified, independent and sovereign nation that has regained a respected place in the world.⁶

A special development in the new kind of warfare is the consequences for the civilians. Increased precision of the weapons and better target acquisition makes the armed forces more effective and less destructive for the civilian population and, in some situations for the civilian infrastructure as well.⁷ These implications are drastically different from former wars where civilians often had to suffer more than the armed forces.

Now the effect of the used weapons were concentrated on the opposing fighting forces. Today, we have the greater power to free a nation by breaking a dangerous and aggressive regime. With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians. No device of man can remove the tragedy from war; yet it is a great moral advance when the guilty have far more to fear from war than the innocent.⁸

However, to win the peace – there must be more. Already Clausewitz saw that, “the effect of all of this [the force of victory] outside the army – on the people and on the government – is a sudden collapse of the most anxious expectations and a complete crushing of self-confidence”.⁹ This can be studied in history of World War II (WW II) and its aftermath. Germany and Japan were defeated and everybody – the government, the armed forces, and the population- was convinced of this. Therefore, these peoples were willing to accept the final defeat and there were far fewer obstacles to the above-mentioned next phase to final victory – build / rebuild a democratic nation.

⁶ President Bush, *President's message to the Iraqi people*, Apr. 10th, 2003
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html>

⁷ Max Boot, “*The New American Way of War*”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.82, No4, July/August 2003, p. 53

⁸ Remarks by the President on board the USS Abraham Lincoln on the 1st of May 2003,
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html>

⁹ Clausewitz, p. 86

The central question at this stage is the mismatch between the great success of the armed forces in winning the battles in Iraq and the problems they face in winning the peace after the fighting is over.¹⁰

US forces destroyed the Iraqi army with the new kind of warfare, but there are still several groups (like members of the Baath party, Sunni, etc.) who do not believe in the truth of defeat and the necessity of a new start.

My thesis is that the new American way of war can produce more obstacles on the road to peace than it removes. Achieving the necessary acceptance of defeat by the population is harder than in the past, where defeat was based mostly on attrition. The modern way to fight, especially Effects Based Operations, can complicate the reconstruction phase if the planning of both phases - defeat of the armed forces and the reconstruction / nation building - are not synchronized and supported by all contributors (i.e. Department of Defense, Department of State, etc.). In addition, all new means, such as information operations, must be concentrated on a common objective for all phases.

BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE

The importance of Effects Based Operations in combination with Network Centered Warfare will in the future be the center of the war fighting strategy of the armed forces. Forces of the major US allies – i.e. NATO, etc. – will follow this development.

At the same time the challenges for the US – and for all democracies – will be broader than in the past. There will be more emphasis on the phase after the major fighting operations end than ever before in history. Whether support to falling states, rebuild fallen states, or prevent states from collapsing, this development has been in progress the last fifty years (i.e. Dominican Republic, Haiti, Bosnia, etc.).

¹⁰ Robert Kagan, “*War and Aftermath*”, *Policy Review*, August / September 2003, p. 1

So there is an urgent need to look a little bit deeper at the possible interconnection and interdependence of those phases – war fighting and the phase after the war fighting ends.

To fight non-state actors, terrorist group etc. that will be a new development beyond the paradigm of the Westphalian system of military power only by nation states is not considered in this monograph.¹¹ This kind of warfare has so different sets of rules, that there is no reconstruction and nation building, because there are no nations involved in these wars.

METHODOLOGY

This monograph analyzes the interrelationship between the new way the US forces will fight wars in the future – Effects Based Operations with Network Centered Force – and the challenges during the phase after the major combat has ended – the reconstruction phase, which includes the reconstruction and the nation building mission. Sometimes this phase is called Phase IV of the operation. For this monograph, the synonym of the reconstruction and nation building is “Phase IV”.

Chapter II reviews the psychological background of defeat. The main emphasis lies in the analysis of the situation of the civilian population. The members of the armed forces have to accept defeat before Phase IV starts. They are considered only so long as they have any consequences for the next phase, but then not any longer combatants.

Chapter III examines the acceptance of defeat in two historical examples – Japan and Germany. In these two cases, reconstruction worked well and both nations are now essential parts of the international community. Why did it work so well here? What were the conditions at the end of the war for the civilian population? Why did both peoples accept their defeat? What are the similarities and differences of each.

¹¹ Heribert Münkler, *Die neuen Kriege*, Reinbek, 2002, explains in great detail all these developments and consequences. The consideration of these topics would be enough stuff for a new monograph.

Chapter IV describes the new kind of warfare. It explains the details of the Effects Based Operations (EBO) and of Network Centric Warfare (NCW). The future of war fighting is assessed and the ideas for Phase IV operations are examined.

Chapter V analyzes the consequences of the new kind of warfare for operations after major combat has ended. The psychological considerations about the acceptance of defeat are viewed with the perspective on the EBO. The lessons learned in Phase IV operations – especially in the area of the acceptance of defeat – are mirrored against the ideas of EBO. The different kinds of effects – like direct versus indirect, cumulative and cascading, physical, functional, systemic, and psychological, etc. are viewed under the experiences of the past.¹²

Chapter VI and VII sum up the conclusions of the analysis and finish the monograph with some recommendations for the future use of EBO and NCW in the consideration of Phase IV operations and the subsequent planning of operations –taking into account that planning for one phase can have serious consequences for the following phases.

CHAPTER TWO

PSYCHOLOGY AND REASONING OF DEFEAT

Defeat is defined as a “triumph over an adversary”. Defeat is the most general: “Whether we defeat the enemy in one battle, or by degrees, the consequences will be the same” (Thomas Paine)... Beat is similar to defeat, though less formal and often more emphatic: “To win battles ... you beat the soul ... of the enemy man” (George S. Patton)¹³ Wolfgang Schivelbusch, a cultural historian, defines defeat as nothing more than the negation of a will that has proven unable to realize its aims, despite using all means at its disposal.¹⁴

¹² Edward C Mann, *Thinking effects*, Cadre Paper No. 15, Maxwell, 2002, pp. 32-37

¹³ The American Heritage® *Dictionary of the English Language*, Fourth Edition

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¹⁴ Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The culture of defeat*, trans. by Jefferson Chase, New York, p. 2

All through history, defeat has been a part of war fighting. There was the threat of extinction, which was directed not only at the soldiers but also at all members of the enemy people. This changed sometime during the eighteenth and nineteenth century in the cabinet wars. The consequences of defeat in the Napoleonic wars were the collapse of expectations and of self-confidence.¹⁵ “The effect of all of this outside the army – on the people and on the government – is a sudden collapse of the most anxious expectations, and a complete crushing of the self-confidence. This leaves a vacuum that is filled by a corrosively expanding fear, which completes the paralysis. In place of an immediate and determined effort by everyone to hold off further misfortune there is a general fear that any effort will be useless”¹⁶ In the twentieth century total war came back. World War I gave the first glimpse of this development while during World War II this was an essential part of the strategy of several countries.

Defeat, threat of defeat or the acceptance of defeat is different for soldiers and civilians. Military psychology concentrates its research and studies on the behavior of the soldier. It is not normally concerned with the feelings and thinking about the threat of defeat of civilians. Even in the military environment, the emphasis on research and doctrine about the psychological vulnerabilities of the soldier is limited.¹⁷ On the other hand, the manipulation of the thinking and the behavior of the warfighters is a very interesting subject to scientists. It results in the ideas of psychological warfare.

An essential part of all effects is the use of weapons. Modern weapons have a huge power of devastation. These weapons have an effect on a great number of people and play an important role in deterrence.¹⁸ Important is the significant difference between the use of weapons concerning soldiers or civilians.

¹⁵ For more details see Schivelbusch, p. 5

¹⁶ Clausewitz, p. 303

¹⁷ Peter J. Schifferle, *Incorporating Enemy Psychological Vulnerability into US Army Heavy Division IPB Doctrine*, SAMS, Monograph AY 93-94, p. 8

¹⁸ Peter Watson, *War on the mind*, New York, 1978, p. 36

The soldier usually has the possibility – and the duty – to fight back. He is trained, has his own weapon and is part of a small group with which he fights.¹⁹ He has most probably chosen his job and is mentally prepared for the consequences – like death or injury, to himself as well as his comrades. The soldier becomes acclimated to the sight of death and wounded comrades. The acceptance of defeat is an organizational decision and normally not taken by a single soldier or officer. Everybody has to recognize that the defeat is not only a matter of personal skills; it may lie in the failure to adequately to understand changes in battlefield tactics or missing equipment as well.²⁰

During World War I and II, the warfare on the minds of the enemy soldier increased with the development of electronic means of delivering the messages. The technological developments during the last decades (like TV and Internet) have improved those possibilities exponentially. The interesting question is to find the right topics suited for the targeted audience.

On the other hand, the civilian is forced to suffer without any possibility to act. He cannot fight back, he is neither trained nor equipped and most importantly, he has no information about the situation and has to live in uncertainty. In addition, a large portion of the population may be children who not fully understand what is happening.²¹ They even make the situation for the adults more difficult because of their concern for the health of the children over their own.

The effects of new weapons, like aerial bombing, were predicted differently – some foresaw mass emotional disturbances while others expected widespread panic. Most of these predictions were wrong, but there were some effects from these bombings and other new

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 217-218

²⁰ George J Andreopoloulos, and Harold E. Selesky, *The Aftermath of Defeat, Societies, Armed Forces, and the Challenge of Recovery*, New Haven and London, 1994, p. 2

²¹ Watson, pp. 218

weapons, which were mostly first used in World War II. Research on bombing is mostly from World War II, but includes Korea and Vietnam as well. People, soldiers and civilians, are able to adapt quickly to bombing. The destruction of housing leaves more people homeless than actually killed. This is the major reason for changing behavior.²² The conclusion is “that you have to destroy at least half the housing before you can hope to have any effect at all on the social structure of the enemy and begin to affect his morale and work capacity in any permanent fashion. On the other hand, it was found that disruption of the food supply affects society much more quickly – it seems to be far less elastic than housing.”²³

The other side part of defeat is recovery or, in this case, reconstruction. So war fighting and the post-war environment must be considered simultaneously. This is true for the military, but even more important for the civilians.

For this reason there has to be a less lethal alternative than to bomb civilians into accepting defeat and looking forward to the end of the fighting. One way to convey the message to the enemy population is psychological warfare. The technological developments during the last decades have improved those possibilities exponentially. The interesting question – like in the military realm - is to find the right topics suited for the targeted audience. These topics are even more complicated than the topics to influence the military. They are based on knowledge of the country and the society and based on soft intelligence. At the same, time they can easily provide opportunities for self deception.²⁴ The assumption during the war in Iraq was that all Iraqi soldiers would surrender and all Iraqi people would welcome the US soldiers. This was a kind of self deception.

Sometimes, part of the preparation for Phase IV operations includes managing the

²² Ibid., pp. 218-219, see here fore more details, especially the data of the different studies and the several footnotes.

²³ Ibid., pp. 220-221

²⁴ Fred C. Iklé, *Every war must end*, New York, 1991, p. 30

expectations of the enemy soldier and the civilian population of those who will execute the occupation and the subsequent reconstruction phase. The different expectations of the Germans concerning the behavior of the American and Soviet soldiers led to a total different approach towards the occupation force and the willingness to cooperate on a constructive basis.

The understanding of those psychological effects is essential. Only in this way is the importance of the will of the populace to accept defeat is understandable. However, American society ever since the war of 1812 had the experience any kind of defeat on the Continental United States from outside – Pearl Harbor was in Hawaii and the target was a military one. There may be an idea of defeat in the former States of the Confederacy, but this was in the middle of the nineteenth century. The attack on the World Trade Center and on the Pentagon was an attack on the mind of the American population which some may appropriate of the emotions other peoples have experienced during their histories. The symbolic functions of these buildings –one as the center of the American military power and the others as the symbol of the economic power of the US – were a great part of the shock this attack inflicted on the American population.²⁵ Nevertheless, this shock is not comparable with emotional defeats other peoples experienced.

CHAPTER THREE

SUCCESSFUL HISTORY OF DEFEAT AND RECONSTRUCTION

In recent history there are always two examples used to explain a very successful reconstruction and nation building. The histories of these two countries are very different from one another. The transferability of the two examples may not always be possible, but there are lessons from both which are transferable to the operations in Iraq and for future operations.

²⁵ Schivelbusch, pp. 291-292

In both cases the political, military situation is closely interwoven with the situation of the civilian population. The history of defeat is only understandable if both parts, military and civilian, are considered.

JAPAN

On 15 August 1945, Japan surrendered unconditionally to the United States. At this time, Japan possessed an army with more than two million men and there was no invasion force on Japanese territory at all.²⁶ Until the middle of the nineteenth century, Japan was a closed society and only in the previous one hundred years did the society developed into a “modern” state and to an imperialistic nation.²⁷ This closed Japanese society was a very challenging task for the US forces which took responsibility after the surrender. This was different from the occupation in Germany, a “typical” western society.²⁸ These circumstances are more comparable with the presence of US forces in Iraq.

The historian Pape examines three different principal explanations for the capitulation before an invasion and decisive defeat of the home army. The first explanation saw as the reason the fear of future punishment from atomic bombing. The second saw the reason in the conventional strategic bombing and its consequences on the civilian population. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) comes to the same conclusion.²⁹ The third explanation saw the possibility for the emperor to keep his position within the Japanese society. Pape argues that all these factors may have been part of the decision, but not decisive. Military vulnerability, not the civilian vulnerability accounts for the decision to surrender.³⁰

²⁶ Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to win*, New York, 1996, p. 87

²⁷ John W. Dower, *Embracing defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II*, New York, 1999, pp. 19-23

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 23

²⁹ USSBS, *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale*, p.6

³⁰ Pape, 1996, pp. 87 – 89, see the single line of arguments and the reasoning behind these arguments.

The civilian morale was nevertheless targeted by the US Air Force which attacked the vulnerable Japanese cities and burned them. This started in March 1945. The idea behind the bombing was a wholesale administrative, psychological and economic breakdown, cracking the backbone of the enemy's will to resist.³¹ The same idea stood behind the use of the atomic bomb in August 1945. But neither the "terror bombing" nor the use of the atomic bomb had the intended effect. The shock of the atomic bomb was minor and most of the destruction was due to the conventional bombing.³²

One part of the use of the atomic bomb was to threaten future damage than to inflict more damage on already heavily destroyed cities. The US forces never used this as information operations. They did not give the Japanese government the time to evaluate the destruction of the first atomic bomb nor did they give them the possibility assess the future risks and to act accordingly.³³ But neither strategic nor atomic bombing forced the Japanese population to call for immediate surrender nor was the industrial output intensively decreased. Here the lack of raw material and energy supplies had a much bigger influence than the bombing.³⁴

The threat of invasion of the Japanese homeland was planned during the winter 1944/45 and should start in fall 1945 and continue during 1946. This was highly credible, especially after the fall of Okinawa. The Japanese government realized the credibility of this threat.³⁵

The reasoning for the final surrender of the Japanese government was not the demand of the civilian population but rather organization within the Japanese government and the special Japanese culture. The government expanded their campaign to socialize the entire population for a final suicidal fight, which did not work. Most Japanese saw the American

³¹ Ibid., p. 92

³² Ibid., 106

³³ Ibid., pp. 105-106

³⁴ Ibid., p. 102

³⁵ Ibid., p. 108

victory as a liberation from death.³⁶ This development in Japanese society started long before the final surrender in August 1945. There was an exhaustion of a deep and complex kind. This was due to the tendency of the government to waste people - soldiers and civilians – in pursuing impossible war objectives.³⁷

The complicated governmental decision making process with its emphasis on the military, the political objectives during the war that were no longer achievable, and the changes in Japanese military leadership concerning surrender, come to recognize the credible threat of an invasion.³⁸ The American idea to bomb the Japanese and inflict major losses on the civilian population to force the government to surrender was never successful. The interdiction of shipping, the destruction of the supply with raw material and oil, and the threat of an invasion convinced the Japanese leaders that to defend the homeland would not be successful and led to the decision to surrender.³⁹

At the end, the emperor broadcasted – by public radio - the message to the Japanese people that Japan had surrendered to the United States. He never used the words “defeat” or “surrender” in his speech but the meaning was clear to all his peoples – Japan had lost the war. Everybody heard this from the emperor himself. This was very important in an society which very much concentrated on the autocratic figure of the emperor.⁴⁰

In this situation, the press played an important factor. The Japanese press switched immediately from propaganda to heighten the will of the people to fight to a theme, which supported the surrender and called for calm reaction of the people.⁴¹

³⁶ Dower, pp. 87-89

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 104-105

³⁸ Pape, pp. 108 – 127, Pape argues there extensively that these three points finally ended in the decision by the government to surrender. The attrition of civilians were never one of the arguments to surrender.

³⁹ Ibid., p.127,

⁴⁰ Dower, pp. 35-37

⁴¹ Makato, Ionize, *Japan meets the United States for the Second Time*, Daedalus, Summer 1990; PA Research II Periodicals, p.100

The Japanese surrender was taken by the (military) government. The reasons are shown above, destruction of the re-supply for industry and the credible threat of an invasion. The decisionmakers never considered the will of the population. At the end, the closed society followed their emperor in the surrender and the occupation. But the government was discredited and nobody wanted to follow them in an additional fight against US forces. This was different in Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo where existing the politicians stayed in power.⁴²

GERMANY

In the beginning of May 1945, Germany surrendered to the Allied forces – mainly comprised of the forces of the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. At this time the German Armed Forces – die Wehrmacht - was beaten on all theaters of war and the country was occupied and without any executive power. Pape argues again that the coercive idea of forcing Germany to surrender failed even more than in Japan. There are two different parts of this problem. One is the failure of the intense air campaign against German cities and civilians and the other is the failure of the threat to invade the German homeland.⁴³

The bombing of German cities, especially favored by the British Royal Air Force (RAF), was directed to destroy the morale of the civilian population as whole and of the industrial workers in particular.⁴⁴ The strategic bombing never had the intended effect (see as well the argument in Chapter II).⁴⁵ Even the influence on the German economy, which was one of the major arguments within the US Air Force to continue the strategic bombing, never had its

⁴² Gary T. Dempsey, *Fool's Errands, America's recent encounters with Nation Building*, Washington, 2001, P. 21

⁴³ Pape, p.255

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 260 – 262, Pape explains in great detail the factors of this bombing.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 281

anticipated effect.⁴⁶ Actual invasion of the German homeland and operational interdiction, disrupting the flow of supplies to the ground forces, proved decisive in the end.⁴⁷

The German civilian population was never enthusiastic about the war, like they were at the beginning of World War I.⁴⁸ But after the first two years of “easy” victories, the mood of the population changed. Only after the higher death rates of the soldiers in Russia and the Stalingrad debacle did the population become war-weary.⁴⁹ During the following years, especially during the winter 1944/45, the mood changed even more. Most of the civilian became fatalistic expected the final victory of the Allied forces.

At the same time the picture of the members of the ruling party, NSDAP, changed dramatically. The behavior of party officials in crisis situations turned out to be devastating. In the first instances, i.e. occupation of Aachen, leading members fled in panic and showed no signs of leadership. This influenced the German population even more about the probable final outcome of the war.⁵⁰ During the spring of 1945, the party officials repeated this performance all over Germany. The moral bankruptcy of those party officials in the face of danger and their dishonest behavior showed many people the real face of a government whose members at all levels – national, regional, and local – had to be members of the party.⁵¹ This behavior, and especially the reaction of the population, should have been exploited by US forces to influence the rest of the German population. In a future Information Operation (IO) campaign this topic, the loss of credibility, especially on local and regional level, should be considered. At the same time, the IO campaign must “support” the behavior of the officials by creating incentives to act in this way.

⁴⁶ p. 281 – 283, USSBS *Summary Report*, indicates that next to the importance of the air operations the economic effect the strategic bombing was not decisive, p. 15-16

⁴⁷ Pape, p.283

⁴⁸ Richard Overy, , *Why the allies won*, New York, 1996, Paperbackversion, 1997, 9. 298

⁴⁹ Klaus-Dietmar Henke, *Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschland*, Munich, 1996., p. 813

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 825

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 825-831

Having understood the destruction of the credibility and morale of not only the national authorities but of the local and regional as well, the problem of a resistance movement receded. The idea of an “official” resistance against the occupation force, the “Werwolf” movement, never got any popular support. German officials tried to impose this movement to fight the Allied forces in the occupied territories. They especially wanted to use younger people because most of the active army soldiers were demoralized even more than the civilian population.⁵²

During the advance of the Soviet forces onto German soil, the Wehrmacht and the civilians realized that the Soviet soldiers would satisfy their desire for revenge for everything the German troops and special Einsatzgruppen had done in the Soviet Union not only by punishing the soldiers, but the civilians as well.⁵³ Therefore, the willingness of the German civilian population to surrender to the advancing American forces was definitely higher than to Soviet forces.⁵⁴ There were even some attempts to surrender unilaterally to the American forces in the west. These were, nevertheless, very risky because there were courts-martial within the Wehrmacht and especially for civilians who wanted to surrender. In addition, the Germans believed that the western Allied forces would not occupy all of the German territory because the demarcation line – the division of Germany in (originally) three occupation zones – had become known to German military authorities.⁵⁵ So, the military kept on fighting, to give fleeing German troops and civilians the chance to cross the Oder and the Elbe Rivers. Surrender to the western Allies could have sealed those borders and cut off this refugee movement, which this was neither in the interest of the military nor in the interest of the civilians.⁵⁶

During the first phase of the war, the German population had seen several revolutionary developments in military equipment and in joint tactics – like the joint use of tanks and dive-

⁵² Ibid., pp. 943 -954

⁵³ Pape, pp. 304 – 305

⁵⁴ Henke, p. 816

⁵⁵ Pape, pp. 307 - 308

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 309

bombers. These developments and the initial successes of the Wehrmacht in 1939 and 1940 were intensively used by the German governmental propaganda – which is a form of Information Campaign. In the years after the successes of the Wehrmacht ended and the Allied forces started their advance towards the German homeland, the role of propaganda grew stronger month by month. The German civilian population was told officially – by the propaganda – that there are several special weapons – “Wunderwaffen” – in development, which would change the war back in favor of the Germans and even end the war with one major blast in favor of Germany. The belief in those arguments was strong within the German population. During the summer of 1944, the belief in these “Wunderwaffen” vanished increasingly. At the end of 1944, the belief had vanished completely and had changed to deep disillusion on all parts of the civilian population. It was time to realize the final truth.⁵⁷ The government lost its credibility in the eyes of the civilian population from day to day

The political leader of Germany, the Austrian Adolf Hitler, had an irrational personality and never considered surrender. He was actually determined to destroy Germany after he realized that there was no chance winning the war. So, he pushed constantly to increase the fighting and forced the authorities within Germany to fight for every step. In the end, the only solution for him was to kill himself. This never gave the idea of him being martyr a chance, nor did it give the Allied forces the possibility or duty to bring him in front of a war crimes tribunal. The unconditional surrender was left to his successor, Admiral Dönitz.⁵⁸

During the last years of the war, there was never the possibility to act against the authoritarian regime by any civilian opposition. Parts of the military establishments tried in July 1944 but were not successful. But even at this time, great parts of the Wehrmacht leadership were not willing to surrender unconditionally because it would mean a Soviet occupation of

⁵⁷ Henke, pp. 816-819

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 965

parts of Germany. This was unimaginable for the military leadership and for the great majority of the German population as well – so, the defeatism of the population and of parts of the Wehrmacht grew.⁵⁹

The information campaign towards Germany was directed by the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) of the Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAPE). They produced several leaflets, single page newspapers, and letters to German soldiers. The topics were not synchronized with the plans of the military commanders and did not get the attention of the German population. The US military leadership was not enthusiastic about psychological warfare.⁶⁰

After the war ended, the information policy started to inform the German public with news and directions. This changed rapidly entertainment and to winning hearts and minds as this effort became a competition between the US and Soviet forces; it became part of the upcoming struggle between East and West.⁶¹

At the end Germany was defeated – both the Wehrmacht and the population. Germany had no government and was divided in four occupation zones. This meant hunger, freezing and living under very difficult circumstances.⁶²

RECENT EXAMPLES OF DEFEAT

After the defeat of Japan and Germany, US forces and their allies have defeated some other countries within the last sixty years. The experience of some of those victories are different than the ones from World War II.

⁵⁹ Pape, 1996, p. 310

⁶⁰ Herbert A. Friedman, and Franklin Prosser, *United States PSYOP Organization in Europe During World War II*, <http://www.psywarrior.com/PSYOPOrgWW2.html>

⁶¹ Earl F. Zimke, *The US Army in the occupation of Germany 1944 – 1946*, Washington, D.C., 1975, pp. 273 – 275

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 281 – 284

In the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, US forces were less involved in fighting a forceful enemy than in preventing civil war and restoring order. PSYOPS and Civil / Military Cooperation (CIMIC) played an essential part in the success of this operation. So, there was no need to defeat the population, but to win their hearts and minds. The soldiers of different combat units were conducting civil military actions.⁶³ The whole operation, despite some planning problems, was a success. It showed the importance of flexibility and adaptability of soldiers and marines in a peacekeeping operation.⁶⁴

In September 1994, US forces established order and stability in Haiti, operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. This operation was very successful, but it showed some problems in the joint planning process, which belongs not to the subject of this monograph. On the other hand, it underlined the importance of Special Forces, civil affairs, and PSYOPS for such a complex operation.⁶⁵ To achieve the mission, it was important to win the trust and confidence of the public. This was the success of the above mentioned units. At the same time, other units isolated themselves and put their main effort on force protection.⁶⁶ “Those Haitians observed American soldiers consciously distancing themselves from the Haitian people and therefore losing an opportunity to uphold US democratic principles⁶⁷”. An important factor of accepting the new start and the democratic ideas is the right perception of the people on the street. This is true for people in Haiti and for people in Iraq as well.

In spring 1999, US forces and their NATO allies forced Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo and accept the presence of UN / NATO forces in this province. This was achieved by air forces and the coercion of air power. There were no war

⁶³ Lawrence A Yates, *Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965 – 1966*, CSI, Ft. Leavenworth, 1988, pp.133 – 140

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p.179

⁶⁵ Walter E. Kretchik, et. al., *A Concise History of the US Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*, Ft. Leavenworth, 1998, pp. 142 – 146

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 108 – 112

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p 193

casualties on the side of NATO forces because of the unequal means of the two sides. The journalist Michael Ignatieff argues that risk-free warfare, like in the Kosovo campaign, is possible and that only modern democracies can deal with those weapons because they are risk-adverse cultures.⁶⁸ So, one nation can defeat another with out any risk at all, which could change the way to look at defeat. At the same time, mostly the US Air Force used precision - guided ammunition, which changed the objective, from attrition and destruction to “blind” the enemy. This decreased the number of civilian casualties, too.⁶⁹ In the end, “virtual war” may end in “virtual victory⁷⁰”. This is no way to start an Phase IV operations. In a war with elements of this “virtual reality”, like Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), it has to be supported by several other means.

EXPERIENCED HISTORY OF DEFEAT

The histories of Japan and Germany are distinctively different. Japan is an Asian island with closed society until the middle of the 19th century. Germany lies in the center of Europe, a part of European history for millennia. At the end of World War II, both countries were defeated and both countries had to be rebuilt and reconstructed. In both cases, strategic bombing was neither essential to the defeat of the government nor of the civilian population.

Punishment does not work – low to moderate level punishment even creates more anger than fear; heavy bombardment produced in both cases more apathy than rebellion. Decapitation did not worked in either of the two cases, neither individuals nor existing governments. It has not worked in recent history either. Strategic bombing in both cases did not destroy industrial capacity. Strategic bombing only matters in a long war of attrition, which in both cases was probably not long enough (several years).⁷¹

⁶⁸ Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War*, New York, 2001, pp. 161 – 164

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 169 – 170

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 208

⁷¹ Pape, p. 316 – 318

The final objective in both theaters of war – unconditional surrender – was for Japan and Germany not acceptable and forced both governments to hard resistance. The information campaign about the Allies final objectives did not convey the necessity of this objective to the civilian population. The Japanese government was never pressured by their population to surrender. They would never have surrendered if there had not been the threat of invasion. The German military establishment and civilian population fought even longer because they would not surrender for fear of Soviet occupation, which was anticipated as very brutal.

On the other hand, the information campaign – propaganda - in Japan and Germany was very successful in supporting the war effort of the government for a long time. In Japan the population believed the official information until the announcement of the emperor concerning the end of war. In Germany the too promising information, subjects changed the mood of the great parts of the population and contributed greatly to the acceptance of the defeat.

The personality and the role of the heads of state and the governments could not have been more different in both countries. But neither the Japanese emperor and military government nor the German dictator and his puppets gave their population any freedom to decide anything about their future. In the end, the actions of the Japanese emperor to declare the end of the war to his peoples and the suicide of the German dictator had the same effect on the peoples. Everybody knew that the war was finally over.

It is important that in no case and in no culture, the coerciveness of air power has worked. So it would probably not have worked in the Middle East either. The role of the leader of the country always played an important role, for the good (Japanese emperor) or the bad (Hitler). The self destruction of the illusion of Hitler and the support of this fact and subsequent exploitation of the US information campaign was a major step towards the acceptance of the defeat. The behavior of the party officials in crisis situations at the end of the war and the subsequent incorporation in the IO campaign by the US forces was important for the perception the German people had about their leadership. This helped in the acceptance of defeat. In the

operation in Iraq, the behavior of the party officials of the Baath party was probably not very much different from the situation in Germany. So, this topic should have been important within the US IO campaign.

Different cultures require different solutions. Knowledge about cultures and perceptions is essential. The fear of the German population of the “hordes from the East” destroyed any idea of early surrender. The meaning of democracy is different for a German, Japanese, a Serb, or a Kurd, a Shiite or a Sunni. The IO campaign, with long-term topics, the coordination between the phases, and culturally sound themes is the most important asset to convince the peoples about their defeat.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE NEW WAY TO FIGHT FUTURE WARS

NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE

During the last years, the developments in military and dual-use technology, together with those applying to forces, doctrine, and tactics multiplied the impact of military forces. These developments can be seen as revolutions in three different areas: sensor, information, and weapons technology. The new sensor technology is capable with smaller and cheaper technology, to provide a comprehensive all-time, all-weather, near real-time surveillance over a great area. The new information technology provides the necessary means to connect all sensors and build a network to integrate a great amount of information collected by the new sensor technology and to keep the results manageable. At the same time, this new technology provides the means to distribute the information to the weapons systems. The new weapons technology provides smaller, cheaper, and more precise weapons, which can be produced more efficiently. With this development, the weapons systems can cope with the other two revolutions and

increase the efficiency of the combat system.⁷² The more those three independent revolutions interact with each other, the more a synergy emerges from the interaction and the higher the efficiency will increase. This development is a constantly changing process with a lot more possible progress. This progress will happen even during the realization phase (applying to doctrine, tactics, and organizations).⁷³ The first steps of the realization phase could be seen during OIF.

The above-explained process is the central part of the concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW)⁷⁴. In this concept, the shared use of sensors and the information network provides the commander a never before known situational awareness. This shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed of command. At the same time, it gives the commander the possibility to focus his actions against the most important target at the right time with an optimized impact.⁷⁵

The idea of NCW is to explore new ways to apply new technology to “old” missions and to take on new missions in the changing strategic environment.⁷⁶ NCW is definitely not a fully developed and deployable war fighting capability. Lots needs to be done to transform today's platform-centric force into a network-centric one. It needs do be develop, test, and refine network-centric concepts of operation and co-evolve them with doctrine, organization, command approach, systems, and the other components of a mission capability package.⁷⁷ The

⁷² Edward Allen Smith, *Effects-based operations : applying network centric warfare to peace, crisis, and war*, United States. Dept. of Defense. Command and Control Research Program, Washington, DC, 2002, pp. 65 – 69

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 70 - 73

⁷⁴ Joint Vision 2020 defines NCW as an information superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self synchronization. In essence, NCW translates information superiority into combat power by effectively linking knowledgeable entities in the battle space.

⁷⁵ DOD, *Network Centric Warfare - Report to Congress* <http://www.defenselink.mil/nii/NCW/>, p. i

⁷⁶ Smith, pp. 75 – 76

⁷⁷ DOD, *Network Centric Warfare - Report to Congress* <http://www.defenselink.mil/nii/NCW/>, p. i

cooperation between the possibility of the immediate support by air (Air Force, Navy, missiles) for the advancing elements of the ground forces and the situational awareness in OIF showed some ways ahead.

This gain of efficiency could be used to fight the old kind of attrition warfare. The answer to this question is the new kind of operations, Effects Based Operations (EBO).⁷⁸

EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS

The Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, described as an essential part of transforming military “to move away from the ‘threat based’ strategy that dominated our country’s defense planning for nearly half a century and adopt the new ‘capabilities-based’ approach”.⁷⁹

Effects Based Operations are not a new development. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz knew and wrote that it is more important to focus on shaping your opponents thinking and behavior than just to defeat his forces. They knew as well that this is not only important for tactical level warfare, but even more for strategic level actions against an opponent or to influence neutrals or friends. It is more than just destroying the enemy’s physical capabilities, but to induce an opponent to pursue a distinctive course of action.⁸⁰ The question remains, whether attrition warfare was successful in World War II, especially as preparation for the reconstruction phase. Attrition had to be supported with other means to be effective as preparation for Phase IV. In recent wars, without attrition, the preparation for Phase IV had some problems. The same question should be asked, whether attrition would have better prepared for Phase IV or whether other parts of EBO (like IO) should have been executed more efficiently.

⁷⁸ Smith, pp. 96 – 97

⁷⁹ Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Transforming the Military*, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002, Vol. 81, No.3, p. 24

⁸⁰ Smith, pp. 103 – 104

At the beginning of the excursion in the ideas and consequences of EBO, there are some definitions necessary. Effects based operations “are coordinated sets of actions directed at shaping the behavior of friends, neutrals, and foes in peace, crisis and war.”⁸¹ Targeting effects are “the cumulative results of actions taken to attack targets and target systems by lethal and nonlethal means.”⁸²

Effects can be divided into direct and indirect effects. Direct effects are normally easily recognizable and immediate. Direct effects can have additional results, which are indirect effects. These indirect effects are so created by direct actions through an intermediate effect or mechanism to produce a result. Direct effects are also known as “First Order” effects. The indirect effects are known as “Second” and “Third Order” effects.⁸³ The bombing of German air defense sites in World War II created both effects. The destruction of those sites prevented them from shooting on American bombers in the future. At the same time they could frighten the personnel of the other sites to continue their work during the next attack – direct and indirect effect of bombing.

There are different kinds of effects. Some effects are more physical in nature and others are primarily psychological. Physical effects alter behavior by dealing with physical means. They are concentrated on destruction and incapacitation of forces and capabilities. Physical effects are closely related.⁸⁴ The physical effects beyond the destruction of enemy forces are part of operational campaigns. The main point of effort is the destruction or abrasion of enemy capabilities of sustained operations and finally to wear down its economy. The destruction of the economy or the forces did not work in World War II. Japan and Germany did not collapse economically. The bombing of Japanese or German cities and industry did not bring the

⁸¹ DOD Joint Vision 2020 <http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/index.html>

⁸² DOD Joint Pub 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*, JEL 2003, Glossary

⁸³ Edward C. Mann, et al., *Thinking effects, Effects Based Methodology for Joint Operations*, pp. 31 – 33

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37

economy to collapse. The physical effect of attrition in a second or third order effect did not work.⁸⁵

Functional effects are direct or indirect effects, which are concentrated on the ability of a target to perform their mission properly. Systemic Effects are concentrated on whole systems. The destruction of a whole power system or power grid is a systemic effect.⁸⁶ Psychological Effects alter behavior by affecting the cognitive process. They effect the reasoning, belief, emotions and the decision-making.⁸⁷ These effects are either direct or indirect. Finally, all effects can or have a psychological part as well. These effects are very important but difficult to plan or to predict.⁸⁸

Direct and indirect effects are interrelated. Direct effects tend to cascade into succession of indirect physical and psychological effects, which are hardly predictable. Physical effects behave like falling dominos. Psychological effects tend to cascade almost explosively, limited only by the speed and scope of communications.⁸⁹ Cascaded effects can switch from physical to psychological effects. Therefore and because of the interrelated environment, the results of effects are hard to plan and to predict. In World War II, Allied planners hoped to achieve not only direct effects by bombing the French railways but that this would cascade into additional direct effects and would produce an additional indirect cascade of psychological effects.⁹⁰ The successive cascades effects of bombing would be the application of effects based approach to attrition-based warfare.

⁸⁵ Smith, pp. 258 – 259

⁸⁶ Mann, p. 38

⁸⁷ Smith, pp. 256 - 274

⁸⁸ Mann, pp. 38 – 39

⁸⁹ Smith, pp. XIV – XVII

⁹⁰ see for more details and graphics about cascading direct, indirect, physical and psychological effects Smith, pp. 311 – 318

Part of the effects are the collateral effects.⁹¹ These are effects beyond those for what action was taken and may be considered positive or negative. Negative effects cause unintended and unwanted effects (like damage to persons or buildings) while positive collateral effects may be beneficial for the military operation. But during operational planning collateral effects have to be evaluated and especially second and third order effects have to be considered. During World War II, those second order effects worked in favor of the Allied forces while third order effects worked in the opposite way. Destruction of bridges and railway nodes prevented the reinforcement and supply of the German Wehrmacht, while later these destructions hindered the advance of the US forces.⁹² These second and third order effects are hard to predict in the realm of lethal effects, but they are even harder to foresee in the area of non-lethal effects. The destruction of infrastructure and consequences of this destruction is mostly a physical problem, while non lethal effects are psychological. These effects are harder to predict.

Effects have tactical, operational, and strategic outcome. They are not clearly distinguishable and are interwoven throughout the direct and indirect effects.⁹³ Military actions not only have military outcomes. The effects are nested and have effects on all levels of observers – on political, economical, military and civil society.⁹⁴

Before the overall concept is put into the context of planning EBO and Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO), measurement or assessment of the effects are discussed.⁹⁵ The planning is always oriented on the outcome sought. As history has shown, this is a difficult task, even in the

⁹¹ DOD Joint Pub 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*, JEL 2003, I-7, but like most definitions and considerations within this publication is concentrated more on the lethal than on the non – lethal effects.

⁹² Mann, pp. 35 – 36

⁹³ Mann, pp. 39 – 42. Cadre Paper No. 15, Maxwell, 2002, These pages depict the interaction of the different effects on different levels of war graphically.

⁹⁴ Smith, pp. 331 – 335

⁹⁵ Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), *Glossary* “- Rapid decisive operations (RDO) is a concept for future operations. A rapid decisive operation will integrate knowledge, C2, and operations to achieve the desired political/military effect

“easy” environment of direct lethal attacks. In the case of EBO, with the interaction of the different effects and their cumulative and cascading results, it is even more difficult.⁹⁶

The measurement of effects after an air campaign is the assessment of the physical damage of the enemy’s troops, infrastructure, etc.. These results are countable. This worked in the attrition based World War II very well. The direct results (destruction of troops, housing, and infrastructure, etc.) were directly measurable. Therefore, the results could be used to plan the next actions. Harder was the assessment of the performance of the targeted railway system. These multilevel assessments were time consuming and complex, but in a campaign of many months and with different information sources it was possible.⁹⁷

EBO is also using psychological effects, in a direct or indirect approach. The assessment and measurement of these results is definitely more difficult. Performance assessment may be one way to assess the results. Here the intuition of politicians and commanders plays a major role.⁹⁸

Important are the overall adjustments of the planning and the respective planned measurements of effectiveness.⁹⁹ This essential part of the approach concentrates on Effects Based Planning (EBP). With all the above-explained details, EBP is an operational planning process to conduct EBO within RDO. EBP is effects-based vice attrition-based. EBP closely mirrors the current joint planning process, yet focuses upon the linkage of actions to effects to objectives. EBP will change the way the enemy sees the US forces and what is included and emphasized in the planning process. EBP uses a flexibly-structured battle rhythm that leverages

⁹⁶ Smith, pp. 353 – 356

⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 357 – 370

⁹⁸ Ibid., 370 – 373

⁹⁹ DOD Joint Pub 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*, JEL 2003 Measures of Effectiveness
“Tools used to measure results achieved in the overall mission and execution of assigned task. Measures of effectiveness are a prerequisite to the performance of combat assessment.- also called MOEs.

a collaborative knowledge environment and capitalizes on the use of fewer formal joint boards. It employs virtual, near-simultaneous planning at all echelons of command.¹⁰⁰

Thus, while the details of EBO, an effects-based approach, which employs a systems methodology, is particularly applicable to an adversary system where identified links and nodes can be influenced by various instruments of national power. Such an approach may complement or supplant other approaches. The desired result for this approach is to produce specific effects that disrupt the adversary's decision making, alter intent, diminish capability and force the adversary to comply with US will.¹⁰¹

CHAPTER FIVE

INFLUENCE OF NEW KIND OF WARFARE ON THE WAR IN IRAQ

The success of US forces was different in the past than in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). For example, at the end of the long-lasting World War II and the surrender, Germany was totally occupied, Japan had no US soldiers on its soil, and in Kosovo no NATO soldier was involved in the initial success.

The great and quick success of coalition forces in the decisive battles in Iraq in March and April 2003 is self-evident. This success coming after the developments of the past decade in modern warfare and the adjacent technologies, came as no surprise. But is it difficult to evaluate the effects of EBO and NCW on this decisive victory. The weaknesses, technically and morally, of the majority of the Iraqi forces have to be considered.¹⁰² Especially the embargo and the continued air operations during the last decade, together with the very repressive regime,

¹⁰⁰ Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), *Glossary*

¹⁰¹ DOD, *Joint Vision 2020*, <http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/index.html>

¹⁰² CSIS; *The Lessons of the Iraq War, Executive Summary*, 21. July 2003
http://www.csis.org/features/iraq_instantlessons_exec.pdf, p. 12

destroyed most of the fighting power of the Iraqi forces. The influence on the public opinion and the will of the Iraqi people is even harder to analyze. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, speaks in his testimony concerning the lessons learned, testimony about the keys for combat success in the transformation process: knowledge, speed, precision, and lethality.¹⁰³

All the new technology works only with professional trained, and highly motivated soldiers. The emphasis on realistic live fire training and the consequent training at all levels of command – company to Joint Task Force (JTF) – with the help of computerized exercises gave the Allied Force an incomparable advantage.¹⁰⁴ This training gave the commanders at all levels the possibility to act with a great amount of initiative when communications broke down.¹⁰⁵ An all professional force and an adequate level of training with the new sophisticated equipment was an additional advantage for the Allied forces. To enhance the level of warfighting even more the US Army conducted a seminar to get the first lessons learned.

The challenges for the planners in this war were extremely high. During the start of the operation, the northern front broke away (political reasons) and the forces and the logistics were not fully deployed. This professionalism and adaptability in planning was greatly aided by major advances in joint warfare capability and its computerization and integration at every level. It is also a lesson in the fact that one of the most important skills in modern arms is not how to agree on a war plan, but how to change one when reality intervenes and—if necessary—abandon key elements of the plan with sufficient adaptiveness to win.¹⁰⁶

In addition to the initiative of single commanders, their adaptiveness did not only seek the initiative, but modified established doctrine and use of weapons by adapting to the special environment and enemy. The effectiveness of combined arms combat teams, joint forces and

¹⁰³DOD, *Testimony on U.S. Military Presence in Iraq: Implications for Global Defense Posture*, 18 Jun 2003, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20030618-depsecdef0302.html>

¹⁰⁴ CSIS, p. 17

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 16 – 17

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*; p. 17

fires and the combination of conventional forces with Special Forces was increased because of this adaptiveness.¹⁰⁷

The ability to fight in a such a synchronized way shows that US forces have adapted some of the above mentioned network centric ideas. They deployed forces, which were able to provide air dominance, superior intelligence, reconnaissance, precision targeting and strikes, and more effective command and control.¹⁰⁸

The speed of the deployment to Iraq and the speed of the operation were key to the success.¹⁰⁹ But the speed of the operation was only possible with air supremacy and overwhelming firepower. In addition, situational awareness and a common operating picture supported the speed of the operation. The availability of precision weapons during day and night disrupted the rest of the Iraqi forces. The use of air- and missile strikes against the communication centers and the Iraqi leadership disrupted the Iraqi command and control system and made sure that no one could react in time.¹¹⁰ At the same time, those direct effects had a psychological effect on the soldiers in those communication centers and probably on many other members of the Iraqi forces. The psychological influence on the Iraqi population, however, was probably not as intense as during the 1991 Gulf War which included a 38 day bombardment.¹¹¹

The possibilities of situational awareness, the new intelligence means, and the modern command and communications gave US forces the means to begin adapting the ideas of NCW. With these changes, the enemy was more easily targeted – with direct fires, but with indirect

¹⁰⁷ US Army OIF Study Group, *CGSC, Briefing, 04.July 2003*, Slides 7 – 11

¹⁰⁸ CSIS; pp. 12 – 13

¹⁰⁹ DOD, *Testimony on U.S. Military Presence in Iraq: Implications for Global Defense Posture*, 18 Jun 2003, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20030618-depsecdef0302.html>

¹¹⁰ CSIS, pp. 18 – 19

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19

effects as well.¹¹² With those possibilities, the targeting by US forces was focused and precise, but it was still air dominated and concentrated on effects based strikes with careful limitations on collateral damage. The US Air Force had nearly 100 percent of their combat aircraft equipped with precision weapons and they were capable of targeting them with a lot more focus and effect than ever before.¹¹³ Those effects were direct and were assessed by a metric system. As a consequence, the impact on the civilian population by the air operation was very limited. Even the destruction of dual-use infrastructure was limited, as opposed to operations in Kosovo.

Another essential part of the new way to fight wars and to effect enemy forces are Information Operations (IO). The employed forces and means had little tactical effect. The deception and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) were partially successful. The Iraqi command and control system was mostly influenced by lethal fires. The effect of IO was not very successful. The most important objective of the IO – to convince the Iraqi forces to surrender – fell short of expectations. The coordination between the planners of IO and the targeting process for lethal fires never was synchronized.¹¹⁴ The targeting of the civilian population was limited, perhaps due to the false perception that US forces would be welcomed as liberators. It did not change during the operation, neither did it exploit any mistakes of the Iraqi IO campaign, i.e. the false propaganda of “Baghdad Bob”.

The combat operations were won largely because of the leadership, the flexibility, and the training of the US soldiers. The elements of NCW were applied very well, especially the joint cooperation was very successful. However, further elements of EBO were not fully incorporated.¹¹⁵ One of the major problems of effective use of EBO could be see here again.

¹¹² DOD, *Testimony on U.S. Military Presence in Iraq: Implications for Global Defense Posture*, 18 Jun 2003, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20030618-depsecdef0302.html>

¹¹³ CSIS, pp. 30-31

¹¹⁴ US Army OIF Study Group, *CGSC, Briefing, 04.July 2003*, Slide 14

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*,

Effects, especially indirect, second, and third order effects, are difficult to plan, to assess and to adjust according to the intermediate results.

At the same time, the Iraqi forces were no match for the coalition. They had neither the leadership, training, nor the equipment. The biggest threats came from non-regular fighters. Those will be probably the enemy in most future wars, even in wars against state actors. In every case, US forces must use their most effective means to defeat the fighters and to spare the noncombatants.¹¹⁶ The source of recruitment for irregular fighters are disappointed soldiers and civilians. Therefore, during Phase III, the main effort, next to defeat the opposing military, is the message to combatants and non-combatants that the future will be worth living. For example, in Germany toward the end of World War II, the behavior of the party officials (NSDAP) and the exploitation by the US Army was more successful than the recent IO campaign concerning Baath officials. But on the other hand, sending the wrong messages, division of Germany, can even strengthen popular resistance.

CHAPTER SIX

INFLUENCE OF NEW KIND OF WARFARE ON THE POPULATION

Although the situations in Germany and Japan were different than in Iraq, some developments can be compared and some conclusions can be drawn for future wars. Neither Germany nor Japan were Muslim countries, and their economies were advanced. Iraq is a Muslim country, ethnical divided and never had a strong economy. Nevertheless, these problems are possible to overcome. Recent history in Asia and in Latin America has shown that democracy can be spread without advanced industrial economies. On the other hand, the

¹¹⁶ Michael P Noonan, *The Iraqi Lessons of Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 01 May 2003, p. 5

economic effort, in the country which is to be rebuilt, is essential for success. The US spent during the height of the Marshall plan some 16 percent of its GDP to support Europe.¹¹⁷ The effort to rebuilt Iraq – or the Middle East should get more than the 20 billion Dollars currently allocated.

The Germany society was different from the Japanese, but both had ethnically homogeneous societies.¹¹⁸ An ethnically homogeneous society definitely helps to start the reconstruction. Still, the developing situations in Bosnia and Kosovo shows that even in ethnically divided counties and regions, stabilization and progress is possible.¹¹⁹

The strategic bombing of the population in Germany and Japan did not force the government to surrender, it did not destroy the economy's ability to produce essential war material and it did not force the population to revolt against their government. As shown above, it did not even produce a feeling of defeat. On the other hand, the destruction within Japan and Germany hampered the start of reconstruction immensely. During the first years, most of the energy of the defeated nations and of the US programs, like the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), went in the clearance of the destruction.

The bombing during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was very precise and concentrated on Iraqi command and communication centers and on Iraqi forces. Additionally, they were more effective because of better reconnaissance, better cooperation, and better situational awareness.¹²⁰ The collateral damage was minimized and the consequences for the civilian population was smaller than ever before. They did not have to suffer destruction of their homes

¹¹⁷ Lionel Barber, *Sharing common risks*, Europe, Mar 1998, Issue. 374, p.8,

¹¹⁸ LTC Wally Z. Walters, *The Doctrinal Challenge of Winning the Peace against Rouge States: How Lessons from Post-World War II Germany may inform Operations against Saddam Hussein's Iraq*, US Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute. [Carlisle Barracks, PA], 2002, pp. 29 - 30

¹¹⁹ RAND, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, Washington, 2003, pp. XIX - XXII

¹²⁰ CSIS, pp. 30-31 and DOD, *Testimony on U.S. Military Presence in Iraq: Implications for Global Defense Posture*, 18 Jun 2003, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20030618-depsecdef0302.html>

nor did they have to suffer the destruction of the infrastructure. Therefore, the start of Phase IV should have been easier in this case than in Germany or Japan.

Since the acceptance of defeat is historically not the result of bombing and destruction of the civilian infrastructure, so the feeling of defeat in Iraq had nothing to do whether the population was bombed or not. In this war, the direct effects of the bombing were optimized and second or third order effects were considered and worked only in their military perspective.

Part of the acceptance of the Japanese government, and finally the population, of the defeat were the consequences of the blockade of essential goods, especially energy resources and raw material. The Japanese people would have realized this definitely during winter 1945 / 1946. The economy would have collapsed in fall 1945.

Hunger and cold are reasons to accept defeat, as shown in Chapter II. The economy of Iraq and the Iraqi people were used to shortages and hunger. After that long period of embargo, everybody had found a way to deal with shortages or a way to get what was needed. A new embargo or new shortages were no way to show the Iraqi people that they were defeated. The opposite way, to give them positive incentives (lift of embargo) after a removal of Saddam Hussein would have worked better. The second and third order effects of the embargo or the lifting of the embargo were neither considered nor exploited.

During World War II in Japan and Germany, the threat of an invasion or the actual invasion of the country was the major reasons for defeat and for the victory of the Allied forces. This was in both cases a reason for the acceptance of defeat by the population as well. OIF ended with the occupation of the Iraqi territory. The direct effect of the occupation showed the majority of the Iraqi people that the war was over and the regime of Saddam Hussein had ended. But what happened to the second and third order effects?

In Japan and Germany, the governments and the people knew the final objectives of the Allied forces - unconditional surrender and, in Germany, the change towards a democratic government. This was planned for a long time – the planning started in 1942. There was a small

psychological campaign to tell this to the German government and the German people. There were even attempts to explain the plans about the future of Germany. However, the relatively recent Treaty of Versailles and the Fourteen Points of President Wilson, had taught the Germans that the ideas of the US government could change quickly and drastically. But knowledge of the plans to divide Germany and the fear of a Russian occupation, which would definitely not change, prevented an earlier end of the war, as shown in chapter II.

The Iraqi government – or Saddam Hussein – may have known the final objective of the US government. But the Iraqi people had problems understanding the final objective of the US forces. The US forces conducted a psychological campaign but failed to conduct this effectively. They had problems showing the Iraqi people what was planned for them or what they could do to shape their future. They had no clear picture of what would happen when coalition forces arrived.¹²¹ So the second and third order effects were not consequently planned and used to achieve the final victory and set the stage for an successful start of Phase IV.

The Allied campaigns in Europe and Asia during World War II lasted more than three years. During this time, the planners had time to adjust to the behavior of the enemy in accordance with numerous intelligence reports, and military and regional experts. Especially in the war against Germany, many experts were German or had German ancestors. Therefore, the basis of expertise was very knowledgeable and deep. The knowledge of experts on Iraq was not as deep, even after more than ten years of observation. Furthermore, several political and military decision-makers did not listen to their advice. So, the expectations that US forces would be greeted as liberators was wrong. The expectations of the Iraqi people that US forces would be seen as a colonial occupation force were never considered. In addition, the expectation of the Iraqi people should have be considered for the various regions. At the end of the Gulf War in 1991, several parts of the population were encouraged to rebel against the regime of

¹²¹ CSIS;pp. 87 – 89

Saddam Hussein. After their rebellion, the Allied forces stopped somewhere in the desert and the regime had the possibility to defeat all rebellions during the next month. In their national memory this kept others from rebelling against the government, even when encouraged by the same forces like the last time. The psychological effect of those disappointed expectations on both sides added to the bad start of Phase IV.¹²²

The important part in the new kind of warfare is a proper IO campaign. Especially in these times of modern means of communication, like real-time news (CNN, FOX News, Al Jazirra) and Internet, the importance of this campaign becomes increasingly valid. The integration of this campaign in the overall concept of war fighting is important. Only with a total integration of both, lethal and non-lethal means can the broad concept of unity of effort be achieved.

During World War II, US forces were prepared to defeat German forces all over Europe and especially within Germany. At the same time, they were prepared to take over responsibility for executive power within Germany.¹²³ During OIF, US forces concentrated on defeating the enemy, but not on taking over overall responsibility for the country. There were almost no preparations for this task. So, the forces had problems dealing with looting and making decisions between peaceful and hostile civilians.¹²⁴ Therefore, they lost credibility among the civilian population and had problems within the first weeks in gaining the confidence of the majority of the Iraqi people.

In Japan and Germany, US forces (or the US forces in their part of Germany) had prepared for a long time to take over responsibility. This was not only an effort by the US Army, but by the whole government. This started immediately after the first US forces crossed

¹²² Ibid., pp. 89

¹²³ Zimke, most of this book shows the preparation to take over control in Germany and the long planning of this campaign.

¹²⁴ CSIS, p. 89

the German border near Aachen. This process was easily understood by the local population and showed everybody that they had lost the war. The final step was the takeover of responsibility in Tokyo by the US Military Governor and in Germany by the Allied Commission in Berlin. There was, at least in the areas where US forces were responsible, an unity of effort. Every German or Japanese official or civilian understood the final result of the war.

In Iraq, there was a lack of coordination between the military leaders of OIF forces and the civilian office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), led by LTG (Ret.) Jay Garner, and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by Ambassador Paul Bremer. This failure created problems in providing a clear message to the Iraqi civilian population. There were many promises which were not kept. There was a lack of security. The best example is the looting in Baghdad.¹²⁵ The Iraqi people could see the direct effect of defeating the military forces, but they could experience the indirect effect of insecurity and instability. The cumulative and cascading effects of these “messages” are probably significant, but hard to measure.

The importance of the varied messages sent to the different groups within Iraqi society, officials, military, police, civilians, etc., is explained above. The developments in public communications, like TV or Internet, could have played an important role in OIF, but the desired effects were not synchronized, not even within one phase. The synchronization of the desired effects, first, second and third order effects, of the whole campaign, including all phases, is one most important lessons learned within OIF.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 90

CHAPTER SEVEN

ACCEPTANCE OF DEFEAT AND A SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION TO “PHASE IV”

Acceptance of defeat is a psychological challenge. The challenge is different in each conflict. It is different for the government, the soldiers, and for the civilian population. The will of the people is an essential part in the acceptance of defeat.¹²⁶ To target all three recipients at the same time has been a challenge through history. Most times the military and the government were the main targeted objectives. With their defeat, the population usually accepted defeat as well. But throughout all history, resistance movements showed that this was not always true..

The modern way to fight wars – with NCW, RDO, and EBO – gives the military a new tool to handle those challenges even better. The methods of Effects Based Operations are more suitable to address the psychology of the military and the population. Those methods, especially the second and third order effects, along with the cumulating and cascading effects help to target the psychology of the population.

At the same time, the execution of all these methods is very difficult and military leaders do not have experience in this “targeting process”. To use attrition bombing to convince the German population to finish the war failed in World War II.¹²⁷

The experience of the recent operations within Iraq showed that the direct and indirect targeting of the Iraqi military was successful. The problems of targeting directly or indirectly the will of the civilian population is underlined every day by day. The problem of effectively influencing the enemy population’s will is essential to the bad start of Phase IV and the subsequent problems the US forces face in Iraq today.

¹²⁶ Clausewitz, p. 86

¹²⁷ Pape, Chapter 8, pp. –254 – 313

The Effects Based Operations on the will of the people of an opponent must be considered at the same time the overall planning starts. Therefore, the planning for Phase IV must start at the same time and must get the same effort as the planning for the defeat of the enemy's military. Only through parallel planning – Phase III and Phase IV – can one coordinate and concentrate the direct and indirect effects on the same objective. When the objective of the whole operation includes something like reconstruction or nation-building, it is all the more important these considerations are made.

The history of Japan and Germany shows that good and honest information for the population is essential for the acceptance. This works for both sides, as the German belief in the “Wunderwaffen” and the subsequent loss of credibility shows.¹²⁸ On the other side, the demand of unconditional surrender with the fear of Soviet occupation may have forced the German military to fight even longer. Those observations underline the importance of Information Operations. Essential are a coherent messages. These messages, whether they are direct or indirect actions, whether they are lethal or non-lethal, must be the same during all phases of the operation.

The design of the whole campaign must be considered. The planning within one campaign forces military planners, understandably, to concentrate on the enemy's military and his defeat. Therefore Phase IV is normally subordinated to Phase III, the “real” war. To divide those to operations into two separate campaigns may be a solution to this problem. It is important that both campaigns have the same overall strategy, start their planning process at the same time, and have the same Information Operations themes. Only then will the effort be the same for both campaigns.

¹²⁸ Henke, p. 816

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