



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

THESIS

**21st CENTURY TERRORISM:
WRONG DIAGNOSIS, INADEQUATE REMEDY**
by

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June 2005

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE June 2005	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: 21 st Century Terrorism: Wrong Diagnosis, Inadequate Remedy			5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Kleanthis Kyriakidis			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) From the early 1990s, and especially since September 11, 2001, numerous scholars, politicians and political analysts alike have characterized terrorism as global, religious, irrational and rising. The theory of the emergence of this "new terrorism" is well established and can be considered as conventional wisdom. The main characteristics of the "old terrorism", its political, local and rational character, are obsolete in accordance with this line of thinking. In particular, Al Qaeda is thought to be an enemy worth changing the National Security Strategy of the United States and even suspending some civil not to mention human rights. However, the decline or disappearance of many prominent terrorist figures or entire groups have been ironically overlooked, or selectively ignored as irrelevant to the "new" terrorism. This thesis challenges the aforementioned common knowledge and suggests that the "new terrorism" has very few if any differences from the "old" one. It remains a purely political, mainly local and definitely rational activity in a steady or declining stage.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS Terrorism, Al Qaeda, Religious, Global, Irrational, Political, Counter-Terrorism, Policy, Misconceptions.			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 91
			16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL

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21ST CENTURY TERRORISM: WRONG DIAGNOSIS, INADEQUATE REMEDY

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

From the early 1990s, and especially since September 11, 2001, numerous scholars, politicians and political analysts alike have characterized terrorism as global, religious, irrational and rising. The theory of the emergence of this “new terrorism” is well established and can be considered as conventional wisdom. The main characteristics of the “old terrorism”, its political, local and rational character, are obsolete in accordance with this line of thinking. In particular, Al Qaeda is thought to be an enemy worth changing the National Security Strategy of the United States and even suspending some civil not to mention human rights. However, the decline or disappearance of many prominent terrorist figures or entire groups have been ironically overlooked, or selectively ignored as irrelevant to the “new” terrorism. This thesis challenges the aforementioned common knowledge and suggests that the “new terrorism” has very few if any differences from the “old” one. It remains a purely political, mainly local and definitely rational activity in a steady or declining stage.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank the Naval Postgraduate School and especially my thesis advisors, Dr. Maria Rasmussen and Mr. James Russell for their invaluable help, for believing in me and supporting a research which contradicts the conventional wisdom and is bound to irritate some readers. Moreover, Dr. Daniel Moran, the discussions with whom broadened my horizons. I would also like to thank Nancy Sharrock for her wonderful work as an editor. I must single out the encouragement I received from my wife, Evgenia, during my countless working hours; despite being neglected, she had always been extremely supportive.

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I. INTRODUCTION

From the early 1990s, and especially since September 11, 2001, numerous scholars, politicians and political analysts alike have characterized terrorism as global, religious, irrational and rising. The theory of the emergence of this “new terrorism” is well established and can be considered as conventional wisdom. The main characteristics of the “old terrorism”, its political, local and rational character, are obsolete in accordance with this line of thinking. In particular, Al Qaeda is thought to be an enemy worth changing the National Security Strategy of the United States and even suspending some civil not to mention human rights.¹ However, the decline or disappearance of many prominent terrorist figures or entire groups have been ironically overlooked, or selectively ignored as irrelevant to the “new” terrorism.² This thesis challenges the aforementioned common knowledge and suggests that the “new terrorism” has very few if any differences from the “old” one. It remains a purely political, mainly local and definitely rational activity in a steady or declining stage.

This brief introduction first presents the research methods, sources and assumptions. It also describes the main arguments of the “new terrorism” theory, which will be contradicted throughout the rest of this thesis.

Before further developing any arguments, it is necessary to state some of the assumptions and shortcomings of this study. Firstly, it must be clarified that most of the

¹ James M. Poland more than a decade before 9/11 wrote: “Certain tactics of random violence can achieve effects on democratic societies that often produce overwhelming fear...can cause governments to overreact by ‘tightening security’. The result of this tactical violence has been the gradual erosion of human rights and civil liberties in many parts of the world.” See James M. Poland, *Understanding Terrorism* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1988), pp. 1-2.

² The disappearance of certain leaders cannot be considered a mortal blow to terrorism and usually it only helps some young leaders to get an “early promotion”. However, it partly illustrates the success of the counter-terrorism services worldwide. Among the arrested leaders are Riduan Isamuddin “Hambali” (Jemaah Islamiyah), Abdullah Ocalan (PKK), Alexandros Giotopoulos (November 17), Salih Mirzabeyoglu (Islamic Greater Eastern Raiders Front), Mullah Krerar (Ansar al Islam), Shoko Asahara (Aum Shinrikyo) and Michael McKeivitt (Real IRA). Among the killed leaders is the entire HAMAS leadership (Abd-al-Aziz Rantisi, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Ismail Abu Shanab, Salah Shihada and Abu Mahmud Hanud), Abu Nidal (ANO), Zein al-Abideen Al-Mehdar (Aden Abyan Islamic Army) and Antar Zouabri (GIA). As regards the terrorist groups, which is really crucial, the Greek Revolutionary Nuclei and Revolutionary Organization 17 November were disbanded, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad merged with Al Qaeda, the Abu Nidal Organization, Mujaheddin-e-Khalk, Al Gamma al Islamiyya, and Aum Shinrikyo, have been practically inactive for more than five years and others like Shining Path, PKK and Harakat-ul-Mujahideen have drastically reduced their activities.

examples are taken from international terrorist incidents, which account for less than one fourth of all terrorist acts.³ The main reason is that the statistics and the available data are easily accessible, well documented and can be cross referenced. However, both the theoretical approach of the “new” terrorism and the conclusions of this thesis can be applied to domestic terrorism⁴ as well. Secondly, the terrorism considered is of the revolutionary type which acts to oppose the state and not the functionary type acting on behalf of the state.⁵ There are numerous cases of the latter kind of terrorism, which is many times portrayed as counter-terrorism. Summary executions in many Latin American dictatorships, French cruel “anti-guerilla” methods used in Algeria or the recent examples of torture and violation of POW rights in Iraq⁶ and Guantanamo⁷ can be regarded as such.

Since there are hundreds of different definitions of terrorism⁸, an attempt is made to try to avoid the theoretical debate about its character. The UN “academic consensus” definition is used:

³ Before 9/11, the worst terrorist attack in the United States was the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995. An explosion devastated the Alfred Murrah Federal Building killing 168 people including 19 children and injuring more than 400. Timothy McVeigh was arrested, convicted and executed in 2001 as being mainly responsible for the attack. His accomplice, Terry Nichols, received a life sentence.

⁴ Especially in the United States, the last 20 years have seen a considerable surge in right-wing terrorism with groups such as the Aryan Nations, the Order, the Silent Brotherhood, the White American Bastion, the Bruden Schweigen Strike Force II, the Posse Comitatus, the Arizona Patriots and the White Patriot Party. See Cindy C. Combs, *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2000), pp. 217-219.

⁵ Richard Falk’s excellent distinction between the revolutionary and functionary terrorist type is used. See Richard A. Falk, *A Dual Reality: Terrorism Against the State and Terrorism by the State*, at Charles Kegley Jr. (ed.), *The New Global Terrorism* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2003) p. 59.

⁶ This refers to the Abu Ghraib scandal as reported on Human Rights Watch Report, *The Road to Abu Ghraib*, June 2004 (available on line: <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604>, last accessed on May 24, 2005) and Amnesty International Report, *USA: Human Dignity Denied, Torture and Accountability in the ‘War on Terror’*, October 27, 2004 (available on line: <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR511452004>, last accessed on May 24, 2005).

⁷ For the relationship between the two cases (Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo) and details on each case see Seymour M. Hersh, *Chain of Command* (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), pp. 1-72.

⁸ For a quick reference to the U.S. official definition of terrorism and the major laws and court cases relating to terrorism, see Harry Henderson, *Global Terrorism, The Complete Reference Guide* (New York: Checkmark Books, 2001), pp. 68-97. For a detailed analysis of the problems of definitions and different approaches, see Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 13-44. For the United Nations’ proposed definitions, see the official website of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (available online: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html, last accessed on May 24, 2005).

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought (Schmid, 1988).⁹

Taking into consideration that even this definition is very vague, the author will treat as terrorist incidents cases that have many of the widely accepted characteristics of terrorism as described in Table 1.¹⁰

Element	Frequency (%)
Violence, force	83.5
Political	65
Fear, terror emphasized	51
Threat	47
(Psychological) effects and (anticipated) reactions	41.5
Victim-target differentiation	37.5
Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action	32
Method of combat, strategy, tactic	30.5
Extra-normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints	30
Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28
Publicity aspect	21.5
Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character, indiscrimination	21
Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims	17.5
Intimidation	17
Innocence of victims emphasized	15.5
Group, movement, organization or perpetrator	14
Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others	13.5
Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence	9
Clandestine, covert nature	9
Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence	7
Criminal	6
Demands made on third parties	4

Table 1. Frequencies of Definitional Elements in 109 Definitions of Terrorism. (From: Alex P. Schmid et al., *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Hoffman, p. 40. Actually, Hoffman reproduces the original table from Alex P. Schmid et al., *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), pp. 5-6.

For instance, a clear case of terrorist assault, the 9/11 attack is violent, political in the sense that Usama bin Laden had certain expressed political goals, which will be analyzed in future chapters, caused fear, threatened the population with further attacks, had severe psychological effects and so forth. On the other hand, some Hezbollah attacks against the Israeli Defense Force have more military than political significance, do not target innocent civilians in order to provoke either fear or threat, do not differentiate between the victim and the target, do not breach accepted rules and do not have symbolic aspect. Hence, one must be very careful when characterizing certain acts as terrorism.

In order to better evaluate the claims of the “new terrorism” theory and limit discussions to certain groups, the U.S. Department of State Foreign Terrorist Organizations List, detailed in Table 2, is used as a reference.¹¹

¹¹ U.S. Department of State Report, *Patterns of Global Terrorism* (Office of Counterterrorism, Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2004).

1. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
2. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
3. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
4. Ansar al-Islam
5. Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
6. Asbat al-Ansar
7. Aum Shinrikyo
8. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
9. Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)
10. Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
11. Gamaa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)
12. HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
13. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
14. Hezbollah (Party of God)
15. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
16. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) (Army of Mohammed)
17. Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad
18. Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
19. al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)
20. Kahane Chai (Kach)
21. Kongra-Gel/ PKK (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party, KADEK)
22. Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT)
23. Lashkar i Jhangvi
24. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
25. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)
26. National Liberation Army (ELN)
27. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
28. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
29. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
30. PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)
31. al-Qa'ida
32. Real IRA
33. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
34. Revolutionary Nuclei (formerly ELA)
35. Revolutionary Organization 17 November (R17N)
36. Revolutionary People's Liberation Army/Front (DHKP/C)
37. Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)
38. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)
39. United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)

Table 2. U.S. Department of State Foreign Terrorist Organizations List. (From: *U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2004).

The aforementioned list is useful because the acronyms or names of many of the included groups will be used throughout this research. A first approach to the list is that inactive groups such as Abu Nidal Organization are still included and groups like the Ulster Defense Association in Northern Ireland or numerous Italian terrorist groups are excluded. Hence, as a disclaimer, the author does not necessarily agree with the content of the list and believes that it both includes and excludes certain groups arbitrarily. It is possible to also make an initial comparison with the respective EU list (Table 3), as adopted by the EU Council Common Position 2004/500/CFSP of 17 May 2004, updating Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and published in the Official Journal of the European Union, L.196/12, June 3, 2004.

- | | |
|-----|---|
| 1. | Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) |
| 2. | Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade |
| 3. | Al-Takfir and Al-Hijra |
| 4. | Anti Imperialist Territorial Units (Nuclei Territoriali Antimperialisti) |
| 5. | Artisans' Cooperative Fire and Similar — Occasionally Spectacular (Cooperativa Artigiana Fuoco ed Affini —Occasionalmente Spettacolare) |
| 6. | Armed Units for Communism (Nuclei Armati per il Comunismo) |
| 7. | Aum Shinrikyo |
| 8. | Babbar Khalsa |
| 9. | Cell Against Capital, Prison, Prison Warders and Prison Cells (CCCCC — Cellula Contro Capitale, Carcere i suoi Carcerieri e le sue Celle) |
| 10. | Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) |
| 11. | Basque Fatherland and Liberty (E.T.A.) |
| 12. | Gamaa al-Islamiyya |
| 13. | Great Islamic Eastern Warriors Front (IBDA-C) |
| 14. | Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre/Antifascist Resistance Groups First of October (G.R.A.P.O.) |
| 15. | HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) |
| 16. | Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development |
| 17. | International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) |
| 18. | International Solidarity (Solidarietà Internazionale) |
| 19. | Kahane Chai (Kach) |
| 20. | Kongra-Gel/ PKK (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party, KADEK) |
| 21. | Lashkar-e Tayyiba(LeT) |
| 22. | Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) |
| 23. | Mujahedin-e Khalq Organisation |
| 24. | National Liberation Army (ELN) |
| 25. | New Peoples Army (NPA), Philippines |
| 26. | Orange Volunteers (OV) |
| 27. | Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) |
| 28. | Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) |
| 29. | Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) |
| 30. | Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) |

31.	Real IRA
32.	Red Brigades for the Construction of the Fighting Communist Party (Brigate Rosse per la Costruzione del Partito Comunista Combattente)
33.	Red Hand Defenders (RHD)
34.	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
35.	Revolutionary Nuclei (Epanastatiki Pirines)
36.	Revolutionary Organization 17 November (R17N)
37.	Revolutionary People's Liberation Army/Front (DHKP/C)
38.	Revolutionary Popular Struggle/Epanastatikos Laikos Agonas (ELA)
39.	Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)
40.	Stichting Al Aqsa (a.k.a. Al Aqsa Nederland)
41.	Twentieth of July Brigade (Brigata XX Luglio)
42.	Ulster Defence Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF)
43.	United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)
44.	Unit for Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative (Nucleo di Iniziativa Proletaria Rivoluzionaria)
45.	Units for Proletarian Initiative (Nuclei di Iniziativa Proletaria)
46.	Unofficial Anarchist Federation (F.A.I. — Federazione Anarchica Informale)

Table 3. EU Foreign Terrorist Organizations List. (From: *The Official Journal of the European Union*, L.196/12, June 3, 2004, pp. 4-5)

Italics are used to highlight the common groups with the U.S. Department of State Foreign Terrorist Organization List. Note that some great differences exist such as the absence of Hezbollah, LLTE or even al-Qaeda, the existence of two Greek groups which are considered merged by the American official list, the split of Al-Aqsa Martyrs to its European (Dutch) constituent and the Palestinian group and the inclusion of many Italian anarchist/communist groups. The conclusion is that no list is universally accepted and the more comprehensive one remains the U.S. Department of State Foreign Terrorist Organizations List.

For the research on both the “old” and the “new” terrorist incidents, five different databases are combined. There are many reasons to take into consideration different databases. First, there is no consensus on which attacks are truly terrorist ones and some can be found in certain databases and are completely neglected in others. The legitimacy of the fight of certain groups is open to discussion; hence different groups are included in different sources. Even when an attack is obviously terrorist in nature, it can be attributed to different groups, or the same organization under different names. In combining them, an attempt is mainly done to include only the terrorist incidents that are commonly accepted as such and are attributed to certain organizations beyond a doubt. Mainly, the

National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism database,¹² the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzlia (Israel) database¹³, the Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre database and Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor one¹⁴ and the Centre for Defense and International Security Studies database is used.¹⁵

In particular, the MIPT database will be used for statistical analysis because of its depth and the handy tools, which are included at the official website and permit comparisons by region, by period or by group.

At this point, it is necessary to describe the theory of “new terrorism” with which the author disagrees. Probably the first effort to differentiate the “new” from the “old” terrorism can be attributed to Bruce Hoffman and traced back to 1992.¹⁶ The most important books, which are mainly cited in this study, were written before the infamous 9/11 attack.¹⁷ However, it was this attack that fueled the literature regarding terrorism with vast quantities of books, whose quality is at best debatable. An attempt will be made to try to analyze the components of the phenomenon and see what has really changed. Table 4 summarizes a first useful approach in order to understand the theory.

¹² Available on line: <http://www.tkb.org>, last accessed on May 24, 2005. This Terrorism Knowledge Base integrates data from the RAND Terrorism Chronology 1968-1997; RAND@-MIPT Terrorism Incident database (1998-Present); the Terrorism Indictment database (University of Arkansas & University of Oklahoma); and DFI International's research on terrorist organizations.

¹³ Available on line: <http://www.ict.org.il>, last accessed on May 24, 2005. It is an Israeli Institute and think tank.

¹⁴ Respectively, available online: <http://jtic.janes.com> and <http://jtsm.janes.com> (both last accessed on May 24, 2005). Jane's Information Group is an independent organization and the world's leading provider of intelligence and analysis on national and international defense and security issues.

¹⁵ Available online: <http://www.cdiss.org>, last accessed on May 24, 2005. The Centre for Defense & International Security Studies is an independent organization engaging in research, analysis, commentary and discussion on issues of significance within the broad context of international security. Established in 1990 as a unit of Lancaster University, it has been based on a new independent form, at Henley-on-Thames, Oxfordshire, since January 2004.

¹⁶ Bruce Hoffman, *Terrorist Tactics, Trends and Potentialities* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1992).

¹⁷ 9/11 represented the worst terrorist attack in the history of mankind. On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four airliners flying domestic flights in the United States. Two planes crashed into the World Trade Centre (Twin Towers) in New York and another hit the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. resulting in more than 3,000 dead and numerous wounded. Another 44 people died when the fourth hijacked airliner crashed in Pennsylvania after a passengers' clash with the terrorists.

OLD	NEW	DIFFERENCES/ REMARKS
Local	Global	Borders no longer serve as barriers, grandiose ambitions
Political	Religious	Religious rather than political reasons and motivations
Within moral/legal norms, rational	Immoral/ Illegal/ Irrational	New terrorism displays indiscriminate violence, driven by hatred
Theatrical	Lethal	Seeking for maximum casualties, use of WMD
Steady/Declining	Rising	Rapidly increasing

Table 4. Differences between the “Old” and the “New” Terrorism.

The order of the table will be followed to develop this line of thinking further. Later, the second chapter is devoted to contradicting the first characteristic (global vs. local) while the third chapter debates the next difference (religious vs. political) and the fourth counter-argues the rest. It is important to state that the “new terrorism” theory is a school of thought and as such, despite certain basic characteristics, its followers have different thoughts on different issues. For instance, Charles W. Kegley Jr. highlights the “professionally coordinated planning of the September 11 attack”¹⁸ and suggests that terrorism is nowadays “reliant on the most advanced technology,”¹⁹ while Bruce Hoffman suggests the opposite: “...the proliferation during the 1990s of so-called ‘amateur’ terrorists, with little or no formal connection to an existing terrorist group...transforming terrorism into the arguably more diffuse and amorphous phenomenon that it has now become.”²⁰ Charles W. Kegley Jr. also suggests that terrorist acts are “waged by civilians without state sanction,”²¹ while many supporters of this theory point out state-sponsored terrorism. Bruce Hoffman clearly suggests that “today, state sponsorship of terrorism continues unabated.”²² Walter Laqueur is in the middle suggesting that “state-sponsored terrorism has not disappeared”²³ and “it is almost certain

¹⁸ Charles Kegley Jr, “The Characteristics, Causes, and Controls of the New Global Terrorism: An Introduction”, Charles Kegley Jr.’s (ed.), *The New Global Terrorism*, (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2003), p. 4.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, p. 185.

²¹ Kegley Jr., p. 4.

²² Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, p. 191.

²³ Walter Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1996, p. 26.

that state-sponsored terrorism will continue in the foreseeable future.”²⁴ Charles W. Kegley Jr. suggests that suicide bombings are a “new tendency” while Laqueur answers “the belief has gained ground that terrorist missions by volunteers bent on committing suicide constitute a radical new departure, dangerous because they are impossible to prevent. But that is a myth....”²⁵

Hence, this thesis describes and then attempts to counter-argue on the characteristics of the “new terrorism” which are widely accepted. In accordance with conventional wisdom, there are three components of the global character of terrorism. First, the capability of a global strike, second, the worldwide network of sympathizers and operatives and third, the global political aim, a revisionist global end-state. Authors, who support the theory that the new terrorism is global, feel that there are no longer any borders that can keep the terrorists out. Glenn E. Schweitzer suggests that “today, in an easily navigable world, the distinction between domestic and international terrorism is a tough call.”²⁶ Any militant group can achieve global reach and practically hit any target in the world. It is true that Al Qaeda was responsible for attacks ranging from Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tanzania and Kenya to the United States. Bruce Hoffman calls the phenomenon “internationalization of terrorism” and deviates from this line of thinking because he believes, and the author agrees with his statement, it dates back to 1968.²⁷ Another element of global terrorism is the network of sympathizers and operatives around the world. Charles W. Kegley Jr. suggests that the new terrorism is “orchestrated by transnational non-state organizations through global conspiratorial networks of terrorist cells located in many countries, involving unprecedented levels of communication and coordination.”²⁸ Furthermore, there is a revolutionary aim of global domination and a revisionist desire to change the international status quo, something Hoffman refers to as “hazy claims and broad demands.”²⁹ The best example is definitely Al Qaeda, which aims to restore the caliphate and unite the entire Muslim world.

²⁴ Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 243.

²⁵ Laqueur, *Postmodern Terrorism*, p. 26.

²⁶ Glenn E. Schweitzer, *A Faceless Enemy* (Cambridge: Perseus, 2002), p. 30.

²⁷ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, pp. 67-86.

²⁸ Kegley Jr., p. 4.

²⁹ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, p. 208.

The religious motivation of the new breed of terrorists is the second very distinct characteristic of the new terrorism. Islamic fundamentalism is considered to be the driving force behind most of the militant groups around the world. Richard Perle and David Frum conclude that “of the thirty-six organizations the U.S. Department of State designates as foreign terrorist organizations, seventeen purport to act in the name of Islam and six more are predominantly Muslim in membership.”³⁰ The foremost expert on “religious” terrorism, Mark Juergensmeyer, points out that at the turn of the century, “religion has provided the motivation, the justification, the organization and the world view” for public acts of violence.³¹ Bruce Hoffman suggests that “for the religious terrorist, violence is a sacramental act or divine duty, executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative and justified by scripture” and brings about an important point, “this explains why clerical sanction is so important for religious terrorists and why religious figures are often required to ‘bless’ terrorist operations before they are executed.”³²

This line of thinking also notes a third issue regarding the changing face of terrorism. “New terrorism” is supposed to be irrational and in defiance of any legal and moral constraint. The indiscriminate nature of the 9/11 attack in New York and Washington, D.C. and the 3/11 attack in Madrid³³ clearly indicate this irrationality. Furthermore, the target of the notorious Beslan attack in North Ossetia was innocent children for the first time in history.³⁴ Paul Wilkinson suggests this is a direct result of the “religious character of terrorism.” He comments that

³⁰ David Frum and Richard Perle, *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 41.

³¹ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 7.

³² Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” Ian O. Lesser et al. (ed.), *Countering the New Terrorism* (Washington, D.C: Rand, 1999), p. 20.

³³ For the first time since September 11, 2001, terrorists achieved a spectacular blow in the West, murdering almost 200 and injuring almost 2,000 innocent people. (The most plausible account is 191 killed and 1,900 wounded as reported by Reuters and BBC News on November 16, 2004. RNR radio concurred on December 9, 2004). Ten bombs detonated in four different trains in three locations in Madrid's rail system at rush hour three days before the national elections. Three of these bombs were planted in two trains heading to the Atocha station, a particularly busy hub for the commuter train line and the metro.

³⁴ On September 1, 2004, the Beslan number one school in North Ossetia was seized by Chechen separatists who took as hostages more than 1,000 children and adults. After two days, a chaotic rescue attempt by the Russian security forces resulted in the death of over 300 people, mostly children.

Where the perpetrators are motivated by religious fanaticism this also contributes to the increased propensity for mass-lethality indiscriminate attacks, because a bomber who believes he is carrying out the will of God, or Allah, in waging a “Holy War” or Jihad against an evil enemy is unlikely to be inhibited by the prospect of causing large-scale carnage.³⁵

Hence, in accordance with the “new terrorism” theory, hatred currently drives the terrorist.

A direct result of this “irrationality” is the lethal character of terrorism. In accordance with the “new terrorism” school of thought, the highly synchronized action of the simultaneous hijacking of four airliners during the 9/11 attack, the simultaneous bombings of two American embassies in Africa³⁶ and the simultaneous train bombings during the 3/11 attack in Madrid are among the cases which prove their argument. Whereas in the past terrorists wanted “a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead,”³⁷ presently they appear to strive for maximum casualties. Along with the aforementioned cases, as well as the Oklahoma bombing, the first World Trade Center³⁸ and the Beslan attack, already mentioned previously, three other incidents prove that terrorists seek mass casualties. Firstly, the alleged “planned simultaneous bombing of the Holland and Lincoln tunnels and George Washington Bridge between New Jersey and Manhattan.”³⁹ Secondly, another plan by Ramzi Yousef, the “Project Bojinka”, aiming “to blow up a dozen U.S. airliners while they were flying over the Pacific.”⁴⁰ Actually, Yousef was captured in Pakistan when the police

³⁵ Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism vs. Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 50.

³⁶ On August 7, 1998, two bomb-laden trucks drove into the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania between 10:35 and 10:40 am. The Nairobi attack led to 201 fatalities (only 12 Americans) and the Dar-es-Salaam to 11. More than 5,000 people were wounded.

³⁷ In accordance with the very famous Brian Jenkins quote which describes the terrorist’s need for publicity and public support. See Brian Michael Jenkins, “International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict”, David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (ed.), *International Terrorism and World Security* (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 15.

³⁸ The Oklahoma bombing, the WTC attack in 1993 and the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack are the examples used by Hoffman. See Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, p. 199.

³⁹ Bruce Hoffman, *Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum* (SSI, U.S. Army War College, July 15, 1994) p. 10.

⁴⁰ *9/11 Commission Report*, p. 107.

discovered his plan. Thirdly, the notorious Aum Shinrikyo use sarin gas in the Tokyo subway that could have actually caused far more casualties than the 12 deaths that it did.⁴¹

This last case is very important, since in accordance with the supporters of the “new terrorism” theory, one of the crucial factors of the lethality of the new terrorism is the actual and possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).⁴² After the fall of the Iron Curtain, nuclear power became more accessible. Glenn E. Schweitzer claims that “the nuclear legacy is a shopping mall for rogue states and terrorists.”⁴³ Yevgeny Primakov points out that

At the beginning of 2002, forty-three nations had nuclear reactors capable of producing nuclear material. More than one hundred nations are stockpiling reserves of radioactive material. There is no convincing reason to believe that all this nuclear material is well managed or protected.⁴⁴

As regards chemo-terrorism, the aforementioned Tokyo subway attack is the proof of a clear and present danger. Last but not least, bio-terrorism is another possible “new terrorism” option. The “anthrax scare of October 2001”, when a handful of American public figures received letters containing anthrax,⁴⁵ is a clear indication of what could happen in the future on a larger scale. Walter Laqueur suggests that

now, mail-order catalogs tempt militants with readily available, far cheaper, unconventional as well as conventional weapons... Governments have engaged in the production of nuclear and biological weapons for

⁴¹ A dozen people were killed and 5,500 were injured in a sarin nerve gas attack on the Kasumigaseki station in the heart of Tokyo. “During the morning rush hour on March 20, 1995, five members of the Aum Shinrikyo – all well-trained Japanese scientists or engineers – carried in a total of eleven small bags, laden with chemical solution containing deadly sarin, onto five trains racing for the station from different directions. Each chemo-terrorist placed his set of bags under a seat or on a baggage rack and, as his train approached the station, punctured each bag with a sharpened umbrella tip”. See Schweitzer, p. 85.

⁴² WMD is a rather unfortunate term, which describes the unconventional weapons. Sometimes conventional weapons can result in much more casualties than the WMDs, as the 9/11 attack demonstrated.

⁴³ Schweitzer, p. 51.

⁴⁴ Yevgeny M. Primakov, *A World Challenged* (Washington D.C.: Brookings/Nixon Center, 2004), p. 16.

⁴⁵ “On October 5, 2001, Robert Stevens, a Florida journalist, died from inhaling anthrax... Within the next few days there were reports that a similar ‘potent’ strain had been found in letters sent to Senator Tom Daschle, on Capitol Hill, and to Tom Brokaw, a well-known television presenter at NBC News, also in Washington, and to the Governor of New York State.” See David J. Whittaker, *Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat* (London: Longman, 2002), p. 152. In total, four people died and at least 13 were infected but survived.

many decades, during which time proliferation has been continuous and access ever easier...proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction does not mean that most terrorist groups are likely to use them in the foreseeable future, but some almost certainly will, in spite of all the reasons militating against it.⁴⁶

Furthermore, as Bruce Hoffman explains “many of the constraints, both self-imposed and technical, which previously inhibited terrorist use of WMD, are eroding.”⁴⁷

Last but not least, some authors suggest that terrorism has gotten worse in the last decade and especially during the second half. Others examine this trend numerically and others qualitatively. This chapter will not discuss their argument in detail but the author will offer an example to demonstrate how the same statistics can be manipulated in order to illustrate different and sometimes entirely opposite trends. Figure 1 shows the increase of terrorist incidents during the last five years using the database that was available for the last eight years. Figure 2 shows the fatalities from terrorist attacks in the last 15 years. The easily drawn conclusion is that fatalities have been multiplied and terrorist incidents, in general, have drastically increased lately.




Figure 1. Incidents by Year from 1997 to 2004. (From: MIPT Database)

⁴⁶ Laqueur, *Postmodern Terrorism*, pp. 28-34.

⁴⁷ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, p. 197.




Figure 2. Fatalities by Year from 1990 to 2004. (From: MIPT Database)

As seen from the 9/11 attack, an “outlier” in the statistical terminology is generated and as seen at a later time, the outliers should be exempt to achieve normal results. Therefore, Chapter IV uses the same database to filter out few attacks and uses a more expanded time period to contradict the “increasing” trend of terrorism.

Having described the main characteristics of the “new terrorism” theory, it is then possible to conclude that conventional wisdom both among scholars and the public is that terrorism is global, religious, irrational and rising. The author suggests that this line of thinking is wrong and the next chapter contradicts the first feature of this theory, the global characteristic of the phenomenon.

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II. THE GLOBAL ASPECT OF TERRORISM

This chapter analyzes the global characteristic of the so-called “new” terrorism. The authors, who discuss this feature, frequently talk about three different dimensions. The first is worldwide public support. The second is global reach. The third, and in the author’s opinion, much more important is the global political aspirations of certain terrorist groups.

The main example of a group with global public support is Al Qaeda and the intent is not to contradict its network of sympathizers. However, it is possible to argue that many groups have been enjoying a level of global support since their creation and are very strictly confined in their borders. The main example is the IRA, which has always been funded by organizations such as the American NORaid (the Irish National Northern Aid Committee) and has also always had sympathizers worldwide. Especially during the famous hunger strike in 1981, “general European impression ranged from pigheaded Thatcher obstinacy, through scandalous misgovernment to outright genocide.”⁴⁸ Nearly 50% of the IRA’s weapons are believed to come from the United States.⁴⁹ In accordance with James Adams

From the onset of modern terrorism in Northern Ireland in 1969, the United States has played a key role in its support. The enormous Irish-American population has always felt a strong sentimental attachment to the “old country”, and this has been translated into a steady stream of cash and guns to the IRA, which has in part enabled them to survive.⁵⁰

Kurds, Basques, Tamils and Palestinians of the Diaspora have been contributing to the “freedom fighting cause” of their compatriots by morally and economically supporting groups like PKK, ETA, LTTE and the numerous Palestinian terrorist ones. LTTE had official representatives in important countries such as India and PLO, while it had been executing terrorist acts, had representatives in many European countries. The

⁴⁸ Tom F. Baldy, *Battle for Ulster* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987), pp. 21-23, reproduces this quote from an article in the *London Times*, circa the death of Bobby Sands, the uncontested leader of the famous hunger strike of the IRA “terrorists”.

⁴⁹ Baldy, p. 125.

⁵⁰ James Adams, *The Financing of Terrorism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 134.

phenomenon of a terrorist group gaining worldwide sympathy and having a considerable network is anything but new and cannot be considered a characteristic of “global terrorism”. Al-Fatah sent its first official representative to France in 1968.⁵¹ Obviously, none of the aforementioned groups can be characterized as global despite their universal network and sympathizers. Moreover, there is nothing “new” about it. Hence, worldwide public support is not enough to characterize the phenomenon or a certain group as “global.”

The second dimension of global terrorism is its universal reach. Paul Pillar suggests that “in today’s globalizing world, terrorists can reach their targets more easily, their targets are exposed in more places....”⁵² Nevertheless, an important fact is that the vast majority of the terrorist organizations have a very limited area of operations. Only one in nine foreign terrorist groups included in the Department of State Foreign Terrorist Organizations List has ever acted outside their “borders”. Al Qaeda is the only one with a sustained global reach and impressive results. Actually, the only four groups on this list that have conducted attacks away from their “territory” are the Abu Nidal Organization (which has been inactive for more than a decade), Hezbollah (which at least for a decade has concentrated on Lebanon), PFLP (also lately concentrated on the Occupied Territories) and Al Qaeda with an uncontested global reach. Again, the intent is not to contradict the obvious Al Qaeda global reach; however, an attempt is made to show that it is a unique group in that aspect. Hezbollah is often used as the fundamental example of “global terrorism” by the defenders of the “new terrorism.” Daniel Byman suggests that “few terrorist organizations meet this standard (global reach) but Hezbollah is definitely one of them. The Lebanon-based group has cells on every continent and its highly skilled operatives have committed horrifying attacks as far away as Argentina.”⁵³ However, Hezbollah has not targeted any European or American for 25 years, it has rejected the accusation of being responsible for the Buenos Aires⁵⁴ attack but proudly presents its

⁵¹ Said K. Aburish, *Arafat: From Defender to Dictator* (London: Bloomsbury, 1998), p. 90.

⁵² Paul R. Pillar, “Terrorism Goes Global: Extremist Groups Extend Their Reach Worldwide,” *The Brookings Review*, Issue 19, Fall 2001, p. 35.

⁵³ Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah be Next?,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2003, p. 54.

⁵⁴ On July 18, 1994, 40 civilians were killed when a bomb detonated at a Jewish social centre in Buenos Aires. Some Iranian diplomats were expelled, being accused of different levels of connections to the incident, and Hezbollah was accused of being responsible for the attack.

military operations against the Israeli Defense Forces and the list of its “martyrs” everyday through its TV channel (“al-Manar”). With no proof of actual worldwide action and taking into consideration that whenever such action took place, the targets were always Israelis, groups such as the PFLP and the Hezbollah cannot be regarded as “global.”

Another important issue about the global reach of the “new terrorism” is that it is not at all “new”. The PFLP “hijacking barrage” that culminated in the “skyjack Sunday” occurred in 1968-1970.⁵⁵ The Munich massacre took place on September 1972.⁵⁶ The PanAm Lockerbie bombing happened in December 1988.⁵⁷ Hence, the major terrorist incidents with a global reach are part of what is called “old” terrorism and from groups that have never been considered “global”.

The third intrinsic component of terrorist “globalization” is what the author calls a “global political agenda,” a revisionist worldview. Al-Qaeda seems to seek the “toppling [of] existing Muslim governments and establishing a new caliphate, an undivided Islamic realm ruled by sharia.”⁵⁸ Whereas all aforementioned cases lack a broader global aim and their goals are very narrowly geographically confined, Al Qaeda is considered by the supporters of the “new terrorism” as an exception. Hence, Al Qaeda is very widely used as an example by the supporters of this theory, as something radically different. However, it can be counter-argued that Al Qaeda expanded its initial goals from forcing the Americans out of Saudi Arabia⁵⁹ to finally ostracizing all “infidels” out of the “dar al Islam.” Actually, the “irrational” restoration of the Caliphate by uniting the entire Muslim

⁵⁵ Only in 1968, 12 hijackings occurred. Among others, on July 22, 1968, PFLP operatives seized an El Al Boeing 707 in Rome and diverted it to Algiers. They held 32 Jewish hostages for five weeks. On August 29, 1969, Leila Khaled led the hijacking of a TWA airliner in Rome and forced it to land in Beirut. On February 10, 1970, PFLP blew up a Swiss airliner killing 47 people. On September 6, 1970, the notorious “skyjack Sunday” took place: Four TWA, Swissair and BOAC aircraft were simultaneously hijacked by PFLP terrorists in Jordan with more than 400 hostages. Finally, one plane flew to Cairo and three were blown up on return to Jordan.

⁵⁶ On September 5, 1972, eight PLO-linked terrorists (“Black September” group) raided the hotel of the Israeli team, killed two athletes and held nine as hostages. The following day a pre-arranged German rescue plan failed and the hostages were killed together with five terrorists and a German policeman.

⁵⁷ On December 21, 1988, a PanAm flight headed to the United States exploded in air over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 259 passengers and another 11 people on the ground.

⁵⁸ Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 103.

⁵⁹ Fatwa issued on August 23, 1996 signed by Usama bin Laden.

world is mentioned at the Fatwa issued on February 23, 1998 and signed by Usama bin Laden (al-Qaeda), Ayman al-Zawahiri (the Egyptian Islamic Jihad later merged with Al-Qaeda), Abu Yasir Rifai Ahmad Taha (al Gamaa al Islamiyya), Mir Hamzah (Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan) and Fazlur Rahman (Jihad Movement in Bangladesh).⁶⁰ It is evident that the “rational” short term objective of Al Qaeda has already been achieved. Hence, it can advertise a global agenda, no matter if it is a real aim of the group, in order to acquire prestige, worldwide support and elevate itself to the status of a global powerful player.

Some authors suggest that other groups also have a broader agenda. However, it is not global. Some Kashmiri groups want to “liberate” the Muslims in the entire sub-continent⁶¹ and Hezbollah wants to establish a theocracy in Lebanon and expand it at least in the Shia Muslim communities. Amal Saad Ghorayeb suggests that “judging by the continued subordination of Hezbollah’s domestic political role to its geostrategic roles, it seems as though Hezbollah has chosen to accord its Lebanese identity and role as an influential local political force, secondary status to its Islamic identity and role as a revolutionary exemplar for the umma”.⁶² Nevertheless, the truth is that Hezbollah “transformed itself from a radical, clandestine militia to a moderate, mainstream political party with a resistance wing...” in order to achieve its short-term aspirations of winning the Lebanese public support and liberating South Lebanon from Israeli occupation.⁶³ In that sense, Hezbollah achieved its initial “rational” goal, in the same way as Al Qaeda did.

One of the major mistakes of U.S. foreign policy was presenting Usama bin Laden as an extremely powerful opponent. As Paul Pillar explains “as far as public diplomacy is concerned, the emphasis should be on cutting him (Usama bin Laden) down, not building him up”!⁶⁴ An unintended consequence of the elevation of Al Qaeda

⁶⁰ The entire fatwa is available in Walter Laqueur (ed.), *Voices of Terror* (New York: Reed Press, 2004), pp. 410-412.

⁶¹ Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) is the main advocate of the restoration of Islamic rule over India as it has stated in one of its pamphlets entitled “Why are We Waging Jihad.”

⁶² Amal Saad Ghorayeb, *Hizbu'llah, Politics and Religion* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 191.

⁶³ Judith Palmer Harik, *Hezbollah, The Changing Face of Terrorism* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004), p. 1.

⁶⁴ Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 199.

to the status of a global powerful opponent was to change its character from a well-structured group to a franchise. This is something radically novel that deviates from the typical command and control hierarchy. In accordance with the 9/11 Commission Report, “Al Qaeda represents an ideological movement, not a finite group of people...It has transformed itself into a decentralized force.” Stephen Sloan characterizes the small decentralized group as

stand-alone, mini-terrorist group (which) may operate within an environment of racial, ethnic and anti-government hatred for example, but it does not have specific organizational ties to a larger organization, nor is dependent on some level of support from a larger organization, a front group or a sector of the community.⁶⁵

Nevertheless, it applies only to Al Qaeda and mainly in the post-9/11 world, where the severely battered group lost much of their centralized power. With Usama bin Laden on the run, the structure of Al Qaeda is forcibly decentralized. It is even possible to consider him unimportant for the continuation and strengthening of the jihaddist movement, in the sense that his disappearance would not end Islamic insurgencies around the world, and possibly would ignite even more aggressive reactions. Jason Burke suggests that “the nearest thing to al-Qaeda as popularly understood, existed for a short period, between 1996 and 2001...What we have currently is a broad and diverse movement of radical Islamic militancy.”⁶⁶

For instance, it is very doubtful that the so-called “Spanish cell”, which conducted the attack in Madrid, had anything to do with Usama bin Laden on a personal level. A plausible scenario is that there is a loose affiliation and a financial aid from the “parent” group of Al Qaeda; however, it is more likely that the attack was just conducted by an Islamic militant group in the name of Al Qaeda. In the aforementioned case, the London-based Arab newspaper “Al Quds al Arabi” received an e-mail, purportedly from the Islamist group Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade with alleged ties to Al Qaeda,⁶⁷ claiming

⁶⁵ Stephen Sloan, “The Changing nature of Terrorism,” James M. Smith and William C. Thomas (ed.), *The Terrorism Threat and US Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors* (Colorado: USAF Institute of National Security Studies, 2001), p. 63.

⁶⁶ Jason Burke, *Al Qaeda, The True Story of Radical Islam* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004), p. xxv. He also points out that “we are now in a ‘post-bin Laden’ phase of Islamic militancy,” p. 21.

responsibility for the bombs. After a while and via an anonymous phone call, a videotape was also found in which the self-proclaimed Al Qaeda's military spokesman in Europe, Abu Dujan al Afghani, in Arabic declared the group's responsibility for what happened in Madrid exactly 2-1/2 years after the attacks on New York and Washington in response to Spanish participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

An even more clear case is the April 2004 British success of arresting eight terrorists and the seizure of half a ton of ammonium nitrate, enough for an explosion capable of killing more than 1,000 people. As Fareed Zakaria pointed out

The authorities see no involvement by Al Qaeda. In fact, not one of the suspects is foreign-born or had spent any time in Afghan training camps. These are British, middle-class Muslim suburbanites who the authorities say became terrorists...They are inspired, not directed by Al Qaeda.⁶⁸

Therefore, it is suggested that one simply observe a franchise phenomenon, where Islamic insurgents around the world use Al Qaeda's name. An example of what the author calls "a franchise phenomenon", is that if a person commits suicide and kills 150 people, this person will then be deemed a common criminal, worthless of much attention. If 20 are killed but a message is left stating that the perpetrator belongs to a distant cell of Al Qaeda, it would be instant front-page news. In that sense, Al Qaeda is not a group that acts globally. There is a shared ideology by independent Islamist groups, which act locally using the same "brand", for easier recognition and publicity. Therefore, terrorism is very local.

Another factor that makes terrorism more local than in the past is that terrorists cannot spread because they cannot find safe havens. Primakov suggests that they "tend to become less closely tied to states and governments."⁶⁹ Bruce Hoffman, an advocate of the "new terrorism" admits that currently terrorists have a "lack of bases and lack of

⁶⁷ The relation with Al Qaeda and with other groups (or even the use of different names by the same group) is confusing. Salafia Jihadia and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (MICG) could be the terrorist organizations responsible for the attack. Actually, it is possible that all three names refer to the same group.

⁶⁸ Fareed Zakaria, *The Best Ways to Beat Terror*, article from *Newsweek*, April 12, 2004, p. 35.

⁶⁹ Primakov, p. 6.

patrons.”⁷⁰ It is evident that “rogue-state” leaders like Libya's Muamar Quaddafi and Iran's Mohammad Khatami have helped the anti-terrorist struggle. Quaddafi broke off relations with the IRA, expelled Abu Nidal and severed relations with the PFLP-GC and PIJ. Khatami was very careful during Operation Iraqi Freedom, pressed Hezbollah to keep a low profile and facilitated the anti-Taliban struggle for his own reasons. Even Pakistan makes efforts to combat the terrorist groups in Kashmir without hurting the “national cause of the real freedom fighters.”

In conclusion, it is necessary to point out that the overwhelming majority of the terrorist groups think and act locally, despite the fact that they have the capability of global reach, and in many cases, a network of sympathizers around the world. Actually, the most important incidents of “global reach” are very old and cannot be connected to the “new terrorism” theory. The only group with real global reach is Al Qaeda. In that case, the counter-argument is that the main difference is that the “global political agenda” of the group is nominal, since its short-term goal has been achieved. Moreover, most of the operations carried out in its name are executed by autonomous or semi-autonomous groups, in a franchise manner, and there is no proof of actual relations between the different “cells”, as they are portrayed by the defenders of the “new terrorism” theory. In that sense, there is no war against terrorism but a struggle against “worldwide Islamic insurgency.”⁷¹ One last thing that makes post-modern terrorism more local than in the past is that there are no state-sponsors, at least overtly, and therefore, a group cannot easily spread, as was the case in the 1970s and 1980s.

The next chapter attempts to contradict the religious character of terrorism and argues that terrorism remains an entirely political activity with political motivation.

⁷⁰ Bruce Hoffman, “Foreword: Twenty-First Century Terrorism”, James M. Smith and William C. Thomas, *The Terrorism Threat and US Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors* (Colorado: USAF Institute of National Security Studies, 2001), p. ix.

⁷¹ Anonymous (Michael Scheuer), *Imperial Hubris* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 2004), p. x.

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III. THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF TERRORISM

This chapter is devoted to the most irrefutable characteristic of the “new terrorism”, in accordance with its believers. The religious nature of the post-modern terrorism is explored and argued by many authors. First, their opinions and examples are presented as regards the core threat, “Islamic terrorism” and they are then contradicted. Subsequently, their arguments on other forms of religious terrorism are highlighted and also challenged. The author finishes with conclusions regarding the religious aspect of terrorism. The first question to be answered will concern the militant nature of Islam. In accordance with Samuel P. Huntington’s famous “clash of civilizations” theory,

The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, different civilization whose people is convinced of the superiority of their culture and is obsessed with the inferiority of their power.⁷²

Walter Laqueur, one of the leading scholars in terrorism noted in 1999,

To deny the specific virulence of Islamic terrorism in our time is self-deception, an exercise in political – or ecumenical – correctness. If we ignore for the moment the tribal violence in Africa, about 80 percent of war and violence occurs at the present time inside and between Muslim countries, and among the myriad factions within the Muslim world.⁷³

The aforementioned statement will be counter argued and the nature and emergence of Islamic fundamentalism will be explained. The arguments will try to show the political aspect of the “religious” terrorist groups and alleged network and prove the continuity in terrorism by comparing them to the extreme leftist terrorism of the 1970s. Then, an attempt is made to analyze the motives of all groups listed on the Department of State’s list of foreign terrorist organizations, and therefore, ascertain which are “Islamic.”

⁷² The term was actually “invented” by Bernard Lewis but became famous due to the controversial theory (first published as an article and then expanded to a book) of Samuel P. Huntington. The quote is from Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), p. 217.

⁷³ Laqueur, *The New Terrorism*, p. 277.

The last argument about the political nature of the so-called “religious” terrorism will be a differentiation of personal and organizational motives. Before concluding, other forms of “religious” terrorism are presented and their character contradicted.

One of the leading specialists on “religious terrorism”, David C. Rapoport, suggests that the “new terrorism” is historically the fourth wave of the phenomenon and he calls it the “religious wave.”⁷⁴ Bruce Hoffman claims that “the religious imperative for terrorism is the most important defining characteristic of terrorist activity today.”⁷⁵ Before 9/11, the National Commission on Terrorism commented that “fanaticism rather than political interests is more often the terrorist motivation now.”⁷⁶

However, terrorism is by definition an enemy of all religions. Islam forbids the killing of women and children and condemns suicide (Holy Quran 2:195). Furthermore, in accordance with the Quran “God hates the aggressor” (Holy Quran 2:190). Mainstream Islam suggests that the meaning of “Jihad” is misinterpreted and twisted by extremists.⁷⁷ In the “Holy Quran,” “jihad” describes mainly an esoteric fight and secondly the defensive warfare in order to protect the “ummah” (early Muslim community). In the “Hadith,”⁷⁸ jihad is used more broadly and is seen as a conflict in a world divided between the “Dar-al-Islam” (territory under Islamic control) and Dar-al-harb (territory of war, practically all lands not under Muslim rule). That does not imply that Muslims wage non-stop warfare and it does not mean that the non-Muslims should be annihilated or necessarily forcibly converted. “Jihad” is a communal and not an individual obligation with the exception of a massive unexpected attack on Dar-al-Islam.

⁷⁴ David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” Charles Kegley Jr.'s, *The New Global Terrorism* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2003), p. 43.

⁷⁵ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, p. 87.

⁷⁶ National Commission on Terrorism, *Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2000).

⁷⁷ Jihad” derives from the verb “jahada” which means to endeavor, strive, do one’s utmost and expend energy. The misinterpretation of the term in the West dates from 1143 when Robert of Keeton translated the Quran. Even the much better and less hostile translations like the one of Juan de Segovia in 1453 (Fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks), are considering “jihad” as a “Holy War”. See R. W. Southern, *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 37. Obviously, for the Islamists, “jihad” also has that meaning, but the primary one is “striving” with one’s self.

⁷⁸ “Hadith” is the “Tradition” in the context of religion and contains the sayings of the Prophet (for the Shi’a also the saying of the Imams) and is one of the major pillars of Islam. “Sharia” is the Islamic Law in a broad sense; the path to be followed; the way of life and code of conduct. Derives from the verb “shara’a” which means to begin, introduce and give (laws). Sharia includes the Holy Quran and the Hadith.

It is useful to explain the meanings of Islamic revivalism and Islamist extreme fundamentalism, because it is the theory behind the so-called “Islamic terrorism.” In the early 18th century, all the Islamic Empires (Mogul, Ottoman and Persian) had been facing a drastic decline. Since then, Islam had to be reconsidered because the Muslim elite had to find a way to justify how these prosperous empires were taken over by infidels and how highly cultured communities turned into third world poor peasant villages. Most of the Islamic intellectuals rejected any relation with Westerners. Almost everyone agreed that Islam was not interpreted correctly, the rulers misunderstood it and the mass did not really comprehend its teachings. A religious “enlightenment” period with common ground led to the return to a “purified”, austere Islam, which started the following movements and schools of thought. It began with the Shah Wali Ullah’s “reform movement” in the early 18th century; the stricter “Faraizi” movement initiated in 1818 in the subcontinent; the “Deoband movement” establishing the first “great madrassa” (“seminary”) on April 14, 1866 for teaching religious subjects; the Ahl-e Hadith School of thought; the Brelvi school of thought; the Syrian Muhammad Rachid Rida; the Sayyid Jamal-al-Din-al-Afghani movement who preached the opening of the gates of “ijtihad”; the Egyptian Grand Mufti Muhammad Abduh preaching “renaissance” (“nahda”) and founding the Salafiyyah movement and the Jamat Tablighi (JT) (“Missionary Society”) founded in 1927 were probably the most important ones.⁷⁹

The application of religious revivalism to politics led to the genesis of fundamentalism, the base of current Islamist militancy. The father of transnational Islamic fundamentalism, Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi, who apart from his basic “Deobandi madrassa” education was not a religious scholar, tried to challenge British rule over India on a religious/political basis. How could someone create an Islamic society without being in political power? In order to establish a universal Islamist state, Mawdudi endorsed “jihad.” Following Mawdudi, the genesis of Muslim Brotherhood (“Ikhwan al Muslimoon”) in Egypt in 1928 became the vehicle for modern Islamic fundamentalism. The founder, Hasan al-Banna, a radical Egyptian schoolteacher, suggested that an Islamic

⁷⁹ For a detailed history of Islamic Revivalism and biographies on the most important figures, see Ali Rahnama (ed.), *Pioneers of Islamic Revival* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1994).

state would be born through jihad.⁸⁰ Based on Mawdudi and his friend al-Banna, another non-Islamic scholar, Sayyid Qutb, the author of the famous “Milestones” and de facto spiritual leader of the Brotherhood after the murder of al-Banna in 1949, became the godfather of modern “Islamic” terrorism.⁸¹ One year older than Mawdudi and four years older than both al-Banna and Qutb, was the Shiite Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who led the Iranian Islamic Revolution and created the first and only Islamic Republic. Homeini contended that Islamic jurists⁸² “by means of jihad must expose and overthrow tyrannical rulers and rouse people so the universal movement of all alert Muslims can establish Islamic governments.” Other important Shiite “fundamentalists” were the Lebanese Ayatollah Musa al-Sadr, the Iraqi Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr and the Iranian Ali Shariati.

An important conclusion is that Islamic fundamentalism is a political system.⁸³ Its pursuit of political power suggests a certain agenda for Islamic Economy, Islamic Law and Islamic Education, which does not compete with or challenge other religions. In that sense, an Islamic terrorist group like al Qaeda that wants to establish a theocracy is no different from an extreme leftist group in the 1970s trying to establish communism. Actually, there is a famous quote from Mawdudi, which could be attributed to Che Guevara or Leo Trotsky, if the word Islam is interchanged with the word Socialism and the word jihad with the word revolution:

Islam wants the whole earth and does not content itself with only a part thereof...Islam wants to employ all forces and means that can be employed for bringing about a universal all-embracing revolution...this far reaching struggle that continuously exhausts all forces and this employment of all possible means are called jihad...

⁸⁰ In his “Five tracts”, he declared “today the Muslims are compelled to humble themselves before non-Muslims and are ruled by unbelievers. Their lands have been trampled over and their honor besmirched...Hence, jihad has become an individual obligation...”

⁸¹ In accordance with Qutb “the whole world is steeped in Jahiliya...The Jahiliya is based on rebellion against God’s sovereignty on earth...The result of this rebellion is the oppression of God’s creatures...”

⁸² The office of “ayatollah” is a 19th century creation and the office of “supreme jurist” is an innovation of Khomeini himself. See Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 114.

⁸³ The unfortunate term Islamic fundamentalism will continue to be used in order to describe the extremist, militant Islam. Caryle Murphy distinguishes *Radical* Islam from *Political* Islam very well, the “second level of Islam’s revival.” See Caryle Murphy, *Passion for Islam* (New York: Scribner, 2002), p. 7.

Another example of mental exercise is to change the word “Islamic” to “Socialist” in the following famous quote from the “Al-Qaeda manual”:

...Islamic governments have never and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they always have been: by pen and gun; by word and bullet; and by tongue and teeth.”⁸⁴

Hence, the so-called “Islamist” groups are maybe “religiously based, but not necessarily religiously driven.”⁸⁵ As Mahmood Mamdani points out by quoting Olivier Roy from the latter’s book, “Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah,”

Even the violence of Al Qaeda is politically, not religiously, inspired. After all, “Al Qaeda did not target St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome, but the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. It targeted modern imperialism, as the ultra-leftists of the late 1960s and 1970s did with less success”...The umma now plays the same role as did the proletariat for Trotskyist and leftist groups in the 1960s: it is “an imaginary and therefore silent community that gives legitimacy to the small group pretending to speak in its name.”⁸⁶

It is suggested that there is a very closely tied network of Islamic militants. The truth is that this infamous network is less connected than the leftist terrorism of the 1970s.⁸⁷ The main reasons are the different interpretations of Islam, the different political aspirations and personal rivalries. Not surprisingly, Shi’a Hezbollah and Sunni Al Qaeda cannot easily see eye to eye. Even in Kashmir, supposed allies, the terrorist group Lashkar e Tayyiba (LeT), an Ahl-e-Hadith Sunni organization, has differences with Harkat ul Mujahidin (HUM) and Jaish e Mohammed (JeM), which are Deobandi Sunni groups. Since the aforementioned groups seek the annexation of Kashmir to Pakistan, they have contentions with other Muslim groups who support the creation of an independent state of Kashmir. Personal rivalries make the cooperation difficult even among groups with exactly the same religious affiliation. The foremost example is the

⁸⁴ Laqueur, *Voices of Terror*, p. 403

⁸⁵ Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 133.

⁸⁶ Mahmood Mamdani, “Whither Political Islam?” Review Essay from *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2005, p. 152.

⁸⁷ Actually, even the ultra-leftist terrorism of the 1960s and 1970s was proven to have very few ties, despite the conservative line of thinking, which had suggested otherwise and has since been discredited.

HUM and JeM rivalry. On 4 February 2000, at a congregation in Binori Mosque, the more radical, and therefore, dangerous elements of HUM⁸⁸ followed Masood Azhar in the formation of what is considered as probably the most dangerous terrorist group in Kashmir: the JeM. Since then, the two groups are literally at loggerheads. Paul R. Pillar notes:

Few serious students regard the militant (or radical, or fundamentalist) part of the Islamic world as monolithic. The fault lines are numerous. Ethnic, national, and socioeconomic differences have impeded efforts at unity, as have differing security perspectives. Sectarian differences are also significant – particularly, but not solely, the split between Sunni and Shia. There are several competing centers of Islamic religious activism...⁸⁹

Consequently, even if most of the Shi'a and Sunni terrorist groups have declared Islamic Republics as political end-states, they are different as were the end-states of the leftist groups depending on their Maoist, Leninist, Marxist or Trotskyite affiliations.

Furthermore, it is necessary to examine how many foreign terrorist groups possess an Islamic character. One third of the groups mentioned in the Department of State Foreign Terrorist Organizations List are European, Latin American or non-Muslim East Asian.⁹⁰ Another 20% is purely Palestinian, having as an agenda the creation of a state, and most of the time, together with the complete destruction of Israel.⁹¹ However, “disagreement with Israel's right to exist was a reaction to the eviction of Palestinians from territory they had settled. It has no basis in the Quran.”⁹² Hence, as regards the Palestinian issue, there is a motivation other than religious fanaticism for terrorist actions, which varies from social reasons to personal revenge and national pride. The Palestinian

⁸⁸ Santhanam, Sreedhar, Sudhir and Saxena-Manish, *Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir*, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), p. 196.

⁸⁹ Pillar, p. 53.

⁹⁰ National Liberation Army (ELN), United Self Defense Forces (AUC) and Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) of Colombia, Revolutionary Nuclei and Revolutionary Organization 17 November (Greece), Shining Path of Peru (SL), Real IRA, Continuity IRA, ETA, Revolutionary People's Liberation Army (DHKP/C) and PKK (Turkey), Communist Party of the Philippines, The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and Aum Shinrikyo.

⁹¹ Abu Nidal Organization, Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigade, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, PFLP, PFLP-GC and Palestinian Liberation Front.

⁹² Primakov, p. 26.

group believed to be the most religious is Hamas. Hamas, in its first communiqué highlights, “Let the Jews understand that despite the chains, prisons and detention centers, despite the suffering of our people under their criminal occupation, despite the blood and tears, our people’s preservice and steadfastness shall overcome their oppression and arrogance.”⁹³ It is self-evident that they apply to national feeling, the pride and the obligation for revenge and they do not use “theological” arguments. Other Palestinian groups were Marxist and were actually led by Christians, such as the PFLP, which was led by George Habash for almost 35 years.⁹⁴

The same reasoning applies to the four Islamic terrorist groups that mainly act in Kashmir.⁹⁵ Is it a religious or an ethnic problem? Is it possibly just revenge for the bad blood between Pakistan and India and a sort of proxy war? If yes, then its character is anything but religious.

There are still two Islamic separatist movements: the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiya. The former, “after Janjalani (its leader)’s death in 1998, deteriorated into a loose federation on bandit chiefs bound mainly by convenience.”⁹⁶ The latter is seeking the creation of an Islamic Republic in Indonesia and was thought to be an Al Qaeda offshoot. However, “Al Qaeda may help fund specific JI programs but it neither directs, nor controls it.”⁹⁷ Five others “religious” groups fight civil wars in order to gain control of their own country and primarily target their compatriots.⁹⁸ It is very characteristic that the most “Islamic” of them, IMU, in its declaration of “jihad” on August 25, 1999, mainly focused on Karimov’s government in Tashkent and not against “infidels.”⁹⁹

⁹³ Khaleb Hroub, *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2002), p. 265.

⁹⁴ See the entirely Marxist (even anti-Islamic) “Platform of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine” at Walter Laqueur (ed.), *Voices of Terror* (New York: Reed Press, 2004), pp. 149 -152.

⁹⁵ Lashkar e Tayyiba, Harakat ul Mujahidin, Jaish e Mohammed and Lashkar i Jhangvi.

⁹⁶ Steven Rogers, “Beyond the Abu Sayyaf,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2004, p. 16.

⁹⁷ See the International Crisis Group, *Crisis Watch Report 2003/2004* in Walter Laqueur (ed.), *Voices of Terror* (New York: Reed Press, 2004), p. 512.

⁹⁸ Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and GSPC in Algeria, Gama’a al-Islamiyya in Egypt, Mujahedin e Khalk in Iran and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

⁹⁹ Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 247-249.

One of the “undoubted” examples of “Islamic” terrorism is Hezbollah, the Lebanese “Party of God.” However, Hezbollah, which legitimately fights the Israelis on Lebanese soil, has targeted Westerners only when they were in Lebanon and it is considered a resistance group by the entire Lebanese public. After 9/11 and during an ecumenical conference in Rome, when a Maronite Cardinal was asked whether Hezbollah should be considered a terrorist group, he replied “these men are Lebanese citizens trying to free their country from foreign occupation; we all thank them for their efforts.”¹⁰⁰ Allegedly Hezbollah’s sympathizers and operatives alike are poor, uneducated, fanatics that want to overthrow the Lebanese government and establish an intolerant Islamic Republic. The truth is that the main cadre of the group is middle-class, educated and some are not exactly “pious” Muslims. Actually, Christians have been voting for Hezbollah as well. In a poll conducted by Professor Harik, “many young Christian and Muslim adults from all areas of Lebanon would be willing (62%) to elect a member of Hezbollah.”¹⁰¹ Furthermore, the “Party of God” collaborated with the Christian Phalange Party and the National Liberal Party, both of which were staunch allies of Israel during the civil war.”¹⁰² The close cooperation with “infidels” and former enemies demonstrated the non-religious character of probably the “most religious terrorist organization.”

Moreover, there is the Jewish/nationalist Kach and two groups fighting against the occupation forces in Iraq. On the one hand, the status quo of Ansar al Islam is very uncertain. On the other hand, the leader of Jamma Al-Tawhid wa’al Jihad, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, has accepted the title of “prince of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.” This group was designated as an FTO on October 15, 2004 and acts autonomously in the name of Al Qaeda, despite some previous “difficulties” between Zarqawi and bin Laden. As Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau suggest that the reason for their cooperation is that “Bin Laden needed a role in the Iraqi insurgency and Zarqawi needed outside support.”¹⁰³ Nevertheless, joining the Iraqi insurgency, led by Palestinian Zarqawi does not necessarily equate to joining Usama bin Laden. The insurgents are “a growing array of

¹⁰⁰ Palmer Harik, p. 180.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 50.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 77.

¹⁰³ Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, *Terror Broker*, article from *Newsweek*, April 11, 2005, pp. 56-57.

soldiers and security men from Saddam's devastated military, members of his old Baathist regime, rebellious desert tribesmen, fierce nationalists, common thugs and a relatively few itinerant fanatics from around the Muslim world."¹⁰⁴

Al Qaeda has already been beaten in Afghanistan and is weakened. However, it is not possible to be sure if it has been practically wiped out, because there has never been a reliable order of battle of the group and its members are reported by different sources as ranging from several hundreds to fifty thousand.¹⁰⁵

Last but not least, it is necessary to examine the individual motives of "religious terrorists." Some truly believe that they become martyrs of a purported spiritual cause. "Political" terrorists see themselves as martyrs for their "freedom fighting" cause. Hence, both "religious" and "political" terrorism stem from the same reasons and psychology. In most cases, the religious motive is only second to other more personal ones such as revenge for the loss of friends and family. Even famous "religious" terrorists are proven to be very secular and their motives are primarily anger and revenge and only secondarily dictated by religion. Al Qaeda's "brains behind bin Laden", Ayman Zawahiri "lost both his wife and only son as a result of a U.S. air strike in Afghanistan in November 2001, [which provides him with] a strong personal motive of uncompromising enmity."¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, even if the acts of some militants are "dictated" by religion, or just done in its name for public relations reasons, the leadership is very clear in its objectives, which remain political. Bruce Hoffman suggests that "for the religious terrorist, violence is a sacramental act or divine duty, executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative and justified by scripture" and brings about an important point, "this explains why clerical sanction is so important for religious terrorists and why religious figures are often required to 'bless' terrorist operations before they are executed."¹⁰⁷ However, the highly regarded Ulema have rejected terrorism and most of the fatwas are issued by self-acclaimed clerics. Hence, the notorious Islamic terrorism is a myth.

¹⁰⁴ Rod Nordland, Tom Masland and Christopher Dickey, *Unmasking the Insurgents*, article from *Newsweek*, February 7, 2005, p. 23.

¹⁰⁵ Anonymous (Michael Scheuer), *Imperial Hubris*, p. 68.

¹⁰⁶ Bruce Hoffman, *Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities: An Assessment* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), p. 8.

¹⁰⁷ Hoffman, *Terrorism Trends and Prospects*, p. 20.

Unfortunately, the market is saturated by a plethora of extremely great books, but with misleading titles, and as is well known, most of the public just reads the titles. “The Age of Sacred Terror”, “The New Global Terrorism”, “Passion for Islam”, “Terror in the Name of God” and “Terror in the Mind of God” are some very good indicative titles. Such titles, no matter how unintentionally, ignite Islamophobia, which is more dangerous than Islamic terrorism itself. Additionally, the false identity of judeo-christianity created to alienate the Muslim world and images of war crimes in Abu Ghraib, Camp Breadbasket (the “British Abu Ghraib”) and Guantanamo might achieve the almost impossible task of finally provoking a universal Islamic reaction. In that case, the Islamic world, realizing a self-fulfilled prophecy, might conduct a universal defensive war instead of some sporadic terrorist acts.

How about millenarian sects and apocalyptic cults trying to “destroy the world to save it?” This case is much more dangerous than “Islamic” terrorism or any other violence committed by the followers of traditional religions and denominations. Whereas a Christian fanatic and a radical Muslim could be influenced by authoritative figures from their religions that condemn violence and denounce terrorism, cultist devotion to a self-proclaimed savior or leader of a new religion makes the follower forget any moral inhibition. If this mentality is combined with visions of the Apocalypse, an end to the world that the cult followers have the duty to bring about earlier, then the situation is extremely dangerous. The members of such cults want to imitate their leader and even become perfect clones, and in that process, they would not hesitate to commit any “purifying” crime. However, certain doubts still remain when it is still possible to use the term terrorism, and especially, the typology of religious terrorism in these cases.

The perfect example of this kind of cult and the only one of such a terrorist group included on the list of foreign terrorist organizations by the U.S. Department of State is Aum Shinrikyo. It is a case in which fanaticism and irrationality seem to apply, especially as during the notorious sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway. Shoko Asahara with his apocalyptic cult seemed to be the only “terrorist leader” entirely indifferent to mass fatalities. Robert Jay Lifton suggests that his aim was either to stage a coup and take over

Japan or bring about a “triumphant Armageddon.”¹⁰⁸ The Aum Shinrikyo attack is unique, extremely interesting, but raises many questions concerning any applicability to other groups. Firstly, Aum mainly targeted police and government offices in order to prevent investigations of its activities. Actually before this attack, three judges were the targets of a previous chemical attack (Matsumoto, Japan, June 1994) because they were investigating the cult. Thus, perhaps, it is not feasible to classify such attacks as terrorist which in the end could be more likely common criminal cases. Even if the “Tokyo subway case” is a terrorist attack, an apocalyptic cult cannot compare to any rational group with certain political demands and aims. Another interesting fact is that Aum “utterly and totally failed to produce biological weapons, after no small expenditure of time and money.”¹⁰⁹

Besides Islam and different obscure cults, the other religions have their “share” of violence, in accordance with the “religious terrorism theory” followers. Marc Juergensmeyer¹¹⁰ points out Northern Ireland, Timothy McVeigh and some cases of Abortion Clinic bombings in order to highlight “Christian terrorism.” Nevertheless, in Northern Ireland, the problem is probably more national than religious and McVeigh targeted the government. Mike Bray and the Abortion Clinic bombings are an isolated phenomenon on a much smaller scale. For Jewish terrorism (namely the Kach/Kahane group), the violence against other Jews like Yoel Lerner’s assassination of Yitzhak Rabin can be understood more in ethnic and less in religious terms. The justification for violence against Muslims, is again justified mainly as “preemption” and “self-defense”, always in a national and not religious sense. For both the aforementioned monotheistic religions, as well as for Sikh violence against Hindus in India, there is an effort by some people to justify such acts based on religion; however, this is not enough to characterize them as acts as “religious terrorism.”

¹⁰⁸ Robert Jay Lifton, *Destroying the World to Save It, Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence and the New Global Terrorism* (New York: Owl Books, 2000), p. 39.

¹⁰⁹ Milton Leitenberg, “Aum Shinrikyo’s Efforts to Produce Biological Weapons: A Case Study in the Serial Propagation of Misinformation”, May Taylor and John Horgan, *The Future of Terrorism*, Special Issue of *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 11 No. 4 Winter 1999 (Frank Cass), p. 156.

¹¹⁰ Juergensmeyer, pp. 19-61, 85-120.

In summary, this chapter demonstrates how religion is used to mask or justify political or personal motives of both terrorist leadership and executioners. Islam was differentiated from Islamic fundamentalism, which is actually a political system and has its own political agenda. The location and motivation of the terrorist organizations for a quantitative analysis of the “religious terrorism” trend was examined, and thus, proved that it practically does not exist. An examination of the violence of apocalyptic cults and other religions in order to see how they fit the “religious terrorism model” concludes the chapter. It can be deduced that some isolated actions of religious violence and some religiously motivated terrorists exist; however, the big picture is that religious terrorism is an incorrect perception and misconception of the phenomenon and that terrorism remains entirely political.

The next chapter examines the lethality and rationality of terrorist violence and contradicts the conventional wisdom of the “new terrorism” theory, which presents terrorism as indiscriminate, driven by hatred, immoral, irrational, seeking WMD and mass casualties. Furthermore, an assessment is made as to whether terrorism is in a steady, declining or rising state.

IV. THE IRRATIONAL AND LETHAL ASPECT OF TERRORISM

This chapter imparts the arguments of the “new terrorism” believers regarding the irrational nature of the phenomenon; a departure from the “old terrorism.” This irrationality also includes the relaxation of legal and moral norms and mainly the lethality, which is definitely greater than during the “old terrorism” era. An attempt will be made to prove that the increasing lethality is a normal procedure and continuity rather than a differentiation from the “old terrorism.” A counter-argument is also presented that as regards rationality, currently, a terrorist has the same logical choices as in the past. The end of the chapter examines the status of modern terrorism and contradicts public opinion that portrays it as a rising phenomenon. It then concludes that these last characteristics of the so-called “new terrorism” are the same as those of “old terrorism.”

In accordance with the “new terrorism” believers, a main characteristic of this new phenomenon is its lethality combined with its irrationality. R. James Woolsey commented that “today’s terrorists don’t want a seat at the table; they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it.”¹¹¹ Walter Laqueur stated “the trend now seems to be away from attacking specific targets like the other side’s officials and toward more indiscriminate killing.”¹¹²

However, as regards illogicality, Brian M. Jenkins argues that “terrorist acts are often dismissed as mindless violence, senseless violence or irrational violence; but terrorism is seldom mindless or irrational.”¹¹³ Richard Clarke, the American “crisis manager” during the 9/11 attack, notes that the alleged new terrorism “does not seek terror for its own sake....”¹¹⁴ It is obvious that since there is political motivation and the targets are symbolic and carefully planned, terrorism is very rational and is not driven by pure hatred.

¹¹¹ National Commission on Terrorism, p. 2.

¹¹² Walter Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism,” *Foreign Affairs Journal*, September/October 1996, p. 25.

¹¹³ Brian Jenkins, “International Terrorism: The Other World War,” Charles Kegley Jr., *The New Global Terrorism*, (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2003), p. 21.

¹¹⁴ Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies* (New York: Free Press, 2004), p. 35.

One of the biggest attestations of terrorist “rationality” is the rejection of the traditional “terrorist profile” as mass media has been portraying it for many years. Political scientists have proven that the socioeconomic, cultural and educational level of the majority of the terrorist cadre belongs to the middle class. Suicide bombers include secular Muslims, females, lawyers or doctors. This is a profile entirely contradictory to the one of the poor religious fanatic motivated by a distorted interpretation of Jihad. More specifically,

...more than two-thirds of the terrorists surveyed came from middle-class or even upper-class backgrounds...The rank and file of Arab terrorist organizations include substantial numbers of poor people, many of them homeless refugees. [However], Arab terrorist leaders are almost all from the middle and upper classes.¹¹⁵

Benjamin and Simon emphasize another very interesting socioeconomic observation:

...the participants in the jihad against the US have not been poor...The link between socioeconomic trauma and terrorism lies in how the imagery of poverty fuels the anger of middle-class terrorists. Revolutionaries from the mid-nineteenth century through the end of the twentieth century were similarly motivated.¹¹⁶

Finally, Martha Crenshaw presents the best socioeconomic analysis:

Terrorism need not reflect mass discontent or deep social cleavages. More likely it represents the disaffection of a fragment of the elite who take it upon themselves to act on the behalf of a majority unaware of its plight, unwilling to take action to remedy grievances, or unable to express dissent.¹¹⁷

Suicide bombing is one of the most “irrational” terrorist actions. In the past, certain studies focused on irrational individual motives, religious fanaticism and psychological predispositions but failed to explain the phenomenon. Robert Pape, in an excellent study, portrayed suicide bombing as anything but irrational.

¹¹⁵ Rex A. Hudson, *Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?*, *The 1999 Government Report on Profiling Terrorists* (Guilford: The Lyon Press, 2004), pp. 75 -77.

¹¹⁶ Benjamin and Simon, p. 408.

¹¹⁷ See Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Charles Kegley Jr. (ed.), *The New Global Terrorism*, p. 103.

Even if many suicide attackers are irrational or fanatical, the leadership groups that recruit and direct them are not. Viewed from the perspective of the terrorist organization, suicide attacks are designed to achieve specific political purposes: to coerce a target government to change policy, to mobilize additional recruits and financial support or both.¹¹⁸

As David Rapoport points out about the most “irrational” terrorists, suicide bombers “despite the conventional wisdom that only a vision of rewards in Paradise could inspire such acts, the Tamils have used ‘suicide bombers’ more than all Islamic groups put together.”¹¹⁹ Furthermore, as Pape’s study illustrates “even among Islamic suicide attacks, groups with secular orientations account for about a third of these attacks.”¹²⁰

However, someone could argue that irrationality applies to very few cases and especially to Al Qaeda. When Usama bin Laden’s group planned the 9/11 attack, it is very doubtful whether they had realized the number of the human losses that they would inflict and the ensuing global rage. “In a meeting with accomplices, bin Laden acknowledged that the toll of September 11 was much heavier than he had hoped for.”¹²¹ It should also be mentioned that even other “terrorists” or/and clerics condemned the 9/11 attack. An advisor of Hamas, Sheikh Yousouf al-Qaradawi, was one of the first clerics to condemn it as a “heinous crime against Islam”, yet he feels that the killing of civilians in the Occupied Territories is legitimate.¹²² The author suggests that there is strategic planning which seeks a spectacular blow, with many casualties so as to be significant, but not as many as to “push the envelope” and create a huge military response. This is mainly the reason why Al Qaeda did not take responsibility for the attack despite the fact that it

¹¹⁸ Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No 3, August 2003, p. 2.

¹¹⁹ David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” Charles Kegley Jr., *The New Global Terrorism*, (Upper Saddle River, Prentice Hall, 2003), p. 45.

¹²⁰ Pape, p. 1.

¹²¹ Gilles Kepel, *Jihad, the Trail of Political Islam* (Boston: Belknap Press of Harvard, 2002), p. 322.

¹²² Noah Feldman, *After Jihad* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), p. 64.

had claimed some previous attacks and had already declared war on the United States. In accordance with the *9/11 Commission Report*,¹²³ the attacks at the level of the USS Cole were deemed risk free by Usama bin Laden.

Even if the aforementioned explanation is inadequate concerning the true motives of Al Qaeda's leadership as regards mass casualties, Brian Jenkins offers an alternative, still very rational explanation for 9/11:

The terrorist leaders also would know that the September 11th attack would provoke a military response, which they could then demonstrate as an assault on Islam. In other words the terrorist leaders did not intend September 11th to be their last act – they intended it as the beginning of their end-game.¹²⁴

Al Qaeda operatives did not commit their monstrous attack based on an irrational desire to kill and their target was both economically vital and symbolic. As Michael Stohl indicates:

The twin towers symbolized more than anything else what many scholars and journalists summarize as 'globalization'. This globalization is identified by many as the spread of the American commodity culture and capitalism as well as the cultural apparatus of modernity.¹²⁵

Nowadays, in the post-9/11 world, Al Qaeda members have nothing to lose, since almost all countries officially are after them and they will never make peace with this group. Hence, Al Qaeda, whose long-term political goal is unachievable, will continue to try to inflict as many losses as possible. It is a sort of a "Samson option" for a group condemned to extinction. In that sense, Al Qaeda is the only group that would have no self imposed restraints in using WMD. Actually, since 1998, bin Laden himself declared that "acquiring [WMD] weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty."¹²⁶

¹²³ *9/11 Commission Report*, p. LXXXVIII.

¹²⁴ Brian Michael Jenkins, *Terrorism: Current and Long Term Threats (CT 187)* (Santa Monica, RAND, November 2001), p. 2.

¹²⁵ Michael Stohl, "The Mystery of the New Global Terrorism: Old Myths, New Realities?" Charles Kegley Jr., *The New Global Terrorism*, (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2003), p. 88.

¹²⁶ Anonymous (Michael Scheuer), *Through Our Enemies' Eyes* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 2002), p. 66.

Had the American policy been less pro-Israeli and the Israeli policy more self-restrained, the speculation is that Al Qaeda would not be so popular as to transform itself into a movement and it would still be a small terrorist group. The author must admit that in the beginning of this research, Usama bin Laden was not considered very popular, but unfortunately, it is necessary to agree with authors such as Joshua Micah Marshall who suggest that Usama bin Laden is revered by many fellow Muslims.¹²⁷ As Michael Scheuer highlights, Usama bin Laden is regarded by many of his fellow Muslims as “well-spoken, kind, considerate, pious and humble” and the successful 9/11 attack “completed the composite picture of a classical Islamic hero.”¹²⁸

Maybe the most “irrational” attack in the history of terrorism is the recent “Middle School number one” attack in Beslan in North Osetia. In that case, the terrorists tried to portray the Russian Armed Forces as responsible for the massacre that led to the death of innocent children. Indeed, it is a very interesting incident, since it was portrayed as a “global religious terrorism” attack. In accordance with C. J. Chivers:

Chechnya’s separatists have received money, men, training and ideological inspiration from international Islamic organizations, but they remain an indigenous and largely self-sustained force motivated by nationalist more than Islamic goals.

He points out that the fighters who conducted the attack were Chechens or Ingushetians, their demands concerned Chechnya’s independence (no grievances about conditions in the larger Muslim world) and their code of honor was the “adat” (Chechen traditional code of revenge). For those familiar with “adat,” the massacre of children is not irrational. Moreover, since no Chechens appeared in Iraq, in Afghanistan or anywhere else, he concludes that “Al Qaeda was much more interested in Chechnya than Chechen separatists were interested in a global religious war.”¹²⁹

¹²⁷ Joshua Micah Marshall, “Practice to Deceive,” *The Washington Monthly Online*, April 2003.

¹²⁸ Anonymous (Michael Scheuer), *Imperial Hubris*, pp. 122-123.

¹²⁹ See C. J. Chivers, “Chechen Rebels Mainly Driven By Nationalism,” *The New York Times*, September 12, 2004.

The main reason why terrorist attacks are rational is that primarily no terrorist wants to alienate public opinion. Abraham Guillen argues that

...any guerilla action that needs explaining to the people is politically useless; it should be meaningful and convincing by itself. To kill an ordinary soldier in reprisal for the assassination of a guerilla is to descend to the same political level as a reactionary army. Far better to create a martyr and thereby attract mass sympathy than to lose or neutralize popular support by senseless killings without an evident political goal.¹³⁰

As a general rule, media coverage, publicity and public opinion are still “as essential for terrorists as the air they breathe.”¹³¹ When Mark Juergensmeyer interviewed Mahmud Abouhalima, who was convicted of the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, he asked the “Muslim terrorist” what he felt to be the greater threat to Islam. The surprising answer was “media misrepresentation!”¹³² This incident alone illustrates the importance of mass media for the terrorists and the transmission of their “message.” Table 5 shows how the terrorists use mass media for propaganda.¹³³

¹³⁰ Abraham Guillen, *Estrategia de la Guerilla Urbana* (1971) in Walter Laqueur (ed.), *Voices of Terror* (New York, Reed Press, 2004), p. 381.

¹³¹ Brigitte L. Nacos, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), p. 193.

¹³² Juergensmeyer, p. 142.

¹³³ Poland, p. 61. Actually, Poland reproduces the original table from Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, *Violence as Communication* (London: Sage, 1982), pp. 53-54.

1.	Instill fear in a mass audience
2.	Polarize public opinion
3.	Gain publicity by agreeing to clandestine interviews
4.	Demand publication of a manifesto
5.	Provoke government overreaction
6.	Spread false and misleading information
7.	Bring about the release of prisoners
8.	Attract converts and support to a cause
9.	Coerce the media by assaulting journalists
10.	Profit from “free advertising”
11.	Discredit public officials while being held hostage
12.	Divert public attention by bombing their way onto front page
13.	Use the media to send messages to comrades to another country
14.	Excite public against the legitimate government
15.	Bolster the terrorist group’s morale
16.	Gain the Robin Hood image by fighting “injustice”
17.	Obtain information on counterterrorist strategies
18.	Identify future victims
19.	Acquire information about popular support for the terrorist group
20.	Exploit the exaggerated media image of a powerful, omnipotent group

Table 5. Propagandist Uses of Mass Media by Modern Terrorist Groups. (From: Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, *Violence as Communication* (London, Sage, 1982, pp. 53-54).

The table shows that mass media is used in many different ways by terrorists and numerous examples for each way are possible. However, the scope of this analysis is narrower, and therefore, only highlights the importance of media in order to explain why terrorists are still interested in portraying their actions as rational.

As regards lethality, someone can easily argue that the intensity of attacks is much greater than in previous years. It is true that currently there are more lethal incidents than in the past and not simply because the weapons are more lethal. Actually, as regards the use of high technology, the terrorists for survival reasons had always tried to achieve state-of-the-art technology. However, in terms of innovation, they seem to insist on the

same methods and tactics. They continue to rely heavily on the “same two basic ‘weapons systems’: the gun and the bomb.”¹³⁴ As Gregory Raymond states, “bombing alone accounts for roughly half of all recorded terrorist incidents.”¹³⁵

Why then has terrorism become more lethal? Is it a “new trend” and a “departure” from the old terrorism? Even if in some cases there is a high death toll, the counter-argument is that it is either the exception or a normal evolution and a “rational” choice. The saturation of media with images of terrorist attacks around the world, “forces” the terrorists to raise the bar on the level of casualties in order to attract the headlines. Livingstone suggests that

As the nations of the globe learn to live with routine low-level violence, it can be expected that there will be a movement by terrorists toward more dramatic and increasingly destructive acts of terrorism designed to ensure that the public does not forget about them and their causes.¹³⁶

Moreover, what is deemed as an “indiscriminate” attack is much easier and has a lower risk than an attack against a political or military target. People are also used to accepting “collateral damage”, and therefore, if together with an important military target many innocent people die, they seem to “justify” such acts. An example of such justification is the Israeli counter-terrorism attacks on refugee camps, with enormous casualties among the civilian population and no reaction from the U.S. media or administration.

Probably the best analysis of the mass casualties attacks and the reasoning why it is relatively rare is given by David Tucker:

To the extent that terrorists with religious motivations also have political and social agendas – for example, the establishment of an Islamic state – they will labor under the same constraints that terrorists with political motivations labor under both as they struggle to achieve their political goals and once they have achieved them. This does not mean that a religious group or a political group would never commit mass casualty

¹³⁴ Bruce Hoffman, *Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum* (SSI, US Army War College, July 15, 1994) p. 2. See also the *9/11 Commission Report*, p. LXXXII.

¹³⁵ Gregory A. Raymond, “The Evolving Strategies of Political Terrorism,” Charles Kegley Jr., *The New Global Terrorism*, (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2003), p. 74.

¹³⁶ N.C. Livingstone, “Taming Terrorism: In Search of a New US Policy,” *International Security Review*, Issue 8, No. 1, Spring 1993, p. 17.

attacks. It means only that they have reasons not to do so...Over time, even militant Islamist groups will learn a lesson about the use of extreme violence – there are good reasons to avoid it – or suffer a decline in life expectancy.¹³⁷

However, the main debate about the “new terrorism” is about the present and future possible use of weapons of mass destruction. This would definitely be a big differentiation from the “old terrorism” but it is not such an obvious, clear and present danger as it is many times portrayed through media and books on terrorism. It should be highlighted that “given the technical difficulties, terrorists are probably less likely to use nuclear devices than chemical weapons, and least likely to attempt to use biological weapons.”¹³⁸ Terrorists’ reservations of using such weapons include the non-heroic character of the attack (in contrast to suicidal missions), the possible alienation of their own supporters, the excessive high cost with uncertain results and the indiscriminate nature of these weapons.¹³⁹ R. W. Mengel (1979) pointed out early on that “the probability of terrorist groups successfully combining the proper skills, material resources and motivations necessary to carry out an act of super terrorism is extremely low.”¹⁴⁰

Infoterrorism and cyberwarfare do not alienate supporters but are not heroic either. Furthermore, the base of a group’s supporters probably cannot understand the pernicious nature of such an attack or its successful results. Nevertheless, terrorist experts like Brian Jenkins predicted that “cyber-terrorism and cyber-war are still in their infancy. More sophisticated attacks are likely.”¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ David Tucker, “Combating International Terrorism,” James M. Smith and William C. Thomas (ed), *The Terrorism and US Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors* (Colorado: USAF Institute of National Security Studies, 2001), p. 137.

¹³⁸ Laqueur, *Postmodern Terrorism*, p. 30.

¹³⁹ David Claridge, “Exploding the Myths of Super Terrorism,” May Taylor and John Horgan, *The Future of Terrorism*, Special Issue of *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 11 No. 4 Winter 1999 (Frank Cass), pp. 139-142.

¹⁴⁰ R. W. Mengel, *Terrorism and New Technologies of Destruction* at Augustus Norton and Martin Greenberg (eds.), *Studies in Nuclear Terrorism* (Boston: Hill, 1979), p. 195.

¹⁴¹ Jenkins, *Terrorism: Current and Long Term Threats (CT 187)*, p. 5.

As regards moral and legal issues, a good example of a group which is portrayed as “crossing the line” is Hezbollah; however, the truth is that it “plays by the rules”. For more than 15 years, Hezbollah militants have not targeted any civilians, with the exception of some tit for tat response to an Israeli violation of the “mutual understanding” between Hezbollah and Israel Defense Forces (IDF).¹⁴² President Yitzak Rabin once “conceded that Hezbollah had not fired on Israeli villages without provocation from the Israeli army. The rocket attacks, he noted, had never been directed at Israeli population targets as targets in themselves.”¹⁴³ Furthermore, Hezbollah fighters, who actually wear uniforms and live in military camps, attack IDF only in Lebanese occupied territories (after the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon, Hezbollah attacks Israeli positions in the contested Shebaa Farms, which are considered by Lebanese and Syrians as Lebanese and therefore are still under Israeli occupation).

The last issue regarding the “new terrorism” is its rate of recurrence. Is terrorism a trend that gets worse as time passes or is it declining? The following statistics (Figures 1 through 6) are taken from the revised¹⁴⁴ State Department report on the “patterns of global terrorism”. Between 1982 and 1986, the average number of terrorist attacks was 560 per year. The following five years it decreased to 530. Between 1992 and 1997, it reached 370 and from 1998 until today there were only 310 attacks per year. Actually, during the last couple of years there were less than 210 attacks per year (Figure 1).

Especially as regards the United States, apart from the surprising and devastating attack of 9/11, for a period of three years both prior and afterwards, there were no casualties in North America and only one incident every two years (Figures 4 and 6).

¹⁴² In accordance with the Israeli International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) Hezbollah committed 12 terrorist acts in the last 17 years. Three were against military personnel, three against embassies (both could be regarded as legitimate targets) and the rest against civilians. All the aforementioned attacks were either attributed to Hezbollah by the Israeli authorities or were claimed by a group called “Islamic Jihad”, which is allegedly a cover name for Hezbollah.

¹⁴³ Palmer Harik, p. 167.

¹⁴⁴ For the significance of the falsified original report and the administration’s effort to present its war on terror as absolutely successful, see Alan B. Krueger and David D. Laitin, “‘Misunderestimating’ Terrorism,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2004, pp. 8-13.

In terms of lethality, it must be admitted that the ratio of victims does increase. However, there are certain attacks that blow the statistics out of the water. For instance, with the exception of 9/11, terrorism accounted for 20 dead and 25 wounded Americans every year (Figure 5). The average number of dead because of shootings in the streets or traffic accidents is enormously greater.¹⁴⁵ Actually, in 2003, 625 people were killed in terrorist attacks worldwide but 43,220 died in automobile accidents only in the United States.¹⁴⁶ Brian Michael Jenkins notes that “according to RAND’s chronology of international terrorism, between 1968 and September 11, 2001, only 14 of more than 10,000 international terrorist incidents resulted in 100 or more fatalities.”¹⁴⁷

Another myth is that the Middle East is dangerous for Americans. Actually, two thirds of anti-American attacks occurred elsewhere last year. Between 2000 and 2003, less than 15% of all anti-American attacks took place in the Middle East (Figure 6). Taking into account the Second Intifada, the unconditional pro-Israeli policy and the illegal Iraq venture, it seems that Middle Easterners behave much better than the American administration usually portrays them.

In order to prove how the statistics can be manipulated to illustrate different results, the MIPT database, which was used in Chapter I, will be used again. It was shown (Figure 1) how international terrorism incidents have drastically increased by choosing a period of eight years. However, if a period of 20 years was selected, the results are entirely antithetical as shown in Figure 3 demonstrating that the terrorist incidents seem to decline.

¹⁴⁵ For interesting comparisons, see Bruce Schneier, *Beyond Fear* (New York: Copernicus Books, 2003), pp. 274-275 and 238-239.

¹⁴⁶ Krueger and Laitin, p. 12.

¹⁴⁷ Brian Michael Jenkins, *Countering Al Qaeda* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2002), p. 13.




Figure 3. Incidents by Year from 1985 to 2005 (From: MIPT Database)

Furthermore, if the very few attacks that caused more than 100 fatalities since 1985 are filtered out (Figure 4), the death rate seem to be constant or very slightly increasing, which contradicts the conclusions in Chapter I (Figure 2).





Figure 4. Fatalities (filtering out few major incidents) by Year from 1985 to 2005 (From: MIPT Database)

In summary, this chapter analyzed why rationality is still the norm in terrorism and will continue to be so. As regards lethality, it was explained that there are certain attacks which blow the statistics out of the water and the true deviation and increase in lethality is normal. It can be justified mainly because of the saturation of media and the need to increase the death toll in order to capture public attention. Finally yet importantly, it was demonstrated that statistically, terrorism is in a steady or declining state.

The conclusion drawn from this as well as from the previous chapters is that terrorism has not really changed. There is continuity rather than a new beginning, and therefore, lessons learned in the past can be applied in the future. The last chapter will attempt, based on this main conclusion, to derive smaller but important lessons and offer some policy recommendations.

Total International Terrorist Attacks, 1982-2003



In past years, serious violence by Palestinians against other Palestinians in the occupied territories was included in the database of worldwide international terrorist incidents because Palestinians are considered stateless people. This resulted in such incidents being treated differently from intraethnic violence in other parts of the world. In 1989, as a result of further review of the nature of intra-Palestinian violence, such violence stopped being included in the US Government's statistical database on international terrorism. The figures shown above for the years 1984 through 1988 have been revised to exclude intra-Palestinian violence, thus making the database consistent.

Investigations into terrorist incidents sometimes yield evidence that necessitates a change in the information previously held true (such as whether the incident fits the definition of international terrorism, which group or state sponsor was responsible, or the number of victims killed or injured). As a result of these adjustments, the statistics given in this report may vary slightly from numbers cited in previous reports.

Figure 5. Terrorist Incidents in the Last Two Decades.




Figure 6. Total International Casualties by Region in the Last Two Decades.

Total US Citizen Casualties Caused by International Attacks, 1998-2003

Note scale break

Dead
Wounded




Figure 7. Total US Citizen Casualties Caused by International Attacks in the Last Two Decades.

Total International Attacks by Region, 1998-2003




Figure 8. Total International Attacks by Region in the Last Two Decades.

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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Terrorism is fashionable. The large public, especially in the United States, just discovered the true face of terrorism. Literally thousands of authors have written about the subject, many of whom without possessing any significant theoretical background in the field. Others have specialized in the Middle East and “Islamic” terrorism and only enjoy a basic knowledge of Islam, have never been in the Middle East and do not speak Arabic or any other Middle Eastern language. Hence, it is less than surprising that “orientalist”¹⁴⁸ misconceptions about terrorism have shaped public opinion, and therefore, the policy of the United States.

Summarizing the conclusions of the previous chapters, the argument states that terrorism is in a continuum. The only great change was the psychological effect of the 9/11 attack on the large American and European public. As regards aims, targets, tactics, methods, behavior and motivation, there is nothing revolutionary or novel about the alleged “new” terrorism. Hence, lessons learned from the recent past and the disappearance of many terrorist groups can be applied in order to combat the present dangers. As David Tucker points out,

We should note first that much of what the United States has done over the past 30 years to combat terrorism remains relevant because the new terrorism is not fundamentally different from the old... We shall still apply today, therefore, lessons we have learned, or should have learned, during the past three decades.¹⁴⁹

In order to counter the terrorist threat, a proactive strategy is required, which is much more important than the tactics of a reactive response. Instead, ill-prepared proactive tactics like “Operation Iraqi Freedom” resulted from a reactive strategy driven by 9/11. It seems that the entire global war on terror does not address the underlying conditions for terrorism to grow. The result of this at best unbalanced policy is the

¹⁴⁸ Orientalism is a school of thought and a manner of writing, vision and study, dominated by imperatives, perspectives, stereotypes and ideological biases ostensibly suited to the “Orient”. Edward Said in his groundbreaking work *Orientalism* (1978) highlighted the long-held, often taken-for-granted Western ideological colonialist way of thinking regarding the “others,” who are the “orientals,” no matter if they are Arabs or even Muslims.

¹⁴⁹ Tucker, p. 140.

stalemate in Iraq and Afghanistan, the “carte blanche” to Ariel Sharon and his imperialistic plans and the strengthening of anti-American sentiment in the Middle East, and not to say the rest of the world. As Michael Scheuer points out:

Bin Laden has been precise in telling America the reasons he is waging war on us. None of the reasons have anything to do with our freedom, liberty and democracy, but have everything to do with US policies and actions in the Muslim world...As I complete this book, US, British and other coalition forces are trying to govern apparently ungovernable postwar states in Afghanistan and Iraq while simultaneously fighting growing Islamist insurgencies in each – a state of affairs our leaders call victory. In conducting these activities, and the conventional military campaigns preceding them, US forces and policies are completing the radicalization of the Islamic world, something Osama bin Laden has been trying to do with substantial but incomplete success since the early 1990s. As a result, I think it fair to conclude that the United States of America remains bin Laden’s only indispensable ally.¹⁵⁰

An example of how reactive responses are inadequate to face terrorism is Israel. The Israeli “philosophy” in counter-terrorism can be epitomized in Benjamin Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism* (New York, Ferrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001). He suggests the limitation of civil liberties (Chapter II) and he concludes by proposing to “impose sanctions on suppliers of nuclear technology to terrorist states, impose diplomatic, economic and military sanctions on the terrorist states, neutralize terrorist enclaves, freeze financial assets, share intelligence, actively pursue terrorists, prepare the population, do not release jailed terrorists, use special forces and revise legislation to enable greater surveillance and action against terrorist groups.”¹⁵¹ Obviously, some of the proposals are a “slippery slope” to follow and not adoptable by modern Western democracies.

One of these responses is the decapitation of leadership. It is based on the clever Clausewitzian approach of targeting the “centers of gravity” of the enemy. However, can the leader of a terrorist group be considered as such? There are some historic examples that proved the merit of this method. PKK was practically wiped out after the arrest of its founding leader, Abdullah Ocalan. However, this method does not always bear fruit. The

¹⁵⁰ Anonymous (Michael Scheuer), *Imperial Hubris*, pp. x-xv.

¹⁵¹ Benjamin Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism* (New York: Ferrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), pp. 132-146.

Israeli practice of assassinating leaders only managed to galvanize the Palestinian will to resist these non-judicial practices, which violate any notion of International Law. The most recent assassinations are those of Rantisi and Yassin (Hamas). Probably the most interesting case is the assassination of the de facto leader of the first Intifada, Abu Jihad, on April 9, 1988 in Tunisia in front of his wife and child, with no practical results for the Israelis.¹⁵² Bruce Hoffman states that:

To date, nearly half of the senior al Qaeda leadership has been killed or captured. Among them are important operations commanders like Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Mohammed Atef and Abu Zubayada (Zayn al-Abidin Mohammed Husayn), as well as key financiers like Mohammed Mustafa Ahmed Hawsawi.¹⁵³

The 9/11 Commission Report comments “killing or capturing Usama bin Laden would not end terror.” Hassan al Turabi, the Sudanese Islamist leader said in 1998, “if they kill Usama, they will create a thousand bin Ladens.”¹⁵⁴

How about trying to create rivalries among terrorists? Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence has been playing this game to perfection, not allowing any militant group in Kashmir to become extremely strong.¹⁵⁵ ISI has been facilitating the creation of different fractions and sects among the “jihadi” movement in Kashmir and thus keeping in check the entire “movement.” Israel has been using the same method in order to provoke rivalries among Palestinian groups. Actually, in accordance with Primakov, “HAMAS was originally created by the Mossad, the Israeli secret service, to weaken the PLO in the occupied West Bank.”¹⁵⁶ The aforementioned example highlights that the “divide and conquer” principle sometimes backfires as well.

The sponsorship of terrorism is really important; however still on a tactical level. Very few countries, if any, support terrorist groups. The United States officially accuses six countries of sponsoring terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and

¹⁵² Aburish, p. 209.

¹⁵³ Hoffman, *Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities: An Assessment*, p. 8.

¹⁵⁴ Jane Corbin, *Al-Qaeda* (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press/ Nation Books, 2002), p. 352.

¹⁵⁵ Kshitij Prabha, *Terrorism – An Instrument of Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: International Academic Publishers Ltd., 2001), p. 144.

¹⁵⁶ Primakov, p. 11.

Syria.¹⁵⁷ Obviously the aforementioned list, excluding countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan¹⁵⁸, has nothing to do with reality and just reflects the relations of these countries with the United States. Adrian Guelke suggests that “whether a country is listed as a ‘terrorist state’ is at least as much a reflection of that country’s relations with the United States as it is of its actual behavior.”¹⁵⁹ Cuba and North Korea are entirely irrelevant and in his thorough analysis, Davis Whittaker does not build a case against them (he has some evidence against Syria, Iran and “old” Libya).¹⁶⁰ Even the most fanatical and biased authors like McInnery and Vallely, who actually advocate a war against North Korea with “well over 4,000 [air force] sorties a day,”¹⁶¹ find no actual link between any terrorist and this country and does not even mention Cuba. Sudan and Libya used to support terrorism quite a bit but not anymore and they are definitely less suspect than Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. Hezbollah seems to be the only terrorist group with heavy sponsorship from Iran and Syria. Adam Shatz points out “Although Nasrallah depends on Iranian arms and Syria’s support for his military operations, he has achieved a significant degree of autonomy from both parties.” He also suggests that “Hezbollah has long ceased to be an Iranian-controlled militia and the last remaining Revolutionary Guards left the Bekaa Valley in 1998.”¹⁶²

Countries that help some groups in Palestine or Kashmir do not view them as terrorist. Clear terrorist cases like al Qaeda have been condemned by almost all countries and those who have been labeled terrorists by global consensus cannot easily find safe haven. Most of the terrorist training camps have been disbanded, offices of terrorist groups have been closed and their representatives have been exiled all over the world. However, in this globalized era of today, it is not hard for individuals, off-shore companies and trusts to fund a terrorist group covertly. For this reason, Al Qaeda is

¹⁵⁷ Schweitzer, p. 41.

¹⁵⁸ For the relations among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, see Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven: Yale, 2001), pp. 137-140.

¹⁵⁹ Adrian Guelke, *The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), p. 148.

¹⁶⁰ Whittaker, pp. 140 – 146.

¹⁶¹ Thomas McInnery and Paul Vallely, *Endgame: The Blueprint for Victory in the War on Terror* (Washington DC: Regnery, 2004), p. 79.

¹⁶² Adam Shatz, “In Search of Hezbollah,” *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. 51, Number 7, April 29, 2004.

stronger than all the others, since Usama bin Laden not only is a millionaire, but he also organized the group's funding very well, without being dependent on any state for economic sponsorship. As Michael Scheuer points out about bin Laden's finances:

As of 11 September 2001, bin Laden appeared to have at least four different funding channels that would have to be targeted by the West: his personal fortune and the profits of his businesses, funds he gets from his family and other wealthy Muslim families in Saudi Arabia and worldwide, witting and unwitting donations from wealthy Muslim governments and individuals via mosque collections and Islamic NGOs, and an undefined cut of the huge profits earned from trafficking heroin in South Asia. This diversity of funding channels provides bin Laden a financial network that is so redundant that, while it can be damaged, it will be almost impossible to destroy.¹⁶³

In any case, this is a domain where significant progress has been made, yet still has a long way to go.

Whereas the application of the aforementioned methods can bring few if any important results, the strategy of addressing the causes of terrorism could really help the anti-terrorist struggle. Understanding terrorism is far from being a simple task. It is not possible to explain terrorism until one "completely empathizes with the pain and frustration that caused it."¹⁶⁴ As Benjamin Barber points out "there is an axis of evil but mirroring them is an axis of injustice, despair, resentment and rage. That does not justify terrorism but it helps explain it."¹⁶⁵ Long standing disputes as in Palestine and Kashmir could be solved and double-standard policies should be abandoned. How can someone

¹⁶³ Anonymous (Michael Scheuer), *Through Our Enemies' Eyes*, p. 33.

¹⁶⁴ Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers Inc, 2003), p. xvi.

¹⁶⁵ Benjamin Barber, *Confronting Terrorism: Smart Bombs or Smart Concepts*, speech at the Commonwealth Club of California, April 25, 2002. Available on line at <http://www.commonwealthclub.org/archive/02/02-04barber-speech.html>, last accessed on May 24, 2005).

win the “heart and soul” of the “Arab street” by letting Sharon’s Israel¹⁶⁶ build a Wall condemned by the International Court and global public opinion? How can someone avoid the rise of terrorism by supporting the “blind” Israeli attacks in Palestinian refugee camps and the continuous policy of “shooting and crying”¹⁶⁷ adopted by Israel since its creation? How can someone become an honest broker in negotiations while allowing Israel to violate human rights¹⁶⁸ and expand its illegal settlements? As Clyde Prestowitz points out

Unless the lobbies and the Congress and the White House wake up, the prospect is for the United States to pour more billions of dollars into expansion of Israeli settlements. This policy will catalyze violence and lead to brutal reprisal that will bring more global disdain for the United States.¹⁶⁹

The current U.S. administration policy is reflected by the 14 April 2004 statement of President Bush who “endorsed the Israeli wall around Palestinian areas, approved Israel’s unilateral action in Gaza and the West Bank, rejected the right of return for Palestinian refugees, and said Israel’s occupied territory settlements should be recognized in final borders.”¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁶ The name of Ariel Sharon is highlighted, characterized by the President of the United States, George W. Bush as a “man of peace” for his notorious past. In accordance with Noam Chomsky, *Pirates and Emperors, Old and New* (Cambridge, South End Press, 2002, p. 142) “Sharon’s terrorist career, dating back to the early 1950s, includes the slaughter of 69 villages in Qibya and 20 at the al-Bureig refugee camp in 1953; terrorist operations in Gaza and northeastern Sinai in the early 1970s including the expulsion of some 10,000 farmers into the desert, their homes bulldozed and farm lands destroyed in preparation for Jewish settlement; the invasion of Lebanon undertaken in an effort – as now widely conceded – to overcome the threat of PLO diplomacy; the subsequent massacre at Sabra and Shatila; and others.” Benjamin Barber notes “Sharon has dismantled and destroyed what little civic, health and educational infrastructures had been created. Without schools, hope, jobs, dignity – why not terrorism?” See Benjamin Barber, *Confronting Terrorism: Smart Bombs or Smart Concepts*.

¹⁶⁷ Benin Joel, “No More Tears: Benny Morris and the Road Back from Liberal Zionism,” *Middle East Report*, Issue 230, Spring 2004, p. 39.

¹⁶⁸ “US officials have protested Israel’s policies of deporting Palestinians suspected of opposing Israeli occupation, detention without charges, beating Palestinians, communal punishment such as curfews against entire towns, destruction or sealing of houses of families of leaders, the closing of schools, assassinations, and other actions” extract from Clyde R. Mark, *CRS Issue Brief for Congress on Israeli-US Relations*, July 10, 2003.

¹⁶⁹ Clyde Prestowitz, *Rogue Nation* (New York: Basic Books, 2003), p. 218.

¹⁷⁰ Clyde R. Mark, *CRS Issue Brief for Congress on Palestinians and Middle East Peace: Issues for the United States*, March 16, 2005, p. 4.

The importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict for the support base of terrorism is pointed out by Usama bin Laden's second in command, Ayman Al-Zawahiri:

The fact that must be acknowledged is that the issue of Palestine is the cause that has been firing up the feelings of the Muslim nation from Morocco to Indonesia for the past fifty years. In addition it is a rallying point for all the Arabs, be they believers or nonbelievers, good or evil.¹⁷¹

Palestine has such a center place in Arab politics, mainly for domestic consumption, that Shiite Hezbollah offered its verbal and material aid to the Sunni Palestinians against the common Arab enemy, winning the sympathy of anti-Shiite populations in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. After the assassination of the spiritual leader of Hamas, the blind Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Hezbollah demonstrated its solidarity with the Palestinians by firing 65 rockets against IDF positions in the Shebaa Farms. Nasrallah, referring to gun smuggling (Katyusha rockets) to the West Bank, proudly accepted the fact adding "we try to supply Palestinians with a very modest weapon, one that for the powerful army like Israel's is like a water pistol."¹⁷²

Nevertheless, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not the only cause of terrorism. The support of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, an unsuccessful model which is also applied to Central Asia, is bound to provoke a massive response sooner or later. As Jim Nichol points out about Central Asia:

Critics of continued engagement have suggested that the Administration's stress on gradual and peaceful political change connotes U.S. support for the stability of current leadership. They warn that the populations of these states may come to view U.S. engagement as propping up authoritarian leaders, and such authoritarianism might encourage a countervailing rise of Islamic fundamentalism as an alternative channel of dissent... They urge reducing or cutting off most aid to repressive governments that widely violate human rights, and reject arguments that U.S. interests in anti-terrorism, non-proliferation, regional cooperation, trade, and investment outweigh concerns over democratization and human rights. Some point to an apparent contradiction between a U.S. policy toward Iraq

¹⁷¹ Ayman Al Zawahiri, *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner* (2001) in Walter Laqueur (ed.), *Voices of Terror* (New York, Reed Press, 2004), p. 431.

¹⁷² Palmer Harik, p. 187.

and the wider Middle East that stresses regime change and democratization and a policy that appears to tolerate existing authoritarian regimes in Central Asia.¹⁷³

The U.S. administration policy towards newly founded Central Asian countries , which props up and sanctions extremely brutal dictators, creates military bases and does nothing to improve the economic conditions of the oppressed people, is much more important to the global war on terror than the Middle Eastern policy. If hypocritically, the United States declares democratization and the well-being of people as a cornerstone of its politics,¹⁷⁴ then no option exists but to agree with Pauline Jones Luong that:

It is at best ironic, at worst prophetic that as America seeks to dismantle the old Middle East as a way to combat terrorism, beginning with Iraq, the United States is building a new Middle East in its place, along with a new terrorist threat.¹⁷⁵

So far and especially in the Middle East, there is no massive reaction towards the authoritarian regime due to, on the one hand, their firm control, and on the other hand, the obedience of the Muslims to the “legitimate” leadership. There are judgments on the crime of “al-baghy,”¹⁷⁶ which is an armed revolt against a legitimate government and the intimidation of the general public in pursuit of political goals. “If terrorism is the last resort for men and women without power, the only ultimate remedy is empowerment.”¹⁷⁷

¹⁷³ Jim Nichol, *CRS Report for Congress on Central Asian Security: Issues and Implications for US Interests*, January 7, 2005, p. 39.

¹⁷⁴ It is also quite ironic that the democratization process is carried out by a country which is among the world leaders in executions: China is by far the leading country in applying the death penalty with more than 3,000 executions in 2004. The next are Iran (159 executions), Vietnam (64) and USA (59) – (from *The Week*, April 15, 2005). Can a country charged with human rights violations (Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and the like) and endorsing the death penalty be considered a global “democratizer”?

¹⁷⁵ Pauline Jones Luong, “The Middle Easternization of Central Asia,” *Current History*, October 2003, p. 333.

¹⁷⁶ See Ayatollah Sheikh Mohammad Ali Tashkiri *Towards a Definition of Terrorism*, from *Al-Tawhid* (1987) based on resolution 20/5-P of the 5th Islamic Summit. It is interesting to note that in accordance with Ali Tashkiri and other Islamic scholars, terrorism is defined as “an act carried out to achieve an inhuman and corrupt objective and involving threat to security of any kind and violation of rights acknowledged by religion and mankind”. Hence, terrorism does not apply in acts of national resistance, resistance against cliques imposed by the force of arms, rejection of dictatorships, resistance against racial discrimination and retaliation against any aggression if there is no other alternative.

¹⁷⁷ Barber, *Confronting Terrorism: Smart Bombs or Smart Concepts*.

The concept of democratizing Middle East is brilliant; however, democracy cannot be imposed or forced. The first example of total failure was Afghanistan. In accordance with Barnett Rubin,

The Bonn Agreement created a government (in Afghanistan), but it did not create a state...Free and fair elections are impossible if a large number of unaccountable people with guns are intimidating citizens.¹⁷⁸

Furthermore, the “democratization” plan’s poor execution, worsened with the insolent invasion in Iraq on false pretenses.¹⁷⁹ Chaos does not solve any problems and permanent military presentation provokes hatred. As Pape points out:

The close association between foreign military occupations and the growth of suicide terrorist movements in the occupied regions should give pause to those who favor solutions that involve conquering countries in order to transform their political systems. Conquering countries may disrupt terrorist operations in the short term, but it is important to recognize that occupation of more countries may well increase the number of terrorists coming at us.¹⁸⁰

Inclusion of religious parties in political life and their response to actual problems can expose the vague and utopian approach of Islamic fundamentalism. Islamism seems to be offering a solution where other systems failed. “...The Muslim world is suffering from a decline, deformed by colonialism, misled by nationalism and wrecked by socialism.”¹⁸¹ The truth is that “when free from government repression, Islamic candidates and organizations have worked within the political system and participated in elections in Tunisia, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Kuwait, Yemen, Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia; activists have even held cabinet-level positions in Sudan,

¹⁷⁸ Barnett R. Rubin, “(Re) Building Afghanistan: The Folly of Stateless Democracy,” *Current History*, April 2004, p. 168.

¹⁷⁹ The main reasoning behind the war was the actual WMD threat, which was entirely misunderstood at best or fabricated at best. The secondary reasoning was the alleged Saddam – Usama bin Laden connection. As James Bamsford thoroughly examines and analyzes, “you would almost always find that Saddam Hussein or someone in his government had rebuffed the attempt by the terrorist organization, whoever it might have been, to get training from, funds from, or establish some kind of operational relationship between Iraqi intelligence and themselves.” See James Bamsford, *A Pretext for War* (New York: Doubleday, 2004), p. 371.

¹⁸⁰ Pape, p. 15.

¹⁸¹ See Anthony Shadid, *Legacy of the Prophet* (New York: Westview Press, 2001), p. 28.

Pakistan, Kuwait, Jordan, Yemen and Malaysia.”¹⁸² In Iran, the same people that brought Khomeini to power struggle for reforms. Islamic fundamentalism should be fought as a theory, in the same way that Communism was fought and beaten on political, economic and moral grounds. Leftist terrorism lost its popular support when people realized the true nature of Communism.

By further developing the aforementioned argument and in order to beat Islamic fundamentalism on moral and political grounds, policies which either allow or encourage human right abuses and laws that violate civil rights¹⁸³ based on “security vs. democracy”, the false-dilemma should be abandoned. The pictures of Abu Ghraib and the reports on Guantanamo do not contribute to a moral victory over terrorism. Moreover, as Benjamin Wittes points out:

If a court cannot look behind the government’s allegations, what prevents the Administration from arbitrarily detaining political foes, domestic critics, or nonviolent Muslim radicals?...The idea of holding detainees until the end of hostilities makes no sense in a war for which we have no clear definition of victory. The government is asserting an essentially unreviewable power to detain forever those the President claims are terrorists.¹⁸⁴

Another important point on how to fight Islamic militant radicalism on political grounds is that as Westerners, the last thing to do is start an honest debate about it. The harm done by the former colonial powers and their even worse heir makes the West seem too distrustful and impure to discuss it with them. However, mainstream, moderate and especially liberal Islam is a force that can convince the uncommitted disenfranchised Muslims that there is an Islamic alternative better than terrorism, which can give reliable solutions to both domestic and international problems. As Muqtedar Khan states “American policy makers must recognize the strategic value of liberal Islam and promote and protect it.”¹⁸⁵ What the Bush administration did was paint the world in black and

¹⁸² See John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality* (New York: Oxford, 1999), pp. 267-268.

¹⁸³ The author is referring to the notorious USA Patriot Act 2001 (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism).

¹⁸⁴ Benjamin Wittes, “Enemy Americans,” *The Atlantic*, July/August 2004, pp. 130-135.

¹⁸⁵ M. A. Muqtedar Khan, “Radical Islam, Liberal Islam,” *Current History*, December 2003, p. 420.

white (“either you are with us or against us”), leaving no room for gray zones or for neutrals. In that sense, there are parallels between American neoconservatives and jihadists. As Mahmood Mamdani highlights “in addition to the mix of interest and ideology, the two groups share global ambitions and a deep faith in the efficacy of politically motivated violence.”¹⁸⁶ Hence, a liberal, moderate Muslim will probably find it easier to side with an extremist jihadist, than with an American neoconservative who has been sponsoring tyrannies in the entire Middle East for many decades. Even a European would be tempted to side with the Palestinians and not with Sharon’s Israel main mentor and sponsor. If the desire is for Muslims to reject extremism, then it is necessary to endorse liberal Islam and help the Muslims out of their poor socio-economic conditions. The U.S. administration offers more lip service to the progress of the developing countries than actual help. As Jeffrey Sachs points out, “development aid is just as fundamental as military spending to US national security” but from the 22 countries of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United States donates the least as a percentage of its gross national income.¹⁸⁷

A genuinely founded and grass root oriented civil society can really help the entire democratization process and would calm down the population by proving that the West is not entirely infernal. Nevertheless, the current civil society leaves the population, it aims to serve, on the sidelines and pays no attention to the local cultural context. The civil society in the Middle East is elitist, professional, sectional and sometimes artificially created and controlled by the governments. “The Jordanian regime utilizes the growth of civil society institutions through NGOs to enhance state social control using order and visibility.”¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ Mamdani, p. 153.

¹⁸⁷ It is worth noting that a poor European country like Greece, having to undertake the major task of organizing a safe and modern summer Olympic Games, did not hesitate in 2003 to contribute to development assistance with a percentage of 0.21% of its gross national income; Norway donated an impressive 0.92 % and the United States only 0.15%. See Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The Development Challenge,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2005, pp. 86-87.

¹⁸⁸ Quina Wiktorowicz, “Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 34 No. 1, October 2000, p. 57.

Little by little, NGOs became distanced from the wider community of which they were once an organic part. They came to see themselves as development professionals, rather than catalysts of community political organization and mobilization.¹⁸⁹

Last but not least, global public opinion should be taken into account and global consensus should be achieved in the counter-terrorism struggle. As Benjamin Barber pointed out:

On September 11, America was not just dealt the blow of a savage attack, but it was also treated to an unsolicited, yet powerful lesson in the new realities of the world – the ineluctability, the inevitability of interdependence; the fact that independent nations can no longer survive with their own destiny in their own hands...The belief that America, by dint of its military power, ignoring multilateral treaties, new legal conventions, international organizations, can overcome terrorism is a new myth.¹⁹⁰

The friction between the axis Russia/China/hardcore of EU (Germany – France) and the United States before the war on Iraq did not help the anti-terrorist cause. Robust alliances and not opportunist coalitions are vital in this common fight. In any war, public opinion and international legitimacy is of utmost importance. Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro highlight that

It would be a mistake to base US policy on the assumption that current American power makes the transatlantic alliance an unnecessary impediment to US freedom of action. Acting on the premise that Washington does not need allies – or that it will find more compliant or more important ones elsewhere – could ultimately erode the reservoir of international legitimacy and consent to US preeminence that has always served as a critical component of American power.¹⁹¹

The last quotes regarding the value of a transatlantic alliance and cooperation in the counter-terrorism struggle are attributed to Brian Michael Jenkins. He pointed out

¹⁸⁹ Rema Hammami, “NGOs: The Professionalization of Politics,” *Race and Class*, Vol. 37 No. 2, 1995, p. 57.

¹⁹⁰ Barber, *Confronting Terrorism: Smart Bombs or Smart Concepts*.

¹⁹¹ Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), p. 15

before the invasion and occupation of Iraq, “the crucial second phase of the war on terrorism cannot be accomplished unilaterally – international cooperation is a prerequisite for success.”¹⁹² In order to conclude as regards the global consensus, he also said:

America cannot expect the world’s applause for every action it takes in pursuit of terrorists abroad, but it is important not to squander the international support upon which the United States unavoidably will depend if it is to win the war (on terror). Military force is at times justified, but the violence should never be wanton, even if future attacks provoke American rage. The monument to those killed on September 11 and to those who may die in future terrorist attacks cannot be a mountain of innocent dead in some distant land.¹⁹³

Another important factor, in order to win the “hearts and minds” of the potential enemies, the neutrals and the betrayed friends, is to ameliorate public diplomacy and public affairs in what is described by the Defense Science Board Task Force as “strategic communication.” The inability of the United States to transmit their message in combination with their at best unbalanced policies brings the following results:

Opinion surveys conducted by Zogby International, the Pew Research Center, Gallup (CNN/USA Today), and the Department of State (INR) reveal widespread animosity toward the United States and its policies. A year and a half after going to war in Iraq, Arab/Muslim anger has intensified. Data from Zogby International in July 2004, for example, show that the U.S. is viewed unfavorably by overwhelming majorities in Egypt (98 percent), Saudi Arabia (94 percent), Morocco (88 percent), and Jordan (78 percent). The war has increased mistrust of America in Europe, weakened support for the war on terrorism, and undermined U.S. credibility worldwide. Media commentary is consistent with polling data. In a State Department (INR) survey of editorials and op-eds in 72 countries, 82.5 % of commentaries were negative, 17.5% positive.¹⁹⁴

Since the whole world is fighting against terrorism and not certain terrorists, there are no clear objectives, the concepts are vague, the moral and legal relaxations dangerous and the future bleak. In conclusion, some final notes by Paul Pillar regarding the nature of this struggle are appropriate:

¹⁹² Jenkins, *Countering Al Qaeda*, p. 21.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹⁹⁴ Defense Science Board Task Force, *Report on Strategic Communication*, September 2004, pp. 14-15.

The long history of terrorism is reason enough to expect that it will always be a problem and usually a significant one...If there is a “war” against terrorism, it is a war that cannot be won... Unlike most wars, it has neither a fixed set of enemies nor the prospect of coming to closure, be it through a “win” or some other kind of denouement. Like the cold war, it requires long, patient, persistent effort, but unlike it, it will never conclude with the internal collapse of an opponent...Perhaps a better analogy is the effort by public health authorities to control communicable diseases...Analogies aside, a central lesson of counterterrorism is that terrorism cannot be “defeated”- only reduced, attenuated, and to some degree controlled.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁵ Pillar, *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy*, pp. 217-218.

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