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Half a decade into the new millennium, the strategic environment continues to change rapidly, and in important ways. Some of those changes, of course, challenge U.S. interests, while others advance them. And the challenges assume regular and, increasingly now, irregular forms. Yet, while the causes of change are many, the discernable patterns are few. It is all the more important, therefore, that the U.S. Army maintain a strategic perspective—that it take advantage of the collective insights of scholars and senior-level students both within the defense community and beyond. The Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL), developed at the U.S. Army War College by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), helps the Army identify and bring together those insights.

SSI develops the draft list, based on input from its expert researchers, and vets it with the rest of the Army War College, the Army Staff, Army Major Commands, Army Component Commands, the Combatant Commands, and the Joint Staff. The various topic recommendations and comments SSI receives are worked into the final document, either for inclusion in the general topic areas or as part of agency-specific concerns found in the Expanded KSIL. The Key Strategic Issues portion of the KSIL identifies research topics considered essential to the Army and to the role of landpower in general; many are broad enough to encompass different research approaches, and to allow researchers to modify or expand the issues as appropriate. Similarly, the Expanded KSIL enables researchers to focus on the concerns of, or to benefit from the perspectives of, individual KSIL sponsors. The KSIL is meant to be extensive, but not exhaustive. No list could capture every issue of potential concern, particularly given the identified dynamic nature of today’s strategic environment. The SSI points of contact herein maintain general oversight of their topic areas, and thus can recommend individual sponsors or subject matter experts.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES

GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

POC: Dr. Stephen Biddle (717) 245-4126
Stephen.Biddle@carlisle.army.mil

1. Global strategy for the War on Terrorism
2. Strategic implications of redefining the terrorism threat in terms of violent radical Islam
3. Strategic implications of using military force in the War on Terrorism
4. The military and the interagency approach to the War on Terrorism
5. Roles of alliances and coalitions in the War on Terrorism
6. Special Operations and the War on Terrorism:
   a. Developing and employing SOF and other regional expertise
   b. Shaping regional battlespace through information operations
   c. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations in the Special Operations community
7. Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism: Identifying and mitigating sources of anti-Americanism and terrorism
8. Ethical and legal challenges in asymmetric warfare:
   a. Killing terrorists vs. apprehension and prosecution
   b. Legal classification of detainees and due process
   c. Jurisdiction of military vs. civilian courts
   d. Impact of the Law of the Sea on protecting the United States
9. Ties between the War on Drugs, international crime, and the War on Terrorism
10. Periods of increased terrorist activity and their determinants
11. Effects of information pervasiveness on the military, the nation, and the War on Terrorism
12. Intelligence challenges in multinational counter-terrorist operations
13. Measuring the effectiveness of the War on Terrorism
14. How/whether military leaders should influence political, informational, and economic lines of operation in the War on Terrorism
15. Defining appropriate end states in the War on Terrorism:
   a. What levels of “peace” and “stability” are acceptable?
   b. What degrees of “democracy” and “tolerance of opposing views” are achievable? Will they be sufficient?
HOMELAND SECURITY

POC: Dr. Dallas Owens (717) 245-4075
dallas.owens@carlisle.army.mil

1. Intelligence, first responder, protection, and reconstitution requirements for homeland security

2. Active and reserve components’ roles and structures for homeland security

3. The military role in federal, state, and local agencies’ homeland security operations

4. NORTHCOM, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Joint Staff, the Department of Homeland Security, and state governors:
   a. Roles, missions, and responsibilities for HQS ARNORTH (UEy) vis-à-vis NORTHCOM
   b. Defining command relationships

5. Assessing, countering, and responding to pandemics, WMD threats, and mass effects’ mechanisms

6. Strategic implications of missile defense

7. Information sharing among intelligence, law enforcement, and other federal, state, and local agencies

8. Protecting DoD and/or non-DoD critical infrastructure

9. Combining federal, state, and local resources for combating homeland threats

10. Implications of the new North American Defense Agreement (U.S., Canada, Mexico)
REGIONAL STRATEGIC ISSUES

POC: Dr. Steven Metz (717) 245-3822
Steven.Metz@carlisle.army.mil

1. Evolving regional security matters in **North Africa** and the **Middle East**
   a. Appropriate U.S. and coalition roles in a sovereign Iraq
   b. Assuring Iraq’s stability, security and reconstruction while fighting an insurgency
   c. Changing the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf
   d. Security issues created by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
   e. U.S. strategy toward Iran
   f. U.S. strategy toward Libya
   g. U.S. strategy toward Syria
   h. Implications of a nuclear Iran
   i. Impact of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM on U.S. national security
   j. Strategic lessons from the Iraqi insurgency
   k. Strategic implications of a changing Egypt
   l. The future of Saudi Arabia and Middle Eastern security
   m. Implications of democratic, but anti-U.S. governments in the region
   n. Implications of increasing Chinese demand for Middle East oil
   o. Future role of NATO in the Middle East

2. Evolving regional security matters in the **Asia-Pacific Region**
   a. Balancing U.S. security interests in China and Taiwan
   b. The future of the Japan-U.S. security relationship
   c. Impact of China’s growing economic and military power in the region
   d. Security concerns in Southeast Asia and implications for the U.S.
   e. Strategic response to North Korea’s intentions and capabilities
   f. Evolving Republic of Korea-U.S. security relations
   g. Future of ASEAN and U.S. strategic posture in the region
   h. The role of the U.S. military on the Korean Peninsula
   i. Future of the U.S. alliance with Australia and New Zealand

3. Evolving regional security matters in **Sub-Saharan Africa**
   a. The role of the African Union in African peacekeeping operations
   b. Army International Activities Programs in Africa
   c. Sub-Saharan Africa and the War on Terrorism
   d. Implications of continent-wide failure due to AIDS and political strife
   e. Forming regional cooperative security arrangements
   f. Effects of the exploitation of Africa’s natural energy resources
   g. Professional development of African militaries
   h. Strategic implications of Chinese activity in Sub-Saharan Africa
   i. U.S. response to acts of genocide (e.g., Rwanda, Sudan)?

4. Evolving regional security matters in **Europe**
   a. U.S. Army roles in future Balkan security
b. Revival of the Russian military  
c. Russo-American Security and/or Defense Cooperation  
d. Russia’s future relationships with Europe and the United States  
e. The impact of growing Muslim populations on Western European security  
f. The U.S. military’s role in Eastern Europe  
g. Reconfiguring the U.S. military presence in Europe  
h. Implications of a changing NATO  
i. U.S. leadership in NATO: The role of the U.S. Army  
j. NATO and EU defense initiatives: Competitive or Complementary?  
k. Implications of OIF for European cooperation in GWOT  
l. EU expansion while excluding Turkey from membership  
m. Drawdown of U.S. forces in Europe: strategic implications  

5. Evolving regional security matters in **Southwest Asia**  
   a. Balancing U.S. security interests between India and Pakistan  
   b. Maintaining stability and security in Afghanistan  
   c. Long-term implications of maintaining the OIF coalition  
   d. Implications of major changes in Pakistan’s domestic conditions  

6. Evolving regional security matters in **Central Asia**  
   a. Growing U.S. security interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia  
   b. Russian-China-U.S. competition in Central Asia  
   c. Strategic implications of energy development in the Caucasus and Caspian  
   d. Synchronizing security cooperation and political reform in Central Asia  
   e. Role and structure of the U.S. military presence in Central Asia  

7. Evolving regional security matters in **Latin America**  
   a. U.S. interests in Caribbean security issues  
   b. Military role in providing security in the Western Hemisphere:  
      i. Enhancing free trade  
      ii. Enhancing the role of Inter-American Defense Board and OAS  
      iii. Roles of military and police (security forces) in addressing new threats  
   c. Improving security ties with Brazil  
   d. Lessons from the Colombian insurgency  
   e. Reemergence of Sendero Luminoso  
   f. Ungoverned space and implications for territorial security  
   g. Military role in securing a stable Haiti  
   h. Political instability in Venezuela  
   i. Narco-funded terrorism and narco-terrorism and the war on terror  
   j. Instability and disenfranchised indigenous populations  
   k. Implications of the rising threat of populism in the region  
   l. Long-term implications of Chinese engagement in Latin America  

8. Supporting and integrating Regional Security Cooperation Plans  

9. Identifying, deterring, and responding to regional irregular challenges
10. The international criminal court and future American military operations

11. The impact of globalization on U.S. national security

12. Environmental issues as a basis for enhancing security cooperation

13. Social, cultural, political, economic, and governance trends and their possible effects on the future strategic environment

14. Rationalizing the boundaries of the Combatant Commands

15. Advantages and disadvantages of basing U.S. military units in specific regions
1. Understanding revolutionary change in warfare
2. Analyzing trends in warfare
3. Responses to unexpected technological breakthroughs
4. Alternative paths for transformation
5. The probable impact of fog and friction on the future force
6. Requirements for full spectrum land force dominance
7. The future force and peacekeeping and stability operations
8. Requirements for network centric warfare
9. Strategic implications of future force operational concepts
10. Evaluating themes in the Army’s 2005 Strategic Planning Guidance:
    a. Assessing force proficiencies against irregular challenges
    b. Assessing force capabilities for stability operations
    c. Assessing force capabilities to dominate in complex terrain
    d. Assessing capabilities for strategic responsiveness
    e. Assessing the Army’s Global Force Posture
    f. Assessing force capabilities for Battle Command
11. Implications of interdependence for the future force
12. Future force vulnerabilities to technology failures
13. Managing sensitive and classified information in an information-pervasive world
14. Inter- and intra-theater mobility
15. Transforming logistical support for U.S. Army, allies and coalition partners
16. Transforming OSD, the Joint Staff, and the service staffs
17. Transforming the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve
18. The modular force at operational and strategic levels: end-strength implications
19. Modular force performance within existing and/or emerging joint doctrine
20. Heavy, medium, and light elements in future forces, both AC and RC
21. Savings and costs of the Future Force, both AC and RC
22. Transformation in light of OIF and other ongoing operations
23. The risk of technology maturation versus stable investment strategies
24. Resource conflicts between operational and institutional transformation
25. Advantages and disadvantages of transforming toward lean efficiency
1. National Security Strategy (NSS), Defense Strategy (DS), National Military Strategy (NMS), Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG), Unified Command Plan (UCP), and Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG):
   a. Assessing the NSS, DS, NMS, SPG, UCP, and CPG
   b. Alternatives to the NSS, DS, NMS, SPG, UCP, and CPG
   c. U.S. national security strategy and projected demands for energy
   d. Determining acceptable strategic risk

2. Deterrence and the War on Terrorism

3. Nonproliferation and counterproliferation in a globalized world

4. Integrating military and nonmilitary tools in coercive diplomacy

5. Implications of U.S. missile defense for allies and potential adversaries

6. Interagency cooperation in conflict prevention and resolution

7. Implications of preemptive and preventive war doctrines

8. Implications of long-term post-conflict stability and support operations

9. Implications of long-term peacekeeping and nation-building activities

10. Implications of long-term security assistance efforts

11. Alternatives to the current spectrum of conflict model
LANDPOWER EMPLOYMENT

POC: LTC Raymond Millen (717) 245-4086
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1. The Army and irregular challenges
2. Strategic and operational requirements for defeating insurgencies
3. Strategic and operational requirements for operations in complex terrain
4. Impact of information superiority in combat and non-combat operations
5. Increasing the synergy of conventional and special operations
6. Transitioning from combat to security operations and stability operations
7. Army roles in stabilization, reconstruction, and humanitarian operations:
   a. Information and intelligence sharing between military and international community
   b. Integrating military and civilian logistics
   c. Definitions and policies for establishing a “safe and secure” environment
8. Improving joint, combined, interagency, NGO and IGO cooperation in humanitarian operations
9. Implications of the emerging concept of Intelligence Overwatch
10. Intelligence sharing in coalition operations
11. The role of land forces in Global Strike
LANDPOWER GENERATION AND SUSTAINMENT

POC: Dr. Dallas Owens (717) 245-4075
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1. Requirements and legal bases for military and interagency mobilization
2. Effectiveness of the War Reserve Materiel Program
3. Force protection requirements in power projection and force employment
4. Globalization and reductions in the military-industrial base
5. Strategic implications of implementing base closures
6. Overcoming anti-access and area-denial strategies
7. Operating in areas with primitive and austere infrastructures
8. Power projection, prepositioning, and forward stationing tradeoffs
9. Planning for protracted conflicts
10. Logistics for dispersed/distributed combat operations
11. Expanded roles of civilians in forward areas of the battlefield
12. Analysis of “Navy-like” task force deployment cycles
13. Transforming reserve components through rebalancing and legislation
14. The Army role in seabasing as a logistical and operational concept
15. Sustaining a modular capabilities-based Army
16. Contractor impact on Total Army Analysis
17. Establishing a single Army logistics enterprise
18. Managing Joint commodities
19. Incorporating LOGCAP and other augmentation agreements into DoD and DoS strategies
FORCE MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP

POC: Dr. Leonard Wong (717) 245-3010
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1. Retention and readiness of active and reserve forces
2. Forces and doctrine for expeditionary operations
3. Forces and doctrine for security cooperation, assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence
4. Developing soldiers and leaders for the future force
5. Implications/effects of increased emphasis on the warrior culture
6. Changing the continuum of service
7. Assessing the gap between civilian and military cultures
8. The U.S. military and American society:
   a. Demographics: who is in it, and who fights?
   b. Civilian control over the military in the 21st century
9. Identifying, managing, and sustaining intellectual and technological talent
10. The status of the Army as a profession
11. Sustaining public support for the U.S. armed forces
12. How the Army develops and responds to “lessons learned”
13. Obtaining Joint synergy despite different service cultures
14. Establishing and maintaining a culture of innovation
15. Implications of adopting commercial best business practices for the military
16. Managing changes in temporary end strength
17. The All-Volunteer Force during war
18. Implications of DoD reorganization initiatives and military reform
19. Managing deployed civilians and contractors
20. Managing non-deployable soldiers
21. Strategic purpose and effectiveness of the Individual Ready Reserve
22. Efficiency and effectiveness of the ROTC program
23. Evolution of the military decisionmaking process

24. Determining a steady-state force structure and requisite surge capacity for the War on Terrorism
WAR AND SOCIETY

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1. American Society:
   a. Individual civil rights vs. national security requirements
   b. America’s role and mission in the world
   c. Strategic implications of America’s perception of other nations
   d. The purpose of war: historical interpretation and debate
   e. The U.S. media and political and social mobilization

2. International Society:
   a. Rethinking the “Clash of Cultures” debate
   b. Strategic implications of the “unipolar” moment
   c. Anti-Americanism and U.S. foreign policy
   d. International views of the United States
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EXPANDED TOPIC LIST

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Mr. David G. White HRC, whitedg@hqda.army.mil

1. What are the lessons learned for deploying units in regard to Personnel Service Support (PSS) changes? (LTC Wark)

2. Identify the changes and efficacy of Army bonuses and incentive programs in maintaining all volunteer force during wartime. How do current enlistment retention bonuses stack up historically with previous wars? What do results of such study imply on initiatives to grow Army end strength by 20-30K? (LTC McSherry)

3. Has “Army of One” campaign delivered in terms of increased enlistments? What is the return on investment for Army sponsorship initiatives such as NASCAR or bull riding? Have such programs been more or less successful than similar private sector initiatives? (LTC McSherry)

4. Review the effectiveness of the Deployment Cycle Support (DCS) process within the Reserve Components. Of particular interest is the reconstitution phase of DCS and the availability of resources to meet the needs of Soldiers and their families. (COL Musser)

5. Well-Being Revisited. A little over 5 years ago the decades old Quality of Life concept changed to Army Well-Being. This expanded and compartmentalized the “taking care of our people mindset” into personal goals of to serve, to live, to connect and to grow and a functional framework that is measurable and can be strategically planned. Well-Being is now 5 years mature and requires a relook to understand where we are today, where we are going for tomorrow and how to operationalize this concept at the service point of delivery level across all components. Topics such as the following are worthy of intense study: (Mr. White)
a. HQDA’s Well-Being’s Strategic Plan and Performance Plan Objectives - assessment
b. Well-Being’s role in a modularized Army; Strategic planning during the process of change; and Operational Well-Being at the installation level
c. Assess the effectiveness of the Well-Being Strategic Communications Plan
d. Well-Being’s place (where it belongs) in the PPBE process.

6. What opportunities and efficiencies are associated with prior military utilization (PMU) as a separate manpower category within DoD? (Mr. Shaw)

7. What incentives should be offered to improve retention? Should those incentives differ depending on rank? (COL Fraser)

8. What would be comparable benefits, entitlements, and accountability for deployed civilians and contractors? (Mr. Caloia)

9. What legislative, policy, and management changes must be made to reduce the number of Soldiers who are permanently nondeployable and to minimize the impact that nondeployable (permanently or temporarily) Soldiers have on unit readiness? (COL Fraser)

10. The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) made several recommendations concerning the development of the officer corps. For the development of junior officers, company command is an important experience. How should a company be defined (for this purpose)? How will the limited number of positions affect the cohort? What other experiences can be substituted for company command? Is there a better strategy? (COL Patterson)

11. Evaluate the success of current and past AC/RC integration efforts. Cover training, personnel policies, and execution outcome in operational performance (perceptions vs. realities), using measurable results if available, across the Services in the past 15 years. Start with the USCG/R, which has the most integration history and studies on record, and expand the study to the Army at several levels of application, either by intent or by necessity (e.g., MACOMs independent of DA, USASOC, in Theater, and at HQDA). Provide recommendations on the value of the integration concept to the Expeditionary Force, which purports that the RC is complementary, not supplementary, to the active duty force. (COL Fraser)

12. Assess reenlistment management (i.e, mission allocation, retention structure, SRB budget, etc.). (COL Frasier)

13. Assess ROTC program (i.e., scholarship award process, PMS management, school selection, curriculum, etc.). (COL Patterson)
14. Evaluate how current and future force Soldiers could leverage DIMHRS and Army eHRS to provide improved delivery of essential personnel services support (PSS) in war. Consider the ABCS (Army Battle Command Systems) architecture in a multicomponent and Joint expeditionary environment. Determine what the architecture should be and how DIMHRS/Army eHRs will interface with other key automated systems in the future. Assess the wartime requirements challenges for the personnel community, focusing on casualty reporting, strength accounting, theater accounting, and replacement operations. (Mr. Carroll)

15. What are the characteristics of organizations where pay for performance concepts have worked over time? Right now, pay for performance seems to work well in lab demonstration projects. What does the literature say about implementing such a system in a broad, heterogeneous environment like the total civilian Army? What kinds of interventions are called for and when should they take place in order to create an environment that fosters cooperation and trust, even within a concept that, on surface, seems to reward competition within groups. (Ms. Wainright)

16. Identify and discuss how wireless technologies should be adapted within the Department of the Army. (Ms. Wainright)

17. With appropriations (tax dollars) shrinking for use in the military, how will funding shortages affect those morale, welfare and recreation service facilities provided in support of Soldiers and their families? (Ms. Wainright)
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2

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1. Global War on Terrorism:
   a. U.S. long-term economic ability to prosecute the War on Terror—what needs to be done?
   b. Strengthening indigenous paramilitary and police forces for the War on Terror—whose responsibility, size of the problem?
   c. Integration of combat information in War on Terror tactical operations—is it working?
   d. Maximizing DoD intelligence and counter-terrorism integration in the War on Terrorism
   e. Measuring U.S. civilian support for the War on Terror, and what influences it.

2. Homeland Security:
   a. Policy, regulations, doctrine, and executive orders which affect intelligence operations in the U.S. conducted by U.S. intelligence organizations
   b. The growing influence of al Qaeda in Central and South America and its looming impact on our homeland

3. Regional Strategic Issues:
   a. Examine the continued manipulation of currency through 2015, while increasing exports to countries in Latin America, S/E and S/W Asia
   b. Examine technology and fuel alternatives to reduce western reliance on fossil fuels while the modernization of countries in S/E and S/W Asia increases requirements
   c. Examine China as a power projection state with the capability of achieving greater influence in S/E and S/W Asia allowing for greater economic flexibility and the capability through political (agreements concerned with nuclear arms and the exchange of technology) and economic (technology after the annexation of Taiwan) ties to impact oil production and pricing
   d. Examine the implications of U.S. technology and telecommunications expansion in S/W Asia and opportunities to enhance regional security
   e. Examine the adequacy of intelligence focus on Latin America
   f. Examine potential strategic responses to Chinese military action against Taiwan

4. Military Change:
   a. Optimizing military linguists
   b. Integrating civilian linguists into military operations
   c. New national intelligence architecture and DoD intelligence efforts
   d. Leveraging strategic intelligence capabilities to support tactical operations
   e. Redefining the tactical, operational and strategic intelligence continuum
f. Networked robotics employed within urban and complex terrain environments to conduct reconnaissance surveillance, breach obstacles and defeat point targets

g. The development, integration and employment of technology in support of deception operations to counter access and deny entry of joint/combined forces

   a. Implications of Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004 for Army intelligence activities
   b. Changing roles and relationships caused by creation of the Director, National Intelligence and Office of the DNI

6. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
   a. Exhaustion of low density, high demand linguists due to continuous, prolonged deployment and redeployment
   b. How should we select, train, and develop interrogators, and maintain discipline in interrogation organizations?
   c. Leadership and structure in a future conscripted U.S. Army—what would we do differently?
1. Global War on Terrorism:
   a. Historical analysis of periods of increased terrorist activity by RCC
   b. How does combating the tactic of terrorism affect our national strategy?
   c. What new international relationships are required for global security?
   d. Implications of GWOT for U.S. / EU relations
   e. Implications of NATO expansion for U.S. grand strategy for GWOT
   f. What are the linkages between intelligence and policy?
   g. How will the democratization of central Asian countries impact GWOT?

2. Homeland Security:
   a. Implications of missile defense for building partnerships and avoiding MCOs
   b. How can the Army assist in training first responders?
   c. Homeland Security and Defense within Posse Comitatus

3. Regional Security Issues:
   a. North Africa/Middle East:
      i. Collapsed or hostile state in Maghreb or Levant
      ii. Analysis of Algerian experience versus Islamic terrorists and implications for GWOT
   b. Asia-Pacific: Future of ASEAN and U.S. strategic posture in region
   c. Sub-Saharan Africa:
      i. Africa as a financing geographical source for terrorist organizations (diamonds, ungoverned territory etc.)
      ii. Analysis of failed or failing states and potential for terrorist operations from ungoverned spaces
      iii. Long-term implications of the spread of AIDS
      iv. Nigerian collapse; ability to form a regional cooperative security arrangement and development towards the future
   d. Europe: implications of OIF for European cooperation in GWOT
   e. Southwest Asia: implications of failed Pakistani state and long-term peacekeeping mission on the border with India
   f. Central Asia: implications of energy development in Caucasus and Caspian
   g. Latin America: implications of narco-funded terrorism and narco-terrorism as well as Far East expansion on hemispheric stability
   h. Regional Security Cooperation: developing threats from demo-graphic or environmental issues (e.g., logging, water, etc.)

4. Military Change:
   a. Future force and stability operations
   b. Use of transformed military in Low Intensity Conflict
c. AC/RC mix to enhance interagency and multicultural capabilities

   a. Should counter-proliferation be changed to combating WMD and given a higher priority?
   b. Updating TAP and TAA processes to better align with new PPBS process
1. Global War on Terrorism:
   a. What are the implications of the Global War on Terrorism on logistics/sustainment strategy for the U.S. Army and the Joint Force?
   b. What are the issues related to coalition support (reliance and dependence) for the Joint Force? What are the logistics implications of a coalition force?
   c. What are the issues related to logistics support for special operations forces in their global commitment to the GWOT?

2. Homeland Security:
   a. What should be our concept of logistics/sustainment support in defense of the homeland? What are the implications regarding the integration of local, state, federal, and commercial logistics capabilities?
   b. What is NORTHCOM’s relationship to Army logistics capabilities, and what is the concept to ensure effective command and control of logistics/sustainment operations?

3. Regional Security Issues:
   a. Integrating Army logistics concepts with focused logistics
   b. How can we leverage commercial capabilities already in place across the globe to facilitate logistics/sustainment support for regional operations?
   c. Are there opportunities to develop regional sustainment platforms that can support the joint force? What are the implications for Service logistics and Title X responsibilities?

4. Military Change:
   a. How can we best leverage emerging technologies/capabilities to enhance the capability of the joint sustainment process?
   b. What does “modularity” mean to Army logisticians?

5. NSS/NMS:
   a. What are the sustainment implications of long-term commitments to SRO, PKO, and GWOT?
   b. How can the joint force leverage the concept of a sea base, and enable a more globally flexible sustainment capability?

6. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
   a. What are the sustainment implications of the simultaneous deployment and employment of the joint force?
   b. Examine the Army logistics enterprise, its role in LANDWARNET, and the challenges to its implementation
   c. Implications for sustainment in the current operational environment
d. Commander’s intent—distribution planning and executing—developing unity of effort

7. Force Management and Leadership:
   a. How can we know what it really costs to sustain a specific force in an operational environment? How can we know the resource requirements in near-real-time as force structure and operational needs change?
   b. What are the force management and leadership implications of the expanding use of contractors?
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6

POC: Mr. Evan Kohn (703) 602-0235
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1. The impact on our military and our nation caused by the pervasiveness of information as we fight the GWOT
2. A re-look at the military’s handling of sensitive and classified information in an information pervasive, digital world
3. The impact of our adversaries’ use of the same commercial technologies our military is using
4. The information explosion and its concurrent effect on our world
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8

POC: LTC Steve Edge (703) 693-1046
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1. Should we reconsider/redefine the roles of the Active Army and Reserve Component forces within the overall context of our national strategy?

2. How do we determine an Army investment strategy that is most likely to succeed in a competitive market across the Services and on Capitol Hill?

3. How do we manage portfolios of capability across DOTML-PF as we transition from current to future force?
1. Global War on Terrorism: Assess which (singular or multiple) centers of gravity the GWOT effort should focus on to deter and/or defeat terrorism: leadership, ideology, safe havens, finances, communications, logistics, support (facilitation) networks

2. Homeland Defense:
   a. Define intelligence, first response, protection, and reconstitution requirements
   b. Examine obstacles to full information sharing among intelligence agencies, law enforcement at all levels, and other federal, state, and local officials. Examine current status of policies, laws, and statutes that either inhibit or promote information sharing, plus cultural and technology obstacles

3. Regional Strategic Issues:
   a. Regional responses (North Africa/Middle East, Asia-Pacific, Europe, Southwest Asia, and Central Asia) to the changing U.S. global defense posture, especially our changing integrated basing and presence policy
   b. Modernization and interoperability in Latin American armies
   c. Instability generated by politically and economically disenfranchised indigenous populations in Latin America
   d. Ability of Latin American armies with large indigenous enlisted ranks to cope with instability
   e. Decline or disestablishment of Latin American armies due to economic drivers and absence of traditional threats

4. Military Change: Is intelligence planning at the national level—lessons learned and current evolution of planning doctrine—moving toward an integral process supporting COMPOCAM and CJTF campaign plans?

5. National Security Strategy: National level intelligence operations—conduct a review of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), the NSS, and COMCAM OPLANs to determine if a national intelligence organization should be formed to perform tasks similar to the ISG.

6. Force Management and Leadership: Army intelligence force management system—no comprehensive manpower/force management system exists for Army intelligence, creating problems for Reserve and National Guard units, for training proficiency, and for MOS skill matches to requirements.
1. Global War on Terrorism:
   a. Review efficacy of Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism (CIST)
   b. Examine best practices for handling and interrogating belligerents
   c. Assess DoD strategic communication in GWOT
   d. Strategic threat implications of Iraq “bleedout” from GWOT

2. Homeland Defense:
   a. Assess implications of DoD intelligence activities in homeland security
   b. Assess US ability to respond to an overseas crisis after an attack on the homeland
   c. Assess HLD and CS strategies and implications on Reserve Component

3. Regional Strategic Issues:
   a. Implications of regime change in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan
   b. Assess possibility of an Israel-Syria conflict over re-entry into Lebanon
   c. Implications of an India-Pakistan nuclear conflict

4. Military Change:
   a. Assess strategic implications of asymmetric warfare
   b. Transforming DoD intelligence to meet military needs in GWOT: Requirements and Implications
   c. Assess impact of Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 initiatives on combatant command planning and operations
   d. Assess military implications of a joint medical command
   e. Determine proper role of US military during Phase IV operations
   f. Defining proper role of contractors on the battlefield
   g. Assess Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) core elements and enablers
   h. Assess joint competencies required of future joint force commanders

   a. National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terror
   b. NMS for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
   c. Joint Strategic Planning System

6. Force Management and Leadership: Establishing a joint engineer enterprise
1. By what metrics should progress in the War on Terrorism be measured?
2. What policies and actions does the U.S. Government need to establish and support in order to shape conditions for regional security?
3. When regional security fails, what are the policies and actions the U.S. Government needs to establish (process and procedures) to achieve rapid building and sustaining of coalitions?
4. What should be the long-term strategy for Iraq?
5. What should be the long-term strategy for North Korea?
6. What should be the long-term strategy for India/Pakistan?
7. Would an interagency “Goldwater-Nichols-type” initiative enhance integration of all U.S. Government elements of power? What would such a program or process look like?
8. How can we better focus U.S. Government long-term security assistance efforts? Currently there is no coherent focused methodology for coordinating security assistance efforts and resources across the interagency arena based on U.S. Government priorities.
9. What should long-term U.S.-Russia strategic relations look like?
10. What should long-term U.S.-European Union relations look like?
United States Central Command

POC: LtCol David A. Dawson (813) 827-4389
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1. Global Strategy for the War on Terrorism:
   a. The role of the nation-state in the GWOT
   b. Balancing democratic reform and internal security: Short and long term implications for the War on Terror. Transition to democracy is a fragile and often unstable period—what level of instability is expected and/or tolerable when transitioning from an autocratic regime to a democratic form of government? General and specific [individual nation-state] case studies
   c. Implications of expanding GWOT to state-sponsored terror groups: Iran and the Lebanese Hizballah
   d. The role of the war of ideas in the GWOT
   e. Perception management and worldwide perceptions of U.S. power and actions
   f. Lessons from the “War on Drugs” that apply to the GWOT
   g. Evaluation of U.S. SOCOM’s role in the GWOT

2. Evolving Regional Security Arrangements:
   a. Musharraf’s Enlightened Moderation—Is it the new National Security Strategy for Pakistan? Arguably, all major policy priorities are related to Musharraf’s vision of Enlightened Moderation (economy, education, political reform, economic development, Western Influence, federalization of tribal areas in NWFP and Baluchistan). Is EM more than just a path to moderate Islam for Musharraf?
   b. The strategy and future role of the PRC in Central and SW Asia
   c. The strategy and future role of India in Central and SW Asia
   d. Analysis of the interrelationships of the logistic train for narcotics trafficking, WMD, weapons, and people trafficking
   e. Developing a democracy in the Middle East in the 21st century: What roles should the military play?
   f. Viability and implications of an OSCE-like organization/process for the Gulf Region (to include Iran and Iraq)
   g. Given limited U.S. resources, is a “pivotal states” strategy for the AOR feasible and acceptable?
   h. Plans, programs, and policies to help Pakistan, KSA, and Egypt help themselves: Military, Economic, Political
   i. Nuclear Iran
      i. Ways to deter going nuclear
      ii. What is Iranian strategy following the achievement of nuclear capability to do if/when Iran does go nuclear?
      iii. How do Iran’s neighbors react in terms of capabilities?
iv. Strategy for deterring Iran following its achievement of nuclear capability.

3. National Security Strategy:
   a. Interagency strategy for transnational insurgency
   b. Improving the planning and execution of national strategy for the GWOT: Structure and Process
   c. An update of the National Security Act of 1947 and Goldwater-Nichols
   d. Operationalizing the interagency process—converting policy decisions to interagency operations:
      i. Role of the Joint Staff and roll of the Combatant Command staff in interagency integration and planning
      ii. Integration of DOS support into military operations (planning phase and operational Phase)

4. Landpower Employment: Evaluation and recommendations for individual and collective cultural awareness training in support of COIN/stability mission deployments:
   a. Precommissioning, esp. language requirements and major/minor fields (area studies, history, international relations)
   b. PME (esp. ILE, SSC, JPME)
   c. NCOES
   d. Pre-deployment collective training
   e. Feasibility/desirability of establishing advisor training similar to that used for personnel assigned to advisory duty in the RVN
1. Global War on Terrorism:
   a. Security, economic, and political implications of continued Islamic support to radical fundamentalist Islamic factions?
   b. Which Islamic factions world-wide will emerge to challenge existing governments, both democratic and authoritarian?
   c. Which adversaries will likely form alliances and coalitions to oppose U.S. interests?

2. Homeland Security:
   a. What are the WMD/WME military capabilities of potential adversaries? How will they get access to and develop these capabilities?
   b. Will potential adversaries continue investing in chemical and/or biological agents with the potential to be used as WMD/WME?

3. Regional Strategic Issues:
   a. Can/will the global economy sustain sufficient production of food?
   b. Will the global economy produce sufficient energy to sustain global growth?
   c. Will global competition for scarce resources be able to balance requirements with environmental concerns?
   d. Will globalization serve to mitigate current inequities or emphasize the existing imbalance in regard to human rights—poverty?
   e. Will globalization and continued growth of multinational corporations have a negative or positive impact on the U.S. economy?
   f. What economic models predict the future state of the global economy?
   g. What are the strategic implications of the emergence of an adversarial, bi-polar global security environment?
   h. What are the strategic implications of the emergence of a technologically equal/superior competitor with sufficient economic power and political stability to leverage this technology into a military advantage?
   i. What are the governance/political trends—global, regional, and domestic—driving the future Joint Operational Environment?
   j. Will continued economic growth lead to a more balanced distribution of resources or will it exasperate the existing disparity between developed, developing, and under-developed nations?
   k. What are the social/cultural trends—global, regional, and domestic—driving the future Joint Operational Environment?
   l. Which nations will transition to an autocratic form of governance?
   m. What are the strategic implications of the United States maintaining relative dominance/parity within the international economic community?
   n. Will existing and/or emerging nations be likely to move toward a more democratic form of governance?
o. What demographic trends—global, regional, and domestic—will drive the future Joint Operational Environment?
   i. Will the global birth rate decline? Stay stable? Increase?
   ii. What patterns of migration will continue? What new patterns will emerge?
   iii. Which regions are most likely to suffer from overpopulation?
   iv. Which regions have the potential to control their population growth and subsequently sustain economic development?
   v. What impact will unbridled population growth have on world health in regard to famine, plague, disease, etc.?

4. Military Change:
   a. What theories explain current phenomena and are useful for prediction of warfare in the future and far future?
   b. What is the role of land power in the far future?
   c. What are the strategic implications of a scientific/technological breakthrough enabling inexpensive access to space by a range of actors to include potential adversaries? (Will this capability play a significant role in U.S. ability to execute future concepts).
   d. What is the potential for the following “wild cards” to generate alternative future environment outcomes?
      i. Appearance of a “spoiler” state or group intent on perpetuating a state’s instability for its own sake?
      ii. Significant decline of the U.S. economy which precludes economic growth and continued military modernization?
      iii. Proliferation of nuclear weapons and/or technology which enables production of nuclear weapons?
      iv. Appearance of a rogue, irrational actor with a capability to cause catastrophic damage and/or casualties?
   e. How has industry adapted to the requirement to produce networked systems for off-the-shelf purchase?
   f. If new airlift capabilities are not fielded, to what degree does operational maneuver by air remain a viable FF concept?
   g. What are the requisite operational maneuver ranges for UAs?
   h. How does the Future Force collaboratively plan, prepare, execute and assess sustainment operations with coalition partners?
   i. Do Future Force organizational designs facilitate capability packages useful to the JFC?

   a. Will a state and/or non-state factions have the potential to emerge as a peer or near-peer? Economic?
   b. Will regional actors—state and/or non-state—develop an ability to challenge U.S. military dominance?
   c. What are the impacts of national ROE, policies and law (intelligent munitions, etc)?
   d. What are the strategic impacts of discovering an abundant alternative energy supply?
e. How does the Future Force adapt to employ diverse levels of warfighting capabilities within a coalition?

f. How does the Future Force collaboratively plan with coalition partners, from beginning of conflict through termination, using compatible C4I architectures and networks for expanded information sharing?

g. What organization (LNOs, etc.) enables effective command and support relationships for coalition operations?

6. Landpower Employment:
   a. How do we effectively define IS in the emerging Contemporary Operating Environment? How should IS be measured?
   b. What are the major challenges to the achievement of IS by the FF (within the joint context)?
   c. Will future adversaries have access to information era capabilities and systems?
   d. How does the FF participate in/contribute to the joint IO campaign to shape the battlespace?
   e. What concepts and capabilities can counteract an adversary who has WMD and a strategy of protracted, asymmetric operations employing all forms of unconventional and irregular warfare?
   f. What asymmetric capabilities can be employed to challenge U.S. conventional dominance?
   g. Will future adversaries will be more capable and adaptive than current adversaries?
   h. Will future adversaries employ a mix of strategies, to include asymmetric strategies, to defeat or deter the United States?
   i. Will the future counterinsurgency environment be fundamentally different (is old doctrine likely to be adequate?)
   j. What are the imperatives of 21st century urban operations?
   k. At the operational level of war, how will the Army’s Future Force complement and reinforce the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to fight in an urban battlespace?
   l. What JISR capabilities are required to support IPB, fires, and situational awareness in complex and urban terrain?
   m. How does the military conduct offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations in the far future?
   n. What ISR and offensive capabilities are required by the FF to extend its ability to shape the battlespace at operational distances?
   o. To what distances can the FF project, C2, and support forces by ground, air, and sea in operational maneuver? Assuming new lift capabilities like SSTOL, HLVTOL, and TSV?

7. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
   a. How does the FF participate in/contribute to the joint force protection umbrella?
   b. What unique force protection capabilities are required to conduct seaborning operations?
c. In a distributed operation environment, what unique protection capabilities are required for support and sustainment forces, systems, and associated LOCs?

d. What industrial capacity is required to produce and sustain the capabilities/technologies necessary for large-scale campaigns?

e. What impacts do base closures, restationing actions, and modularity have on CONUS-based forces?

f. Does the timing of restationing of forces from Europe conflict with base realignment and closure timelines?

g. As resources decline, how do we prioritize competing requirements for limited facilities and ranges?

h. What anti-access capabilities will challenge U.S. ability to operate in areas of interest?

i. How can the Future Joint Force conduct capability-based projection and employment?

j. How can the Joint Force Projection and Sustainment system identify trade-offs between services’ force packages in terms of capabilities required by the JFC?

k. What are the trade-offs of the following on FF sustainment: Joint seabasing? Joint theater logistics command? Vertical, intra-theater lift? Army regional flotillas?

l. How are FF sustainment operations conducted across non-contiguous LOCs?

m. What capabilities are required at forts/installations to support OMFSD?

n. What are the logistic command and control concepts and capabilities necessary to support simultaneous, distributed operations from strategic distances and the capability to deliver and sustain combat power at multiple entry points?

o. How can the distribution-based sustainment concept support a hybrid force?

p. To what degree does the UE augment subordinate UAs with sustainment capabilities?

q. How can the FF be adequately sustained with a reduced in-theater log structure and increased reliance on logistical reach-back?

r. How is strategic sustainment blended with campaign execution to support the FF directly in forward operating areas?

s. What are the relative contributions of the Sea-basing, Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB), Air Assault Brigade Combat Team-Afloat (AABCTA) and Army Regional Flotillas (ARF) concepts when employed as part of a joint force and when used with USMC MEU or MEB?

t. How will joint seabasing enhance strategic responsiveness?

8. Force Management and Leadership:

a. How can we develop more adaptive leaders?

b. What is the feasibility of incorporating “social intelligence” into Soldier and leader development and education?
c. How do we ensure competent leader development for the Future Force (Train the Force)?
d. How do we develop leaders ready to deal with the complexity of the Contemporary Operating Environment, threats, interagency implications?
e. Should the FF shift the focus in leader development from military expertise to cultural competency, inductive/deductive skills, human behavior and cultural anthropology?
f. How do we develop “cultural competency? (BCT through PME level training)
g. What are the impacts of pursuing a cognitive (cultural) rather than a technological approach to intelligence.
h. How do we identify certain individuals who have innate skills at cognition, problemsolving, and rapid decisionmaking under conditions of uncertainty, ambiguity, complexity, and stress? How do we reinforce these skills?
i. What is the impact of culture on decisionmaking?

9. War and Society:
a. What are the strategic missions that the military forces will be expected to accomplish in the future? Near? Mid? Far?
b. Are any other religions or religious factions likely to adapt a violent, fundamentalist approach toward evangelism?
c. Will adversary governments continue to portray the United States as the source of all evil and misery in the world?

10. Science and Technology:
a. Robotics that protect or reduce vulnerability?
b. What are S&T enablers for the FF?
c. What are the scientific trends—global, regional, and domestic—driving the Future Joint Operational Environment?
d. Which ongoing scientific efforts would, if successful, fundamentally alter the global environment?
e. What ongoing efforts have the potential to reduce the global dependence on fossil fuels?
f. What are the major technology trends driving the far future operational environment?
g. What emerging technologies will have military utility in the far future?
h. What military significant technologies are being developed by other nations?
i. Does the emerging science of complexity (nonlinearity, sensitivity to initial conditions, fractal/chaotic processes and probabilistic analyses) offer relevant ideas for military theory and operational concepts?
j. Will potential adversary states and other groups continue investigating directed energy technology or have access to such technologies? Are any attempting to weaponize DE capabilities?

2. Homeland Security: Counterproliferation of WMD: When is preemption appropriate? (J57)

3. Regional Strategic Issues:
   a. Asia-Pacific:
      i. Reversing rising anti-Americanism: From exporting fears and anger toward a vision of hope and opportunity (Rosenberger)
      ii. Transforming Army C2 in the Pacific: Reexamining the roles and missions of 8th U.S.A, U.S.ARPAC/UEy, and I Corps/Uex (J53)
      iii. China’s expanding influence in Asia: Conflict with U.S. strategic aims? (J51)
      v. Strategic options in South Korea: Permanent presence or redeployment? (J51)
      vi. Biological warfare countermeasures: The race is on in the Asia-Pacific (J57)
      vii. Homeland Defense in the Asia-Pacific: The tyranny of distance (J57)
      viii. China’s rising appetite for energy: Collision in sight? (Rosenberger)
      ix. The rise of Asian democracies: Are they permanent? (Rosenberger)
      x. The Malacca Straight: Funnel for disaster? (J52)
      xi. Assessing Theater Security Cooperation (LTC McGuire)
      xii. China’s economic rise: Implications for Southeast Asian businesses? (Rosenberger)
      xiii. Rising Chinese military superiority over Taiwan: Strategies to close the gap (J54)
      xiv. Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI): Toward private sector involvement and ownership (Rosenberger)
xv. Nuclear and Non-nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP): Potential impacts on theater operations (J57)

b. Southeast Asia:
   i. Nepal’s counterinsurgency: Formulating a holistic U.S. strategy (J52)
   ii. SE Asia multilateral cooperation: The future of the ASEAN regional forum (J52)
   iii. Improve U.S.-Philippines counterterrorism strategy given constitutional realities (J52)

c. Southwest Asia: Improving India-Pakistan relations—Can we improve the process? (J52)

4. Military Change:
   a. Transforming the Army in Korea: Building a force for rapid regional and global employment (J53)
   b. Methodology for disaggregating OPLANs into critical effects (J54 & J55)
   c. Unique and complementary utility of operational and functional taxonomies in capabilities-based planning (J55)
   d. Transforming the nature and extent of U.S. Marine Corps presence in Japan (J53)
1. Global War on Terrorism: How are unintended, unanticipated consequences impacting its prosecution?

2. Homeland Security:
   a. How will Homeland Security requirements be integrated into the overall Global Force Management (GFM) process?
   b. Should a national para-military force be established for Homeland Security missions?

3. Regional Strategic Issues:
   a. Partnering with allies and friends to address growing Islamic fundamentalism in predominately Muslim nations in the Asia-Pacific theater.
   b. Overcoming the Vietnam War-American War of Aggression legacy and forging mutual bonds of trust and cooperation through military-to-military cooperation.
   c. U.S.-Indonesia strategic reappraisal is overdue—are mutual interests and democratic goals in conflict?
   d. U.S.-China relationship after peaceful resolution of Taiwan issue—superpower rivalry, status quo, or something else?

   a. Is the current proliferation of strategies, enabled by modern technology and communications, counterproductive?
   b. Should there be a National Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism?

5. Landpower Generation and Sustainment: Does reliance upon overseas Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) and forward operating sites constitute a vulnerability?

1. How has the erosion in Latin American democracy over the past decade undermined U.S. security interests in the region? To what extent does the anti-American message of Hugo Chavez of Venezuela resonate in the region? Does President Lula da Silva of Brazil offer a middle way?

2. Examine the politics of oil and gas pipelines in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and western China.

3. Chart the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Latin America and understand the factors underlying its growth.

4. Examine the problem of human security as an obstacle to building sound states and promoting democratization. Focus on water shortages; demographic bulges; human trafficking; prostitution; food shortages; deforestation; geographic focus on Africa and Asia.

5. Explore the politics of oil in Africa. What threatens the free flow of African oil to the United States?

6. Understand the social, political, economic, and cultural obstacles to democratization in countries that may be targets for “regime change” in the future (Iran, etc.) Develop requirement for building democracy in those states, and identity sources of domestic support.

7. Examine the prospects for successful democratization in countries that have recently experienced self-generated (internal) “regime change”: Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia.

8. How will Russia respond to these “regime changes” in what it sees as its sphere of interest? Develop metrics to measure how committed Russia is to the U.S.-led GWOT.

9. How durable is the deescalation of tension between India and Pakistan? To what extent can Pakistan alter the “image of the enemy” applied to India in Pakistan schools, particularly its madrassas and public schools. Precisely how important are the madrassas to fuelling Islamic radicalism in South Asia?

10. Explore the problem of human security and political stability in Indonesia.

2. Realizing the Potential of Network Centric Warfare:
   a. Evaluating new information assurance requirements in a net-centric army or analyzing effects of a transforming army at war on information assurance.
   b. Strategic implications for combat service support operations given planned mix of FCS systems and current systems that will equip the UAs of the near future.
   c. Operational and cost benefit opportunities from leasing of Combat Support/Combat Service Support equipment to include: cost effectiveness, impact on national security/military operations, logistics management of leased equipment (safety implications, transportability implications, supportability considerations).
   d. Implementation of sense and respond logistics concepts integrated with AIT technology, demonstrating improved warfighter support from supply chain management, fault isolation, and maintenance technical data usage for logistics.
   e. Increasing and changing role of contractors in forward areas (interacting with military force).
   f. Strategic and logistical planning for increasing numbers of contractors who will accompany the military force.
   g. Maintaining Army industrial support (organic/private) for transformation.
   h. The role of the Army’s organic manufacturing base in transformation.

   a. The impact of raw material for Class V production
   b. Viability of a CONUS ground-centric sustainment/support structure
   c. Risk of offshore production of tires, electronics, ball bearings, etc.
   d. LOGCAP/other augmentation agreements as a part of DoS and DoD strategies.

4. Landpower Employment:
   a. LOGCAP and other similar instruments in stabilization and reconstruction operations.
   b. Sustaining a modular capabilities-based Army
   c. Joint applicability of Army weapon systems
5. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
   a. APS as a force multiplier, and implications of “sea-basing”
   b. Impact of all civilians (government and contractors) on the battlefield
   c. Implementing “sense and respond” logistics in an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) environment
   d. The role of the Army’s ground systems industrial base (organic/private) in supporting land power generation and sustainment
   e. Joint Theatre Logistics Management
   f. Development of a national level Global Logistics Command
   g. Establishment of a single Army Logistics Enterprise
   h. The Army planning, budgeting and funding schema for new systems in light of the extended contractual periods associated with performance based logistics
   i. Logistics operations in dispersed/distributed combat operations against predominantly insurgent forces
   j. Changing materiel requirements as operations transition from combat to stabilization to reconstruction/nation-building
   k. New requirements for the organic industrial base given the changing force structure and nature of conflict
   l. Implications for reliance on the commercial industrial base given changing force structure and nature of conflict
   m. Sustaining a modular capabilities-based Army
   n. Joint applicability of Army weapon systems
   o. Methods to reduce reliance on contractor support on the battlefield
   p. Implication of centralized/single fact to warfighter non-tactical maintenance
   q. Implication of central control of all Reset
   r. Requirements for, and implications of, an Army Log component of a Joint Logistics Command
   s. Desirability of single control of log systems from factory to foxhole—acquisition, fielding, maintenance, distribution, etc.
   t. Assess how the new active and reserve component force generation models will change the way the Army manages, maintains, and accounts for materiel. Consider both title 10 and title 32 requirements for the respective components
   u. The emerging growth of radio frequency identification technology and the required uses and security implications for DoD
   v. What are the role and impact of contractors on the battlefield?
   w. What are the role and impact of Nongovernmental Organizations on the battlefield?
   x. Will the Logistics Management Program (LMP) enhance supply chain management?
   y. Assess how to implement Base Reduction and Closure decisions while not impacting readiness
   z. Consider difficulties created within the pre-positioned stock program by how quickly the equipment needs of the Army change
aa. What is the military’s role in controlling environmental impact on the modern battlefield?

bb. Assess the implementation of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS)

c. Assess whether indemnification is still a good strategy for GOCOs when using performance based acquisition principles

d. Has the integration of Automated Identification Technology (AIT) into logistics tracking systems used for visibility and accountability of Class V, VII, and IX lived up to Army/DOD expectations during the most recent deployments into Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines? If not, what have been the shortcomings?

e. Transformation of the Army’s Requirements Process focusing on joint warfighter readiness

6. Global War on Terrorism: Overarching, integrated analysis of terrorism funding, including narcotics, terrorism, sale of diamonds, etc.

7. Military Change:
   a. Analysis of the issues associated with implementing the Army’s Data Strategy and products to improve NETOPS functionality
   b. Analysis of Multi-Level Security (MLS) issues for systems being developed for the Future Force
   c. Discussion of IPV6/IPV4 translation issues and implementation pilots/demos required
   d. Development of strategic options for providing an acceptable level of protection for information systems and networks using fewer resources. Problem is balancing the manpower, time and materiel costs of protecting U.S. information systems from enemy exploitation so we can provide an acceptable level of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for the information in U.S. operational and tactical systems and networks with the requirement to conserve scarce resources
   e. The impact of the growing requirements to use wireless technology to communicate on and off the battlefield

8. Force Management and Leadership:
   a. The Arming of Civilians—What are the implications from an international law perspective and what protections/safeguards exist for the individual?
   b. Deployment Incentives—What compensation should be provided to deploying DACs, including necessary legislative changes (i.e., tax exemptions, recruitment bonuses, increased life insurance, etc.). What can be done to encourage more civilians to deploy in the face of an aging workforce? What retention and recruitment incentives should be considered for emergency-essential personnel?
   c. Special Needs—What special needs exist for civilians and contractors who are deploying and/or on the battlefield. The CONUS Replacement
Center (CRC) does not have enough uniforms in unusual (larger) sizes to allow everyone to deploy in a timely manner.

d. Disciplinary and Performance Issues - How should disciplinary and performance issues be handled for deployed DACs. AR 690-700, Chapter 751, states that the on-site chain of command has the authority and the discretion to initiate appropriate administrative action against a civilian employee for misconduct or disciplinary issues. Generally speaking, the easiest course of action is to send the employee back to the home station, many times with no documentation of the infraction or problem. This often results in no action being taken because the home station does not have the information necessary to take the disciplinary or performance action.

e. Post-deployment issues—What physical/psychological services should be available to DACs and contractor employees for injuries suffered on the battlefield, including post traumatic stress syndrome, etc.
1. Homeland Security:
   a. Viability of a Civil Disclosure Officer, patterned on the Foreign Disclosure Officer, to manage communication of classified information to civil partners
   b. Standardizing Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) databases

2. Regional Strategic Issues:
   a. Strategic legacy of Osama Bin Laden on the Mediterranean Littoral
   b. Strategic legacy of Osama Bin Laden on the Asia-Pacific Region
   c. Strategic legacy of Osama Bin Laden in Sub-Saharan Africa

3. Landpower Employment:
   a. Exiting from security operations and stability operations
   b. The Army’s obligations as an occupation force

4. Landpower Generation and Sustainment: Planning to win the peace

5. Force Management and Leadership: The Army Force Generation program

6. War and Society: Foreign media and social mobilization
1. Global War on Terrorism:
   a. How should we train and integrate required joint skills and specialists to operate in detention facilities and debriefing centers? (G2)
   b. What is the right mix of linguists for the command language program? (G2 ISR)
   c. Are we winning the global war on terror: metrics to assess effectiveness? (G2 ISR)

2. Homeland Security:
   a. Overcoming obstacles to intelligence sharing for HLS: Assessing current initiatives and proposing a way ahead (G2 ISR).
   b. When, where, and how will terrorists strike the USA again? (G2 ISR)
   c. Homeland Defense and individual freedoms: conflict or compatible? (G4)
   d. Does the Army require new capabilities or structure to support NORTHCOM and the future ARNORTH? (CGSG)

3. Regional Strategic Issues: How do units develop regional intelligence acuity and continuity under the one year rotation proposed by the ARFORGEN? (G2 ISR)

4. Military Change:
   a. Should the UEy theater intelligence structure be tailored or standardized? (G2)
   b. How does ARFORGEN change the way the army must think about property and equipment sets?
   c. What are the best business practices for accountability, maintenance and management of these assets across the components? (G4)
   d. LOGCAP, are there better options? (G4)
   e. How should the Army meet requirements given affordability, CS/CSS structure and sustainment contract tradeoffs? (G8)
   f. How should the Army resource ARFORGEN requirements outside the PPBES system, specifically: infrastructure, manpower, support services and the war? (G8)
g. Is the Reserve Force relevant: rethinking the concept of citizen Soldiers (CGSC)
h. Mobilization and protracted conflict: What authorities and processes must be adapted to facilitate mobilization under the ARFORGEN? (CGSG)

a. Joint Force provider and ARFORGEN: Will joint interdependence improve? (G2 ISR)
b. Can the ARFORGEN model generate capabilities adequate to meet the demands of the emerging joint, interagency and multinational strategic environment? (CGSG)
c. Can ARFORGEN meet the requirements of 1-4-2-1 strategic metric? (CGSG)
d. Can future congressional budget supplementals be relied upon to fund transformation to the modular force while also prosecuting the war on terror? (CGSG)

6. Landpower Employment: Will the ARFORGEN produce forces relevant to the new UJTL and AUTL? (G2 ISR)

7. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
a. The intangible effects of ARFORGEN: How will transformation and unit life-cycle Manning within ARFORGEN impact family well-being and readiness? (G1)
b. CONUS to OCONUS deployment security: What vulnerabilities exist for personnel and cargo from POE to POD? (G3)
c. How effective is the Army Global Command and Control System as a strategic bridge to the Joint Command and Control System? (G3)
d. Challenges and solutions for sustaining Reserve Component readiness through the ARFORGEN Cycle (CGSC)
e. Joint Installations: Creating infrastructure for an Expeditionary Army (CGSG)
f. What are the new TRM model and readiness reporting system required to resource and monitor readiness of units under ARFORGEN? (CGSC)

8. Force Management and Leadership: Will the national security personnel system recruit and develop civilian strategic leaders and a workforce that enhances national security? (G8)

9. War and Society: How can intelligence be integrated with psychological operations to shape the population center of gravity in future COIN wars? (G2 ISR)
1. Priority 1 Questions:
   a. What is the threat posed to CONUS by the flow of special interest aliens (SIA) across the borders and what can USNORTHCOM do to counter the threat?
   b. What are the centers of gravity associated with HLS and HLD? Does the United States have a center of gravity? What should be done to protect it?
   c. What nonlethal weapon capabilities does DoD require to conduct HLD and CS missions?
   d. Should Canada and the United States pursue a treaty or agreement for bi-national maritime domain awareness?
   e. How can we improve interoperability in command, control, communications, and computer systems to support the Canadian and U.S. transformation strategies, protect our vulnerabilities to our economies, security, and environment?
   f. What are the threats and challenges associated with untracked air threats (general VFR aviation, low-altitude, low-observable vehicles), and what can NORAD do to address them?
   g. What are the potential issues and implications of NORAD’s adoption of maritime roles?
   h. What is a useful framework for understanding and evaluating the CBRNE threat from a red force perspective?
   i. How do we measure how well NORTHCOM is performing its mission in deterring, preventing, and defeating clandestine attacks?
   j. What are the likely psychological effects of a terrorist attack?
   k. What is the optimal configuratireness?
   m. What levels of risk are acceptable in conducting CBRNE-remains recovery and processing?
   n. What are the most effective techniques and protocols for protecting hospitals against introducing CBRN contaminants during post-attack operations?

2. Priority 2 Questions:
   a. How should NORAD/NORTHCOM ensure continuity of operations in the event of catastrophic failures or loss of ability to operate?
   b. How can USNORTHCOM effectively, efficiently, and legally develop and implement comprehensive collection of HLD and CS threat information consistent with U.S. privacy law?
c. What key theater security cooperation initiatives are required to reduce vulnerabilities and enhance the overall HLD posture of the United States?

d. What is the appropriate NORTHCOM involvement in federal, state, tribal, and local government exercises?

e. How can we improve the interconnectivity of U.S. efforts to reduce the WMD/E threat with international efforts?
United States Special Operations Command

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1. Global War on Terrorism: Toward a global strategy
   a. U.S. strategy
   b. DoD strategy
   c. SOF strategy
   d. Measuring effectiveness of the GWOT: Identifying the metrics
   e. Global capability gaps in the GWOT:
      i. U.S. capability gaps
      ii. DoD capability gaps
      iii. SOF capability gaps
   f. The hunt for UBL: how to finish the mission

2. Special Operations and the GWOT:
   a. The graying of SOF
   b. Logistics and signal operations in the Special Operations’ community

3. Homeland Security:
   a. DoD’s role and ability to defend U.S. borders
   b. DoD’s role in consequence management

4. Regional Strategic Issues:
   a. Evolving regional security matter in North Africa and the Middle East:
      i. U.S. strategy for Pakistan:
      ii. Pakistan government overthrown and becomes less friendly or even hostile
      iii. Pakistan in relation to democracy
   b. U.S. strategy with non-democratic friendly nations in move toward democracy
   c. Evolving regional security matters in Southwest Asia: building partnerships to balance long-term competition with China

5. Military Change: Analyzing missed opportunities leading up to the GWOT

6. Force Management and Leadership: The feasibility of returning to the Specialist series in SOF, especially linguists and intelligence analysts
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

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Sean.M.Wachutka@hq02.usace.army.mil

1. DoD Engineer: What are the possibilities and pitfalls?
2. Joint Installations: What does the future look like?
3. Installation Management Agency (IMA) and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM): Who is in charge?
4. DoD Reconstruction and Stabilization: What do recent cases tell us?
Office of the Chief, Army Reserve

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1. Global War on Terrorism:
   a. Assessing the value of using “Overwhelming Force”
   b. Understanding the history of non-linear warfare
   c. Assessing the relevance of “Shock and Awe”
   d. Redefining boundaries in the modern battlespace
   e. Understanding the role and risk of transitions in campaign planning
   f. Understanding Effects-Based Operations
   g. Understanding complex operations
   h. Examining John Warden’s concentric rings
   i. Examining the role of efficiency in military planning
   j. Examining the relationship between combatant commanders and force providers
   k. Defining interrelationships between operational phases of war

2. National Security Strategy:
   a. Defining the Global War on Terrorism
   b. The role of Russia in GWOT strategy
   c. Understanding the history of unilateral power
   d. Evaluating the precedent for “Proactive War”
   e. Evaluating the risk posed by nuclear material from the former Soviet Union
   f. Understanding WMD
   g. Assessing the relevance of the Geneva Convention

3. Force Management and Leadership:
   a. Examining modularity and Army Reserve
   b. Understanding unit integrity
   c. Determining the optimal role of each component in tooth-to-tail organization
   d. Assessing the balance of contractors in the military in certain areas of expertise: Engineering, Intelligence, Chem-Bio, Public Affairs
   e. Examining the role of landpower in the context of GWOT
   f. Examining the impact the Directorate of National Intelligence will have on national security
   g. Understanding the role of HUMINT in future strategic planning
   h. Examining intelligence oversight in the context of GWOT
   i. How to grow leaders in the RC

4. War and Society:
   a. Comparing military recruiting and retention activities to competition in the American marketplace
   b. Tolerance for deployment frequency and duration for RC Soldiers
c. Assessing the value of civilian-acquired skills on the battlefield
d. Assessing the legitimacy of the “Abrams Doctrine”
e. Examining the role of faith during time of war
f. Examining Clausewitz’ Trinity and the role of society in war
g. Defining legitimacy for war in American society
h. The roles of legislative, executive, and judicial branches during wartime
i. Assessing changing demographics for Army Reserve prospects
j. Evaluating importance of geographic dispersion of RC Soldiers
k. Comparing Vietnam and Iraq from the viewpoint of American society
l. Determining the cost to society of deploying an RC Soldier
m. Exploring the impact of a draft to support GWOT
n. Applying demographic models to the process of recruiting and retaining RC Soldiers
o. The relationship between civilian leadership and the military components
p. Evaluating the effects of assured access to RC Soldiers during wartime
National Guard Bureau

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1. What are the appropriate Roles and Missions for the Army’s components?
2. What is the future force structure of the Army National Guard?
3. What is the future of the All Volunteer Force?
4. How will the Army project forces in the global terrorism environment?
5. What does interoperability mean to the future Army National Guard force?
6. How can the Army National Guard Personnel system transform?
7. What is the future of training simulation in the Army National Guard?
8. How should the mobilization and demobilization processes be changed?
9. How can the Army streamline the PPBES process?
10. How can the National Guard expand the State Partnership Program?
11. How should the ARNG grow commission and warrant officers?
12. How many components does the Army need?
13. How should the ARNG implement the Army Force Generation Model?
14. Future ARNG force structure - what can we sustain?
15. Impact of minimal infrastructure funding on ARNG facilities?
16. How can a National Personnel System be implemented?
17. How can we optimize the Individual Ready Reserve and conduct individual unit replacements?
18. Impact of the Global War on Terrorism on officer and NCO career development?
19. What levels and forces will the ARNG require to fight GWOT for 10 to 20 years?
20. Can the ARNG continue to provide its own replacements for extended periods under the current Partial Mobilization Authority?
21. What, if any, changes need to be made to the current Partial Mobilization Authority (Sec 12302) statute or policy?
22. Should the Training Readiness Oversight function of the CONUSA be changed; if so, how?

23. What is the Joint Force HQ - State role and interaction with NORTHCOM?

24. Are equipment training sets appropriate for selected ARNG units?

25. Define the future role of the Regional Training Institutes?