USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

“AMI” GO HOME –
ASSESSING THE REALIGNMENT OF
U.S. ARMY FORCES IN EUROPE

by

Colonel C. Brandon Cholek
United States Army

Doctor Larry Goodson
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104. (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
1. REPORT DATE
  18 MAR 2005

2. REPORT TYPE

3. DATES COVERED

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
"AMI" GO HOME Assessing the Realignment of U.S. Army Forces in Europe

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)
  C Cholek

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
  U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
  Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
  See attached.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. REPORT</th>
<th>b. ABSTRACT</th>
<th>c. THIS PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

18. NUMBER OF PAGES
  50

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Stationing United States Army forces in Europe, particularly in Germany, has been a fixture of our national security and military strategies since World War II. As U.S. strategy evolved during the next fifty years, our forward presence formed the backbone of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which contributed to the security of Europe and its economic recovery. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, while in search for new relevance in the “New World Order,” U.S. force strength in Europe decreased by sixty percent. The reduced threat coupled with the emergence of the European Union shifted the transatlantic partnership pillars from security to economics and diplomacy. Without a revised comprehensive national security strategy, the military adhered to the status quo in Europe, albeit on a smaller scale.

In the wake of the horrific 9/11 terror attacks in the U.S., the Bush administration’s revised National Security Strategy mandated the U.S. military transform to a joint expeditionary capabilities-based force. The reinvigorated National Military Strategy energized the services and combatant commanders to reassess force structures and disposition throughout the world to execute the Global War on Terrorism. In August 2004, Bush unveiled the global troop realignment to create more flexible and agile forces with unprecedented global reach. Finally, the military was freed from the vestiges of last century’s “Germany first” grand strategy.

This paper traces the origins of the U.S. Army force posture in Europe, examines the post-Cold War and Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) geopolitical dynamics leading to the realignment, and assesses the impending changes of forces in Europe.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................ iii
PREFACE .................................................................................................................................................... vii

“AMI” GO HOME – ASSESSING THE REALIGNMENT OF U.S. ARMY FORCES IN EUROPE .......... 1

OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................................................. 1
POST-WORLD WAR II AND THE COLD WAR .................................................................................. 1
POST-COLD WAR ............................................................................................................................... 2
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM ........................................................................................................ 3
ARC OF INSTABILITY .......................................................................................................................... 4
MILITARY TRANSFORMATION ......................................................................................................... 5

ARMY TRANSFORMATION .............................................................................................................. 6
Modularity .............................................................................................................................................. 7
Rebalancing ........................................................................................................................................... 7
Stabilization .......................................................................................................................................... 8

REALIGNING ARMY FORCES FROM EUROPE ............................................................................ 8

REALIGNMENT ASSESSMENTS ....................................................................................................... 10

INFRASTRUCTURE .......................................................................................................................... 10
Facilities in Europe ............................................................................................................................. 11
Facilities in CONUS ........................................................................................................................... 12
Infrastructure Assessment .................................................................................................................. 13

PRE-POSITIONED STOCKS ............................................................................................................. 14
Pre-positioning On Land ....................................................................................................................... 15
Pre-positioning Afloat .......................................................................................................................... 15
Pre-positioning Assessment .................................................................................................................. 16

STRATEGIC TRANSPORTATION ................................................................................................. 16
Strategic Sealift ..................................................................................................................................... 17
Strategic Airlift ...................................................................................................................................... 18
Strategic Transportation Assessment .................................................................................................. 19

READINESS ......................................................................................................................................... 19
Unit Readiness ....................................................................................................................................... 20
Personnel Readiness ........................................................................................................................... 21
Readiness Assessment ......................................................................................................................... 21
PREFACE

For the United States Army, the 21st Century is proving to be as challenging and turbulent as any time in its illustrious history. Shouldering the brunt of the Global War on Terrorism while undertaking its greatest transformation since World War II, attests to the professionalism and dedication of the Army’s leaders, soldiers, civilians, and family members. Transforming the Army now is critical in developing a relevant campaign quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities across the full spectrum of threats facing the nation. Rebalancing the force and returning units from overseas locations enhances the Army’s capabilities to better sustain the force from the home front to the front lines of the Global War on Terrorism.
Undertaking the most comprehensive restructuring since World War II while simultaneously conducting the Global War on Terrorism, the Army is transforming into an agile expeditionary force with increased joint capabilities. A key component to the Army’s transformation is the realignment of its global posture. This paper traces the origins of the U.S. Army force posture in Europe, examines the post-Cold War and Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) geopolitical dynamics leading to the current decision for realignment, and assesses the ramifications of the impending changes to U.S. forces in Europe.

**POST-WORLD WAR II AND THE COLD WAR**

As World War II was ending, the U.S. military was at an all-time high in numbers of personnel in uniform and overseas. After the 1945 victories in Europe and the Pacific, the U.S. armed forces rapidly demobilized. By early 1946, the victors in Europe were reduced from a strength of over two million troops to an occupation force of 400,000. In the same year, Winston Churchill, in his famous “Iron Curtain” speech, warned the western world of Soviet expansionism. In 1947 President Harry Truman advocated an anti-communism crusade to support free peoples worldwide, enacted the National Security Act, and launched the ambitious Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of Europe. The fear of communist expansion was exacerbated when the Soviets detonated an atomic bomb and the communists prevailed in the Chinese civil war. To counter the looming threat, the U.S. and its allies formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.

On the other side of the globe, in June 1950 North Korea invaded South Korea causing Truman to commit U.S forces to a limited war in Korea. Fearing a Soviet attack on Western Europe, the U.S. simultaneously reinforced Germany. Later that year Truman ordered the rapid build up the nation’s political, economic, and military strengths to counter Soviet expansionism. This policy profoundly altered America’s views of a large standing peacetime army and solidified our long term commitment to maintaining forces in Europe. For the next three decades, ensuing administrations adapted strategies encompassing containment, peaceful co-existence, mutual destruction, proxy wars, and reliance upon nuclear and naval superiority. Throughout this period in Europe, the U.S. maintained large numbers of conventional forces, established hundreds of permanent facilities and strengthened its bonds with the NATO allies to counter the Warsaw Pact nations. America had a strong sense that it knew where the major fights were
going to be, and developed large, comprehensive bases in Europe from which to support the Cold War.²

In 1981 Ronald Reagan came into office with a vision to win the Cold War and set about to redefine U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union, which he called the “Evil Empire.” In 1983 he approved NSSD-75 to champion the reversal of Soviet expansionism, promote economic and political change within the USSR, and to engage the Soviets in negotiations. The U.S. modernized its military forces – both nuclear and conventional – so that Soviet leaders perceived that the U.S. was determined never to accept second place or a deteriorating military posture.³ Deploying the controversial intermediate range Pershing missiles and modernizing the conventional forces significantly bolstered European defenses while challenging the Soviets to maintain the same pace. NSDD-75 was the first comprehensive strategy since NSC 68 to engage all aspects of U.S. national power and is thought to have greatly contributed to the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991.⁴

POST-COLD WAR

Attempting to match the U.S. led military build-up, the Soviet Union’s weak economy could not sustain the level of its adventurism in Third World countries, and ultimately sealed its collapse as democracy expanded eastward.⁵ Mainly, the changes were for the better: the end to ideological superpower conflict; a vastly increased number of countries wishing to adopt liberal trading rules to join the market economy, thus aligning their interests mainly with those of the West; technological innovation that made it easier for ideas and products to flow across borders; and a big rise in the number of countries choosing and regulating their governments by means of democracy.⁶ The complete collapse of the Soviet Union established a new world order, leaving the U.S. as the world’s sole superpower. Capitalizing on the Soviet Union’s demise and anticipating a windfall peace dividend, the U.S. reduced its overall military and “built down” its force structure in Europe. Temporarily interrupted by Desert Storm in 1991, the U.S. closed and consolidated facilities and drew its forces down from 300,000 to less than 100,000 by the end of 1995.

During the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, U.S. strategy focused upon maintaining the U.S. hegemonic position. The Clinton era engagement and enlargement policy maintained U.S. forces throughout the world to enlarge the community of democratic free market countries.⁷ Central to this theme was to expand NATO by incorporating former eastern bloc nations. The relative peace of Europe was shaken in the mid to late 1990s by the Balkan wars. Frustrated by the Europeans’ inability to lead a regional effort to maintain peace in their own backyard, the
U.S. spearheaded an intervention to separate the warring factions and established peacekeeping operations that continue to this day. Some of the U.S. forces and infrastructure in Europe proved indispensable in supporting these operations. The first Gulf War and subsequent deployments of European based forces to Africa and the Middle East transformed Europe from a potential battlefield to a force provider, power projection platform, and sustainment base in the 1990s.

GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

At the dawn of the new millennium, the U.S. started to recognize terrorism as an emerging threat, but operated as if the major task involved in national security was to prepare for the next Cold War and deter new great powers from rising. Terrorism is a tactic and means of the politically desperate and military inept, and a type of warfare that our conventional forces are not best arrayed for. Not until the horrific terror attacks of September 11 did the U.S. discern that the terrorists are more capable, sophisticated, and ruthless than many experts had believed. Demonstrating their willingness to sacrifice themselves, indiscriminate killing of innocents, and desire to gain access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorists resort to irregular warfare to circumvent overwhelmingly superior U.S. conventional armed forces. Exploiting technology and globalization, non-state actors and transnational terrorist organizations are actively seeking WMD to inflict mass casualties on the U.S. and its interests.

September 11 changed the dynamics of U.S. interests, and for the foreseeable future will influence the international environment in which the U.S. pursues its policies. The confidence and freedom of strategic choice that existed in the unipolar, post-Cold War world was abruptly stripped away. The terror attacks of 9/11 profoundly changed the U.S. National Security Strategy and the supporting National Military Strategy. Although American predominance of military power has never been greater, September 11 demonstrated both how vulnerable the U.S. itself is to attack and how essential it will be, in coping with future terrorist threats and attacks, to cooperate with old allies and new friends in all corners of the globe. The U.S. doctrine for the global war on terrorism aims to preemptively destroy the capability of the terrorists to operate any place on the globe.

In late 2001, the U.S. embarked on a strategy heavily reliant upon global military action. It is becoming increasingly clear that the American military, particularly the land components – the Army and Marines – are shouldering much of the burden on the war on terrorism. In addition to the higher commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and homeland defense, the U.S. Army is strained by an array of burdens encompassing building alliances, training other military
forces, counter drug operations, and humanitarian assistance spanning the globe. The U.S. Army prepared for a high intensity war and wound up engaged in an open-ended campaign of global counterinsurgency and nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan. The war on terrorism is essentially becoming a global counterinsurgency campaign and the Army acknowledges that such a pace is unsustainable. The Army is bearing the heaviest burden of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and is mired in a long hard slog to stabilize the post-war Gulf region.

ARC OF INSTABILITY

Strategists have identified the major threat regions as the "arc of instability," which is said to run from the Andean region of South America through North Africa, across the Middle East to the Philippines and Indonesia. Encompassing the breeding grounds of radical Islamic sects and some nuclear capable countries, this region poses the potential for the most dangerous conflicts. With all of the September 11 hijacker terrorists originating from the Middle East, our strategy to defeat terrorism must focus heavily on the region, where so many ideas and attitudes motivating terrorist behavior have become entrenched.

Fueling the volatility of the region, the arc of instability encompasses the world’s major oil producing and distribution countries and the major sea lines of communications. Within the region lies the “strategic energy ellipse” containing 60% of the world’s proven oil reserves and 80% of the proven natural gas. Protecting these vital interests supports our national strategy of promoting the economy and free markets. Given the vital interests to the nation’s security, the U.S. seeks to be the security guarantor of the Gulf.

Since Desert Storm in 1991, the U.S. military has maintained a modest presence in the region. Opting to minimize the number of permanently stationed troops, U.S. strategy encompassed pre-positioning equipment in Kuwait and rotating battalion size units for training; conducting Operations Northern and Southern Watches over Iraq from Turkey and Saudi Arabia, respectively; pre-positioning equipment afloat at Diego Garcia; conducting the biannual, multilateral Bright Star exercise in Egypt; maintain multinational force observers in the Sinai; and maintain modest naval forces afloat in the Gulf. However, in responding to the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. learned the limitations of its vaunted global reach when it found itself constrained in mounting offensive operations in Afghanistan to depose the Taliban and Al Qaida. To gain access by land and overflight approaches into Afghanistan, the U.S. had to hastily rekindle diplomatic relations with Pakistan and start courting the former Soviet states of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, at the risk of jeopardizing relations with Russia and China. Despite spending millions of dollars for transportation and infrastructure improvements in Turkey for an
American northern approach into Iraq, the U.S. was dealt an embarrassing military and political setback when the Turks denied access for offensive operations in 2003. Additionally, one of our closest allies within the region, Saudi Arabia, dealt the U.S. another setback when the Kingdom forbade offensive air operations and asked the U.S. to vacate the Prince Sultan air base near Riyadh as the presence of American forces was no longer acceptable to the Saudi populace.

By examining our current global force posture and recent lessons observed for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, it becomes apparent that America is not postured to readily access the Gulf region and has too many forces in Europe. The U.S. needs to diversify the countries upon which it depends and create redundant capabilities in multiple locations. To realign American forces in the Gulf states, the U.S. will have to improve diplomatic and military relations and develop creative basing concepts to enhance forward capabilities that promote multilateral security cooperation within the region. The challenge is to create a new posture for peacetime presence and wartime reinforcement that supports the execution of U.S. defense strategy without creating an unsustainable footprint in the region or draining the overall U.S. force posture of too many forces and resources.  

**MILITARY TRANSFORMATION**

Military transformation is the act of changing the shape and functions of the military to meet the challenges of the future security environment. The Bush Administration states it is no longer relevant to measure America’s warfighting capability by the number of troops and equipment in a particular country or region. Under Secretary for Defense Policy, Douglas Feith, stated “everything is going to move everywhere, there is not going to be a place in the world where it’s going to be the same as it used to be.” Pentagon officials are working to implement this vision by reducing our outdated Cold War basing requirements and to posture our forces to the Middle East and Central Asia as sites of potential conflicts.

From Cold War locations, U.S. forces are postured to defend against traditional adversaries with conventional air, sea, and land forces. Precisely for the reason that the conventional U.S. military power is so widely recognized, the Pentagon does not expect to face this type of enemy. Instead, the U.S. will be challenged by a wider array of threats encompassing a mix of irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive threats emanating from the arc of instability. Operating in the uncertain and complex environment of failed nation states and non-state actors, the U.S. armed forces must transform from a threat-based to a capabilities-based force. Capabilities-based forces focus less on a specific adversary or where a conflict may arise by
shifting to how an adversary might fight. This approach relies heavily upon intelligence, agility, and anticipation to rapidly adjust to changes in the security environment over diverse and geographically dispersed areas. Key military force structure considerations for prosecuting the war on terrorism include how we are going to fight, where to project forces from, and what force mix to employ.

The draft National Defense Strategy directs a force size to defend the homeland, deter forward in four regions, and conduct two overlapping swift campaigns, while winning one decisively. This 1-4-2-1 force construct requires commanders to develop options to mitigate risks while restructuring and transforming to a joint expeditionary force from a force optimized for high-intensity conflict in mature theaters. By continued forward posture and presence throughout key strategic locations in the world, the U.S. assures our partners of our willingness to support and assists in accessing key regions and securing lines of communications. The global posture of forces accounts for sustaining permanently stationed, rotational, and temporarily deployed forward forces. Forward presence enhances security at home while actively patrolling strategic approaches and extending defensive capabilities beyond U.S. borders. In seeking a more agile deployable force, U.S. forces will train and be deployed in more diverse locations throughout the world as well as increase locations from which we can deploy. Power projection infrastructure, lift platforms, and networked information are key enablers of the transformed expeditionary and joint forces.

ARMY TRANSFORMATION

Seizing upon GWOT as a unifying catalyst to transformation, the Army has embarked upon its most ambitious restructuring since World War II. To transform the Army to a more relevant and capable expeditionary and joint force, the Army developed its campaign plan outlining three essential tasks: converting the forces to modular units of action; rebalancing the skill sets of the force across the active and reserve components; and stabilizing the forces to enhance unit, personnel, and family readiness. The uncertainty as to where we must deploy, the probability of a very austere operational environment, and the requirement to fight on arrival throughout the battle space pose new challenges – and is the fundamental distinction of expeditionary operations. To adapt to the current and future operational and strategic environments, the Army will undergo profound changes to its culture, doctrine, and policies by shifting from long-term overseas basing to a Continental U.S. (CONUS)-centric stationing plan with short term deployments. The transformation enhances the Army’s overseas power projection, allows for flexible projection into key regions, reduces Cold War overseas basing
burdens, expands interoperability with our partners, increases combat power capabilities for sustained periods and improves predictability and stability for the soldiers and their families.\textsuperscript{26}

**Modularity**

Transforming to brigade-based Units of Action (UA) from the division-based force enables the Army to increase its depth while expanding the breadth of its capabilities. The most recent combat operations have demonstrated that modern Army brigades proved nearly as lethal, survivable and demonstrably quicker and more adaptive than full divisions.\textsuperscript{27} Undertaking the Army’s most significant restructuring in 50 years, the Army’s current ten division force encompassing 33 brigades will be reorganized into 43 Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) by 2006, with an option to add another five BCTs in 2007. BCTs will be permanently task organized with assigned combat, combat support, and sustainment forces along with engineer, intelligence, signal, and other enablers that used to come from the division or corps. BCTs will be standardized in organization and configuration across the active, reserve, and guard components to simplify movement, rotations, and operations. The National Guard operating as a fully integrated force, as opposed to it once being a strategic reserve, will reconfigure eight divisions and fifteen Enhanced Brigades into 34 BCTs. This restructuring is envisioned to transform the Army into a more responsive, agile, deployable, joint, and expeditionary force capable of sustained, continuous combat operations in the Global War on Terrorism.

**Rebalancing**

Despite Congress authorizing the Army to increase its active component strength by 30,000, the Army will rebalance, reallocate, and retrain 100,000 Cold War positions into more high-demand skills required in the Global War on Terrorism. Based upon the obsolete Cold War-era tiered readiness system, both the National Guard and Reserves have more force structure (units) than soldiers to fill the positions. Much of the restructuring will occur within the Reserves, but some high demand units such as civil affairs and military police will be moved to the active component to ensure the military can execute missions for the first thirty days of an operation without reserve augmentation. By transitioning to the train-alert-deploy paradigm from the Cold War era alert-mobilize-train-deploy model, the reserves are expected to increase readiness and expand the pool of deployable units. The intent is to establish a five-year training cycle for reserve units with an expectation that soldiers would be deployed for up to a one-year period.
Stabilization

At any one time, the Army has 68,000 of its personnel not available to deploy because they are in training, in schools, in transit between assignments or medically unavailable. Another 110,000 are assigned to non-tactical units including garrison, staffs, training, and recruiting. This leaves the Army with the remaining 330,000 assigned to tactical units to conduct operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sinai, and other world-wide commitments encompassing 120 countries.28

By implementing unit-focused stability policies, the Army intends to synchronize soldier’s tours with the unit’s 36-month operational lifecycles. A typical 36-month tour entails up to six months to reset the unit’s personnel and equipment, followed by six months of intensive training concluding with a validation of readiness, and a two year ready period for deployment to any contingency or overseas rotation. This policy change accompanied with reduced overseas basing is expected to substantially increase unit cohesion and readiness while increasing stability and predictability for the soldier and his family. At the end of the unit life cycle, it is estimated that up to 50% of the unit’s personnel will stay on for the next life cycle.29

REALIGNING ARMY FORCES FROM EUROPE

In mid-August 2004, President Bush announced the long expected troop realignment plan to reshuffle 60,000 forces from Europe and Asia. Over the next decade the U.S. will realign up to 40,000 Army forces from Europe to the U.S. The move includes almost 100,000 dependents and civil servants while impacting the livelihood of thousands of local nationals. As stated by General James Jones, NATO Supreme Commander, the current U.S. forces garrisoned in Germany with their dependents are an unwieldy, expensive relic of the past. To achieve Donald Rumsfeld’s vision of an expeditionary force, the military will close 35% of the Cold War era facilities as it expands a network of bare-bones sites encircling the arc of instability. The planned redeployments are the most sweeping since the onset of the Cold War, and are all part of a global strategy to build a capability to impose lethal power, where and when needed, with the greatest flexibility and agility.30

At the height of the Cold War, almost 240,000 soldiers, hundreds of Department of Army civilians, and accompanying dependents, along with 65,000 local nationals were spread among 600 installations in Europe. Currently, the Army has about 62,000 soldiers stationed permanently in Europe, mainly in Germany and some in Italy. U.S. forces in Europe are not there just for Europe. They are mainly dedicated for use elsewhere – staging from some of the finest bases in the world and benefiting from interactions with other nations while encouraging
allies to join coalitions of the willing. The U.S. European Command, the self-entitled “Freedom’s Expeditionary Force,” is engaged in 91 countries extending from the Cape of Good Hope in Africa, the Mediterranean to include Israel, north to the Bering Straits and Russia. This includes not just training and staging forces for peacekeeping, but also the Partnership for Peace; stabilizing West Africa; increasing involvement in North Africa; and expanding political-military engagement in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Russian Federation.\textsuperscript{31}

The need for realignment for the Army is greater than the other services. Land forces are inherently less mobile than ships and aircraft, so the Army cannot react and move to a developing crisis as readily as the Navy and Air Force can. Additionally, the Army’s overseas locations and personnel are heavily concentrated in Germany, the area least likely for conflict. Redistributing combat power deemphasizes garrisoning allied territory in favor of a strategy that secures access to bases on allied soil with fewer forces. Access to overseas facilities for projection platforms, forward operating sites and intermediate bases enables the expeditionary forces to organize and train to fight as a joint force.\textsuperscript{32}

The Pentagon foresees a combination of overseas arrangements encompassing\textsuperscript{33}

Joint Main Operating Bases (JMOB) to serve as enduring strategic assets in a friendly nation with permanently based combat forces, command and control structures, and family support facilities. Examples include Ramstein AFB and Landstuhl Army Regional Hospital in Germany.

Joint Forward Operating Sites (JFOS) provide “expandable” sites with limited U.S. military support presence and possibly pre-positioned equipment. These sites can host rotational forces and can be tailored to meet anticipated requirements over an extended period. Examples include the Balkans base camps of Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo and Eagle Base in Bosnia.

Joint Cooperative Security Locations (JCSL) comprises host nation facilities with little or no permanent American presence. These would see occasional use, would provide contingency access, and are a focal point for security cooperation. These sites have no family support facilities, but could quickly expand into a JFOS. Examples could include sub–Saharan air bases in Mombasa, Kenya and Entebbe, Uganda.

Joint Pre-Position Sites (JPFS) are secure locations with pre-positioned war reserve materiel tailored and strategically positioned for rotational and expeditionary forces. Before the Iraq war, such sites were maintained in Kuwait and Qatar.

En-Route Infrastructure (ERI) are strategically located, enduring assets that can be used to rapidly expand, project, and sustain military power during times of crisis or contingencies.
One such anchor point is Moron Air Base, Spain, a refueling stop halfway between America and the Middle East.

REALIGNMENT ASSESSMENTS

Up to this point, this paper has traced the origins of Army forces in Europe and highlighted the major factors rationalizing the DOD decision to realign forces worldwide. The details of the Army force realignment are still evolving and cannot be finalized until the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) list has been published. For the purpose of illustration, I will assume that the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions along with most of the supporting units of the V Corps, approximately 40,000 soldiers, will return to the U.S. within the next decade. For forces added to Europe, a Stryker Brigade will be assigned to Germany, another infantry battalion added to the Airborne Brigade in Italy, and another BCT to cycle from CONUS to Eastern Europe for six month rotations. The remainder of this paper will assess the impacts of these changes upon the Army, and to make recommendations for implementing this realignment.

The criteria used for the assessments include: infrastructure, pre-positioned equipment, strategic transportation, readiness, and the politico-military posture. Infrastructure considers the options and costs associated with replacing like facilities (buildings, grounds, utilities, and transportation) in Germany to CONUS or to the proposed eastern bloc nations. Pre-positioning examines equipment stocks on land and afloat. Strategic lift assesses the movement capabilities of sea and air resources for forces based in CONUS and Europe. Readiness assesses the impacts on unit, personnel, and families. Politico-Military posture assesses the potential impact on NATO and coalitions as a result of the reduced footprint in Europe.

INFRASTRUCTURE

Unlike the drawdown of the post-Cold War in which two-thirds of the Army’s forces in Europe were entirely deactivated or reflagged in CONUS, the proposed realignment entails no reductions in force numbers and will result in significant expenditures to replace elsewhere what already exists in Western Europe. The Army maintains the highest number of overseas installations – with by far the most buildings with the greatest total replacement value. With subsidies from its host nation allies, the U.S. has built up significant infrastructure overseas to support forward-stationed units, assigned personnel and their families. Almost all European overseas locations accommodating permanently assigned troops include most of the amenities of bases in the U.S. – commisaries, chapels, exercise facilities, clinics, exchanges, post
offices, etc. In Germany alone, the DOD runs 70 schools for more than 30,000 dependent children of US soldiers and DOD civilians.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{Facilities in Europe}

Currently the Army maintains 255 installations in Germany alone. Among the largest and most expensive bases in Germany are at Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels. These two training facilities provide ranges where units can maneuver and exercise tactics over 52,000 and 40,000 acres, respectively, and have a combined replacement value of more than $1.5 billion. The Army also maintains 33 barracks for unaccompanied soldiers and 36 housing areas for families with a replacement value of $14 billion. Other Army installations include five hospitals, five hotels, fifteen smaller training areas, nine airfields, four depots, and three golf courses. The infrastructure is designed to enhance soldiers’ morale and replicate the facilities and conveniences that would be found around many Army bases in the U.S. The estimated replacement value for facilities in Germany is $30 billion. Despite the enormous land and facility improvement values on existing installations in Europe ($14 billion), the U.S. can expect to receive only negligible remuneration for facilities returned to the host countries. For the massive reductions in forces undertaken in the early 1990s, the U.S. returned hundreds of facilities to the German government, for which it received $3 million in cash and $200 million for improvements and barracks modernization.\textsuperscript{35}

Though the U.S. facilities in Germany are among the most modern, they are costly and restrictive for training heavy forces. Increasingly stringent and costly environmental standards and population encroachment restrict the training value of many facilities. The cost of stationing soldiers and their families in Europe is typically much higher than stateside locations. Individual cost of living allowances (COLA) can exceed $2,000 a month for some locations and it costs an additional $5,000 per soldier to house in Germany. Additionally, it costs almost $15,000 to move each household overseas. The Congressional Research Service estimated that it costs an additional $1B - $2B to maintain the U.S. forces in Europe rather than in the U.S.\textsuperscript{36}

As the U.S. looks eastward from Germany to establish less capable, but better strategically located, facilities in the former eastern bloc nations in Europe, it will have to assess the tradeoffs of lesser capable host nation infrastructures. Countries such as Romania and Bulgaria, part of the “New Europe” as labeled by Rumsfeld, are wooing the U.S. to improve relations while improving their economies. To establish three forward operating sites in Eastern Europe in which to rotate a BCT every six months entails significant upfront and recurring costs. Three austere bases in Eastern Europe would cost up to $750 million to establish and $225
million a year to operate. Several analysts have suggested that significant logistical costs will be associated with shifting forces from Germany to Eastern Europe. Besides paying for new bases, the U.S. will have to invest significant funds to create or upgrade infrastructure to bring up to acceptable standards. Basic services such as clean and safe drinking water, reliable electrical power, and proper sewage treatment are not available on a consistent basis in Eastern Europe, and providing them will require a major U.S. investment.\(^{37}\)

According to Stuart Drury of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, deploying would be much more difficult from Eastern Europe countries because many roads there are not capable of accommodating military traffic and many railroads are narrow gauge and ill-suited for military cargo. He further points out that Black Sea ports are not capable of handling the same volume of cargo as ports in Rotterdam, Holland or Bremerhaven, Germany. Moreover, transiting out of the Black Sea often bottlenecks at the Bosporus and Dardanelles. In the past, NATO has invested funds to improve the transportation infrastructure of its newest members, including Poland and Bulgaria. Future NATO investments could include upgrades to seaports, training ranges, and railroad tracks to address these concerns.\(^{38}\)

**Facilities in CONUS**

For the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), the Army has certified that 29% of its facilities are excess. Unfortunately, most of the excess infrastructure is not suitable for basing the relocating forces. A 2002 Army study suggested that virtually no excess barracks space exists at seven of the largest installations that could be expected to receive the returning forces. The returning units would require construction and renovation of unit headquarters, maintenance and operations of related facilities, base infrastructure, barracks, and cafeterias to house and feed troops. The Army would also need to build new commissaries and exchanges and in some locations schools for soldiers’ children. Constructing new housing units and facilities or refurbishing old ones requires a multi-billion dollar investment. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that it would cost $6 billion to build and refurbish facilities in the U.S. to accommodate returning units.\(^{39}\) To reduce the costs, DOD is examining the feasibility of establishing active duty joint bases similar to the Joint Reserve Base at Willow Grove, Pennsylvania. Since both the Air Force and the Navy are in the process of reducing their end strengths, the facilities vacated could possibly be backfilled with Army units. Additionally, depending on the base locations and access to airfields and seaports, co-locating could reduce the deployment time and facilitate joint training.
Supporting interstate transportation, utilities and social infrastructure enablers in the U.S. are at least equal, if not better, than abroad. Prior to returning the forces back to the U.S., infrastructure of the receiving bases will have to be assessed and improved to accommodate billeting, family housing, and training facilities. Expecting to receive federal assistance as well as increased revenues from soldiers, many communities will actively seek the additional forces. The military will have to conduct extensive coordination with local gaining communities to ensure the quality of life is up to the standards vacated in Europe.40

Infrastructure Assessment

From a strategic and national political perspective, realigning our forces to the U.S. is warranted and will be welcomed by the troops as well as most gaining communities, but will not save money in the near term. Augmented with host nation subsidies to fund continual improvements to facilities over the past sixty years, the Army’s infrastructure in Europe is modern and functional. Unfortunately, these several hundred facilities are remnants of the Cold War era, with few having enduring utility in supporting the Global War on Terrorism. Shedding excess infrastructure and consolidating on fewer installations enables the U.S. to maintain a potent presence in Europe while maintaining the key strategic platforms capable of supporting crises abroad.

The immediate challenge facing the DOD and Army is how to fund the construction of facilities while simultaneously fighting the GWOT and transforming. Despite the unprecedented increases to the Army budget, the GWOT and many transformation components are mostly funded by supplemental appropriations, that are sure to dissipate with the burgeoning national debt. There will be significant costs involved in terms of military construction, even for the skeleton bases as well as a variety of other costs associated with expanding or downsizing military bases both at home and overseas.41 To replace the facilities in the U.S. to accommodate the units, soldiers, and their families returning from Germany, the COB estimates it will cost $6 billion in up-front investments. Partial initial investment costs can be offset by long-term savings in reduced overseas military construction, reduced COLA, and individual housing and transportation allowances. The CBO estimated potential savings by foregoing all new construction and maintenance of facilities in Germany for a decade could total $3.4 billion.

Timing of the realignment is essential for supporting Army transformation and the Global War on Terrorism. The Army’s plan for rebasing its forces will be influenced by the 2005 BRAC and its associated political fallout arising from basing forces in new locations, and from removing them from previous locations. A concerted effort must be undertaken to start
construction of the many facilities required to avoid overcrowding and degrading the quality of life in what is already a turbulent and demanding period for our Army’s troops. To allow for sufficient funding and construction of the required stateside infrastructure, the forces from Germany should not be relocated for another several years. In the meantime, the V Corps along with both divisions could be sent to subsequent OIF rotations in 2006, and return to Germany in 2007 to prepare for realignment to the U.S. starting in 2008.

The prospects of expanding regional alliances and access to strategic locations affording unencumbered training and exercise resources only hours from the arc of instability provide the U.S. a profound depth of capabilities and redundancies it currently lacks. Struggling to emerge from decades of communism, Eastern European nations are more susceptible to U.S. leverage and impose fewer restrictions on the use of airspace and environmental barriers. However, developing three austere forward operating bases in Eastern Europe and rotating forces through them will require substantial start up and operating expenses. Atop the $1 billion cost for the new bases and operations expenses, the CBO forecasts the cost of rotating one BCT from CONUS would cost an additional $26 million. The DOD and the Army must analyze the efficiencies of repositioning equipment from Germany to the eastern locations, or examine sending more lightly equipped forces or smaller battalion size units from Germany instead of CONUS.

PRE-POSITIONED STOCKS

The DOD has made extensive use of pre-positioning (PREPO) equipment and supplies throughout the world for many decades. PREPO is a critical program for rapidly projecting combat and support forces in early stages of contingencies and reduces the demands on the strategic transportation system. All services and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) make use of this force enabler from land based facilities and vessels afloat. PREPO offers numerous advantages to combatant commanders, but requires a permissive security environment and preparation prior to deploying for combat, as well as deep draft ports.

During the Cold War-era, the Army maintained in excess of two divisions worth of equipment and supplies in Europe to quickly provision fly-in troops to bolster the extensive forces stationed in the front lines of Germany. During the Return Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises of the 1980s, the equipment was issued, exercised, and returned to replicate the entire process as envisioned in the general defense plans. After the Cold War and Desert Storm, the pre-positioned stocks in Luxembourg, Netherlands, Italy, and Germany were significantly restructured into the more flexible and capable Army pre-positioned stocks (APS-1
through APS-5) we know today. Army PREPO stocks are maintained on land in CONUS, Europe, Korea, Kuwait, and afloat in Diego Garcia. Additional support equipment and ammunition are maintained in Bahrain, Kuwait, South Korea, and Japan.

**Pre-positioning On Land**

Less flexible than afloat stocks, pre-positioned stocks on land require identifying the areas most likely for conflict and considerable investment in fixed support facilities. APS-1 comprised of sustainment material and operational project stocks are stored in the U.S. and can be rapidly shipped or flown to support all regions of the globe. APS-2 consists of three brigade sets in Europe, APS-4 has one brigade set in the Pacific, and APS-5 consists of two brigade sets in Kuwait. These brigade sets provide the full complement of equipment from M1A1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles to hundreds of support trucks and provisions. The Marines maintain land based stocks in Norway sufficient to support a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) for 30 days. The preponderance of the Air Force’s PREPO stocks are munitions packages, theater ammunition stocks and life support and flight line support complexes maintained in two air transportable variations. Additionally, each service operates depots to store major end items and repair parts. DLA is the backbone for managing, storing, and distributing most common items by maintaining a robust presence in Germany, Korea, and now in the Gulf.

**Pre-positioning Afloat**

PREPO afloat affords increased flexibility by its ability to reposition around the globe where needed. The Army’s afloat prepo, APS-3, typically docked in Diego Garcia in the India Ocean, has two brigade sets on 12 vessels. APS-3 stocks provide 30 days of supplies, port opening packages, and ammunition for a corps to conduct operations from major combat to humanitarian relief. It is dual apportioned so it can support missions in the Gulf and in the Pacific and capable of dispersed simultaneous missions. As one would expect of naval forces, the Marines have the preponderance of their stocks afloat on 12 vessels. Their three sets provide the full range of capabilities to support 18,000 marines (Marine Expeditionary Brigade) for 30 days. Unlike the Army, the Marines can conduct in-stream discharge and are spread loaded so that equipment is more readily acceptable for tailoring varied configured force packages. The Navy maintains one pre-positioned ammunition ship and two aviation support vessels for the Marines. The Air Force’s significant commodity afloat is ammunition. DLA has several petroleum tankers equipped with an Offshore Petroleum Distribution System (OPDS) capable of pumping 1.2 million gallons a day from up to four miles offshore. Once vessels are
downloaded with their respective equipment, the vessels typically revert to Military Sealift Command control for common user service.  

**Pre-positioning Assessment**

Pre-positioning equipment and stocks on land and afloat provide the military unique capabilities to rapidly project forces to regions identified as potential flashpoints and faster to other unanticipated contingencies. Pre-positioned fixed equipment in Kuwait and afloat equipment in Diego Garcia have been exercised many times and proved effective for OIF by reducing deployment times from weeks to days. As the Army transforms to a lighter, more expeditionary force with the Stryker vehicle as the centerpiece (until the Future Combat System is developed), the Army has to reassess whether the pre-positioned equipment is best suited for the GWOT. Like the Army of the Cold War-era, the prepo stocks reflect the same organization and are typically the last structure to be outfitted with the equipment. The Army intends to equip six Stryker Brigade units, but is not forecasted to fund a Stryker prepo set. The CBO estimates that it would cost $1.6 billion to purchase a set of equipment for a Stryker brigade.

In OIF we have painfully learned the importance of armoring the light skinned vehicles and transporters in asymmetric, non-traditional warfare. Lighter, more versatile vehicles would enhance flexibility for the combatant commander by allowing pre-positioning on smaller, swifter vessels requiring less draft. For the road ahead, combatant commanders will want a greater array of equipment that can be used for multiple tasks encompassing humanitarian relief, engineer projects, and medical assistance to enhance theater security and cooperation. In addition to reassessing the right equipment on smaller vessels for PREPO afloat, the three brigade sets of APS-2 could be partially repositioned elsewhere, such as in the Eastern European forward operating bases. This would reduce the unit shipping expenses and save units time and effort in preparing and receiving equipment. In the future, the DOD should explore emerging concepts like mobile offshore and sea basing along with increasing joint equipment to gain greater efficiencies for its pre-positioning strategies.

**STRATEGIC TRANSPORTATION**

Since Desert Storm in 1991, the U.S. aggressively pursued correcting shortcomings noted during the build-up and conduct of the war. Among the most significant shortfalls was the lack of strategic sealift and airlift capacity for wartime and national contingencies. Based upon the recommendations of the 1992 Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Mobility Requirements Study, the U.S. embarked on an ambitious sealift acquisition program, purchased additional lift aircraft, and made major transportation infrastructure improvements to projection platforms. Congress
funded nineteen Large Medium Speed Roll On Roll Off (LMSR) vessels, increased the number of C-17 aircraft, and funded extensive improvements to rail, airports and seaport facilities. U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is the Functional Combatant Command responsible for coordinating the military's transportation system for full spectrum operations.

**Strategic Sealift**

The bulk of the Army's equipment will be moved by sea in combination with pre-positioned equipment sets placed in key locations around the globe. The nation's strategic sealift inventory consists of 60 ships maintained in high readiness and another 84 in the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) maintained in reduced readiness. These ships provide unprecedented global reach for moving large quantities of equipment and supplies in an efficient, cost-effective manner.\(^{45}\)

Much like the previous conflicts, over 90% of Army equipment and cargo for OEF and OIF was transported and continues to be moved via sea. Military owned and chartered vessels sailed from ports worldwide to the ports of Ash Shuybah and the Kuwaiti Naval Base. Ship transit times for the conflict typically averaged 25 days for vessels from the U.S. compared with sail times from Europe (Rotterdam) of 22 days. The three days disparity in ship transit times can be misleading. Sail times encompass only part of the entire deployment process spanning movement from the fort to port of embarkation to downloading and processing at the port of debarkation. The major limiting factors affecting shipping typically occur in getting to the ports, processing at the port, downloading vessels at the destination port, and clearing the port.

During OIF, transportation and logistics from Europe presented numerous challenges. Three months elapsed from the decision to deploy the 1\(^{st}\) Armored Division from Germany to its arrival to Iraq in March 2003. Austria denied rail transit through its country and Turkey's infrastructure could not sufficiently accommodate U.S. heavy and oversized loads. These factors prevented the U.S. from railing cargo to ports in the Mediterranean. While European ports are marvels of efficiency, they are mostly dedicated to commercial shipping. To ship through these ports, the U.S. must attain host nation approval, negotiate staging and pier space, and schedule ships from the U.S. or from the commercial market to sail to Europe. Commercial ships suitable for military cargo were limited as the British and other allied nations had leased the smaller vessels, because their countries do not have strategic lift capacity. Compounding the challenges at the ports of embarkation, the biggest limiting factor was in Kuwait, because almost all the ships had to be unloaded at the port of Ash Shuybah using only three to five berths while the port was still used for commercial shipping throughout the conflict. Exacerbating the strain on shipping at the start of hostilities, the 4\(^{th}\) Infantry Division had over 40
ships afloat in the Mediterranean Sea for almost a month while awaiting Turkey’s fateful decision to deny a U.S. northern approach into Iraq.

To increase flexibility within a theater of operations or adjacent theaters, the Army and Navy have combined to form a joint program to test and procure High Speed Vessels. Tested successfully in OIF, the services leased and modified for military use two commercial 313-foot catamarans capable of moving 850 short tons along with 363 personnel for distances of 2,000 miles at speeds of 40 knots per hour. This unprecedented capability also provides for a state of the art command and control suite on board affording commanders the ability to obtain real time information to plan and rehearse missions while underway. These vessels used in conjunction with wise pre-positioning of equipment enable combatant commanders to potentially reduce strategic lift requirements while providing speed and precision consistent with transformation.

**Strategic Airlift**

The U.S. fleet of strategic air lifters is the envy of the world, but not sufficient to meet the inexhaustible demand to move cargo and equipment in short order. Despite the U.S. Air Force having 180 C-17s under contract and expected to gain approval to rise to 222 throughout the next decade, and 112 of the venerable workhorse C-5s, the war time planning requirements far exceed these numbers. Such demand on the air fleet requires U.S. TRANSCOM and its Air Force Component subordinate command, Air Mobility Command (AMC), to scrutinize every mission while orchestrating the aging tanker fleet for all aerial refueling missions. In an era of just in time logistics and limited stocks at wholesale and retail facilities, the distribution chain has supplanted the supply chain. The Air Force is routinely reliant on the commercial sector for contracting commercial transportation to supplement its military fleet. The Air Force created the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program in 1987 to provide three tiered levels of support for national crises. Whether peace or war and depending on the location of the mission, AMC routinely contracts 95% of military passenger flights to free up its fleet for military cargo and equipment. Additionally, AMC extensively contracts cargo out to commercial carriers and high speed freight forwarders flying a wide range of aircraft.

Similar to shipping and port operations, constraints at the aerial ports are often a key limiting factor. For starters, in Europe the U.S. must comply with host nation landing and takeoff time slots to conform to local quiet or black out restrictions and political whims. Seeking host nation approval to launch offensive operations from or transit airspace is an additional coordination measure impacting deployments. High profile examples of restricting operations include the French government denying overflight permission for U.S. bombers in 1986 to bomb
Libya, and Italy’s last minute approval to authorize the airborne assault originating from Italy for OIF in March 2003. The European airspace is much more congested and most of the long haul passenger aircraft have to reposition from the U.S., often flying an empty “dead” leg enroute to Europe. By law, flying American forces must be tendered to U.S. CRAF carriers meeting strict specifications. Another restrictive factor at the departure and arrival airfields is the maximum on ground (MOG). MOG refers to the maximum number of aircraft that can occupy space at an airfield at any one time. MOG can be restrictive by the size of the airfield to accommodate wide bodied aircraft, the ability for ground support to service aircraft, and competition with commercial aircraft. Ramstein AFB in Germany is the major hub for U.S. forces in Europe and has proven to be a key projection platform for most U.S. operations since the Cold War. It will continue to be critical as one of our premier overseas joint main operating bases.

**Strategic Transportation Assessment**

Since 9/11 the Pentagon has been securing bases, landing and overflight rights and signing military agreements with a series of countries rimming the arc of instability – namely, troubled and failing nations in parts of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia. Military bases have been upgraded or established in Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Djibouti, and the Philippines. The billions of dollars invested by the U.S. since Desert Storm to increase our strategic transportation capabilities, coupled with infrastructure improvements throughout the U.S. and abroad, enable the U.S. to project forces from America more effectively and with less uncertainty to more regions of the world. The numerous world-class air and sea ports available for military use in the U.S. exceed the numbers available in Europe, providing additional redundancies and efficiencies that cumulatively exceed the few days sail time saving from Europe. The capacity and flexibility to rapidly orchestrate deployments with almost entirely CONUS-based ships and aircraft is greater by projecting from the U.S. Strengthening our alliances with nations rimming the arc of instability for en route infrastructure, increases our options and reduces our risks by lessening dependability on few allies.

**READINESS**

The Army’s definition of force readiness equates to the DOD term “military readiness” defined as:

the readiness of the Army within its established force structure, as measured by its ability to station, control, man, equip, replenish, modernize, and train its forces in peacetime, while concurrently planning to mobilize, deploy, employ and sustain them in a war to accomplish assigned missions.
To achieve high states of readiness across the total force to fulfill the demands of full spectrum operations, the Army is moving to a smaller expeditionary force. The Army is undertaking the most significant revision of manning policy in its history. To increase unit and personnel readiness, the service will implement four key changes to stabilize the force.\(^49\)

Shift from a scenario basis to a capability basis encompassing sustained rotational forces for training, refitting, and rest.
Abandoning tiered unit readiness by early and late deployers. No more late deployers. Just future deployers at different stages of their rotation cycle.
Synchronize the soldier’s tours with their unit’s rotation cycles.
Stabilize the assignment of soldiers and their families at home stations and communities across the recurring rotations.

Unit Readiness

Army unit readiness is the ability of a unit to deliver the output or service for which it was designed. The industrial age, high tech force is mired in a protracted, manpower-intensive, counterinsurgency marathon. Requiring 17 brigade combat teams for OIF and OEF, the Army is the only service forced to deploy its troops to serve in combat zones for one-year tours, with many units extended up to 15 months. With 37 active-duty BCTs, up from last year’s 33, many units are returning for their second tour after only a one-year respite that is consumed with transforming and resetting for the next rotation. Equipment usage under combat conditions is the equivalent to ten times normal wear and tear, requiring extensive resources in time and maintenance to reset the force between combat rotations.

The Army has authorization to increase its force strength by up to 30,000 as it transforms from its 10 division-centric construct to 43 active duty brigade combat teams by 2006, and possibly an additional five BCTs in 2007. Ideally, the transformed force will have eight to twelve active duty BCTs deployed overseas on six-month tours while having another 18 months to recover, prepare, and redeploy again.\(^50\) Additionally, National Guard units will be standardized and augmented by transforming eight divisions and fifteen Enhanced Brigades into 34 BCTs. Once rebalanced, the Army expects its active BCTs to conduct deployments once every three years and the reserves once every six years. Conceivably, the proposed active and reserve force mix will provide up to 20 BCTs for sustained operations. When not deployed into a combat zone, units will deploy to forward operating bases for theater security operations to instill the expeditionary warrior ethos. Some units may be designated for specific regions to inculcate geographical or cultural expertise and familiarity to facilitate a timely crisis operations response.
**Personnel Readiness**

The new manning programs will stabilize soldiers and families by reducing permanent change of station moves and extending tour lengths to synchronize soldier’s assignments with unit operational cycles. This fundamentally shifts the emphasis in manning formations from a focus on individual replacement to providing fully manned, ready, capable and deployable units. The Army hopes to reduce the turbulence of frequent assignments by keeping soldiers at individual stateside bases for as long as seven years. Under the home-basing concept, soldiers buying homes can participate in the American dream of home ownership and prospects to increase their personnel worth. The personnel stabilization policies will reduce the number of soldiers separated from their families by broadening the pool of BCTs rotating, and increase the predictability of the time and duration of separations. These policies, in conjunction with reducing the permanently assigned soldiers in Europe, enhance family readiness by markedly reducing the double separation families endure when their soldier deploys from overseas.

**Readiness Assessment**

Stabilization entails a major cultural change for the Army which until now has discouraged soldiers from “homesteading” or remaining at bases for consecutive tours. Putting the brakes on the Army’s built-in inefficiencies of perpetual turbulence in units created by the individual replacement system enhances unit cohesion and readiness at multiple levels. Young soldiers entering the Army will be able to identify with a particular unit and have the opportunity to bond with a unit, knowing what the three-year schedule will be with a high degree of predictability. Coupled with the larger number of BCTs in the active force and greater reserve integration, the Army will be postured to endure the long hard slog while improving the conditions for its soldiers and families. Like most major organizations, changes take time to permeate throughout the varying levels and systems affected, and the Army and its soldiers will be changed for the better. For leaders, the culture change affords the opportunity to achieve greater proficiency and levels of teamwork that translates into improved combat capabilities. Instead of perpetual turbulence, the BCTs will start out as team and train to sustain this level of proficiency for a two-year period. In the near term, BCTs can expect to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan for their period of rotation. In the long run, the BCTs will be deployed to other regions of the arc of instability for GWOT and theater security cooperation missions.

**POLITICO-MILITARY POSTURE**

Arguably the most serious potential consequences of the force realignment would not be military, but political and economic. European stability remains a vital U.S. strategic interest and
Europe remains an essential partner in the Global War on Terrorism. U.S. forward presence in Europe over the past sixty years served as the basis for stability in the region, was critical to our national security, and will continue to be so in the foreseeable future. The partnership continues to evolve and it is in all the parties’ best interests to continue seeking common security solutions for an increasingly volatile and uncertain world. To maintain stability, the military, economic, and diplomatic interdependencies permeating the transatlantic partnership must transcend the inevitable temporary disputes. The realignment could be construed as America disengaging from political entanglements with European countries or international institutions in ways that might constrain its freedom of action. The repudiation of permanent alliances in favor of “coalitions of the willing” increases the impression that the U.S. is proceeding unilaterally.\(^{51}\)

The economic recovery of the European countries, the Cold War’s end, and the emergence of the European Union are powerful forces shaping the transatlantic partnerships. As Europe comes to grips with its increased solidarity as an economic force, challenging the U.S. economic juggernaut in an increasingly globalized world, the partners must assess their relationship(s), identify common and divergent ground, and redefine their security objectives. Historically the past hundred years has taught us that the transatlantic partnership is essential to the security of the U.S. and the modern world.\(^{52}\) The transatlantic partnership is based so firmly on common interests and values that neither feuding personalities nor occasional divergent perceptions can derail our common interests of free trade, security, and counter proliferation.\(^{53}\) Understanding the emerging dynamics in Europe is critical for U.S. policymakers in prescribing the U.S.’s global strategy. The European Union’s (EU) advancement of its own distinct defense forces signals the organization’s desire to expand beyond its original economic mandate, which could compete with NATO and undermine U.S. leadership. This last section explores the impacts of U.S. force alignment from Europe on the evolving North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the emergence of the European Union.

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**

Formed in 1949 to counter the Soviet threat, the enduring NATO continues evolving to safeguard the security and freedom of its 26 members through political and military means. NATO safeguards the common values of democracy, individual liberty, rule of law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Only in NATO, the central legitimizing framework for U.S. power in Europe, can America play an undisputed leadership role in advancing strategic objectives.\(^{54}\) As the dominant military member possessing the most capabilities, the U.S. has
always commanded the alliance by providing the Supreme Allied Commander, while NATO rotates civilian heads to serve as the Secretary General.

Bound by a common heritage, similar values, democratic and market oriented societies, the transatlantic connections are too firmly entrenched to be easily jettisoned.\textsuperscript{55} NATO has long been something more than the sum of its parts. Designed in part to transcend old-fashioned balance of power politics within Europe, it has evolved over the years into a deep-rooted institution with a commitment to democratic values and practices. Much of what NATO has done to promote security in Europe has been diplomatic as much as military. The provision of security in the North Atlantic area has in recent years involved the rebalancing of instruments of power, with greater emphasis on the political and economic and a lesser emphasis on the active military.\textsuperscript{56}

In the late 1990s, NATO reached out to Central and Eastern Europe through its policy of partnership and NATO enlargement. Three post-Cold War challenges to NATO manifested themselves in the aftermath of 9/11.\textsuperscript{57}

- The new threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction emanate from outside of Europe. These emerging threats drew the attention of the U.S. away from Europe, and therefore NATO, an institution critically dependent upon U.S. leadership.
- Emergence of divergent strategies to cope with the emerging threats coupled with a consensual decision-making culture that is cumbersome and unresponsive.
- Disparate military capabilities among U.S. and NATO allies are widening as the U.S. transforms to a rapid response, power projection force, encouraging the U.S. to act unilaterally.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and highlighted by the Balkan wars, the U.S. spearheaded initiatives for NATO to expand “out of area” operations beyond the territorial boundaries of the member nations. Drawing from observations during the Kosovo campaign, the U.S. pressed NATO to become more flexible and less bureaucratic, while encouraging the European nations to enhance their military capabilities. After fifty years of restricted military activity to self-defense within the defined treaty area, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in America convinced most alliance members of the vulnerabilities posed by threats beyond NATO’s boundaries. In the wake of the terrorist attacks, the U.S. convinced NATO to trigger the alliance’s collective self-defense obligation to respond to terrorist attacks by non-state actors or rogue nations.\textsuperscript{58}

In November 2002, NATO formally broadened the meaning of collective self-defense and implemented fundamental changes to adopt new policies for dealing with terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In addition to mandating the alliance to combat terrorism, NATO committed to an unprecedented deployment of forces to Afghanistan by taking over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in August 2003. Additionally, NATO further expanded the military as a means to counter terrorism and stated a willingness to act in support of the international community.  

Though the ISAF mission represents a considerable stride outside of Europe for NATO in support of the fledgling Afghan government, the mission authorized by the United Nations underscores the limitations and exposes the weaknesses of the non-U.S. led mission. ISAF’s mission is limited to assisting the Afghans in establishing security and mounting non-offensive operations, and is completely distinguishable from the U.S.-led coalition fighting the war on terrorism. Although sanctioned by NATO, the ISAF command structure is not NATO, but member nations volunteering to lead ad hoc coalitions to provide forces and support. This patchwork of limited commitment demonstrates there is still a great deal of discomfort in NATO conducting combat operations outside of Europe. As a result, the NATO-sanctioned ISAF suffers from a shortage of equipment, vehicles, and personnel. Its planning and coordination mechanisms are broken and woefully unresponsive as demonstrated by taking six months to provide three helicopters. Although ISAF is an Article 5 NATO operation, it obviously is not a priority to many of the European nations.

Urged by the Americans to transform NATO towards more relevant current threats, NATO is seeking to balance traditional, Euro-centric missions while tackling the new global threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In response to the new threats, NATO recently announced that it would establish a 20,000-man expeditionary force for global operations, the NATO Response Force (NRF). NATO is creating the integrated, spearhead NRF to take action in world hotspots for full spectrum operations within five days and sustain itself for 30 days. Manned by NATO members to provide personnel on an annual basis, the NRF will be able to conduct fully integrated and sustained land, sea, and air operations. Given the poor ISAF commitment, it is debatable whether the NRF will come to fruition.

Compounding the challenges of the Afghanistan mission, the U.S.-led war into Iraq has caused the most tumultuous rift within the alliance. Much of the transatlantic divergence on Iraq stems from the fact that since 9/11 the U.S. has been psychologically at war, while the Europeans have not. Europeans do not share the U.S. urgency to act kinetically against the “Axis of Evil,” and favor deterrence as their primary means to thwart terrorism. Among the NATO membership, there is no consensus on how to tackle the new threats of terrorism and WMD. Europeans agree terrorism is very real, but recognize it as a tactic best contained by
mobilized civil actions and counteractions rather than employing conventional military operations. The U.S. strategy of preemptive strike has become the focus of great criticism among the Europeans. They view preemption as unwise, unwarranted, dangerous, and a disturbing harbinger of things to come from the world’s sole superpower.63

As the U.S. seeks to diversify its risks globally, it is bilaterally broadening alliances with new NATO members and in other regions to access the arc of instability. What is certain for the U.S. is that it is going to reduce its forces in Europe to the lowest levels since World War II. Some analysts argue the move could spur the alliance to streamline and reprioritize mandates to make NATO more effective. While enabling U.S. forces to be more effective on the world stage, Nile Gardiner forecasts the realignment to be a wake-up call for the European countries which are complacent about spending money on their own defense, particularly Germany. In 2003 Germany spent $35.1 billion on defense, less than 10% of the U.S. He added America’s reliance on “new” European nations could change the dynamics in NATO, to the point where France and Germany could no longer be so dominant.64

**European Union (EU)**

Created in 1951 by six European Nations, and excluding the U.S., the organization set out to establish a common European market for the coal and steel industries. Now comprising 25 nations, the EU’s goal is to evolve into an economic and political superpower on the European continent that stands equal to the U.S. In 2004, the heads of the EU signed the European Constitution (to be ratified over the next two years by each state), effectively creating the first transnational political entity. These “United States of Europe” represent the rise of the new ideal that could eclipse the U.S. as the world’s model for well-being and prosperity. A European vision is of a new type of power, based not on military strength but on economic cooperation and construction of communities of conscience, a new kind of superpower based on waging peace.65

The EU’s 455 million consumers comprise the largest internal market in the world and is the largest exporting power. Just within three years of its circulation as a currency, the euro is 33% stronger than the dollar, fueling debate about converting the world monetary standard from the U.S. dollar to the euro. The EU’s economic clout has humbled once powerful U.S. businesses. In many of the world’s leading industries, European transnational companies dominate. European financial institutions are the world’s bankers with fourteen of the twenty largest commercial banks in the world. European businesses lead in the chemical, engineering, construction, aerospace and insurance industries, as well as the food wholesale and retail
trades. Sixty-one of the 140 biggest companies on the Global Fortune 500 ranking are European, while only 50 are U.S. companies.\textsuperscript{56}

The Europeans were extensively consulted and were not surprised by the U.S. realignment of forces from Europe. The responses have been mixed, as for many decades the U.S. presence has been a reassuring fixture of stability, while conjuring post-World War II occupation and Cold War memories of the past. As early as the mid-1990s, the EU started to articulate an ambition to become a military actor in its own right, raising the question of NATO’s future. With a combined defense budget of 160 billion euros and 1.6 million troops, EU countries together boast the world’s second largest military force. While the EU spends one-half of what the U.S. invests in defense, it has been estimated that its military capability amounts to only one-tenth of what the U.S. gets for its money because of duplicate and incompatible equipment.\textsuperscript{67} With the withdrawal of U.S. troops, Europeans will have to take more responsibility for their own security.

The idea of the European Defense Agency (EDA) originated in 1998 as a result of Europe’s inability to respond appropriately to the Balkan conflicts. The EDA’s objective is to strengthen European contributions by enabling European forces to take a larger share of the European security burden in circumstances where NATO as a whole is not engaged. The EU agreed that Europe should be able to handle its own peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. The EDA has proposed this intergovernmental agency set up within the EU to supervise the development of military capabilities, research, and armaments across the European nations. The agency will have several functions related to capability development encompassing research and technology; management of cooperative programs; and reinforcement of European industry, including the implementation of a European defense equipment market. The EDA wants to create up to nine elite battle groups (1,500 soldiers) for rapid deployment to international trouble spots within 15 days. This force would complement the 20,000-man NRF.\textsuperscript{68}

The creation of the European Defense Agency is troublesome across the Atlantic and raises concerns about Europe diverting resources and commitment away from NATO. Europeans contend that improvements derived from the new agency will complement NATO, and help solve European shortfalls in material and organization. The agency will ensure that new members of the EU contribute in European defense by tapping into their niche capabilities. Previous European defense collaborative attempts have had mixed results. Lacking common supply channels and doctrine, the leadership could not sufficiently focus the common efforts to navigate the many pitfalls in coordinating defense requirements across disparate systems.
However, ongoing EDA development seems more promising as the Europeans are advancing programs for an air-to-air missile, observation satellites, and a strategic cargo airplane.69

Politico-Military Posture Assessment

U.S. troop levels abroad have been viewed as symbolic of our commitment. Realigning most of our ground forces from Europe clearly signals to our NATO allies our shifting interests towards the arc of instability. However, our resolve to remain engaged in European affairs and security is solidified by maintaining the joint main operating and forward bases. The U.S. risks forfeiting intangibles accrued from its substantial presence in Europe, from close relations with their alliance counterparts to the goodwill of the communities. The Europeans could interpret our pulling back into fortress America as a way of enhancing our unilateral capability. The reduction in forces in Europe lessens our commitment to Europe as our day-to-day capacity to participate in the full range of activities diminishes. The U.S. will substitute periodic exercises for forward presence to maintain familiarity with other militaries and other peoples that we gained from being in Europe.70 To compensate for our reduced European military footprint, the U.S. is embarking on a sustained and effective diplomatic campaign. The U.S. will expand its consulate general in Frankfurt with up to 1,000 employees in order to use it as a hub for supporting diplomatic missions in Europe.71 U.S. diplomats will have their hands full over the next decade trying to win the war on terrorism and help manage these multiple transitions and will need every ounce of U.S. political and military leverage.72

As evident by the ISAF performance, the U.S. is disappointed with the European support for the war on terror. Many Europeans, in turn, are disappointed about what they perceive as America’s fixation on military responses, resenting the U.S. approach of linking the war on terror with issues such as weapons of mass destruction and the war in Iraq.73 Europeans tend to assess NATO as a military alliance somewhat less useful in counterterrorist efforts than their emerging regional organization, the European Union. To some observers, an EU command structure could potentially serve as a security organization of first response. A greater role for the EU would tend to marginalize NATO and the U.S., the preeminent player in the latter organization. Despite the U.S. being the most powerful member, it could find itself upstaged by a bloc of powers less powerful and capable. In the future there will be a greater role for the EU in defense and security matters, including planning scenario development and coalition operations. As the EU matures and evolves to become more relevant for advancing European centric concerns, the U.S. is less likely to influence European thinking.74
Europe’s ineffectiveness during the Balkan Wars and most recently “old Europe’s” outright opposition to the U.S.’s invasion of Iraq have severely strained the alliance. Perceiving a reduced threat from its members and accustomed to the reliance on the U.S. for security, the Europeans have continued to decrease their defense spending. The U.S. spends $10 billion annually for its force structure in Europe. The U.S. defense spending is almost 4 percent of GDP while Europe’s average contribution is 2 percent. Most European nations have cut their defense spending to the bone to prop up their social-welfare states by providing benefits not afforded to Americans. Despite the growing synergy of the European Union’s population of 450 million and combined domestic gross domestic product exceeding that of the U.S., Europe is struggling to establish a foreign and security policy. The undefined Europe may be independent, it may even offer something constructive from time to time, but it will usually be self-centered and inwardly focused.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Realigning our forces from Germany finally breaks the last vestiges of the Cold War-era, and must be part of a greater grand strategy if the U.S. is to be successful in the Global War on Terrorism. Using the NATO construct as a successful model for implementing regional stability, the U.S. needs to develop a far reaching grand strategy encompassing all forms of power and work multilaterally within long lasting, meaningful alliances to promote security within the arc of instability. Though temporary coalitions of the willing may be convenient and not bind the U.S. to longstanding requirements, they undermine our long-term security by questioning our resolve and commitment to partners. Unlike the Cold War era in which the world was forced into a symmetrical mutual deterrence posture, the Global War on Terrorism is irregular, asymmetrical, and occurs in regions geopolitically and culturally vastly different than the U.S.

To ensure the realignment of our forces from Europe contributes to increasing our national strategy, I propose the following recommendations.

Realign the forces from Europe over a period of three to five years. Prolonging the realignment period enables the DOD to conform to the 2005 BRAC decisions, and to establish a logical and affordable construction program to build the infrastructure to replace vacated facilities in Europe. If it were to cost an estimated $6 billion, the expenses could be prorated over several years while not excessively increasing the annual military construction budget, currently at $9.5 billion. During the period until 2008, the European-based forces should be rotated for subsequent OIF rotations. Upon returning in 2007, the first units will prepare for redeployment over a period commensurate with the receiving facilities in the U.S. Timing of the
deployment to CONUS should coincide with the completion of new or renovated facilities in the states, or even be timed to backfill deploying units for OIF V and VI. Prolonging the realignment provides the U.S. some leverage with the host nation, NATO and Europe. The communities in Europe will be adversely affected by the loss of revenues, so the host country will appreciate a protracted timeline. The longer period allows both NATO and the EU to adjust to the new posture. Time allows the U.S. to assess its Theater Security Cooperation efforts, establish the Eastern European forward operating bases, and assess the capabilities of the emerging NRF and EDA forces.

We must increase our political and economic efforts to advance our strategic goals in Europe. The EU’s inevitable emergence as a superpower to rival the U.S. in political and economic might will continue to shape the military alliance. Our sixty years of security investments have come to fruition by stabilizing enduring democratic regimes, defeating the Soviet threat, and expanding democracy eastward towards Russia. Instead of Europe being a battlefield requiring Americans to either protect it from itself or outside attack, it is now a power projection platform. Establishing austere bases eastward expands our options, increases regional stability, and frees up U.S. troops to fight the GWOT in other parts of the globe. The U.S. should encourage the European countries to upgrade their military capabilities while welcoming their involvement on the world political stage. While the transatlantic rift over the war in Iraq clearly demonstrates Europe’s resolve to act independently in the pursuit of its own interests, it also highlights the effectiveness of its non-military powers. Europe’s willingness to spearhead the negotiations with Iran to curb nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is timely, at least for the near term, and postpones U.S. unilateral action.

The U.S. must work with its allies in resolving the tactics and techniques to respond to terrorism by drawing upon each other’s expertise and niche capabilities. Our presence in Europe is still important, but being forward deployed is not the same as being optimally deployed for global threats. As NATO and the EU evolve, and the U.S. security interests shift elsewhere, the rationale for the U.S. European Command to rename its headquarters to Western Command speaks volumes.

Expanding on the success of NATO, the U.S. should spearhead creating multilateral regional alliances to legitimize its presence for promoting mutual security within and around the arc of instability. The U.S. needs to be increasingly engaged on the world stage through theater security cooperation, cultural, and education engagement programs to reestablish the credibility of America. As demonstrated by the decreasing number of countries among the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq, the U.S.’s unilateral and preemptive actions undermine our long-term interests.
and overburdens the military. Strategically establishing forward operating bases and bare base facilities in multiple locations coupled with our reduced commitment in Europe enables the Army to rotate forces throughout other regions to improve geographic, military, and cultural understanding to advance U.S. national security. Unlike post-World War II and the Cold War, large numbers of permanent forces are not desirable, as our enemies are asymmetric and unconventional. America’s challenge is to achieve a balance of useful presence without undermining or offending the local populace. The U.S. needs to apply the lessons learned from its untenable presence in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan to ensure it does not repeat the problems at our new forward operating bases. The U.S. must secure flexible agreements with host countries to allow U.S. forces to launch offensive operations, sustain operations, or transit countries en route to operational areas.

Reevaluate the Army pre-positioned stocks to improve its capability to respond to irregular and short notice crises. The current sets consist of heavy conventional equipment, with too many sets in Europe. The three brigade sets in Europe need to be redistributed with one of the sets moved to the new forward operating bases in Eastern Europe for use by rotating units. In addition to the locations and numbers of sets, the Army must reevaluate what type of equipment is loaded, types and quantities of supplies, and the type of ships. If the U.S. foresees smaller, unconventional type conflicts, combatant commanders will want ground forces reflecting such equipment and loaded on smaller, faster ships capable of docking at shallower ports.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. is the only nation capable of exporting security in a sustained fashion and it must expand upon its success in Europe by systematically exporting security throughout the arc of instability. Maintaining America’s existing force levels and infrastructure in Europe while simultaneously increasing its global posture, overextends an already stretched force and impedes transforming the military to a capabilities-based force. In a dynamic environment threatened by failed states and non-state actors in regions beyond Europe, the U.S. can globally posture its forces by leveraging its transformational strategic and technological superiority. America’s investments in pre-positioned equipment and strategic airlift and sealift provide the U.S. unprecedented global reach. Realigning military forces from Europe is a prudent means supportive of the GWOT, and consistent with transformation as outlined in the U.S. defense strategy. The emergence of a secure Europe is a testimony of the success of our Cold War strategy.
Though the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the 2005 BRAC, and the federal budget will have a great impact on transforming the DOD, rebalancing the Army from the Cold War division-centric to the modular Brigade Combat Team formation postures the service to sustain prolonged combat operations now. Standardization of the brigades and integration of the active and reserve mix enable the Army to spread the burden among its forces. Stabilizing BCTs, their soldiers and families will pay readiness dividends while providing predictability. Replacing the Army’s sixty years of infrastructure investment in Europe is going to be a costly undertaking. The prolonged commitment in Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism requires high stake negotiations amongst Congress, DOD and the Army to fund military construction.

To maintain its influence in Europe, the U.S. must continue to improve its military and diplomatic relations with old and new Europe allies while pursuing new alliances with countries bounding the arc of instability. Using NATO as the basis for its legitimacy in Europe, the decreased American footprint could reduce its ability to influence the allies and possibly someday relinquish the command of NATO. Largely as a result of Washington’s pressure on the Europeans, the U.S. has been successful in convincing its allies to modernize their military capabilities and reach beyond the borders of the continent. While not wielding the biggest stick in Europe may be an uncomfortable proposition to the Cold War warriors, it shifts the burden of security to the allies, lessens America’s military commitments in Europe, and increases the dependence upon diplomacy. While the Europeans fully respect our capabilities, they must be reassured of our commitment to Europe’s security and would be perhaps more cooperative if we acted more multilaterally.

The partnerships need to be genuine such that aligned nations derive mutual long term security and cooperative benefits. Routinely sharing intelligence, conducting joint and coalition military exercises, and performing outreach and engagement efforts on a consistent basis increases U.S. experience and influence within the regions. For existing partnerships, the U.S. must refine the agreements to develop understandings for the employment and deployment of forces to ensure its expeditionary forces are not impeded by a country’s denial of territory or airspace during crises. Decreasing the U.S. military footprint in Europe by transforming to a more efficient mix of main, forward, and cooperative bases worldwide enhances homeland security and expands global stability while promoting national security.
ENDNOTES


4 Ibid, FORWARD.

5 Ibid.

6 “Present at the Creation: A Survey of America’s World Role,” The Economist 22 (June 29, 2002); [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 8 September 2004.


10 Newman, 347.

11 Ibid, 345.


13 Walt, 59.


15 Kemp, 64.

16 Kemp, 67.


18 Ibid.


23 Ibid, 3.

24 Ibid, 3.


26 Ibid, 7.

27 Kitfield.

28 Congressional Budget Office, Options for Changing the Army’s Overseas Basing, May 2004, 71.

29 Schoomaker, 5.


31 Ibid.


33 Vince Crowley, “What to Expect at a JFOS, JCSL or ERI,” Army Times (11 October 2004): 30.

34 Congressional Budget Office, 7.


36 Ibid, 12.

37 Ibid, 29.

39 Congressional Budget Office, xvi.


41 Ibid, 27.

42 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Transportation Resources, Joint Publication 4-01 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 19 March 2003), 28-18.

43 Harvest Falcon is the much more capable package, providing shelters and equipment to support up to 55K personnel and 822 aircraft at 15 bed-down locations in a variety of configurations. Ibid, 28-20


49 R. L. Brownlee and Peter J. Schoomaker, United States Army Serving a Nation at War, Department of the Army, n.d., 13.

50 Kitfield.


55 Ibid.

57 Ruhle, 91.

58 Ibid, 93.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid, 96.


62 Cahlink, 58.

63 Ruhle, 95.


66 Ibid.


68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 Kitfield.


72 Asmus, A19.

73 Ruhle, 96.


76 Dowd, 61.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


