

Organizational Change for the United States Armed Forces

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE FOR THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES by Major Keith J. Teister, United States Air Force, 55 pages.

The current military force structure, and subsequently the Department of Defense, requires a significant change. This monograph reveals, thru the lens of Colonel John Boyd and Doctor Joe Strange, a critical vulnerability and the lack of capabilities of the current joint force structure. The focus of this monograph is to highlight the problem. Additionally, a unique solution for organizational change, not previously debated, is provided. It advocates the creation of a new, capstone service, which provides the authoritative leadership for all medium focused services. Due to the brevity of this document, the conclusion and recommendations serve as a departure point for further debate and elaboration.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The war on terrorism is a transformational event that cries for us to rethink our activities, and to put that new thinking into action. . . .

As we prepare for the future, we must think differently and develop the kind of capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and to unexpected circumstances. We must transform not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight. We must transform not only our armed forces, but also the Department that serves them by encouraging a culture of creativity and prudent risk-taking. . . .

. . . we must achieve: fundamentally joint, network-centric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across the battlespace. Realizing these capabilities will require transforming our people, processes, and military forces.¹

*Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense*

Background

The present environment the military operates in is complex and fast paced. There is no indication that in the future it will become simpler, slow down, or even maintain the status quo. The military continues to be stretched to its limits in human and equipment resources; doing more with less has become the norm. With the added complication of not having robust forward basing, as previous decades, the ability to deploy and be ready to hit the ground running has become more important. Add to the equation a thinking enemy who can function on interior lines of operation within a permissive country/territory, and the vulnerability of time is accentuated. We must have a joint team ready to effectively fuse and employ the unique capabilities each medium expert (military service) brings to the table. **“Commanders today must orchestrate joint operations** [original emphasis] across the dimensions of air, land, sea, space, and time.”²

¹ Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary’s Forward to *Transformation Planning Guidance* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2003), 1.

² United States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), *Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities* (Washington DC: Doctrine Division, 1999), I-1.

This team must not be vulnerable to hostile action while it takes time to orient itself on the joint task force (JTF) staff structure and the many capabilities at its disposal. The current joint organization is vulnerable during this period.

The ad hoc nature of a JTF organization reduces the effectiveness of the military. Recent operations such as OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, PROVIDE COMFORT, URGENT FURY, DESERT SHIELD, and even operations ANACONDA and IRAQI FREEDOM in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively, highlight the need to improve our ability to employ a JTF headquarters that is well-trained and ready to fuse capabilities in a time constrained environment. Additionally, time spent on training/orienting the ad hoc staff on JTF systems and capabilities at their disposal, adds to the vulnerability time.³

The increase in the Joint Force Commander's (JFC's) observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop creates the fundamental vulnerability future adversaries can exploit. Time constraints also place pressure on the untrained staff to use the capabilities of individual services that they are familiar with--not the entire joint team's capabilities. This too could increase the OODA loop time, decrease the effectiveness, or reduce the quality of the actions taken (i.e. use a monkey wrench to drive a nail because all you know how to use is a monkey-wrench).

The concept of a standing joint task force headquarters (SJTFHQ) is currently being evaluated by Joint Forces Command, and is a step in the right direction; however, it still has downfalls and suffers the same inadequacies the current joint task force system possesses. First,

³ Several professional military papers have examined the referenced operations and all revealed similar findings--lack of preparedness and ability to swiftly and rapidly organize forces and establish effective command and control structures for these forces. For the sake of space and brevity, not all these works will be revisited in the body of this text and the scholarly work of the authors taken at face value. Documents reviewed include: Randy H. King, "Standing Up a Joint Task Force: The Acid Test" (Newport: Naval War College, 1995); James N. Hanley, "JTF Staffs: Permanent or Temporary Level of Command?" (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1996); and John A. Del Colliano, "A Look at Joint Task Force Headquarters. What is Wrong? How Do We Fix It?" (Newport: Naval War College, 2000). Full bibliographical information of these works is provided in the *Sources Consulted* section of this monograph.

the transitory nature of personnel assignments within the joint commands erodes the collective knowledge of those commands. The assignment process of the services pulls the team members from the joint environment and any corporate knowledge is siphoned away degrading the effectiveness of the team while a replacement service member is trained. Secondly, the members of the joint team are either consciously or subconsciously influenced by service bias. It is human nature to want your team to be the best, and though a part of the joint team, each member is beholden to a larger parent service team who may take priority. The realization of advancement and promotion relies on excellence as viewed by your service. The joint team does not control your professional future--there are no joint promotion boards.

Finally, the ability to translate national military theory and its capabilities into executable action is hampered by the lack of bedrock, joint doctrine, from which other services can build. Current joint doctrine is written by entities within each service and has a tendency to take on the attributes of that service's doctrine. The doctrine is then haggled over by other services until consensus can be reached.⁴ It is common to have doctrinal disputes over the definition of a word or term (i.e. Army vs. Air Force's definition of Close Air Support). The outcome of the ensuing debate is doctrine that the services rarely find useful. This is a bottom-up process that does not produce a standard language and framework for the services to use as a skeleton for subsequent service doctrine creation.

The current developmental problems associated with the doctrine writing process can be overcome by the following change. An unbiased doctrine writing body, knowledgeable in the multi-medium theory and capabilities of each of the services that also has the authority to push down/out the baseline joint doctrine to the other services, should be created. This creates a top-

⁴ United States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), *Joint Publication 1-01, Joint Doctrine Development System* (Washington DC: Doctrine Division, 2000; Change 1, 2001), vi-vii.

down process providing a solid framework and language for the services to follow while complementing it with the individual service doctrine.

Thesis Purpose

This thesis highlights the need for organizational change within the Department of Defense and provides a unique recommendation for the future structure of the armed forces in the United States.

Thesis Significance

This monograph provides a unique solution for organizational change that has not been debated before. It directly supports Secretary Rumsfeld's views outlined in the Department of Defense's *Transformation Planning Guidance* of April 2003. It will provide a solution for achieving true joint team play thru a more time responsive, capable, and highly effective military organization.

Methodology

This monograph addresses the need to establish a new organization that can quickly, without hesitation or delay, translate national will into actions. This new organization reduces the JTF OODA loop and increases effectiveness as well as the quality of actions. It also provides an unbiased, foundation for joint doctrine. This paper does not advocate total unification of the services. Each service is a medium expert. The freedom to explore and exploit their mediums is fostered by the uniqueness and independence of each service. No one medium has to be subjugated to another within a single service.

First, the reader is familiarized with Colonel John Boyd's observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop. The ability to observe first, orient, make decisions faster, and execute actions in order to get the desired effect faster than your opponents is a keystone argument in this paper. Due to the current nature of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), an

assumption of this paper is that adversaries to the United States have seized the initiative somewhere in the world, and taken initial actions against the United States' vital interests. The national leadership does not have the advantage of detecting (observing) these events first and taking preemptive actions to prevent them. In other words, the attack is a surprise. The problem then becomes creating an organization that can make-up for lost time and seize the initiative through a shorter OODA loop cycle.⁵

Second, research methodology has investigated multiple sources to include books, professional journal articles, service schools' monographs, on-line databases, other scholarly publications, and academic presentations.

Third, the evaluation criteria for the purpose of this monograph are based on current joint doctrine principles of war. They are assumed to be relevant, commonly agreed upon, and applicable to military operations now and in the conceivable near future (approximately the next 50 years). The primary principles, which the new organization must be evaluated against, are: mass, economy of force, unity of command, and simplicity. The ability to achieve all these qualities in organizational structure increase the effectiveness and minimize the time required to press ideas into actions.

Mass:

- a. The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to achieve decisive results.
- b. To achieve mass is to synchronize and/or integrate appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass often must be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating

⁵ The late John Boyd, a Colonel in the United States Air Force, developed several bodies of work that expressed the ability to detect and solve problems in terms of a figurative loop. This loop was broken down into several components: observation, orientation, decision, and action (OODA). The loop was an expression of this process over time. The larger the loop, the more time the OODA loop process took to complete. He developed his ideas from his early days as a fighter pilot. The OODA loop cycle, though initially developed as a tactical level model for fighter aircraft engagements, has implications and utility at the operational and strategic levels of war as well as externally in the competitive civilian world. The exact sources for these works are elaborated upon in subsequent chapters and detailed in the *Sources Consulted*.

forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.⁶

Economy of Force:

a. The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.

b. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.⁷

Unity of Command:

a. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.

b. Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. In multinational and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort — coordination through cooperation and common interests — is an essential complement to unity of command.⁸

Simplicity:

a. The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.

b. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to success in multinational operations.⁹

⁶ United States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, Director for Operations, *Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington DC: Doctrine Division, 2001), A-1.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., A-2.

⁹ Ibid.

The first step to resolving a problem is recognizing that there is a problem. Definitive, quantitative examples of how the current joint military structure is broken do not exist. Thankfully, the “can do” attitude of the American fighting man and woman mask the problem and prevent it from being captured as scientific data. Unfortunately, when the joint force system fails, it will equate to a loss on the battlefield for American forces. As many authors have noted, modern warfare is both art and science. The proof to the problem lies in the art portion of the equation. The time the joint task force staff utilizes to work through the dynamics of organizational development gives potential enemies an advantage. Just as in viewing a painting, the conceptualization of the work of art lies in the eye of the beholder. This perspective can be thought of as a lens. The works of both Doctor Joe Strange and the late Colonel John Boyd help provide lenses that bring the critical problem into focus. The following chapter helps reveal the United States’ critical problem.

Chapter 2: The Critical Problem

Organisms must cooperate or, better yet, harmonize their activities in their endeavors to survive in an organic synthesis. To shape and adapt to change, one cannot be passive; indeed, one must take initiative. The combination of variety, rapidity, harmony, and initiative—particularly their interaction—seems to be the key that permits one to shape and adapt to an ever-changing environment. These qualities aid in getting inside an adversary's OODA loop.¹⁰

Grant T. Hammond

The nature of the problem the United States armed forces faces lies in the time it takes to put idea into action. This chapter examines the work of the late Colonel (Retired) John R. Boyd, of the United States Air Force, to familiarize the reader with a method for comparing two competing entities and demonstrating how the one with the quickest, more effective observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) time cycle will inevitably be the victor. Additionally, the work of Dr. Joe Strange of the United States Marine Corps War College is examined to identify a critical vulnerability (CV) within the framework of the operational art.¹¹ Finally, the two concepts of OODA Loop and CV are applied to the current joint force structure to highlight the current CV of today's military.

¹⁰ Grant T Hammond, *The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press: 2001), 124.

¹¹ “operational art — The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war.” United States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington DC: Doctrine Division, 2001; Amended 2003), 385.

Boyd and His OODA Loop

Colonel John Boyd, considered a heretic by some, offers a unique lens to view competing systems.¹² His ideas on the OODA loop stem from his early days as an Air Force fighter pilot and reflect one perspective on how an opponent is beaten. Given two competing, adversarial entities, the entity that observes the threat, orients itself to the threat, decides on a course of action to take, and then takes the action in the shortest amount of time, is the victor.¹³ The winner is the entity with the quickest, most effective overall process. Graphically, Figure 1 demonstrates the basic idea of this concept. Note the smaller size loop depicts a quicker overall process and equates to a shorter total time interval.




Figure 1. A basic OODA loop comparison

¹² Grant T. Hammond offers a solid biographical accounting of John Boyd in his book, *The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security*. This chapter will not revisit this intriguing man's life work. I recommend reading Hammond to gain further insight to the man, his history, and his thoughts.

¹³ An additional requirement is that the course of action (COA) must be effective. If the COA is rushed into action and does not effectively resolve the problem, the COA is wasted effort.

The blue loop above represents the victor with a reduced total time from recognition of a conflict to corrective action. This model applies to fighter aircraft engaged in a dogfight, to two multibillion-dollar businesses competing to corner a niche in the marketplace, or even two nations struggling for power on the world stage. One assumption of the above OODA loop comparison is that the entities both see/observe a situation simultaneously. This reveals another aspect of the loop that must also be examined--initiative.

Even if two entities are on equal footing and share an identical total time from observation to action (the same size OODA loop) it is possible for one entity to beat the other; it all comes down to seizing the initiative. If one entity has the capability to observe a developing situation before its competitor, it may be able to start the OODA process first. Even with parity, the entity that sees first should be able to act first. Figure 2 demonstrates two mirror-image entities with the blue one seizing the initiative.




Figure 2. Blue sees first, shoots first, and wins!

Boyd expands on his concepts in his work “A Discourse on Winning and Losing” by looking at historical patterns of conflict.¹⁴ One of the “bits and pieces” he derives from his observations is that the victor is able to “operate inside [the] adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action loop or get inside his mind-time-space.” With this control, you can “penetrate [the] adversary organism and bring about his collapse.”¹⁵

The ability to penetrate the organism relies on the ability to visualize the complexity of the organism. This capability defines harmony to Boyd. “Harmony [is the] Power to perceive or create interaction of apparently disconnected events or entities in a connected way.”¹⁶ Not properly visualizing the complex system can cause friction within the entity. “Complexity (technical, organizational, operational, etc.) causes commanders and subordinates alike to be captured by their own internal dynamics or interactions—hence they cannot adapt to rapidly changing external (or even internal) circumstances.”¹⁷ In essence, the entity slows or even ceases its capability to put idea into action. Figure 3 shows the breakdown of red’s OODA loop (the inability to put idea into action), and Figure 4 demonstrates the impact friction has on red’s loop and its expanding effect.

¹⁴ Most of Boyd’s works survive as slide presentations that had been revised or expanded on over time, dependent on the audience he presented it to. He was not known for publishing formal articles according to Hammond. The version reviewed for this monograph was dated August 1987.

¹⁵ John R. Boyd, “A Discourse on Winning and Losing,” in *The Evolution of Air Power Theory, Readings Volume IIIA* (Montgomery, AL: School for Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, AY 1994-1995), 189.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 149.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 181.




Figure 3. The breakdown of red's OODA loop.




Figure 4. The expansion of red's OODA loop due to friction.

Conversely, if an entity can promote harmony within itself, it may reduce its own OODA loop. With a solid understanding of your own capabilities and limitations, as well as the internal system you operate within, the better off you are to look for efficiencies that can make you more effective over a shorter period of time. This concept has everything to do with Sun Tzu's idea of knowing yourself to increase your chances of success.¹⁸ Change within the Department of Defense needs to foster better harmony, as defined by Boyd, in order to reduce the military's OODA loop. This knowledge of self strength, and more importantly weakness, has been written about by many authors, but recently a professor at the United States Marine Corps War College has captured his perspectives of weaknesses that can be viewed as vulnerabilities.

Doctor Strange and Critical Vulnerabilities (CVs)

Doctor Joe Strange, of the United States Marine Corps War College, authored a monograph, in 1996, which provides an analytical construct for evaluating centers of gravity (CG) and their vulnerabilities.¹⁹ He wrote the paper because there was/is a growing tendency for the joint war fighting community, within the United States, to have multiple definitions for the term *center of gravity*.

¹⁸ Sun Tzu, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War*, trans. and an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith, with a forward by B. H. Liddell Hart (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.

¹⁹ This paper uses Dr. Strange's definition of CG and CV that he proposes be rewritten into *Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*, "Centers of gravity are agents and/or strength, power, and resistance – what Clausewitz called 'the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends . . . the point at which all our energies should be directed.' At the strategic level, centers of gravity might include a military force, an alliance, a political or military leader, or national will. All CGs have inherent 'critical capabilities' enabling them to function as CGs. In turn, all critical capabilities have essential 'critical requirements' necessary for the realization of those capabilities. 'Critical Vulnerabilities' are those critical requirements or components thereof which are deficient, or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction or attack (moral/physical harm) in a manner achieving decisive or significant results, disproportional to the military resources applied." Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, with introductory essays by Peter Paret, Michael Howard, and Bernard Brodie, with a commentary by Bernard Brodie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 595-596 quoted and expanded upon in Joe Strange, "Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language," in *Perspectives on Warfighting*, no. 4, 2d. ed. (Quantico: Marine Corps University, 1996), 99.

Not only does Strange clarify the definition of centers of gravity, he “introduces two new conceptual terms, ‘critical capabilities’ and ‘critical requirements’. These . . . terms bridge the gap and explain the relationship between centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, . . .”²⁰ He brings clarity and common language while “building upon the traditional Clausewitzian concept of centers of gravity, Dr. Strange clarifies the concept and relationship between centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.”²¹

Strange shows the relationship of his ideas with his building block definitions. He introduces the new concepts of critical capabilities and critical requirements while leading the reader to the concept of critical vulnerability:

Centers of Gravity [CG]: Primary sources of moral or physical strength, power and resistance.

Critical Capabilities [CCs]: Primary abilities which merits a Center of Gravity to be identified as such in the context of a given scenario, situation or mission.

Critical Requirements [CRs]: Essential conditions, resources and means for a Critical Capability to be fully operative.

Critical Vulnerabilities [CVs]: Critical Requirements of COMPONENTS THEREOF [Dr Strange’s emphasis] which are deficient, or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction or attack (moral or physical harm) in a manner achieving decisive results—the smaller the resources and effort applied and the smaller the risk and cost, the better.²²

The relationship among CG, CC, CR, and CV helps operational planners evaluate, thru a unique lens, the strength and weakness of self and opponent. This concept is not new and again points back to Sun Tzu, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing

²⁰ Anonymous, Introduction to Joe Strange, “Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language,” v.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Joe Strange, “Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language,” 43.

are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.”²³

The bottom line here is that CVs are potential showstoppers. If an enemy’s CVs are exploited, they may enable a victory over him. If you fail to protect you own CVs, and the enemy exploits them, he may bring about your demise. This, in combination with Boyd’s OODA loop, helps highlight the United States’ dilemma.

The Joint Forces’ CV

The United States has a critical vulnerability and it is revealed when viewing our military, and the environment in which it operates, thru the lenses of Colonel Boyd and Doctor Strange. Today’s world finds the USA projecting forces worldwide at a moments notice to combat everything from natural disaster to terrorists. Without the military, the operational level capabilities could not be realized; national will from the strategic level could not be put into action. Current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq could not be possible without a capable military. Our military is therefore a source of power for these operations and brings all the nations critical capabilities to bear on the selected crisis. With this in mind, the armed forces meet the definition of CG set forth by Dr. Strange.

With the CG defined, we can start to examine CCs. One of many that come to mind is timely force projection. It can also be viewed as mass: “The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to achieve decisive results.”²⁴ This CC enables the military to take action at the right place with the right force at the right time. In order to have full functionality of this capability, several CRs must be fulfilled.

²³ Sun Tzu, 84.

²⁴ *Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*, A-1.

Some of the critical requirements that support the CC of mass are: sensing the crisis, interpreting the system/environment in which the problem lies, formulate effective course of action (COA) to remedy crisis, and implement COA in a timely manor so it remains effective. This process is directly related to the process Boyd distills. Translated into his terms, these CCs are Boyd's observe-orient-decide-act cycle.

Given a potential adversary's ability to seize the initiative (i.e. our intelligence community fails to detect or predict pending clandestine operations against the United States' vital interest; therefore, we do not have the opportunity for a preemptive strike), the adversary may be able place idea into action first. The United States is surprised. If we do not have the ability to recover from the initial actions of the adversary and then implement a superior (more effective and much shorter) OODA loop, we can never expect to gain the initiative in a conflict. Without initiative, controlling the tempo of the conflict and positive conflict resolution (a win) is in question. Figure 5 demonstrates this point. (Blue traces/track lines in the subsequent OODA loops represent friendly forces--United States, Allies, and/or Coalition teammates).




Figure 5. Enemy has the initiative and superior OODA loop.

Figure 6 demonstrates how we overcome the loss of the initiative in order to dictate the tempo of the conflict, and resolve CV. This ability to maintain harmony and regain the initiative is predicated on the ability of our system to survive the blows dealt it and thru flexibility be able to regain composure.




Figure 6. Friendly OODA loop survives first blow, maintains harmony, and regains initiative.

With these CRs in mind, neutralization or attack on any one of the CRs has catastrophic effects on the system as a whole. The military organization fails to effectively place idea into action in a timely fashion. This time element is therefore the essence of the problem and can be viewed as the Critical Vulnerability. The organization of the military must maintain its composure and be able to regain the initiative thru flexibility. The current organizational structure of the armed forces prohibits this effectiveness. Joint task forces and their respective staffs are not usually created until after a problem is identified. If the adversary has the initiative,

the United States is by default handicapped in the OODA time cycle. As stated in chapter one, numerous after action reports identify a CV with the Joint Force Commander and his ability to overcome lengthy time intervals while preparing for a crisis. This lack of effectiveness has several root causes, and it is examined in the next chapter.

Chapter Summary

The United States has a critical vulnerability. A competing entity has a time advantage when comparing the United States to potential adversaries thru the lens of Boyd's OODA loop cycle. These potential adversaries can covertly initiate their OODA loop cycle first and seize the initiative. Additionally, they may be able to operate on a shorter OODA time cycles and deliver blows before we can organize to meet and counter the problem. This mismatch in abilities helps identifies the CV as defined by Strange. The ad hoc nature of our JTF structure, within the Department of Defense (a reactionary measure to crisis), degrades the ability to counter this CV. The organizational structure causes the JTF staff to waste valuable time while it forms and thus is a major contributor to the CV. The real world finds limited budgets and resources that make forecasting and anticipatory planning for every potential crisis an impossible task. The United States will take preemptive measures when able, but must maintain the capability to quickly execute effective action when surprised by crisis. The United States' CV is compounded by the inability to take effective countermeasures and is discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 3: Effectiveness

*The after-action report from every joint operation has said that we could have been much more effective, earlier, if we had been a team when the crisis started rather than trying to form our team while the crisis is ongoing.*²⁵

Colonel Chris Shepherd, USA

There is sound reason for maintaining multiple services. As stated earlier, this paper in no way advocates the elimination of independent services. They each foster professional forces focused on the total exploitation of their respective medium: air, land, sea, and space.²⁶ This expertise breeds a needed bias--a good thing--within the service. Each service in turn provides an environment that promotes esprit and the freedom to explore new aspects of the medium. It makes for highly effective, specialized forces. Unfortunately, the same bias that is used to promote the medium also limits senior leadership, thru their parochialism, when it is time to fuse the capabilities of all the mediums/services. An organization free from a single bias towards a single service/medium needs to be created.

Service Bias

Service bias is good, at the right place and the right time. It fosters a sense of belonging and promotes a healthy environment for men and women to pursue their common interests. In his

²⁵ Colonel Shepherd, of the United States Army, was the director of strategic communications in the Joint Experimentation Directorate when he made this comment. Agency Group 09, "QDR Approves Joint Force Headquarters Concept," in the Military & Government Collection of the FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database [database on-line] (Washington: Department of Defense, 2001, accessed 11 July 2003); available from EBSCOhost Research Database, identification no. 32W2751700411.

²⁶ It is my position each medium should have a respective armed service capable of manned operations to, in and thru the medium. Each service should be responsible to the public for mastery of their respective medium and free to explore/exploit the respective medium to the fullest. I therefore advocate and see a necessity for the creation of an independent space force. The constraints of this paper do not allow for elaboration on this subject.

book *Battle Studies*, Colonel Ardant du Picq observed, “An army is not really strong unless it is developed from a social institution.”²⁷ This institution provides the needed environment to promote esprit among its members.

General William “Billy” Mitchell in his book *Winged Defense* also envisioned the strength independent services bring to the table. Specifically, he pressed for the creation of an independent air service because he realized airpower could never be fully developed and capitalized upon if it was subjugated to an uneducated, ground-oriented, commander.

Without knowledge on the part of the personnel of their work, neither the proper air units nor suitable material can be devised or created for the flyers. If persons are put in authority that are not trained air officers, with long service as pilots and observers, they cannot know the kinds airplanes which should be given their men and the material which should accompany them to keep them up.²⁸

He continues:

All countries have attempted at first to put men in the control of aviation who knew little about it just because they had high military rank. These officers always attempt to conceal their ignorance of the subject from others, and have surround themselves with advisors that knew little more about aviation than themselves so as to maintain greater control over their subordinates. The result of this procedure always comes quickly and is manifested in worthless and dangerous machines for the pilots, an inadequate system of training, no real air system for reserve officers, and no appreciation of what the conditions of future war will be. Everything depends primarily on the creation and development of a specialized air personnel, capable of actually handling their duties in an efficient manner, making a real class of air men.²⁹

This specialization in a single medium helps produce services with focused capabilities.

²⁷ Ardant du Picq, *Battle Studies*, 8 ed., trans. John N. Greely and Robert C. Cotton, in *Roots of Strategy, Book 2* (1920; reprint Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 1987), 248 (page citation is to reprint edition).

²⁸ William Mitchell, *Winged Defense*, (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1925), 159.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 159-160.

Capabilities Knowledge

The services' independent environment allows them to focus on their area of expertise and produce a wide variety of capabilities within the medium and in support of other mediums. Each service, thru its unique culture, seeks medium specific capabilities knowledge. All the current services' doctrine express this expectation of total exploitation and professionalism throughout there respective medium. General Michael E. Ryan, Chief of Staff of the Air Force in 1997, typifies the expectations of senior leadership, within the air-focused service, in his "Forward" to *Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Basic Air Force Doctrine*:

...we have developed core competencies to provide insight into the specific capabilities that the US Air Force must bring to the activities across the range of military operations.

Together, the principles, tenets, and core competencies describe air and space power as a force distinct from surface forces and the air arm of other Services. . . .

This basic doctrine presents the guiding principles of our Service and our view of the opportunities of the future. . . . These warfighting concepts describe the essence of air and space power and provide the airman's perspective. As airmen, we must understand these ideas, we must cultivate them, and importantly, we must debate and refine these ideas for the future.³⁰

The general's comments set the tone and the expectation that Air Force Airmen are the masters of the upper realm and should always strive to fully exploit the medium while never sitting on their laurels. The USAF is not unique in this position; all the services demonstrate their pride and mastery of their medium. However, there is a point at which this bias becomes negative.

Parochialism

The ever-increasing complexity of weapon systems and nature of warfare demands the expertise the services bring to bear. This expertise is a strength, but it is also a weakness. Colonel du Picq's and Billy Mitchell's words above also serve to demonstrate the single-minded nature of these officers--the dark side, if you will--parochialism. The type of parochialism being

³⁰ Michael E. Ryan, forward to *Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Basic Air Force Doctrine* (Maxwell Air Force Base: Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center, 1997), i.

referred to here may not be deliberate prejudice. It is often the unconscious human tendency to go with what is known and stay in a known area of experience.

Colonel du Picq's statement shows his "army" parochialism. He did not deliberately ignore or snub the naval service, but it shows how service parochialism is engrained in his thoughts and expressed in terms of his service. His remarks and basic premise are applicable to all professional institutions (especially military services).³¹

Parochialism is also evident in General Mitchell's previous quoted comments. All services gain expertise and further develop capabilities within their medium when they are focused on the medium. Advancements in armored, maneuver warfare (i.e. the development of the tank) around the same time period (post-World War I), helps highlight the Army's pursuit of excellence thru the exploitation of the land medium. As with du Picq, General Mitchell's comments can be applied to any service.³²

This parochialism can turn unhealthy, especially in the real world environment of limited military budgets. Each service vies for their portion of limited financial resources from Congress in a zero sum environment. The gain of one service is at the expense of another. This negative aspect of "unhealthy interservice [*sic*] rivalry due to poor ethical conduct on the part of individuals and the general military bureaucratic system has long been, and continues to be, problematic for harmonious joint military activity."³³

³¹ Not all countries had a separate/independent services (i.e. army, navy, air force, etc.) at the time of the Colonel du Picq's remarks; therefore, only the army and navy are referred to in this statement.

³² Billy Mitchell, though a US Army officer, is considered an airman due to his single-minded crusade for an independent air service. This is evident in his willingness to sacrifice his career and subsequent courts martial in his ferocious pursuit of this goal.

³³ Eric A. Ash, "Purple Virtues, Curing Unhealthy Interservice [*sic*] Rivalry" (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, Air University, 1999), vi.

A recent example of this parochialism was demonstrated at the Army's Command and General Staff College. During a lecture to the student body, a senior Army officer³⁴ discussed his vision for the future of the Army. He overtly advocated joint team cooperation, "jointness;" however, close examination of his choice of words reveals his engrained parochialism.

His vision of the immediate future, in light of the dwindling military budget and the rising cost of technologically advanced weapon systems, sees the need for "joint interdependence" when fielding forces and integrating military capabilities in support of the President and his assigned tasking.³⁵ He openly admits no one service goes to war alone anymore. His opening comments were positive and very joint-team oriented. However, shortly after stating the need to be joint interdependent, while briefing his vision of how to improve Army aviation, he said the Army needs to "compete for capabilities others have . . . we need C-130-type capabilities." If the senior officer truly believed in joint interdependence, why would the Army need to "compete" for capabilities other services have? Additionally, he later went on to say, "The Army is the centerpiece of the Joint Force." Again, if the team is truly a team, how can one member be more important than another? Is he trying to build a valued team member or be a service not dependant on anyone else? In fairness, this officer is known for his open-minded approach to joint operations. It is my opinion he is not overtly hiding a prejudice against the other services, it is more the fact he has been institutionalized by his service and defaults to that perspective unconsciously.

³⁴ This officer will remain anonymous because the comments were made under the understanding of the academic non-attribution policy of the United States Army's Command and General Staff College. The lecture was presented 23 October 2003 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

³⁵ Anonymous, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 23 October 2003.

Fusion Experts Needed

The American armed services need an entity that can fuse the many diverse capabilities of the joint team without favoring one service. It needs to provide the right tool at the right *time* for the right *effect*.

On July 29, 1994, the 10th Mountain Division “stood up” as Joint Task Force 190 for planning purposes. . . . One pressing issue concerned the need to transform the division staff into a joint staff, capable of planning for, and exercising control over, a JTF. In part, this meant expanding the 10th Mountain staff to more than double its size (from some 300 to 800), a process that, once completed, resulted in a staff that was joint in name only. There were neither augmentees [*sic*] from the other services nor a “joint plug” from USACOM. As for the newly arrived Army augmentees [*sic*], some later confessed that they felt like outsiders, isolated from a division staff that had been working together for some time.³⁶

The 10th Mountain did a great job and overcame adversity, but they had, by their own admission, sizable hurdles to rise above while planning what would become the backbone for Operation Uphold Democracy. In a recent interview with one of the head planners for the operation, he remarked on the planning process and drew a parallel to today, “10th Mountain was not adequately prepared to be a JTF headquarters.”³⁷

During the research phase in preparation for this monograph, unclassified documentary evidence could not be found stating the exact time interval various JTF staffs have taken to familiarize themselves with all the capabilities at their disposal. The same planner quoted above and examination of other operations generally places the spin-up time for the staff in the period of

³⁶ Edward Short, interviewed by Thomas Ziek, 6 October 1994, JTF 180 Uphold Democracy, 413-20, quoted in Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, 'Intervasion': A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 100.

³⁷ Anonymous, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 19 November 2003. This officer was a planner for Operation Uphold Democracy, and volunteered his viewpoint while talking to students of the School for Advanced Military Studies, under the confidentiality of the Command and General Staff College's non-attribution policy.

months.³⁸ This is acceptable when dealing with an adversary who cannot substantially dictate the terms of battle, seize the initiative, and attack you first (i.e. Haiti).³⁹ We have the luxury of time; we get to dictate the initiation of OODA loop cycle, but what about the current environment considering the war on terrorism?

It is conceivable, and highly possible, that in future conflict an adversary will take action first in an attempt to unbalance us. If they act swiftly, they may be able to work well inside of our OODA loop. If their first blow is a total surprise and has devastating impact, the adversary may even prevent us from taking action, breaking our OODA loop. Figure 7 represents this disruption/neutralization of the friendly loop. An example of this concept is the prevention of joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of troops in a remote country where the United States has only one port facility (one point of access to the country). Eliminate the ability to operate through the port, (i.e. chemical attack, conventional attack on critical infrastructure, or even natural disaster⁴⁰) and our OODA loop breaks down.

³⁸ Spin-up time for the purposes of this paper is defined as the time interval required from initial notification of duties as JTF headquarters to the moment when the staff has the combined knowledge and ability to fuse all joint force capabilities available into an effective campaign plan and act as a competent JTF headquarters.

³⁹ In Haiti, the 10th Mountain Division was afforded the time to overcome the ineffectiveness of their organization. It was given time to transform into a JTF headquarters. The Haitian military did not or could not seize the initiative or attempt to attack American forces first. In Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti did not dictate the terms of engagement.

⁴⁰ Adversaries may not be limited hostile groups of people. The breakdown of an OODA loop cycle is as relevant to humanitarian relief efforts, peacekeeping operation, and other endeavors as it is to combat campaigns.




Figure 7. United States' OODA loop disrupted/neutralized.

Practiced Professionals with Longevity

The United States needs an entity it can turn to who can create a plan which brings to bear military capabilities and is immediately prepared to execute campaign plans. *Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Joint Planning Operations (Second Draft)*, dated 10 December 2002, supports the necessity and importance of having a group of practiced professionals who can fuse multiple elements during Campaign Plan Design:

Theater-level planning is inextricably linked with operational art, most notably in the design of the operational concept for the campaign. While facilitated by such procedures as JOPES and commonly accepted military decision-making models, the **operational design process is primarily an intellectual exercise based on experience and judgment. The result of this process should provide the conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means for the campaign.** [Emphasis from original text]⁴¹

⁴¹ United States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability, *Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Joint Planning Operations (Second Draft)*, (Washington DC: Doctrine Division, 2002), IV-8.

United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) is currently experimenting with the concept of a standing joint task force headquarters (SJTFHQ), a concept borrowed from the United Kingdom.⁴² The Joint Requirements and Integration Directorate (J-8) of USJFCOM, is focusing an effort around a cadre of trained and practiced experts. However, these experts are not a fully functional headquarters staff as their title implies. A large staff does not support them nor can they conduct all the staffing/administrative functions of a JTF staff. The SJTFHQ staff are, at best, only two or three bodies deep in functional expertise areas; they are manpower limited. They constitute a core body of individuals whose full time job is to think about and try new ways of integrating all of the United States' military capabilities. These individuals work closely together to breakdown stove-piped (specialized and compartmentalized) information and fuse capabilities at hand. This group of experts is then called upon to deploy into a theater and support a combatant command by setting up the basic architecture that will command and control deployed forces. They in-turn train the combatant commander's staff on the SJTFHQ and then re-deploy home once the commander's staff is ready to conduct the functions of a JTF staff. Their strength is that they regularly practice and dedicate the entirety of their time and effort into development of the concept. This is a step in the right direction, however this idea has limitations.⁴³

The new SJTFHQ still possesses two basic weaknesses present in the current joint force structure. The first weakness is that personnel are transitory in nature; they have limited time

⁴² David Capewell, "Joint Force Headquarters," Presentation to British Army Staff Conference, United Kingdom, 8 January 1997, Power Point presentation authored by Commander Williams PJHQ.

⁴³ United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Requirements and Integration Directorate (J-8), *Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters* briefing conducted at U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 2002.

assigned to their joint duties. The second, personnel assigned to USJFCOM are borrowed from other services and maintain their service identity.

The transitory nature of the military assignment process effectively translates into loss of corporate knowledge and the need to reacquire knowledge previously gained when new service members are assigned into and then out of the SJTFHQ. Depending on the depth of personnel (availability of trainers due to deployment demands), the “experts” assigned to the SJTFHQ may not reach expert status. Hypothetically, with unit manning at three deep in every position, one expert could be deployed while another expert trains the new service member. This assumes world events do not demand the deployment of multiple JTFs and their respective command staffs. Who is left behind to train the trainer?

The next problem lies in the fact all the individuals assigned to USJFCOM belong to some other service. The parochialism discussed earlier is a significant hurdle to overcome. This is compounded with the reality that the individual, who is on loan to the joint community, must be promoted within their respective service. Generally speaking, the services may not recognize the importance of the individual’s contribution to the United States’ armed forces because the effort and job description while working for USJFCOM does not easily translate into the individual service language/competencies. The Air Force (substitute any service) looks to promote individuals who demonstrate potential to serve at higher levels of responsibility in the Air Force, not the joint force. This is a direct result of the beneficial bias each independent service needs in order to promote expertise in their medium.

Colonel Boyd addressed the detrimental effects of an inward focus in his briefing “Organic Design for Command and Control.” He concludes, “Any command and control system

that forces adherents to look inward, leads to dissolution/disintegration (i.e. the system comes unglued).”⁴⁴ He furthers his message [Underline emphasis below is Boyd’s]:

Suppress tendency to build-up explicit internal arrangements that hinder interaction with the external world.

Arrange settings and circumstances so that leaders and subordinates alike are given opportunity to continuously interact with external world, and with each other, in order to more quickly make many-sided implicit cross-referencing projections, empathies, correlations, and rejections as well as create the similar images or impressions, hence a similar implicit orientation, needed to form an organic whole.

A similar implicit orientation for commanders and subordinates alike will allow them to:

- Diminish their friction and reduce time, thereby permit them to:
- Exploit variety/rapidity while maintaining harmony/initiative, thereby permit them to:
- Get inside adversary’s O-O-D-A loops, thereby:
- Magnifying adversary’s friction and stretch-out his time (for a favorable mismatch in friction and time), thereby:
- Deny adversary the opportunity to cope with events/efforts as they unfold. ⁴⁵

Boyd continues:

...implicit orientation [Boyd’s emphasis] shapes the character of:

- Insight and Vision
- Focus and Direction
- Adaptability
- Security

Since a first rate command and control system should possess above qualities, any design or related operational methods should play to expand, not play down and diminish, implicit orientation [Boyd’s emphasis].⁴⁶

Two more recent examples of ineffective campaign planning, with the current joint force organization, should be brought forward. Formal, unclassified, joint after action reviews have not been published, at the time of this monograph, on the Afghan and Iraqi wars. They would be suspect if they were, considering the war still slogs on in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, the

⁴⁴ John R. Boyd, “Organic Design for Command and Control,” in *The Evolution of Air Power Theory, Readings Volume IIIB* (Montgomery, AL: School for Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, AY 1994-1995), 100.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 102.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 103.

School for Advanced Military Studies recently provided a two-day-long forum for the students to interface with several key planners for these two operations.⁴⁷

In both cases, an Army unit was given responsibility to plan the operations. By the admissions of the planners, this planning was conducted in a highly dynamic environment without the benefit of a joint campaign plan. Basic assumptions seemed to change at the national level daily. The planning was slow to include other components and was focused on ground component only. Without the joint vision of how the war was to be conducted provided by a joint campaign plan (i.e. internal focus), the friction degraded cohesion of team members when the other components were integrated into the JTF staff.⁴⁸

This degradation of cohesion within the joint team is a property of group dynamics. A 1998 *Academy of Management Review* article acknowledges demographics and subsequent grouping of individuals with diverse attributes (i.e. medium based services ties) influences group performance. The group may produce a much more creative solution to problem sets, but the differences may impede “cross-demographic communication and diminish group cohesion.”⁴⁹ If communication slows down, the time needed to get the creative answer is increased. If the problem solving time is increased, the United States OODA loop time CV is exasperated.

⁴⁷ Again, the panels of guests were afforded the school promise of non-attribution for their participation. The names, ranks, and exact positions are withheld in the spirit of the policy. Their credentials, expertise, and first-hand knowledge are considered in the highest regards by the senior staff of SAMS, as conveyed to the student body of SAMS. The forum was conducted in Eisenhower Hall on 16-17 December 2003.

⁴⁸ Friction is used here as defined by Carl von Clausewitz, “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. . . . Countless minor incidents--the kind you can never really foresee--combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls short of the intended goal.” *On War*, 119.

⁴⁹ Dora C. Lau and Keith J. Murnighan, “Demographic diversity and faultlines: The compositional dynamics of organizational groups,” *Academy of Management Review* 23, no. 2 (1998): 325, 16p [database online]; available from EBSCO Host Research Database at <http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=533229&db=bsh>; Internet accessed 18 February 2004.

The friction and detriment to unit cohesion could have been avoided if the JTF Staff had published a timely campaign plan to build upon and conducted backbriefs to further aid the planning process as the environment evolved (i.e. had an external focus for all the services and agencies). These planners pulled off, thru titanic effort and enormous personal fortitude, the development of plans that have successfully guided the United States thru major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to date. Unfortunately, they were so focused on the immediate combat operations by ground forces, the subsequent plan on how to fuse the military instrument with others (diplomatic, information, and economic instruments) into a stability operation struggles today.⁵⁰

Ad hoc command structures and the organizational nature of current joint task force staffs violate basic principles of war and are why we must rely on the Herculean efforts of a few good planners. It is also arguable that their singular focus on combat operations within their own medium has not afforded them the capability to fully develop plans that can effectively draw upon the capabilities of the entire armed service community as well as incorporate the capabilities located outside the DOD--an external focus. A truly joint command structure and supporting staff must be ready to put idea into action.

Chapter Summary

The bottom line is that the lack of a permanent joint military institution, with personnel who specialize in the fusion of all the capabilities of all the services, degrades the effectiveness of the United States' armed forces and their subsequent integration with the other instruments of national power. The current organizational structure will not allow the military to evolve to the next level of responsiveness and effectiveness needed in today's no-notice Crisis Action Planning

⁵⁰ Instruments of power are those elements or abilities the United States can use to influence external actors. They are commonly referred to as the DIME: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power.

environment. A military organization must be created that encourages external orientation and rewards multi-medium solutions. Only a new military organization creates a culture, which truly promotes the fusion of joint warfighting.

Chapter 4: Doctrine

*Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. Joint doctrine provides authoritative guidance, **based upon extant capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States**. It incorporates time-tested principles for successful military action as well as contemporary lessons which together guide aggressive exploitation of US advantages against adversary vulnerabilities. **Doctrine shapes the way the Armed Forces think** about the use of the military instrument of national power. [Emphasis added is mine]⁵¹*

Joint Publication 1

Current Joint Publication Development

The ability to translate national military theory and its capabilities into executable actions is hampered by the lack of bedrock, joint doctrine, from which all the services can build. Current joint doctrine is written by entities within each service and has a tendency to mimic, or share the same bias, of the service's doctrine. The doctrine is then reviewed and revised by other services until consensus can be reached. It is common to have doctrinal disputes over the definition of a word or term (i.e. Army vs. Air Force's definition of Close Air Support). The outcome of the ensuing debate is doctrine that the services rarely find useful. This process does not produce a standard language or framework the services can use as a skeleton while building subsequent/supplemental service doctrine. An unbiased doctrine writing body, knowledgeable in the services' multi-medium theories and capabilities is needed. This body must also have the authority to push down and out the baseline joint doctrine to other services. This top-down process would provide a solid framework, language, and common reference point for the services

⁵¹ United States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability, *Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington DC: Doctrine Division, 2000), vi.

to guide upon while building their supplemental doctrine that will fill the voids and meet the unique requirements of their individual mediums.

The complexity of the joint publication developmental process is depicted in Figure 8. It is an excerpt from the rear, inside cover of JP-1. Two important elements of this figure highlight the problem with the current problem. First, handoff for responsibility of authorship, to a lead agent, is abdicated in Step #2. Second, note the duration of the process in Step # 5--five years.




Figure 8. Excerpt from Joint Publication 1.

This process lends itself to influence from single services. An individual lead agent (possibly an organization within a service) may not have expertise outside of its area/medium. The tendency has been for the joint doctrine to be developed and expressed in single service language because the developer is most comfortable in his service language. The draft is then

sent forward to the Joint Staff and services where the language is accepted or revised. Unfortunately, the language and terms may spark parochial debate and subsequent compromise. The end result tends to be a non-specific document, unable to clearly provide substantive information or guidance to the services. It does not shape “the way the Armed Forces think about the use of the military instrument of national power.”⁵²

Another problem finds roots in the same area outlined in Chapter 3 above; the Joint Staff is on loan from other services. Action officer(s) may not have the vision/expertise to see the complex impact the new doctrine may have on other services’ capabilities. Additionally, a joint staff tour of three years potentially prevents any one individual, or group of individuals, from shepherding the doctrine’s development from conception to implementation. This ultimately slows the publishing process down while mistakes are revisited or while staff officers cope to grapple with the road traveled by their predecessors. In haste, even poorly developed doctrine may be published because the suspense looms. Regardless of the reason, if joint doctrine suffers, how can services fuse capabilities and develop their doctrine to complement joint doctrine? The lack of fusion experts in the doctrinal environment is also a telling sign concerning our joint CV outlined in Chapter 2. If we cannot fuse the capabilities on paper, how can we implement them in the real world? The process needs experts to push the doctrine out and down to the services.

Ideal Joint Publication Development

The ideal entity that creates true joint publications has two key traits: longevity in the joint doctrine development environment, and equal bias towards all the services. With the current force structure, the longevity issue is attacked one of two ways. First, lengthen the tour of duty for staff members who create this bedrock doctrine, or secondly, shorten the doctrine approval

⁵² Ibid.

process. There are strengths and weaknesses to the current system; however, a true solution is not attainable within the current force structure.

Extending tours of duty allows staff members the opportunity to guide the development from initial inputs to final published document. Corporate knowledge is maintained thru the control of the assignment system. Unfortunately, this benefit comes with some negative effects.

Extended tours on the Joint Staff may not be a possibility with the real world demands of today's operational environment. The services have a need to deploy larger numbers of members in an expeditionary environment. Each service satisfies the demand of this environment in its own unique way; however, all the services seem to have answered the manpower issue with a similar solution. Staff assignments appear to have lower priority than deployed operations. Joint Staff positions may suffer additionally because the services must fill vital service-staff positions first to insure survival/functionality of their service. In addition, as members are assigned to operational units in deployed locations (i.e. away from service and joint staffs) and military operations increase, the associated staff-work also increases. With the staffs undermanned and fewer people to process the staff-work, the time to process the paperwork increases slowing the doctrine process even further.

The second option of shortening the doctrine approval process helps to insure Joint Staff and lead agency staffs can work within the time allotted in an assignment cycle. This benefit however, is also overcome by the demands of the expeditionary environment of today. Smaller staffs and increased in workload continue to overburden the undermanned staffs.

Regardless, these two options do not provide the second trait, equal bias towards all the services. The service members provided to the Joint Staff are transitory in nature. They come with single service bias or even parochialism. By the time their tour is complete, they may have been transformed into a true joint team member, but they are a perishable resource on their way back to their parent service. The corporate knowledge is again lost and effective joint doctrine development is hindered.

Chapter Summary

The current joint doctrine system is fundamentally flawed. It produces doctrine by consensus and has no true neutral advocate who possess the depth of experience and the longevity in the staff system to watch over the authorship process. The optimum fix provides a joint entity that can staff the process internally, within a short period of time, and who has the resident expertise to fuse the services capabilities. This entity provides continuity in creation process of the document and frees-up non-joint agencies to write any medium-specific, supplemental doctrine and/or staff-work. This new entity has a much larger joint staff than currently exists.

Chapter 5: The Road Ahead

Joint operation planning is a complex process that takes place in a knowledge-based collaborative environment. The emphasis is on sharing information iteratively and collaboratively throughout the process. . . . All echelons of command must collaborate to complete multiple tasks across a broad spectrum of activities. This broad range of activities includes data gathering and fact finding, mission analysis, preparation and distribution of planning guidance, development and refinement of force and support requirements, identification of forces and sustainment resources, and review and re-planning based on changes in assumptions or the current situation. Most planning activities are not independent events. They are dependent on other activities or the results of other activities and are performed or reviewed at multiple echelons of commands in overlapping timeframes. Concurrent execution may increase the tempo in which these planning activities must occur. Joint planning and execution are interdependent and are optimized when consistently integrating situation awareness.⁵³

Joint Publication 5-0, Second Draft

Conclusion

Over the course of this paper, several problems have been noted with the current joint structure. Doctor Strange and Colonel Boyd have provided a lens thru which we can view these problems. The key critical vulnerability we have is not for lack of technologically advanced weaponry, it is in how we institutionalize the fusion of the capabilities we possess and the human tendencies that interfere with the total effectiveness of the process--how we organize our force structure. There is no one uniformed entity that is morally or legally bound to lead the entirety of the armed services to the objectives of the SECDEF and President. Paranoia and lack of trust created the separate yet equal service structure we currently have. The strength of the current structure is it allows each service the freedom to explore and exploit the entirety of their respective medium without repercussion. The services justifiably have an inward institutional focus. This freedom and strength cannot be maintained if the independent environment the

⁵³ *Joint Publication 5-0, I-13 to I-14.*

service members operate in is devolved into one single service. The weakness of the current structure is that this independence degrades effectiveness and the ability to externally focus when attempting to fuse capabilities for employment within the current JTF construct.

Previously, this ineffectiveness was tolerable because time was on our side; this is not the case now. The speed at which an opponent can generate force and strike us has intensified the need to protect and if able, eliminate the United States armed forces' ineffectiveness. Secretary Rumsfeld recognizes the need for change, a change that is evident in his remarks quoted at the opening of this paper:

...we must think differently and develop the kind of capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and to unexpected circumstances. We must transform not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight.⁵⁴

Joint Task Force Headquarters do not have time to get smart and learn the capabilities available, and the requirements each have in the coordination process, so they can be properly brought to bear at the time and place needed. The combatant commander needs a fully integrated and well practiced staff that can immediately start planning the campaign with subsequent operations, and then quickly execute those plans.

Men like Strange and Boyd are sometimes thought too abstract and can sometimes evoke strong emotion in the reading of their works. Neutral measures may be introduced to examine and briefly demonstrate how the current system promotes the United States' critical vulnerability. These alternate measures/evaluation criteria are the time honored principles of war outlined in current joint publications. All the examples/military operations noted in this paper violate *mass*, *economy of force*, *unity of command*, and *simplicity*.

Mass was violated every time the planners did not consider the full spectrum of military capabilities available. They did not "synchronize and/or integrate appropriate joint force

⁵⁴ Rumsfeld, 1.

capabilities where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time.”⁵⁵ They approached the problem at hand with what they knew, a single medium methodology--an internal focus.

Economy of force was violated similarly thru the lack of knowledge of what resources/capabilities where at hand. Planners did not have the capability to effect “judicious employment and distribution of forces.”⁵⁶ The benefit of time allowed planners the opportunity to adjust the plan and include additional capabilities as they revealed themselves (as specifically noted in the 10th Mountain example). Unfortunately, the time lag could have been exploited had our adversaries assessed our lethargic state of readiness in our ability to quickly and effectively fuse capabilities during planning and employment of our forces.

As operations unfolded, *unity of command* matured as chains of command developed. The joint and coalition forces adapted to the ad hoc environment, but again at some cost of time. We could virtually eliminate the lag in time (while command structure is being ironed out) if we regularly organized, equipped, trained, and exercised the command structures we utilize in crisis. The lack of a single service with associated authority and budget to train and equip all the forces together hinders progress in this area. We do not practice like we fight.

A thorough understanding of capabilities and clear, concise doctrine written in a standard language promotes *simplicity*. The ad hoc nature of the current JTF construct and the requirement for a prolonged spin-up time demonstrates *simplicity* is not inherent in the system. The SJTFHQ, as discussed earlier, works to promote *simplicity*; however, due to the transitory nature of the military personnel system, and the lack of a commonly accepted useful body of joint doctrine, *simplicity* continues to be negated. Without parochialism and with the capability to provide clear direction, thru effective joint doctrine, friction is reduced and *simplicity* flourishes. The lack of

⁵⁵ *Joint Publication 3-0., A-1.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

multi-medium capabilities knowledge, parochialism, and the shortfalls of joint doctrine development all indicate there is a change needed in the Department of Defense.

Recommendation

A new, capstone service is needed to provide the authoritative leadership of all medium focused services. This lead service can, without parochialism, focus on fusing all the armed forces' capabilities and write clear, meaningful doctrine that guides the employment of these capabilities. The working title of this organization for the remainder of this monograph is the United States Military (USM).

The single strength of the USM is its outward focus. It harmonizes all the external capabilities of the other services in order to effectively, and in a timely fashion, meet the challenges placed at our doorstep by our adversaries. It provides a national level entity that is capable of true campaign planning. Not only does it fuse all the capabilities of the joint services, it also serves as a conduit for interagency, multinational, and non-governmental organization (NGO) cooperation.⁵⁷ Figure 9 represents the new proposed chain of command with the introduction of the USM.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2020*, [book on-line] (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, June, 2000, accessed 21 February 2004); available from <http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision>; Internet.

⁵⁸ The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs will still have a direct relationship. This relationship is administrative in function and insures civil involvement in each medium. Service Secretaries will have an equal voice with the USM commander to the SECDEF to insure balance and well being of each independent service. Ultimate control of the military remains with the Commander in Chief, as prescribed by our founding fathers. The Combatant Commanders will stand up operations at the direction of the United States Military Commander (USM/CC). The C/JTF Commanders and key staff positions will be USM personnel from the USM regional commands. The duration of their command is temporal and a function of the nature of the crisis.




Figure 9. Proposed chain of command.

The men and women of the USM continuously look for ways, and have the freedom to pursue within their own organization (the United States Military), the fusion of all the nation’s capabilities and instruments of power. The freedom to excel in this environment is directly related to those traits noted by du Picq and Mitchell in previous chapters. Personnel have the longevity and promise of competitive career opportunities while diverging from the stovepipe experience of a single-medium focused service. They are challenged and rewarded for looking outward; medium-based parochialisms is bread out of them. The USM is able to achieve the implicit internal organization, architecture, and external orientation Boyd saw as a requirement for success.

The creation of this new service requires Congressional and Presidential action. As the lead actor for all things military in the United States, the USM has to be manned and budgeted so it can effectively assess capabilities, create doctrine, and fuse capabilities in time of national crisis. Regional USM cadre will fill all combatant commanders and JTF staff core positions.


This insures practiced professionals are in positions ready to answer the call of the President and SECDEF at a moments notice.

When not actively employed as a JTF somewhere in the world, the USM personnel exercise and practice the skill sets needed to do their operational duties. They build a regional awareness and nurture the external links with those entities that could aid in the development of campaign plans--the joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) links.⁵⁹ The USM actively trains with other services insuring all components are interoperable and inter-reliable. Additionally, the USM facilitate relationships with those additional agencies outside the DOD so that in time of crisis, the groundwork is already laid and the agencies know what to expect from the DOD and the DOD would understand the role the agencies play in theater. The USM will be knowledgeable and practiced not only in military capabilities, but also the links to outside agencies and organizations (JIM, NGOs, etc.).

In times of crisis, the regional command would detail a JTF commander and staff specifically for the crisis. The key positions on this staff would be the practiced fusion professionals of the USM. With the exception of the core staff positions, the remainder of the JTF will look very similar to the standing joint task forces of today, as proposed by JFCOM's SJTFHQ initiative.⁶⁰ Together the entire team quickly develops operational-level plans and transitions to execution quickly and more effectively. In addition to the operational-level presence, the USM will also have a national/strategic-level organization to turn to for timely guidance.

⁵⁹ Shelton, *Joint Vision 2020*.

⁶⁰ Joint Forces Command's Standing Joint task Force Headquarters initiative alters the structure of the traditional (J1, J2, J3, J4, etc.) staff. The organization is broken-down into functional areas creating more effective lines of communication. Information sharing across the entire command staff is more effective. Each element within the task force headquarters has a resident expert from each of the traditional stovepipes (J1, J2, J3, J4, etc.) that helps build situational awareness for the staff.



* A USM planning staff that serves as national fusion experts. Creates campaign plans. Maintains connectivity with other departments, governmental agencies, NGOs, etc.

Figure 10. Joint/Coalition Task Force sourcing.

The USM Commander has a national-level planning group responsible for creating timely, useful campaign plans. The USM Crisis Planning Group (USM/CPG) draws upon regional expertise from the regional commands, medium components (air, land, sea, and space), as well as provides a national level interface with agencies such as the CIA, NSA, Department of State, and non-governmental organizations (JIMs and NGOs). By interfacing at the national-strategic level, the USM provides a conduit and the capability for the President and SECDEF to rapidly fuse the entire spectrum of the national instruments of power. The Combatant Commanders (Joint Force Commanders) will ultimately have a campaign plan that they can hand their planning staff. This enables the JTF to create a more effective, timely operational plan and eliminates the assumptions the operational level planners traditionally have had to make when creating the JTF's plan. Reduce the confusion, give solid planning guidance from the national

level that incorporates all phases of desired effects within the campaign and the required capabilities of each, and the OODA loop for the combatant commands is reduced.

Congressional and Presidential action will also be required to squash the inevitable resistance to the creation of a lead military authority. Current service chiefs could view the USM as a threat to their existences. The USM is not a threat. The ability to rise to the highest rank and level of authority within individual services will remain. The services will be expected to maintain total dominance and exploitative capabilities in their respective mediums. The only thing the senior personnel of non-USM will not be able to do is command the joint force in contingency operations. Their unique perspectives, though a strength for their service, hinder the external focus of the USM. Just as the services have made a commitment to their service, the personnel of the United States Military make as serious a vow to the USM and defense of the Constitution. It is not a power struggle; it is a matter of perspective.

On the other hand, it must also be emphasized the USM is not coequal to the other services. One of the weaknesses of the current force structure is the lack of control one uniformed officer has over the direction of the military. The USM should have total budgetary control (and 100% accountability to Congress) over the entire military budget. This pragmatic step will effectively insure each service is providing interoperable and interdependent training, and more importantly, operational capabilities. The USM provides a common vector to follow when forging operational capabilities. Services must justify and meet the USM's criteria for interdependent and interoperability standards, if they do not, funding is not granted--no bucks, no Buck Rogers. The only area excluded from these standards will be research and development.⁶¹

To foster the freedom needed to pursue medium dominance, research and development (R & D) funds would be used by the services as they see fit. The USM provides each service a

⁶¹ The President and Congress may elect to elevate the commander of the USM to the rank of 5-star general. This will eliminate any date-of-rank issues and clearly set the USM as the supreme uniformed military commander for the armed forces.

portion of the total military budget for R & D. The services should then use the funds to bolster or explore their medium's capabilities. Each service chief has the responsibility for providing direction of their R & D budget. The creative strides each service takes will be tempered by only one restriction, the capability under research will only be funded for operational use if the capability can be integrated and is interoperable with current USM capabilities. If the new capability cannot be currently integrated, all the services must demonstrate how they plan to change together so integration and interoperability leap forward together. The intent here is to encourage cross medium dialog to insure forward progress does not isolate the other mediums. It gives common direction to operational capabilities.

This organizational structure also insures top-down creation and dissemination of doctrine. The outward focus of the USM doctrine writers help better weave capabilities and provide for a common point of reference when writing medium specific supplements. USM doctrine provides a common language for the other services. The authoritative hierarchy of the service structures allows the USM to set the doctrinal lexicon standards. The end result is that clear and useful joint doctrine will be created.

The new organization and associated authority allows the deficiencies in the previously noted principles of war to be rectified making it a more responsive and effective instrument of power. *Mass, economy of force, unity of command, and simplicity* are better achieved in the USM than in the current system. External focus and the ability to regularly exercise the USM's external links are central to its ability to achieve the principles of war.

In order to *mass* effects in the shortest interval of time, you have to be aware of the capabilities that produce the effects. The USM's external focus fosters the ability to look across the services, into the other instruments of national power, and better judge what effects can be brought to bear in a given time and space against an adversary. Knowing what tools are in the tool chest is just as critical to a carpenter as is to a military commander and his/her staff.

Similarly, *economy of force* attempts to bring the right effect to the right place at the right time without winnowing away too much “essential combat power to secondary efforts.”⁶² The carpenter analogy is again helpful. The carpenter must not only know what is in his tool chest, but also how to use the tools within it. If he does not know how to judiciously use them, he may waist his effort and time trying to figure them out. The USM is a well-trained and practiced carpenter. Its external focus and ability to regularly exercise its external links helps it to understand what tools are in its tool chest and how best to enable their use. The USM is better equipped to bring the right capability to the right place at the right time.

Unity of command is instantaneous because the inherent relation of the USM to the other services and the deployed JTFs. The single USM commander and his/her staff are ready and practiced at standing up JTFs. They know how to leverage the external links and waste no time establishing the command and control architecture. The USM fights like it practices and is ready to assume JTF responsibilities at a moments notice, eliminating the vulnerability associated with spin-up time.

Finally, *simplicity* is achieved because the chain of command is less complex and a more diverse cross-medium knowledgeable planning staff conducts planning. A common, clear, definitive doctrine helps eliminate language barriers of the services. If we communicate more clearly, we foster *simplicity* thru gained understanding. Repetition and regularly exercising the external links of the USM also promotes *simplicity*--practice makes perfect.

The bottom line is that the USM provides the country a single military authority that can fuse military capabilities in a timely and effective manor, especially in the Global War on Terror. It eliminates the United States’ current critical vulnerability Doctor Strange helped to define by reducing the military’s OODA loop cycle time, as viewed with Colonel Boyd’s lens. It allows us to bring the military instrument of national power, in coordination with the other instruments, to

⁶² *Joint Publication 3-0, A-2.*

bear in a much more responsive fashion. The USM has the external focus that allows it to bring the right capability to the right place at the right time. It also provides the military a single uniformed authority to follow. Additionally, the public trust is preserved (as it is now) because civilian control over the military remains absolute. The organizational change outlined in this monograph provides for the dynamic requirements outlined by Secretary Rumsfeld while preserving the independent environments each service relies on for the total exploitation of their mediums. The American people look to the services to act as one upon their behalf; we should be organized and focused in a fashion that helps meet the timely demands they entrust in the armed services. The USM and subsequent DOD reorganization helps us to see our self, the enemy, and the environment better. Our OODA loop is reduced and our key vulnerability mitigated. The United States Military, in unison with the entirety of the armed forces, can quickly and effectively meet any challenges future foes present the United States anywhere in the world.

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