


The False Divorce: Retying the Knot of War and Peace



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CETO Report

The False Divorce: Retying the Knot of War and Peace

Introduction. We started work on this paper shortly after President Bush declared that major combat had ended in Iraq. Back then, we thought the problem that needed to be addressed was “transitioning from warfighting to stabilization operations” and answering the question of “how we transition from one to the other better, more seamlessly, and without skipping a beat.” We saw combat and support forces who had fought in the shock and awe phase of the campaign, and others who arrived shortly afterwards, experience difficulties in performing a wide variety of missions, especially in the early stages of the post-conflict phase. While many of the missions they performed had to do with providing security, many others related to restarting and rebuilding the economy, the public infrastructure, and governmental institutions, areas for which they had little if any expertise, experience, or training.

As time went by, it became apparent that “transitioning from warfighting to stabilization operations” wasn’t necessarily the problem. In a reasonably short period of time, our forces developed and refined tactics, techniques, and procedures tailored to deal with the challenging situations they faced. This enabled them to perform their security and myriad other missions more effectively while being able to shift back to combat operations whenever necessary. In essence, out of practical necessity, they operationalized the Marine Corps classic “Three Block War” mentality, of being able to provide humanitarian relief on one block, perform classic peacekeeping on the next, and conduct full-scale combat on the third.

As we watched what was happening in Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan, and worked and reworked this paper, we concluded that the problem which actually needed to be addressed was one of “emphasis and balance.” Warfighting always has been the primary reason for the military to exist. Because of that, the Department of Defense has given it the highest priority and much of its resources. On the other hand, those many other things the military does, commonly referred to as military operations other than war (MOOTW), and more recently as security or stability and support operations (SASO) or stabilization operations, have been given a lower priority and far fewer resources. Consequently, the military has not been adequately organized, trained, or equipped to perform them. This paper attempts to describe the environment which led us to where we are one year after the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom and provides recommendations to help our forces perform all of their missions equally well across the range of military operations from peace to crisis and conflict.

Terminology and Definitions. One of the challenges we faced in researching and writing this paper, was using terminology and definitions that were commonly agreed to and understood. Many people used the terms “MOOTW” and “SASO” interchangeably, almost as if SASO had replaced MOOTW, making it confusing as to what they meant and what the distinctions were between the two, if any. There also was disagreement as to what “SASO” meant. While some defined it as “security and stabilization operations,” others defined it as “stabilization and support operations.” Still others used the term

stabilization or the phrase “stabilization and reconstruction” to define similar activities.¹ Additionally, the terms “war” and “military operations other than war” often were used to mean a type of operation, a time-frame, and an environment.

The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms defines “MOOTW” as:

Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war.²

This definition captures two important aspects of this type of operation: (1) it includes military capabilities that can be performed during operations short of war; and (2) it integrates them with the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of power before, during, and after war. This latter part of the definition significantly expands the time frame and environment in which these capabilities are performed.

Range of Military Operations




Figure 1

Figure 1 depicts the of range of military operations from war through military operations other than war, which is commonly accepted and used throughout the

¹ S. 2127, 108th Congress, 2D Session, 25 February 2004.

² Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 as amended through 17 December 2003.

Department of Defense. What is of particular value in this chart is the listing of potential operations combined with the graphic depiction of their timing or conduct across the spectrum

The Department of Defense dictionary and joint acronyms and abbreviations master data base do not yet include SASO, nor is SASO addressed in Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. Furthermore, the Marine Corps does not define it either.

However Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, explains SASO this way:

The Army conducts full spectrum operations to accomplish missions in both war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). Full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. Offensive and defensive operations normally dominate military operations in war, as well as some smaller-scale contingencies. On the other hand, stability and support operations predominate in MOOTW that may include certain smaller-scale contingencies and peacetime military engagements.³

Full Spectrum Operations

Types of Military Operations	Offense	Defense	Stability	Support
	Types of Offensive Operations	Types of Defensive Operations	Types of Stability Operations	Types of Support Operations
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Movement to contact •Attack •Exploitation •Pursuit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Area defense •Mobile defense •Retrograde 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Peace operations •Foreign internal defense •Security assistance •Humanitarian and civic assistance •Support to insurgencies •Support to counterdrug operations •Combatting terrorism •Noncombatant evacuation operations •Arms control •Show of force 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Domestic support operations •Foreign humanitarian assistance
	Forms of maneuver			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Envelopment •Turning movement •Frontal attack •Penetration •Infiltration 				
Types of Tactical Enabling Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Reconnaissance operations •Security operations •Troop movement •Breach 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •River crossing •Relief in-place •Passage of lines •Information operations 		

Figure 2

³ FM 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations, dated 20 February 2003, p. 1-1.

This field manual goes into great detail describing stability and support operations individually, listing some of the purposes for which forces might be employed to conduct them and the types of operations they might include. It lists ten broad types of stability operations and two types of support operations. See Figure 2.⁴

All of these descriptions, definitions, and charts leave room for confusion and misunderstanding. Even though the term “military operations other than war” exists in the current official joint lexicon and is commonly used throughout the Defense Department, the term itself truly is a misnomer and vestige from the past. The word “other,” if not directly, at least in-directly, conveys the meaning that these types of operations are of lesser importance and have a lower priority than those performed during war. While on one hand the definition limits military operations other than war to those capabilities performed during operations short of war, on the other it expands it to include those things performed before, during, and after war as well. The way the term is used also is confusing – is it a capability, a type of operation, a time-frame, or an environment in which these capabilities or operations are performed? It often is used to mean all three.

The Army’s field manual on stability operations and support operations categorizes these types of operations into four areas: offense, defense, stability, and support. This is clearer and perhaps more accurate than grouping capabilities under either war or military operations other than war. However, these four areas may not be all-inclusive categories for everything the military does, especially those things done during peacetime, contingencies, pre-conflict, or post-conflict. Additionally, this categorization does not clearly convey the reality that many of the operations could be performed in two or more of the categories simultaneously. The manual’s description that stability and support operations would predominate in military operations other than war seems to miss the point that they also could play huge roles during peacetime, offensive, and defensive operations.

As with the term “MOOTW,” “SASO” also can be confusing and inaccurate – aside from the differences in wording and lack of an official Department of Defense definition, does it mean a capability, a type of operation, a time-frame, or an environment in which these capabilities or operations are performed?

The lack of a Marine Corps or Department of Defense Joint definition and doctrine addressing SASO is not necessarily a bad thing. When Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, undergoes its next revision, the Services and Joint community will have the opportunity to provide suggestions and recommend changes based on a wide variety of lessons they have learned since it was last published in June 1995. This opportunity to shape and update the doctrine in this critically important area will require sufficient time to reflect on and digest the changes that have occurred in the global security environment which will impact the types of operations the military will conduct in the future.

⁴ FM 3-07, pp. 1-1 to 1-7

What became very evident during Operation Enduring Freedom is that we must move away from any distinction or classification system that “boxes” operations performed during peacetime, contingency, pre- or post-conflict into something that implies operations “other than war.” Whether one calls them military operations other than war, security or stabilization and support operations, stabilization operations or something else, what is most important to realize is that they are performed across the entire range of environments and can be just as deadly as war.

A broader, more simple concept that captures the types of operations the military performs and the environments in which it performs them should be considered when new doctrine is developed. For example, the terms “peacetime, contingency, pre-conflict, war, and post-conflict,” or something similar, could be used to describe the environments in which offensive, defensive, stabilization and other operations are performed. See Figure 3 below for a depiction of this concept.




Figure 3

Background. Historically, the United States military has been organized, trained, and equipped principally to fight and win our nation’s wars, and it has a long and illustrious history of doing so. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the U.S. national security strategy no longer rests on deterrence in a bi-polar world. A much more complex, unpredictable, and all too often, violent world has emerged, replacing the one for which we had organized, trained, and equipped our forces. Our forces also have become involved more and more frequently in conducting

operations during peacetime, contingency, and in pre- and post-conflict environments. In this context the U.S. has a mixed record of success.

For example, the 1992-1993 U.S.-led humanitarian relief effort in Somalia was an overwhelming success. However, the mission failed after the U.S. transitioned responsibility to a United Nations-led effort with a much broader nation-building mandate. The United Nations changed its primary focus from humanitarian relief to capturing local warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed without making the necessary transition in combat forces, multipliers, and rules of engagement that would have allowed it to successfully prosecute the new mission.

Long after the brief 1994 U.S. intervention, Haiti remains the poorest nation in the Western hemisphere with chronic political, economic, and social problems. It continues to be one of the world's many flashpoints and once again requires U.S. military involvement because of civil unrest and insurrection.⁵



26th MEU Marines walk with Kosovo's children.

By contrast, both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are examples of successful peacekeeping operations. However, they continue to require a long-term military presence simply to maintain the peace among the various ethnic entities, to react to periodic crises, and to support progress in redevelopment.

Two years after the Taliban was overthrown from power in Afghanistan, the reach of the Karzai government remains limited primarily to Kabul and other large cities. A resurgent Taliban has increased its rhetoric and attacks against Afghan and international military forces, civilians, and humanitarian relief organizations, and contractors operating in the cities, throughout the countryside, and along the borders. Additionally, some powerful warlords resist the authority of the central government. These actions continue to disrupt the pace and impact of reconstruction and democratization efforts.

And by the end of October 2003, six months after President Bush declared that major combat had ended in Iraq, more U.S. servicemen and women had been killed by hostile fire than were killed during the major combat phase.⁶ As a result of continued attacks against coalition forces and Iraqis who cooperate with the coalition, as well as innocent Iraqis, international and non-governmental organization employees, and

⁵ Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities draft paper, *Flashpoints of Future Conflict*, is examining six critical factors as drivers of future conflict in countries and regions across the globe. The factors it is assessing include: water (scarcity and conflict), energy, poor governance, HIV/AIDS, demographics and religion. The study's aim is to project potential regions and countries that may develop conflict based on these critical factors, determine potential courses of action for the Marine Corps, and identify opportunities to exploit.

⁶ Susan Sachs, "Iraq: Postwar G.I Death Toll Exceeds Wartime Total," *New York Times*, 30 October 2003.

contractors, the coalition's reconstruction and democratization efforts have been slowed, while fear, disillusionment and resentment have spread throughout the Iraqi population.

There is no question that the U.S. military must be prepared to fight and win our nation's wars. However, it must be prepared to do much more. The reason is simple – no one can predict accurately how threats will manifest themselves or what crises will occur in the future. Will the wars of tomorrow remain wars in the classic sense of the word, with traditional force-on-force confrontations fighting for terrain? They may – China could become a potential threat, not only to Taiwan, but elsewhere because of its increasing need for energy. Will future threats resemble the war in Afghanistan where a few Special Operations Forces were able to empower the Northern Alliance and other warlords to overthrow the Taliban government? Will they mutate into a hybrid, multi-dimensional, asymmetric, constantly changing threat, similar to the one we are fighting today in the global war on terrorism? Or will they become more like nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan or peace operations in the Balkans? In order to fight and win each of these "wars," in any potential environment, the U.S. military must be prepared to perform a wide range of operations equally well from the very onset.

Characteristics and Trends. One significant characteristic of the post-Cold War world has been the dramatically increased frequency of situations requiring our military to deploy overseas and perform a very wide range of operations. We fought six wars during this period, one in Panama, two in Iraq, one in Serbia, one in Afghanistan and one globally. Occasionally, natural disasters have occurred, creating an immediate need for assistance that no one other than the military can provide, at least initially, as in Bangladesh and Central America. Our forces also have deployed following agreements by governments or among warring parties to end their hostilities and allow foreign forces into their countries, such as when U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces deployed into Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed. Deployments to East Timor and, most recently, Liberia are other examples.



U.S. and Iranian military work together in humanitarian relief operations to support post-earthquake Bam, Iran.

A trend that has developed since 9/11 has been the requirement to conduct offensive, defensive, and stabilization operations simultaneously, repetitively, and in random order, regardless of the type of environment. Partially in response to this trend, but more to shape the environment into which our forces are deployed, one major key to success will be having the ability to shift seamlessly back and forth between these various types of operations and to perform each of them with the same degree of proficiency. It will be important that our forces hit the ground running from the very beginning; there often will be little time for on-the-job training, and it will be difficult to recover from some mistakes.

There is a common but understandable misconception that war is the most dangerous environment in which the military conducts operations. However, other environments, peacetime, the pre- or post-conflict phases of a campaign or during a separate contingency, can be just as dangerous as war, if not more so. There are many reasons for this, from the types of military forces involved, to the types of operations they perform, their interaction with the local population, the threat, and the willingness of our enemies to target civilian, non-military targets. The number of U.S. and coalition military forces, international humanitarian relief workers, contractors, and local civilians killed and wounded in Iraq since the end of major combat exemplifies this.

A fundamental characteristic of many of the situations which require the deployment of U.S. forces is that they can be extremely complex and difficult to resolve. They may involve multiple crises simultaneously, such as civil war, interstate conflict, or religious disputes; atrocities and genocide by one group over another; control of natural resources; cultivation of crops used in the production of illegal drugs; natural disasters such as floods, droughts, and earthquakes; refugees and displaced persons; and starvation, disease, and deaths. The term “complex contingency” commonly used to describe these situations is apropos.

In many cases, the underlying circumstances which caused the crisis and precipitated the U.S. deployment will not be resolved quickly or easily, if at all. Once U.S. and other forces arrive in a country and impose a new order, the status-quo will change. Individuals and groups who previously had been repressed may exact revenge on those they hold responsible. Those who lost power and control as a result of the deployment may resist the changes. Resolving these and many of the other problems plaguing the country will require much persistence and patience on the part of U.S. forces. And it may take years of deployments in very challenging and difficult circumstances simply to maintain the peace while reconstruction proceeds slowly, relying heavily on a host of other entities, many from the interagency, international, and non-governmental sectors.

Many of the situations requiring military forces to intervene will last longer in duration and be more complex and dangerous than full-scale war. Consequently, these situations will demand sufficient numbers of forces, perhaps more than required during war, who are disciplined, trained, experienced, and technically proficient. The forces will



PSYOP literature distribution at a market in Baghdad, Iraq.

need special equipment and support systems, from weapons to vehicles and communications. They will need efficient unit rotation and individual replacement programs, tailored medical support, and flexible logistics capabilities. They also will need specialized capabilities such as non-lethal weapons, working dogs, explosive and chemical detectors, and unmanned aerial and ground vehicles that are routinely accessible at the lowest levels. They will need linguists for commanders as well

as squads and teams. They most definitely will need significantly enhanced intelligence capabilities that maximize human and cultural intelligence at the local level. They almost always will need proactive civil affairs capabilities that enable them to undertake meaningful projects in collaboration with other organizations and groups. They also will need quick and easy access to sufficient funding for these projects. And they certainly will need robust psychological operations capabilities at the tactical and operational levels that enable them to communicate directly, continuously, and clearly with the local population.

Dealing with these situations will require a mix of combat, support, and Special Operations Forces, both active and reserve. Units must be flexible and adaptable, able to perform roles for which they have neither been trained nor equipped. It may require coordination and work with forces from different nations, who speak different languages and follow different rules of engagement. There also may be a whole host of interagency and civilian organizations operating on-scene. Finally, and absolutely critical to long-term success, local populations will have to be included in the process of building and implementing programs from the very beginning. This entire process will pose incredible challenges.

For example, during the post-conflict phase of a campaign or during a complex contingency, artillery forces may not be needed to perform their artillery missions. If properly prepared, they could be assigned to perform the military police law enforcement, information operations coordination, or civil affairs functions as a short term, expedient fix. The 11th Marine Regiment in Operation Iraqi Freedom provides an example of this flexibility and adaptability.⁷ Long term solutions will require force structure changes that increase those needed skills and capabilities. Infantrymen from different countries could be used to patrol on-foot and in vehicles in assigned sectors, often in a combined fashion with host-nation officials in order to provide the overall security umbrella. Units and individuals from myriad other countries possessing technical skills in fields such as medicine, engineering, telecommunications, law enforcement, judicial, governmental affairs, etc., may work with local groups and officials, international and humanitarian relief organizations, and private contractors to provide basic services and rebuild the nation. Interagency and international organization representatives could assume responsibility for working with local governmental officials to repair, restart, and improve the governmental bureaucracy and local or national infrastructure. Non-governmental organizations could focus on their areas of expertise, from humanitarian relief to education, health, and communications. And local leaders could share the responsibility and eventually take charge of running their country. This will require extensive training, practice, coordination, cooperation, and give-and-take between and among all the parties concerned.

Just as the number of situations requiring our nation to deploy its forces have increased, more and more often our forces have been required to perform everything from offensive to stabilization operations at the same time. Especially since the end of major

⁷ Brigadier General John F. Kelly, "Tikrit, South to Babylon," *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 2004, p.18.

combat in Iraq, it has become evident that overall mission success cannot be achieved if we win the war but lose the peace. The mantra and the mindset that the military is organized, trained, and equipped principally to fight and win our nation's wars must be modified. Winning the post-conflict phase of a large campaign or succeeding in a limited contingency must have a priority equal in importance to winning the war.

Differing Views Within the Defense Community. Throughout the past decade, much debate has occurred regarding the use of military forces in countries where the U.S. has little or no national security interests. Arguments were offered that many of the situations that existed required military forces to employ different, softer skills that degraded their overall combat readiness and negatively effected their warfighting ethos. It also was opined that the military would need additional time to prepare for these types of operations, and that upon redeployment at the completion of a mission, it would take a considerable time and effort to retrain, adjust attitudes, and sharpen individual and collective skills for combat.

Others commented that the Department of Defense should create separate units which only performed peacekeeping and peace enforcement duties, allowing the remainder of the armed forces to focus on combat. Some countered this argument with the concern that if the U.S. had forces specifically earmarked for peacekeeping and peace enforcement, then it would be forced to use them. There were others still who called for the U.S. to create a standing, deployable civilian police force, similar to the Italian national police force, the Carabinieri, to perform law enforcement related duties overseas.

Shift Between Warfighting and Those Other Things.

Although September 11, 2001 changed the focus and intensity, the debate continues today with regards to the priority that should be given to operations conducted during wartime versus those performed during peacetime and contingency. And although we cannot predict the future, one thing is certain – for the foreseeable future, U.S. military forces will be called more and more frequently to perform a wide variety of operations in a range of environments. And even though many of these will fall short of what normally is considered full-scale combat, they will be just as deadly and have extremely high stakes. Consequently, the military must be prepared to perform them.



Marine from 2nd CEB probes for mines in a Kosovo school yard.

This preparation must include having a flexible organizational structure with access to the right numbers and kinds of people possessing the necessary skills and expertise. It must include realistic training to familiarize the forces with the challenges they will face in order to test their actions and reactions, refine their tactics, techniques,

and procedures, and build their confidence and teamwork. This preparation also must include language and cultural training. While many native, fluent speakers will be needed, virtually every individual service member should learn basic words and phrases in order to communicate with and show respect for the local people.

Preparation must emphasize that during peacetime and contingencies, operations may switch back and forth to offensive operations. This will require individuals to be able to discern and react quickly, almost intuitively, to even the slightest changes in the environment and the situation. This capability is predicated upon well-led, disciplined, and mentally agile warriors who are imbued with an expeditionary mindset and the ability to handle complex and ambiguous situations. The training and education program needed to foster this mental agility has to be established and maintained.

Finally, preparation must include detailed planning, coordination, and integration among the military, diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of power, with international, private, and non-governmental organizations, as well as local governments and civilians. There will be times when the military can and should be the principal entity involved in an operation. But in many other cases, the interagency and civilian community will be more important than the military, especially with regards to implementing long-term solutions to the complex problems that exist. Unfortunately, many of these organizations are not adequately resourced, such as the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, while others may not accept a greater role due to security concerns or political reasons. This should not be an excuse for the military to do more, but the current reality is that the military probably is the only organization capable of performing the myriad functions necessary to deal with the complex contingencies ever more likely in today's world. As one element in a tapestry of national power assets, the military should not always be the element of choice, especially if we hope to do things right.

Immersion and Cultural Awareness. One key facet of stabilization operations is that our forces will need to be fully immersed in the environment, not sequestered behind walls or patrolling from inside of armored vehicles. They will need to maintain close contact with the people – the civilian population as well as the local government, its bureaucracy, police and the military. This closeness will extend to the other actors in the area of operation as well, from coalition forces, to international and non-governmental organizations, and private contractors.⁸ Immersion in the local environment combined with close contact with the people and improved cultural awareness will greatly enhance intelligence and information operations.

Immersion and close contact will not only provide better situational awareness but also a deeper understanding of the feelings and perceptions of the people. This will also allow the people to see and interact with U.S. forces first hand, to meet them one on one, and to decide for themselves whether to cooperate with or resist, rather than to base their feelings and ultimately their actions on what someone else tells them. A common term

⁸ P.W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003.

used within the U.S. special operations community is that their forces are “U.S. ambassadors in uniform.” This term is applicable equally to all U.S. forces. Military



“No Better Friend” in action at Umm Oasr, Iraq.

men and women serving overseas must recognize this special, additional role that they perform, and strive to create the best, most positive impression possible with the people. An excellent example of how to effectively apply this philosophy comes from the 2003 war in Iraq where the commander of the 1st Marine Division coined the phrase “no better friend, no worse enemy” to describe his Marines to the Iraqi people. Not only did he set the bar high for his Marines in terms of their interaction with the people, but he let Iraqis know in no uncertain terms that resistance would not be tolerated and would be dealt with firmly, fairly, and swiftly. This same philosophy permeated the Division’s return to Iraq in 2004.

Much of the information and intelligence U.S. forces need in order to perform missions during any situation or environment, focuses on the human dimension – what the people are thinking and feeling, what they believe and why, and all the tangible and intangible things that influence what they are going to do. For the most part, this can be obtained only by personal, face-to-face contact and interaction with the people. Once obtained, it must be swiftly analyzed, with linkages developed showing relationships among various individuals and groups, and then disseminated quickly to the right echelons in order to optimize near real-time operations. As evidenced by the capture of Saddam Hussein and other senior Ba’athist regime officials, tactical operations will be influenced more by knowledge acquired from the continuous interaction with the local population – basic cultural and human intelligence – than may be garnered from modern technologies.

Not only will the Services, particularly the Marine Corps and the Army, need the agility to tailor their force structures to enable them to better perform missions during peacetime and contingencies, but they also will need to increase cultural understanding, regional familiarization, and language proficiency dramatically in their officer and noncommissioned officer corps. There will be an increasing need for more military police, civil affairs, and psychological operations forces. Commanders should encourage more officers and noncommissioned officers to obtain advanced degrees in diverse fields such as anthropology, political science, international studies, and foreign languages, and to spend time living, traveling, and studying abroad.

To build organic capabilities, the Services could tailor recruiting to seek personnel with needed cultural understanding, local familiarity, and language skills. Personnel exchanges among the Services and with other U.S. departments and agencies, coalition partners, and international and non-governmental organizations, and others could be expanded to generate greater expertise and understanding. Additionally, individuals with these types of expertise and experiences from the academic, humanitarian relief, or

expatriate communities could be contracted to participate in military training and serve during deployments.

In order to maintain momentum and achieve decisive results, U.S. forces also need the ability to integrate cultural intelligence and knowledge with the appropriate application of fires and maneuver. Procedures will need to be developed in order to apply the right capability at the right time and place. Many tactics, techniques, and procedures from classic offensive military operations will have direct application, while others will require selective adaptation and modified application.

Combined Action Program in Vietnam. One of the most unique and effective programs for dealing with the civilian population during the Vietnam War was the Combined Action Program. This program combined a U.S. Marine infantry squad with a Vietnamese Popular Forces platoon. The Marines and their Vietnamese counterparts lived and worked together in local villages and hamlets. The Vietnamese forces brought their language capabilities, knowledge of the local area, culture, and the people to the team, while the Marines brought the military expertise and access to supporting arms and other support.⁹



U.S. Marine, Free Iraqi Force member, and town's people discuss water plant restoration at Qalat Sikar, Iraq.

Combined Action Program units successfully established 24/7 control over areas that for years had been under only marginal Vietnamese government sway, in daylight hours at best. They coordinated humanitarian relief efforts, patrolled, and set ambushes, severely limiting the Viet Cong's ability to move freely among and influence the people. The Marines and their South Vietnamese counterparts established a rapport with and won the trust and confidence of the people, which made it

easier for them to provide timely information on the activities of and movement of the enemy.

Similar types of units could be used by U.S. forces conducting stabilization operations today and in the future. By teaming U.S. forces with local police and military, we could combine our military expertise with their local knowledge, while concurrently setting the example for them on proper police and military behavior and techniques, as well as ensuring the rights of local population. In the fall of 2001, U.S. Special Forces essentially did the same thing in Afghanistan. By teaming with local warlords and calling in air strikes on Al Qaeda and Taliban forces, they were key to overthrowing the Taliban government. Currently in Iraq, U.S. Marines are conducting patrols and raids with Iraqi police and security forces. The Iraqis' language capabilities combined with

⁹ For more insight into the Combined Action Program, see Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities Quick Look paper, Personal Experiences with the Combined Action Program in Vietnam, 17 March 2004.

their inherent knowledge of the local environment and situation, where they can see, hear and understand things our forces do not, have greatly improved the capability of our forces to perform their missions.

Measuring Success. Ours is an impatient culture, one which expects decisive results delivered in short order. Such impatience works against us during stabilization operations. Rather than decisive military operations employing overwhelming combat power, these types of operations mandate the patient pursuit of goals and well-defined metrics that highlight progress. The measure of success will be progress toward the aim points rather than pre-identified withdrawal dates or rigid end-states.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Marine Corps Task Force Tawara developed the simple but informative assessment chart at Figure 4 to measure the status of various public services by location. Although just a snapshot in time, it is precisely the type of tool that can be used not only to visualize things that are important to the mission and to measure trends over time, but also to assist commanders in allocating resources. This assessment tool reinforces the need to mentally transition from traditional warfighting to stabilization operations, where the measures of effectiveness can be substantially different.

Assessments




Figure 4

The Cold War, post-Vietnam days when American forces spent the majority of their time training at home bases and focused on fighting the Soviet Union in Europe and holding the line in Korea are long gone. Today, success in securing our homeland and winning the global war on terrorism will be based to a large extent on our success in performing a wide variety of missions in many faraway places and over protracted periods of time. Success in these missions may be measured in small, incremental changes that improve the standard of living and overall quality of life throughout a

country or region. The Brookings Institution has published and regularly updates a document titled the *Iraq Index Tracking Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq*.¹⁰ It provides information on various criteria for monitoring progress or setbacks in Iraq, including crime, telephone, water service, troop fatalities, unemployment, Iraqi security forces, oil production, and coalition troop strength. It has some good examples of criteria that could be helpful in the future to measure success in nation-building efforts.

Shifting Missions in Iraq. In the spring of 2003, as U.S. and coalition forces rolled into Iraq, they became responsible for providing security and governance, as well as insuring the people had access to necessities like food, water and medicine in the areas they controlled. By the time President Bush declared that major combat operations had ended, the U.S. military already had transitioned to the post-conflict, stabilization operations phase throughout most of the country.¹¹ But in preparing for the Iraqi campaign, the military had been focused on the war-fight and was not as well prepared for what followed.

In the immediate aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war, critics attributed the difficulties the U.S. experienced following the shock and awe phase of the campaign to having the wrong reasons for fighting the war in the first place, poor intelligence, and ineffective planning. In the planning arena, there is no question that planning for the combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom was more than adequate. Although it did not anticipate everything that occurred during the war, such as the ferocity of attacks by the Fedayeen Saddam and the swift influx of foreign Islamic jihadists, the plan as it was executed clearly demonstrated America's unparalleled ability to deploy forces swiftly into a distant location, react to a changing situation, and defeat an enemy while causing minimal casualties and with limited damage to the civilian infrastructure. Just prior to the start of the war, military strategists wargamed the fight for Baghdad and predicted much of what happened during the war. They did not, however, wargame the aftermath of the war and did not predict the scale of the looting, the systematic sabotage of the infrastructure, or the resistance to coalition forces.

The criticism that planning for the post-conflict phase in Iraq was inadequate, is at least partially true. From all indications, there was a considerable amount of planning conducted by numerous parties for a post-Saddam Iraq. Most notably, the Defense Department's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs focused much of its pre-war planning on potential problems that never materialized during or after the war, such as oil production facility fires intentionally set by Iraqis, refugees and displaced persons fleeing the war, hunger and starvation due to a halt in the delivery of food as part of the food for oil program, flooding of the Euphrates river valley, and numerous

¹⁰ The Brookings Institution, *Iraq Index Tracking Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq*, <http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex>, updated Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.

¹¹ For a brief discussion of 1st Marine Division Operations during the transition phase, see the article by Brigadier General John F. Kelly, "Tikrit, South to Babylon," *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 2004, pp. 17-18.

casualties as a result of Saddam's use of chemical and biological weapons on his own people and coalition forces.

It does not appear, however, that there was sufficient planning or training for the military to perform the wide range of complex, post-conflict functions it was required to conduct. This included such things as obtaining and distributing food, water, and medicine; setting-up governments, vetting former Ba'athist officials and administrators, holding elections, and serving as mayors and governors; repairing and administering civilian infrastructure facilities such as water, power, postal, and broadcast; contracting for workers and services; establishing police and security forces; and paying former soldiers. Although U.S. and coalition forces were able to adapt to their newfound requirements, and for the most part, perform them efficiently, with minimal guidance or assistance from outside of their immediate military chain of command, initially they did not do so with the same precision, confidence, and effectiveness as they demonstrated in the warfighting phase. Lack of planning and training was a primary contributing factor. So was the persistent belief in the primacy of warfighting over other capabilities.

Perhaps the major shortcoming in military planning and execution was the failure to plan for the immediate assumption of responsibility for essential governance and security, particularly as urban areas and rural population centers were liberated from Saddam's regime. Focused as it was on defeating Iraqi military and paramilitary forces, the U.S. military and its allies moved rapidly and with singular purpose to seize Baghdad and topple Saddam's government.

Clausewitz would have applauded this approach and its focus on the enemy, except that this narrow vision failed to address the larger implications of "winning the peace." When an operation is conducted with the avowed objective of replacing the extant governing regime, it implies an immediate inherent responsibility for maintaining good order and discipline in the country, as well as responsibility for providing all of the normal functions of government.

This responsibility does not begin once the "war" has ended, and victory has been declared, but rather commences as forces uncover or liberate each town, village or city; it is a concurrent function of the overall warfighting effort. Forces must be identified and trained to assume immediate policing activities in areas brought under our control, while others must assume responsibility for essential government services such as governance, fire-fighting, food distribution, water production, etc.



Before the war ends, the battle to win the peace begins.

One of the key elements in this effort is the establishment of security over areas brought under our control. This will serve two immediate and essential requirements. First, it will send a strong message to the local population as to our strength, dominance, and determination. Second, by quickly and decisively establishing control, we will be able to begin the task of building the local human and cultural intelligence network. U.S.

forces working alone or in tandem with coalition and local military and police forces, patrolling the streets of newly liberated areas, will send a strong message to the local population that we are in charge, that we can be trusted, and that we will deal fairly, firmly, and swiftly with any individuals or groups who attempt to disrupt the peace.

Conclusion. It has been a little over a decade since the Berlin Wall was torn down and the Soviet threat collapsed. It is no surprise that the military as an institution still tends to focus on warfighting as its reason for being, that fighting and winning our nation's wars is something with a much higher intrinsic value, something distinctly separate from those other things it is required to do during peacetime and contingencies.

From the end of the Cold war up until September 11th, especially after the losses the U.S. suffered in Mogadishu, the military tended to resist deploying forces to places that needed help for reasons short of war. When ordered, it developed limited and very narrow mission parameters and clear exit strategies. It also developed effective pre-deployment training programs and rotation schedules for its active component combat forces, while relying to a certain extent on reservists for combat service support, civil affairs and psychological operations, as well as on specialized technicians from private corporations, and various non-governmental organizations to perform many required functions.

September 11th abruptly changed the military's paradigm for engagement and thrust transformational efforts to the fore. Since then, the U.S. military, active, Guard, and reserve, has found itself stretched thin and not optimally organized, trained or equipped to perform many of the types of missions it is performing today in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the global war on terrorism. Further complicating this situation is the reality that there is no other organization available to perform the missions it is performing, the ones that straddle the line between peace and war, that increasingly confront our nation around the globe.

Correcting this situation will take some changes in our military culture and focus. We must recognize that it is in our national security interest to perform stabilization operations as an integral part of military operations. To accomplish this mission we will need additional capabilities, training, equipment, and military occupational specialties. We must become as efficient and effective in performing stabilization operations as we are in warfighting.

Implementing these changes will require time; something the military seldom has enough of, given its size, current and projected operational tempo, and the threats facing the nation. Although much change already is underway, the real challenge facing the military will be not only to implement innovation and change without wasting resources, but also to continue to evolve and adapt well in advance of future challenges and threats.